A Case for the 'Fractal Self': The Scope of Moral Consideration as Influenced by Personal Identity

Abstract

This dissertation begins with an exploration of why various occurrences of cruelty arise and then assess their moral importance. I shall argue that such cruel acts show the psychological basis for all immoral acts. That inquiry shall lead to an examination of the notion of Moral Consideration; the determination of who or what is considered by the agent when determining the consequences of one's actions and how far such consideration extends. From there, it will then look at the case of moral exemplars, and what can be learned from their views about themselves, including the notions of moral considerability that they use. This shall be followed by a detailed outline of the thoughts that allowed a particular exemplar – M. K. Gandhi – to act as he did. Given the implications Gandhi's views have, this dissertation will then turn to examine theories which do discount the individual self; specifically the works of Derek Parfit and Buddhist Ethics. Finally, I will argue that in order to take the most ethically effective actions, one must consider the different notions of self, not to determine the 'best choice' among these notions, but to take as many as possible into account simultaneously in order to determine the most ethical action.