Which Reward Should I Choose? Preliminary Evidence for the Middle-Option Bias in Reward-Based Crowdfunding

dc.contributor.author Simons, Alexander
dc.contributor.author Weinmann, Markus
dc.contributor.author Tietz, Matthias
dc.contributor.author vom Brocke, Jan
dc.date.accessioned 2016-12-29T01:38:36Z
dc.date.available 2016-12-29T01:38:36Z
dc.date.issued 2017-01-04
dc.description.abstract Crowdfunding has become an important research area, but we know little about how rewards influence fundraising success. This research-in-progress studies reward-based crowdfunding through a behavioral-economics lens. We draw on dual-process theory and provide preliminary evidence for the middle-option bias in crowdfunding. Two empirical studies in a simple, controlled environment confirm the significance of the middle-option bias, both for varying numbers of donation options and for varying price ranges. Since our findings suggest that the positioning of rewards in a menu of rewards can influence support behavior and how much money project creators collect, they can inform the design of crowdfunding projects. Our future research will develop a mock crowdfunding website to study the middle-option bias in a more realistic environment.
dc.format.extent 10 pages
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2017.526
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-0-2
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41687
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject Crowdfunding
dc.subject Dual-process theory
dc.subject Middle-option bias
dc.subject Rewards
dc.title Which Reward Should I Choose? Preliminary Evidence for the Middle-Option Bias in Reward-Based Crowdfunding
dc.type Conference Paper
dc.type.dcmi Text
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