Supply Chain Security and Mutual Trust Research Minitrack

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In January 2012, President Obama released the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. International trade has been and continues to be a powerful engine of the United States and global economic growth. The many cybersecurity challenges facing the U.S. include one of which many Americans are unaware – the serious threat posed by vulnerabilities in the cyber supply chain. Of the many components – including hardware, firmware, and software – that compose a technological product, most contain elements stemming from a broad global market, making it difficult to ascertain the complete security of an end product. With the market for technological goods and components continuing to rapidly grow every year, and with everything from missiles to smartphones relying on these information products, the need for mutual trust cyber supply chain security has never been more critical.

Enhancing the security of any national interests’ technological supply chain must not destroy the well- functioning international market for technology. Instead of the two extremes of “intrusive government mandates” or “do nothing,” the U.S. government is promoting development of private-sector systems for securing and accrediting technology companies that would allow customers – from the federal government to small businesses – to make more informed and risk- based decisions.

Organizations of all types (business, academia, government, etc.) are facing risks resulting from their ever- increasing reliance on the information infrastructure. Decision and policy makers managing these risks are challenged by a lack of information intelligence concerning the risks and consequences of cyber events (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, HIPAA, and Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACT). They need to understand the implications of cyber security risks and solutions related to their information infrastructure and business. Risk management investment decisions, within the context of mutual trust among supply chains should involve: (i) a comprehensive approach to cyber security risk management, (ii) credible appropriate data needed to support intelligent decisions, and (iii) assessment of the impacts resulting from the various investment alternatives. Sound, rational IT/business decisions require a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of information intelligence and the likely effects of cyber security investment choices.

As our dependence on the cyber infrastructure and their associated supply chains grow ever larger, more complex, and more distributed, the systems that compose them become more prone to failures and/or exploitation. Trusted Supply Chains values currency and relevance over detail and accuracy. Information explosion describes the pervasive abundance of (public/private) information and the effects of such. Gathering, analyzing, and making use of information constitutes a business- / sociopolitical- / military-intelligence gathering activity and ultimately poses significant advantages and liabilities to the survivability of "our" society. The combination of increased vulnerability, increased stakes and increased threats make supply chains and their associated processes one of the most important emerging challenges in the evolution of modern cyberspace "mechanization." The goal of this minitrack is to challenge, establish and debate a far-reaching agenda that broadly and comprehensively outlines a strategy for mutual trust, cyber security, efficiency, and resilience of our vital global supply chain infrastructure research that is founded on sound principles and technologies.

Minitrack topics include, but are not limited to:

  • Promote the secure and efficient movement of goods by o resolving threats early, improving verification and detection capabilities, and enhancing security of infrastructure and conveyances in order to protect the supply chain, and maximizing the flow of legitimate trade.
  • Foster a resilient supply chain by mitigating systemic vulnerability of supply chains and promoting trade resumption policies and practices.
  • How can stakeholders provide assurance that my product is safe without revealing intellectual property (e.g., source code)?
  • Is there a formal certification process and authority that can certify certain security properties exist in the product?
  • What would constitute a trusted third party (TTP) certification body (e.g., charter, COI, goals, membership, participants, industry)?
  • What would be the focus and benefits of the TTP (incentives, methods, technologies) and key outcomes (especially sponsors)?
  • How would the TTP get industry buy-in and be distinguished from other (e.g., TCB, OWASP, etc.) existing bodies?
  • Better precision in understanding existing and emerging vulnerabilities and threats.
  • Advances in insider threat detection, deterrence, mitigation and elimination.
  • Assuring security, survivability and dependability of our critical infrastructures.
  • Assuring the availability of time-critical scalable secure systems, information provenance and security with privacy.
  • Observable/ measurable/ certifiable security claims, rather than hypothesized causes.
  • Methods that enable us to specify security requirements, formulate security claims, and certify security properties.
  • Assurance against known and unknown (though perhaps pre-modeled) threats.
  • Mission fulfillment, whether or not security violations have taken place (rather than chasing all violations indiscriminately).

Minitrack Co-Chairs:

Frederick T. Sheldon (Primary Contact)
University of Idaho

Robert K. Abercrombie
University of Memphis

Xiaohui Cui
Wuhan University


Recent Submissions

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
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    Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring
    ( 2017-01-04) Hernández Jiménez, Jarilyn ; Chen, Qian ; Nichols, Jeffrey ; Calhoun, Chelsea ; Sykes, Summer
    Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are industrial automation systems that remotely monitor and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. We describe recent SCADA attacks that have caused serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. SCADA systems are often not monitored to the same level as business computer systems. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. To address this challenge we did a feasibility study to prove that monitoring power consumption of SCADA devices is an effective approach to detect cyber-attacks. We built a testbed containing a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) that was instrumented to record its power usage.Three SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and we report the power consumption of the PLC under these normal and anomalous scenarios. We show that it is possible to distinguish the PLC power utilization between these scenarios.
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    Reverse Engineering Integrated Circuits Using Finite State Machine Analysis
    ( 2017-01-04) Smith, Jessica ; Oler, Kiri ; Miller, Carl ; Manz, David
    Due to the lack of a secure supply chain, it is not possible \ to fully trust the integrity of electronic devices. Current \ methods of verifying integrated circuits are either destructive \ or non-specific. Here we expand upon prior work, in \ which we proposed a novel method of reverse engineering \ the finite state machines that integrated circuits are built \ upon in a non-destructive and highly specific manner. In \ this paper, we present a methodology for reverse engineering \ integrated circuits, including a mathematical verification of \ a scalable algorithm used to generate minimal finite state \ machine representations of integrated circuits.
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    DANE Trusted Email for Supply Chain Management
    ( 2017-01-04) Gersch, Joseph ; Massey, Dan ; Rose, Scott
    Supply chain management is critically dependent on trusted email mechanisms that address forgery, confidentiality, and sender authenticity. The IETF protocol ‘Domain Authentication of Named Entities’ (DANE) described in this paper has been extended from its initial goal of providing TLS web site validation to also offer a foundation for globally scalable and interoperable email security. Widespread deployment of DANE will require more than raw technology standards, however. Workflow automation mechanisms will need to emerge in order to simplify the publishing and retrieval of cryptographic credentials that are applicable for general audiences. Security policy enforcement will also need to be addressed. This paper gives a descriptive tutorial of trusted email technologies, shows how DANE solves key distribution logistics, and then suggests desirable automation components that could accelerate deployment of DANE-based trusted email. Pilot deployments are briefly described.
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    A Structured Analysis of SQL Injection Runtime Mitigation Techniques
    ( 2017-01-04) Steiner, Stu ; Conte de Leon, Daniel ; Alves-Foss, Jim
    SQL injection attacks (SQLIA) still remain one of the most commonly occurring and exploited vulnerabilities. A considerable amount of research concerning SQLIA mitigation techniques has been conducted with the primary resulting solution requiring developers to code defensively. Although, defensive coding is a valid solution, the current market demand for websites is being filled by inexperienced developers with little knowledge of secure development practices. Unlike the successful case of ASLR, no SQLIA runtime mitigation technique has moved from research to enterprise use. This paper presents an in-depth analysis and classification, based on Formal Concept Analysis, of the 10 major SQLIA runtime mitigation techniques. Based on this analysis, one technique was identified that shows the greatest potential for transition to enterprise use. This analysis also serves as an enhanced SQLIA mitigation classification system. Future work includes plans to move the selected SQLIA runtime mitigation technique closer to enterprise use.
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    Introduction to Supply Chain Security and Mutual Trust Research Minitrack
    ( 2017-01-04) Sheldon, Frederick ; Abercrombie, Robert ; Cui, Xiaohui