Why Don't Analysts Always Value Earnings Conference Calls?

dc.contributor.author Basu, Sudipta
dc.contributor.author Xiang, Zhongnan
dc.date.accessioned 2020-12-01T00:52:36Z
dc.date.available 2020-12-01T00:52:36Z
dc.date.issued 2020-08-15
dc.description.abstract We compare analyst forecasts before earnings releases, between earnings releases and conference calls, and after conference calls, and unexpectedly find that the forecasts do not become more accurate or less dispersed around conference calls. We propose and show that analysts ignore potential information in conference calls if they got prior access to private information. Analyst forecasts between earnings releases and conference calls are associated with less market movement during conference calls. Our results suggest that some analysts have superior information access before a few open conference calls. We show that public disclosure is sometimes preempted by private information channels and implicitly question the effectiveness of disclosure regulation.
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10125/70519
dc.subject Private Information
dc.subject Analyst Forecast Timing
dc.subject Disclosure Regulation
dc.subject Conference Calls
dc.title Why Don't Analysts Always Value Earnings Conference Calls?
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