Great Effort, Some Concern. How Making Effort to Acquire Information Influences Managerial Reporting

Abstract

I investigate if managers’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on the effort they expend in acquiring the information they need to report. I develop and test theory positing that expending effort to acquire information can justify opportunistic behavior but also enhances a sense of responsibility discouraging unethical actions. I predict that the dominant effect depends on whether the reporting environment induces sufficient concerns for honesty. In my 2 × 2 experiment, managers are either endowed with information to report or required to expend intellectual effort to earn it. I also manipulate whether concerns about honesty are triggered by framing reporting in terms of profit allocation or an ethical dilemma. I find that when honesty is not triggered, managers report earned information more opportunistically than endowed information. However, when the reporting context triggers honesty concerns, the negative effect of earned information on opportunistic reporting is alleviated. These results have strong implications for theory and practice by showing the conditions under which acquiring information detrimentally affects reporting behavior.