Uninvolved: Effects of Misstatement-Independent Auditor Oversight

Abstract

Researchers in prior studies assume the current auditor is responsible for misstated financials or attempt to perform filtering to assign responsibility. However, for a minimally filtered sample of restatements within Audit Analytics, 20 percent of the restatements annually correspond to cases where the auditor engaged at the time of a restatement announcement was not engaged during the misstatement period. I refer to these observations as uninvolved. Using a similar model from prior literature, I find that companies with involved audit firms are negatively associated with the abnormal return around the restatement announcement. Following the restatement announcement, companies with uninvolved audit firms have a lower likelihood of experiencing audit turnover, and uninvolved auditor departures are characterized by a positive abnormal market reaction around the departure date. These findings suggest that involvement is an informative dimension to the market and is associated with different audit outcomes.