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Patient Choice in Acute Care

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Item Summary

Title: Patient Choice in Acute Care
Authors: Cakici, Ozden Engin
Dewan, Rajiv
Freimer, Marshall
Keywords: Decision making by uninformed users
emergency room
Nash Equilibrium
waiting cost
urgent care
Issue Date: 04 Jan 2017
Abstract: Consumer healthcare information plays a critical \ role in informing patients who participate in or make healthcare \ decisions for themselves without direct supervision of a healthcare \ professional. One such example is the choice of facility for \ acute care, prototypically between a fully equipped emergency \ care department (ED) at a hospital and a more convenient \ but less capable urgent care (UC) or retail clinic. We model \ a strategic patient making this decision taking into account the \ limited medical information and convenience factors that affect \ the patient’s decision. This model is then used to inform the \ pricing decision made by the manager of the UC. We show that \ a separating equilibrium, in which all patients self-triaged as noncritical \ choose to go to the UC first, dominates pooling equilibria \ for moderate error rates in self-triage. We analyze the separating \ equilibrium to examine the effect of consumer health information \ (CHI) systems, and show that as the quality of the CHI decreases \ and the error rates go up, the co-pay for an UC decreases, the \ facility is smaller, and makes less profit.
Pages/Duration: 9 pages
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
DOI: 10.24251/HICSS.2017.678
Rights: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Appears in Collections:Strategy, Information, Technology, Economics, and Society (SITES) Minitrack

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