LABOR UNION AND LINGUISTIC ATTRIBUTES IN FIRM DISCLOSURE

Abstract

Little research examines managers’ language itself in the presence of labor unions, especially using a rich communication channel such as earnings conference calls. By disentangling the two latent components of linguistic complexity (i.e. information and obfuscation) using conference call transcripts, I find that firms with stronger labor unions tend to disclose less information and, surprisingly, employ less obfuscation. However, the negative relation between obfuscation and union strength is driven by the loss firms subsample, indicating that the strategic obfuscation of negative news is less likely for firms with a powerful labor union in order to be forthcoming about negative information to gain bargaining power. Furthermore, I document that unionized firms tend to provide more non-factual language to add noise to disclosure, reveal less forward-looking information, and use more negative words in their narratives. This study provides a comprehensive view on the nuanced linguistic styles and contents via which firms react to labor unions.