Credible Information Sharing in Supply Chains - A Behavioral Assessment of Review Strategies Neumann, Thomas Schosser, Stephan Vogt, Bodo Voigt, Guido 2019-01-02T23:53:48Z 2019-01-02T23:53:48Z 2019-01-08
dc.description.abstract In laboratory experiments, we compare the ability of trigger strategies with that of (relatively complex) review strategies to coordinate capacity decisions in supply chains when demand forecasts are based on private information. While trigger strategies punish apparently uncooperative behavior (misstated demand forecasts) immediately, review strategies only punish when apparently misstated information culminates over several periods. We contribute to the existing literature on capacity coordination in supply chains by showing that repeated game strategies lead to a significant degree of forecast misrepresentation, although they theoretically support the truth-telling equilibrium. However, forecast misrepresentation is more pronounced in review strategies. This behavioral effect is diametrically opposed to the theoretically predicted benefit of review strategies.
dc.format.extent 10 pages
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2019.185
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-2-6
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subject Intelligent Decision Support and Big Data for Logistics and Supply Chain Management
dc.subject Decision Analytics, Mobile Services, and Service Science
dc.subject Repeated Game Strategies, Capacity Game, Behavioral Operations Management
dc.title Credible Information Sharing in Supply Chains - A Behavioral Assessment of Review Strategies
dc.type Conference Paper
dc.type.dcmi Text
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