Core and no-treat equilibrium in tournament games with externalities
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2010
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University of Hawaii at Manoa
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We consider a situation where coalitions are formed to divide a resource. As in real life, the value of a payoff to a given agent is allowed to depend on the payoff to other agents with whom he shares a common interest. There are various notions of equilibrium for this type of game, including the core and no-treat equilibrium. These stabilities may exist or not, depending on the power structure and the rule for allocating the resource. It is shown that under certain conditions, the no-treat equilibrium can exist even though the core is empty.
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Plan B paper, M.A., Mathematics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2010
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18 pages
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