Audit market concentration and audit fees: an international investigation

Abstract

Several large auditor consolidations in the late 1980s-early 1990s, along with Arthur Andersen’s collapse in 2001, facilitated global audit market concentration. Subsequently, regulators have expressed serious concern over the potential detrimental effects of this concentration, including cartel pricing. This study investigates the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. Using a large sample from 17 countries, our study yields three principal findings. First, consistent with regulators’ concern, a significantly positive association exists between market concentration and fees. Second, the country-level legal regime changes this association dramatically: while significant and positive in countries with a weak legal regime, the association weakens and eventually becomes negative as the legal regime strengthens. Third, these associations are more pronounced among clients of non-Big 4 auditors than those of Big 4 auditors. These findings provide regulators and other stakeholders with important insights into the effects of audit market structure on audit pricing.