THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF AESTHETICIZED EMOTIONS: WONDER, PATHOS AND COMEDY IN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Abstract

This dissertation sheds light on the virtue conducive role of aestheticized emotions for a theory of knowledge. It brings classical theories of emotion and Kantian reflective aesthetic judgment, on the one hand, and the Sanskrit aesthetic theory of rasa, on the other, into dialogue with contemporary analytic epistemology. In order to account for a ‘reflective-judgment’ in the aesthetic experience of emotion, our vocabulary must be expanded to include impersonal, and subjectively universal / communicable emotions, and we must theorize these “distanced emotions” realistically in terms of aesthetic judgments, rather than logical, moral, and private judgments. Reflectively contemplating, and recognizing rasa-s, refines an epistemic agent into a conscientious, truth-oriented, and more egoless questioner of the world. One of the most expansive text traditions in this philosophy of aestheticized emotions is the Sanskrit aesthetics of rasa, whose authors date from 200BCE to 1000CE. Connoisseur “rasikas” theorize at least eight possible aesthetically relishable emotion-tastes. This dissertation hybridizes Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, and rasa theory to form an ‘emotion-centric account’ of “reflective judgment.” Several points of contact between our two aesthetic theories demonstrate that the affectively reflective epistemic agent is poised to inquire well, but not for the sake of some further end. Mutual harmony between the faculties of ‘imagination and understanding’ leads to communicable judgments of apt tastes. By analyzing three instances of “aestheticized emotions,” this dissertation shows how the cognitive faculties of ‘imagination and understanding’ are critically engaged with intellectual virtues in rasa. The rasa experience is arguably a normative, yet transpersonal and aesthetically moving moment. Specific intellectual virtues of “aestheticized” wonder, pathos and comic sentiments emerge that are theoretically contrasted with the ordinary emotions of “wonder,” “compassion,” and “derisive humor.” Rasas are characteristically linked to traits--lingering, insight, and humbling critique--that guide the process of inquiry, where epistemic value is not confined to propositional knowledge. Virtuosity extends into acquiring an intellectual character conducive to: ‘wisdom,’ ‘insight,’ and ‘self-critique,’ which is crucially important for epistemology.