Korea's royal families : presidential politics and the political economy of chaebŏl reform

Abstract

For decades South Korean politicians, pundits, and citizens have criticized the chaebŏl, the massive, family-owned conglomerates who take up a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth and who use their influence to avoid penalties for law-breaking. However, political considerations, as well as the chaebŏl's role in Korea's post-war economic miracle, have caused reform efforts to fizzle once presidential candidates make their way into office. This thesis analyzes scholarly assessments of Korea's presidents, their policies on economy and finance, and the political considerations each faced in dealing with the large business groups. It challenges the claims of these business groups, and their supporters, of the chaebŏl's indispensability by comparing Korea to Taiwan, which enjoyed similar successes by fostering smaller businesses. It concludes by offering policy recommendations to the current presidential administration, which is better-positioned to tackle chaebŏl reform than any administration in decades.