Political Information Flow and Management Guidance

dc.contributor.author Wellman, Laura
dc.contributor.author Christensen, Dane
dc.contributor.author Morris, Arthur
dc.contributor.author Walther, Beverly
dc.date.accessioned 2019-12-06T18:33:51Z
dc.date.available 2019-12-06T18:33:51Z
dc.date.issued 2019-08-28
dc.description.abstract We examine whether politically active firms play a role in disseminating political information via their management guidance. Using campaign financing activity or the presence of a government affairs office to proxy for firms’ access to political information, we find that politically active firms are more likely to issue management guidance overall, and especially when the government is a customer of the firm. Further, relative to politically inactive firms, the guidance released by politically active firms is more likely to discuss government policies. In addition to using numerous econometric techniques to address self-selection, we examine the timing of when guidance is issued. We find that politically active firms are more likely to issue guidance and change their government policy-related disclosures prior to the public revelation of government policy decisions. Collectively, these findings suggest that the privileged information firms obtain through their political activities is shared with investors through voluntary disclosures.
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10125/64853
dc.subject Political connection
dc.subject Information flow
dc.subject Management forecasts
dc.subject Corporate disclosure
dc.title Political Information Flow and Management Guidance
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