Nonlinear Pricing of Shareable Products

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dc.contributor.authorWeber, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-04T08:26:03Z
dc.date.available2020-01-04T08:26:03Z
dc.date.issued2020-01-07
dc.description.abstractWe consider a durable-goods monopolist who is able to control the collaborative consumption of its goods on an aftermarket by a sharing tariff. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their respective need propensities in each period. We show that the firm may be able to extract this private information by offering a nonlinear pricing scheme, which amounts to a menu of options that distinguish themselves by different combinations of retail price and sharing tariff, whereby the latter is charged to owners at the point of sharing their item with a nonowner on the sharing market. The solution, which is obtained using optimal control theory, critically depends on the product's durability.
dc.format.extent10 pages
dc.identifier.doi10.24251/HICSS.2020.737
dc.identifier.isbn978-0-9981331-3-3
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10125/64479
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectStrategy, Information, Technology, Economics and Society (SITES)
dc.subjectcollaborative consumption
dc.subjectnonlinear pricing
dc.subjectscreening
dc.subjectsharing economy
dc.titleNonlinear Pricing of Shareable Products
dc.typeConference Paper
dc.type.dcmiText

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