Optimal Subsidy and Tax Policies for Green Product with Consumer Environmental Awareness

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Linghong
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jie
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-29T01:54:24Z
dc.date.available2016-12-29T01:54:24Z
dc.date.issued2017-01-04
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the government’s optimal subsidy and tax policies in response to consumer environmental awareness (CEA) and the manufacturers’ product selection (generic, green or both) plus quality and pricing decisions. We derive the equilibria under different policy combinations and derived the analytical and numerical solutions. We find that (1) subsidizing and taxing consumers is more social beneficial when the potential market share of green products is small and environmental technology is high; (2) subsidizing green-product consumers and taxing manufacturers who produce ordinary products can yield higher social welfare; (3) subsidizing and taxing manufacturers may be more social optimal when either CEA or consumer awareness of traditional quality is high.
dc.format.extent10 pages
dc.identifier.doi10.24251/HICSS.2017.618
dc.identifier.isbn978-0-9981331-0-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10125/41780
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectGreen Product
dc.subjectGame Theory
dc.subjectSubsidy Policy
dc.subjectTax Policy
dc.subjectConsumer Environmental Awareness (CEA)
dc.titleOptimal Subsidy and Tax Policies for Green Product with Consumer Environmental Awareness
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.type.dcmiText

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
paper0631.pdf
Size:
348.39 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download

Collections

Integrating Business Operations, Information Technologies, and Consumer Behavior Minitrack