Moral Hazards and Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets
dc.contributor.author | Liang, Chen | |
dc.contributor.author | Hong, Yili | |
dc.contributor.author | Gu, Bin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-29T00:07:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-12-29T00:07:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-01-04 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates how IT-enabled monitoring systems mitigate moral hazard in an online labor market and their effect on market competition. We exploit a quasi-experiment at Freelancer when it introduced an IT-enabled monitoring system in 2015. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to identify the treatment effect of the monitoring system on employer contractor choice, market competition, and employer surplus. We found that the IT-enabled monitoring system lowers the employers’ willingness to pay the reputation premiums. Meanwhile, comparing the trend of the control group, the IT-enabled monitoring system raised the employer surplus in hourly projects and increased the number of bids. Our result suggests that IT-enabled monitoring systems have a significant effect on alleviating moral hazards, reducing agency costs, and facilitating market competition. | |
dc.format.extent | 10 pages | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.24251/HICSS.2017.006 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-0-9981331-0-2 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41156 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | moral hazard | |
dc.subject | monitoring systems | |
dc.subject | online labor market | |
dc.subject | reputation systems | |
dc.subject | contract type | |
dc.title | Moral Hazards and Effects of IT-enabled Monitoring Systems in Online Labor Markets | |
dc.type | Conference Paper | |
dc.type.dcmi | Text |
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