The Phoenix Program: the Viet Cong, the CIA, and the Paradox of Success

Abstract

The Phoenix Program remains one of the more controversial and understudied aspects of the American involvement in Vietnam and CIA operations generally. As a program constructed to fight the Viet Cong, the CIA used an innovative approach which will be analyzed through a different perspective. Namely, it will be argued that the Viet Cong was primarily a political machine, with the function of establishing political control through acts of violence rather than the traditional guerilla role often given to it. The paradox of the Vietnam War, namely the political effectiveness of the Viet Cong and the weakening of its control through military operations, will be contrasted with the military success of the Phoenix Program through political and information-based means. Primary sources, from Communist Vietnamese and former CIA operatives, as well as secondary historical and think tank reports will be used to establish and reinforce the primary argument. As numbers are notoriously hard to come by in terms of accuracy, a broad analysis of changing tactics, particularly the Tet Offensive in 1968, will be used to establish the effect of the Phoenix Program on the operations and command structure of the Viet Cong. Finally, this paper will explain how the Viet Cong, after 1970, ceased to be either a guerilla organization or a serious threat to South Vietnam.