Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Common ownership, price informativeness, and corporate investment
|Title:||Common ownership, price informativeness, and corporate investment|
|Authors:||In Ji Jang|
|Date Issued:||26 Aug 2019|
|Abstract:||Using financial institution mergers as exogenous shocks to common ownership, we find that stock prices of commonly held firms incorporate future earnings news more efficiently and are less sensitive to noise traders. We identify two potential mechanisms: (1) information diffusion between connected firms, and (2) active trading by common owners. We find that the investment sensitivity to Tobin’s Q for commonly held firms is higher, indicating that managers of such firms rely more on market prices for information. Our findings suggest that common ownership has a positive effect on information production and influences real corporate decision by improving price informativeness.|
|Appears in Collections:||
12 Financial: Labor Unions/Political Connections/Equity Valuation|
Please email firstname.lastname@example.org if you need this content in ADA-compliant format.
Items in ScholarSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.