Effects of Transparent Performance Data on Employee Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Abstract

There is a growing trend of continuously tracking performance metrics and providing them to employees via digital means without supervisor intermediation. Using a field experiment at a service organization, we examine how employees respond to transparent performance data previously available only to supervisors (i.e., daily performance metrics of employees in the same work group). We find that, compared with the pre-intervention mean value, the treatment group experienced an 11-percent decrease in strictly nonproductive time relative to the control group. The effect on reducing strictly nonproductive time seems greater than that on increasing strictly productive time. Performance improvements are greater in certain employee subsamples: those who previously perceived their supervisors as less-supportive, those with low intrinsic motivation, and those with high extrinsic motivation. We find inconclusive evidence on the moderating effects of social comparison orientation, suggesting that the main effect is unlikely to be driven by access to relative performance information.