Counterbalancing the Asymmetric Information Paradigm on High-Value Low-Frequency Transactions Hoksbergen, Mark Chan, Johnny Peko, Gabrielle Sundaram, David 2020-01-04T08:09:04Z 2020-01-04T08:09:04Z 2020-01-07
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on the purchase of high-value infrequently traded assets. If a high-value asset is infrequently traded in a market its valuation becomes less predictable and more tension can exist between the vendor and the purchaser. Often the vendor possesses more knowledge of the asset, which leads to an asymmetric information paradigm between the two parties, nurturing a dark side of information and knowledge management. Using the New Zealand real estate industry as the context of a design science research study, a purchase decision process model for high-value infrequently traded assets has been developed. It aims to support the novice real estate purchaser to realise the potential pitfalls they should avoid. The study also calls for a unified system with codifiable, explicit information that can be used by all stakeholders in high-value infrequently transactions. Thus reducing the asymmetric information imbalance between vendor and purchaser.
dc.format.extent 8 pages
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2020.576
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-3-3
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subject Illuminating the Dark Side of Knowledge
dc.subject asymmetric information
dc.subject communication models
dc.subject explicit knowledge
dc.subject high value low frequency transactions
dc.subject tacit knowledge
dc.title Counterbalancing the Asymmetric Information Paradigm on High-Value Low-Frequency Transactions
dc.type Conference Paper
dc.type.dcmi Text
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