Ho Ph.D., Shuyuan Mary2019-01-032019-01-032019-01-08978-0-9981331-2-6http://hdl.handle.net/10125/59757This study intends to provide a theoretical ground that conceptualizes the prospect of detecting insider threats based on leader-member exchange. This framework specifically corresponds to two propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42]. Team members that are geographically co-located or dispersed are analogized as human sensors in social networks with the ability to collectively “react” to deception, even when the act of deception itself is not obvious to any one member. Close interactive relationships are the key to afford a network of human sensors an opportunity to formulate baseline knowledge of a deceptive insider. The research hypothesizes that groups unknowingly impacted by a deceptive leader are likely to use certain language-action cues when interacting with each other after a leader violates group trust.10 pagesengAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalInside the Insider ThreatsDigital Governmentcomputer-mediated deception, human computer interaction, insider threat, language-action cues, leader member exchangeConference Paper10.24251/HICSS.2019.388