Credible Information Sharing in Supply Chains - A Behavioral Assessment of Review Strategies

Date

2019-01-08

Contributor

Advisor

Department

Instructor

Depositor

Speaker

Researcher

Consultant

Interviewer

Narrator

Transcriber

Annotator

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Volume

Number/Issue

Starting Page

Ending Page

Alternative Title

Abstract

In laboratory experiments, we compare the ability of trigger strategies with that of (relatively complex) review strategies to coordinate capacity decisions in supply chains when demand forecasts are based on private information. While trigger strategies punish apparently uncooperative behavior (misstated demand forecasts) immediately, review strategies only punish when apparently misstated information culminates over several periods. We contribute to the existing literature on capacity coordination in supply chains by showing that repeated game strategies lead to a significant degree of forecast misrepresentation, although they theoretically support the truth-telling equilibrium. However, forecast misrepresentation is more pronounced in review strategies. This behavioral effect is diametrically opposed to the theoretically predicted benefit of review strategies.

Description

Keywords

Intelligent Decision Support and Big Data for Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Decision Analytics, Mobile Services, and Service Science, Repeated Game Strategies, Capacity Game, Behavioral Operations Management

Citation

Extent

10 pages

Format

Geographic Location

Time Period

Related To

Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

Related To (URI)

Table of Contents

Rights

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Rights Holder

Local Contexts

Email libraryada-l@lists.hawaii.edu if you need this content in ADA-compliant format.