

Brief Sum-up of Porteus Hall Struggle
December '74-May '75

I. Analysis

- A. Racism: (Newsletter) "Racism refers to all those social ideas that develop to aid the exploitation of one race over another."
- B. Errors
1. The tendency in that definition is to pose the contradiction as being between all whites and all non-whites.
 2. The definition doesn't clearly establish that racism is developed and used by the ruling class of one race to justify its exploitation of another race in order to establish and maintain its political and economic supremacy.
 3. The definition doesn't point to working class whites as a potential ally. Although objectively white workers benefit from racism, white skin privileges and white chauvinism have to be combatted so that white and non-white workers can be united by their common interests as workers.
 4. The definition intensifies the haoles vs. local antagonism.

II. Strategy

- A. Two-Pronged Strategy
1. Educate as many people as possible about racism.
 2. Lobilize as many people as possible -- from as many areas (nationalities, students, faculty, community) as possible -- to take action against the name.
 3. Errors
 - a. The struggle was issue-oriented.
 - b. The strategy was short range. It stopped short at renaming.
 - c. The strategy lacked a long range view. The Porteus Hall issue was not seen as a tactic within a long range strategy to build an organization that would take up other issues.
- B. Coalition: Lessons Learned
1. On campus, students are the main force (numbers, easily mobilized, will take up an issue more readily).
 2. Faculty
 - a. Concerned with scholarship.
 - b. The issue has to be academically sound.
 - c. They will support it in academic terms.
 - d. But they won't stick their necks out.
 - e. Concerned with tenure, the opinos of their colleagues. e.g. Steinberg: "reputation", Cahill: "credibility"
 - f. They uphold academic freedom which implies being value-free.
 - g. Have condescending, patronizing attitude toward students.

C. Tactics: Lessons Learned

1. We appealed to the national consciousness of students (their Japaneseness, Hawaiianness, etc.).
 - a. We found that local students didn't necessarily rally around the issue.
 - b. Haole students were just as able to see the injustice and as willing to fight against it. They could see that it wasn't a black vs. white issue. Being haole didn't make them racists. All whites weren't racists. Racism only truly serves the ruling class whites. The rest of white people are deluded and pacified by having an under-class of blacks as scapegoats.
2. We appealed to the national consciousness of the BOR.
 - a. We felt that they would naturally support the issue since 1) they were mostly Japanese 2) Fujiyama (who really ran the BOR) reportedly "hated haoles."
 - b. At our Dec. 11 '74 meeting with the Facilities Comm. the regents laughed when Forteus' quotes were read. Regent Sasaki said, "But wasn't he just reflecting his times?"

What does racism and oppression mean to the Regents? Not much. They've made it. But a worker wouldn't laugh. A worker knows what discrimination is. Workers bear the brunt of racist attacks.
 - c. We failed to do class analysis which later clearly showed that the BOR would not support our demand because 1) they were upper petty bourgeoisie and in addition, 2) had strong political and economic links with the ruling class.
 - d. Result: Reformist line: Convince the BOR.
 - e. Root: Putting race in the forefront, rather than presenting it as primarily a class question.
3. Going Through Channels
 - a. Must clearly be seen as a tactic to draw out lessons on the role of the BOR and Administration to thwart dissent and to serve the interests of the ruling class.
 - b. Each event should be summed up to put forth the lessons to the people.
 - c. Lessons are grasped more readily if people have actually gone through struggle.

Without this understanding we expected people to accept our line on the BOR and to agree to not pursue the BOR after the hearing.

Because they had not gone through the channels along with people in the Coalition and because a clear analysis of the BOR was not put forward, people felt that the BOR could still be persuaded to change the name.

Therefore, in order to win people over to our line, we had to take them through another confrontation with the BOR (K.C.C., May '75).