Nonlinear Pricing of Shareable Products Weber, Thomas 2020-01-04T08:26:03Z 2020-01-04T08:26:03Z 2020-01-07
dc.description.abstract We consider a durable-goods monopolist who is able to control the collaborative consumption of its goods on an aftermarket by a sharing tariff. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their respective need propensities in each period. We show that the firm may be able to extract this private information by offering a nonlinear pricing scheme, which amounts to a menu of options that distinguish themselves by different combinations of retail price and sharing tariff, whereby the latter is charged to owners at the point of sharing their item with a nonowner on the sharing market. The solution, which is obtained using optimal control theory, critically depends on the product's durability.
dc.format.extent 10 pages
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2020.737
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-3-3
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subject Strategy, Information, Technology, Economics and Society (SITES)
dc.subject collaborative consumption
dc.subject nonlinear pricing
dc.subject screening
dc.subject sharing economy
dc.title Nonlinear Pricing of Shareable Products
dc.type Conference Paper
dc.type.dcmi Text
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