REMAKING THE NATION FROM BELOW: MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS, CROSS-CLASS MOVEMENTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF COMPETING NATIONAL IMAGINARIES IN BRAZIL

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Abstract

With the preparations for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil, the forms of illegality and exceptions to institutional order multiplied, and a growing number of Brazilian citizens therefore began to question the intentions of the authorities and the consequences of these mega-events for ordinary residents. During 2013-2016, consequently, Brazil was inundated with an immense oppositional force, the vociferous social backlash, and the flood of exasperated voices against perceived injustices. Given that hosting mega-sporting events have been conventionally recognized as a powerful tool for social unity by a number of previous studies, these vibrant protests might signal the end of their taken-for-granted role as promoters of nation-building.

This dissertation explores how the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil instead served as a catalyst for social and national dissension. By drawing on archival data, in-depth semi-structured expert interviews and unstructured interviews with 143 ordinary residents in five Brazilian state capitals during field research, I argue that networked cross-class coalitions that were propelled into a mode of constructive opposition decisively spurred the move toward the emergence of new, competing national imaginary—civic nationalism—based on increasingly shared values and norms of democracy, equality, justice and the rights to become full-fledged citizens. This dissertation maintains that the rise of such shared “civic” values among varied groups, as a counter-narrative of conventional Brazilian national identity, destabilized the long-standing narrative of “racial democracy” qua the historically deep-rooted “ethno-cultural” sense of what it means to be a Brazilian.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION

“It doesn’t make sense to be the soccer country if there’s no health and education!”

Media reports of millions of Brazilian citizens taking to the streets to oppose the two global sporting events, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, that were supposed to be held in their country, shocked people around the world. No one would have imagined that Brazilian citizens would protest against the World Cup in Brazil, which is known to the world as the “country of football.” The strikingly satirical message that begins this dissertation became increasingly popular when protesters’ placards were broadcast, as waves of nationwide demonstrations occurred. The message conveyed the overwhelming antipathy of a large portion of Brazilian society to the events. Such an immense oppositional force, the vociferous social backlash, and the flood of exasperated voices against mega-sporting events from 2013 to 2016 were truly atypical in terms of their volume, intensity and continuity as well as their distinct characteristic of cross-class solidarity between Brazil’s lower and middle classes. Given that mega-sporting events have been conventionally recognized as a powerful tool for social unity, these vibrant protests might signal the end of their taken-for-granted role as promoters of nation-building.

Sports, as a phenomenon of popular culture in Brazil, and in particular football, have always been associated with politics and with possible political abuse (DaMatta 1991). With the preparations for the World Cup and the Olympic Games, the forms of illegality and exceptions to institutional order multiplied, and a growing number of Brazilian citizens began to question the intentions of the authorities and the consequences of these “neoliberal” games for ordinary residents. Consequently, Brazil was inundated with a series of large and small
demonstrations between June 2013 and 2016 in several of the host cities. The outpouring of dissent against these events in Brazil was sparked by the Brazilian government’s top-down, undemocratic policies and practices in the event-preparation stages. For instance, public expenditure on infrastructure increased sharply at the expense of social welfare and public services. Various human rights violations were committed, and people were forcibly evicted from slums in the name of urban beautification. People not only reacted with contempt at the corrupt political elites who exploited these mega-events for their private profits, but they also revolted against a wide variety of perceived injustices around these mega-events. Countless intense anti-World Cup movements occurred throughout Brazil in almost every host city between June 2013 and July 2014. According to the Guardian (Jul. 4, 2013), over a million Brazilians joined the anti-World Cup protests in more than 100 cities across the country in early July 2013, and the civil resistance lasted until the beginning of the World Cup and continued throughout. These protests were the most massive nationwide demonstrations in Brazil since the campaign against then President Collor de Melo in 1992 (Zirin 2016). Eventually, the public dissent decisively contributed to the delegitimization of Brazil's hosting of such mega-sporting events. After the World Cup, a number of fierce protests occurred in Rio de Janeiro against the 2016 Olympics as well, and these produced controversies and had significant repercussions on Brazilian society. Several street demonstrations against the Olympic Games broke out in various places in the city of Rio as the Olympic opening ceremony came closer.

Notably, these mega-sporting events failed to act as a unifying force in Brazil; instead, they elicited fierce public backlash and dissension. This statement is congruent with my personal interview with Dr. Carlos Vainer (July 23, 2018), a professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, who firmly contended, “Look at not only the past World Cups
or Olympic Games but also recent ones held in China, South Africa, and Russia. There were no such cases like Brazil, where they eventually failed to build national and social unity.” In other words, a series of experiences during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil evidenced that the Brazilian case clearly contradicted the theoretical expectations of the paramount role of mega-sporting events as promoters of national identity which has been empirically examined by numerous scholars in social sciences (e.g., Cho Han 2004; Creak 2011; Knott et al 2015; Labuschagne 2011; Lee and Cho 2009; Malfas et al 2004; Matheson and Baade 2004; Morphet 1996; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011; Stevens and Bevan 1999).

This dissertation explores how the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil instead served as a catalyst for social and national dissension rather than their conventionally expected role as a means of consolidating Brazilian national identity. I suggest that hosting mega-sporting events does not always promote and enhance national pride and consolidate existing national identities; rather, it can also contribute to change, reshape and reconstruct what it means to be a member of particular national communities. In this context, this study shows that mega-sporting events and related cross-class protests rather brought about the rise and dissemination of civic national identity among Brazilians from the grass-roots level, based on increasingly shared values and norms of democracy, equality, justice and the rights to become full-fledged citizens. In other words, this study explores how a series of urban experiences, such as exploitative policies related to the preparatory stages of the events and the subsequent emergence of protests against them, had an impact on the emergence of civic nationalism. I demonstrate that the rise of this new national imaginary contributed to the

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1 Civic nationhood is a political identity built around “shared citizenship” in a democratic state. A civic nation need not be united by “commonalities of language or culture,” but simply requires “a disposition on the part of citizens to uphold their political institutions,” and to accept the democratic principles where they are based (Stilz 2009: 257). In this form of nationalism, people adhere with conventional liberal values such as equality, tolerance, freedom and civil rights. Details are explained from the p.12.
further rejection of the mythical notion of a racial democracy—an idea imposed by the Brazilian political elites throughout the twentieth century as a means of nation-building. Ultimately, this dissertation maintains that the rise of such shared “civic” values among varied groups, as a counter-narrative of conventional Brazilian national identity, destabilized the nation-building effect centered around the long-standing narrative of miscegenation and racial democracy *qua* the Brazilian national identity in the historically deep-rooted ethnocultural sense of what it means to be a Brazilian. The two mega-sporting events and their neoliberal character rather confirmed and even consolidated the existing socioeconomic and racial order in Brazil.

**Mega-Sporting Events and National Identity: Literature Review**

*Conceptualizing Mega-Sporting Events*

Economically, politically, and culturally mega-sporting events have increasingly become resonant as a sporting festivity. Thus, a growing body of academic literature addressed both the concept and the impact of mega-sporting events on host countries. Ritchie (1984) first coined the term “hallmark events” in the early stages of research pertinent to this topic. These occasions were described as follows:

> Major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal, and profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term. Such events rely for their success on uniqueness, status, or timely significance to create interest and attract (Ritchie 1984: 2).

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2 According to Domingues (2005: 1), racial democracy is a “racial system devoid of any legal or institutional barrier to racial equality, and to some extent a racial system devoid of any manifestation of prejudice or discrimination” (Translation is mine). This “manipulated” ideology was proffered in the 1930s by the celebrated Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and has long characterized how Brazilians believe themselves to be and how they feel that they should be. This myth of racial democracy has been used as a means of nation-building strategy in Brazil throughout the twentieth-century for the purpose of social and political stability; on the other hand, it has also been used to conceal a significant structural racism and discrimination in Brazil and to shut down public discussions on racial disparities and race-based organizing in Brazil.
However, the term “hallmark” was replaced by the affix “mega,” owing to Maurice Roche’s contribution to the field; this term is now widely applied in contemporary scholarly literature. Roche (2000: 1) defines mega-events as “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and international significance.” Malfas et al. (2004) suggest in their study on the impact of the Olympic Games that mega-sporting events may be characterized as occurrences that include specialist, world-level, and international sports competitions attracting extensive attention marked by media coverage—particularly television—and (inter)national sponsorship. Roberts (2004) suggests that particular sporting events become “mega” when they are international, big, and “discontinuous.” Similarly, Müller (2015: 6) conceptualizes a mega event as a “one-time occasion of a fixed duration that attracts a large number of visitors and has worldwide reach.”

Assuming mega-sporting events to be a crucial part of the experience of capitalist modernity, Horne (2007, 2015: 466) maintains that they can be best understood as encompassing two defining features: they exert highly significant “social, political, economic, and ideological consequences” for the host city and nation, and they attract considerable media coverage. In their book entitled *Key Concepts in Sport Management*, Byers et al. (2012) conceptualize mega-sporting events as follows:

One-time sporting events of an international scale organized by a special “authority” and yielding extremely high levels of media coverage and impacts (economic, tourism, infrastructure, etc.) for the host community because of the event’s significance and/or size. The mega event is often accompanied by parallel activities such as festivals and/or cultural events (Byers et al. 2012: 102).

While others delineate “international significance” and “worldwide reach” as central characteristics of a mega-sporting event, the definition posited by Byers et al. emphasizes a “special authority,” implying the existence of power relations behind the sporting events. To
synthesize the statements postulated by existing literature, mega-sporting events cannot merely and naively be characterized as pure sporting festivites detachable from the logic of politics in our society. In this context, I define mega-sporting events from a political perspective, as "a large-scale, one-time, and global sporting event attracting worldwide audiences; drawing a significant level of the media spotlight, and inextricably linking to a variety of forms of power that influence the popular masses of the host community.” Such a conceptualization would enable a proper understanding of the fact that mega-sporting events in Brazil and its people are inevitably intermingled in complex power relations; it would also elicit an appreciation of the manner in which Brazil's citizenry is significantly affected by such political logics of mega-sporting events.

**Sport and Mega-Sporting Events as a Powerful Tool for Nation-Building?**

It has been widely recognized that sports represent a crucial cultural arena through which particular identities, such as nationality, gender, social class, or race, are formulated. Specifically, many scholars argue that sports symbolize a primary social space constructing and consolidating national identities and propagating national sensitivities. Thus, the sport has long been recognized as a means of nation-building (e.g., Andrews and Ritzer 2007; Archetti 1999; Bairner 2001; Billing 1995; Edensor 2002; Fox 2006; Hargreaves 2002; Hong 2011; Leite Lopes 1997, 2007; Miller and Crolley 2007). As Eric Hobsbawm (1991: 143) notes, “the imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people…The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his nation himself; the team becomes the physical embodiment of the nation.” In the same vein, Archetti (1999) posits, “the team becomes the physical embodiment of the nation.” Hargreaves (2002: 32) also observes, “political elites, for some considerable time, tended to intervene in and
promote sport as an important instrument for the creation of a sense of national identity.” Hong’s (2011) case study also reveals that the South Korean government has employed elite sport policy via business (primarily the colossal role of chaebol) as a way of promoting national identity and pursuing nation-building.

Many scholars have particularly attended to the ways in which sport contributes, as a form of popular culture, to the construction and transformation of national identity in everyday life. For instance, Fox (2006) analyzes the creative ways in which sports audiences and fans consume nationalism through sporting events. After examining the case of Romanian and Hungarian university students, he argues that international sporting competitions characterize significant occasions for the display of national allegiances and nationalism. In his path-breaking book entitled Banal Nationalism, Billing (1995) also draws attention to the apparent parallel between sports and warfare. He suggests that sport is “a benign reproduction of war,” which provides “symbolic models for the understanding of war,” primarily because the sports pages of newspapers echo the language of warfare and invite us to wave flags (Billing 1995: 122-124). Similarly, Hoberman (1984) describes sportspeople as “proxy warriors” and argues that sports are among the most effective vehicles of expression of nationalist feelings. Meanwhile, Edensor (2002) elucidates that as producers of popular culture, sporting heroes are essential markers for any identification of national culture. He regards sports as “the most currently powerful form of popular national performance.” According to Edensor (2002: 78), an organized sport is “increasingly situated in the mediatized matrix of national life, is institutionalized in schools, widely represented in a host of cultural forms, and is an everyday practice for millions of national subjects.” Thus, this daily context offers “one of the most popular ways in which national identity is grounded.”

Mega-sporting events have also been traditionally considered a powerful tool for the
formation of national identity, national unity, and social cohesion in host countries. The nation-building role performed by the major international sporting events is remarkable precisely because, in addition to economic and other legacies, such events offer an effective opportunity to the host nation to enhance its national pride and prestige (Tomlinson and Young 2006). Scholars have often argued theoretically, and demonstrated empirically, that mega-sporting events such as the World Cup and the Olympics provide a legitimate political platform to create a strong collective consciousness and that they promote national identity and unity in host countries. In this context, Duminy (2012: 49) maintains, “A purported key motivation behind the hosting of mega-events is the opportunity for host nations to build national unity and social cohesion.” Jarvie (1993: 74) similarly claims that mega-sporting events offer “a uniquely effective medium for inculcating national feelings; they provide a form of symbolic action, which states the case for the nation itself.” These international sporting events form important vehicles for the alignment of national allegiances and the display of national symbols (Fox 2006: 226). In sum, the explicitly international profile of mega-sporting events, combined with national colors, anthems, and flags, has become the paramount channel through which social cohesion is achieved.

Hargreaves (2002) pays particular attention to the role of political elites and their intervention in nation-building processes by means of sporting events. Tomlinson and Young (2006: 1) suggest that sporting events celebrating physical culture have been guided by ideological and political motives from ancient civilizations, and the growth of IOC and FIFA and their major sporting events have offered practical opportunities for nation-building. Specifically, Lee and Grix (2013) assert that mega-sporting events play a decisive political role in nation-building in two ways: by arousing national pride at the domestic level and by signaling collective identity on the international stage which is appealing to others. For
example, Barbara Cassani, a member of the London 2012 bid committee, mentioned that the London Olympics would “raise national pride and give the chance to show the country at its best” (Cited in Malfas et al. 2004: 214). Matheson and Baade (2004) also maintain that mega-events can serve a promising role in achieving intangible benefits in nation-building. With much conviction, Knott et al. (2015) asserted that, in times of peace, “only sport has the capability to mobilize and motivate people to believe in national identity and strive towards contributing towards nation-building.” Finally, Malfas et al. (2004) also observed that local pride could be reinforced by hosting mega-sporting events.

A wide range of empirical studies has supported and demonstrated theoretical expectations of mega-sporting events as a promoter of national identification and accelerator of nation-building. For example, Stevens and Bevan (1999) introduced in their study a survey of residents of Georgia in the U.S., confirming that the 1996 Olympics contributed to the creation of civic pride, with 93% of respondents believing that the events had positively impacted community spirit. Morphet (1996) also shows that the 1996 European Football Championship, held in England with the nostalgic slogan “football is coming home,” stimulated the sense of national pride and national unity. According to Knott et al. (2015), a similar phenomenon can be found during the 2006 Germany World Cup; through a longitudinal study, they found that German's national pride increased by about 7% as a result of the hosting of the World Cup.

Existing literature demonstrates similar recent experiences in non-Western contexts as well. Matheson and Baade (2004: 1095) suggest that the 1995 South Africa Rugby World Cup was “an opportunity for the country to announce its reemergence as a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but its political community.” Performing nation-ness during the World Cup in the form of a festive mass rally of social and national performance,
according to Lee and Cho (2009), was evident in the case of South Korea in 2002 that enabled South Koreans to encapsulate the idea of the nation. Likewise, Cho Han (2004) understands the 2002 World Cup as a historically unprecedented moment wherein the entire South Korean population experienced nation-building “from below.” Meanwhile, Close et al. (2007) suggest that “the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was seen by millions in China as a national legacy to the Chinese people who were able to show its long-forgotten pride” (Cited in Chappelet 2012: 83). In his anthropological work on the 2009 Southeast Asian Games held in Laos, Simon Creak (2011) argues although there was a controversy over the Games due to their heavy dependence on foreign assistance, this event created a joyous and inclusive expression of national pride throughout the Games with national colors, flags, shirts, and slogans. Some scholarly attention has been paid to the 2010 South Africa World Cup as well, which is the most recently held event, except for those in Brazil. According to survey research conducted by the Human Science Research Council (2011), most South African respondents felt that the key benefit of the event was its impact on social integration and cohesion. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) and Labuschagne (2011) also found that what Michael Billing (1995) terms “banal nationalism” had been significantly invoked through the events, spawning a substantial degree of national unity.

Previous literature has mostly focused on sport and mega-sporting events as a social unifier, emphasizing its positive relationship with nationalism and national identity. These previous studies, however, have significantly failed to capture the neglected dimension of mega-sporting events, that is, as having the potential to frustrate national pride and cohesion and deconstruct the narrative of the existing national identity of a particular host country. In his path-breaking research, Terrance Carroll (2012) in this context attempts to understand that mega-sporting events may serve to fragment, rather than unite nations, through the case
studies of the 2010 and the planning of the 2014 World Cup. Carroll’s case study, without a
doubt, provides new insight into the field; however, it lacks sufficient empirical evidence and
fails to suggest specific processes and mechanisms by which those events resulted in social
and national fragmentation. This dissertation attempts to complement this weakness by
providing detailed empirical explanations of how mega-sporting events in Brazil became
anomalous cases.

_Brazilian Cases: What is wrong with them?_

There exist indeed some scholarly research that elucidated how the mega-sporting
events caused a negative impact on Brazil and its residents. In his book, _Brazil's Dance with
the Devil_, the celebrated sportswriter Dave Zirin (2016) depicts how “neoliberal Trojan
horses” such as the World Cup and the Olympics exerted severe negative influences on the
populace under the banner of "celebration capitalism" and triggered massive protests.
Highlighting the inherent drawback of the Brazilian economic model, Ordonez et al. (2014)
argue that the Cup would not spur economic growth; instead, it would cause inflation. Alves
(2016) emphasizes the severe lack of the right to voice opinions and the deficiency of access
to information in the midst of forced evictions in Rio de Janeiro during the city's preparations
for the 2016 Olympics. In her study, "The 2014 World Cup in Brazil: Its Legacy and
Challenges," Marilene de Paula (2014) critically outlines the ways in which mega-sporting
events can result in the privileging and the gentrification of certain social groups even as a
majority of people are marginalized in the name of urban security and modernity. The
resulting urban development can then generate the prime opportunity to “sell” the host
country. Similarly, Maharaj (2015) notes that Brazil wanted to host such mega-events to
promote its emerging power status; however, the Brazilian experience clearly suggests that
the privileged benefited at the expense of the marginalized and that socioeconomic inequalities were actually exacerbated. According to Woods (2015), Brazil's case reveals that the mega-sporting events enabled the transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector, largely benefiting elite investors rather than the entire population. Gaffney’s (2014) study explores how Brazil’s traditional architecture and cultural traditions were demolished by the hyper-commercialization of constructing a new stadium for the 2014 Brazil World Cup.

Overall, a rich array of academic literature that was reviewed earlier throughout this chapter tends to focus on the positive relationship between sport and/or mega-sporting events and national identities. Although some existing literature has admittedly addressed how the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil triggered negative outcomes and legacies, no academic attention has been paid to the relationship between Brazil’s hosting of mega-sporting events and the unfavorable impact of such events on the country’s nation-building and on the promotion of national pride and bonds. Hence, this dissertation aims to fill this research gap by tracing the process through which mega-sporting events in Brazil ultimately brought about the destabilization of the longstanding ideology of racial democracy as the basis of an existing Brazilian national identity, which ultimately impeded the effect of nation-building through the mega-sporting events.

Types of National Identity: Ethnic versus Civic

Although national identity is considered as a unitary and single form of collective identity, a number of scholars have pointed out that there indeed exist nations with different types and elements. Among these theoretical discussions, the most representative forms of division within the concept of the nation would be ethnic versus civic nationhood. To put it
simply, ethnic and civic nationalism respectively denote nationalism based on “claims of
kinship as manifested in shared culture” and nationalism “rooted in shared citizenship and
political values” (Roshwald 2015: 1).

This dichotomy that differentiates ethnic and civic nationhood was introduced by
Anthony Smith (1991) as a non-Western and Western conception of the nation. By
suggesting that national identity cannot be reduced to a single element but is fundamentally
multi-dimensional, Smith (1991: 11, 14) points out that:

Historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and
common civic culture and ideology; these are the components of the standard, Western
model of the nation...At the same time a rather different model of the nation sprang up
outside the West, notably in Eastern Europe and Asia...We can term this non-Western model
and 'ethnic' conception of the nation...Whereas the Western concept laid down that an
individual had to belong to some nation but could choose to which he or she belonged, the
non-Western or ethnic concept allowed no such latitude (Smith 1991: 11).

In other words, for Smith, while national unity in a Western or civic nation derives not only
from a historic territory, but also from institutions, laws and the legal-political equality of
members who hold a commonly shared civic ideology and culture and express themselves in
a set of duties and rights, national unity in non-Western or ethnic model arises from “fictive
super-family” based fundamentally on descent, vernacular culture, language, and customs.

In a similar vein, Billing et al. (2006) characterizes the civic nation as being based on
shared political values, not the shared ethnicity that ethnic nationalism depicts. One of the
most influential writers in nationalism, Michael Ignatieff (1993, 1996), also compares two
types of the nation and nationalism, in accordance with the nature of belonging. According to
him, ethnic nationalism highlights common “blood,” fraternity, and the sense of belonging to
nationhood is based on emotional attachment. Therefore, in this model, it is widely accepted
that the nation creates individuals. In contrast, Ignatieff (1993) characterizes the civic nation
as a “community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in a patriotic attachment to a shared
set of political practices and values.” Ignatieff considers this nationalism as necessarily democratic, because “it vests sovereignty in all of the people.” Civic nationalism emphasizes law rather than roots, and people's feeling of belonging is based on rational attachment and their choice, not inheritance. In this form of nationalism, thus, an individual creates a nation.

The civic type of collective identification is described as being “inclusive for every citizen notwithstanding their ethno-cultural origins” (Caron 2013: 221). According to Auer (2004), membership in the community of the civic nation thus can be defined primarily in political terms and civic virtues are more significant in this model of nation than ethnicity and common culture and language. Ignatieff (1996) sees that civic nationalism defines the nation in terms of willingness to stick to its civic values such as democracy, equality, human rights, and justice, not in terms of shared ethnicity. Therefore, he believes that this type of nationalism can contribute to reconciling divisions in society through the framework in law and political participation; on the contrary, while ethnic nationalism can facilitate substantial unity among “them” against ethnic others, it cannot help overcome other divisions such as gender and class.

The civic vs. ethnic model of nations presented above does not necessarily mean that ethnic nations are bad and the civic model is better. Moreover, the major problem underlying these theoretical discussions, first and foremost, is that they cannot explain particular nations' transformative processes from ethnic to civic national identity or vice versa. In this regard, I suggest in this study that a modernist-constructivist theoretical framework can effectively help fill the gap for examining how Brazil's national identity changed from ethnic or cultural to a civic sense of nationhood. Of course, although Billing et al. (2006) addressed this issue in their study, 'Britishness’ in the Last Three Elections: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism, the authors too focused on how civic nationalist discourses arise in place of traditional ethnic-
national discourse exclusively during the general elections. This dissertation presents other types of political participation—social movement as a type of collective action—that can also become a potent and powerful source of the transformation of national identity from ethnic to civic.

**Making Sense of the Brazilian National Identity: From Ethnic to Civic Identity?**

The primary aim of this dissertation is to identify how the hosting of the two mega-sporting events elicited the robust rise and the dissemination of a civic sense of national identity in Brazil over the country's traditional ethno-cultural identity. At this juncture, addressing the Brazilian national identity in general and the concept of racial democracy that has long shaped Brazilian-ness, in particular, would therefore be pertinent. The following section deals with the trends and issues related to civic identity in Brazil, a central notion for this dissertation, to better understand the recent dynamics of Brazilian national identity and to determine the impact of the mega-sporting events on Brazil’s civic identity.

*The Making of Brasilidade: Racial Democracy as the Central Axis of the Brazilian National Identity*

According to Domingues (2005: 1), racial democracy is a “racial system devoid of any legal or institutional barrier to racial equality, and to some extent a racial system devoid of any manifestation of prejudice or discrimination.” The idea of racial democracy has been widely used to frame Brazil’s racial harmony as one without racial discrimination or hierarchical race relations. Proffered in the 1930s by the celebrated Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, this notion has long characterized how Brazilians believe themselves to be
and how they feel that they should be. In his book entitled *Casa Grande & Senzala* (The Masters and the Slaves), Freyre ([1933] 1956) highlighted the promising role of miscegenation and asserted that racial mixture would eventually lead to social development and harmonious race relations in Brazil. Thus, he simultaneously attempted to create the new ethnic category of the “racially mixed Brazilian.” This idea was broadly propagated through popular culture during the first term of the Getulio Vargas regime (1930–1945), particularly via popular music (e.g., *samba, Bossa nova*) and sports (e.g., *capoeira* and *futebol*). These cultural activities epitomized the creative power of racial mixture and miscegenation as a nation-building strategy. This ethnic and cultural nationalism based on what Pravas (2003) calls “hibridação estratégica (strategic hybridization)” was enormously influential in shaping the Brazilian national identity. Among other iconic activities, football undoubtedly played a dominant role in the determination of what it means to be a Brazilian. The sport became the paramount arena through which the sense of Brazilian nationhood was formulated, expressed, and promulgated throughout the twentieth century under the banner of racial miscegenation and racial democracy.

In effect, Brazil experienced a white supremacist history of race and nation for most of its colonial period, and this ascendancy continued and even blossomed after the country’s independence in 1822. After independence, the Brazilian political elite who admired both European modernity and thought, specifically Comtean positivism, attempted to build the Brazilian nation on the basis of social Darwinism. The *Embranquecimento* (Whitening) policy was implemented until the 1920s and 1930s and was supported and promoted by massive European immigration into Brazil. However, racial democracy would later become the founding myth of the Brazilian nation primarily because the myth was accepted by the vast majority and was reproduced in daily Brazilian life. This actualization became possible
because of the State's consistent efforts, particularly during the Getulio Vargas regime. It was propagated as a nation-building strategy through futebol, samba, and carnaval, which epitomized the creative power of racial mixture and miscegenation.

In this vein, it is also essential to note that the role of media was consequential to the formation of the imagined Brazilian community (Anderson 1983). Radio, film, and television profoundly facilitated the creation of an ongoing conversation about Brazilian national identity from the 1930s on. The rise of the national television broadcasting system, Globo, during the military regime of the mid-1980s provided the “crucial means to transform futebol into the truly national sport of Brazil” by making it possible for Brazilians to experience a powerful identification with their national team and with the symbols of the Brazilian nation (Eakin 2017: 179-180). The phenomenal appeal and success of futebol, aided by these media technologies, confirmed that racial democracy and mestiçagem (miscegenation) formed the central axis of Brazilian-ness.

However, many critical scholars have revealed that racial democracy in Brazil is nothing but a mythology that truly misguides reality. McLucas (2005) suggests that there still predominates a widespread sense of “racial hierarchy” within Brazilian culture today, which has unconsciously trapped Afro-Brazilians. Bailey (2004) maintains that based on his research, his analysis of racial attitudes in Rio de Janeiro contradicts the long-held racial democracy, showing most Brazilians still recognize that racism plays a defining role in Brazilian society. In her book Race and the Brazilian Body: Blackness, Whiteness, and Everyday Language in Rio de Janeiro, anthropologist Jennifer Roth-Gordon (2016) explores how embedded racism, what the author calls “comfortable racial contradiction,” is pervasive in people’s everyday cultural, linguistic and bodily practices. Based on ethnographic research in Rio de Janeiro, she suggests that while the racial differences are cordially unspoken,
whiteness is still tacitly regarded as privileged, superior and a source of pride. That posits racial democracy as a smokescreen fabricated and manipulated by political elites to conceal the deep-seated socioeconomic inequality and the structural racism in Brazilian society. Particularly, this idea of racial democracy had been widely used during the authoritarian regime (1964-1985) to obstruct public discussion regarding racial inequality and to justify the suppression of race-based organizing (Eakin 2017).

However, it is evident that racial democracy has still constituted a dominant element of national identity in Brazil. The historical trajectory of the formation of racial democracy as a powerful narrative of Brazilian national identity through football is congruent with the manner in which a series of processes contributed to the elimination of the social Darwinist white supremacy in Brazil in the first half of the twentieth century. The process of the construction of an imagined Brazilian community through football entailed the back-and-forth emergence and disappearance of social prejudices, racial tensions, and contradictions against Afro-Brazilians and mulattos. It is undeniable that football significantly contributed as a popular culture icon to the nation-building endeavor of multi-racial Brazil in the twentieth century, particularly since its aristocratic patronage in the late nineteenth century.

*The Emergence of a Civic National Identity in Late-Twentieth Century Brazil*

Twentieth-century Brazilians may be characterized as people with ethnocultural ties in the absence of civic national identity. Brazilians could create a sense of belonging to a nation within themselves on the basis of their strong cultural citizenship, mainly through *futebol* and *samba*, but without the rights that they should have possessed through political or civic citizenship. From the 1930s to the late-twentieth century, Freyre's vision of a coherent and prominent narrative of ethnocultural identity took shape in Brazil, but struggled to bloom
into a civic identity because of the lack of representative politics under authoritarian regimes (Eakin 2017: 220-221).

However, as Brazil moved from a military dictatorship toward democratic politics in the 1980s, it witnessed the blossoming of an increasingly powerful civic–political culture for the first time in the nation’s history (Moisés 1992). During the 1980s, new black consciousness movements emerged in Brazil, condemning Freyre’s vision of racial democracy as a truly racist fantasy. In 1986, approximately 50% of the Brazilian population exercised its electoral mandate in State and municipal elections, a rate of voting much higher than the less than 20% participation recorded in the 1960s. The 1988 Constitution finally affirmed the full-blown rise of civic identity. It extended suffrage to all Brazilian citizens above sixteen and removed the literacy requirements for voting (Eakin 2017). In this context, Debrun’s (1990) study, A Identidade Nacional Brasileira (Brazilian National Identity), contends that the rise of a civic–political sense of nationhood in Brazil at the end of the twentieth century should be acknowledged and actively discussed in academia.

In effect, the Freyrean vision of racial democracy as the Brazilian national identity based on culture and ethnicity was first adopted by the Vargas regime in the first half of the twentieth century. The military rule between the 1960s and the 1980s enshrined this imagining as truth to legitimize the State suppression of the proliferation of discourse on racial discrimination and to thwart race-based organization of the populace.

However, the emergence of civic identity in the 1980s with Brazil’s democratization produced heated debates about the dominant Freyrean vision of the Brazilian national identity. Eakin (2017), one of the most prestigious Brazilianists, elucidated that the Diretas Já (Direct
Election Now) campaign\(^3\) during 1983–1984 largely contributed to the emergence of the civic identity of the Brazilians. An enormous number of Brazilians poured into the streets calling for re-democratization and direct presidential elections. Nationwide movements in 1992 for the impeachment of then President Fernando Collor de Melo\(^4\) also significantly affected the rise of a potent civic nationalism in Brazil. Thus, both Diretas Já and Collor’s impeachment invoked the civil rights of Brazilians as citizens to actively express and voice their dislike of the political system and its inherent corruption. The Diretas Já movement ultimately failed; nevertheless, the mass mobilizations for Collor's impeachment succeeded with the demand for re-democratization as a result of the civic nationalism that accelerated and was promoted in the 1980s. At the end of the twentieth century, the State and nation finally converged with the blossoming of civic nationalism in Brazil, perhaps more fully than at any other time in the country's history (Eakin 2017). Nevertheless, the popular ideology of racial democracy had still constituted a central element of Brazilian national identity in the twenty-first century. In this regard, I suggest in this dissertation that hosting mega-sporting events provoked the powerful (re)emergence and consolidation of civic identity and address how these processes ultimately challenged the long-standing national narrative of racial democracy.

\(^3\)DiretasJá campaign is a civil movement that began with street demonstrations in 1983 in Abreu e Lima, a municipal district of Pernambuco State, calling for direct presidential elections. This movement soon diffused to the other side of Brazil and became more severe in 1984 along with Brazil's harsh economic crisis. Over a million protesters participated in these marches, but a subservient Congress rejected the Constitutional Amendment that would permit direct elections. However, these protests planted the seed, which brought about Brazil's political transformation. In 1985, the military left the office after the indirect election of Tancredo Neves (Nery 2010).

\(^4\)Fernando Collor de Mello, who was the first President to be directly elected, took his office from 1990 to 1992, and was impeached due to the influence-peddling scheme of his the presidential campaign and corruption charges. Millions of Brazilians took the streets and the demonstrations were the largest in Brazilian history (Martuscelli 2010).
Making Sense of Social Classes in Brazil

As in many other countries, the demography of Brazilian population can be segmented by social classes that candidly denote sharp socioeconomic stratification. While suggesting that Brazil’s upper class exclusively enjoyed the privilege stemming from the World Cup and the Olympic Games, throughout this study, I show that cross-class solidarity between the lower and middle classes, which opposed the mega-sporting events ultimately spurred the move toward the rise of civic nationalism. Since issues related to Brazil’s social classes will be frequently addressed in the course of this dissertation, it is pertinent to briefly deal with and conceptualize the social class system in Brazil.

Conventional class distinctions can also be utilized when characterizing Brazil’s upper, middle and lower classes. Upper-class Brazilians, as Alex Cuadros (2017) vividly portrayed in his groundbreaking book *Brazillionaires*, typically comprise the country’s the wealthiest people, including ultra-rich business owners who control swaths of the economy, highly educated and skilled professionals and those who hold the highest social status such as political elites. This upper class, usually known as the Brazilian plutocrats, is located at the top of the socioeconomic pyramid, and is overwhelmingly Caucasian.

Members of Brazil’s middle class, who have demonstrated their strong activism during protests against the mega-events, were the backbone of these movements. In the early 1980s, the middle class accounted for only 15% of the Brazilian population. However, Brazil witnessed the unprecedented expansion of an emergent middle class, particularly after Lula came to power in 2002. Since that time, nearly half of the country’s population has been part of the middle class, meaning that 40 million people were newly incorporated into the middle-class category during Lula’s tenure (*CNN*, Jul. 24, 2013). According to Ceratti (2012),
between 2003 and 2009, the middle-class population grew by 50% in Latin American region, and the Brazilian middle class alone contributed about 40% of this overall growth. Despite Brazil’s stigma as a country of long-time colossal socioeconomic disparities, the Lula administration gained an international reputation for the country’s remarkable economic growth and successful poverty-reduction initiatives, which together gave greater impetus to the incorporation of a huge segment of “previously poor” Brazilians into the so-called “new middle class” (Klein and Mitchell 2018: 83).

Although middle-class activism in Brazil played a consequential role in the proliferation and persistence of the protests against the mega-events, lower class people who suffered intensively and enormously from the events constituted the central axis of the protests. Lower-class Brazilians, who are largely undereducated, are typically low-level laborers employed in low wage jobs who have highly limited income and cannot make ends meet or are unemployed, unemployable and underemployed people who occupy the lowest possible social stratum. They are generally expected to be people of color, particularly Afro-Brazilians. Some scholarly works have attempted to subdivide the lower class, such as in the Gilbert-Kahl model of the class structure (Gilbert and Kahl 1998). However, I use the terms working class and urban poor in this dissertation to refer to the same category that falls under the boundary of the lower class, depending on the context in which it is discussed. The term working class is largely used in chapter 3, which explores the historical trajectory of nation-building through futebol in Brazil, particularly when I navigate the process through which factory football teams and workers’ inclusion into the previously aristocratic Brazilian football. The term urban poor is utilized particularly when addressing the ways in which

5 According to Gilbert and Kahl (1998), the U.S. social class ladder can be divided into six tiers—the capitalist class, upper-middle class, lower-middle class, working class, working poor and underclass—based on the level of education, occupation and income.
people living in concentrated poverty in urban settings and favela dwellers were exposed to vulnerability from violent exploitation due to mega-sporting events.

Methodology and Data Collection

This dissertation examines how Brazil’s hosting of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games created national dissension rather than functioning as a unifying force. The Brazilian case is important because it is obviously a deviant, or so-called oddball case, that contradicts the conventionally recognized leading role played by mega-sporting events in nation-building. No other cases have experienced such a drastic national resentment as an outcome of hosting mega-sporting events. In other words, the Brazilian case is unique when compared to the events previously and recently held in other countries that successfully led to the promotion of nation-building. In particular, mega-sporting events held in Brazil stand out in terms of not only the rise of extreme social dissension surrounding those events, but also the scale of urban redevelopment projects, cost spent for these events and the marginalization of ordinary people as well as the size, intensity and durability of the social movements that arose over a long period (2013-2016) to oppose them. As James Mahoney (2007) suggests, a “deviant case study” would be the most prominent technique for generating new hypotheses; by studying cases in which the outcomes do not conform to theory, researchers can explore the causes of theoretical defiance while generating new hypotheses.” Gerring and Corocaru (2016) also note that the purpose of the study of anomalies, which show an unexpected causal pattern as suggested by theories or common sense, is to explicate the oddball case and to explain other similarly deviant cases. Exploring the Brazilian case as an outlier can produce novel explanations that have not been previously examined in the existing literature.
I examined both of the two mega-events in Brazil—the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics—in this dissertation and I considered them as one unit of analysis. This choice is attributed to the reason that both events took place consecutively at a relatively close time with only a two-year interval. Both mega-sporting events were held during Brazil’s severe economic recession and political chaos provoked by a corruption scandal. In other words, both events can be analytically treated as a single unit and contextualized in the same time frame given the highly similar social and political atmosphere around them. Furthermore, this study cuts across multiple levels of aggregation, particularly when exploring the urban and national levels and their affinitive interactions. In chapters 4 and 5, I address politics at the urban level, particularly concerning the neoliberal governance that occurred during the preparatory phases for the two events and the rise of oppositional forces against it as a form of collective action, respectively. Since the protests against the exploitative mega-events and activism in which protestors demanded their civil rights took place in several major Brazilian cities, these dynamics must be observed at the urban level. Subsequently, I shift to the national level in chapter 6 to interpret how multiple subnational politics impacted the national politics—the rise of new, competing national imaginary. In particular, I focus on the relationship between urban and national politics, given that the national sense is strongly influenced by and vividly expressed through urban experiences, and these forces impact each other in a cyclic process.

This dissertation employs qualitative methods to explore the ways in which Brazil's hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics and the emergence of a series of movements affected Brazilian national identity. In particular, I attend to the manner in which the consecutive hosting of the mega-sporting events brought about and consolidated a potent and

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6 This will be explained in depth in chapter 5.
powerful civic nationalism in Brazil, a country whose citizens’ sense of belonging to the nation was traditionally and fundamentally tethered throughout the twentieth century to ethno-cultural components primarily grounded in the concept of racial democracy. Using qualitative methods enabled me to dive deeper into the research problems and to gain a better understanding of underlying processes around identity dynamics.

To this end, this study combines a social constructivist perspective and a qualitative methodology to enable capturing “intersubjective meanings” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Constructivist perspectives are essentially skeptical about claims to an “all-encompassing truth” or what Price and Reus-Smit (1998) call the “Big-T”; rather, they are more concerned with “small-t” contingent claims. Such partial contentions still constitute causal explanations in a way that is different from the positivist understanding of causality (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 394-395). Likewise, Adler (2005) maintains that constructivists share an epistemology “in which interpretation is an intrinsic part of the social sciences and emphasizes contingent generalizations.” For him, contingent generalizations “do not freeze understanding; rather, they open up our understanding of the social world” (Adler 2005: 10-11). This study employs the constructivist and interpretive approach to capture Brazil’s horizontal national dynamics of an imagined community and its socially constructed nature. The modernist–constructivist theory of national identity, particularly Seton-Watson’s (1977: 5) argument that a nation only exists “when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation,” is applied in this dissertation. Consequently, the essentialist notion of identity is challenged, and it is assumed that the formation and transformation of national identity are both products of social construction and discursive

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7 This paragraph was cited in my original work first published in Sage Open: Jung, Hoyoon (2019), “The Evolution of Social Constructivism in Political Science: Past to Present.”
practices.

Keeping in mind the main topic of this dissertation, the straightforward methodological limits of this study must be noted: the paucity of meticulous field observation during massive demonstrations between 2013 and 2016. Since well-conducted ethnographic participant observations can adequately support persuasive analytic explanations on social movement, the absence of such data is palpable. However, this dissertation attempts to partly alleviate the limitation by making optimal use of varied qualitative methods such as extensive archival research and fieldwork and intensive interviews with stakeholders and ordinary Brazilian citizens.

I conducted four-month field research in Brazil, where I visited five state capitals that hosted either the World Cup or the Olympic Games: Curitiba, Manaus, Salvador, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro (See Figure 1.1). These five major cities were carefully selected based on how these urban centers represent the geographically divided and politically and culturally idiosyncratic Brazilian regions: the North (Manaus), the Northeast (Salvador), the South (Curitiba), and the Southeast (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). The justification behind this regional selection was to secure more balanced interview data and to maintain an unbiased territory-wise interpretation of the data because fieldwork in one or two representative Brazilian cities could impede holistic thinking and affect the synthetic analysis of Brazil and its people. In such a case, the primary objective of this dissertation would remain elusive.

< Figure 1.1. Five Brazilian Cities Visited for the Field Research >
Apart from the field research, I conducted archival research during the research period. This enabled me to examine how social movements against mega-sporting events in Brazil emerged, were diffused and were further sustained. I collected a wide array of data from sources including newspapers, magazines, polls, publications by civil society, and the individual official bid books and reports of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The official documents helped me understand and record the principal aims of the Brazilian authorities in hosting these events. Conversely, the examination of discrete documents published by civil society, especially those disseminated by social movement organizations, allowed the realization of the ways and processes through which the human rights of the non-elites, or the ordinary Brazilians, were significantly infringed.

Newspapers and magazines were also beneficial, as they offered detailed information on the chronological sequences of Brazil's preparations for the two events and the development of the mass protests against them. The sources also helped illuminate the popular discourses pertaining to mega-sporting events and elucidated how these discourses were created and appropriated. I examined various Brazilian news reports and magazines
collected by search engines that comprised, but were not limited to, the following: *O Globo, Folha de São Paulo, Jornal O Tempo, Agência Brasil, Fórum, O Dia, Agência Pública, Gauchazh, and Rede Brasil Atual*, and so forth. I also referred to supplemental materials in the form of foreign news reports from sources such as *the Guardian, Reuters, ESPN, and BBC Brasil*, etc. These non-Brazilian sources provided fresh perspectives and insights, particularly when I compared the different tones accorded to the same issue. These archival sources were not selected purposively; instead, I tried to gather as many diverse sources as possible that provided in-depth information on Brazil's mega-sporting events and demonstrations against them. The time period of these news reports and magazine was, for the most part, between 2013 and 2016, which corresponds to the year that anti-World Cup protests occurred and the Olympic Games ended.

During my field research, I conducted several in-depth interviews with social movement activists, academics, public lawyers, and representatives of a number of regional and national associations to ascertain the impact of mega-sporting events. Expert and stakeholder interviews allowed me to better understand the actual impact of the two events on various sectors of Brazilian society, chiefly on the lower class and the country’s socio-political arena. Expert and stakeholder interviewers were also significant in obtaining detailed information on the exploitative attributes of mega-sporting events and their destructive legacies to Brazil.

Apart from the in-depth expert interview, the primary approach to data collection for this dissertation was comprised of unstructured interviews with 143 “ordinary” Brazilian citizens residing in five Brazilian cities. This dissertation investigates personal narratives of the interviewees to “narratively” understand the reformation and negotiation of Brazilian identity in relation to ordinary citizens’ experiences with mega-sporting events, which will be
particularly examined in chapter 6. There I explain that narrative inquiry was employed in this study as a mode of gathering information through interview participants’ storytelling and a mode of understanding and knowing into their experiences through constructing meaning. As Clandinin and Huber (2010: 436) succinctly put it, narrative inquiry, a relatively novel qualitative methodology, is the “study of experience understood narratively.” For this study, I suggest that narrative inquiry is especially useful to the questions of identity as this dissertation follows the idea that identity is narratively constructed. Hinchman and Hinchman (2001: xviii), in this regard, suggest that “identity is that which emerges in and through narratives.” Rosenweld and Ochburg (1992: 1) also pointed out that “personal stories are not merely a way of telling someone about one’s life; they are the means by which identities may be fashioned.” Interpreting stories told by the interviewees helped me to encapsulate their experiences with and popular ideas on the mega-sporting events and to figure out the rise of the competing narratives of Brazilian identity in relation to these events.

These interviews were mostly spontaneous and were conducted on street benches and in parks, squares, cafés, hotel lobbies, or in comfortable living rooms belonging to the interviewees. The conversations lasted from a minimum of twenty minutes to a maximum of one and a half hours. The respondents evinced great diversity in terms of occupation. I was even able to interview impoverished and homeless urban individuals and a favela dweller—people whose “rights to the city” were directly and fatally infringed upon through the process of the neoliberal reconfiguration required in the preparatory phases of the two events. Basically, I approached people personally and extemporaneously in indeterminate spaces in the cities that I visited. First, I introduced myself and outlined my dissertation topic. Next, I presented prospective interviewees with consent forms after providing them with detailed information about the proposed interview and its procedures. Fortunately, the Brazilian
citizens whom I approached were very open-minded, and most of them happily acceded to the interviews. However, I could not request interviewees to provide sensitive information such as class, age, and race given that the interviews were spontaneous and sudden.

Chapter Breakdown

This dissertation comprises seven chapters. Chapter 2 builds on a theoretical framework for this dissertation by reconciling literature on national identity, nation-building and identity change, which provides an effective tool to explain how nationwide popular resistance against the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics ultimately gave rise to the emergence of the new counter-narrative of national identity in Brazil. I will first deal with the social constructivist character of nations and national identities by challenging the primordialist and ethno-symbolist account. I attempt to complement nation-building literature by suggesting the dynamics of nation-making from below which can best capture how ordinary citizens can make their sense of nationhood, challenging the traditional approach of "making, building, construction" of national identity in a top-down way. Whereas the latter approach underlines the public (political) domain of the construction of national identity, the former approach that will be adopted in this study highlights the private domain of the formation of identity which is reconstituted through everyday lives and everyday experiences of ordinary citizens. Later on, I also deal with the dynamics of changes in national identity—from one based on ethnicity to civic nationalism in particular—which has not received much scholarly attention from academia and suggest that collective actions, such as social movements, popular resistance and so forth, can shape, influence and transform collective identity.
Chapter 3, entitled “Building the Brazilian Nation through Futebol-Mulato: Racial Democracy, Visual-Aural Capitalism and the Rise of Cultural Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Brazil,” traces the historical trajectories of Brazil’s nation-building project from the 1930s to the end of the twentieth century. This chapter specifically examines the dynamic and dialectic process through which Brazilian national ethno-cultural identity was built, and also how racial democracy and mestiçagem could become the dominant narratives of a national myth propagated throughout the twentieth century, primarily via the popular culture of futebol. This chapter facilitates an intensive comprehension of the ways in which Brazilian national identity was constructed on the basis of “ethnicity” and “culture.” Such clarity and awareness are critical in examining the rise of a contesting or civic national identity in Brazil, as a consequence of the nation’s hosting of mega-sporting events and the series of protests that emerged against the events.

Chapter 4, entitled “Hosting Neoliberal Games: The World Cup and Olympic State of Exception and the Neoliberal Production of Space in Brazil,” takes a closer look at Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics and its preparations for these events to ascertain how the preparatory processes were closely related to a series of acts associated with the reconstitution of a “spectacular urban space” (Harvey 2001: 92) under the political and economic rationalities of neoliberalism. This chapter particularly investigates the ways in which the urban poor and the favela were simultaneously excluded, securitized, and, ironically, commodified. Chapter 4 argues that the two mega-sporting events in Brazil resulted in the neoliberal production of urban spaces, and these phenomena can genuinely be characterized as “neoliberal” and “exclusionary” games that, in fact, exacerbated social inequalities and consolidated the existing socioeconomic and racial order in Brazil. This chapter also shows that the displacement of urban poor during the preparation stages of the
Chapter 5, entitled “The Rise of Networked Cross-Class Movements against Mega-Sporting Events in Brazil: Challenging Differentiated Citizenship and Calling for the Right to the City,” examines the emergence of civil resistance against the negative, perilous facets of the two events that included an array of human rights violations. I suggest that the major opposition to mega-events in Brazil expanded and developed beyond just the lower class and was enabled by the rise of “middle-class activism.” This chapter also navigates the detailed processes through which the protests were mobilized and executed in cities across Brazil. It surveys civil society networks and scrutinizes the causes for the occurrence of such massive nationwide resistance. Based on the discussion, the chapter suggests that the wide-ranging demonstrations can best be synthesized and characterized as a networked cross-class movement. It further asserts that the mega-sporting events hosted by Brazil were critically delegitimized among the country’s citizenry. Civil society networks and online platforms (particularly in the form of social network services) provided powerful vehicles through which the fury of discrete Brazilians could be united. In other words, many different Brazilian grievances achieved an amalgamated culmination via social and digital networks pivotal to the emergence, promotion, and diffusion of extensive protests in the country. The chapter finally suggests that these movements embraced the features of “right to the city” movements intended to subvert special treatment rights, usually understood as privileges, and to undermine the social systems of differentiated citizenship supporting such exclusive behavior. The underlying processes of the “networked outrage” that delegitimized the mega-sporting events stemmed from the public realization of the asymmetric distribution of rights events was one of the factors that contributed to the formation of strong emerging opposition, albeit not strong enough to generate the massive opposing forces to the World Cup and the Olympics.
between the privileged and the marginalized. In other words, the populace became aware of the country's “structural differentiated citizenship.”

Chapter 6, “Remaking the Nation from Below: Mega-Sporting Events, Contested Racial Democracy and the Rise of Civic Nationalism as a Competing Narrative of National Identity in Brazil,” primarily deals with the emergence of the civic sense of national identity within Brazilian society due to the 2014 World Cup, the 2016 Olympic Games, and the series of intense movements against these events. I relate the various aspects of urban politics addressed in chapter 4 and 5 to this in chapter 6 to explain how individual’s urban experiences impacted the rise of a new, competing national imaginary. This chapter is informed by personal narratives based on my interviews with 143 ordinary Brazilian citizens during field research, through which the chapter argues that the emergence of such sharing of “civic” identity as Brazil’s collective imaginary among various groups led to the destabilization of the long-standing narrative of racial democracy qua Brazilian national identity, which has been rooted fundamentally in “ethnicity” and “culture.” I suggest that the prominence of civic nationalism as an emerging counter-narrative to racial democracy were particularly provoked by a series of social movements as well as everyday activism against mega-sporting events, which can be best seen as “nation-remaking” by forces and processes emanating from a broad alliance of the lower echelons of society and middle class based particularly on shared civic norms of democracy, human rights, equality and justice who previously had never been protagonists in Brazil's history of nation-building.

Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, summarizes and amalgamates the dissertation’s major findings. This chapter also makes a comparison of recent mega-sporting events in South Africa and Brazil to examine how two analogous societies that hosted mega-sporting events around the same time ultimately diverged into completely different consequences.
Subsequently, I outline the contributions and limitations of this study and suggest an agenda for future research.
CHAPTER 2.

MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS AND REIMAGINING THE NATION:

THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Introduction

Throughout this dissertation, by shedding light on the case of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics held in Brazil, I argue that apart from the fact that hosting mega-sporting events contributes to the further consolidation of nationalism and national identity, mega-sporting events can also trigger a profound challenge to an existing national identity and lead to the rise of competing identities. This chapter builds on the theoretical framework for this dissertation by reconciling literature on national identity, nation-building, collective action and identity change, which provides an effective tool to explain how nationwide collective actions against the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics ultimately gave rise to the emergence of a new counter-narrative of national identity in Brazil.

I will first deal with the social constructivist character of nations and national identities by challenging the primordialist and ethno-symbolist interpretation. I attempt to complement nation-building literature by arguing that the dynamics of nation-making from below can best capture how ordinary citizens can make sense of nationhood, challenging the traditional approach of “making, building, construction” of national identity in a top-down way. Whereas the latter approach underlines the public (political) domain of the construction of national identity, the former approach, and the one that will be adopted in this study, highlights the private domain of the formation of identity which is reconstituted through everyday lives and everyday experiences of ordinary citizens.
Subsequently, I also deal with the dynamics of change in national identity—from one based on ethnicity to civic nationalism in particular—to which academia has not paid scholarly attention and suggest that collective actions, such as social movements, popular resistance and so forth, can shape, influence and transform collective identity.

**From Primordial Essence to Social Construction: Nation, Nationalism and National Identity**

Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the terms nation, nationalism and national identity, just as with many social science concepts, it is widely recognized that there is no scholarly consensus on their meanings. In this regard, Canovan (1996: 50) also notes that the notion of the nation is admittedly “a subject on which it is extraordinarily hard to get a conceptual grip.” In spite of this great difficulty in the conceptualization of the nation, the social sciences in the past and in recent decades have witnessed the development of varied theories of nationalism and national identity. In terms of theories, the major lines of contestation can be singled out by controversies with regard to the origins of nations and nationalism; whereas primordialists argue that nations precede nationalism (Geertz 1963, 1973; Connor 1978, 1990), modernist-constructivist theorists claim nationalism engenders a nation (Kedourie 1960; Calhoun 1997; Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1983; Deutsch 1953), and ethno-symbolist theory of the nation aims to carve out a middle ground between primordialism and modernism (Smith 1986, 1991).

In order to explore how Brazilian national identity changed over time as a consequence of hosting mega-sporting events, this dissertation challenges primordialist, or so-called realist ideas of the nation, rejecting an essentialist postulation of identity. Instead, in
this section, the modernist-constructivist theory will be emphasized as a theoretical approach to this study. To do so, the central tenets of primordialist and ethno-symbolist theories will first be introduced, and their fundamental theoretical limitations for this dissertation’s topic of research will be suggested as well.

Realist Idea of the Nation: Primordialist Theories of Nation Formation

According to Walker Connor (1994: xi), a nation can be defined as “a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related.” Stefan Wolff (2006: 33) also describes ethnicity as “deeply ingrained in human history and experience.” In this way, based on these premises, primordialists postulate that a particular group identity—specifically, national—is not a modern innovation, but a given, natural, and universal one (Geertz 1963, 1973; Connor 1978, 1990). In other words, for primordialists, nations are regarded as universal and natural and are not simply invented, because their primordial attachments based on region, race, blood, and language are deeply rooted in history.

Primordial attachment, in the words of Clifford Geertz (1963), stems from the “givens” of human social existence. This “givenness” is not only an immediate kin connection, but also “being born into a particular community, religion, culture, then it is a mother tongue, and sharing the same social practices” (Bacova 1998: 31). The primordial view thus highlights the ethnic and cultural elements; language, in particular, is considered as the most critical element. In his book Idols of the Tribe, Harold Isaacs (1977) also maintains that each individual’s basic group identity is the consequence of where one is born at a certain historical time. Geertz (1963) carefully observes that these primordial attachments are also formed at the social level when a particular community feels togetherness based on the shared ideas of the same race, territory, customs, traditions and blood ties.
According to Viera Bacova (1998: 31-33), although the form and strength of primordial attachment varies greatly from community to community, from individual to individual, from one period to another, for time and in each community, there are particular bonds and ties, inferred from spiritual connections, natural affinities and emotional bonds rather than from social and mutual interactions. Thus, for him, the primordial community is based primarily on “a historically developed givenness,” which is considered to be hereditary and assigned to an individual. One’s membership in a particular community, therefore, is exclusive: race, religion or ethnic group, for example.

These proponents of the nations-precede-nationalism thesis are nonetheless criticized by anti-primordialists for their intense obsession over perennialism: nations are understood and conceptualized by primordialists in a much broader and looser sense than we understand today (Hopper 2007). Furthermore, they are unable to offer a sufficient account for the modern process of changes, dissolution, and fusion of nations (Llobera 1999: 2). In addition, primordialists seem to “discourage further scholarly inquiry, particularly into the causes of, and possible solutions to, ethnic conflict” by accentuating the unpredictable and explosive nature of ethnic bonds (Conversi 2007: 16). These primordialist arguments, therefore, cannot adequately demonstrate the process through which Brazil’s dominant cultural narrative of racial democracy as the core of Brazilian national identity in the twentieth century had been socially and culturally constructed in a dialectical and uneven way. Nor can they account for the ways in which popular resistance arose against the hosting of mega-sporting events in Brazil, which brought about the rise of a competing narrative of national identity—a “civic” sense of nationhood.

*Ethno-symbolist Theories of Nation Formation*
In attempting to stake out a middle ground between primordialist and modernist schools of thought, ethno-symbolists put emphasis on “ethnic origins of modern nations.” In this regard, Anthony Smith (1986) insists that nations are not merely a product of modernity such as industrialization and capitalism, but also they have “roots” in the ethnie of the ancient and pre-modern times. Ethno-symbolist tradition, therefore, strongly highlights “continuity” from pre-modern to the modern period (Kellas 1991). For example, Smith (1991) offers crucial insights into understanding a nation which has its origins in ethnie in an ethno-symbolist perspective as below:

A nation, it was argued, is a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. By definition, the nation is a community of common myths and memories, as is an ethnie. It is also a territorial community. However, whereas in the case of ethnie, the link with a territory may be only historical and symbolic; in the case of the nation, it is physical and actual: nations possess territories. In other words, nations always require an ethnic “element.” These may, of course, be reworked; they often are. However, nations are inconceivable without some common myths and memories of a territorial home (Smith 1991: 40).

In other words, for Smith (1991: 40), nations are “the products of particular social and historical conditions working upon antecedent ethnic cores and ethnic minorities.” Likewise, nations have emerged from nowhere but build upon the ways in which ethnic group members associate (Hopper 2007: 113). Conversi (2007) also observes the core of ethno-symbolism, underscoring the role of shared ethnic myth in the creation of national identity:

Ethnosymbolism underlines the continuity between pre-modern and modern forms of social cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, memories, values, traditions, and symbols. This is a complex set of elements that Smith tends to use interchangeably, often without sufficient specification to allow critical analysis or easy application. Myths of ethnic descent, particularly myths of ‘ethnic chosen-ness,’ lie at its core. Of all these myths, the myth of a ‘golden age’ of past splendor is perhaps the most important (Conversi 2007: 21-22).

These ethnic myths, according to him, are principal to understanding the subjective
dimensions which highlight the importance of ethnic identities in the formation of nations. In the same vein, John Armstrong asserts in his study *Nations before Nationalism* (1982) that the fact that persistence and continuity of ethnic identities and nations in our modern times require us to focus more on the symbolic boundary which distinguishes them from others. Smith’s *Ethnosymbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (2009: 230) also highlights the need to understand the symbolic elements and “inner world” of ethnicity and national identity.

Although ethno-symbolism remains robust on its own ground, some significant weaknesses can be signaled. Fundamentally, ethno-symbolists are accused of undervaluing the crucial differences between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities. Particularly, the nature of a modern “civic” sense of nationhood is not found in earlier periods in our history; thus this ethno-symbolist view cannot fully explain the rise of contemporary civic nations (Hopper 2007: 113-114). These fundamental limits of an ethno-symbolist view of a nation are unable to effectively support this study as a theoretical framework, by failing to account for: 1) how Brazil’s *mestiçagem* and racial democracy as a cultural and ethnic national identity had been formed by the fusion and integration of ethnicity, in which it had actually no “roots” in the pre-modern period, and; 2) how the rise of popular resistance against the hosting of mega-sporting events in Brazil contributed to the transformation of collective identity and the process of remaking of the nation from below, and how the dominant narrative of national identity changed from the formerly predominant “cultural/ethnic” to the “civic” components.

*Nationalism Precedes the Nation: Modernist-Constructivist Theories of Nation Formation*

The modernist-constructivist view of a nation has long been the prominent trend in
the studies of nationalism and national identity (Conversi 2007: 18). In contrast to primordialist and ethno-symbolist accounts, modernists-constructivist theorists of national identity claim that nationalism and national identity are distinctively modern and regard the transitional process from a traditional society to modernity as a necessary condition for their formation; these theories in the modernist-constructivist camp focus respectively on the role of industrialization, socio-economic, political or cultural conditions in the formation and development of nationalism. These theorists have also highlighted that nations are not objective, real or indispensable, but a historical, social, and cultural construct based fundamentally on collectively shared cultures, myths, symbols, and rituals.

Ernest Gellner’s (1983: 1) theory of industrial homogenization suggests that the rise of industrialization at the late-eighteenth century played a pivotal role in the formation of a nation and nationalism, which are “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” and “maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond”. For Gellner, nations can be seen as the result of the demands and requirements of the industrial revolution, because an industrial society that necessitated a single language, culture, several institutions and systems and currency in common contributed enormously to the creation of homogenous nations. In this regard, Gellner conceives that nationalism and national identity spring not from any shared pre-existing characteristics, but the fabrication of recognition. He specifically states that:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation…A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members (Gellner 1983: 6-7).

Thus, to Gellner, a national identity that was created where it does not exist is considered as
an elite-led project that facilitated the control and coordination of the modern industrial state. Nationalism, in the words of Gellner (1983: 48), “is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.” Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm (1983), in a robust anti-promordialist view of the nation, suggests the masterpiece concept of “invention of tradition,” indicating traditions that appear to be old are often invented and recent in origin. He asserts that it is clear “new symbols and devices came into existence as part of national movements and states, such as the national anthem, the national flag, or the personification of the nation in symbol or image either official” (Hobsbawm 1983: 7). Both Gellner and Hobsbawm share a common assumption about nationalism that they see it as a calculated political project in modern times, devised and invented by social elites for specific purposes. Thus, they believe in national identity as a top-down diffusion of the collective identity as a nation.

Craig Calhoun (1997: 5) asserts that nationalism is “constituted largely by the claims themselves, by way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce a collective identity.” Likewise, Benedict Anderson (1983) conceptualizes nations as “imagined communities” which embrace not only political formations but also forms of cultural representations where national identity can be consistently reproduced through discursive action. Therefore, for Anderson, national identity is a particular type of imaginative identification through which national symbols are expressed, in which all members of a certain nation never know or meet most of their fellow members. Based on this social constructivist presumption, Anderson (1983) proposes the definition of a nation as follows:

It is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.... Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness,
but by the style in which they are imagined.... Finally, [the nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willing to die for such limited imaginings (Anderson 1983: 6-7).

He contends that the rise of print-capitalism that burgeoned in the late eighteenth century played a pivotal role in the emergence and development of nationalism and national identity, because the dissemination of a variety of literature such as books and newspapers facilitated a vernacular language to be diffused, fixing it as the “national” language while rendering people to “imagine” themselves and engage in inescapably shared national consciousness and experience.

In his book *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Karl Deutsch ([1953] 1966) similarly deals with the impact of modernization on nationalism. While treating the transition to modern from traditional societies as a stepping stone for the growth of nationalism, he emphasizes the overarching role played by communication in the formation of national identity. Deutsch further suggests that the massive social mobilization, along with urbanization, industrialization, and commercialization, as well as the development of mass communications, provided people effective chances to communicate with one another that facilitated the making of a nation.

The works of Tim Edensor (2002) and Michael Billling (1995) are particularly noteworthy in terms of national identity as a collective consciousness and identification deeply embedded and continually reproduced in everyday life. In his path-breaking book *National Identity, Popular culture and Everyday Life*, Edensor (2002) faults dominant theories of the nation for concentrating heavily on political economy and history and also points out that the cultural elements that the dominant theories deal with are exclusively “high culture” or “folk culture” that are genuinely “invented” for certain nationalist purposes.
He pinpoints that the nation is continually experienced and represented instead through the national popular culture that includes a number of other cultural producers such as pop stars, film and television producers, fashion designers, and sporting heroes as well. The underlying theoretical foundation of his argument is based primarily upon what Billing (1995) terms “banal nationalism” that refers to daily unmindful reminders of nationhood we ordinarily receive. Opening the door to explore the often routine reproduction of everyday national consciousness, Billing (1995: 8) claims that national identity is seldom forgotten because “there is a continual ‘flagging,’ or reminding, of nationhood in the established nations.” Billing specifically suggests that:

> By noticing the flaggings of nationhood, we are noticing something about ourselves. We are noticing the depths and mechanisms of our identity, embedded in the routines of social life. These rhetorical episodes continually remind us that we are ‘us’ and, in so doing, permit us to forget that we are being reminded. And, if we look closely, we not only see reminders of ‘ourselves’; we see reminders of ‘them’ and foreignness (Billing 1995: 175).

He illustrates how the use of banal utterances in daily life, such as “here,” or “us” that we tend to overlook easily actually engravés us as a part of a nation. Overall, modernist-constructivist accounts examined above are indeed best represented by Jackie Hogan’s (2010) description of nations: “Nations are more than geopolitical entities; they are discursively constructed “imagined communities.” As such, the modernist-constructivist view of the nation, by challenging primordialism and ethno-symbolism, distinctively underlines the modernist and the social constructivist nature of nationhood.

Some modernist-constructivist theorists of nationalism and national identity have paid particular attention to the ways in which "sports as popular culture" have contributed to the construction and transformation of national identity in everyday life. For example, Fox (2006) analyzes the creative ways in which sports audiences and fans consume nationalism through sporting events. After examining the case of Romanian and Hungarian university
students, he argues that international sporting competitions are a crucial arena for the display of national allegiances and nationalism. Billing (1995), in his path-breaking book, *Banal Nationalism*, also argues that there is an apparent parallel between sports and warfare. He suggests that sport is “a benign reproduction of war” providing the “symbolic models for the understanding of war” primarily because the sports pages in the newspaper echo the language of warfare, inviting us to wave flags (Billing 1995: 122-4). Similarly, Hoberman (1984) describes sportspeople as “proxy warriors,” arguing that sport has become one of the most effective vehicles for expressing nationalist feelings. Meanwhile, Edensor (2002) points out that sporting heroes as producers of popular culture are essential markers for any identification of national culture. He particularly regards sports as “the most currently powerful form of popular national performance.” According to Edensor, sport is “increasingly situated in the mediatized matrix of national life, is institutionalized in schools, widely represented in a host of cultural forms and is an everyday practice for millions of national subjects.” These everyday contexts thus offer “one of the most popular ways in which national identity is grounded” (Edensor 2002: 78).

In the Latin American context, Eduardo Archetti (1999) and Leite Lopes (1997, 2007) argued that football played a significant role in the (re)making of national identity from a social constructivist perspective, primarily in the first half of the twentieth century in Argentina and Brazil, respectively. First, Archetti (1999: 47) examines how football contributed to the “growth of a national football style and identity” and the integration of immigrants. He further notes that football created “imagined Argentine qualities” that permit the construction of a unique national identity (Archetti 1999: 231). Leite Lopes (1997, 2007) traces the formation and transformation of Brazilian national identity by examining the historical trajectory of football in Brazil. He shows how working-class people as well as
racial minorities—specifically Afro-Brazilians—who were initially excluded in the early aristocratic practices of football became successfully integrated in football under struggling social circumstances that signaled the rise and fall of surrounding social tensions.

This dissertation follows this school of thought, to consider how modernist-constructivist accounts can effectively shed light on exploring the process through which Brazilian national identity transformed into more and more “civic” or “political”-based national identification, from a long-standing national imaginary based on “culture” and “ethnicity,” as a result of popular resistance against the hosting of mega-sporting events. It also serves to examine how the rise of a civic sense of collective identity as a Brazilian was socially and discursively constructed in a bottom-up way in the midst of and after these massive protests.

Two Sides of the Diffusion of the National: Nation-Building from “Above” and “Below”

The social sciences in the past and in recent decades have considerably contributed not only to the development of varied theories of nationalism and national identity associated with the origins of the nation, but also to the studies concerning “nation-building.” Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the term, nation-building and state-building have often been used interchangeably. However, it is worth noting, first of all, that these concepts have a massive gap in their meanings: whereas the latter relates to the process of the construction of state institutions, the former refers to the formation of a national identity (Alesina and Reich 2013).

According to Tolz (1998: 993), nation-building in this regard points to “defining ‘who are we the people’ and fostering the people’s national identity, i.e., the sense of
belonging to one distinct community.” Alesina and Reich (2013: 4) conceptualize nation-building as “a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals, and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from each other.” In this regard, Carroll (2012: 14) points out that “national unity and national identity are both fundamental elements of nation-building.” The major problem I would like to point out here is that a majority of nation-building literature first and foremost postulates nation-building to be primarily oriented by top-down political projects or deliberate processes that pursue national integration by constructing an all-inclusive national identity that seeks to diminish differences and increase inclusivity. It can be pointed out that the other dimension of the diffusion of the national, i.e., nation-building from “below” via discursive processes, has been significantly understudied in the previous studies.

It is particularly noteworthy that there have also been vibrant debates among modernist-constructivist theorists about whether the diffusion of national identity is hierarchical and top-down (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983; Kedourie 1960), or horizontal (Billing 1995; Edensor 2002; Seton-Watson 1977). In this section, these differing schools of thought on this subject will be discussed generally. I will suggest nation-building from below as a theoretical framework for this dissertation by highlighting the significance and role of horizontal interconnection in the (re)making of the Brazilian nation.

Many modernist-constructivists, such as Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1983) and Kedourie (1960), have overly focused on the vertical dynamics of national diffusion. In the words of Gellner (1983: 48), “nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent ... political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality.” For Gellner, as described in the previous section, a
centralized state coordinated, encouraged and implemented a common language, culture, single currency, education, and legal system along with industrialization, which contributed to the making of homogenous nations.

While Gellner’s explanation suggests the role of economic conditions in nation-building by the state, Hobsbawm (1983) conceives the formation of nations was a calculated political project from a Marxist perspective, whereby national traditions were indeed a product of elites’ invention in order to preserve and maintain their position and the status quo (Hopper 2007: 113). In his influential volume, The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm (1983: 1) asserts that “traditions that appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.” In other words, for Hobsbawm, traditions that have been regarded as a potent and strong promoter of nation-making believed to be originated actually from the remote past are often illusion; these traditions have been manipulated and invented at a particular period of recent times by political elites for achieving their political aims. That says the sense of belonging in a nation is promoted in a vertical way in order for elites to preserve their power.

In a very similar vein, Kedourie (1960) firmly argues in his book Nationalism that nationalism is merely an invention. He specifically suggests that nationalism is “a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century,” by pointing out its artificial character (Kedourie 1960: 9). Kedourie specifically states that:

Nationalism…pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and the right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Not the least triumph of this doctrine is that such propositions have become accepted and are thought to be self-evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a meaning and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far from having. These ideas have become firmly naturalized in the political rhetoric of the West which has been taken over for the use of the whole world.
For Kedourie, the construction of new states precedes the formation of national identity, but not vice versa. In this process, he suggests that a hegemonic identity was imposed on a given society, and that fulfilled best the elites’ interests. As part of a broader strategy of state control, Kedourie argues, nationalism and national identity are formed, which is “an elite affair superimposed from above,” closely connected to “an oppressive modern state apparatus” (Kedourie 1960, quoted in Gries 2006: 503).

Contrary to vertical and top-down accounts of nation-building within the modernist-constructivist camp, other modernist-constructivist theorists consider them to be overly structural in their explications of nationalism and national identity. Empirical research in the social sciences and history in the past two decades, in the words of Kaufmann (2017: 11), has similarly revealed the weaknesses of top-down conceptions. For example, as examined in the previous section, Anderson’s (1983) path-breaking concept of imagined community sheds light on how the rise of print capitalism and ensuing dissemination of various types of literature enabled people to imagine themselves as member of a particular national community, although they were never likely to know and meet the majority of fellow citizens (Hopper 2007: 112-113).

As such, Edensor (2002) and Billing (1995) also speak of “horizontal” interconnections, rather than “hierarchical structures” as central to nationalism and national identity. Billing’s work on banal nationalism underlines the signature role in the often mundane, vernacular, routine and mass production and reproduction of national understanding, not played by the state, but by private media. Edensor’s study also highlights, as an extension of the concept of banal nationalism, a new dimension of “everyday” nationalism which privileges “horizontal over vertical relationships, mass over high culture, the contemporary over the traditional, de-centredness rather than state centralism.” In other
words, both scholars find modernist-constructivist theorists excessively statist but also fault ethno-symbolism for overly prioritizing the traditional and the folk or high culture over the contemporary and mass-cultural modes of expression (Kaufmann 2017: 11-12).

As discussed, this dissertation adopts a horizontal reproduction of national understanding, among variants of modernist-constructivist theories of nations and national identity, by challenging the state-centric accounts. For this, Seton-Watson’s (1977: 5) definition of the nation shows a quintessence of the approach this study takes advantage of: “All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation.” In other words, the rise of new national narrative as a consequence and legacy of the hosting of mega-sporting events, the diffusion of civic identity specifically, cannot be fully explained by a state-centered approach to nation-building. This is primarily because the case of Brazil clearly shows people- and their network-centered nation-making process by newly identifying, representing and claiming themselves with regards to what it means to be Brazilian in other than the traditional way of nation-building by the efforts of the state. Importantly, Brazilians’ nation-making from below had been triggered on the street and in online space in an innovatively and horizontally networked way. It does not indicate the demise of state-centrist accounts of national diffusion, but this dissertation suggests the rise of new bottom-up ways and processes through which national identity is constructed and reconstructed in the era of technological development and an ensuing expansion, intensification, and consolidation of networks that connect people by people.

From Cultural/ Ethnic to Civic: Cross-Class Collective Action, Identity Shift and Nation-Remaking from Below
A theoretical framework for this dissertation is discussed in the above sections in a broader sense. To recapitulate, first, I suggested that hosting mega-sporting events does not always promote and enhance national pride and intensify existing national identities; instead, it can also contribute to changing, reshaping and reconstructing what it means to be a member of particular national communities. Second, on the basis of the first hypothesis, this study adopts the modernist-constructivist account of the nation; specifically, horizontal national dynamics rather than top-down processes of nation-building is employed. To put it simply, this chapter has attempted to build on the theoretical framework for explaining the impact of cross-class movements in Brazil against the mega-sporting events on the emergence of a competing and new national imaginary. Based on the presumption of these discussions, this final section of chapter 2 aims to sharpen a theoretical framework in order to explain how Brazil’s hosting of mega-sporting events and the related emergence of cross-class collective actions that had arisen to oppose them have triggered a reshaping and a shift in a collective identity as Brazilians—from the ethnic/ cultural to more civic elements.

The Role of Middle Class Activism and Cross-Class Coalitions in Social Movement

It is worth noting first that although relatively fewer studies have dealt with middle-class activism, some scholars have demonstrated the implications of the middle class for social movements. In contemporary societies, the middle class often spearheads political ferment against the status quo, and the cases of Brazil in 2013-2016 and Hong Kong in 2014 provide recent examples of this phenomenon (Chen 2017: 1). According to Chen and Suen’s (2017: 1318) new theory of middle-class activism, middle-class people are more likely to aspire for change of the existing regime because they are “more sanguine about the prospect
of good government,” and believe that “collective action is effective because they expect many fellow citizens to share the same view.” As Francis Fukuyama wrote for the Wall Street Journal (Jun. 28, 2013), today’s political turmoil worldwide has a common theme: “the failure of governments to meet the rising expectations of the newly prosperous and educated.” This emergent middle class often exerts pressure on governments by taking part in various types of collective actions and demanding governance reforms, such as less corruption and better public services (Chen 2017: 1). That means, an emergent middle class in modern societies has occupied a critical part of today’s mass movements, based on their increased expectations for good governance.

As middle class activism invigorates, a number of cross-class coalitions have emerged worldwide. Brazil’s experience during 2013 to 2016 notwithstanding, the representative case was the Arab revolts of 2011. In this regard, in the words of Goldstone (2011), virtually all successful social movements have been forged by cross-class coalitions that effectively bridge the diverse interests of different groups and goals, thus pitting society against the regime. He specifically stated the vital role of cross-class coalitions in affecting the strength of mobilization and shaping the outcomes of protests:

If a protest draws support mainly from just one class or group (peasants, workers, students, urban shopkeepers, professionals), the state can confront that group as a disruptive force, and seek to unify elites from other sectors against that threat. However, if protestors represent many different groups, it is much harder for the state to find allies against them. Moreover, while a state can claim to be preserving society by acting against isolated disruptive elements, it is far more difficult to maintain legitimacy when acting against a broad cross-class coalition. Elites are more likely to desert the state, creating crippling elite divisions, if protestors represent a broad spectrum of society. In addition, a broad cross-class coalition facilitates further mobilization by creating ‘mega-networks’ linking prior, tightly-linked within-group networks to each other. The impact of public media in favor of the protestors is also greater if media representation shows protestors as representative of the whole society, rather than as one particular group seeking partisan advantages for itself (Goldstone 2011: 457).

Based on this theoretical foundation, the author suggested that the three successful
revolutions, the so-called Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011, all demonstrated the crucial role of cross-class coalitions.

In his seminal contribution to the welfare state literature, Danish sociologist Esping-Andersen (1990: 1) contended that “the history of political class coalitions is the most decisive cause of welfare state variations.” He suggested that although Anglo-Saxon countries had not catered the support of the middle classes, Nordic countries successfully achieved pro-welfare state coalitions through cooperation between social democracy and agrarian parties, which further expanded to include the middle class following World War II. Esping-Andersen (1990: 31) explained that Sweden succeeded in building a welfare state due to its successful expansion of cross-class political support for a new type of welfare state that “provided benefits tailored to the tastes and expectations of the middle class.” Although Esping-Andersen’s work does not provide deeper implications of middle-class activism for collective actions, his arguments show that the structure of cross-class coalitions is much more crucial than “the power resources of any single class” for making any changes within certain societies (Manow 2009).

In the same context, Everingham’s (1996) work, *Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua*, vividly traces the factors that led to the revolution in July of 1979 to overthrow Somoza government. People from almost every social stratum took part in the Nicaraguan revolution, he suggested, and this formation of a revolutionary alliance among disparate social groups in the late-1970s was the decisive factor that brought about the success story of the insurgency. As such, it is widely acknowledged the significant role played by cross-class solidarity in the success of collective actions. However, it is not always easy to engender a culture of appropriate formation of cross-class coalitions, depending on certain sectors or characteristics of social movements. For example, Mix and Cable (2012), in
their empirical study of the contemporary environmental movement informed by data sources drawn from interviews and focus groups with working class activists, revealed that cooperative efforts involving class or groups of different social status within that movement are rare. Nevertheless, once these are formed, successfully maintained through continuing dynamics and propelled into a mode of constructive opposition, such coalitions can succeed in moving toward progressive and positive changes such as democracy and social justice (Goldstone 2011).

I suggest in this dissertation that such cross-class coalitions, which were marked by succinct middle-class activism, were among contributing factors that spurred the move toward the rise of civic nationalism in Brazil. If the protests were limited to a single class, they might cause the consolidation of class identity of a particular group of people. However, as explored throughout this dissertation, Brazil’s demonstrations were clearly characterized by cross-ideological and cross-class solidarity that embraced the “civic” values. In this regard, following sections will deal with the relationship between collective actions and identity shift.

Toward a Civic Narrative: Social Movement and Collective Identity Shift

A number of social science scholars have observed the process by which national identity transforms from ethnic to civic in particular regions or particular countries with particular attention to Canadian cases. For example, Raymond Breton (1988) and Jose Igartua (2007) analyze how a long-standing English Canadian identity based on ethnicity rooted in British Origins changed to one based on civic values. Following Anderson’s (1983) argument that collective identity can be conceptualized as imagined community, Bruner (1997) examined how prevalent inequality in the realm of politics and economy in Canada have productively led to the emergence of civic values embraced in public discourses and policies,
which then contributed to construct a new collective identity based on multiculturalist ideas—what the author calls strategic multiculturalism—in the province of Québec. Apart from Canadian cases, Vladimir Fedorenko (2012) sheds light on the five Central Asian states. While admitting that ethnic nationalism prevalent in this region was a “convenient and promising strategy capable of providing a sense of stability by uniting majority groups around the common and powerful link of ethnicity,” it also affected minority ethnic groups who do not easily embrace this collective identity, instead suffer exclusion, injustice, and domination during the process of nation-building (Fedorenko 2012: 1-2). Civic nationalism based on a shared set of values apart from ethnocentrism, Fedorenko suggests, should be a priority for Central Asian states to shift national policy in order to integrate and unite nations.

While previous studies have excellently examined the dynamics of identity transformation, from ethnic to civic in particular, these focused excessively on the role played by political elites, the governments or public policy in this transitional process of identity. Likewise, it is worth noting that the literature on nation-building discussed in the section above has neglected how collective actions—social movement, popular resistance, etc.—have guided the shift in collective identity as well. In other words, few scholars have paid particular attention to the impact of “social movement” as a collective action on “national identity changes” from “below.” On top of that, social movement literature has neglected to examine how collective actions shape, impact and transform people’s identity; instead, it has focused excessively on why, when and how social movements arise, primarily dominated by both approaches and models of resource mobilization and political process (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283). Consequently, few scholars have observed the former, traditionally understudied area of research which sheds light on social movement as a cause of the transformation of identity. Sociologist Guobin Yang (2000) deals with this issue by arguing:
Social movements transform participants’ identities… I argue that for participants, social movements are liminal phenomena characterized by varying degrees of freedom, egalitarianism, communion, and creativity. As such, the transformative power of social movements depends on their degree of liminality. Those that approximate most to the pure type of the liminal offer to the participants’ high degrees of freedom, egalitarianism, communion, and creativity. They transform identities most powerfully (Yang 2000: 379).

While society is comprised of a highly structured hierarchical system in general, the space of this “liminality” forms an unstructured anonymous community. In this regard, for Yang, identity transformation is one of the “liminal effects” of social movements that provide the participants' high degrees of shared values and communion.

However, based on this theoretical presumption, very few scholars have examined the relationship between a social movement and the rise of civic nationalism. For example, Justin Kwan (2016) sheds light on how social movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan triggered the emergence of a liberal democratic civic nationalism which was contributing to the rejection of Chinese ethnonational identity interfused by Beijing, by analyzing the case of the 2014 Umbrella movement and Sunflower movement in both countries, respectively. This dissertation ultimately attempts to apply this analytic framework which can offer a compelling account of how various forms of collective action led to the rise of civic identity.

_Collective Action and Nation-Remaking from Below: Identity as an “Outcome”_

In this study, I reconcile “horizontal” nation-making theories and social movement/collective action literature based on a modernist-social constructivist perspective of nation formation in order to explain identity transformation and dynamics caused by collective actions against mega-sporting events in Brazil.

Like many other social science concepts, there is no unified definition of collective action; however, it generally refers to action taken together by a number of people “to
achieve some common objective’’ (Dowding 2013). As Tilly (2001: 189) puts it, much collective action consists of cooperation or conflict, which may imply “two or more interacting parties.” As the concept of collective action implies, there are varied forms of collective action and it can range from revolution and mass demonstration to small ad hoc groups’ joint action or electoral campaigns (Wright 2009). Among others, a social movement is a type of collective action, which can be classified into “collective political action” (Klandermans 2003). Tilly (2001: 189) pointed out that social scientists often reserve the notion of “collective action” in a narrow sense, which resembles what other scholars call rebellion or protest. In this dissertation, I use the term “collective action” in a broader sense that embraces not only protests but also symbolic resistance via online platforms, strikes, open forums, etc. In effect, there had been a number of forms of actions, other than social movement, taken by Brazilian people to collectively resist the perceived injustice surrounding mega-sporting events.

Social science has faced the “turn to collective identity,” which enables scholars to fill gaps in the political process and resource mobilization accounts of the emergence and trajectories of social movements (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 283). Understanding the relationship, in other words, between collective action and group consciousness has been in the spotlight of social science research (Taylor and Whittier 1992). In this context, many social movement literatures and collective action literature have delineated the relationship between collective identity and movement or collective action participation. In other words, the concept of collective identity has been extensively used to elucidate how social movement generates and sustains (Fominaya 2010). “New Social Movement” or identity politics literature have largely regarded a collective identity as either precondition or a potent motivation for the rise of social movement and actors’ participation (e.g., Calhoun 1993;
Melucci 1980, 1989; Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). As Talyor and Wittier (1992) put it, the role of identity is crucial not just to the so-called new movements, but to all forms of collective actions as well. For this scholarship, social movements and collective actions based on a common identity are what differentiate recent political organizing in the United States and Europe from the past’s class- or ideology based movements (Kauffman 1990; Laraña et al. 1994).

In their empirical studies, a large number of scholars have demonstrated the role played by collective identification in motivations for participation in collective action. For example, Klandermans et al. (2002) examined farmers’ protest in the Netherlands and Spain by conducting longitudinal interviews and suggested that a strong sense of collective identity combined with contextual circumstances stimulated participation in collective action. Authors showed that collective action participation is more likely among group members with a strong collective identity. Similarly, Simon et al. (1998) also scrutinized the elderly’s movement in Germany and the gay movement in the United States and argued that both cases yielded identical pathways to the willingness to take part in collective action based on collective identification as members of particular groups. In their survey research and regression analysis on the social-psychological factors involved in women’s participation in different types of political action, Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) revealed that collective identification as an activist was the most powerful correlate of movement participation.

The post-material politics scholarship that emphasizes the centrality of identity in social movement and collective action participation, however, has significantly neglected a novel dimension of how social movements and collective actions affect or transform identity. This dissertation attempts to offer a new analytic framework to this literature, particularly with respect to the impact of collective action on identity shift. In this project, I delineate
collective identity as an “outcome” of collective action; in this way I suggest that identity itself can also be a dependent variable of collective actions. Particularly, as this study articulates, social movements as collective action can provoke the rise of new collective identity—civic identity in the case of this dissertation—and cause possible identity contestation, conflict or (re)negotiation in a society where another form of identity prevails.

Conclusion: Toward the New Approach to National Identity

This chapter has sought to build a theoretical framework for the dissertation. To this end, a variety of existing literature in several fields was reviewed. Since this dissertation’s major concern is to scrutinize how cross-class collective actions against the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics ultimately gave rise to the emergence of the new competing narrative of civic national identity in Brazil against one based predominantly on ethnicity, the adoption of the new approach to nation-making is imperative. Thus, it is essential for this study to take a closer look at national identity existing in the “private sphere” as a form of “personal and group subjectivity which expresses a variety of modes of life and feelings which sometimes are not well represented in public versions of identity,” rather than the traditionally taken-for-granted approach that has paid particular attention to one existing in the “public sphere” as “articulated discourses, highly selective and constructed from above by a variety of cultural agents and institutions” (Ibanez 2001: 16). In this regard, this chapter also suggested collective actions as one of the important catalysts in (re)defining and (re)shaping who we are as people and what it means to be a member of a nation in a bottom-up way.
CHAPTER 3.
BUILDING THE BRAZILIAN NATION THROUGH FUTEBOL-MULATO:
RACIAL DEMOCRACY, VISUAL-AURAL CAPITALISM AND THE RISE OF
CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH CENTURY BRAZIL

Introduction

As American historian Marshall Eakin (2017: 1) observes, the history of national identities is a history of myth-making. Twentieth-Century Brazil, like many other countries in the Latin American region, witnessed the dynamic and dialectic process through which national identity had been socially constructed through popular culture. In the case of Brazil, futebol, among other popular cultures such as film, literature, samba, and carnival, can be marked as the most influential and powerful nation-builder which eventually enabled all Brazilians to embrace the myth of mestiçagem and racial democracy from the 1930s to the 1980s and, into the 1990s. Brazilian futebol had significantly contributed Brazilian people to sharing a commonly held sense of Brazilianness based on strong ethnocultural ties, largely in the absence of a vibrant and potent civic identity (Archetti 2003; Eakin 2017; Leite Lopes 1997). Then, how did Brazilian leaders and the political elites take advantage of the power and appeal of futebol for the sake of making an imagined Brazilian community throughout most of the twentieth century? What made futebol so popular that it finally became a standard set of national symbols and rituals among Brazilian people?

This chapter primarily navigates the history and politics of nation-building—the making of racial democracy as a central component of Brazilianness—through futebol and aims to address the abovementioned two principal questions by drawing primarily on
modernist-constructivist accounts of national identity. While some scholars have addressed the role of football in nation-building in Brazil (e.g., Archetti 2003; Leite Lopes 1997), less scholarly attention has been paid to how the development of media technology and an ensuing emergence of aural-visual cultures—notably, radio, film, and television—contributed to this process. I argue that it is unconvincing that football itself, through the exertion of the State, just spontaneously captured the hearts and minds of Brazilian people in a top-down way, making all Brazilians feel strong national ties through football. Thus, unlike Benedict Anderson’s (1983) ground-breaking work which argues that the formation of nation-states in Europe were closely associated with the nineteenth century’s print capitalism, this chapter suggests, with particular reference to the American Brazilianist Marshall Eakin’s classic study (2017), that in the case of Brazil, the imagined community through futebol came into being with the advent of vibrant visual and aural cultures—specifically, the dissemination of radio, film, and television—in the twentieth century.

**From Scientific Racism to Racial Democracy: The History of Race and National Identity in Brazil, 1870-1985**

Any discussions about race and nation should take into deep consideration contingent local or regional contexts; primarily this is because varied historical experiences and processes that ultimately lead to generating particular countries’ distinct social and cultural constructs of race and nation. The Brazilian case is no exception; examining the history of Brazil related to racial issues facilitates our better understanding of racial ideas and their intersection with the nation in Brazil. This section begins with a very brief history of race and nation in Brazil, from its discovery to the second half of the nineteenth century in order to
review the rise of social Darwinist thought and the ensuing institutionalized *embranquecimento* (whitening) policy in Brazilian society during the late-nineteenth century to the early-twentieth-century. It will also examine how the notion of racial democracy dramatically became a coherent and dominant narrative of Brazilian national identity from the 1930s to the end of the authoritarian regime in 1985.

**Improving the Brazilian Population? Scientific Racism, Social Darwinism and Institutionalized Embranquecimento (Whitening), 1870-1930**

Europe first made claim to Brazil when Portuguese nobleman and explorer, Pedro Alvares Cabral, arrived in April 1500, which marked not only the birth of Brazil as a Portuguese colony, but also the beginning of racism in Brazilian history. The latter is clearly demonstrated in *A Carta de Pero Vaz de Caminha* (the letter from Pero Vaz de Caminha, Portuguese knight who accompanied Pedro Alvares Cabral’s exploration) to King D. Manuel as soon as they discovered Brazil: “*Pardos*⁸, all naked, and they have nothing to cover their shame.”⁹ It can be seen that this expression relegated dark-skinned native people to a lower social status in relation to European whiteness.¹⁰

Beginning in the 1530s, sugarcane production became a principal colonial industry in Brazil. In 1534, Portugal finally decided to establish captaincies in Brazil, hereditary

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⁸ The term *Pardo* is used currently as one of the skin color categories in the Brazilian census by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE), which widely indicates mixed race between the white, Afro-Brazilian, Asian and native Brazilian. However, at that time in the era of European colonization in the Americas, Pardo was commonly used to call native Indians.

⁹ Original in Portuguese: “*Pardos, nus, sem coisa alguma que lhes cobrisse suas vergonhas.*” Quoted in Menezes (2005) and the translation is mine.

¹⁰ Apart from the discourse of the Portuguese justification of the conquest, Spanish philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda also rationalized the Spanish conquest of Latin America, by relegating Indians as natural slaves. The dichotomy of civilization and barbarism can not be simply seen as racism, however, a series of processes of “otherizing” the Native Americans since the discovery and “structuralizing” the societies that has privileged white European settlers have been a fundamental root for perpetuating socioeconomic disparity based on color.
lordships, which were governed by a Captain General from Portugal in order to effectively manage colonial Brazil and, most importantly, to promote sugar cultivation throughout all the captaincies. As a result, the sugarcane industry achieved notable success in the Northeast region of the Brazilian territory. During this process, the native slaves, who succumbed to several infectious diseases and the heavy workload imposed by the Portuguese, had been exchanged for African slaves through the slave trade directed by the Portuguese empire. In 1591, 37% of the labor workers were African, and in 1638, all labor forces in Brazil were composed of Africans and their descendants (Fausto 2006).

Although the sugar industry faced a gradual decline due to a drop in price competitiveness, the so-called gold rush in the interior state of Minas Gerais and the development of the coffee industry in the Northeastern states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro throughout the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries created greater need for African slaves (Demissie 2014). The estimated number of Africans imported to Brazil varies from scholar to scholar. While some suggest that about 3.6 million Africans were enslaved in Brazil (Baronov 2000; Curtain 1969), others argue that the number of Africans sent to Brazil should be higher: Eduardo Bueno (2003: 120) and Herbert Klein (2002: 93) estimate between 4 to 4.5 million. Yeda Pessoa de Castro (2001: 62) maintains that 5 to 8 million Africans were traded. Despite such variations, firm consensus has been made that the slave trade to Brazil can be distinguished in terms of its volume, duration, and intensity. Brazil was the largest recipient of African slaves in the Americas from the fifteenth century until the end of the slave trade in 1850 (Byrd 2012; Heringer 2000: 2).

At the end of the nineteenth century, Brazilian politicians and elites began to

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11 Although there were fourteen captaincies, only two were successful, due to perfect conditions for the cultivation of sugarcane in terms of climate and geography: São Vicente and Pernambuco.
contemplate the idea of the nation and race amid fractious debate revolving around these ideas, which were stimulated by the official full emancipation of slavery in 1888 and the proclamation of the old republic in 1889 (Nava and Lauerhass 2006). They particularly worried about, according to Jennifer Roth-Gordon (2017), the country’s lack of whiteness. Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Brazil, in the words of Thomas Skidmore (1974), spent many more a “sleepless night” concerning its far-reaching blackness, and strategizing on how to upgrade their national population racially. According to Nancy Stepan (1991), leading thinkers in Brazil and Latin America obsessed over their global standing, at the same time they yearned for the whiter U.S. and European values. The elites in Brazil felt particularly disadvantaged in the realm of race vis-à-vis mostly white Argentina, their primary South American rival (Skidmore 2010: 82).

At the international level, nineteenth-century Europe witnessed the rise and predominance of “science” that “scientifically” maintained the Caucasian as “biologically” superior to other races, which had been the base of scientific racism that went hand in hand with imperialism. This trend was not an exception to Brazil. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, after independence from Portugal in 1822, more precisely, Brazilian elites had long credited whites with racial superiority. At the same time, the Brazilian intellectual community increasingly had contacts with Europe—especially with France— and thus they were hugely influenced by Auguste Comte’s positivist philosophy. As a result, European eugenics, scientific racism, and social Darwinism, which stressed racial hierarchy and white supremacy, were successfully transplanted and became dominant in Brazilian intellectual life and social thought under the banner of positivism (Heise 2012; Levine 1992). However, in contrast to such dominant social Darwinism and Spencerian theories in Europe, the racial idea of the ruling whites in Brazil at that time was that the white race is not only biologically,
but also intellectually and morally superior to the others. The black race was mainly seen as a racial degeneracy (Kim 2010). Also, in his book *Race in Another America*, Edward Telles (2004) suggests that whereas British, German and North American eugenics was based closely on Mendelian eugenics which adhered to genetic inheritance and its racial impact, most Latin America and Brazilian eugenics maintained strong intellectual ties with the French version, following neo-Lamarckianism which highlighted that genetic deficiencies could be ameliorated in a single generation. Thus, the neo-Lamarckian view had enormous implications for Brazilian scholars and political elites who later adhered to the belief that black and mulatto inferiority could be improved through miscegenation with whites (Telles 2004).

Based on this dominant intellectual view, Brazilian elites who dreamed of constructing a modern state like the U.S and those in Europe finally proposed *embranquecimento* (whitening)—or what Natasha Pravas (2003) calls “*hibridação estratégica*” (strategic hybridization)—as an alternative solution in order to resolve racial problems and reach a comparable level with those countries. This whitening was backed up primarily through European immigration, by promoting and financially subsidizing emigration for workers in Europe, where surplus labor was produced in the process of demographic transition (Guimarães 2012; Roth-Gorden 2017; Sansone 2003; Telles 2004). The elite in Brazil who did not want Brazil to remain as a second-class country believed that a flow of healthy Caucasian blood and an inter-racial marriage would allow Brazilians to “cleanse themselves of the backward population” (Davis 1999: 19; Ferreira 2001).

The whitening policy was closely allied to the 1891 Constitution which manifested a ferocious prohibition of immigration from Asia and Africa, for fear of “mongolization” and “Africanization” (Hanchard 1994; Skidmore 2010: 83). The First Republic (1891-1930) made
a constant effort to attract European immigration; as a result, 2.5 million European workers arrived in Brazil between 1890 to 1914, and another approximately 847,000 Europeans migrated during the 1920s, paid for by state subsidies (Merrick and Graham 1979: 92, quoted in Andrews 1996: 486). Thanks to embranquecimento, the national census of 1920 could confirm that the white race was becoming more elevated in the Brazilian population. However, the 1920s in Brazil witnessed a strong opposition to European immigration. George Andrews states explicitly that:

By the 1920s and 1930s national disenchantment with immigration and Europeanization was abundantly clear. Right-wing xenophobia became a core element of middle-class political mobilization, culminating in the fascist-inspired Integralist movement, founded in 1932 in São Paulo, the state most affected by European immigration. São Paulo had already abolished its programme of subsidies for European immigration in 1927, and in 1930 and 1931 the federal government placed restrictions on immigration into the country, as well as on the employment of foreign nationals in commerce and industry (Andrews 1996: 486-487).

As the effort of Brazil to transform itself into a white society failed, according to Andrews (1996: 487), questions around Brazil’s path for future development, modernity and the character of its national identity were reopened. It was at that time, that the new dawn of the rise of racial democracy as an alternative view of the Brazilian nation came into play.

Building a Nation, Uniting People: The Rise of Racial Democracy as Brazilian National Identity

As the endeavor to “whiten” the Brazilian nation was unsuccessful, Brazil’s twentieth-century dictatorships attempted to undertake myth-making strategies as a nation-building project beginning in the 1930s: crafting and projecting a favorable image of racial democracy and mestiçagem, both domestically and internationally (Davis 2000). In particular, President Getúlio Vargas (dictator during 1930-1945, who was democratically elected, and governed during 1951-1954) sought to centralize Brazil’s federal system, modernize and
industrialize Brazil, as well as to actively promote a cohesive and shared sense of national identity through nation-building founded on racial democracy and racial mixture (Roth-Gordon 2017: 21). Beginning in the 1930s, Brazil’s socio-racial relations had centered around the idea of racial democracy (Sansone 2003: 2). Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta (1981) famously called this national mythology as the “fábula das três raças.” This fable of three races represents the “racially harmonious Brazilian national family,” which incorporated African, European, and native peoples (Davis 1999: 2).

The notion of racial democracy has been widely used to frame Brazil’s racial harmony as one without racial discrimination and hierarchical race relations. It should be noted that the celebrated Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre had contributed enormously to making this idea popular, which had long been characterized as brasilidade (Brazilianess)—how Brazilians believe themselves to be and how they should be. In his book *Casa Grande & Senzala* (The Masters and the Slaves), Freyre ([1933] 1956) highlighted the promising role of miscegenation and racial mixture that would eventually lead to Brazilian social development and harmonious race relations, attempting at the same time to create a Brazilian “meta-race,” downplaying discussion of racial difference (Roth-Gordon 2017: 21).

It is important to note that Freyre did not directly coin the term racial democracy; the term evolved first from the notion of “social democracy” coined by Freyre in the 1930s and later developed into “racial,” substituting “social” in the intellectual circle in the 1950s. Specifically, he speaks of “social democracy” in his lecture in Lisbon on “Aspects of the Influence of Race Mixture on Social and Cultural Relations between the Portuguese and Luso-descendants.” In Freyre’s lecture, published in 1938, he specifically states that:

There is, with respect to this problem of growing importance for modern peoples—the problem of miscegenation, of Europeans’ relations with black, brown, and yellow people—a distinctly, typically, characteristically Portuguese attitude, perhaps better described as Luso-Brazilian, Luso-Asian, Luso-African, which makes of us a psychological and cultural unit
founded upon one of the most significant events, perhaps one could say upon one of the most significant human solutions of a biological and at the same time social nature, of our time: social democracy through race mixture (Freyre 1938: 14, Quoted in Guimarães 2005: 122).

Freyre stressed that Brazil’s social democracy is not only the most original and crucial legacy of Luso-Brazilian civilization to humanity, but it also contrasts with the merely political democracy in Europe. He asserted that:

By virtue of this cultural dynamism, which does not shut off European culture from other influences; by valuing in men, to the greatest extent possible, authentic qualities independent of color, social position, economic success; through equality—as much as possible—of social opportunities and of culture for men of different origins, regions molded by the Portuguese—molded by miscegenation—constitute today an anticipation of, or, more accurately, an approximation to, that social democracy from which currently more advanced peoples find themselves distant in their practice of that often inefficient, unjust, and anti-human political, merely political, democracy (Freyre 1938: 18, Quoted in Guimarães 2005: 122).

His intellectual implications, in the words of Edward Telles (2004: 33), “transformed the concept of miscegenation from its former pejorative connotation into positive national characteristics and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture.” According to Peter Fry (2005: 215), Freyre suggested an exuberant and optimistic vision of racial democracy and mestiçagem, declaring that all Brazilians, whatever their biological and genealogical affiliation, “were culturally Africans, Amerindians and Europeans.”

Since Getúlio Vargas, the myth of racial democracy had become, at its zenith, a dogma under the military dictatorships from 1964 to 1985, which is also the period in which Brazil achieved its most considerable economic growth. The authoritarian regime during this period turned the Freyrean vision into an uncontested and obstinate principle of the Brazilian nation (Telles 2004). By the 1980s, therefore, all Brazilians, regardless of color, “carry with them shadows in their soul, traces of Europe, Africa, and the Americas in their cultural, if not their biological, DNA.” They shared this Freyrean vision of Brazil, brasilidade, which had become a “master narrative of Brazilian culture” (Eakin 2017: 2). However, it is worth noting
that this process of transculturation did not translate into a non-hierarchical society, particularly in terms of racial and socioeconomic order in Brazil.


According to Livio Sansone (2003: 2), racial democracy could become the founding myth of the Brazilian nation primarily because a myth had been both accepted by the vast majority and reproduced in daily life. This became possible thanks to the consistent efforts of the State, particularly during the Getulio Vargas regime propagated through *futebol*, along with *Samba* and *Carnival*, which epitomized the creative power of racial mixture and miscegenation—as a nation-building strategy. Since Vargas, *futebol* became one of the sources of Brazilian pride, not only because of their excellence, but also because this sport represents Brazil’s positive image of multiracial harmony to the rest of the world (Telles 2004: 37).

The previous section discussed the history of race and the nation in Brazil, particularly from the rise of scientific racism to the new invention of racial democracy and *mestiçagem* as a dominant and powerful narrative of Brazilian national identity. The history of *futebol* in Brazil parallels the history of race and nation in Brazil. This section will explore the history of the construction of Brazilian national cultural identity through *futebol*, by examining chronicles from its elitist and aristocratic beginnings to the appropriation of football by working-class and non-white Brazilians. The democratization of *futebol*, which brought about the creation of *futebol-Mulato* and contributed later to the making of a Brazilian imagined community based on the idea of racial democracy and *mestiçagem*.
produced a further consolidation of this narrative by the end of the military dictatorship.

**Aristocratic Beginning of Brazilian Football: British Influence and Elite Football, 1894-1904**

The early spread of football in Latin America was closely associated with Britain’s status as a world power (Archetti 1999). Notably, British sailors played a vital role in this process. It was thus not by accident that “the oldest football clubs were founded in the main ports visited by sailors and traders: Rosario and Buenos Aires in Argentina, São Paulo/Santos and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, Montevideo in Uruguay, Lima/Callao in Peru and Valparaiso in Chile” (Archetti 2003: 116). Early internationalization of football followed “the network of contacts stimulated indirectly by previously established and spontaneous relations between local elites and their institutions” (Leite Lopes 1997: 55). This was the case for Brazil as well. In Brazil, Charles William Miller, the son of a Scottish father and an Anglo-Brazilian mother, a student in Southampton who returned to São Paulo in 1894 with two leather balls and outfits, is generally considered a representative figure in the introduction and popularization of football, especially in São Paulo (Ferreira Antunes 2014; Leite Lopes 1997). He organized teams consisting of players from the privileged classes, specifically dedicating himself to encouraging British residents in São Paulo. Although pursuing his career as a successor of British-owned companies, he was also eager to teach young men in São Paulo-based British community the techniques, rules, and tactics of football (Ferreira Antunes 2014). Another outstanding figure includes Hans Nobling, who arrived in São Paulo from Hamburg, where he had been affiliated with the “Germania Club.” Recruiting top business employees in São Paulo, he founded the Germania Club in that city to play against the teams consisting of British players (Leite Lopes 1997). In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the federal capital at that time, Oscar Cox played an important role similar to that of Miller and Nobling in São Paulo.
Cox, the son of a British father and a Brazilian mother, returned to Brazil in 1897 after the completion of his studies in Switzerland. Excited by the growth and spread of *futebol* in São Paulo, Cox helped found the Fluminense Football Club and became its first president. Influenced by the spread of British technology and the growth of investment in Brazil, British workers in São Paulo and Rio brought their culture into the Brazilian sport. In some sense, English supremacy during the inception of football practices in Brazil ironically contributed to the development of football (Ferreira Antunes 2014).

Apart from the British, only upper-class Brazilian elites were able to participate in the new sport. Although the equipment needed to play football was not exclusive, compared with other sports, playing football was a costly activity because all the equipment—uniforms, boots, and balls—was imported at that time. In other words, the green fields symbolized the attributes of people with greater financial resources (Leite Lopes 1997; Ferreira Antunes, 2014). Playing football regularly, thus symbolized one of the characteristics of an elite lifestyle (Leite Lopes 1997). According to Leite Lopes (1997: 56-7), “several football clubs were made up of university students, and access to law, medicine and to a lesser extent, engineering was a form of social reconversion (via schooling) for the declining Brazilian rural aristocracy or an expanded reproduction of the new scholarized urban elites.” Therefore, the clubs became a symbolic place for their urban socializing (Leite Lopes 1997). Because of this, football maintained an elitist and aristocratic character while remaining an amateur practice for some time. However, despite these restrictions, football gradually attracted interest among the lower classes, especially workers (Ferreira Antunes 2014).

*Factory Football and Workers’ Inclusion, 1905-1922*

Although the first football clubs only allowed the participation of the upper class and...
social elites as players or counselors, they began to attract significant attention from the popular classes as well (Wachelke 2008). The best-known workers’ team in Brazil would probably be the Bangu Athletic Club, which was established in 1904 at the Companhia Progresso Industrial do Brasil, a textile factory located in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro (Leite Lopes 1997; Ferreira Antunes 2014). According to Levine (1980: 235), “its first team included an Italian, seven Englishmen, and a white Brazilian, but team members taught the sport to some of the factory workers, and Bangu began to draw neighborhood support and an image as a working-class team.” Ferreira Antunes (2014) observed that workers at Bangu could finally have access to the game because there were insufficient numbers of British players at Bangu to have two complete teams to play against each other. It would be no exaggeration to say that the Bangu Athletic Club provoked the popularization of football in Rio de Janeiro, as well as in other regions. Indeed, the Bangu Athletic Club became well-known as the club rapidly reached the top division, and soon played matches against Fluminense, Botafogo, and so on (Ferreira Antunes 2014).

At that time in Brazil, according to Leite Lopes (1997: 57), football was a means to discipline, both morally and symbolically, the working-class youth. Likewise, the board of directors at the Bangu factory adopted football as a disciplinary and pedagogical technique for “total institutions,” stimulating workers to augment their “sense of belonging to the company community.” This was a clear example of the utilization of sport in a functionalist means. In the same vein, several factories began to encourage football among their employees and workers, and established a large number of teams in São Paulo in the 1910s, using the Bangu team as their point of reference (Leite Lopes 1997). Ferreira Antunes states in this regard, “it was difficult to find an industry that did not have at least a small team. Amateur football, the sport played in clubs created in factories by the workers themselves,
became a new tradition in the city” (Ferreira Antunes 2014: 24). The number of mulatto and black players increased as more working-class players joined the team. Therefore, it was not only schools, but also companies, that facilitated the dissemination of direct access to the game among the working classes (Leite Lopes 1997). In addition, Aquino (2002) asserts that the prohibition of the practice of capoeira after the abolition of slavery for political and security purposes was another factor that facilitated and increased the interest of working-class people in futebol (Cited in Wachelke 2008). It was not only São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, but also Brazil’s vast interior that the dissemination of the game among the lower-income population reached. This was enabled, and empowered by, according to Gaffney, the improvements in transportation as well as the advent of radio transmission. Football, finally, became a central part of centennial celebrations in Brazil in 1922 (Gaffney 2014). However, in spite of the popularization of football among the working-class people, the hegemony of amateur elites still took the initiative due to their better knowledge of the training and the tactics of the game, as well as their greater resources available in comparison to the worker players’ limited time and resources due their required factory production (Leite Lopes 1997).

Social Tensions in Amateur Football, 1923-1932

It was in 1923, however, that the enduring hegemony of elite clubs collapsed for the first time. Elite clubs achieved every victory in the Rio de Janeiro city championship previously; however, this streak was broken by Vasco da Gama’s historic acquisition of the title (Leite Lopes 1997). There was a secret behind the victory of the Vasco team, which was a second division champion in 1922. According to Leite Lopes (1997: 60), the team recruited “the best players from the working-class suburbs, whether they were white, black or mulatto, and kept them in a regimen of semi-confinement, financed by the club, so that the athletes
were available to play football full time.” In other words, the Vasco team was “the first to field non-white players in 1923; they promptly stormed to the championship, encouraging other sides to follow suit” (Giulianotti 1999: 160). Vasco symbolized the growing popularity of football, and this game was being played in nearly all the working-class neighborhoods (Leite Lopes 1997).

However, the success of the workers’ team triggered some underlying social and ideological tensions underlying in Brazilian society. In terms of the social context at that time, as I pointed out previously, social Darwinism was widely diffused throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, influenced hugely by the European—specifically the French—traditions of positivist philosophy (Park 2010). In Brazil, as Magali Romero Sá (2001: 65) points out, “during the last decades of the nineteenth century, evolutionary thought and racial theory represented guiding axes for the natural sciences and strongly influenced the ideas of the intellectuals who were involved in defining Brazilian nationality.” In this context, the theory of *embranquecimento* (the whitening process) was widely encouraged in all sectors in Brazil, treating Afro-Brazilians and the mulatto as racially and culturally inferior and relegating them as the subjects that damaged social cohesion. As they were also portrayed as an obstacle in the process of nation-building, elites at that time promoted the elimination of these components through miscegenation, seeking Europeanization, and systematically disqualified all “non-white” cultural manifestations (Maranhão and Knijnik 2011).

Consequently, “the arrival of the game a few short years removed from the abolition of slavery meant that dark-skinned Brazilians who participated as clandestine professionals in an amateur game intended to reflect high culture were often viewed as unwanted reminders of the region’s alleged determinist albatross” (Jackson 2014: 50). From this social context, the big clubs counteracted the repercussion of Vasco’s victory; the Rio all-star team, which was
supposed to compete for the national championship did not include a single player from the Vasco team. Other measures were also taken. The clubs established a new football league that prohibited Vasco from joining. This new league also found a commission to investigate players’ means of survival to verify their status as an amateur. Leite Lopes (1997: 62) points out that the substance and procedures of this investigation revealed a number of class distinctions and social prejudices. In addition, some individuals with occupations such as stevedores, soldiers, taxi drivers, and barbers were banned from playing in the first division. The new league even tested the players on whether they could read and write properly, making them sign their names and fill in an enrollment form when they entered the field (Leite Lopes 1997). This implicit test of schooling, according to Leite Lopes (1997: 63), clearly reveals the “very characteristic of the indirect, euphemistic exercise of class and color prejudice in Brazil.”

_The Professionalization of Football: Racial Democracy and Futebol-Mulato, 1933-1950_

Leite Lopes (1997: 67-8) maintains that outside pressure significantly worsened the internal crisis in amateur football when European clubs wanted to recruit excellent players from Latin America. Specifically, Mussolini’s Italy wanted to recruit Italian-Latin Americans in order to prove national superiority as a host country of the 1934 World Cup. This recruitment endangered Argentinian football the most. In response, professionalism was adopted in Buenos Aires, and soon Uruguay followed their lead. Meanwhile, in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, white players who were of non-Italian descent overtly changed their names into Italian style names, in order to manipulate their identification papers, with the assistance of the Italian clubs. The impetus and momentum for the implementation of professional football in Brazil, therefore, was accelerated to countervail such an exodus of
players, and professionalism finally arrived in Brazilian football in 1933 (Giuliannoti 2014).

According to Leite Lopes (1997), whereas white players were recruited from Europe, black players became virtually non-exportable to Mussolini’s Italy. He postulates that racial division ironically facilitated the growth of football as a professional and the “national” sport, as well as the social emancipation through sport. In this regard, he argues explicitly that:

Many white Brazilian players who had gone to Italy ended up integrating into that society, encouraged by the Italian colony in São Paulo, who considered a triumphant return to Italy an ideal to be achieved by Brazilian-born descendants of Italians. Blacks, in turn, appeared to be “condemned” to “local” success, to be great local players, to be Brazil’s greatest players. In this sense, they were identified as the great initiators of Brazilian national football. Football thus could not have the same meaning for both black and white players. Between them, there was a difference separating “good professionals,” prone to exercise their talents on the international football scene, and talented players, who—through their athletic success—were seeking their ethnic emancipation but condemned to succeed exclusively in their homeland. Professional football became a means of emancipation for black athletes, a necessary condition to establish football as a “national” sport. This undertaking was not just a business strategy; it established an identity between players and the public, united in their adherence to a common project of social emancipation through sport. (Leite Lopes 1997: 68-9).

Thus, the 1930s in Brazil can be marked by the gradual spread of football democratization. According to Kim (2010), black players gained recognition alongside the emergence of professional football, including such players as Leônidas da Silva and Domingos da Guia. These democratizing improvements stood out in Brazil’s third participation in the 1938 World Cup (Leite Lopes 2007). Gaffney (2014: 189) asserts that “the centrality of football to Brazilian national identity was confirmed when the national team won a third-place medal at the 1938 World Cup in France and tens of thousands gathered to welcome the team home on the docks of Rio de Janeiro.”

The 1930s to the 1950s was a crucial period for the development of football, marked by the era of the Getulio Vargas regime characterized as authoritarianism, populism, and nation-building (Giuliannoti 2014, Preface xiv). With his nationalistic ideology, Vargas
devised socio-cultural policies to promote a collective imagined community, which would bridge the stark divisions, in terms of race and social class, in every aspect of social life. Accordingly, previously ridiculed non-white manifestations were gradually transformed into national symbols (Maranhão and Knijnik 2011). In this political and social context in Brazil, the 1938 World Cup played a catalytic role in defining Brazilianness and animating the process of the construction of national identity as a racial democracy, promoted mainly by some notable intellectuals. Among them, Gilberto Freyre’s theory of *mestiçagem*, *mulatismo*, and *Democracia Racial* is particularly noteworthy. Rejecting the idea of white supremacy, he asserted that racial mixing should be considered as the quintessence of the Brazilian nation, and pride (Kim 2010). Leite Lopes (2007) points out that Gilberto Freyre provided two novel interpretations of football in Brazil: first, the actualization of African heritage in Brazilian football; and second, the invention of a beautiful game, incorporating intrinsic components of music and dance into Brazilian style of playing. In this regard, Maranhão and Knijnik (2011) explicitly state that:

Freyre’s perspective was clearly and publicly demonstrated in the insightful ‘Football mulato’ article of 1938. At that time, the *Diários Associados* was a leading and influential Brazilian newspaper; in the article, Freyre maintained that the football played in Brazil was a kind of dance, where the human being could shine, as opposed to the football played in Europe which, he thought, was overly mechanized…After football began to take on a truly international dimension, Freyre collaborated as a contributor to newspapers and magazines, continuing to fervently advocate the advantages of the mulatto style of playing football. This mulatto football would be an indispensable condition for the creation of ‘our [Brazilians’] own style’ of playing football, shaping a distinct mode, constructed in a game of opposition in respect to ‘the European playing style.’ (Maranhão and Knijnik 2011: 59-60).

In other words, football was seen as a major field in which racial coexistence modeled a new imagined community of Brazilians. For Freyre, *futebol-mulato* embodied the essence of *mestiçagem* and racial democracy in sharp contrast to the rational, cold, and machine-like play of the Europeans (Eakin 2017: 175). According to Roberto Damatta (1994), this
Brazilian style of *futebol-mulato* showed an exceptional, artistic, and skillful use of the legs and the body which created a beautiful game to watch. Racial democracy—both on the playground and in Brazilian society—as an explicit nationalist ideology played a paramount role in defining the Brazilian way of being as well, as how Brazilians ought to be (Archetti 2003).

Apart from Gilberto Freyre, others in disciplines like sociology, literature and sporting journalism, according to Jackson (2014: 51), were also active in promoting “the idea of Brazilian race through their published interpretations of the game.” A representative figure was a Brazilian sportswriter and publisher Mário Filho, a personal friend of Gilberto Freyre. Like *Casa Grande e Senzala* which manifested the prominence of *mestiçagem* in Brazilian society, Mário Filho’s (1947) path-breaking book—*O Negro no Futebol Brasileiro*—had also profoundly shaped the idea of Brazilians about race and *futebol*. This book constructed the vision of Brazilian *futebol* with vivid historical narratives, adopting Freyre’s concept of *futebol-mulato* and highlighting the triumph of racial democracy in Brazilian society in general, and that on the playing fields in particular. His writings and the daily journalism, in the words of Marshall Eakin (2017: 175), “helped firmly establish the myth of *mestiçagem* as central to the identity of Brazilian Futebol and national identity in the 1940s and 1950s.”

*Maracanazo and Football in Military Dictatorships, 1950-1985*

Although the previous period saw the remarkable racial democratization of football, as well as a wide array of intellectual endeavors for the construction of national identity, these achievements had not eliminated racial stereotypes in society at large; ambiguous prejudices remained in Brazilian society (Archetti 2003). Leite Lopes (1997: 70) points out that at that time, “the lack of discipline, drinking and taking bribes were attributed more readily to
blacks.” However, to some extent for mulattos and black players, football was a relatively greater field of opportunity to make possible social and economic mobility (Archetti 2003). The explicit invention of traditions in Brazilian football sprang out of the 1938 World Cup, and became consolidated as a “particular national style of football” in the 1940s. Gilberto Freyre became “the prophet of the success of a new style of football, linked to national traits that he was constructing positively” (Leite Lopes 2007: 77, 80). Therefore, the 1950 World Cup was the perfect time and place to show this new Brazilian style to the world, possibly with the victory (Leite Lopes 2007).

In this sense, the historical defeat by Uruguay in the final game in 1950, which was held in Maracanã stadium, Rio de Janeiro, was devastatingly traumatic for the collective construction of national identity (Leite Lopes 2007). This defeat greatly affected the construction of national sentiment; a vast range of criticisms was directed toward the many black players. According to Archetti (2003: 119), they were accused of lacking stamina and courage and targeted as “the scapegoats for the nation’s tragedy” because “the Brazilian sense of inferiority was related to racial stereotypes.” It was not seen as a coincidence that the mistakes of defenders and goalkeepers, who were black, provided the decisive loss (Leite Lopes 2007).

This occasion eventually sparked the fervent comeback of the old evolutionist and social Darwinist thought in Brazil and triggered debates on the deficiencies of mixed Brazilian ethnicity (Leite Lopes 2007). The defeat in the 1950 World Cup thus played a pivotal role in justifying these social stereotypes. Leite Lopes (1997: 71) further notes that the defeat by Hungary in the 1954 World Cup held in Switzerland also offered the opportunity for the head of the Brazilian delegation to draw up a report on the team, “turning to the above theories to justify Brazil’s defeat on the basis of the alleged emotional instability resulting
However, according to Leite Lopes (1997), Brazilian football successfully accomplished the reversal of social stigmas, showing a new style of excellence along with the victories in the 1958 World Cup in Sweden. Beating the English, Austrians, Russians, French, Welsh, and Swedes, Brazilian football eventually contradicted the previous social Darwinist ethnocentrism, which expressed the inferiority of mestizo football. The victory in 1958 with its “multi-racial” team, and further consolidation by the triumph in the World Cup in 1962 and 1970, confirmed the excellence of the qualities of black players and the new Brazilian style of playing, providing a crucial domain for Brazilian national identity (Archetti 2003, Galeano 1995). Leite Lopes (1997) and Archetti (2003) point out that this Brazilian style of football is closely connected to physical activities and bodily techniques, which manifest ethnic Afro-Brazilian components of music, dance and martial arts such as samba or capoeira. This might be possible due to the democratization of Brazilian football, which accompanied the colossal influx of blacks and mulattos. In other words, as Leite Lopes (1997: 74) suggests, “the social and ethnic origins and composition of this style is not something which can be pointed out as a substance with an underlying nature; it is rather a historical process with unplanned issues and contradictions.”

The repressive military regime, during 1964-1985, also attempted to harness football’s popularity for State purposes, recognizing the appeal and power of futebol. Particularly, the authoritarian leaders invested hugely in the seleção (Brazilian national team) in 1970 and fully exploited the crowning victory for their vision of nationalism and nation-building based on the compelling narrative of racial democracy, overwhelming all other vying narratives of national identity (Eakin 2017: 168).
Creating the Myth of *Futebol-Mulato*: Football, Visual and Aural Cultures, and the Making of Cultural Citizenship in Brazil

Radio, film, and television profoundly facilitated the creation of an ongoing conversation about Brazilian national identity stemming from the 1930s. That is, the aural and visual cultures promoted by these technologies eventually shaped a shared set of national symbols, myths, and rituals that integrated into every nook and corner within Brazil’s borders. These aural and visual technologies helped forge, in the words of Marshall Eakin (2017: 166), “a mélange of popular and elite cultures, at the same time defining and redefining the meaning of ‘popular.’” As Eric Hobsbawm (1996: 509) observed, “the common culture of any late-twentieth-century urbanized country was based on the mass entertainment industry—cinema, radio, television, pop music.” In Brazil, according to Richard Giulianotti and Roland Robertson (2009: 17), “the mass production and consumption of radio—then television—was integral to the nation-building process, in which football played a crucial part.”

The phenomenal appeal and success of *futebol* aided by these media technologies—including, but not limited to, glorious victories in the 1958, 1962 and 1970 World Cups, as well as sporting heroes such as Garrincha and Pelé—confirmed the racial democracy and *mestiçagem* as a central axis of Brazilianness, which produced the sense of the nation’s exuberance and greatness (Eakin 2017: 166).

The 1930s to 1960s witnessed the more significant role of radio, not only in making *futebol* a game of *povo* (the masses) but also in promoting a centralized national imagination through this football phenomenon (Fontes and Hollanda 2014). Robert Levine (1980: 239) maintains that the advent of radio in the mid-1930s also helped the transition from amateurism to the professionalization of Brazilian *futebol*, which accompanied the rise of
racially democratized teams, *futebol-mulato*, and the first national star players. The emergence of professional *futebol*, as well as samba, mediated by radio from the 1930s, initiated the creation of the so-called "culture industry," producing a shared national popular culture for the first time in Brazil (Eakin 2017: 9). Since the first live commentary of the game in São Paulo in 1931 and the first international radio transmissions in the late-1930s, along with the advent of the new transistor radio, almost the entirety of Brazilian population came within radio’s reach. The audiences for football and its popularity, therefore, grew unprecedentedly; it was so ubiquitous listening to the football matches on a portable radio (Édison 2014; Goldblatt 2014: 46).

Film, along with the rise of radio, generated a powerful shift with the rise of *futebol* as a shared national experience in the 1950s and 1960s in Brazil. According to Tatiana Heise (2012: 2), while the radio played a pivotal role by the 1940s, in subsequent decades film took over as “the preferred media for representation of national identity.” Film especially helped promote the massification and dissemination of *futebol* throughout Brazil at those times, catching the hearts and minds of Brazilians, making *futebol* players national icons (Eakin 2017: 7-8, 176). Films for popular audiences which were devoted exclusively to *futebol*, such as Osvaldo Sampaio’s *The Price of Victory*, and documentaries about Domingos, Leônidas, Garrincha and Pelé, significantly contributed to position futebol as shared national cultural symbols within people’s everyday lives (Goldblatt 2014: 114-119; Mason 1995: 86).

While forms of cultural expression, including *futebol* and Samba, became the symbols of Brazilian national identity through radio and film, in the 1970s the widespread diffusion of television acted as the chief mediator in the process of national cultural integration (Schelling 2004: 182). Although television stations in São Paulo started broadcasting football matches as early as the mid-1950s, television’s time came only after
radio remained by the 1970s as the most popular mode of consuming *futebol* for inhabitants in Brazil (Goldblatt 2014). This televised *futebol* successfully offered, in the words of Marshall Eakin (2017: 166), “the final piece” in the decades-long construction of Freyrean vision of *mestiçagem* and racial democracy as the dominant national myth.

This was genuinely possible through the consistent policies of the military dictatorships and their close partner, Rede Globo, the emerging giant of telecommunications in Brazil which concentrated exclusively on newspaper and radio business until 1965 (Eakin 2017: 179). As the military regime attempted to develop national technology and control nationally spread mass media, television was primarily considered by the military both as “fitting into this technology vision and as the best way to build Brazilian national identity (Tunstall 2008: 19). In his book *Brazillionaires*, American journalist Alex Cuadros (2017) describes how television, with the rise of Globo, affected the vast majority of Brazilian inhabitants to share a cohesive sense of *brasilidade*:

Brazil became a TV nation watching *Globo*. By the seventies, destitute families might not have running water, but they usually had a TV set, like the low-income families in today’s *baixoes*…For the first time—it was incredible—a kid in Copacabana saw the buffalo off in the Amazon, and he didn’t know that existed in the country. And over in Belem too, the Indians could see the buildings of Rio de Janeiro.” This was a big deal in a country where, for much of its history, the major cities had kept more contact with Portugal than with one another…None of it would have been possible if the government hadn’t created Brazil’s first national telecommunication network, which went into operation in 1969 (Cuadros 2017: 88).

It was therefore “the construction of a national television broadcasting system through the efforts of the military regime and *Globo* that provided the final means to transform *futebol* into the truly national sport of Brazil,” by making it possible for the majority of Brazilian people to experience a powerful identification with their national team and the symbols of the Brazilian nation such as the flag, the national anthem, and the national colors. This national television broadcasting facilitated the consolidation of *futebol* as a dominant symbol of
Brazilian identity, both at home and abroad (Eakin 2017: 171-172, 179-180).

Likewise, the dominant narrative of national identity and nationalism in twentieth century Brazil is dominantly cultural, rather than civic. Brazilians’ struggle for the making of cultural citizenship was more successful than the civic arena because, as Renato Ortiz suggests (2009: 129), “the inability of Brazilian society to create national civic myths was due to a lack of consciousness of citizenship.” In effect, from the 1930s to the 1970s, Brazilians have forged “an increasingly rich cultural citizenship over decades in the absence of a strong civic citizenship” and this “vibrant popular culture spawned contending forms of cultural nationalism and identity” (Eakin 2017: 10). *Futebol* in radio, film, and television had been “major sites for the construction of a hegemonic discourse on *brasilidade* or Brazilianness, a term that encompasses the qualities that are thought to define the nation and distinguish Brazilians from other people” (Heise 2012: 2). As Brian Owensby (2005: 339, 342, quoted in Eakin 2017: 10) has maintained, “in a society that largely excluded Brazilians from civic citizenship and full political participation, popular culture offered sites of unofficial citizenship where people could avoid entanglements with a politics that so often excluded them. Through *Samba*, *carnival*, and *futebol*, to be Brazilian…is to rise to a moral plane above the pettiness, corruptions, and exclusions of politics.”

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined the dynamic and dialectic process through which Brazilian national cultural identity has been constructed, and how racial democracy and *mestiçagem* could become the dominant narrative of national myth, primarily via *futebol* as popular culture throughout the twentieth century. Brazil experienced a white supremacist history of
race and nation, not only during its colonial period, but also after independence in 1822. After independence, Brazilian political elites who admired both European modernity and European thought—particularly, Comtean positivism—attempted to build the Brazilian nation based on social Darwinism. The Embranquecimento (whitening) policy was carried out until the 1920s and 1930s through the promotion and realization of massive European immigration into Brazil. However, later, racial democracy would become the founding myth of the Brazilian nation primarily because this mythology had been both accepted by the vast majority and reproduced in daily life through. This became possible thanks to the consistent efforts of the State, particularly during the Getulio Vargas regime, and propagated through futebol, along with samba and carnival, which epitomized the creative power of racial mixture and miscegenation—as a nation-building strategy.

Brazil’s historical path of the construction of national identity through futebol expresses a series of struggles. The historical evolution of football in Brazil, where football is regarded as "the unofficial religion of millions" (Landau 2007: 210), has experienced dynamic processes involving social class and racial prejudices that have intersected with the national and international contexts, as well as with issues of professionalization. History shows how working-class people, as well as racial minorities—specifically Afro-Brazilians—who were initially excluded in the early aristocratic practices of football, became successfully appropriated into football under contentious social circumstances that signaled the rise and fall of surrounding social tensions. The internationalization of football, triggered by Europe, promoted the spread of the sport’s professionalization in the 1930s, with marked democratization of football. However, the mixed-race team that modeled the new Brazil was not free from a deep-rooted social Darwinist prejudice. The defeat in the 1950s known as the Maracanazo incited a strong return of this old tradition. Nevertheless, the mythology of racial
democracy was later consolidated through the victories in the 1958 World Cup and after during the military regime.

It is vital to finally note that the role of media was consequential to the formation of the imagined Brazilian community. Radio, film, and television profoundly facilitated the creation of an ongoing conversation about Brazilian national identity emerging from the 1930s. During the military regime, by the mid-1980s, the rise of the national television broadcasting system, Globo, provided the crucial “means to transform futebol into the truly national sport of Brazil,” by making it possible for Brazilians to experience a powerful identification with their national team and the symbols of the Brazilian nation (Eakin 2017: 179-180). The phenomenal appeal and success of futebol aided by these media technologies confirmed racial democracy and mestiçagem as a central axis of Brazilianness.
CHAPTER 4.
HOSTING NEOLIBERAL GAMES: THE WORLD CUP AND OLYMPIC STATE OF EXCEPTION AND THE NEOLIBERAL PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN BRAZIL

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, racial democracy has become the dominant narrative of Brazilian national identity, primarily via futebol as popular culture throughout the twentieth century. However, this Brazilian national belief was increasingly challenged by exploitative and neoliberal forces and tensions around mega-sporting events, which rather confirmed Brazil’s significant existing socioeconomic and racial disparity and later fueled the destruction of the longstanding idea of racial democracy.

Mega-sporting events such as the Olympics and the World Cup have been closely sutured with a variety of historical socio-political-economic trajectories (Silk 2014: 51). As the process of neoliberal reorganization is deepening across society in our times, it is widely acknowledged that there is a cohesive relationship between neoliberalism and mega-sporting events. According to Michael Silk (2014: 51), hosting mega-sporting events has emerged as “one of the most effective vehicles for the advancement of internally and externally identifiable places, the (re-)imaging and (re-)organization of urban space, and the attraction of capital and people in an intense period of competition between cities.” Brian Mier (2014) also points out Brazilian local governments used the mega-events as an excuse for neoliberal restructuring, and many of Brazil’s favelas, particularly those of Rio, experienced new versions of “neoliberal development,” complete with failed public transport, new private security, and gentrification.
This chapter primarily explores how Brazil’s hosting of consecutive mega-sporting events—the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics—resulted in the production of neoliberal space, particularly in terms of the ways in which the urban poor were criminalized, surveilled and gentrified at the same time that the space of the poor was ironically commodified as well. I also suggest that the displacement of the urban poor and the favelas during the preparation stages of the events was one of the factors that contributed to the formation of strong emerging opposition, albeit not enough to generate the massive opposing forces that surfaced against the World Cup and the Olympics as the next chapter reveals.

**Neoliberal Games: Mega-Sporting Events in the Neoliberal Era**

In spite of the prevalence with which the term neoliberalism is employed within a wide range of academic literature, its complex, multifaceted and multidimensional nature makes it challenging to define and conceptualize (Rowlands and Rawolle 2013). Jenson (1999) describes “neo-liberal” at the general level as a “general descriptor for post-welfare state citizenship regime” (Cited in Larner 2000: 5). Gallaher (2009: 152) argues that neoliberalism can be conceptualized in a simple way as “a return to laissez-faire.” Also, Larner (2000: 5) sees that neoliberalism denotes “new forms of political-economic governance premised on the extension of the market relationship.” According to Harvey (2005: 2), neoliberalism is in the first instance a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”

Mega-sporting events are, in the words of Michael Silk (2014), closely associated
with the rubrics of neoliberalism, particularly when it comes to the transformation of urban spaces—scrubbed spaces of consumption, gentrification, and surveillance. Renowned sport sociologist, Jay Coakley, and Lange Sousa (2013: 584-585) in this regard maintain that hosting mega-sporting events “make it possible for neoliberal interests to reorder social and physical landscapes as local government officials seek the expertise and resources to manage the challenges they face.” Also, Maharaj (2015) sees competing to host mega-sporting events has become a prominent and potent urban promotion strategy particularly in today’s neoliberal era. As Brenner and Theodore (2002: 375) state, cities have become “strategic targets for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy experiments, institutional innovations, and politico-ideological projects” which include mega-sporting events. Michael Hall (2006) in this regard points out the neoliberal attributes of mega-events in terms of urban development strategy, by arguing that:

[m]ega-events have assumed a key role in urban and regional tourism marketing and promotion as well as wider urban and regional development strategies. Nations, regions, cities and corporations have used mega-events to promote a favourable image in the international tourist, migration and business marketplace. Mega-events are therefore one of the means by which places seek to become ‘sticky’—that is attract and retain mobile capital and people—through place enhancement and regeneration and the promotion of selective place information…Imaging a city through the organization of spectacular urban space by, for example, hosting a mega-event, is therefore a mechanism for attracting mobile capital and people in a period of intense inter-urban competition and urban entrepreneurialism in which neoliberalism has become one of the major frameworks by which the experience of urban development is understood (Hall 2006: 59, 63).

Thus, for Hall, discourses on urban entrepreneurialism and competitiveness under the tenets of neoliberalism offer an ideological justification for an elite-led neoliberal state of exceptions, both in the host countries and the host cities. As such, several scholars have examined the inextricable link between mega-sporting events and neoliberalism in the era of globalization; it is widely recognized that the game has become, whether it be intentional or not, a highly potent means of the extension of neoliberal policies, philosophies, and logics.
into our everyday experiences through the (re)organization of spectacular urban space in the host cities.

In this context, Vanwynsberghe et al. (2012) examined the case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and suggested that game planning initiatives and processes to ensure the maximization of local social inclusion became a powerful instrument for the proliferation of liberal philosophies by institutionally promoting public-private partnerships. Authors argue that the neoliberal shift from the provision of public service to private sector entrepreneurialism made “individual employability” the primary goal of social inclusion policies. According to Müller and Steyaert (2013), this entrepreneurial model of private-public partnership governance was first tested at the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, which generated a profit of USD 225 million dollars. Meanwhile, in his thorough case study of the 2006 Germany World Cup, Volker Eick (2010) assumes FIFA as a neoliberalizing global institution and argues that the neoliberalization of FIFA shaped a new urban form, which promoted commercialization, commodification, and hierarchization of public space.

Other scholars have focused on the impact and legacies of mega-sporting events on the issue of security in urban areas from a critical neoliberal perspective. For example, Giulianiotti and Klauser (2010) suggest that critical urban theory would enable mega-sporting event security research to focus on how generalized and institutionalized sociospatial control of the mega-sporting events is associated with the fashioning of a neoliberal city. With their careful case analysis of Cape Town during the 2010 South Africa World Cup, Eisenhauer et al. (2014) examine how visible policing combined with technology such as CCTV and other equipment have imposed social transformations in the form of the removal of the undesired and have further shaped post-event security.

Some have studied the mega-sporting events in the context of neoliberalism with
Brazilian experiences. In his book *Brazil’s Dance with the Devil*, the celebrated sportswriter Dave Zirin (2016) explores how the World Cup and Olympics, which he calls “neoliberal Trojan horses,” under the banner of “celebration capitalism,” have seriously caused negative impacts on the populace. Alves (2016) points out there had been a serious lack of the right to voice and access to information in the midst of forced evictions in Rio de Janeiro during preparation for the 2016 Olympics. In her study “the 2014 World Cup in Brazil: Its Legacy and Challenges,” Marilene de Paula (2014) critically suggests how mega-sporting events can result in privileging certain social groups. The process of gentrification marginalizes a majority of people in the name of urban security and modernity, with the resultant of urban development that is expected to generate a prime opportunity to “sell” the host country. According to Woods (2015), Brazil’s case clearly shows that mega-sporting events enabled wealth transfer from the public to the private sector, largely benefiting elite investors rather than the whole population. Gaffney’s (2014) study explores how hyper-commercialization in constructing a new stadium for the 2014 Brazil World Cup demolished Brazil’s traditional architecture and cultural tradition.

Overall, these scholarly examinations effectively elucidate how mega-sporting events have been inextricably tied to a series of processes associated with the reorganization and reconstitution of particular space, and this feature helps us to grasp how mega-events like the World Cup and the Olympics are inscribed in this “entrepreneurial, neoliberal dynamic” (Müller and Steyaert 2013: 146). This chapter attempts to focus primarily on the effects of mega-sporting events on favela communities and how it produced a negative impact on the urban poor in Brazil through the lens of neoliberal governance. As discussed throughout this section, I suggest that an analytical framework of neoliberalism provides significant explanatory power, especially when elucidating the ways in which the modern forms of urban
entrepreneurial governance surround mega-sporting events. The Brazilian case nicely fits with the economic and political rubrics of neoliberalism in the context of mega-sporting events in particular, which basically claims to advocate, although it varies, the elimination of obstacles to the system of free market, the promotion of the virtue of privatization and commodification, the celebration of economic self-sufficiency, the attenuation of social program and criminalizing the urban poor and homeless (Giroux 2005). As this chapter will later show, a majority of the cost of Brazil’s Rio Olympics comprised private sector and the so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs) that enabled their expeditious operations as a form of privatization, “advancing the interests of the private sector and the market under the banner of sharing power with the poor and the state” (Miraftab 2004: 89). Brazil’s public service had been attenuated in keeping with the making of the modern infrastructure. Brazil was in collusion with the interests of national and international capital under the banner of “spectacular show” and “exceptionalism” around mega-sporting events that contributed to facilitating the temporal-scaling of the extension of free market power. More importantly, the space of the urban poor—the favela—ironically underwent the simultaneous process of criminalization and commercialization. Through these processes, capital became a winner by means of the marginalization of the underprivileged.

The Making of Modern Brazil: Mega-Sporting Events for the Infrastructural Development and Urban Improvement

Most countries willing to bid for or host mega-sporting events have particular motivations and strategic aims because hosting the games costs a tremendous amount. Namely, host countries would accept the inevitably exorbitant expenditure for hosting mega-
events for achieving specific goals based on a profound examination of cost-benefit estimates. Many scholars have studied the host countries’ primary expectations for hosting the games, and it can be divided into three major issues including but not limited to; 1) economic; 2) political, and 3) socio-cultural goals that cannot be fully separated but are closely interrelated.

As examined earlier, a number of studies have suggested that host countries seek to acquire direct and indirect economic, social and political benefits via hosting mega-events through newly constructed infrastructure, enhanced soft power and international reputation, increased tourism and employment, social cohesion via the consolidation of national identity, etc. (Kasimati 2003; Malfas et al. 2004; Rensmann 2015; Lee and Grix 2013; Nauright 2013). In addition, hosting mega-events is a greater chance to transform, revive and regenerate into new forms of neoliberal urban space without undergoing the usual kind of legitimizing process for social and public consensus, but rather doing so mainly through constructing new facilities, infrastructure and evicting slums (Maharaj 2015; Hall 2006; Eick 2010; Giulianotti and Klauser 2010).

The expectations in the Brazilian cases are not different from those that other host countries have sought through the Games. Host selection for the 2014 World Cup was not competitive compared to other bid elections. Only Brazil and Colombia formally expressed their candidacy in 2006; however, Colombia finally withdrew from the bid process in the next year, making Brazil the sole candidate to host the cup (FIFA, Oct. 30, 2007). Paulo Coelho, Brazilian best-selling author and a former official ambassador for the 2014 World Cup bid, commented during the media interview that “I saw the World Cup in Germany and how it changed the soul of the country…In Brazil it will change the body and soul of my country, meaning that all the infrastructure we need will surely be put in place” (Reuters, Jul. 31, 2007). Former Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF; Confederação Brasileira de Futebol)
president Ricardo Teixeira also mentioned during his interview with CNN that “over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure…In social terms it will be very beneficial…Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in global arenas…The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It's going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation” (CNN, Oct. 30, 2007). Namely, their interviews argue that expanding and supplementing urban modern infrastructure and sophisticated facilities, which have been regarded as a major obstacle for Brazil’s sustainable development, was the primary aim of hosting the World Cup, including, without a doubt, promoting Brazilian soft power at a global level that can also help attract foreign investments into the country.

Many Brazilian people did not conceal great expectations when Brazil was selected as a host country of the World Cup, particularly in terms of new infrastructure which was to be built for the preparation of the event. In his interview with Folha de S. Paulo, José Marinho Nery Júnior, professor of the University of São Paulo, commented that:

The 2014 Brazil World Cup could mean a new level in urban politics of the cities which will host the event. There will be a set of the constructions of road infrastructure, collective transportation and monumental stadium which can serve to energize poor regions of the city where public investments are highly needed (Folha de S. Paulo, Nov. 1, 2007).

A Brazilian citizen, Adoniro Prieto Mathias also enthusiastically welcomed Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup, expecting that “there will be an opportunity to upgrade our infrastructure…and also, it will be an opportunity to promote the level of our country’s business, investments, tourism, in addition to the creation of a huge number of jobs…”

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12 In Portuguese: “A Copa do Mundo no Brasil em 2014 poderia significar um novo patamar na política urbana das cidades que vão sediar os jogos. Haverá um conjunto de obras de infra-estrutura de sistema viário, de transporte coletivo, de construção de estádio monumental que poderá servir para dinamizar uma região pobre da cidade que está carente de investimentos publicos.” Translation is mine.
In September 2007, right before the announcement of the World Cup hosting, Brazil also submitted an official bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics, becoming recognized as one of the candidate cities (International Olympic Committee Rio 2016 News, Sep. 14, 2007). The Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB) selected Rio de Janeiro as the bidding city, and on October 2, 2009, Brazil finally became the first South American country to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Former Brazilian president Lula da Silva mentioned right after the announcement of the host city for the Olympics, “our time has come…Brazil is the only country that has not hosted the Olympic games among the top ten largest economies in the world…It will increase the self-esteem of Brazilians, consolidate recent achievements, stimulate new advances” (O Globo, Oct. 2, 2009).

The sustainability Management Plan for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, published by the Rio 2016 Organizing Committee (2013: 58, 74), specifically states that the Olympics will leave great legacies for the population of both the city of Rio and the Brazilian nation with a positive social balance, including social integration and social inclusion through projects encompassing cultural and educational elements, volunteer opportunities and job creation and seeking to inspire people from underprivileged communities. On top of that, the Organizing Committee also expected the Rio Olympics to boost Brazil’s prosperity through the transmission of the marvelous image of Brazil, attracting tourism in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil and strengthening Brazil’s reputation as being a desirable destination, a great place to

13 In Portuguese: “Será uma oportunidade para a melhoria da infra-estrutura…e, também, para a divulgação do nosso país em nível de negócios, investimentos, turismo, além da criação de milhares de empregos…” Translation is mine.

14 In Portuguese: “Chegou nossa hora. Chegou! Entre as dez maiores economias do mundo, o Brasil é o único país que não sediou os Jogos Olímpicos e Paralímpicos... Aumentará a autoestima dos brasileiros, consolidará conquistas recentes, estimulará novos avanços.” Translation is mine.
live, visit and do business.

Through the hosting of the Olympics, among others, the Rio 2016 Organizing Committee (2013) highly expected a unique opportunity to accelerate and promote “much-needed infrastructure investments in the city,” while interestingly acknowledging that negative impacts on the environment could be brought about due to the investments in infrastructure. In particular, the Committee’s strategic objective was to improve public transport and logistics and to modernize urban infrastructures, such as the implementation of a fully renovated train system, four new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lines and an expanded metro system, and the renovation of existing venues and so forth. Eduardo Paes, the former mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro, commented “Rio 2016 will help change the face of Rio, for visitors and residents for years to come,” emphasizing the valuable legacy venues, the Olympic village will provide much-needed housing as well as other newly constructed facilities will be invaluable for business (GamesBids, Oct. 2, 2009).

As such, countries or cities willing to host mega-sporting events have aimed to achieve particular strategic goals as a valuable legacy after the events, which embrace social, political, cultural and economic elements. As illustrated by the Brazilian cases, among the host nations, developing or Third World countries have taken advantage of the events in order to expand and modernize urban infrastructure, which is considered as one of main promoters of economic development, to highlight the projection of new soft power in the global arena that is also a principal attractor of foreign visitors and foreign investments, and to promote the acceleration of social unity and integration.

Neoliberal State of Exception: The 2014 Brazil World Cup, the 2016 Rio Olympics and the Neoliberal (Re)production of Urban Space in Brazil
As examined previously, one of the main objectives that Brazil had pursued through the consecutive hosting of mega-sporting events was to improve social and public infrastructure—including transportation and residential gentrification, etc.—and renovate urban facilities that have been long considered as the primary obstacle for Brazil’s modernization and economic development. The outdated images of Brazil related to the low level of infrastructure were not just domestic but also international problems which had discouraged foreign investments and made foreign business hesitant to enter the Brazilian market.

In order to extensively supplement large scale infrastructure without facing fierce backlash from the public, particularly during the process of housing gentrification, that required some degree of human rights violations, the government needs to acquire “legitimacy” to justify this one-way, quasi-authoritarian and “exclusionary” project which clearly circumvents democratic social and legal consensus. One of the most effective legitimacy-making ways, in these circumstances, is to rely on the unofficial declaration of what Giorgio Agamben (2005) calls a “state of exception.” Agamben’s study concerning the deployment of the “state of exception” suggests “how rather than a provisional and exceptional measure it has become a technique of government,” increasingly utilized in a wide range of non-war situations including general strikes, financial crisis, and many others. The state of exception generates an empty space, “a zone of indeterminacy in which bare life is encompassed by naked power—a limitless power, which is not tied to the legal system” (Marrero-Guillamón 2002: 20-21). Defining the state of exception as “the suspension of law by law,” Marrero-Guillamón (2002: 20-21) argues that the voluntary maintenance of a permanent state of exception—though not technically declared—has become one of the
indispensable practices of contemporary states, even in so-called “democratic” ones. Facconi (2017: 4) also examines the state of exception in the context of mega-sporting events; state of exception is delineated as “a strategy that allows for something otherwise not possible, in the name of, for example, mega-sporting events” and in fact, exceptions in legislation were given to host successfully mega-sporting events, for the success of attracting capital flow and foreign direct investments and for urban renovation, etc.

A number of countries have often utilized mega-sporting events as a means to transcend the rule of law, or democratic principles such as forced eviction, under the banner of state of exception in the name of the provision of the public good such as urban renovation and residential gentrification. In his study, Marrero-Guillamón (2012) terms “Olympic state of exception,” observing that the 2012 London Olympics which relied on “the unofficial declaration of a state of exception” and ensuing “suspension of the ordinary juridical order” resulted in a huge transformation of the spatial and legal landscape. While arguing that “infrastructural upgrades and fast-tracking of urban development projects are supposedly the further benefits of hosting mega-events,” Steinbrink et al. (2011) also reported that in Cape Town, in the course of the city’s image-building project for the 2010 South Africa World Cup, large parts of the settlement were demolished and thousands of people were rehoused in a temporary transit camp, which is reminiscent of a refugee camp, and they were disconnected from livelihood opportunities. The following sections will examine the ways in which urban renovation projects produced new urban space under the rubric of neoliberalism in the Brazilian cases of the World Cup and the Olympic Games.

The Spectacle of Mega-Sporting Events and the Neoliberal State of Exception

In Brazilian history, hosting the Olympics and the World Cup can be characterized as
a “hallmark” moment, in the words of Horne and Manzenreiter (2006). Traditionally, mega-sporting events have been seen as “the ultimate in global connection,” at the same time that “local uniqueness remains foregrounded in the aesthetics and institutional structures of the events themselves,” both in the urban spaces and in the media (Smith 2016). This fact implies that, during the preparation stage of the events, power is unusually, but intensively, shifted towards the hands of institutions led by powerful elites. In this context, it is widely recognized that large-scale sporting events have offered governing entities the exceptional extension and enlargement of the use of force.

According to Gaffney (2010), the history of mega-sporting events in Brazil and elsewhere tends to reflect the structure of the neoliberal political economy since the early 1990s. Above all, the neoliberal character of mega-sporting events can be seen in their ability to take advantage of state apparatus to facilitate and accelerate the transfer of public funds to private coffers, asymmetrically reflecting a few wealthy investors’ interests over a majority of constituents of an inefficient political democracy (Smith 2016). This capacity of private coffers, namely private corporations, to take part in and wield a powerful influence on the mega-sporting events planning and the privatization of public spaces is inarguably the recent trend. For example, Hall (2006: 61) notes that in the 2006 Germany World Cup, “as the part of the event bid the arrangements for the World Cup meant that in the supposedly ‘public’ places of the twelve host cities, the winning sponsors had the right to pitch their products exclusively when matches were on.” Likewise, as Gaffney (2010) suggests, Brazil’s rehearsal for the World Cup and the Olympics were geared highly towards capitalist urban development and the interests of private investors. In this regard, Smith (2016) highlights that the “corruption” and “illegal under-the-table contract” between state and private institutions that legitimize profit-driven governance make mega-sporting events in Brazil an increasingly
“neoliberal” spectacle.

While highlighting that corporate monopolies on the public World Cup and Olympic spaces have significantly extended in recent times, Hall (2006) also points out that contemporary mega-sporting events have led to the suspension of the rights of citizens. He suggested, as an illustration, the case of the Sydney Olympics in 2000, in which the right to court appeal for the residents who opposed the Olympics was refused by the corporate-driven “1995 environment and planning legislation” in New South Wales (Hall 2006: 62). Similarly, as the World Cup and Olympics preparations unfolded, the civic rights of Brazilians, evicted residents, in particular, were seemingly suspended.

It is particularly noteworthy that Brazilian conglomerates, in planning the infrastructure makeover across a number of host cities, as well as several members of the World Cup and Olympics authority and the municipal government, were in collusion with the interests of international capital. Thus, the so-called World Cup and Olympic “exceptionalism” is an effective mode of disseminating the emergent hegemonic norms of neoliberal governance and that of facilitating the temporal-scaling of the extension of market power, through a state of exception (Smith 2016). As Kumar (2012) observed, in this context, the “spectacular show” of the World Cup and the Olympics can be seen as “a hegemonic device to reconfigure the rights, spatial relations and self-determination of the city’s working class.”

**The 2014 Brazil World Cup as Jogo da Exclusão (Exclusion Game)**

In Brazil, corrupt local governments, based on informal connections to and political patronage with urban development and real estate industries, have conventionally “surrendered to a pattern of speculative land development that follows the interests of the builders and transportation companies at the expense of the quality of life of urban dwellers”
In order to prepare the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, a number of infrastructural projects were carried out throughout the host cities. The preparation for the World Cup was a perfect and timely chance to improve Brazil’s substandard public transportation, especially upgrading road transport infrastructure. Host cities resorted to establishing a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system because it was less costly than rail and subway construction. Many railway and subway projects were canceled; only two host cities, Fortaleza and Recife finalized their subway projects on schedule (De Paula 2014: 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host City</th>
<th>Investments (in BRL 1,000)</th>
<th>Constructions/ Improvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Belo Horizonte | 1,405,600 | a. Arrudas Boulevard/Tereza Cristina  
b. BRTs: Antônio Carlos/Pedro I; Área Central; Cristiano Machado  
c. Pedro II transport corridor  
d. Extension of Traffic Control Centre |
| Brasília | 44,600 | a. Extension of highway DF047 (airport access) |
| Cuiabá | 1,719,400 | a. Upgrade of roads and access to Arena Pantanal  
b. Mário Andreazza transport corridor  
c. LRT: Cuiabá/Várzea Grande |
| Curitiba | 466,200 | a. BRT: Extension of South Green Line/Marechal Floriano  
b. Airport bus corridor/Bus and train stations  
c. Upgrade of bus and train station  
d. Upgrade of Marechal Floriano transport corridor  
e. Upgrade of Santa Cândida terminal  
f. New road monitoring system  
g. Upgrade/integration, Metropolitanas radial road |
| Fortaleza | 617,156 | a. BRT Alberto Craveiro Avenue  
b. BRT Dedé Brasil Avenue  
c. BRT Paulino Rocha Avenue  
d. Via Expressa/Raul Barbosa (new tunnels and flyover)  
e. New underground stations  
f. LRT: Parangaba / Mucuripe |
| Manaus | - | - |
| Natal | 472,248 | a. Access to new airport São Gonçalo do Amarante  
b. Zona Norte/Rena das Dunas stadium transport |
Apart from transport infrastructure, football stadiums were also newly built or renovated, marking total costs of BRL 8 billion\(^\text{15}\), which was all publicly funded (See Table 4.2). The stadium constructions in four of the host cities— Brasília, Cuiabá, Manaus, and Natal—are still highly controversial, since none of the futebol team of those cities is in Série A, which could possibly attract bigger crowds.

### Table 4.2. Cost of the World Cup Stadiums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host City/ Stadium</th>
<th>Total Cost (BRL 1m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte / Mineirão</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasília / Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha</td>
<td>1,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuiabá / Arena Pantanal</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curitiba / Arena da Baixada</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza / Arena Castelão</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) According to the website [Exchange Rates](https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/BRL-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2014.html), the average Brazilian Real (BRL) to US Dollar (USD) exchange rate in 2014 is 0.43 USD. Thus, BRL 8 billion can be converted into about USD 3.44 billion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manaus / Arena Amazônia</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal / Arena das Dunas</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre / Estádio Beira Rio</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife / Arena Pernambuco</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro / Maracanã</td>
<td>1,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador / Arena Fonte Nova</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo / Arena Corinthians</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,096</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Paula (2014: 15)

These large-scale projects had negative side as well; infrastructure progressed at the expense of the poor. It was estimated by 2012 that more than forty-thousand people suffered forced eviction in the name of making space for the new urban landscape (UOL, Nov. 13, 2012). The in-depth news coverage by *Universo Online* (UOL), which dealt with the residents of favelas Buraco Quente and Comando in Southern zone of São Paulo, revealed the horrendous stories. According to the article, approximately 200 families were living in a pile of wreckage, debris, and trash generated by the demolition of house at the expense of city-wise infrastructure constructions.

These forced evictions in several host cities of the World Cup in Brazil were directly linked to and justified by the World Cup. *Metrô Mangueira*, a favela in Rio de Janeiro, offers one of the most representative stories of the forced evictions that occurred throughout the Brazilian cities. When it was declared that Brazil would become a host country for the 2014 World Cup, the urban development plan of the city of Rio de Janeiro was carried out rapidly and *Metrô Mangueira* became one of the major targets of forced eviction. For this project, the government workers visited *Metrô Mangueira* while disclosing their intentions in the middle of 2010, and later municipal workers gave notice to the residents that they would have to move their home to Cosmos, located in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro. The military police
were later sent to suppress the protest that occurred by the residents who strongly opposed the forced eviction. There was no time for the residents’ participation in the development planning process for the area when they were notified of an eviction with just a few days notice (Facconi 2017).

According to personal interviews of Metrô Mangueira residents conducted by Facconi (2017), this was because 1) the government first attempted to make this favela a parking lot for the Maracanã stadium visitors, and 2) the government announced that Metrô Mangueira posed an environmental risk. However, the author also pointed out that these believed reasons were a mere illusion; the real goal of the removals was to get rid of the favela’s visibility for the visitors of Maracanã stadium in order to enhance the urban layout around Maracanã since the space of Metrô Mangueira was not utilized as a parking space as it had been planned and there was very limited environmental hazard (Facconi 2017: 54). This clearly implies that the removal processes of Metrô Mangueira can be seen as “social cleansing.”

Among many others, the residents of Favela Morro da Providência in Rio de Janeiro, one of the oldest favelas in Brazil, also suffered from infrastructural constructions including, but not limited to, building a sports complex, sanitation, and road improvements. The Brazilian magazine Fórum (Dec. 11, 2012) reported that the construction works associated with the World Cup had a huge impact on this favela and the livelihoods of the residents; surprisingly enough, approximately more than nine hundred houses were demolished in the name of infrastructural development.

When Brazil was first nominated as the host nation of the 2014 World Cup, FIFA suggested new construction of stadiums or the renovation of existing stadiums to meet the “FIFA quality” necessary to host the World Cup. Brazilian sports authority decided to newly
construct seven stadiums and modernize five others. However, due to the postponement of stadium construction bidding, the strike and the shortage of the laborers, stadium constructions were significantly delayed, even into 2014, the actual year that the World Cup kicked off. Fearing the delay of the construction process, Jérôme Valcke, then Secretary-General of FIFA, commented in January 2014 that: “the situation is not ideal. The stadium is very delayed and well outside the delivery schedule to ensure the best use by the FIFA World Cup” (The Guardian, Jan. 22, 2014).

FIFA and the Brazilian government’s push toward the speeding up of construction completion and ensuing severe human rights violations in the workplaces brought about ceaseless horrific accidents. According to Reuters (May. 9, 2014), nine workers were killed in workplaces of the World Cup stadium construction in total from June 2012 to March 2014, as the following table shows.

< Table 4.3. Workers Death in the World Cup Stadium Construction Workplaces >

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2012</td>
<td>Brasília</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 2013</td>
<td>Manaus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 27, 2013</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14, 2013</td>
<td>Manaus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 7, 2014</td>
<td>Manaus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 2014</td>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 2014</td>
<td>Cuiabá</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reuters (May. 9, 2014), the table is made by author.

Libcom, an anarchist and working-class self-organization’s blog, called it “cultural terrorism.” According to this organization, the two workers’ deaths that occurred in late November, 2013 were in particular sufficiently preventable, certainly, including other cases that harmed
innocent victims, because there was “whistle-blowing” before the accidents that warned critical security issues with the crane. After an internal investigation, Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction conglomerate running the project, disaffirmed the serious health and security issues raised by the media. However, strong cynicism about the investigation prevailed throughout Brazil because of well-known strong ties between the government and Odebrecht, of which the former one was under significant pressure for a successful World Cup and the latter is a traditional huge influencer in Brazilian politics (Libcom, Dec. 15, 2013). A spokesman of the construction trade union mentioned, in this regard, that:

The government only shows the pretty part of the works and forgets who’s there making them happen. This Monday we will be there, demanding our rights as workers and exposing this reality. The accident happened because there wasn’t a safety technician on site. The labor ministry has to get off their chairs and audit the works, even when people at working at night (Libcom, Dec. 15, 2013).

As such, the World Cup preparation in Brazil demonstrated that a series of preparation processes not only provoked the deconstruction of the space for the poor, but also triggered human rights violations of workers. Indeed, the real problem underlying this is not just the “cultural terrorism” towards the lower class, but the fact that the privileged tended to benefit at the expense of the unprivileged as well. The loss of livelihood, forced evictions and human rights violations which occurred during the infrastructure development projects clearly demonstrates the statement above. The fact that socioeconomic inequality was exacerbated through the mega-event preparation would be an adverse effect of the hosting games, which have been conventionally regarded as one of the means of promoting social cohesion. Finally, one favela resident made the following insightful comments regarding the 2014 World Cup:

Here, as Brazilians, we love the World Cup and futebol. However, we are feeling the effect of the World Cup on our skin. There is a lot of money for constructing infrastructure and for the games, but how about for we the people? What do they do? See there a hospital Santa Marcelina, they received money because of the World Cup, but people don’t have access to doctors and medicines. That hospital will function only for the World Cup (El Pais, Mar. 30,
The 2013 Lei Geral da Copa: The Neoliberal State of Exception in Legal Regime

The state of exception for the mega-sporting events in Brazil was not only limited to the urban regime but also permeated Brazil’s legal regime for the events. The Brazilian Congress enacted the Lei Geral da Copa (The Brazilian General World Cup Law) in June 2013 which was intended to fulfill the legal requirements FIFA expects of host countries. The World Cup law ultimately allowed FIFA to profit through the World Cup without any obligation to pay taxes. This law was invoked during the Olympics as well, which made the violations of human rights legitimate and lawful in preparation for the Games (Global Nonviolent Action Database, Aug. 2, 2017).

Since its proposal, the law had sparked heated debate among politicians and legal scholars due mainly to the conflicting aspects between FIFA’s requirements and Brazilian national laws that should be respected. According to the Brazilian attorney Petrice Barricelli (2013), these contentious requirements imposed by FIFA include 1) “mandating the sale of alcoholic beverages in stadiums (because of beverage sponsors)”; 2) “allowing sales (i.e. game tickets) conditioned on the acquisition of other products or services such as hotel packages and travel”; 3) “suspension of the right of return legal guarantee for online sales as such may be applied to FIFA’s products”; and, 4) “permission for FIFA partners (i.e. sponsors) to offer products or services, such as credit cards, without necessarily meeting normal consumer regulatory requirements.” These four of many other FIFA demands are obviously

characterized for neoliberal control, favoring not only FIFA’s interests, but also corporate sponsor profits.

Former General Secretary of FIFA Jérôme Valcke stressed the importance of FIFA’s requirements, advocating for the one-time state of exception. In defense of the Brazilian World Cup law, he asserted that FIFA had neither asked Brazil more, nor less, than they required the past hosting countries such as South Africa or the next host nation, Russia. He further stated that while FIFA respects existing laws and regulations of the host nation, it is “necessary” for the host country’s legal and political authorities to recognize the fact that the World Cup event is a unique, one-time global sporting festivities that are demanded, for its success, some level of local law adaptation (Barricelli 2013).

One of the most significant implications of the World Cup law in Brazil was the debate about mega-event sponsored by FIFA, a non-governmental sporting organization, can be a justification for modification of a national legal system, albeit temporary (Barricelli 2013). The enactment of the World Cup law in Brazil in 2013 demonstrates how an externally imposed state of exception changed existing local norms and legal regime, and how it accommodates FIFA’s contentious requirements in a neoliberal fashion.

The 2016 Rio Olympics, the Neoliberal Conquest of Urban Space and Infrastructural Violence

For the municipality of Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian government, hosting mega-sporting events was a perfect chance to promote the city’s gentrification program. However, consecutive events and ensuing urban planning had yielded a far-reaching controversy throughout both the city of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, although the privileged—including economic and political elites—welcomed it. This is primarily because many Brazilians
criticized quasi-dictatorial, market-oriented governance for the World Cup preparation program. Nevertheless, the governmental authorities pushed ahead with infrastructural development projects at the expense of the rights of both ordinary citizens and the poor who resided in “beauty spoiling” areas. During the beautification processes, the access of citizens to both their rights and democratic participation was ignored at the expense of meeting the obligations required of mega-sporting events.

The cases for neoliberal reconfiguration of urban landscape at the expense of major violations of human rights and loss of livelihood during the preparation for the 2016 Rio Olympics can be easily seen; most involved forced eviction from favelas, as had happened during the preparations for the World Cup described in the previous section. Sánchez and Broudehoux (2013), in their study, pointed out that the urban planning for the World Cup and the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro was instrumentalized and exploited by local economic and political elites—including, but not limited to, a coalition of private entrepreneurs, civic leaders, and real estate interests, etc.—in the name of remaking the supreme image of the “Olympic city.” In order to achieve their goals, a coalition of those privileged “players” created a “state of emergency,” exploiting a sense of consensus and urgency about the event. The authors finally argued that such an urban regeneration project, intertwined with various political and economic interests, opened the way for “the state-assisted privatization and commodification of the urban realm, and promote the rise of a new, ‘exceptional’ form of neo-liberal urban regeneration in the Latin American landscape, which serves the needs of capital while exacerbating socio-spatial segregation, inequality and social conflicts” (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013: 132).

Eduardo Paes, former mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro, confirmed in 2016 that 57 percent of the total amount of money spent on the Olympic Games came from the private
sector—much of it is comprised of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The consortium behind this PPP includes two Brazilian construction conglomerates—Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht, both of which are implicated in a corruption scandal, *Lava Jato*—and the real estate development company Carvalho Hosken that owns a large portion of land in the suburbs in western Rio. Odebrecht and Carvalho Hosken built the Olympic Athletes’ Village as well, a condominium that would be privately sold after the Olympics, facilitating the change of the whole area into a completely new neighborhood. Surprisingly, a billionaire, Carlos Carvalho, an owner of *Carvalho Hosken*, mentioned that “the poor did not belong in this upmarket new neighborhood,” saying specifically that “You can’t stay in an apartment and live with an Indian alongside, for example,” insulting Brazilian indigenous people using the colloquial Portuguese term (Independent, Aug. 2, 2016). Leaving these discriminatory remarks aside, PPPs for Brazil’s mega-events permitted effective and expeditious operations as a form of privatization, “advancing the interests of the private sector and the market under the banner of sharing power with the poor and the state” (Miraftab 2004: 89).

Apart from domestic interests that might have affected the urban planning projects of the city of Rio de Janeiro, international factors also had a significant influence on the projects. Eduardo Paes, the former mayor of Rio de Janeiro, revealed that the president of IOC, Jacques Rogge, urged Brazilian authorities to modernize and urbanize *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro before the Olympic opening, commenting in his interview that: “The ICO president asked me to transform informal settlement. He told me that it would be great for the Olympic movement.” During the conversation with the President of ICO, Eduardo Paes promised to execute a program that would urbanize a total of 378 favelas with more than a hundred
dwellings at a cost of about $5 billion (ESPN, Apr. 25, 2011).\footnote{In portuguese: “O presidente do COI me pediu para transformar os assentamentos informais. Ele me disse que seria ótimo para o movimento olímpico.” Translation is mine.}

For the Olympic and municipal authorities, the favela habitants were seen as objects that should be cleaned up, and obstacles to be removed. This was not just the case in Rio, but traditionally has happened elsewhere for other events. For example, in his case study of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Greene (2003: 186) observed that “poor neighborhoods and squatter communities did not enjoy the benefits of the international celebrations in Seoul...Rather, the urban poor were systematically removed or concealed from high-profile areas in order to construct the appearance of the development.” According to Brazilian newspaper Folha de S. Paulo (Oct. 8, 2009), IOC requested Brazilian municipal and Olympic authorities to establish a feasible plan for the removal of more than 3,500 families from the six favelas in the western and northern zone of the city; most of the families to be evicted were from Jacarepaguá where various Olympic-related facilities would be constructed. Likewise, the urban poor in the city of Rio de Janeiro needed to be hidden out of sight from the foreigners and the global audiences whose impression of the city needed to be affirmative and progressive.

In their book SMH 2016: Remoções no Rio de Janeiro Olímpico (SMH 2016: Evictions in Olympic Rio de Janeiro), Journalist Lena Azevedo and Urbanist Lucas Faulhaber (2015) observed that more than 67 thousand people in Rio were removed from their moradia in the name of the gentrification and the preparation of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, based on data from Secretaria Municipal de Habitação do Rio de Janeiro (Municipal Housing Secretariat). A 2009 estimate suggested that approximately 275 of the 800 families living in the favela Vila Autódromo were forced to leave after the city committed to the construction of an Olympic park around the Western suburb of Barra de Tijuca. Also,
many critics pointed out that not just building or constructing new facilities had a huge impact on the favela residents, but the implementation of new bus-rapid transit lines (BRTs) in Rio also negatively affected the urban poor because it had come at a high bus fare for them (Independent, Aug. 2, 2016).

<Figure 4.1. The BRT TransCarioca Project for the 2016 Olympics>


The BRT TransCarioca project, one of the high-speed bus systems that pass through a total of 27 of Rio’s neighborhoods, was proposed as part of the Olympic Games transportation system (See Figure 4.1). The TransOlímpica line was built to provide ethletes, ticket holders and Olympic staff connections between the the Deodoro and Barra Olympic centers until the end of the Games. These projects are an extension of the preexisting route suggested during the bidding process that has impacted millions of people’s lives in many forms (BBC Brasil, Aug. 8, 2016). For some, the projects were seen as highly positive because they generated temporary construction-related jobs and reduced travel time. Hairdresser Aldair José commented in his interview with BBC Brasil that:

For me, the BRT changed a lot, mostly for the good. It has already helped me with work. I was unemployed and I ended up working on the construction of the route as a transport operator for 11 months. It helped me financially, which I needed. It also helped me because
I’m coming here to start another temporary job for the Olympic period (BBC Brasil, Aug. 8, 2016). Nevertheless, for many urban poor, it is widely regarded that the infrastructural construction throughout the city devastated their lives. The removal process began in 2013 with the notification to the residents for the sake of the *TransOlímpica* construction. *Via Rio*, the consortium composed of Grupo *CCR*, *Invepar*, and *Odebrecht*, was responsible for the forced eviction, relocation of residents, destruction of the houses, and so forth (Agência Pública, Jun. 21, 2016). Isabel, whose *moradia* was demolished due to the construction of the new BRT line, said:

For me, the Olympics don’t mean anything. This *TransOlímpica* only came to end my life, because if it weren’t for this cursed line I wouldn’t be going through this. Everything is blocked, my tax number (CPF), my business registration number (CNPJ). I have never owed anyone anything before… Compared with where I lived, this is like living in *Barra da Tijuca*. It is a wonderful success in terms of heritage, but it’s destroyed our lives (BBC Brasil, Aug. 8, 2016). The government destroyed, as well, a symbolic place, *Vila Autódromo*, a favela located near the Olympic Park between 2009 and 2016 after the mayor claimed it posed aesthetic and environmental problems. By 2015, approximately 90 percent of the 600 residents had been forcefully evicted; their homes were bulldozed in preparation for the construction of the park. In June 2015, militarized police penetrated into the community to eject the remaining residents, using rubber bullets and pepper spray. *Vila Autódromo*’s residents, like many other favelas in Rio, had to deal with police occupation and government-sanctioned power cuts (*Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Aug. 2, 2017).

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18 In Portuguese: "Para mim o BRT mudou bastante, ao princípio para o bem. Já me ajudou com emprego. Eu estava desempregado e acabei trabalhando na construção da via, como operador de trânsito, por 11 meses. Deu uma esquentada na minha carteira, que andava fria. Também me ajudou porque estava vindo aqui começar em outro emprego temporário, pelo período olímpico."

19 In Portuguese: “Pra mim a Olimpíada não significa nada. Essa Transolímpica só veio para acabar com minha vida, porque se não fosse essa maldita linha eu não estava passando por isso. Está tudo bloqueado: meu CPF, meu CNPJ. Eu nunca devi nada a ninguém…Comparando com onde eu morava, isso aqui é como estar morando na Barra. É um patrimônio maravilhoso, mas acabou com nossa vida.”
Felicity Clarke from *Catalytic Communities*, a non-profit NGO and think tank based in Rio, pointed out the absence, or inadequacy of compensation for families evicted from the favelas, asserting in an interview with *Global Journalist* that: “We have seen many evictions, which is when people are forcibly taken from their prior homes and not given proper compensation…Since 2009 we have seen no cases where those three options were provided.” According to the 2001 Brazilian law, the authorities have to offer three options of compensation: 1) cash compensation; 2) replacement housing nearby; and 3) an assisted buying of another property. Nevertheless, Felicity Clarke maintained that they have seen no cases where these three options were offered. According to her, relocated favela residents, due to World Cup construction, have been provided either cash compensation as low as R$6,000, public housing in predominantly remote locations, or subsidized monthly rent of R$400 without guarantee of maintenance (*Global Journalist*, May. 10, 2014). Considering a high cost of living in the city of Rio, these compensation offers were insufficient and relocated *favela* residents had no choice but to live in a very distant area outside the city center, or, live in the streets. It is consistent with the comments of the homeless interviewee, Wallace, whom I met in Rio: “I hate the ways in which our government unilaterally carried out such policies for the World Cup and the Olympics which is actually against the poor people in our country. I experienced a forced eviction from *favela* and it was truly a human rights violation. I was forcefully relocated to another place, but I could not afford the monthly rent. That’s why I am now living here on the street.”

In Rio, I interviewed a public defender, Dr. Maria Lucia. As a public defender who had helped favela residents fight forced eviction, she vividly testified about her experiences, first asserting that the government and large Brazilian firms had exploited the narrative and discourse of mega-sporting events for achieving their own goals and profits. According to her,
the authorities in Rio already had a prepared list of forced evictions in 2009, when Rio was nominated as an Olympic host city by ICO. The mayor of Rio immediately announced the eviction plans and several favelas in Rio were on the removal list. Lucia further mentioned: “It is impossible to confirm how many families had been forcefully evicted from the favelas because the city of Rio has not provided complete and accurate figures. However, it is evident, through an estimate made by activists, the number of forced evictions in Rio between 2009-2016 in preparation for the mega-sporting events was predominantly higher than the total numbers in any other period in this city. The compensation for them was far from enough and this produced another risk for relocated families. The forced relocation, without a doubt, negatively influenced everyday lives of the relocated families given that it even hinders access to their jobs and schools which were closer to home before.”

Under this state of exception, the desire for the “global” and “Olympic” city, effectively combined with the interests of “capital” and “power,” provided the urban poor nothing in return except the demolition of their civil rights and their lives. This is not just because of the construction process, but includes a variety of forms that neoliberal power intersects. “These are exclusion games…It is an event by the rich for the rich.” These words of Sandra de Souza, Vila Autodromo resident, are evidently consistent with the abovementioned statement (Independent, Aug. 2, 2016). The following section demonstrates how the neoliberal conquest of the urban spaces of the favelas ravaged the lives of the poor in another ironic form; a simultaneous process of commercializing and securitizing “poverty.”

An Alternate Configuration of Favela: Simultaneous Processes of Criminalization and Commodification of Poverty

Estimations on the total number of forced relocations of favela residents in Rio are
contested due to the lack of official statistical data. The Comitê Popular da Copa (the Popular Committee of the World Cup), a non-profit organization, estimated that more than eight thousand people’s homes were demolished in preparation for both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The removal of these favelas in Rio reveals a “politics of visibility” because the slums are located in nearby Olympic zones, which were first targeted for the occupation of a police force and for gentrification. Rio de Janeiro as a global and modern city should put “clean up” first, as it was not theoretically possible to remove all the favelas. This eventually entailed the explicit presence and occupation of military police in the name of security. Forced relocations and house demolitions occurred simultaneously that “Unidades de Polí cia Pacificadora (UPPs; Pacifying Police Units)” occupied the area in efforts to bring down drug cartels, get peace and safety during the Games settled, and to attract new investments in those neighborhoods (Smith 2016).

According to the study conducted in 2016 by Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV; Getúlio Vargas Foundation), a majority of the residents in the twenty Rio communities that had Pacifying Police Units did not perceive of the UPPs as guaranteeing residents’ safety. Although UPP began in 2008 in Rio, the study revealed that the residents considered UPP as a program exclusively for mega-sporting events such as presenting a good image of Rio and the presence of tourists during the World Cup and the Olympic Games. Ludmila Ribeiro, a researcher at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG; Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais) also observed that young people and Afro-Brazilians experienced more antagonism from the UPP in the favelas because most UPP inspections targeted black youths (O Globo, Jul. 5, 2016).

What is noteworthy is the ways in which neoliberal ideology occupies urban spaces, by securitizing poverty. Throughout these processes, the notion of “race” also intervenes, which is not irrelevant to the criminalization and securitization of blackness as well. In other words,
criminalizing the poor Afro-Brazilians residing in favelas becomes legitimate in order to produce the modern and global image of Rio and facilitate the success of mega-sporting events and capital influx. In other words, neoliberal violence within urban spaces expansively reproduces a specific image intertwined with poverty and race, which is truly negative and perilous.

In an extremely ironic sense, the favela became a spatial object which was criminalized as well as “commercialized,” taking on its simultaneous alternate configuration. Thus, the politics of visibility served, on the one hand, to cover up the “failure of modernity” in urban spaces, on the other hand to commodify the spaces to attract tourists and revenues during the World Cup and the Olympics by romanticizing favelas through their carefully managed construction as spectacle (Smith 2016).

This favela-commodification project was mainly driven by private actors—tourism companies. According to the Brazilian media O Dia (Aug. 28, 2016), one of the main Olympic legacies is a definitive inclusion of favelas in the touristic routine in Rio. Although favela tourism had been a popular attraction for those who come to the country long before the World Cup and the Olympics, it is evident that these mega-events significantly captured the eyes of favela tourists, and the number of tourists increased expansively especially during the events.

One of these projects, called “favelidade” run by Favela Experience, specified the goal of the tour in a favela on a homepage to serve to “connect people, ideas and resources from around the world with dynamic favela residents, organizations and services through culturally immersive spaces and experiences and… to facilitate the breakdown of stereotypes by promoting cultural exchange and social collaboration.” In other words, it aimed to help favelas thrive through the visiting of tourists, which seems to encourage a highly positive

20 Available at: https://www.favelaexperience.com/about-us (accessed 25 June 2018)
impact on the communities.

However, many critics point out that the commodification of favelas and the increase of revenue through tourism continue a vicious circle of violence because it might implicitly support the power of a local drug cartel. In her ethnographic study *The Spectacular Favela: Violence in Modern Brazil* (2015), Erika Larkins observed that the commodification of favelas forms a type of violence itself and the structural arrangement of profit from it rather amplifies existing inequalities. In other words, this violence involves the matter of economic inequality—“the highly asymmetric power relationships” between those who profit from the favela-brand as a romanticized place and those who live in the favela. In other words, “the producers of the favela brand occupy very different social worlds from the marginalized subjects featured in a favela.” The author also casts a critical comment that it would not be morally acceptable to make profits from others’ suffering (Larkins 2015: 84).

As stated above, the commodification of favela lives and the consumption from tourists produce a form of violence that is rather beneficial to the traffickers. Ironically, at the same time, the securitized, racialized and criminalized poor in the favelas are vulnerably exposed to another form of violence. These simultaneous alternate, but interlocked, forms of violence surrounding the favelas have been rather reinforced through power tied up not only with neoliberal mega-events, but with modern everyday lives in Brazil.

**Conclusion**

In the neoliberal era, hosting global mega-events, especially sporting ones, has become a highly prominent and effective urban promotion strategy. These events have entailed large-scale public expenditures, urban revitalization strategies, and infrastructure
constructions. Although there are some explicit benefits from hosting, such as the enhancement of infrastructure which may serve as a central pivot for future development, recent experiences including Indian, South African, and Brazilian events show that “the privileged tend to benefit at the expense of the poor, and socioeconomic inequalities were exacerbated,” due mainly to the forced eviction, human rights violations and ensuing loss of livelihoods (Maharaj 2015: 983). In other words, urban redevelopment projects associated with mega-sporting events may have undesirable long-term impacts for public stakeholders although great short-term gains for corporate interests involved in the events (Hall 2006: 59).

As examined throughout this chapter, the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil and its preparation processes were closely related to a series of processes associated with the reconstitution of “spectacular urban space” (Harvey 2001: 92) under the political and economic rationalities of neoliberalism. This chapter particularly explored the ways in which the urban poor and the urban space of the poor are simultaneously excluded, securitized and commodified in an ironic manner. As Brazil’s two mega-sporting events have resulted in the neoliberal production of urban space, these events can be indeed characterized as “neoliberal games” and “exclusion games,” which rather exacerbated social inequalities and further consolidated existing socioeconomic and racial order in Brazil. I suggest that the displacement of urban poor and the favelas in Brazil not only delegitimized the hosting of mega-sporting events among Brazilian people, constituting one of the significant factors that had led to the rise of strong opposition, but also fueled the further destruction of the narrative of racial democracy.
CHAPTER 5.
THE RISE OF NETWORKED CROSS-CLASS MOVEMENTS AGAINST MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS IN BRAZIL: CHALLENGING DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP AND CALLING FOR THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

Introduction

As Whitson and Horne (2006: 84) pointed out, mega-sporting events worldwide have resulted in generating massive profits exclusively for “construction companies and suppliers, engineers and architects, local security firms, media outlets, and anyone professionally involved in the promotional economy” that now surround any mega-events. Such a perspective is truly consistent with the observations of the Brazilian case by scholars in the field of social sciences and humanities, the present-day activists, as well as by investigative journalists who find that the interests of private sectors and involved economic and political elites had been fully satisfied while disenfranchising the urban poor (Smith 2016), through violations of human rights, extensive gentrification and forced eviction that ultimately brought about massive nationwide demonstrations.

Chapter 5 primarily aims to explore how the protests against the World Cup and the Olympic games emerged in Brazil, paying particular attention to the detailed processes through which the social movements had been mobilized, organized and publicized. This chapter also deals with the characteristics of the above-mentioned protests, suggesting that these can be best seen as “networked social movements” struggling for the asymmetric distribution of rights during the preparation period for the neoliberal mega-events. These networked social movements entailed the characteristics of the right to the city movements
that intended to subvert special treatment rights, usually understood as a privilege, and the social systems of differentiated citizenship which supported them in Brazil. I finally argue that the major opposition to mega-events in Brazil expanded beyond just the lower class. Especially noteworthy was the rise of “middle-class activism,” and these social movements clearly showed the nature of the cross-class coalitions.

**Urban Politics: Differentiated Citizenship, Right to the City and Social Movements in the Neoliberal Era**

Social movements generally express themselves in cities. As neoliberal urbanization deepens in our time, “cities” have become one of the major constitutive and prime sites of social movements; the basic features of cities—density, diversity, and size—offer the defining elements for contention to develop. In the perspective of urban politics, cities also breed control in the sense that the city—a generative space of mobilization—is the frontline as well “where states constantly create new governmental methods to protect and produce social and political order” (Uitermark et al. 2012: 2546).

This section primarily aims to provide theoretical examinations on the notion of differentiated citizenship and the right to the city. It will also explore the ways in which the right to the city movements are entangled with and supported by the systems of differentiated citizenship. A conceptual and theoretical framework provided by differentiated citizenship and the-right-to-the-city literature would help better analyze cities and social movements—the rise of anti-World Cup and anti-Olympics movements occurred primarily in major Brazilian cities, which showed a definite form of the right-to-the-city movements that attempted to subvert special treatment rights associated with mega-sporting events.
Neoliberalism and the Rise of Differentiated Citizenship: The Differentiated Treatment of Citizens

The primary aim of citizenship, under law, is to guarantee equal rights for all citizens (Leydet 2014: 39). Marshall (1950) defines citizenship as “political” membership in a particular community, a status that grants members a certain set of rights and duties. However, the traditional notion of citizenship has faded as our current pace of globalization increases across the world. Iris Young (1989: 251, 1999) challenges this idea of “universal citizenship” by coining the term “differentiated citizenship,” and argues that there obviously exist differentiated treatments of particular groups that violate the principle of equal rights that universal citizenship highlights. According to Young, the rise of contemporary social movements struggling for their rights as a citizen, led primarily by African American, Hispanic, Women, the disabled and LGBT, proves how taken-for-granted universal citizenship has not translated into equality and social justice in our time.

The term differentiated citizenship has been thoroughly examined by several citizenship scholars. The concept, according to Mintz et al. (2013: 89), was originally defined as “the granting of special group-based legal or constitutional rights to national minorities and ethnic groups.” In other words, some investigators present this concept as a positive strategy that helps maximize benefits minorities can achieve (Young 1989, 1999; Cattacin 2006; Smith 2011). In his study regarding migration in Europe, for example, Cattacin (2006) highlights how differentiated citizenship can facilitate a chance of legal inclusion for the realm of migration, including the sojourn of foreign students and short term seasonal workers, etc. Likewise, Young (1989: 273) argues that special treatment and group representation of oppressed minorities is needed to assure their full participation as citizens in crucial decision-making processes or public institutions “without shedding their distinct identities or suffering
disadvantages because of them” (Quoted in Ochoa Campo 2017). Rogers Smith (2011: 241) also points out that differentiated citizenship can help realize “meaningful civic equality instead of systemic subordination, oppression, and exclusion.”

In the context of neoliberal globalization, however, the notion of differentiated citizenship refers to “the ways in which nation-states grant privileges to certain people considered valuable in a market-driven world while excluding others considered less valuable from rights and entitlements” (Ochoa Campo 2017). Aihwa Ong has made a profound scholarly contribution to differentiated citizenship literature in the context of contemporary neoliberal globalization, by coining the terms “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999) and “graduated citizenship” (Ong 2006) which represent differentiated treatment of citizens in our neoliberal societies. Flexible citizenship refers to, in the words of Ong (1999: 6), “the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidity and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions.” In this context, she specifically states that:

In the era of globalization, individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion of citizenship and sovereignty as strategies to accumulate capital and power…In their quest to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility and repositioning in relation to markets, governments, and cultural regimes (Ong 1996: 6).

In her ethnographic study *Flexible Citizenship* (1999), Ong observes transnational Chinese subjects with multiple passports who travel across borders for business purposes and argues that they are highly privileged individuals who can claim citizenship-like rights across the world—particularly in the U.S.—due mainly to their higher valorization in the market, while excluding others of “lesser market value” who cannot benefit the US economy (Ochoa Campo 2017). In a similar context, Ryan King-White (2010) focuses on the flexible citizenship of (im)migrant sport stars in neoliberal America; examining the case of
Dominican baseball player Danny Almonte, the author suggests that Almonte was “appropriated by the U.S. media into dominant neoliberal discourse about the ability to achieve the American Dream.” Under the neoliberal citizenship regime, the neoliberal subject is, therefore “not the citizen with claims on the State, but a self-enterprising citizen-subject who is obligated to become an entrepreneur of himself or herself” (Ong 2006: 15). In this regard, Federico Oliveri (2015) also points out in his migration study that:

The current governance of migration deserves the label of neoliberal because migrants’ fundamental rights and freedoms are linked to the right to entry and stay in the country, which essentially depends on their employability and usefulness according to market rules. Under neoliberal ideology even arguments for free movement are made with the only purpose of moving people with lower status into positions from which they can serve the needs and meet the demands of people with higher status more easily. Moreover, in the frame of contemporary global migration, populations are no longer fixed entities tied to a specific national territory, but flexible resources that can be selected and manipulated through entry quotas, points-based visas, administrative and penal detentions, expulsions (Oliveri 2015: 493)

For him, while neoliberal citizenship openly legitimizes inequalities in accessing fundamental rights based on individual merits and failures, neoliberal citizenship works through the “securitization” (Wæver 1998) of social problems, and racialization and criminalization of marginal groups as marketization tends to generate conflicts rather than social bonds and cohesion (Oliveri 2015: 494).

In her path-breaking book Neoliberalism as Exception (2006), Ong uses the term “graduated citizenship” as an extension of the concept of flexible citizenship to shed light on the ways in which neoliberal societies have dictated the unequal treatment of individual subjects. Based on ethnographic study of Southeast Asian countries, Ong observes that under “neoliberalism as exception,” the nation-state grants various benefits and indirect power and authority to particular territories of markets and corporations over the citizen in accordance with market demands, while the underunprivileged—such as workers, ordinary citizens and
many others who are outside of this global production and financial circuits—enjoy highly limited rights. This graduated governance and ensuing graduated citizenship is exemplified as well in Ong’s study, which describes the immigrant classification system in Singapore as below:

The instrument is the employment pass system, which grades skilled foreigners according to an intricate three-tier system of employment passes. The top criteria are professional qualifications, university degrees, and specialist skills; professionals, administrators, entrepreneurs, and investors are most highly valued. Foreigners are also graded in terms of their basic monthly salaries. The expatriate (a term applied to all white-collar and skilled foreign workers) can obtain permanent residency easily, depending on a point system measured according to skill and income (Ong 2006: 186).

What is important in Ong’s observation is not the privilege itself granted to a particular group of people, but the new modes of privilege under the new regime of graduated citizenship. In this regard, it is worth noting that the different degrees of legitimate mobility show how neoliberal logic is deeply intertwined with migration and citizenship. Based on these theoretical considerations, I will show in the following sections how the hosting of mega-sporting events, which are obviously associated with a series of neoliberal policies and neoliberal governance, provokes and triggers preexisting differentiated citizenship more conspicuously.

Right to the City Movements and Differentiated Citizenship

Before outlining the relational discussions about the right to the city movements and differentiated citizenship that tie together this chapter, it is first necessary to engage with the right-to-the-city literature which has been the most potent and prominent framework for analyzing cities and social movements (Uitermark et al. 2012: 2547). The notion of the right to the city was first coined by Henri Lefebvre in his book *Le Droit à la Ville* (1968), which principally asserts that the right to the city entails a renewed right to urban life and the
capacity to reinvigorate ourselves through remaking cities. For Lefebvre, special consideration was given to the growing spatial inequalities, which was caused by the commodification of urban space and the expansive power of capitalism throughout the world cities. He put a particular emphasis on transforming cities into urban space for building collective life and rescuing the citizens who had actually built the city. Lefebvre’s central idea has had a great influence on contemporary social movements in the U.S., Europe, and many Latin American countries. Followings are Lefebvre’s own words about his thoughts on the city:

To think about the city is to hold and maintain its conflictual aspects: constraints and possibilities, peacefulness and violence, meetings and solitude, gatherings and separation, the trivial and the poetic, brutal functionalism and surprising improvisation. The dialectic of the urban cannot be limited to the opposition centre-periphery, although it implies and contains it…One can hope that it will turn out well but the urban can become the centre of barbarity, domination, dependence and exploitation…In thinking about these perspectives, let us leave a place for events, initiatives, decisions. All the hands have not been played (Lefebvre 1996 [1968]: 53).

To summarize it, the right to the city, in the words of Lefebvre, signifies “a demand…for a transformed and renewed access to urban life” (Cited in Attoh 2011).

His influence was not just limited to activists and social movements but contributed to the development of academia as well. The right to the city has actually become one of the most talked-about concepts not only in urban studies, but also throughout the social science literature as a prominent analytic framework for social movements and cities (Purcell 2013). A central idea of contemporary literature on the right to the city suggests that mobilization within cities emerges to cope with “neoliberal urbanization” and employ their local resources to call for a more just city (Brenner et al. 2011; Harvey 2008; Purcell 2006, 2013). The-right-to-the-city literature maintains that the grievances, claims and political targets of activists are firmly rooted in the urban, and their mobilizing discourses are generally framed through
“urban concepts and symbols.” In this way, cultural, structural and institutional elements interact with one another “to channel insurgents into a particular issue and geographical space centered on the city” (Uitermark et al. 2012: 2547). David Harvey (2008), one of the pioneers who have examined the link between urbanization and capitalism, carefully described the idea of the right to the city as follows:

The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights (Harvey 2008).

In other words, the right to the city can be considered a novel type of an actual right that citizens should collectively bear. With this right, citizens can be given greater freedom to transform themselves through remaking and reshaping the city that was in effect built by citizens—protagonists of the city.

The concept has also had an impact on policy circles and initiatives as well. UNESCO and UN-HABITAT have led an endeavor to embrace the right to the city and to conceptualize it as part of an agenda for human rights (UNESCO 2006; UN-HABITAT 2010), which aim to encourage urban policies that can promote urban sustainability, justice and social inclusion in the cities. A related effort was also practiced to establish and develop charters that articulate a right to the city, including the European Charter for Human Rights in the City, the World Charter for the Right to the City, and the Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities. Moreover, in Brazil, the right to the city was codified in federal law, the City Statute (Fernandes 2006; Purcell 2013: 141).

Recent studies have revealed that the right-to-the-city movements are closely related to the notion of differentiated citizenship, which was examined in the first part of this section.
This is primarily because cities have become a space that tends to benefit the privileged at the expense of the marginalized, as capitalist urbanization deepens in our times. While cities are “the source of cosmopolitanism and conviviality,” as Beall (2007: 6) points out, it is the case as well that “as urban populations grow and become more differentiated, social distance is often magnified.” In other words, the heterogeneity of a city can be a double-edged sword, where a right to a “dignified standard of living” or citizenship is often undermined and denied (Earle 2011: 2). For these reasons, it is acknowledged that contesting differentiated citizenship within a city entails characteristics of the right-to-the-city movements. As Holston (2011: 335) maintains, “rights associated with right to the city movements in many cities around the world are subverting special treatment rights (understood as a privilege) and the systems of differentiated citizenship that support them.” This chapter, in this perspective, regards the emergence of anti-mega-sporting events movements that occurred throughout 2013 to 2016 as a form of the right-to-the-city movements which principally challenged the unequal distribution of rights as a citizen, prevailed in socio-economic-political systems in Brazil, and was distinctly inscribed in Brazilian people during the preparation stages of those sporting events.

**Economic and Political Conditions Prior to the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil, 2013-2016**

Before examining the phase of a series of movements, it might be appropriate to deal with economic, political and social environments that Brazil faced at the time of the sudden rise in demonstrations against the hosting of mega-sporting events. This is because certain economic and political contexts are often conducive or explosive for potential social movement activities. Besides individual factors such as relative deprivation to influence on
collective behavior (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962; Morrison 1971), as is generally known, such micro-level factors are conditional on contextual macroeconomic and political factors that closely interact with the former (Grasso and Giugni 2016). In other words, the emergence of anti-World Cup and Olympics demonstrations cannot be fully explained without scrutinizing macro-level factors such as economic, political, and social environments of the times.

Becoming an Economic Superpower as a Springtime Fantasy: Economic Downturn and the Recession in Brazil from the 2010s

Brazil attracted, since the early 2000s, among a variety of developing countries, the notice of the world as a potential economic superpower. This led Jim O’Neill, Goldman Sachs economist, to claim that the four BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations will eclipse conventional developed countries in the world (O’Neill 2001). Brazil came on the stage where they can voice to the global world, based on steady economic progress in the Latin American region.

After the Asian crisis occurred in 1997-1998, the 2000s have generally been more favorable to Brazil’s economy. No major turbulence hit Brazil until 2008, the global financial crisis which greatly impacted the country, but it was relatively short-lived. Since 2003, GDP growth rates have risen consistently; widespread optimistic expectations about the Brazilian economy have increasingly mounted (Cardim de Carvalho and de Souza 2011). To be specific, the Brazilian economy grew, from 2004-2010, by 4.2 percent annually, which marked more than double its annual rate of growth from 1999-2003, accompanied by a noticeable reduction in (extreme) poverty and inequality, especially after 2005. Brazil’s growth was initially driven by a boom in exports of raw materials; however, from 2006, the internal market began to expand faster, while export growth lost steam, due to Brazil’s more expansionary
Brazil’s GDP per capita also marked a significant growth, with an annual rate of 2.5 percent from 2003-2014, about three times faster than the prior government’s (1995-2002) annual growth rate of 0.8 percent (See Figure 5.1). More importantly, this growth rate was achieved in the midst of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, which resulted in the 2009 recession in Brazil (Weisbrot et al. 2014).

FIGURE 5.1 Average Annual Change of Real GDP per Capita

Source: IMF (2014)

In this regard, economist Edmund Amann (2011) maintained that the 2000s marked a decade of “a new Brazilian second economic miracle,” which followed the first, during the period of 1967-1973. He asserts that Brazil’s remarkable turnaround lies in the coalescence of two factors; the long-standing reform agenda was consolidated on the one hand, and the rise of a more favorable external environment for investment and trades on the other hand. Specifically, in terms of the macroeconomic policy side, the Brazilian government has maintained, since 2000, economic openness, providing a relatively stable platform for the admission of foreign capital. The second key element, a more favorable international climate, concerns the state of global markets for capital flows that were particularly of benefit to
Brazil having cemented in place a competitive and stable macroeconomic framework. In addition to these significant factors, importantly, the rise of emerging markets in Asia, particularly China, contributed to the notable surge in commodity prices. This was a real bonanza for Brazil since the country has been one of the leading producers of a variety of the key commodities, including, but not limited to, soy products, iron ore, gold, and oil. The increase in the demand for international markets and the ensuing acceleration of the rise in commodity prices loaded Brazil with great trade surpluses (Amann 2011: 33-34).

<Table 5.1. Brazil’s 2000s: Export Performances and External Account Indicators>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports (US$bn fob)</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>118.3</td>
<td>137.8</td>
<td>160.6</td>
<td>197.9</td>
<td>153.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Primary Products Exports</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Reserves (US$bn)</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>193.8</td>
<td>235.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Foreign Direct Investment (US$bn)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean (ECLAC) 2010, Cited in Amann 2011.

In spite of staggering economic growth, in addition to the success in a soft landing from the 2008-2009 recession provoked by an external financial crisis, Brazil experienced a severe economic depression from 2013 to 2016. The Brazilian economic recession during 2013-2016 is considered the deepest one in Brazilian economic history (Nassif 2017). This was clearly shown in the following table (see table 5. 2); a comparison between economic indicators in the below-mentioned sub-period suggests that the 2010s entered an economic downturn, showing that major economic indicators had deteriorated.

<Table 5.2> Economic Indicators in the Period 2003-2010 and 2011-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators/ Average in the Sub-Periods</th>
<th>2003-2010</th>
<th>2011-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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### Economic Indicators during Economic Recession, 2014-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth, %</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-3.77</td>
<td>-3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Inflation Rate, %</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>6.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Fiscal Balance, %</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Debt of Public Sector, % of GDP</td>
<td>56.28</td>
<td>65.45</td>
<td>69.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Debt of Public Sector, % of GDP</td>
<td>32.59</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>46.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nassif (2017: 95)

Many scholars point out two important factors that led to Brazil’s deepest and historical economic downturn. In terms of internal factors, it is widely acknowledged that the
Dilma Rousseff administration committed several mistakes. In order to reverse a poor economic performance in 2012 that marked a 1.9% growth rate, Rousseff’s economic team employed several stimuli for accelerating both aggregate demand and supply, including, but not limited to, credit expansion and tax exemptions to a majority of sectors of the economy. However, these strategies practiced from 2012 onwards were actually counterproductive, eliciting a highly weak response from private investment (Nassif 2017: 98). Secondly, external factors combined with internal ones that accelerated the deepening of the Brazilian crisis. Continuing global stagnation and uncertainty suffocated Brazil’s fiscal and balance of payments and quantitative easing in the U.S. which aggravated the destabilization of not only the real, but also other currencies of developing countries. In other words, these unfavorable external circumstances, along with domestic economic interventionism by Rousseff, limited private investments. On top of that, Brazil’s prospects were undermined further as China’s economy showed signs of slowing down, and thus commodity prices began to fall, which has traditionally been Brazil’s major export portfolio (Saad-Filho 2015).

**Political and Social Maelstrom: Deep Rooted Corruption and the Failure of Public Service Provision**

From 1964 to 1985, Brazil underwent a long period of a coercive authoritarian regime whose government structure consisted primarily of a coalition of technocrats, military officers and old-line politicians. Although the backlash against it, embodied as civil resistance, including demonstrations and strikes which were increasingly rampant, Artur da Costa e Silva’s military government (1967-1969) oppressed them and further consolidated military rule by enacting *Institutional Act No. 5* that aimed to abolish civil rights and impose substantial censorship (Luna and Klein 2006). However, military rule eventually broke down as a result of the persistent rise of democratic mass movements during 1977-1985 (Filho
In short, Brazil’s political circumstances during those times can be marked as incompleteness; military coup, weak democracy, and heavy intervention.

After 21 years of authoritarian rule, Brazil’s democratization had finally been realized; nevertheless, it did not necessarily mean that Brazil’s democratization immediately brought about political stabilization since the first civilian president, Tancredo Neves, passed away just prior to his inauguration. Then Vice-president Jose Sarney, a member of the military, alternatively took office. Fernando Collor de Mello from the National Reconstruction Party, (PRN; Partido da Reconstrução Nacional) came to power as the president of the Republic in 1989 through direct election; however, he was later impeached, charged for the failure of reformation policy, as well as due to a critical corruption scandal, and, thus, Vice-president Itamar Franco was handed the baton. In 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso ultimately seized power and took office, and held it for a second term in 1999 through elections. Under the Cardoso administration, Brazil’s political circumstances stabilized at last.

In 2003, Cardoso’s successor Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, from the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores; PT) took office with far-reaching popular support and was reelected to a second term in 2007, leaving office with a nearly 90% approval rate in 2010, which made him the all-time most popular Brazilian president (O Globo, Dec. 16, 2010). During the first and second term of the Lula administration (2003-2010), the political situation had shown high stability. This, coupled with Lula’s great popularity due to the booming economy and a number of successful social programs—such as Bolsa Família (Family Grant Program)\(^{21}\) and Fome Zero (Zero Hunger)\(^{22}\)—contributed to lift millions of

\(^{21}\) The Bolsa Família program was first launched by ex-President Lula in 2003, which aimed for the “social inclusion of families constrained by extreme poverty by providing immediate relief to their situation, and to stimulate improvements to their education and health, in order to cease the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Brazilians out of poverty. It seemed that Brazilian politics enjoyed an unprecedented period of stabilization.

As shown in the previous section, nevertheless, the economic recession in Brazil during the early- and mid-2010s became coupled with a critical political crisis, which led to widespread dissatisfaction with the Brazilian political system. In other words, the Brazilian economic crisis which was regarded as one of the most critical of the last century, not only reached the economic, but the social and political spheres as well (Nassif 2017).

After “Lula’s era,” Dilma Rousseff became the 36th, and the first female President of Brazil in 2011. She was born in Minas Gerais as a daughter of an upper-middle-class family and was well educated in private schools during her childhood. However, the military coup in 1964 became a turning point for Dilma’s life; she joined the guerilla and the opposition to the military. Studying economics at the university in 1967, she also joined a group that aimed at open resistance. These vigorous anti-military activities ended with her arrest in 1970. After her release in 1973, Dilma got involved in various areas of Brazilian politics. Particularly noteworthy in her political career was her involvement with Lula when he won the presidential election in 2002. Dilma was appointed as a member of Lula’s presidential transition team and was named, in 2003, minister of Mines and Energy. In 2005, she became Lula’s Chief of Staff (Ministra-chefe da Casa Civil). As seen in her career, Dilma Rousseff has been regarded as an inheritor of a great political and ideological tradition from Lula and PT (Agência Brasil, n.d.).

reproduction.” It is widely acknowledged that this objective was fully achieved, which influenced the living conditions of the poor, based on its wide coverage (Institute for Applied Economic Research 2014).

22 The Fome Zero program was also first established by ex-President Lula in 2003, who designated the fight for hunger as an absolute priority of the government. Co-ordinated by Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Combat), this program had an objective of eradicating hunger and extreme poverty in Brazil by acknowledging the right to access to basic food. This program took a number of forms, including direct financial aid to the family in extreme poverty, distributing nutritional supplements, creating low-cost restaurants, granting access to microcredit and subsistence for family farming, etc (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 2010).
While Lula enjoyed great popularity among the public, being considered a hero of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff’s case was the opposite. It is widely acknowledged that the economic crisis was a proximate cause in Brazil’s political collapse during 2014-2016, which left the federal government out of control to effectively govern (De Carvalho 2016). Apart from this, one of the most critical factors that impacted Rousseff’s fall was a corruption scandal involving the ruling party and the financial circles. This eventually led to the initiation of a criminal investigation known as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash), which first began with a money-laundering investigation and expanded to corruption at Petrobras, a state-controlled oil company and other Brazilian major construction corporations, Odebrecht in particular. Executives received bribes in return for awarding contracts to construction companies at inflated prices.

Operação Lava Jato was the largest ever corruption scandal in not only Brazilian, but all Latin American, history. This corruption scandal abruptly expanded due to the people’s intolerance for so-called “structural corruption” that has prevailed in politicians, business leaders, and Brazilian society more broadly. What is critical here is that this corruption scandal hugely impacted domestic politics due to the deep complicity of the then-governing party, PT. It was ascertained that Fernando Soares, a lobbyist, and businessman had maintained a close connection of “rewarded collaboration” with the PT and several major Brazilian construction companies (O Estado de S. Paulo, Jul. 1, 2015).

Seemingly untouchable politicians such as the former and then-president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff were also indicted (Fausto 2017) for their wrongdoings, which was shocking news for the Brazilian people who had believed in them as a people of integrity. Until December 2017, nearly more than three hundred individuals had been accused of crimes in the far-reaching corruption scandal (Felter and Labrador 2018).
These corruption crimes, considered as a part of their culture at all times, had nevertheless, an unusually high negative impact on the legitimacy of governance. As stated above, many economic, political and social policies of the federal government lost their balance and support as then-President Dilma Rousseff’s approval rating decreased sharply. As seen in the following figure, Rousseff’s approval rating dropped significantly from mid-2013, due to the severe economic depression that hit Brazil. The political crisis had further worsened matters, provoked by the economic downturn as well as the corruption scandal.

< Figure 5.2. Approval Ratings of Dilma Rousseff, 2011-2016 >

Source: Datafolha (2016)

In mid-2015, Dilma Rousseff marked her worst rating with a 71% disapproval rating, previously recorded by former President Fernando Collor (1990-92) who was impeached in 1992 (Folha de S. Paulo, Aug. 6, 2015). In addition to the corruption scandal, to make matters worse, it is revealed that Dilma Rousseff illegally manipulated government accounts to conceal a deficit that primarily led to her impeachment in 2016. To sum up, Brazil’s crisis—not only economic, but political and social as well—resulted in her impeachment and the rise of extensive dissatisfaction with Brazil’s political system.
Delegitimizing Games: The Emergence of Social Movements against the Mega-Sporting Events in Brazil

As evidenced by various studies, hosting mega-sporting events has had an explicit and implicit impact on the promotion of the sense of the “national” and the consolidation of social bonds. However, a series of recent experiences during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, both held in Brazil, have shown that these mega-events can also serve as a catalyst for social division and public contestation, as opposed to their conventionally assumed role as a means of nation-building. In the face of perceived injustice, a huge number of intense anti-World Cup movements took place throughout almost every host city from June 2013 to July 2014. According to the Guardian (Jul. 4, 2013), over a million Brazilians joined anti-World Cup protests in more than 100 cities throughout Brazil in early July 2013, and this civil resistance lasted until the beginning of the World Cup. These protests were the first largest nationwide demonstrations in Brazil since protests in 1992 against then-Brazilian president Collor de Melo (Zirin 2016), and this eventually made a decisive contribution to the delegitimization of hosting such mega-sporting events. After the Cup, a number of violent protests in Rio de Janeiro against the 2016 Olympics occurred as well, and these produced far more controversy over the event. This section primarily attempts to deal with how a series of anti-mega-sporting events protests unfolded in Brazil from 2013 to 2016—from before the World Cup to the beginning of the Olympic Games.

Bus Fare Increase in 2013: The Fuse of the “Brazilian Spring”

In January 2013, the former mayor of the city of São Paulo Fernando Haddad
announced the rise in bus fare from R$ 3.0 to R$ 3.2, coming into effect on June 2, 2013. This decision caused widespread social grievances. Due to the city’s decaying and underdeveloped public transportation network, daily commuting from the periphery to the center has caused commonly shared and cumulative social suffering, especially during rush hours. Only those who can afford or own a helicopter have been able to avoid traffic jams in this city, which succinctly reveals a significant imbalance between social classes. Brazilian people, lower-class people to be exact, end up paying relatively high ticket fares compared to other countries in the world, and the constant rise in the fares has not followed a tangible improvement of public transportation infrastructure. In this circumstance, Brazilian people began to wonder with anger where their money was going (New Generation Consulting 2013: 6).

Many people would never have guessed that the increase in transportation ticket prices in São Paulo would spark an intense and abrupt emergence of protests and riots throughout approximately twenty Brazilian cities. Activists asserted the reason for the protests, opposing an increase of 20 cents: “It was not about the 20 cents, it is about our rights.” On June 6 of that year, the first protest, organized over the internet by Anonymous, Ninja (independent media) and the Movimento Passe Livre (The Free Fare Movement; MPL), occurred on Avenida Paulista (Paulista Avenue) against this series of measures of the municipality and the state of São Paulo (Castells 2015: 232). As this movement increasingly enlarged and spread, police began to take advantage of the armed crackdown as the best alternative—especially using rubber bullets—in order to retrieve their lost control over the protesters (O Globo, Jun. 6, 2013). During this process, not only protesters, but journalists at the scene also became the target of armed repression, which caused criticism from civil society, notably including Amnesty International (Agência Brasil, Jun. 13, 2013).
Folha de S. Paulo (Jun. 18, 2013) reported that movements led by 250 thousands occurred in a variety of Brazilian cities on June 17 and 18, notably including 100 thousand protesters who took to the center of Rio de Janeiro. In Rio, many protesters were detained, arrested and three were injured by gunfire by the military police for a deliberate act of vandalism. Brazilians’ fury was not just limited within its territory; According to Jornal da Banda (Jun. 18, 2013), Brazilian nationals residing abroad also actively participated in the protests on June 17, 2013 in London, Barcelona, Florence, Hamburg, Melbourne, and New York. In an interview in Southern Manhattan, Brazilian participants stated the principal motive of protest was “to support what has been happening in Brazil and to understand what is happening to warn everyone from outside.”

June 20, 2013 can be considered as a historical date in Brazil. Surprisingly enough, mass protests occurred in more than 140 Brazilian cities in which over 2 million people rallied. Although the rallies were peaceful, some cases of vandalism were reported in various cities. Special measures were also taken in those cities, including police repression and shortened working hours for public officers who took precautions over the danger of attack. As stated above, these protests were the largest nationwide demonstrations in Brazil since the protests in 1992 against then-Brazilian president Collor de Melo.

< Table 5.4. Brazilian Cities with Demonstrations on June 20, 2013 >

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Cities (Time)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alagoas</td>
<td>Maceió (16h), Rio Largo (18h30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>Macapá (15h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>Manaus (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>Salvador (13h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceará</td>
<td>Fortaleza (16h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>Brasília (16h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espírito Santo</td>
<td>Vitória (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goiás</td>
<td>Goiânia (17h), Catalão (17h), Porangatu (19h30), Rio Verde (18h), Itumbiara (18h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>São José de Ribamar (16h), Bacabal (16h30), Imperatriz do Maranhão</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estado</td>
<td>Cidades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>Cuiabá (17h), Campo Grande (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso do Sul</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte (17h), Betim (pela manhã), Cambuquira (14h), Poços de Caldas (17h), Varginha (17h), Uberlândia (17h), Boa Esperança (17h), Camanducaia (17h), São Lourenço (17h), São Sebastião do Paraíso (17h30), Itajubá (17h30), Caxambu (18h), Três Corações (18h), Lavras (18h), Araguari (16h30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Gerais</td>
<td>Curitiba (18h), Londrina (14h), Castro (16h30), Arapongas (17h), Guaraucaba (17h), Maringá (18h), Casca (18h30), Ponta Grossa (19h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>Recife (16h), Petrolina (15h), Lagoa Grande (16h), Garanhuns (16h), Arcoverde (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>Belém (15h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parába</td>
<td>João Pessoa (16h), Campina Grande (16h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraná</td>
<td>Curitiba (18h), Londrina (14h), Castro (16h30), Arapongas (17h), Guaraucaba (17h), Maringá (18h), Casca (18h30), Ponta Grossa (19h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piauí</td>
<td>Teresina (16h), Parnaíba (16h), Campo Maior (16h), Picos (16h), Paulistana (16h), Miguel Alves (16h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (17h), Campos (16h), Volta Redonda (16h), Rio das Ostras (17h), Macaé (17h), Resende (18h), Silva Jardim (17h), Búzios (17h), Saquarema (17h), São José do Vale do Rio Preto (17h), Teresópolis (17h), Areal (17h), Cordeiro (17h), Quissamã (17h), Natividade (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Norte</td>
<td>Natal (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>Porto Alegre (18h), Santa Rosa (17h), Bagé (17h), Santa Maria (17h), Cruz Alta (17h), Santa Cruz do Sul (17h), Rio Grande (17h), Alegrete (1h), Ijuí (17h), Pelotas (17h), Cachoeira do Sul (17h30), Passo Fundo (18h), Lajeado (18h30), São Leopoldo (18h), Santo Antônio da Patrulha (17h), São Lourenço do Sul (17h), Itajaí (18h), Santana do Livramento (18h), Santiago (18h), Tenente Portela (18h), Cerro Largo (18h30), São Sebastião do Caí (18h30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>Porto Velho (16h), Ariquemes (16h), Jaru (16h), Rolim de Moura (17h), Guajará-Mirim (18h), Ji-Paraná (18h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>Boa Vista (18h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Catarina</td>
<td>Florianópolis (18h), Itajaí (17h30), Blumenau (18h), Joinville (18h30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>São Paulo (17h), Campinas (17h), Santos (17h), Caraguatatuba (17h), Guaratinguetá (17h), Rio Claro (17h), Tambaú (17h), Ilhabela (17h), Ituverava (17h), Jacareí (17h), Taubaté (17h), Cruzede (17h), Sertãozinho (17h), Limeira (17h), Piracicaba (17h), São José dos Campos (17h), São Carlos (17h), Ribeirão Preto (17h), Mogi das Cruzes (17h), Franca (17h30), Lorena (17h30), Ferraz de Vasconcelos (17h30), Americana (18h), Laranjal Paulista (16h), Mirassol (16h), Sorocaba (17h), Itu (17h), Castilho (17h), Ilha Solteira (17h), Porto Feliz (18h), Bauru (18h), Jaú (18h), Araçatuba (18h), Itapeva (18h), Cerquilho (18h), Itape (18h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergipe</td>
<td>Aracaju (17h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>Palmas (17h), Gurupi (17h), Araguaína (17h)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: O Globo (Jun. 20, 2013)
The motive for the demonstrations, in which a series of Brazilians’ outrage was intensely expressed, was hope for improving an obsolete health and education system, as well as for eradicating police brutality and political corruption, importantly including suspending the massive consumption on construction for mega-sporting events (O Globo, Jun. 20, 2013). In other words, a new theme of the protests came to the forefront, in addition to the increase in the transportation fare: political corruption and wasteful spending related to the football stadiums and infrastructure in preparation for the 2014 World Cup (Castells 2015: 232). These waves of protests across Brazil lasted until June 23, while protests on a smaller scale continued, when then-President Dilma Rousseff’s announcement was released, in which she finally decided to recognize and address the protesters’ demands.

In Rio de Janeiro, several protests occurred during the final match of the Confederations Cup, attacking the building of a Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF; Confederação Brasileira de Futebol) and protesting around the monumental Maracanã stadium. Small groups of demonstrators threw firecrackers at the police line, and security forces reacted with tear gas and sent armored vehicles to break up the protesters. The slogan “FIFA, paga a minha tarifa!” (FIFA, pay my fare!) manifested their demands of free public transport, calling for the eradication of other social problems such as the eradication of corruption and the resignation of the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro (BBC, Jul. 1, 2013).

Seemingly tranquilized demonstrations were re-sparked on September 7 of that year in dozens of cities, challenging military parades that were commemorating Brazil’s Independence Day. Demonstrators’ comments interviewed by the New York Times well express the anger of Brazilian citizens with their governing institutions (The New York Times, Sep. 7, 2013);
“This whole government only knows how to rob us” (Naiana Vinuto, 25, a protester in Rio de Janeiro).

“Currently, politics is a dirty game of exchanges. They always are in favor of their own interests” (Graciara Albuquerque, 32, a protester in Brasília).

Initially, the protests were largely peaceful; however, it finally became, towards the end, violent, and demonstrators vandalized many bank branches and shops and attacked police officers, which caused vigorous clashes with police. These demonstrations were organized not only to challenge corruption prevalent in the Brazilian political culture, but also to question excessive spending in preparations for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics (BBC, Sep. 8, 2013). These waves of protests were not limited only to that year; they continued into 2014 and beyond.

Protests in 2014: “We Don’t Want the World Cup!”

Before the opening of the 2014 World Cup, Brazil re-faced a series of anti-World Cup movements from January to July that year. While the protests in the previous year tended more to question governing institutions and deep-rooted outdated political culture—although the disapproval of the hosting of mega-sporting events was one of the main agenda items of the past demonstrations—, the 2014 protests showed, in particular, the vigorous expressions of fury against the World Cup in Brazil. Although the number of protesters in the streets was relatively lower than similar protests in the previous year, the demonstrations were more frequent as the event got closer (BBC, May. 16, 2014).

On January 25, protests against the World Cup erupted in a number of cities including São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Fortaleza, Vitoria, Sorocaba, Porto Alegre, and Brasília. These protests were peaceful at first, however, they ended in confusion. Some vandalism occurred as well, resulting in 128 people being arrested by police
(O Estado de S. Paulo, Jan. 25, 2014). Several protests were also reported between mid-May to early June in a number of cities. In Brasília, on May 30, approximately 200 citizens marched from Esplanada dos Ministérios (Ministries Esplanade) to Mané Garrincha Stadium where the group was dispersed peacefully, demonstrating the city’s hosting of the World Cup (TNOline, May, 30. 2014). On the same day in São Paulo, demonstrations occurred with more than 500 protesters as well. They marched from the municipal theater in Centro to Federação Paulista de Futebol located in Barra Funda. This protest was historically labeled as the first, according to O Globo (May. 31, 2014), in which military police used exoskeleton armor to control the group of people in Brazil. A small-scale anti-World Cup demonstrations that consisted of about 50 people emerged in front of the Hotel Castro in the city of Goiânia on June 3rd, where the Brazilian national team was lodging for the exhibition game against Panama (Terra, Jun. 3, 2014).

It is worth noting that there even were a number of demonstrations during the World Cup. In the first week of the event between June 12 and June 18, at least 21 protests in a total of 10 cities rose up throughout the country, of which 12 protests had a fierce collision with the military police, resulting in the arrest of about 180 people. The 10 registered cities or regions that experienced the protests during this period include São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Taguatinga (Distrito Federal), Porto Alegre, Salvador, Fortaleza, Manaus, Curitiba, and Natal. On June 12 in the São Paulo protest, six people were injured, including two Brazilian journalists, two female journalists from CNN and two Brazilian protesters (O Globo, Jun. 19, 2014). More seriously, the military police utilized a tear-gas bomb and pepper spray, not only to disperse the masses, but also to actually “torture” the defenseless protesters who were tightly seized by the police. According to El País (Jun. 13, 2014), one police sprayed the eye of one arrested protester from a distance of fewer than ten centimeters to.
El País commented on this “state of exception” with regard to such brutal savagery of the police that was perpetrated during the repression process, quoting NGO activist Juana Kweitel’s remarks, a director of Conectas Direitos Humanos; “The police is trampling the constitution and attacking their own reason to exist: that is precisely to protect citizens and guarantee the free exercise of their rights. The military police cannot become a militia in the service of FIFA.”

On June 23 in Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, a violent and vandalistic manifestation was reported against the World Cup. Different from the police behavior on the June 19 protest in São Paulo led by Movimento Passe Livre (The Free Fare Movement; MPL), police tried to get close to the demonstrators and even circulate among them in order to prevent a latent unfavorable impact on the on-going event. In the end, three people were arrested at the end of the protests (O Globo, Jun. 23, 2014). On June 24, about 200 members of Bloco de Luta pelo Transporte Público (Fight Block for Public Transportation) in the city of Porto Alegre started marching throughout the city, and one protester was arrested by police for deflating vehicle tires (Gauchazh, Jun. 24, 2014). On the final day of the World Cup, on July 13, there was a violent demonstration in Rio de Janeiro. The protest, which gathered around 300 people on that day in the northern zone of the city, was harshly repressed by the military police, resulting in 37 people in detention. According to BBC Brasil (Jul. 13, 2014), at least ten journalists were injured by tear gas bombs and assault rifles used by police.

After the Cup: Recurring Protests against the Olympic Games

Although the post-World Cup period in Brazil had not experienced such intense and

23 Original text in Portuguese: “A polícia está atropelando a Constituição e atacando sua própria razão de ser: que é justamente a de proteger o cidadão e garantir o livre exercício de seus direitos. A PM não pode se transformar numa milícia a serviço da Fifa.” Translation is mine.
frequent demonstrations as anti-World Cup movements during 2013-2014, the consecutive hosting of the 2016 Rio Olympics had significant repercussions in Brazilian society as well, in the form of civil resistance. The protests rose up repeatedly as the Olympic Games came closer, which was held during August 2016.

On July 5 of that year, according to *Rio on Watch* (Jul. 12, 2016), hundreds of people participated in the demonstrations against human rights infringements in relation to the preparation of the Olympic Games in Rio. Lara Martins, a protester who was the student of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, declared in the protest that “I want IOC to recognize and acknowledge all human rights violations that occurred in the context of the Olympics.”

The second public protest broke out the next day in the Centro of the city with the presence of public officers and public school teachers on strike from March 2, 2016, claiming that the Olympics had generated the state of exception in Rio, which caused far-reaching encroachment of civil rights. There was both a protest and a forum on July 17 in the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) about the 2016 Rio Olympics and the problems related to the event with the participation of more than 80 people, including a number of human rights lawyer, professors, favela residents and members of *Comitê Popular da Copa do Mundo e das Olimpíadas* (Popular Committee of the World Cup and the Olympics).

Apart from these references, there existed a number of large and small protests throughout the city. On July 27, activists from Amnesty International placed 40 body bags right in front of the building of the Olympic Games Organizing Committee, not only to symbolize the number of police killings in May 2016, but also to shed light on the 2,500 people killed by police in Rio since the city was “honorably” nominated as the Olympic host.

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24 Original text in Portuguese: “Eu queria que o Comitê Olímpico Internacional (COI) reparasse e reconhecesse todas as violações dos direitos humanos ocorridas no âmbito dos Jogos Olímpicos.” Translation is mine.
One of the highly impressive symbolic acts of resistance occurred on July 28 that year; groups of protesters interrupted the passage of the Olympic torch which was heading to Angra dos Reis from Rio, a Brazilian municipality located in Southwest Rio de Janeiro state. During this process, stones were thrown at the entourage and the military police responded with rubber bullets, resulting in great turmoil and chaos. It was reported that one child was injured and evacuated to the *Hospital Geral da Japuíba* (O Globo, Jul. 28, 2016).

On August 5 some hours before the Olympic opening ceremony, Rio faced a big street demonstration composed of thousands of protesters, which was the largest demonstration against the Olympic Games. Violence broke out immediately before the opening ceremony and the police responded with tear gas shots at a group of anti-Olympic demonstrators who assembled in a town located a half-mile from Rio’s main Olympic stadium—Maracanã. The protests occurred due mainly to the resentment felt by Brazilians who expressed criticism against the astronomical costs as the country was undergoing a severe recession, political turmoil, as well as public health and safety crises (Independent, Aug. 5, 2016). One demonstrator mentioned, during the interview with the *Washington Post* (Aug. 5, 2016), the appalling fiscal conditions that the city of Rio faced, arguing that “we don’t have the conditions to host the games. At this moment, it is a chaotic activity.”

One English teacher in Rio commented in his interview with *NBC News* (Aug. 6, 2016) that “We love sports in our city, but our city needs other things like better schools, better hospitals, free access to education. We need to invest money in our people… We hope the athletes have the best performance in their lives, but for us it’s a very bad moment to receive the Olympic Games because in Brazil everything is not okay.”
Networked Cross-Class Outrage: Questioning Differentiated Citizenship, Calling for the Right to the City

It is noteworthy that the protests that had arisen during 2013-2016 contained clear demands that were not held exclusively by protesters, but by many ordinary Brazilian citizens as well. Basically, Brazilian disenchantment against the ruling class has been deep-rooted in Brazilian history, beginning from and influenced by the social hierarchy that stemmed from slavery and the colonial system. There were a number of reasons for and ensuing demands coming out of these protests. Leaving aside poor social provisions, political corruption, and high tax rates that have not benefited the poor, hosting a mega-sporting event itself was one of the main targets of the protesters. Although people’s frustration and disappointment with the mal-functioning social services in Brazil is nothing new, the anger of Brazilian people in relation to this social problem, along with the historied unequal social system, was explosive ahead of the World Cup and Olympic Games, which had been stoked by a series of economic crises and political turmoil.

As examined in the previous chapter, the pre-World Cup period in Brazil experienced the practice of undemocratic neoliberal urban reconfigurations that followed human rights violations. In these circumstances, the rise in transport fare in São Paulo, combined with and carried out during Brazil’s tough economic and political conditions of the time, was an evident tipping point for the abrupt emergence of demonstrations throughout the country. These series of situations and practices also triggered a particular social phenomenon, that was, in turn, one of promoting and accelerating factors for the rise of the social movements against mega-sporting events as well—the formation of networks of outrage, mainly in online spaces first, and later in the streets, throughout Brazilian cities.
According to my interview results conducted during field research in Brazil, 29 of 143 interviewees participated in the demonstrations during 2013-2016 against the hosting of mega-sporting events. It was a surprising result given that 20.3% of interviewees had taking-a-street-experiences at least once. More astonishingly, all of the respondents who had joined the protests evidently acknowledged the powerful role of social networks in the initiation and the enlargement of the protests, arguing “Sem internet, sem protestos (No internet, no protests).” Although there were varied paths that people took to participate in the protests, such as impromptu street joining or accepting invitations from friends and so forth, 25 of 29 protest participants were directly led to the streets by social networks, typically Facebook and WhatsApp, which have long had massive popularity among Brazilian people. One of my informants, Vasconcelos Filhos, a member of the labor union Central Sindical e Popular and ex-member of Comitê Popular da Copa em Manaus (Popular World Cup Committee in Manaus), shared his experience of mobilizing people for anti-World Cup protests as follows: “As an ex-member of the Comitê Popular, I have a vivid memory of how we mobilized people in our city. Actually, we established a dual-track strategy. First, we tried our best to meet people in the street, distributing flyers and encouraging people’s participation. On the other hand, we promoted through the internet channel, particularly the Facebook page, to maximize visibility and attract as many Brazilians as possible to the demonstrations. Personally, I think these methods significantly contributed to the explosion and diffusion of people’s participation from a variety of social groups.” Similarly, my informant in Salvador, Luis, a director of Associação Brasileira de Preservação da Cultura Afro-Ameríndia (AFA; Brazilian Association of Preservation of Afro-Amerindian Culture), remarked that their organization primarily took advantage of social networks online combined with home-visiting in order to maximize the mobilization effect.
As observed above, it is evident that social networks played a paramount role in the emergence and proliferation of demonstrations against the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil. In this context, this section principally deals with how these networks of outrage had been created and how they had become a prime mover for these protests, actively renouncing deep-rooted differentiated citizenship and calling for the right to the city.

*The Formation of Networks: Intersections of Brazilian Outrage*

Brazil had been at the “forefront of networked social movements” in 2013 and 2014 (Castells 2015: 230) and afterward. As Brazilian streets and its social networks became the primary sites of demonstrations by the hundreds of thousands, an array of ideological groupings, social demands and political projects “converged toward this multifaceted movement, making it less spontaneous and more ambiguous in their criticism of the political order.” It is particularly noteworthy that a number of demonstrations witnessed a sizable presence of conservative groups, more on the online SNS than in the street (Castells 2015: 235).

These manifestations represented “the culmination of years of the formation of a new generation of urban movements.” Organizations such as MPL, urban resistance movements, student movements, and favela residents’ associations have through “occupations and demonstrations articulated in broader networks challenging the existing emptied out top-down spaces of participation” (Braathen et al. 2015: 266). The networks that had been formulated during the pre-events period—including the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016—played a significant role in not only the creation, collection and linkage of Brazilian people’s grievances against governmentality in relation to the World Cup and the Olympic Games, but the direct appearance of extensive and intense demonstrations against the events across the Brazilian cities as well.
While pre-existing social movement organizations acted as a leader of the street protests in Brazil, a number of groups of individuals online played a paramount role in the spark and diffusion of such demonstrations. The news article by Terra (Jun. 16, 2013) pointed out that Facebook groups have oriented Brazilian citizens to protests. The Guardian (Jun. 21, 2013) also suggested that the major promoter of the continuation of anti-World Cup protests in Brazil was social networking service (SNS); unlike previous protests in Brazil, the 2013-2014 uprising “has played out across social networks in a build-up of images, videos and stories left on Facebook and Twitter—showing unseen footage and pictures from the streets.”

First of all, it is appropriate to suggest already existing and well-known organizations in civil society and social movements in Brazil had actively led the 2013 protests, in particular, Movimento Passe Livre (The Free Fare Movement; MPL) founded precisely during the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre in 2005, which advocated free fares in mass transit. What is noteworthy here is that MPL, as an offline social movement, also created a significant symbolic space as a form of online pages where a huge number of Brazilians expressed both their anger, demands and agenda on anti-World Cup and Olympics protests. In addition, the role of Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (Homeless Workers’ Movement; MTST) cannot be neglected in their effort to support the protests, particularly in May 2014 when more than 2,000 members of the movements actively participated in the demonstrations per se and supported their continuation and diffusion (The Washington Post, May, 15, 2014).

The role of a number of small regional organizations cannot be ignored as well. In

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25 MTST was originated from Movimento Sem Terra (Landless Rural Workers' Movement, MST), and is generally considered as one of the largest social movements in Latin America in terms of its membership. MST and MTST have maintained a close relationship and alliance, however, they have significant differences; while MST focuses on rural reform, MTST concentrates on urban issues. Both movements have common ideological roots—Marxism, and can be classified as classist movements (Oliveira 2011).
the city of Porto Alegre, *Bloco de Luta pelo Transporte Público* (Block of Struggles for Public Transportation), composed of diverse individuals and organizations in Porto Alegre, united for the fight against public collective transport and popular quality and actively led the protests against the World Cup. In effect, Porto Alegre, a symbolic city in our contemporary era of social change, was the convener of the first three World Social Forums, a global meeting organized as an alternative to the World Economic Forum at Davos. In 2013, *Bloco de Luta pelo Transporte Público* was naturally formed there and the movement soon diffused and shifted to other regions such as Amazon, Rio Grande do Norte, and Bahia, etc. In early 2013, the following calls posted on the SNS, and thousands of Brazilians participated in the protest in several cities denouncing the increase in transportation fares and opposing the World Cup disaster (Castells 2015: 231).

In Rio de Janeiro, *Revolução Jovem* (Youth Revolution), a grassroots protest group, was also noticeable in their leadership, together with other left-wing organizations against the Rio’s hosting of Olympic Games, where its finances and cash-strapped “public calamity” were premature to host them (*The Washington Post*, Aug. 5, 2016). In the context of human rights violations during the preparation stage of the 2016 Rio Olympics, *Povo Sem Medo* (People without Fear) and *Rio 2016 – Os Jogos da Exclusão* (Rio 2016 – The Exclusion Games) played a paramount role in promulgating the ugly reality of the Games, organizing the event, “*Calamidade Olímpica – 30 Dias para os Jogos da Exclusão***” (Olympic Calamity – 30 days until the Exclusion Games). According to the event description on Facebook: “The state of Rio de Janeiro has money to finance a mega-sporting event, while retroceding public servants’ salary and basic social provisions for the population. The state faces crises, but they will receive billions of money from the Temer government only for repression” (*Rio on

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Watch, Jul. 12, 2016).⁷ Povo Sem Medo, composed of more than 30 national movements against conservatism, joined forces with an instant online group Rio 2016 – Os Jogos da Exclusão to maximize the impact of the movements, organizing several protests in addition to public debates on the Games (Rio on Watch, Jul. 12, 2016). Community journals—Coletivo Papo Reto, an independent journal established in 2014 with young residents of Complexo do Alemão and Voz das Comunidades, a vehicle for communications among favelas in Rio—were also particularly noteworthy in terms of their endeavors to awaken the slum residents by taking the initiative in the protest, called “A Nossa Tocha Olímpica” (Our Olympic Torch) held on July 16, 2016 inside the favela streets of Complexo do Alemão.

Importantly, online groups—the Facebook group in particular—took their leadership as the pivot of the assembly of Brazilian outrage and as a promoter of the protests. For example, Occupy São Paulo, by its united efforts with the Facebook Group Occupy World Cup and MPL, promoted several anti-World Cup protests, including the big demonstration of June 14, 2014. The other Facebook group Movimento Anti-Copa de Decoração de Ruas (Anti-Cup Movement for the Decoration of the Streets) gained high popularity among Brazilian netizens, as the World Cup had approached and increased the protests in the streets. As of June 2014, in slightly over a month since this group formed, they acquired more than 15,000 Likes on the Facebook page (O Tempo, Jun. 2, 2014). After what this group called the “Bourgeois Cup,” this online group took aim at a new target—the Rio Olympics—by pledging to boycott the Olympic Games which had caused forced evictions and a number of the loss of livelihood for many. Although Movimento Anti-Copa de Decoração de Ruas did not aim at direct resistance by participating in or promoting the demonstrations, their street

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⁷ Original text in Portuguese: “Tem dinheiro para financiar megaevento, enquanto atrasa salários de servidores e corta serviços básicos para a população. [O Estado] está em crise, mas vai receber bilhões do governo Temer só para repressão.” Translation is mine.
decorating activities and their pieces that satirized mega-events had great importance and repercussions such that provoked a sense of “symbolic resistance,” not only from online users, but from the Brazil’s general public as well, who could frequently encounter their works on the street in everyday lives.

Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup sparked the new emergence of the national network of Comitê Popular da Copa (Popular Committee of the World Cup), which is called ANCOP (Articulação Nacional dos Comitês Populares da Copa). ANCOP, according to the description of Fundo Brasil de Direitos Humanos (Brazil Human Rights Fund), has as its mission to:

Unite social movements, civil society organizations and communities affected by mega-events to be active in the process of resistance, denunciation and reparations for human rights violations that occur in Brazil due to the holding of the World Cup, Confederations Cup (FIFA) and the Olympic Games... The national network of Popular World Cup Committee is a network that integrates the World Cup People’s Committees of all the cities that will host the event, as well as social movements, NGOs, afflicted groups, research programs and science outreach programs participating in the process of resistance, denunciation and redress of human rights violations that occur due to the realization of these mega-event.  

ANCOP had several main activities, including coordination, mobilization, networking and publicizing of the event and social movements; and presentation and submission of the “Justice, Reparations and Prevention of Human Rights Violations Plan” to municipal, state and international organizations, and so on. 

A number of Popular Committees were also created throughout all of the host cities in Brazil, affiliated nationally with ANCOP as well as with organizations such as MPL, Homeless Workers’ Movement, Conectas Human Rights and Fórum Popular de Saúde

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Like ANCOP, the Popular Committees’ mission was to coordinate among a group of social movements, organizations, legal professionals, researchers and students, and ordinary citizens to denounce human rights violations, consolidate the resistance against the World Cup and create new spaces for the resistance. There were no significant differences in terms of principal activities between the Popular Committees and ANCOP; the Committee aimed to organize debates to train activities and jointly communicate with the community in relation to the World Cup, to mobilize social movements, to produce content such as a short documentary on the resistance and negative impact of the World Cup, radio skits (“the World Cup for Whom?”), newsletter, stickers, stencils, graffiti, pamphlets, blogs, and social networks.

ANCOP established Comitê Popular Rio da Copa e Olimpíadas (Popular Committee of the World Cup and the Olympics of Rio de Janeiro) in Rio de Janeiro in 2010, which was a year after the ICO announced Rio as the 2016 Olympic host city. The main aims of the committee were to mobilize social movements and organizations, as well as activist groups to empower communities affected by mega-sporting events, with particular purposes to protect Rio’s favelas which faced forced displacement of favela residents. In April 2011, the committee filed a letter regarding the violations of human rights to the UN Special Rapporteur for Adequate Housing Rights. On April 12, 2012, the committee launched the “Mega-events and Human Rights Violations Dossier series,” publishing the first dossier in Portuguese. In November 2015, the committee finalized the publication of its second dossier in English and Portuguese that provided detailed information on the Olympic state of exception in Rio and an array of violations in housing, environmental and public safety areas.

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listing the committee’s demands at the end of the report, such as the suspension of the World Cup Law, forced removals and the police occupation of the favelas. In addition, the committee had organized a number of nonviolent demonstrations at several locations within the city.\(^{31}\)

_Beyond the Lower Class: Cross-Class Nature in Networked Social Movement_

The previous chapter argued that the displacement of the urban poor and favelas under the banner of urban restructuring for mega-events was one of the factors that fueled strong emerging opposition, but not that it was not sufficient to generate the massive opposing forces. In addition to various catalysts that contributed to the mobilization and expansion of the protests discussed in this chapter, I argue that the role of middle class activism was consequential in those processes. In fact, it might have been impossible to witness such huge oppositions if there were no middle class activism in Brazil.

In the early 1980s, the middle class accounted only for 15% of the Brazilian population. However, an emergent middle class has taken off in Brazil since 2003, particularly during the Lula administration; nearly half of the population has comprised the middle class in the country since that period, which means that 40 million people were added to the middle class during Lula’s tenure (CNN, Jul. 24, 2013). From 2003 to 2009, according to Ceratti (2012), the middle class population had grown by 50% in Latin American countries, and the Brazilian middle class alone contributed about 40% of the overall growth in the region. While long known for colossal socioeconomic inequality, Lula’s Brazil gained international celebration for its high growth of the economy and glittering poverty-reduction

\(^{31}\) _Fundo Brasil de Direitos Humanos_. Available at: https://fundodireitoshumanos.org.br/en/projeto/popular-world-cup-and-olympics-committee-of-rio-de-janeiro-1/ (accessed 02/05/19)
initiatives, which together gave impetus to the incorporation of a huge part of “previously poor” Brazilians into the so-called “new middle class” (Klein and Mitchell 2018: 83).

Networked social movements that had arisen resisting the World Cup and the Olympics clearly entailed the nature of the cross-class coalitions with the leadership of the poor. According to my informant, Vasconcelos Filhos, who had contributed to the mobilization of anti-mega-events and vividly witnessed the development processes of these protests as an active member of CSP (Central Sindical Popular) and a former member of Comitê Popular da Copa, attested that while the lower class and darker-skinned people were admittedly the core of demonstrations as it was in the past, the white and middle class people hugely contributed to the development and expansion of social movements during 2013 to 2016.

Initially, the leadership of the protests had been centered on the various social movement organizations in relation to the lower class people who suffered vastly from the negative effects triggered by the undemocratic policies around mega-sporting events. However, the lower and middle classes attempted to create solidarity when middle class people ended up being damaged by the “aristocratic” events. Rising income and economic conditions had not kept Brazilian middle class people from joining the protests. Various news reports also demonstrate this cross-class nature of the protests that occurred in Brazil. According to CNN (Jun. 25, 2013), a rising middle class as a result of economic growth, indeed fed discontent. This is because their demands and expectations for social services that the governments had failed to meet actually increased, as their socioeconomic prospects ameliorated. The particular frustration of not only the lower class, but also the middle class, was especially geared toward all the money Brazil was spending to host mega-events, government corruption and the failure of governmental leadership to deliver basic services.
As time passed, the mobilization transformed to incorporate the middle class and professionals, representing a broader motivational and ideological spectrum in their character. According to a survey conducted by the IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística; Brazilian Insitute of Public Opinion and Statistics) regarding the so-called “Brazilian Spring” in 2013 protests, 79% of the protest participants earned more than double the minimum wage and 76% of the participants were employed at the time (CNN, Jul. 24, 2013).

Social movements disapproving of the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil clearly showed that the lower class people and an emergent middle class united based on cohesive solidarity. This actually enabled the protests in Brazil to further develop and expand, embracing and taking advantage of information technology, and social network services in particular. This network effectively contributed to create massive, robust, intense and durable movements in the country.

*Denouncing Differentiated Citizenship, Calling for the Right to the City*

Maharaj (2015) pointed out that the Brazilian experiences show that the privileged tend to receive greater benefits at the expense of the poor. Socio-economic inequalities thus were exacerbated, which has been illustrated in the various papers, news media and the voice of the people with reference to the loss of livelihood, forced eviction and the violation of human rights. Maharaj specifically states that:

> Disturbingly, the cost of constructing new sports’ facilities and associated infrastructure escalated phenomenally from the original bid-document estimates, without any public oversight, and some are destined to be white elephants. The mega-events were largely organised and funded by the governments in consultation with the private sector, with little or no accountability to citizens, although such decisions had major implications in terms of the diversion of public spending priorities from more urgent social needs such as housing, healthcare and education (Maharaj 2015: 983).
Romário, federal senator and also popularly known as an ex-football player in Brazil, affirmed in his Facebook that the 2014 World Cup was the “biggest robbery” in Brazilian history, because of the dirty game of politicians, particularly in terms of the huge amount of costs for the construction works missing in the legitimate bidding process. He finally argued that Brazilian people are tricked by the government (*O Globo*, Mar. 18, 2012).

Brazil has been identified with inequality and differentiated citizenship throughout its history. In effect, the history of differentiated citizenship stems from the Portuguese colonial system beginning in 1500. This politics of difference in Brazil has been based on a combination of “universal membership” and “special treatment rights,” understood as a privilege, which has made Brazilian citizenship an entrenchment of “legalized privileges” and “legitimated inequalities” (Holston 2011: 335). Today’s high level of socio-economic inequalities—among class and race in particular—in Brazil is a consequence of this dishonored history of differentiated citizenship.

Differentiated citizenship in the context of the World Cup and Olympic Games in Brazil was evident. As discussed in chapter 4, the extensive reconfiguration of Brazilian host cities had truly yielded new ways of production of neoliberal urban spaces where the rights of the urban poor were severely infringed while the privileged benefited at the expense of the others. Huge, persistent and large-scale anti-global sporting events protests in Brazil that occurred during the period of 2013-2016, in this context, can be best understood as right-to-the-city movements that intended to subvert special treatment rights and “the systems of differentiated citizenship” which support them (Holston 2011).

In effect, the earliest initiatives in relation to the right to the city surfaced in Brazil where several organizations of the urban poor, particularly among the favela residents, started advocating for slum dwellers’ right to the city. This endeavor eventually brought about the
codification of the concept of the right to the city into federal law, commonly known as the “2001 City Statute,” which established the legal framework governing urban management and development and recognized the right to the city as a “collective right” (Fernandes 2007: 201). One of the significant elements of the law calls for the “regularization of informal settlements in Brazilian cities, integrating them over time into the formal state and economic sectors.” The law also establishes that “the development of urban land (whether in the formal sector or in the favelas) should be determined not only by its exchange value but also by the social use-value of the land and its surrounding area” (Purcell 2013: 142-143). However, Fernandes (2007) points out that although this law has contributed to promoting the “materialization of the right to the city” in Brazil, there exist serious obstacles to be overcome in terms of socio-spatial inclusion.

An implementation of “profit-driven” urban investments in relation to the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil had made blatant notion of the right to the city that has increasingly been used to dispute the effects of “uneven development on vulnerable informal residents” (Freitas 2017: 953). In this regard, Freitas (2017) points out that Brazilian right-to-the-city policies have fallen short of “addressing the needs of the urban poor” and have eroded their rights in the process of mega-event investments.

However, it is worth noting that an intense resistance against the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games in Brazil can be characterized into the movements that called for the right to the city as the way of denouncing the systems of differentiated citizenship, transcending ideological, political, race and class spectrum. In effect, the demonstrations that had gripped Brazil against the mega-sporting events have been led not only by the lower class, but by a rising middle class as well, that put demands on better social services and equal treatment which had been seriously neglected during the preparations for the events (CNN,
Jun. 25, 2013). Along with the preparations for the mega-sporting event, the “differences” became more evident in Brazilian society.

“We are against the cup for the spending and for forgetting health and education,” said a striking teacher in an interview with the Washington Post (May. 15, 2014), who participated in the protest that gripped Rio de Janeiro on May 15, 2014. One hairdresser from Rio commented about Rio Olympics during an interview with BBC Brasil:

I think the Olympics is good for the world and for Rio. It generates tourism, money, employment. But there is the other side, which is forgotten, which is health and security here. This is terrible. The Olympics will bring in a lot of money, but we wonder whether this money will be invested in Rio afterwards. I hope so (BBC Brasil, Aug. 8, 2016).

One resident in Vila Autodromo, evicted ahead of the the Olympics, also mentioned: “These are the exclusion games… It is an event by the rich for the rich.” Another resident asserted: “This is a city being made for the elite, and it seems the social sanitizing has no end” (Independent, Aug. 2, 2016).

A commonality underlying the comments and interviews above are characterized by, without a doubt, the demands of Brazilian citizens that felt excluded and with fewer rights than those of the upper class—elites, politicians, and conglomerates—who benefitted while others are marginalized. In addition, the World Cup and the Olympic state of exception in the process of preparation for the events in Brazil had come into justifying inequality and differentiated citizenship in different forms, which rather contributed to reinforced and renewed inequalities. These inequalities can be different treatment among citizens and segregated access to basic needs and rights as a citizen (Holston 2011: 341).

Global Nonviolent Action Database (Aug. 2, 2017) presented the main goals of Rio de Janeiro residents’ protests against the World Cup and the Olympics during 2011-2016 as below:
1. An end to forced removals
2. An end to harassment of street vendors
3. The re-opening of the Célio de Barros Athletics Stadium and the Júlio Delamare Water Park
4. A return to the popular use of the Maracanã stadium
5. The regrowth of APA de Marapendi (Olympics golf course)
6. The right to protest without criminalization and the release of political prisoners
7. An end to militarization, favela occupation, extermination of the black population, and police violence
8. Sports as education, health, leisure, not as business
9. The provision of popular housing and facilities on all surplus land from public developments
10. An end to the privatization and gentrification of the Lagoa Rowing Stadium and the Glória Docks
11. The replacement of the Public-Private Partnerships with popular projects for the Marvelous Port and Olympic Park
12. The cleaning of Guanabara Bay and Rodrigo de Freitas and Jacarepaguá lagoons
13. Adequate public transportation free of charge for all
14. The reinstatement of teachers and street cleaners fired for protesting
15. An end to the forced removal of street children from the streets
16. An end to the “World Cup Law”

These goals, or so-called agendas, of the protests of Rio residents are considered the best example of social mobilizations where citizens were calling for equal rights, and creating their own arenas by calling for these rights that challenged differentiated citizenship which particularly rose to the surface during the events preparations period in Brazil (Facconni 2017).

Considering the prevalent image of soccer-loving or sport-fanatic Brazil, it would have never been expected that there be a protest against the World Cup and the Olympic
Games in that country. During the period of the overflow of the protest, the media and politicians were shocked by the popularity and the intensity of the demonstrations, particularly with the overwhelming majority of the Brazilian public opinion (about 89 percent of support) advocating the criticism voiced by the protests both in the streets and on the online social networks, and opposing the massive spending on the Games without accountability, as well as denouncing the exclusive benefit of corrupt stakeholders such as politicians, public corporations and construction companies. As time passes, the slogan “We would trade one hospital for ten stadiums” became a principal motto of the demonstrations (Castells 2015: 232-234).

As such, the demands of social mobilizations during the 2013-2016 period moved beyond traditional formal citizenship to a substantive one, that involved an array of economic, social, political and civil rights, including shelter, housing, education, and basic health. This call for rights truly incorporated the concept of the right to the city that recognizes the city residents as “right holders.” As the new generation of Brazil’s civil society movement began to claim the notion of the right to the city, it was frequently shown on posters, banners and online pages during the protests against mega-sporting events (Braathen et al. 2015: 266). As David Harvey (2012: 4) pointed out, the right to the city is “far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources the city embodies: it is the right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts’ desire.

The right to the city has been incorporated into a slogan for social movements worldwide against the manifestations of a number of modern cities where public utilities and processes are privatized and where urban development has become a primary aim. This was the same case for the demonstrations in Brazil, which sparked a new wave of mobilizations, allowing “the struggles of local communities over localized issues to connect to a wider...
discourse of urban development conflicts” in Brazilian cities. As a response, President Dilma Rousseff and political party leaders promised to pay particular attention to “the voice of the streets,” undertaking several reform initiatives. However, no profound transformations could be found in the urban regime, the remaining World Cup and Olympic projects continued to overstride the governance of the city (Braathen et al. 2015: 267).

Conclusion

This chapter examined the emergence of civil resistance against the negative and perilous aspects of the World Cup and the Olympic Games, which included an array of human rights violations. I specifically navigated detailed processes by which the protests occurred throughout Brazilian cities based on civil society networks and the reasons behind the occurrence of massive nationwide resistance and suggest that it can be best characterized as a networked social movement. This chapter maintains that the mega-sporting events in Brazil were critically delegitimized among the Brazilian people and, within these processes, civil society networks and online platforms (particularly, social network services) had provided a powerful vehicle through which Brazilian fury could be united. In other words, the culmination of Brazilian grievances, based particularly on networks, played a paramount role in the emergence, promotion, and diffusion of extensive protests in the country.

This chapter also explored the core tenets of these networked social movements in Brazil and suggested that these truly entailed the characteristics of the right-to-the-city movements that intended to subvert special treatment rights, usually understood as privileges, and the social systems of differentiated citizenship which support them. The underlying processes of the de-legitimization of mega-sporting events based on the “networked outrage”
stemmed from the realization of asymmetric distribution of rights between the privileged and marginalized, i.e. differentiated citizenship. I suggest that these networked social movements can be seen as a cross-class movement that expanded beyond the lower class people. Brazilian people expected, since Brazil was nominated as a host nation for the World Cup and Rio for Olympic Games, a sustainable and positive long-term legacy for both hosting cities and the whole country, but instead, witnessed neoliberal and undemocratic urban governance that seriously disenfranchised the poor and infringed human rights.
CHAPTER 6.
REMAKING THE NATION FROM BELOW: MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS, CONTESTED RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF CIVIC NATIONALISM AS A COMPETING NARRATIVE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BRAZIL

This chapter primarily argues that a series of irrationalities and illegalities around the World Cup and Olympics and ensuing strong public antipathy—in the broader form of collective feelings or in a more concrete nature of cross-class coalitions—ultimately gave rise to the potent civic nationalism in Brazil as a competing narrative of national identity. I suggest in this chapter that the dynamics of national politics—particularly the rise of competing national narratives in Brazil—are closely intertwined with and expressed through urban experiences of Brazilian people, who suffered from the neoliberal governance around the preparatory phases of the two mega-events and the ensuing emergence of oppositional forces, which are addressed in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

As previously examined in this dissertation, the history of nation-building in Brazil witnessed a dynamic and dialectic process through which national identity had been imposed and constructed in a top-down way by political elites and intellectuals through popular culture, futebol in particular. This ethno-cultural sense of Brazilian-ness based on the popular notion of racial democracy has defined what it means to be Brazilian and how they should be. However, Brazilians could reconstruct their imagined communities in a bottom-up way, which I call “nation-remaking from below,” based on increasingly shared discourses of civic values such as democracy, justice, equality and human rights as a consequence of a series of practices and policies of mega-sporting events in Brazil. It was possible because these shared civic norms directly contradict the legitimacy of racial democracy that had been utilized to
prevent public discussions about prevalent injustice and inequality in Brazil and shut down the production of vibrant civic discourses.

This chapter investigates personal narratives based on unstructured interviews with 143 ordinary Brazilian citizens during my field research. As revealed in the methodology and data collection section in chapter 1, narrative inquiry is particularly useful to the questions of identity in this study because this dissertation presumes and follows the widely acknowledged statement that “identity” is constructed through “narrative.” As Hinchman and Hinchman (2001: xviii) succinctly put it, “identity is that which emerges in and through narratives.” Personal stories, in the words of Rosenweld and Ochburg (1992:1), “are not merely a way of telling someone about one’s life” but they are indeed “the means by which identities may be fashioned.” Understanding and interpreting narratives told by ordinary citizens were particularly useful to encapsulate popular ideas on the mega-sporting events and to figure out the emergence of the competing narrative of Brazilian identity in relation to ordinary citizens’ experiences with mega-sporting events.

Through an inquiry of interviewees’ personal stories, a number of narrative threads emerged; this chapter interprets that Brazilian imagined community and strong ties among its members could be formed based on the sharing of the civic sense that 1) Brazil is not a country of racial democracy anymore, 2) Brazil is an unjust and corrupt country, 3) Brazilian democracy is a total failure and needs to be improved and finally 4) Brazilians deserve to demand their rights to education, healthcare and security as rights-bearing citizens. A broad alliance of the lower and middle classes in Brazil was not simply an oppositional force but acted as a productive catalyst for the rise of a competing and new national imaginary—a civic national identity—based particularly on shared civic norms of human rights, democracy, equality, and justice. I suggest that these four principal narratives that are closely connected
to each other emblemize the emergence of civic identity in Brazil.

**Ongoing Controversies, Enduring Bad Memories**

“We hated the Games!” Pessimistic Voices from the Streets

Like any other country, the announcements made by FIFA and IOC that Brazil became a host nation of the World Cup and the Olympics indeed spurred a “national” celebration and festive mood throughout the country. It was coincided by Brazil’s historical economic boom and the following elevation of Brazil as a significant international agency during the Lula administration. Both Brazilian elites and ordinary citizens firmly believed that Brazil could successfully prepare and host the Games with full support from whole parts of the country.

However, this dream was just a rosy illusion, lasting a short period. As explored in the previous chapters, the federal and local governments had carried out neoliberal urban reorganization and several mega-events policies for the preparation for the World Cup and the Olympics based on the so-called “state of exception.” During these processes, the privileged—including private parties, construction companies, as well as engaged politicians—gained an exclusive benefit while the marginalized were disenfranchised. These series of procedures, in effect, made “right differences” become more evident and noticeable in Brazilian society. One important matter that should be noted here is that the preparation for the events and ensuing negative sides were manifested during Brazil’s severe economic recession and political turmoil provoked by a critical corruption scandal.

In these circumstances, the increase in bus fare in São Paulo was a tipping point for the emergence of social mobilizations against the mega-sporting events that were scheduled...
to be held in Brazil. In addition, as examined previously, Brazilian people’s grievances were effectively united by networks, including pre-existing social movement organizations as well as newly arisen social networks online, which served to organize, mobilize, promote and publicize the “networked social movements” against the mega-events in Brazil. In other words, an increase of just 20 cents of bus fare provoked the realization of the consciousness of citizens’ rights, in which networks helped and, often, which directly involved the emergence of civil resistance throughout Brazil.

These unwelcomed and disliked World Cup and Olympic Games have also produced highly negative views of the events among Brazilian people even after a lapse of several years. Castells (2015) revealed the Brazilian public opinion in his work, that, before the event, the media and politicians were shocked by the popularity and intensity of the nationwide demonstrations in Brazil with the support of 89% of the Brazilian people. In the case of the World Cup in Rio, 63% of Rio residents in 2011 believed that mega-sporting events would benefit the city, while only 27% responded that the events would be beneficial in 2015, marking a significant decrease in the figure (Global Nonviolent Action Database, Aug. 2, 2017). According to the Pew Research Center’s report (2014), a majority of Brazilians (61%) felt in 2014 that hosting the World Cup would yield a negative impact on the country, outstripping 34% of positive responses (See Figure 6.1.)

< Figure 6.1. Most Say Hosting World Cup is bad for Brazil, 2014. >
These public opinions are consistent with the data gathered during my fieldwork in Brazil. Among 143 interviewees that consisted of adults with Brazilian nationality living in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, Salvador and Manaus, 62.2% of interviewees responded that the hosting of mega-events was bad for Brazil, while 23.1% said it was positive and 14.7% answered neither.

Those who were in favor of Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games pointed out the alegria (joy) and profits generated by the foreign tourists as a primary reason for the positive answers. Luciedry, a university student in Manaus and one of my interviewees, commented that: “In my point of view, it was good and it was positive in terms of economy. Many tourists came here and they stimulated economic profits. Also, society and people in Manaus could also contact a foreign culture, which has been a rare case in our city.” One São Paulo resident also mentioned that: “I really liked the World Cup in Brazil. I live near Arena Corinthians, and at that time, many tourists came to the stadium and every day was a festa! The World Cup was a unique source for Brazilian alegria. Also, the jobs related to the event had been hugely generated, although it was temporary. It helped a lot and offered an opportunity for unemployed Brazilian people.”

An anonymous hotel worker in Salvador that I interviewed during the fieldwork
suggested a positive side of the World Cup from a newer perspective of politics of attraction and soft power. She specifically said: “Although the World Cup has produced intense controversies among Brazilian people, I personally think it was great. Particularly, I think the World Cup made people across the World get more familiar with Brazil. In other words, the event enhanced Brazil’s international visibility.”

Although there existed some favorable attitudes towards the mega-events, my interview results succinctly reveal that a majority of Brazilian citizens (62.2%) expressed a hearty antagonism against them. Their responses were associated with the questioning of the legitimacy of hosting the mega-events in terms of their timing during Brazil’s economic and political turmoil and the matter of prioritization of investing money. “Constructions for whom?” my interviewee Lucas, a university student in Manaus, said, “it was totally a failure. The government invested heavily in the constructions of stadiums and infrastructure, neglecting a true necessity for Brazilians’ quality of lives such as education, health and housing, and many others.”

Joselito, a street vendor that I met in Salvador, mentioned that: “I really disliked the World Cup. Lower class people, like me, who sell something on the street, rather suffered from city-round constructions such as stadiums and apartments, which disturbed the people’s transit and emptied streets where I sell. Praça da Sé was also closed, where a huge number of street vendors are gathered. I personally think it triggered a type of unemployment for street vendors. This consequently made prostitution more rampant throughout the city.”

Rodrigo, an interviewee in Curitiba, pointed out that Brazil’s hosting of the mega-events lost their justification: “Do you remember Brazil’s corruption scandal, lava jato during the preparation period for the World Cup? This is the reality of Brazil. Like this, politicians benefitted a lot from the Cup, but the debt is ours. There has been a huge debt due to the
hosting of the Games. Also, what was ridiculous is that the completion of the construction of the avenue that links the airport from the city center had been delayed, completed the very day before the World Cup. Where did all that our money go?"

Nor were Interviewees that I met in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro any different. Ramon Pacifico, a travel guide in Rio, said: “Before the World Cup and the Olympics, I had thought these events would improve our country. But I soon realized they didn’t come up to my expectation.” Gomes, whom I met in Praça Largo do Machado (Largo do Machado Square), strongly asserted that: “The government should have invested in our real necessities such as education, health, and security… I have chronic pain in my leg, but I couldn’t properly be treated in the hospitals.” “It was the worst ever,” said my interviewee and São Paulo resident, Marcos, commented: “I love football as other Brazilians do. However, I disliked the World Cup here in Brazil. I think the World Cup in Brazil was a typical means of concealing corruption in our country. Brazilian politicians are all thieves. The more we concentrate on the World Cup games, the more people’s concern about political corruption is distracted. Politicians here in Brazil exploited the World Cup to rob our money. This is because, in Brazil, football is one of the most effective ways to cover up political corruption!”

As proven by a number of street voices above, by far a majority of Brazilian people still have a highly negative collective memory of the World Cup, and partly, the Olympic Games in the case of Rio residents. Their main sources of loathing against the events was, in sum, 1) Brazil’s socio-economic-political crises that caused the loss of legitimacy for hosting the games during a critical situation, 2) prioritization matters, which means the heavy governmental investments into the preparation of the Games at the expense of public services such as education, health, security, and housing, etc, and 3) the divulgence of political corruption in the process of constructions and developmental works associated with the
World Cup and the Olympics, which is traditionally deep-rooted in Brazilian society.

Brazilians’ antagonism toward the so-called mega-events exploded as a form of social mobilization prior to the events; the antagonism never ceased even in the post-event periods. These cynical and pessimistic memories collectively held by a majority of the Brazilian people produced negative discourse on the World Cup and Olympic legacies, while remains a topic of heated debate.

*The Fallacy of Legacy: Mega-Sporting Events as a White Elephant*

Many of the previous studies have highlighted positive impacts and legacies of mega-sporting events on host nations and host cities. For instance, Malfas et al. (2004) emphasized that mega-sporting events can contribute to generating new jobs, social inclusion, an increase in participation in sporting activities, and large-scale urban improvement. The International Olympic Committee (IOC, 2009) also suggests five principal sustainable legacies through hosting the events in terms of economic, environmental, sporting, urban and social, cultural and political.

However, the recent experiences of the World Cup and the Olympic Games have shown that it was not the same case for Brazil. In other words, the Brazilian case suggests that mega-sporting events have instead sparked heated debates on their ongoing uncomfortable impacts on Brazil and its citizens, producing negative discourses on the legacy of international sporting events. A number of scholars also pointed out that, in this context, mega-sporting events have brought about a negative legacy in Brazil. The celebrated sportswriter Dave Zirin (2016), in his book *Brazil’s Dance with the Devil*, explored how the mega-events, which he calls “neoliberal Trojan horses,” have seriously led to negative legacies on the populace. Alves (2016) suggested there had been a lack of the right to access
to information and right to voice in the process of forced eviction in Rio during the preparation stage for the 2016 Olympic Games. In her study “the 2014 World Cup in Brazil: Its Legacy and Challenges,” Marilene de Paula (2015) critically suggests how mega-sporting events can result in privileging certain social groups, including gentrification while marginalizing a majority of people in the name of urban security and modernity as a result of urban development which can generate a prime opportunity to “sell” the host country. Similarly, Maharaj (2015) also notes that Brazil wanted to host such mega-events to promote its emerging power status; however, the Brazilian experience clearly suggests that the privileged benefited at the expense of the marginalized and socio-economic inequalities were actually exacerbated. According to Woods (2015), Brazil’s case clearly shows that mega-sporting events enabled wealth transfer from the public to the private sector, largely benefiting elite investors rather than the whole population. Gaffney’s (2014) study explores how hyper-commercialization in constructing a new stadium for the 2014 Brazil World Cup demolished Brazil’s traditional architecture and cultural traditions. Although some existing literature has elucidated intangible and/or negative legacies of the case of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, very little academic attention has been paid to the relationship between Brazil’s hosting of mega-sporting events and its national identity.

While scholars have highlighted an ugly side of the mega-events, voices from the streets by ordinary Brazilian citizens also had cynical ideas on the legacies of the World Cup and the Olympics, similar to their negative views and experiences in relation to the mega-events examined in the previous section. Jorge, a taxi driver, whom I met in Manaus, said: “I don’t know exactly how people in the other cities feel, but in case of Manaus, there is no such a kind of legacy. This is because, in our city, there is no ‘cultura de futebol (football culture).’ We don’t have a football club in the first division, but the government invested hugely in the
construction of the stadium. Now, it has become a headache.” In this context, Mier (2014) pointed out that the best team in Manaus is in the fourth division, where a USD 300 million arenas mushroomed up just for the World Cup.

I met hotel owner Roberto, who was also the president of Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Hotéis de Amazonas (Brazilian Association of Hotel Industry in Amazonas). Many would have assumed that professions associated with lodging businesses would have positive views on the mega-events legacies that are based on a significant benefit from the event, particularly because it could attract a huge number of tourists into host cities. During the interview, however, Roberto pointed out that the expected legacy through the World Cup was just a rosy illusion, particularly if the city is not well-known, compared to the high popularity of São Paulo and Rio as a famous touristic destination: “The government positively estimates the sustainable impact of the World Cup on tourism industries. However, it was totally false. There were very short-term and temporary effects. I have thought that tourists would walk around the city, visit restaurants and shops, but that was not the case. Rather, they disappeared to another city right after they watched a match. The governmental expectation was false and this expectation related to tourism was not achieved.” His remarks clearly suggest that the mega-event generated a very short-term, temporary effect on the area of tourism in the city of Manaus.

A similar experience could be found in another city as well. An anonymous tour guide that I met in Salvador said: “As a tour guide, I was really waiting for the World Cup in our city because I thought a huge number of tourists would make a profit for us. However, far fewer people had come to the city than expected, and they just moved right after they watched a game.” In Curitiba, my interviewee Rodrigo asserted in the same vein that: “Brazil has two major cities that many people around the world might know and want to travel to…
In the case of our city, people just visited only to watch a game and they departed right after the matches, without a doubt, to São Paulo and Rio.”

Others suggested the fact that the World Cup and the Olympics further divided people and society, rather than promoting social cohesion as many host countries have achieved through the events. Regional asymmetry within the city was also noticeable, particularly in the city of Rio in the process of an array of construction carried out for the Olympic preparations. Specifically, Rio’s Zona Sul (South Zone), where the wealth is traditionally concentrated, benefitted, while other regions were relatively marginalized. Luiz Roberto whom I met in Rio commented during the interview: “There was no such kind of a legacy for me. Basically, it should be pointed out that the constructions were overpriced because of chronic corruption in our country…Even after the game, we have no access to the stadiums…The Olympics made people separated as well. That means that some urban renovations only favored the south zone of Rio.” Similar comments could be found in the interview with Anderson, who said that: “the Olympic is nothing related to me and impacted positively in my life. I live in Zona Oeste (West Zone) in the city, and we had nothing, nothing, and nothing.”

Mega-events in Brazil were seen not as the Games for athletes, but as the Games for the elites. Representatively, it would be worth noting one anonymous taxi driver’s comment during the interview in Rio: “For the World Cup and the Olympics, the money did not go to us, but went to the elites. Transport improved? No, it wasn’t. Health and security? Deteriorated. The only beneficiaries were conglomerates and politicians who were engaged in them. Our quality of life has never ever improved.”

Brazilian people questioned “superfaturamento” (overpricing) of the stadiums and a variety of constructions and their “utility” in the era of post-events, which inhaled a huge
amount of money under the name of “investments.” In other words, these facilities that were constructed for the events with an astronomical investment were considered as a “white elephant” by many of Brazilians across the country—although only 4 interviewees actually mentioned the term elefante branco (white elephant), far more than one-third of participants (59 out of 143) criticized in their narratives the uselessness of facilities or a tremendous cost of follow-up management of various stadiums—because there is a serious lack of access to them in the post-event period and a heavy investment on them forfeited an opportunity to invest in other significant areas such as economic growth and public services. The only thing left was a heavy debt generated by the preparations for the mega-events. One anonymous hotel owner in São Paulo maintained that: “The World Cup put Brazil in a predicament in financial ways. First and foremost, it was not productive, but gave us huge debt. Look at the stadiums in other regions. Like cities in North or Northeast Brazil, the football teams are in the second or third division. Do you think that it is reasonable to pour a lot of money into the construction of stadiums for the second or third division teams? Again, it only left debt and was truly a white elephant.”

In effect, many news media have criticized a skyrocketing debt in Brazil as a consequence of mega-events. *O Globo* (Aug. 19, 2018) pointed out that the Olympic Games left “a legacy of debt and broken promises,” which reaches around R$ 52 million32. *Valor* (Jan. 6, 2017) also suggested that mega-events held in Brazil accelerated the rhythm of indebtedness in Rio. *ESPN Brasil* (August. 10, 2017) was also sarcastic on their news title about the legacy of the 2016 Rio Olympics: “Um ano depois, o que a Rio 16 deixou para o Brasil? Uma cidade e um país envoltos por corrupção, dívidas e promessas perdidas (One

32 According to the website *Exchange Rates* ([https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/BRL-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2018.html](https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/BRL-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history-2018.html)), the average Brazilian Real (BRL) to US Dollar (USD) exchange rate in 2018 is 0.28 USD. Thus, BRL 52 million can be converted into about USD 14.56 million.
year after, what did the Rio Olympics leave for Brazil? The city and the country wrapped with corruption, debts and lost promises.” Eduardo Coutinho, an economist of *Ibmec* (private university in Rio de Janeiro), sees that the legacy of mega-sporting events in Brazil is residual, according to an interview with *Hoje em Dia* (May. 2, 2016): “There was a warming about the economy and the level of happiness of the population only during the occurrence of the games. Most infrastructure problems still exist. There is, in fact, no legacy.”

Finally, the remarks of Alexandre, an interviewee of mine and a citizen of São Paulo, synthetically represent an ugly side of mega-events legacy in Brazil that has been explored throughout this chapter: “I love football, and I liked all the World Cups, but I didn’t like our World Cup. We needed to develop all the areas of our society, but it failed. In terms of the World Cup legacy, every single host country has produced a very positive legacy. However, Brazil has achieved nothing at all. We had no qualifications and were not prepared well as a host country because we had financial and political problems at that time. Think about the United States or Europe. They are economically developed and possess a stable domestic market. For these reasons, they have fundamental to generate and inherit the World Cup legacy while Brazil failed. We also expected a huge inflow of foreign tourists from all over the world but the reality was that the tourists were mostly from poor countries of Latin America, so we had no such big influx of capital and tourist expenditures. It counted for nothing, and the World Cup legacy would be expressed in one word, ‘failure.’”

During my field research, I found an unexpected result: the national team’s performance or match results in the World Cup also strongly affects a legacy, which is comprised of not only objective and statistical figures, but can be constituted partially into an unquantifiable one such as people’s collective memory.

As a country of football, in this context, one should recall one of the most critical
moments in Brazilian history was the tragedy of 1950 *Maracanazo*, which significantly affected and destabilized nation-building through football, a strategy that had been carried out by both political elites and intellectuals of that period. In other words, as examined in a detailed way in Chapter 2, the historical defeat by Uruguay in the final game in the 1950 Brazil World Cup, which was held in Maracanã stadium, Rio de Janeiro, was completely traumatic for this collective construction of a national sense of self (Leite Lopes 2007).

A similar experience reappeared in the 2014 World Cup as well. The great defeat by Germany in the semi-final match, by the score of 7 to 1, stabbed a dagger into Brazilians’ heart. It is called 2014 *Mineirazo*, because the game was held in Minas Gerais. This national sorrow, as expected, has not only exacerbated and even, accelerated the sense of “pre-existing pessimistic antagonism” against the World Cup, but also had a negative impact on national unity and nation-building. In this regard, *ESPN Brasil* (Jul. 8, 2014) argued that while *Maracanazo* was tragic, “*Mineirazo*” was definitely the greatest humiliation in Brazilian history. In fact, a number of interviewees of mine pointed out that *Mineirazo* made the unwelcomed Brazil World Cup worse, considering it as indeed a national tragedy and shame. It was evident that this great defeat of Brazil had influenced negative collective feelings and the sense of legacy in the World Cup, according to my interview results. Several interviewees commonly mentioned that the only one that they can unquestionably suppose as the World Cup legacy was a national collective memory in relation to *Mineirazo* that actually stunned a country. The 2014 *Mineirazo* was widely considered by Brazilians as a new version of the 1950 *Maracanazo* tragedy.

**Towards a “Civic” Narrative: The Destruction of Racial Democracy as a Legacy of Mega-Sporting Events**
This dissertation suggests that the World Cup and the Olympic Games left nothing but the powerful emergence of civic identity intermingled with the delegitimization of the narrative of racial democracy that has long been a central element that constitutes Brazilian-ness. The research outcome clearly shows that the idea of racial democracy had been deconstructed in a bottom-up way, which is exactly opposite of Brazilian popular ideology had been imposed by political elites in a top-down, hierarchical model as a nation-building strategy, dating from the first half of the twentieth century.

This section first deals with the conceptual exploration regarding how Brazil’s civic identity and ethnic identity based on the notion of racial democracy are inherently antithetical to each other and examine how both cannot coexist as a hybrid identity. Based on the discussion, I later explore the ways in which racial democracy had been destabilized in the context of mega-sporting events that contributed in part to the rise of civic identity.

*Civic Identity and Ethno-cultural Identity as Competing Narratives of Brazilian National Identity*

According to one of the most influential writers on nationalism, Michael Ignatieff (1993, 1996), a major distinction can be made between ethnic and civic identity, based on the nature of belonging. Ignatieff characterized ethnic nationalism as one based on common “blood,” fraternity, and the sense of belonging to nationhood stemming from emotional attachment. Therefore, in this model, it is widely accepted that the nation creates individuals. In contrast, he sees that civic nationalism defines the nation in terms of willingness to stick to its civic values such as democracy, equality, human rights, and justice, not in terms of shared ethnicity. The civic nation can be thus characterized as a “community of equal, rights-bearing
citizens, united in a patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff 1993). Ignatieff considers this nationalism as necessarily democratic, because “it vests sovereignty in all of the people.” Civic nationalism emphasizes law rather than roots, and people's feeling of belonging is based on rational attachment and their choice, not inheritance. In this form of nationalism, thus, an individual creates a nation, unlike the ethnic nation model. Nevertheless, the fact that there are clear distinctions between ethnic and civic nationhood does not necessarily mean that both cannot be combined with each other. In fact, several scholars have challenged the civic-ethnic dichotomy drawing on existing literature, suggesting they both can truly exist as a mélange, hybrid national identity (e.g., Hansen and Hesli 2009; Hristova and Cekik 2013).

In the Brazilian context, however, I suggest that these accounts cannot be easily applied. As examined throughout this dissertation, Brazilian national identity has been fundamentally ethno-cultural based on the concept of racial democracy that has long shaped Brazilian-ness in particular. The notion of racial democracy has been used to frame Brazil’s harmonious race relations as one without racial discrimination, inequality, and hierarchy. Proffered in the 1930s by intellectuals, particularly the celebrated Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, racial democracy has long characterized how Brazilians believe themselves to be and how they should be. In his book Casa Grande & Senzala (The Masters and the Slaves), Freyre ([1933] 1956) emphasized the promising and potent role of racial miscegenation that would eventually bring about Brazilian social development and harmonious race relations, attempting at the same time to create a new ethnic category—“racially mixed Brazilian.” This idea was broadly propagated during the first term of the Getulio Vargas regime (1930-1945) through popular culture—particularly popular music (e.g., samba, Bossanova) and sports (e.g., capoeira and football), which epitomized the creative
power of racial mixture and miscegenation—as a nation-building strategy, and remained a central tenet of Brazilian-ness throughout the twentieth century. The concept has been utilized, however, to conceal Brazil’s deep-rooted race and class inequalities, particularly during the military regime (1965-1984), which debilitated the emergence and diffusion of civic consciousness in Brazil.

To put it simply, Brazilians have forged “a rich cultural citizenship” over decades in the “absence of strong civic citizenship,” and this vibrant and growing popular culture spawned “contending forms” of ethno-cultural nationalism and identity (Eakin 2017: 10). On the contrary, Brazilians could fully realize how ethnic national identity based on the “myth” of racial democracy has been just a rosy illusion, by increasingly embracing civic nationalism. The sarcastic message, “It doesn’t make sense to be the soccer country if there’s no health and education,” that has been numerously illustrated in this dissertation, might best indicate how Brazilian civic identity and ethnic identity are two sides of the same coin in reality. It is truly paradoxical if one ambivalently embraces ethnic and civic identity at the same time, given that the centralities and characters of both identities are incompatible in the Brazilian context.

“Brazil is not a Country of Racial Democracy Anymore!”

It has been widely recognized that a central pivot that constitutes what it means to be a Brazilian has been, without a doubt, based fundamentally on the notion of racial democracy. From a critical perspective, however, much sophisticated social science research conducted by Brazilianists has revealed that a racial democracy in Brazil is nothing but a myth that truly misguides a reality. For example, Burdick (2016: 40) claims that in Brazil, “people on the lighter end of the color-race continuum hold strong prejudices against those toward the darker end.” McLucas (2005) also suggests that there still predominates a widespread sense of
“racial hierarchy” within Brazilian culture today, that has unconsciously trapped Afro-Brazilians. Bailey (2004) maintains that his research outcome of an analysis of racial attitudes in Rio de Janeiro contradicts the long-held racial democracy, showing most Brazilians still recognize racism plays a defining role in Brazilian society. In her book *Race and the Brazilian Body: Blackness, Whiteness, and Everyday Language in Rio de Janeiro*, anthropologist Jennifer Roth-Gordon (2016) explores how the embedded racism, what the author calls “comfortable racial contradiction,” are pervasive in people’s everyday cultural, linguistic and bodily practices. By conducting an ethnographic study in Rio de Janeiro and conversation with *Cariocas*, she suggests that while the racial differences are cordially unspoken, whiteness is still tacitly regarded as privileged, superior and a source of pride.

The cases of the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil had been a series full of blatant racial and class disparities. The question that Brazilians crucially raised was the problem associated with high ticket prices for the games that solely the rich could afford. This uncomfortable reality represented an implicit and explicit social exclusion of the poor, largely composed of darker-skinned people in Brazil. “How many Brazilians could by a ticket to watch the games?” responded my personal interviewee Leonardo, a graduate student at *Centro Universitário do Norte (UniNorte)* in Manaus, “a majority of Brazilian people actually have no such purchasing power.” In his words, buying a ticket for the games for the World Cup or the Olympics seemed to be limited to a member of an upper-class family, which consists of more “whiter-skinned people” in reality.

Some news media outside Brazil also cast light upon the race and class divisions in the participation in these mega-sporting events. News articles pointed out how the stadiums were bulging with “uncolored” people, while “people of color” were excluded from the access to the games. The nationwide lack of crowds from racial minorities and the
underrepresented—Afro-Brazilians in particular—in the arenas, even in the city of Salvador where the multiracial and black accounts for approximately 80% of the population (IBGE 2010),\(^{33}\) demonstrates that “Brazil is no true rainbow nation” (The Guardian, Jul. 1, 2014). In other words, as the newspaper Independent (Sep. 29, 2013) pointed out, “the beautiful game seems to belong to white middle class.”

The long-standing national narrative of racial democracy in Brazilian society has been at stake by facing the production and proliferation of counter-narratives, which was particularly detonated during the event preparation period. Without mentioning the case of racial and class division in the gap of participation in the games, it was not difficult for Brazilians to recognize the lack of ideals of more integrated, inclusive and egalitarian policies and practices around mega-sporting events in their country. The numerous cases of forced evictions and loss of livelihood in the workplace that generated injustice and human rights infringement dominantly corresponded to non-white Brazilians’ experiences; hosting mega-sporting events had delineated succinct divisions between the racialized classes.

These accounts were consistent with many interviews. 23 interviewees furnished detailed stories that an implicit exclusion was evident in the events and perceived how a celebratory atmosphere and joyous experiences associated with the World Cup and the Olympics were largely shared by upper-class Brazilians. For example, based on his work experience, one former World Cup volunteer, whom I met in São Paulo, attested that “the stadiums at each game were full of upper-class people, while the poor had to watch the games on television.” A racial contradiction had been embedded in mega-sporting events in Brazil that led to civil rights abuses and the consolidation of the existence of structural racism.

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\(^{33}\) 2010 IBGE Census reveals the demographics of Salvador as follows: Pardo (51.7%), Black (27.8%), White (18.9%), Asian (1.3%) and Amerindian (0.3%).
When I asked concerning the Brazilian popular ideology of “racial democracy” in the context of mega-sporting events during the interviews, a majority of the respondents expressed a sense of hostility over the idea, pointing out how Brazil’s two mega-events were disastrous in terms of disunity between racial lines. One doctoral student, an Afro-Brazilian, whom I interviewed in Rio de Janeiro, asserted that hosting mega-sporting events and its sort of related procedures rather “confirmed” that an idea of racial democracy that has guided what it means to be Brazilians was simply a rosy illusion and mythology.

One homeless interviewee in Rio de Janeiro mentioned that “os jogos” were exclusively for the people with “white skins and blue eyes.” As frequently examined throughout this dissertation, the privileged tended to benefit from the events, while the marginalized were disenfranchised within a variety of processes involved in mega-sporting events. “Racism is hidden in every corner of our society,” said one travel guide in São Paulo, “I don’t believe the idea of racial democracy in Brazil. The World Cup and the Olympics in our country were totally racist games…A huge number of the poor’s lives were destroyed in the name of showing off the Brazilian modernity. The underlying problem here is that most of the targeted people were blacks or darker-skinned people. For whom were these events intended?”

People’s experiences in relation to the World Cup and the Olympic Games disclosed the ugly reality of racism in Brazil. The image of tolerance and a racially harmonious society that the Brazilian government had been trying to portray was tarnished by the rise of civic discourses and narratives that directly disapproved the idea of racial democracy. For the majority of black and mulatto Brazilians, mega-sporting events in their country were merely exclusion games, nothing more, nothing less.
From Cultural Citizenship towards the Prominence of Civic National Identity: The World Cup, the Olympics and Nation-Rebuilding from Below in Brazil

Since the late-1990s, social controversies have grown around the idea that racial democracy is a myth or reality; modern Brazilian society witnessed the decline of the notion and its reality in Brazil (Eakin 2017). Although the phenomenon had deepened throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, no one could deny that a racial democracy based on miscegenation and popular culture has maintained a central axis that represents what it means to be Brazilian. The notion of a racial democracy in Brazil has played a pivotal role both in 1) maintaining an ethnic and cultural sense of national identity based on racial miscegenation, and 2) concealing inequality within Brazilian society based on the manipulation and emphasis on a “democratic” character of racial relations.

Like the Diretas Já campaign in 1992, however, anti-mega-events movements sparked the rise of powerful civic nationalism in Brazil. Although these two historical protests share common points in that they contributed to the emergence of civic nationalism, this dissertation argues that they differ significantly, notably in terms of the forms of civic nationalism generated by each one and how each relates to an existing discourse of racial democracy. Anti-mega-events demonstrations have shown that, unlike Diretas Já, people called for social and civic rights based primarily on increasingly shared norms of democracy, human rights, equality, and justice, directly contradicting “the legitimacy” of racial democracy prevalent in Brazilian society. Thus, the movements against the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil contributed significantly to delegitimizing the notion of racial democracy, which has increasingly lost its fame in Brazilian society. It is highly ironic that Brazilianness, hugely constituted by sports—football in particular—was
deconstructed by football and sporting events themselves. This statement is true mainly because the mega-events in Brazil divided and further polarized racial and class lines, being recognized as the events not for all, but exclusively for elites and the upper class. Overall, the occurrence of a number of large and small street protests against the World Cup and the Olympic games in Brazil during the 2013-2016 clearly indicates that a prominence of democratic, civil rights values contributed to the further rejection of the idea of racial democracy as a fundamental ethnocentric Brazilianness that had been imposed by the government, political elites and academics throughout the twentieth century.

Vasconcelos Filhos, a member of CSP (Central Sindical Popular), as well as an ex-member of Comitê Popular da Copa in Manaus, asserted during my personal interview that while many participants in the protests were comprised of the lower class and darker-skinned people, the middle class and white activism were also noteworthy. Jefferson Nonato, a member of SINTESAM (Sindicato dos Trabalhadores do Ensino Superior do Amazonas), also mentioned that everybody in the Brazilian society participated in the movements regardless of gender, race, and class. These statements are consistent with the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo (Jun. 20, 2013), which affirmed that Brazil’s rising middle class was the backbone of the movements. It ultimately means that the movements were not limited to a particular racial category or particular class, but embraced the pan-political and ideological spectrum. This means that Brazil’s anti-mega-events movements can be best seen as indeed a fight for their fundamental rights that had been infringed upon by a series of governmental policies in relation to the mega-sporting events. Above all, people reacted against the systems of differentiated citizenship that became an obvious substantiality in Brazilian society through the hosting of the events.

Through an analysis of my interviews with ordinary Brazilian citizens, I found their
narratives clearly represent a “civic” sense, denouncing a racial democracy as a Brazilian popular ideology that has consistently been sustained through the efforts of political elites. The following sections are the research outcomes that have been informed by interviews with ordinary citizenry during field research in Brazil.

“We Are Brazilians because we are living in an Unjust and Corrupt Society.”

Inequality, injustice, and corruption that have been deep-rooted in every corner of the Brazilian society, as in many other countries, apply to race and socioeconomic class lines. These social problems have been persistent since the Portuguese colonial period and have become a central peculiarity of Brazilian society. Clientelism driven by traditional patronage-bearing politicians has prevailed within the political culture in Brazil, and the word “corruption” has become a primary keyword of Brazilian politics. Nonetheless, as Alberto (2011: 245) observes, a shared popular idea that Brazil is the country of racial democracy has played a colossal role in preventing and shutting down public discussion about prevalent injustice and inequality in Brazil. As Roth-Gordon (2017) reveals in her study, a “comfortable racial contradiction” in which structural racism is comfortably embedded might be the best indication of the past and contemporary “unjust” Brazilian society.

However, two mega-sporting events in Brazil confirmed and consolidated an unfortunate idea that Brazil is a highly unequal, unjust and corrupt society, in which the systems of differentiated citizenship are prevalent. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, protests against the mega-sporting events in Brazil can be best characterized as a movement that intended to subvert special treatment rights and privileges and the differentiated citizenship that supports them. Neoliberal urban governance around the preparations of the events also assured that the urban poor that is comprised of a majority of darker-skinned
people were to be removed.

In my interviews during fieldwork, 67 out of 143 informants specifically attested that they became fully aware that Brazil is a society where social injustice and corruption are normalized. Jefferson Nonato, whom I met in Manaus, derisively commented: “the World Cup definitely enabled me to keep up with the fact that we are living in the country of corruption.” In effect, they particularly mentioned a specific word “corrupção (corruption)” when it comes to relating their feelings and memories with the World Cup and the Olympics. They expressed a strong antipathy towards politicians and conglomerates who exploited these events for their private profits. One taxi driver in Rio de Janeiro, explicitly rendered that the cancer of Brazil is corruption, commenting that “Construction delayed a lot. The budget for the World Cup and the Olympics skyrocketed more than the money already earmarked. We don’t know where our money went but I believe our money got into politicians’ pockets.”

Two mega-events in Brazil and their exploitative characters provided Brazilian people a sense of themselves as rights-bearing citizens. Luis, one of my interviewees who participated in the anti-World Cup protest with his family, boldly mentioned: “Brazil is a rich country in terms of natural resources, but Brazilian people have had a very poor mentality because Brazilians had not exactly known their rights as a citizen before. However, after the World Cup, I believe that many of them became more aware of their rights, including me.” Brazilian people, the lower class, in particular, expressed a huge resentment when they realized the special treatment rights for businesses and politicians, leaving many Brazilians to be convinced that it is a clear case of discrimination and human rights violation. As examined in chapters 4 and 5, the favela residents were evicted in the name of urban beautification and many workers lost their lives while constructing facilities. Some companies forced their workers to work and live in slave-like conditions.
The above image was painted by a street artist Paulo Ito at a public school entrance in São Paulo, which depicts a poor starving child with nothing to eat but a soccer ball; it has been shared more than 50,000 times on Facebook (Human Rights in Latin America, Jul. 6, 2015). This clearly shows how the World Cup further impoverished the underprevilieged and how many lower class people suffered from the event. One interviewee, who was homeless in Rio de Janeiro, shared his experience of how his life was completely devastated by the Olympic Games: “I had lived in the favela for my entire life before I was evicted. I was expelled and moved to other places, but I could not afford the monthly rental. I am now living in the street as you see…It is definitely the case of human rights violation.”

“The real problem is our politicians,” said Djalma da Silva, an informant in São Paulo, who strongly criticized the “invisible connection” between the construction firms and politicians during mega-sporting events period. “We were extremely disturbed to see the continuing corruption stories even during the events that I have thought they were for Brazilian people. We knew that the events were not for us, but for them.”

Overall, Brazilians were involuntarily able to witness how the World Cup and the Olympics, considered a white elephant by ordinary Brazilian citizens, evidently exposed the
country’s deep-rooted social injustice. The voice of ordinary residents in the street showed that two consecutive mega-events in Brazil had shown nothing, but had created a collective memory and sense of having their basic rights were threatened while privileges were granted to the so-called political elites and businesses. The claim “Brazilians have DNA of corruption,” that I heard several times during the interviews, might indicate that their DNA was “showcased” through the hosting of mega-sporting events. Public anger at corruption might be the lasting sense that Brazilians share. By sharing such feeling, either via social movements or hashtagging on online space, Brazilians could come to realize they are members of a community peppered with a series of corruption, injustice, and inequality.

“We are Brazilian because We Fight for Better Democracy!”

The abovementioned narrative associated with perceived corruption, injustice, and inequality in Brazilian society further brought about new interrelated narratives, which urged the remodeling of Brazil’s flawed democracy into a better one. Brazil is acknowledged as one of the largest and most dynamic democracies in the World since the end of the military regime in 1985 that opened a new democracy. In this regard, Timothy Power (2010: 219) evaluated that Brazilian democracy had come to be seen relatively favorably in a regional perspective, managing many of the more “spectacular ills” that conventionally afflicted neighboring countries (e.g., the collapse of the party system, financial default, secessionism, and populism, etc.). He also highlighted the regime had successfully placed some crucial policy achievements on the table, including social welfare, macroeconomic performances, or global activism.

However, the experiences in the past years in Brazil have revealed the vulnerabilities of Brazilian democracy, in the midst of growing polarization, deep economic uncertainty,
inadequate social provision, and corruption investigations (Burns et al. 2019). As Zirin (2016) articulates in his book Brazil’s Dance with the Devil, these fragilities resurfaced particularly through a series of practices around mega-sporting events, with ordinary Brazilian citizens taking to the street and online space to reclaim and clamor for better democracy in the country, particularly against governmental unidirectional policies, profiteering, and corporate interest and greed at the expense of the poor.

Brazilian interviewees suggested that they could fully realize an ugly face of Brazilian democracy through many aspects associated with mega-sporting events. There was a deep sense of grievance with political institutions, which were seen as inefficient and unresponsive. Not to mention forced evictions, loss of livelihood and human rights violations, people were outraged by the fact that the cost of the construction of new sports’ facilities and related infrastructure phenomenally escalated from the original bid estimates, largely in the absence of public oversight, and a majority has been destined to white elephants (Maharaj 2015: 983). “We are a democratic country but it is totally out of control,” said one private security guard that I interviewed at the square in Rio de Janeiro, claiming “there was no such a democratic consensus around policies implemented by the authorities.” He further criticized preposterous procedures around the forced eviction of favela residents, suggesting it clearly shows the quintessence of Brazil’s poor democracy.

Voices from the streets criticized the lack of democratic consensus in the process of policy implementation for mega-sporting events. Particularly, a vast array of interviewees expressed their deep animosity over the opacity of resource distribution around these events. One interviewee, a doctoral student in Rio de Janeiro, pointed out the real problem behind the World Cup and the Olympic Games in Brazil was the fact that the flows of money, contracts, and resources were not transparent; Brazilians had no choice but to reason these were poured
into somewhere else, possibly toward the big construction companies and colluding politicians. As such, Brazilian citizens expressed in common that the country’s hosting of mega-sporting events was disastrous for the basic legitimacy of democracy in Brazilian society.

Popular perception that governing bodies did not abide by democratic principles had led to a huge public contestation and social backlash. Paradoxically enough, the World Cup and the Olympics protests might signal democratic progress for Brazil. These protests reflected a deep frustration that a great deal of exertion to build a democracy from a military regime in the past had not garnered solid momentum for overcoming a profound inequality. As Zirin (2016) articulated, the protests might be best described as the “fight for democracy.”

<Figure 6.3. Protester Placard>

Football is a democratic sport. However, the World Cup itself seemed to be oligarchic for many Brazilian people. Many Brazilian people were increasingly realizing that mega-sporting events in Brazil were not for themselves, but for a small number of domestic/transnational economic and political elites, which is truly an oligarchic character rather than democratic (See Figure 6.3.).

“For me, becoming Brazilian is fighting for justice, rights to work, rights to health,
rights to housing, and our basic human rights,” Vasconcelos Filhos, my informant as an ex-member of the popular World Cup Committee in Manaus, affirmed that the preparations for the World Cup in Manaus demonstrated that Brazilian civil rights were severely infringed. He suggested that the numerous cases of perceived human rights violations during that period “demesmerized” hidden Brazilian’s rights that in effect turned into the forms of both online symbolic resistances and street demonstrations as social activism. In fact, 65 out of the 143 interviewees consisting of ordinary citizens acknowledged and expressed in their narratives such undemocratic mega-events made Brazilians fully grasp how they had been indifferent and unconcerned with the fact that they are rights holders as a citizen who is entitled to make legitimate claims.

A new Brazilian imaginary was formed, amid the perceived injustice and ensuing resistance, around the claim that “We are Brazilian because We Fight for Better Democracy!” Small and large demonstrations that persisted for a number of years against mega-events and the past efforts to building a democracy in the 1980s are in parallel; particularly, police brutality and oppression during the protests harkened back to the military dictatorship in the past. One homeless person in Rio de Janeiro, a three-time protest participant, told me that “police violence has become a social problem in Brazil, particularly their violence towards dark-skinned people in our city. It continued and intensified during our protests against the World Cup and the Olympics. I have no idea that our country is a democracy.” As such, Brazilians could become united around a civic narrative that called for better democracy for their country.

“It Doesn’t Make Sense to be the Soccer Country if there’s no Health, Security, and Education!”
The satirical message giving title to this section became increasingly popular when protesters’ placards were broadcast, as waves of nationwide demonstrations occurred (See Figure 6.4.). The message conveyed the universal antipathy of Brazilian people to the events.

<Figure 6.4. Brazilian Protester’s Placard>

Ordinary Brazilian citizens, and protesters, in particular, had juxtaposed the conspicuous stadiums and fancy facilities built to meet FIFA and IOC quality standards with their poorly maintained public services particularly in the realm of education, healthcare, and security—schools staffed by poorly-paid teachers, decrepit hospitals with shortages of doctors and quality health services, corrupt police and a horrible public security.

Brazil has faced huge challenges in the abovementioned public services. In the area of public health, there has been a deficit of universal access to quality primary healthcare, marked by the lack of primary care doctors and facilities. Brazil became the country that has the most expensive healthcare in Latin America as private hospitals have raised the price by 20 to 30 percent since 2009. With regard to education, Brazil’s public education system significantly lacks the necessary funding and facilities, which resulted in a high level of illiteracy and the low ranking in students’ knowledge and ability of math and science.
compared to the average students in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries (Mitra 2015: 5-6). Apart from that, Brazil’s violent crime and the incapacity to guarantee public security have been a serious social problem. According to the Ministry of Health, there were 59,080 homicides in Brazil, equivalent to 28.9 homicides per 100,000 people. What is worse, Brazil’s murder rate has been increasing since 2005, marking Brazil among the top 20 countries in terms of international homicide rates (Cerqueira 2017, See Figure 6.5). In 2016, Brazil had a surprising record on average 168 homicides per day (Latin American Herald Tribune, n.a).

![Figure 6.5. Homicides in Brazil, 2005-2015](source: Cerqueira (2017).

The fury of Brazilians had been triggered by colossal spending for the new stadiums and facilities at the expense of Brazil’s immediate priorities. In effect, 51 out of 143 interviewees expressed in their personal narratives hostility against the governmental disregard for urgent demands on poorly-maintained public services and against the
benefitting of private sectors at the cost of Brazilians. Gomes, an interviewee, and a Rio resident, explicitly affirmed that Brazil totally ignored the improvement of its healthcare service, one of the people’s top priorities. He narrated: “The government should have spent money not for the World Cup or the Olympic Games, but for our miserable healthcare. I have chronic leg pain, but I am not able to go to the health center because there are no doctors available near my town.”

Brazilians’ strong wish for better, quality healthcare, education, and security was far greater than anticipated from the outside. The absence of capacity or the lack of will to improve them, entangled with the “glorious” festivities of the World Cup and the Olympics, worsened Brazilian popular sentiment. Danilson, a resident in Curitiba, made sarcastic remarks: “We could get to have double-digits state of the art, world-class stadiums which are built with our money even in some areas that have no such a futebol club, while our access to healthcare and rights to education and security plunged to the ground.”

“We love futebol but our priority should have preceded,” said a member of Association of Guides and Tourism Monitors in Salvador (Associação dos Guias e Monitores de Turismo), “Look at the appalling situations of Brazil’s education and health. They are much more important and such problems require urgent attention. For me, and for us Brazilians, the World Cup is just a meaningless festival unless these problems get solved.” As such, Brazilian citizens shared common feelings based primarily on the sense that Brazil is a country of poor public services. They all commonly expressed and called for their rights to education, healthcare, and security, to which they feel they had no guaranteed universal access.

An imagined Brazilian community had been formed, through a series of public demands and the eruption of dissension associated with mega-sporting events, around the
strong consensus that Brazil is a blind spot where there is no education, health, and security. Although this bond of sympathy had admittedly existed prior to the hosting of mega-sporting events, Brazil’s various experiences with regard to mega-events facilitated this sense coming to the surface. It surprised me to repetitively hear the voices from the street that, in response to my interview questions about the relationship between the interviewee’s experience in mega-sporting events and their sense of Brazilian-ness, what it means to be a Brazilian is to fully perceive that they are living in a country without sensitivities to serve the needs and demands of people’s “basic” rights to and access to “basic” public services. For Brazilian people, it makes no sense to spend money to visualize modernity at the expense of education, health, and security that still remain pre-modern.

The Brazilian government decided to bid for and host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics despite the country’s apparent lack of infrastructural capacity. This made the government repeatedly neglect the demands for the betterment of notorious healthcare, education and public security that had been the pressing concerns of Brazilian society. Instead, mega-sporting events had served to benefit private businesses, corrupted politicians and FIFA, at the cost of Brazilian citizens (Mitra 2015: 13).

To synthesize the sub-sections above, a Brazilian imagined community and strong ties among its members could be built through a set of experiences around the practices and policies of mega-sporting events. The mega-sporting events in Brazil were largely funded and organized by the government in collaboration with the private sector, with no or little accountability to citizens. Such decisions had “major implications in terms of the diversion of public spending priorities from more urgent social needs such as housing, healthcare and education” (Maharaj 2015: 983). The major narratives that had arisen based on the shared civic values can be summarized into 1) Brazil is an unjust, unequal and corrupt country, 2)
Brazilian democracy needs to be improved and 3) Brazilians deserve to demand their rights to education, healthcare and security as rights-bearing citizens. This dissertation suggests that these narratives and discourses emblemize the powerful rise of civic identity, particularly because the argument is consistent with scholarly accounts provided by numerous scholars in the field of national identity/nationalism. Representatively, As Anthony Smith (1991) suggested, a civic nation derives not only from a historic territory, but from laws, institutions and legal-political equality of members who hold a shared civic ideology and express themselves in a set of rights. In a similar context, Billing et al. (2006) characterized a civic nation as being based on shared political values, not shared ethnicity as ethnic nationalism depicts. Brazilians’ narratives and discourses that had been explosively generated, diffused and reproduced against the irrationalities of mega-sporting events were closely associated, not with shared ethnicity based on the popular ideology of racial democracy, but with shared political membership and civic values such as equality, democracy, justice, and human rights.

Conclusion

Based on the ordinary citizen interviews during field research, this chapter addressed how the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games and ensuing irrationalities around the events ultimately provoked the powerful rise of civic identity in Brazil. Although the major forces that drove these demonstrations were primarily the lower class people, especially noteworthy was the rise of middle-class activism as well, and these solidarities were based on increasingly shared values and norms of democracy, equality, justice and individual rights across different subgroups of Brazilian society. An analysis of interview data suggests that the emergence of the Brazilian imagined community indeed contained civic
characters, and these contents can be summarized as follows: 1) *Brazil is not a country of racial democracy anymore*, 2) *Brazil is an unjust and corrupt country*, 3) *Brazilian democracy is a total failure and needs to be improved* and finally 4) *Brazilians deserve to demand their rights to education, healthcare and security as a rights-bearing citizens*.

This chapter also suggests that such sharing of “civic” identity as Brazil’s new collective imaginary among various groups, which was particularly enabled by a cohesive cross-class solidarity between the lower and middle classes, indeed challenged the long-standing narrative of racial democracy *qua* Brazilian national identity, which has been rooted fundamentally in “ethnicity” and “culture.” Since its inherent antithetical character between ethnic (racial democracy) and civic identity in the Brazilian context, it should be highlighted that the emergent civic nationalism in Brazil can be best viewed as a rising counter-narrative to racial democracy as an ethnic narrative of national identity in Brazil.
CHAPTER 7.

CONCLUSION

As explored in this dissertation, the recent experiences during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Brazil evidenced that the Brazilian case clearly generated a national contestation and even consolidated socioeconomic and racial orders, as opposed to other cases that successfully promoted nation-building. As the forms of illegality and exceptions to the institutional order multiplied with the preparations for the World Cup and the Olympic Games, Brazil was inundated with a series of large and small demonstrations between June 2013 and 2016 in several of the host cities. The outpouring of dissent against these events in Brazil was sparked by the Brazilian government’s top-down, undemocratic policies and practices in the event-preparation stages. For instance, public expenditure on infrastructure increased sharply at the expense of social welfare and public services. Various human rights violations were committed, and people were forcibly evicted from slums in the name of urban beautification. People not only reacted with contempt at the corrupt political elites who exploited these mega-events for their private profits, but they also revolted against a wide variety of perceived injustices around these mega-events.

In this dissertation, I looked at the World Cup and the Olympics as a big frame, one unit of analysis as a mega-sporting event because both events were consecutively held at relatively close intervals under very similar social and political conditions in Brazil. I have examined how the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics and a series of irrationalities around those events had an impact on national identity in Brazil. By analyzing data collected from archival sources and both in-depth expert interviews and unstructured ones with ordinary Brazilian citizens during my fieldwork in five Brazilian host cities, I argue that those
experiences in relation to mega-sporting events in Brazil provoked the powerful rise of civic nationalism, which contributed to the further rejection of the mythical, popular ideology of a racial democracy as a Brazil’s long-standing ethnic sense of what it means to be a Brazilian.

Towards a “Civic” Narrative: Mega-Sporting Events as the Catalyst for Nation-Remaking in Brazil

Brazil has experienced a white supremacist history of race and nation, not only during its colonial period, but also it blossomed after independence in 1822. After that period, Brazilian political elites who admired both European modernity and European thought—particularly, Comtean positivism—attempted to build the Brazilian nation based on social Darwinism. *Embranquecimento* (Whitening) policy was carried out until the 1920s and 1930s backed up and promoted by massive European immigration into Brazil. However, later, the ideology of racial democracy could become the dominant narrative of national myth, primarily via popular culture, throughout the twentieth century. This became possible thanks to the consistent efforts of the State, particularly during the Getulio Vargas regime propagated through *futebol*, along with *Samba* and *Carnival*, which epitomized the creative power of racial mixture and miscegenation—as a nation-building strategy. Racial democracy has thus symbolized Brazil’s racial harmony as one without racial discrimination or hierarchical race relations. In other words, Brazilians, for much of the twentieth century, constructed a vibrant and potent ethno-cultural nationalism “largely in the absence of the rights they should have enjoyed through civic nationalism” (Eakin 2017: 220).

However, the country’s hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games and the politics around them transformed the identity landscape in Brazil. The preparations for two
consecutive mega-sporting events entailed a series of processes associated with the reconstitution of “spectacular urban space” (Harvey 2001: 92) under the political and economic rationalities of neoliberalism. These “neoliberal” urban beautification projects in the host cities as a part of urban promotion strategy through mega-sporting events necessarily resulted in the fact that “the privileged tend to benefit at the expense of the poor, and socioeconomic inequalities were exacerbated,” due mainly to the forced eviction, human rights violations and ensuing loss of livelihoods (Maharaj 2015: 983). The state of exception under the banner of promoting “successful” events and ensuing neoliberal production of urban space mainly influenced the urban poor. The space of the urban poor was ironically excluded, securitized and commodified during these processes, further consolidating existing socioeconomic and racial order in Brazil. Brazilian people’s antipathy over these neoliberal games had increasingly risen.

From 2013, Brazil faced the surge of anti-mega-sporting events movements. A number of large and small street demonstrations occurred throughout Brazil until the Olympics in 2016. The increase in bus fare in São Paulo, decisively combined with Brazil’s economic downturn and political crisis, was a tipping point of the emergence of social mobilizations against the mega-sporting events that were scheduled to be held in Brazil. It is particularly noteworthy that Brazilian people’s grievances were effectively united by networks, including pre-existing social movement organizations as well as newly arisen social networks online, which facilitated the drive to organize, mobilize, promote and publicize the “networked social movements based on networked activism” against the mega-events in Brazil. In other words, an increase of just 20 cents of bus fare evoked awareness of citizens’ rights, and networks helped and, often, directly involved the emergence of civil resistance throughout Brazil. The major opposition to the World Cup and the Olympic Games
in Brazil could be expanded by the active participation of an emergent middle class, beyond just the leadership of social movement organizations and the lower class. The core tenets of these networked cross-class social movements in Brazil suggested that these truly entailed the characteristics of the right-to-the-city movements that intended to subvert special treatment rights, usually understood as a privilege, and the social systems of differentiated citizenship which support them. The underlying processes of the de-legitimization of mega-sporting events based on the “networked outrage” stemmed from the realization of asymmetric distribution of rights between the privileged and marginalized i.e. differentiated citizenship.

A series of experiences surrounding mega-sporting events and related civil resistance indeed bred the powerful emergence of a civic narrative of national identity in Brazil. Again, although the major forces that drove these demonstrations were primarily the lower class people, especially noteworthy was the rise of white “middle-class activism” as well, and these solidarities were based on increasingly shared civic values and norms of democracy, equality, justice and individual rights across different subgroups of Brazilian society. This broad alliance of the lower and middle classes—a cross-class coalition not only in the protests but also in everyday activism—was not simply an oppositional force, but acted as a productive catalyst for the emergence of a competing, new national imaginary—a civic national identity. An analysis of interview data suggests that the emergence of the Brazilian imagined community indeed contained civic characters, and these contents can be summarized as follows: 1) Brazil is not a country of racial democracy anymore, 2) Brazil is an unjust and corrupt country, 3) Brazilian democracy is a total failure and needs to be improved and 4) Brazilians deserve to demand their rights to education, healthcare and security as a rights-bearing citizens. As the first narrative suggests, this chapter also argues that the emergence of such sharing of “civic” identity as Brazil’s collective imaginary among
various groups led to the destabilization of the long-standing narrative of racial democracy 
quà Brazilian national identity, which has been rooted fundamentally in “ethnicity” and “culture.” Since its inherent antithetical character between ethnic identity—based on the notion of racial democracy—and civic one in the Brazilian context, it should be highlighted that the emergence of civic nationalism brought about the delegitimization of the ethnic national narrative.

Politics of Nation-Building: A Comparison of Mega-Sporting Events in 2010 South Africa and 2014 and 2016 Brazil

Hosting mega-sporting events had been mostly the perview of developed countries, of which a majority was the case of Europe and North America in the twentieth century. With the opening of the twenty-first century, however, we have witnessed “the rise of the Global South” not only in the realm of global power rearrangement, but in the hosting of mega-sporting events. The 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games both held in Brazil, as well as the 2018 Russia World Cup, can be representative exemplary cases.

In this section, I will make a comparison of the South African and Brazilian cases. I particularly examine how two analogous societies that hosted mega-sporting events around the similar time ultimately diverged into completely different consequences. I selected the South African case to compare with Brazil because hosting mega-sporting events in both countries has yielded very diametrically opposite effects on nation-building. As opposed to Brazil, existing literature on the South African case demonstrated that the 2010 World Cup effectively bound people together within a divided society and promoted social and national

Brazil and South Africa as developing countries share homogenous social structures. Like Brazil, South Africa experienced the colonial period from the seventeenth to mid-twentieth century by the Netherlands and Great Britain and the official systems of black slavery were maintained until 1834 in South Africa and 1888 in Brazil. Both countries are relatively new democracies that suffered from authoritarian regimes until the late-twentieth-century—1948-1994 in South African and 1964-1985 in Brazil. In terms of the history of racial relations, they also share similarities; as the white supremacy and whitening policy had prevailed during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Brazil due to the strong influence of social Darwinism from Europe, South Africa underwent institutionalized racial segregation within a system of so-called “apartheid” during the most of the twentieth century. As a consequence, both countries also still suffer from massive inequalities. South Africa is known for its widening disparity and the continuing racial divisions and Brazil, regarded as one of the most unequal nations in the world, has been facing structural racism and class discrimination.

In the context of a particular set of the circumstances surrounding mega-sporting events, both countries also have similar experiences in urban settings. Brazil and South Africa carried out the forced eviction of the urban poor based on a “development narrative.” As examined throughout this dissertation, various Brazilian favelas became a target to be socially cleansed. In the case of South Africa, The N2 Gateway project was carried out with the objective of eradicating the slums in the areas located between Cape Town and the main airport. This project was designed to beautify slums, replacing them with fancy-looking housing units. The underlying purpose of this project was straightforward. It was closely
associated with the politics of visibility like Brazil’s case; through the replacement of slums, the government wished to demonstrate and promote the modern South African image to foreign visitors (Carroll 2012: 17). Many South African urban poor were evicted in various areas, although there exist no exact estimates. Steinbrink et al. (2011) reported that in Cape Town, in the course of the city’s image-building project for the 2010 South Africa World Cup, large parts of the settlement were demolished and thousands of people were rehoused in a transit camp, which is reminiscent of a refugee camp, and they were disconnected from livelihood opportunities.

Blikkiesdrop, popularly known as the “Tin Can Town,” was transformed into a “temporary relocation area” by the mayor of Cape Town. This area became a dumping place where people from the streets were forcibly moved to because the government did not want them in the city during the World Cup (Guardian, Apr. 1, 2010). The government also attempted to displace more than 20,000 residents in Cape Town’s Joe Slovo area, a decision was resultingly overturned by the constitutional court in 2011 (Carroll 2012, Mail & Guardian, Apr. 1, 2011). As a consequence of these “exclusion” policies, Brazil and South Africa faced anti-mega-events demonstrations. As explored in chapter 5, Brazil experienced vehement large and small protests during 2013-2016. In South Africa, several protests against the World Cup were also reported. Approximately 3,000 people marched in Durban in June 2010, denouncing the government for their massive spending for the World Cup when millions live in poverty (Mail & Guardian, Jun. 16, 2010). In Pretoria, violent housing protests occurred by the township dwellers against their squalid living conditions in March 2010 (Telegraph, Mar. 10, 2010). Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) headquartered in Cape Town also symbolically protested against the World Cup by organizing a “Poor People’s World Cup” event to expose the displacements and evictions affecting the poor communities.
in a negative way (CNN, Jun. 22, 2010).

In this regard, comparing these two cases enables us to analyze the impact of mega-sporting events on nation-building by two different processes within similar social contexts.

The 2010 South Africa World Cup: A Powerful Nation-Builder

In apartheid South Africa, the national rugby union team, generally known as the Springboks, both symbolized institutionalized “a racially based form of ‘bounded citizenship’” (Farquharson and Marjoribanks 2003: 27). However, as the ex-President Nelson Mandela recognized sport as a powerful connective tissue that can bind people in a divided society together, the South African government took advantage of the 1995 Rugby World Cup in the country as the prominent chance to unite people and build a “non-racial nation” through reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa (Farquharson and Marjoribanks 2003: 27). In this context, Matheson and Baade (2004: 1095) suggest that the 1995 Rugby World Cup was “an opportunity for the country to announce its reemergence as a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but its political community.”

The most recent mega-sporting event in South Africa, the 2010 World Cup, also provided a potent vehicle through which national unity and integration could be successfully promoted. Although it is a complex process to achieve nation-building in South Africa consisting of diverse ethnicities, languages, and beliefs, mega-sporting events in the country obscured those divisions and disparity that would otherwise endanger national stability (Hyde-Clark et al. 2014: 16).

According to survey research conducted by the Human Science Research Council (2011), most South African respondents felt that the key benefit of the event was its impact on social integration and cohesion. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) and Labuschagne (2011) also
found that what Michael Billing (1995) terms “banal nationalism” had been significantly invoked through the events, spawning a substantial degree of national unity. Kersting (2008: 277) observed that the World Cup in South Africa was in part held to help foster national cohesion and to transcend deep-seated social cleavages. The Guardian (Jul. 12, 2010) showed the World Cup in South Africa left a positive legacy, particularly in terms of nation-building in the country, stating that:

Given the extent to which spin-off legacy benefits have begun to dominate the rhetoric of the bidding process for so-called “mega-events,” the forensic spotlight on South Africa is likely to remain for some time. Organisers have spoken at length about the “nation-building” potential of the World Cup, and this was proved to be far more than empty rhetoric as South Africans came together in a national sense of near-hysteria. The fear must be that it will prove to have been temporary but its effect should not be dismissed (Guardian, Jul. 12, 2010).

“An explosion of national pride” in South Africa as a valuable legacy by hosting the World Cup can be found in then-President Jacob Zuma’s remarks. Giving credit first to Nelson Mandela who had consistently made efforts to nation-building in the country, Zuma mentioned below during the World Cup period:

It is through his tireless efforts to achieve reconciliation and to build a thriving rainbow nation that the world bestowed South Africa with this honour of hosting the games…The South African flag has become the most popular item on the shopping list of South Africans and this augurs well for nation-building. This explosion of national pride is a priceless benefit of the World Cup tournament (News24, Jun. 6, 2010).

In a similar context, Danny Jordan, chief executive of the World Cup local organizing committee, indicated at a press briefing on the impact of the World Cup that the 2010 World Cup in South Africa significantly closed the racial gap in the country. He specifically said “we have seen black and white side by side at fan parks and stadiums when for many years these people were prohibited by law to sit together…The demographics at stadiums really showed football contributed towards nation-building” (Times Live, Jul. 10, 2010). As such, many existing literature and news media confirmed that racial and national reconciliation was
a central benefit to South African people by hosting the World Cup.

What Made the Difference?

Although both countries are similar in terms of social structure and undemocratic policies during the event-preparation period, the cases of Brazil and South Africa yielded different outcomes. What are the factors contributing to such a divergence between the two countries?

I first suggest completely opposite economic conditions prior to the beginning of mega-events in Brazil and South Africa and a huge disparity in terms of the cost for these sporting events between two countries can be contributing factors to the difference. In short, whereas South Africa spent a relatively small amount of money during their economic stability for the 2010 World Cup, Brazil faced a severe economic downturn in the early 2010s, investing exorbitant resources for the consecutive mega-sporting events.

It is widely agreed that the domestic costs associated with hosting mega-sporting events are magnified when hosting events happen to be in developing countries because they generally do not have much of the sport-specific facilities and infrastructure. That says a mega-sporting event is a one-time event that a huge amount of government spending is directed to. In this regard, hosting mega-sporting events, in developing countries, necessarily accompanies the opportunity costs where funds are drawn from social welfare (Carroll 2012: 16). In this circumstance, the host government would lose the legitimacy of mega-events if the country experiences a sluggish economy that cannot be justified by the public spending massive sums of money for the event.

The 2010 World Cup in South Africa was hosted during the country’s healthy economic cycle. The economic growth of South Africa improved dramatically with the
regime transition toward democracy since 1994, marking an average annual growth rate of 3.2 percent. Particularly, the global commodity boom that was intensified throughout the 2000s fueled the economic and employment boom in South Africa (OECD 2010). Although South Africa was not an exceptional case that was influenced by an international financial crisis in 2008-2009, the economy was successfully recovered. South Africa’s economy prior to the World Cup in 2010 shows stable growth in terms of gross domestic product (IMF 2018, See table 7.1.).

<Table 7.1. GDP Growth in South Africa from 2005 to 2010>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Growth (Real)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2018)

It is important to note that South Africa spent about $3.9 billion on the World Cup, including $1.3 billion in the construction of the stadium alone (CNN, Jun. 10, 2014). In 2002, when South Korea hosted the World Cup jointly with Japan, about $2 billion was spent on constructing ten new stadiums (Carroll 2012: 16). Although South Africa spent twice as much money as South Korea, the South African case cannot be regarded as “excessive” spending considering the trend in increasing costs of mega-events over time especially in developing countries and the country’s stable economy at that period.

Conversely, as examined in chapter 5, Brazil faced a severe economic downturn prior to the events. In spite of a soft landing from the 2008-2009 recession provoked by an external financial crisis, Brazil suffered from severe economic depression from 2014 to 2016. The Brazilian economic recession during this period is considered the deepest one in Brazilian
economic history and more critical than that of 1981-1992 economic crisis, which is still called as a “lost decade,” when per capita income marked a 7.5% accumulated negative growth rate while recent one marked similar figure in just two years during 2015 to 2016. (Nassif 2017: 95-96).

\textbf{Table 7.2. GDP Growth in Brazil from 2011 to 2016}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Growth (Real)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF (2018)

During this economic recession, Brazil spent hugely excessive money on the World Cup and the Olympics. $15 billion was spent (\textit{Pri}, Feb. 22, 2016) exclusively for the World Cup. In terms of the Olympic Games, the authority decided not to officially release Brazil’s spending on the Olympic Games without proper reason but Brazil first allocated a budget of $9.7 billion for the event (\textit{Folha de S. Paulo}, Jun. 14, 2017). In total, it is estimated that Brazil spent $25 billion, which is as much as more than 6 times what South Africa expended for the World Cup. Unlike South Africa, Brazil’s extravagant expenditure on mega-events, combined with its economic downturn, might have a much greater impact on ordinary residents.

Finally, while protests against the World Cup in South Africa were only limited to a particular race and class—the black poor and the lower class, the case of Brazil showed that participants’ social and ideological spectrum were broader as revealed in chapter 5. South African protests were sporadic, consisting principally of the poor and working people (\textit{Rosa Luxemburg Foundation}, Sep. 28, 2014; \textit{CNN}, Jun. 22, 2010; \textit{Telegraph}, Mar. 10, 2010). However, the Brazilian cases indicated not only the lower class, but also middle class
activism fueled demonstrations against mega-sporting events. Vasconcelos Filhos, a member of CSP (Central Sindical Popular) as well as an ex-member of Comitê Popular da Copa in Manaus, asserted during our personal interview that while many participants in the protests were comprised of the lower class and darker-skinned people, the middle class and the white activism were also noteworthy. This statement is consistent with various news reports as well. According to CNN (Jun. 25, 2013), Brazil’s rising middle class was the “backbone” of the movements that occurred in 2013 because their expectations for improved public services have grown as their socioeconomic prospects have ameliorated. As time passes, the mobilization transformed to incorporate the middle class and professionals (CNN, Jul. 24, 2013), representing a more broad spectrum in their character compared to the South African case.

As addressed in chapter 2, Goldstone (2011) argued that virtually all successful social movements have been forged by cross-class coalitions that effectively bridge the diverse interests of different groups and goals, thus pitting society against the regime. He particularly observed that:

If a protest draws support mainly from just one class or group (peasants, workers, students, urban shopkeepers, professionals), the state can confront that group as a disruptive force, and seek to unify elites from other sectors against that threat. However, if protestors represent many different groups, it is much harder for the state to find allies against them. Moreover, while a state can claim to be preserving society by acting against isolated disruptive elements, it is far more difficult to maintain legitimacy when acting against a broad cross-class coalition. Elites are more likely to desert the state, creating crippling elite divisions, if protestors represent a broad spectrum of society. In addition, a broad cross-class coalition facilitates further mobilization by creating ‘mega-networks’ linking prior, tightly-linked within-group networks to each other. The impact of public media in favor of the protestors is also greater if media representation shows protestors as representative of the whole society, rather than as one particular group seeking partisan advantages for itself (Goldstone 2011: 457).

Likewise, the role of cross-class coalitions is vital to strengthening the mobilization and shaping the protest’s outcomes. The middle class in Brazil attempted to make solidarity
with the lower class when the middle class people were also eventually excluded and suffered from the negative effects triggered by mega-sporting events. Whereas South Africa’s sporadic protests occurred mainly by and within the marginalized communities, the case of Brazil reveals that the poor and middle class unite in the protests. This made room for the expansion of the protests in Brazil by actively embracing the technology of social network services and this network among various sectors had been effectively contributed to more intense, durable and larger-sized social movements than South Africa.

<Table 7.3. A Comparison of South Africa and Brazil>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Condition</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure on Mega-Events</td>
<td>$3.9 billion</td>
<td>$24.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The character of Social Movement</td>
<td>Marginalized Groups (Urban Poor, Black)</td>
<td>Broader Spectrum, Networked (Poor, the Middle Class, Professionals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Social Movement</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, unlike the South African case, exorbitant expenditures on mega-sporting events during an economic crisis and ensuing deterioration of public services triggered strong hostility against mega-sporting events among extensive sectors of Brazilian society. The middle-class activism that eventually led to the rise of cross-class coalitions in Brazil played a pivotal role in affecting the strengths and persistence of the protests, resulting in their extensive impact on society, which differed from the protests in the South African case that drew support mainly from a limited class or group. This eventually contributed to the uprising of far-reaching protests and brought about the powerful rise of shared civic identity, which confronted the long-standing discourse of racial democracy. Given the limitations of time and space, however, a bit of deeper nuance might be missing. This dissertation is
nevertheless concentrated upon the major differences between the two contexts surrounding the mega-sporting events. The seemingly materialist account of this comparative work can also be made up in my future research, which will provide me an opportunity to suggest more nuanced explanations for the subtle factors that ultimately led both countries to completely different outcomes.

“When Brazil was selected as the host of the World Cup five years ago, we celebrated. We celebrated because we didn't know that it was going to cost so much,” said one Brazilian citizen during the 2013 protest. “Our leaders should have known that Brazil was not in a condition to organize the event” (CNN, Jul. 24, 2013). This simple but resonant statement offers us better understandings of how Brazil’s mega-sporting events had been de-legitimized and how they failed to achieve nation-building.

**Limitations and Contributions**

The main limitation of this dissertation is straightforward: the lack of meticulous observation in the field during the 2013-2016 periods of massive demonstrations. Given that persuasive analytic accounts can be effectively supported by well-conducted ethnographic participant observation, particularly in the realm of identity politics, this absence definitely leaves much to be desired. To complement this limitation, in this regard, this dissertation attempted to make the best use of the detailed methodological strategies, including intensive research of archival sources and in-depth interviews with a number of stakeholders and protest participants as well as unstructured interviews with ordinary citizens during my field research.

Second, this project needs to pay particular attention to the significant role of gender
in the discussion of national identity and nationalism. Admittedly, scholarly discussions on these issues have been in large gender-biased. Particularly, the politics of national identity and nation-making through sports in Brazil and elsewhere have predominantly reflected hegemonic masculinity embedded in their societies, by focusing exclusively on the story of males. Given that more sophisticated and nuanced claims of national identity cannot be produced without considering the role played by gender and hegemonic masculinity, this limitation should be supplemented in future research.

In relation to the context of the second limitation suggested above, finally, this dissertation should have secured more interview data from female Brazilians. A majority of interviewees that I met in Brazil were male respondents; however, it does not necessarily mean that I deliberately excluded females. The forms of the interview were spontaneous recruiting and unstructured interviews, and many female Brazilians were not interested in my research topic to interview or refused to have an interview with me. In this circumstance, I could not recruit female interviewees exactly in the way that I expected. This methodological weakness needs to be complemented to obtain a more balanced sample by using a variety of strategies such as targeted recruiting based on semi-structured interviews or focus group interviews.

Despite these limitations, it is expected that this dissertation can provide important analytical implications for existing theories on mega-sporting events and nation-building in particular, as well as general theories on nationalism and national identity. First, this study looks at mega-sporting events in a non-Western context—specifically, the Global South—which has been largely neglected in comparison to North American and European case-based research. Based on the examination of Brazil’s consecutive mega-sporting events, I challenge the conventional, taken-for-granted role of these sporting events in nation-building through
the consolidation of national identity. By exploring Brazil’s oddball case that deviates from the expected outcome, this dissertation shows how mega-sporting events can also bring about nationwide public contestation and social division.

Second, this study goes beyond the main assumption of classic theories of nationalism and national identity—both ethno-symbolist and modernist—that emphasizes the role of political elites in the vertical spread of “imagined communities” (e.g., Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983; Kedourie 1960). I believe my dissertation can contribute to the field by shedding light on the dynamics of “nation-(re)making from below,” by following the important theoretical premise of social constructivism—which stresses peer-to-peer, horizontal national dynamics (e.g., Billing 1995; Deutsch 1953; Edensor 2002; Seton-Watson 1997) and illuminates the conflicting and negotiating dynamics between ethno-cultural and civic identities—that has been relatively understudied to date.

Related to the above-mentioned contribution of the study, this dissertation can provide future implications for the study of identity transition from ethnic to civic or, even vice versa. As the value of democracy, individual rights, freedom, and equality has been increasingly pursued by people around the world, civic sense of affinity might determine what it means to be a member of a particular national imagined community, rather than banal ethno-centric sense. We are also witnessing this trend across the globe; Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Quebec in Canada, and possibly South Korea and many developing countries in the Asian and Latin American regions. Therefore, it is crucial and necessary to pay scholarly attention to the identity shifting dynamics as a pending issue.

Finally, this project offers a new perspective to the post-material politics literature particularly in regard to the relationship between social movement and identity. The literature on “New Social Movements (NSMs)” or so-called “identity politics” has largely emphasized
collective identity as either precondition or a powerful motivation for movement participation (e.g., Calhoun 1993; Melucci 1980, 1989; Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). However, as this project shows, I suggest that identity itself can also be an outcome or a dependent variable of social movements. Particularly, as this study articulates, social movements and everyday activism as collective action can trigger the rise of new collective identity—civic identity in the case of this dissertation—and its consolidation during the course of repetitive networked movements.

**Epilogue: Implications for Future Research**

_Jair Bolsonaro’s Victory in the 2018 Presidential Election: What Happened in Brazil?_

When the results of the first round of Brazil’s presidential election were released on October 7, 2018, not only pundits, but also people in Brazil and elsewhere were surprised by the rise of Bolsonaro. This far-right populist took the top spot with a surprising 46% of the vote, leaving other candidates far behind in the presidential race. On October 28, Bolsonaro was finally elected Brazil’s 38th president after winning approximately 55% of the vote in a run-off against a leftist rival, former São Paulo mayor Fernando Haddad.

This dissertation illuminated the ways in which Brazil’s activism against mega-sporting events, which was based on cross-class coalitions, fighting for democracy and social justice, ultimately brought about the rise of new national imaginary—civic nationalism. The main argument of this research seems to be antithetical to the results of the 2018 Brazilian presidential election. What happened in Brazil and how can we interpret the rise of Bolsonaro vis-à-vis the research result of this dissertation?

Several accounts have explained how Bolsonaro captured the hearts and minds of
Brazilian voters. However, among others, I argue that Bolsonaro, as a populist, and his campaign, effectively employed a strategy to dominate the “empty space,” created by swing voters who had grown increasingly disenchanted with the country’s infernal political culture and existing political system, as well as its institutional order. As examined throughout this dissertation, “corruption” has become a byword for Brazilian politics, and collusion among various interest groups and political bosses is the deep-seated rule of the game. His promises to stamp out patronage, vote buying, clientelism and endemic political corruption cut across ideological lines and therefore appealed to Brazil’s floating voters, breaking a two-decade-old tradition of electing leftist presidents.

The protests against the mega-sporting events during 2013-2016 clearly represented, as explored in this dissertation, the nature of an anti-political injustice in Brazil, where corruption has chronically dominated every corner of the political culture. These cross-class movements against the irrationalities and illegalities surrounding the World Cup and the Olympics, intertwined with the so-called Lava Jato, the largest corruption scandal in Brazilian history at that time, and abruptly expanded due to the people’s intolerance for so-called “structural corruption.” These movements, which embraced the pan-political and ideological spectrum, spoke with one voice against the deep complicity of the then-ruling leftist party (PT) within the corruption schemes34, which revealed the fact that “former presidents of Brazil purchased support from Congress to pass legislation” (Foreign Policy, Oct. 26, 2018). This landed a number of politicians in prison, even including former President Lula. Then came President Rousseff was also impeached due to allegations that she cooked the governmental books to conceal the scope of Brazil’s deficit during her reelection campaign in 2014.

34 The Brazilian corruption scandal, the Lava Jato, is explained in Chapter 5.
Taken together, the faults of the past administrations may have ironically paved the way for Bolsonaro to occupy the empty space using populist pledges, attracting Brazilian people seeking a change and an end to political corruption. Thus, the rise of Bolsonaro can be seen as the manifestation of existing, deep-rooted political dissatisfaction among the Brazilian people. A more nuanced analysis of the relationship between the rise of civic nationalism as an outcome of the protests that occurred against the mega-events and Bolsonaro’s emergence will be part of my future research agenda.

**Recent Movements in Hong Kong: The Re-Making of an Imagined Community**

In 2019, Hong Kong has been experiencing an uneasy moment triggered by massive and nationwide demonstrations, as a successor to the 2014 Umbrella Movement in the country. Recent prolonged protests were ostensibly provoked by the issue of the Extraction Law Amendment Bill. Marked by at least one million people, the initially peaceful protests deteriorated into violent clashes between the police and protestors and this produced a violent cycle that was demonstrably beyond the government’s capability to break. As the protesters grew more radical, the police utilized traditional riot control tactics and during that process, they failed to distinguish the majority of peaceful protesters and the minority who became violent (Purbrick 2019). Along with the protests that have shaken Hong Kong, media reports regarding this issue attracted many concerns from many people around the world.

While it is certain that the strong antipathy against amendments to the extradition law was the fuse for the protests, the cause, enlargement, and persistence of these movements cannot be explained without admitting that there is deep-rooted discontent among large parts of the population. Like the cases of the 2014 Umbrella Movement provoked by a decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) on proposed
reforms of an electoral system in Hong Kong, and the protests against mega-sporting events in Brazil during 2013-2016, strong discontent has been effectively “networked” through digital media usages. In other words, “self-joining citizens’ everyday networked activism” at the grassroots level have a pivotal role in the continuing protests in Hong Kong (Ting 2019: 3250).

In line with this dissertation’s analysis, I frame the 2019 Hong Kong movement as “identity politics.” To be specific, I view that not only a series of protests were the results of increasingly accumulated civic identity among people in Hong Kong, but these repetitive movements have also produced a powerful civic nationalism in the country. As examined in his article, Kwan (2016) asserted that the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, as well as the case of the Sunflower Movement in 2014 in Taiwan (re)produced an obvious prominence of democratic liberal values, which directly oppose an ethnonational Chinese identity that has been imposed by Beijing. The same is the case for the recent 2019 Hong Kong movement, which also clearly indicates the rise of potent civic nationalism in Hong Kong. Young protesters in Hong Kong are particularly challenging China’s ruler, dreaming to bring a revolution and to revive their country. Slogans like “Hong Kong is not China” and “Free Hong Kong” (Reuters, Aug. 16, 2019) demonstrate that the younger generation seems to make a further rejection to the Chinese norms and rules that are completely antithetical to the political values shared by Hong Kong people.

Regardless of the social movement’s success or failure, as the protests continue, the proliferation of civic identity throughout Hong Kong will be accelerated and the identity gap will be widened between Hong Kong and China. People will be furthering the “nation-remaking” from the grassroots level in their own way. Similar to the Brazilian case, ordinary citizens are increasingly becoming the protagonist within the nation-building project at an
unprecedented rate, as opposed to the principal role played by the political elites in this process in the past. The making of (re)imagined communities in Brazil and Hong Kong has great implications for the politics of national identity across the globe.
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