

BHINNEKA TUNGGAL IKA (UNITY IN DIVERSITY):
NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY, AND RELIGION IN INDONESIAN HIGHER EDUCATION

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Abstract

My dissertation aims to bring further understanding on multicultural education outside the Anglo-American axis and with a new focus on ethnicity, religion, and province of origin as key identity-markers. Indonesia is my case-study, with over 375 ethnic groups, six officially recognized creeds (i.e., Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism), the greatest number of Muslims in the world, and the fourth highest population on the planet scattered across 6,000 inhabited islands.

I examine the meaning and implications of the Indonesian national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) in the context of higher education. This study uncovers existing initiatives that foster *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in Indonesian universities, as well as suggests paths for improvement. My Grounded Theory methodology encompasses document analysis, observations, 633 survey responses, and 57 in-depth interviews with administrators, faculty members, and students at Universitas Gadjah Mada as well as other key informants.

My theoretical framework draws from notions of nationalism and ethno-religious identity to illuminate the realm of unity and diversity. Theories of multiculturalism and grounded cosmopolitanism reveal the local, national, and global belongings that shape both individual and institutional hybrid identities in today's globalized era. Multicultural education, religious education, intercultural contact theory, and notions of university as a public sphere contextualize the broader discourse on unity and diversity in higher education.

Ultimately, I propose two arguments. First, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* frames multiculturalism as grounded cosmopolitanism. In particular, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, or grounded cosmopolitanism, means to hold grounded (e.g., ethnic, religious, national) and cosmopolitan (e.g., humanist and global) allegiances. In particular, participants refer to *Bhinneka*

Tunggal Ika as a hybrid historical concept and a process of “identity blending.” Regardless of the specific shapes and proportions, grounded and cosmopolitan memberships are present and interacting in each person, group, and institution. Second, a “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika education,” or a grounded cosmopolitan education, means to support the agency to blend grounded and cosmopolitan allegiances within a hybrid identity. While the dominant discourse attempts to restrict hybridity, counter publics advocate further hybridization across governmental policy, university regulations, teaching and research, formal curriculum, and campus life.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation investigates cultural diversity in the context of higher education in the era of globalization. Universities in multicultural societies confront the mounting challenge of representing national plurality while aspiring to be international institutions. The conceptual focus of this study is on region of origin, ethnicity, and religion—three consequential identity-markers in states which aim to reach unity without uniformity, and diversity without fragmentation. Classical sociologists, such as Marx (1964) and Weber (1963), predicted that these “outdated” loyalties were going to vanish in the individualist, industrialized, and urbanized world. Yet, their predictions never materialized and recent research has indicated that national, ethnic and religious identities have gained strength, especially “in situations of flux, change, resource competition and threats against boundaries” (Eriksen, 2002, p. 99). Scholarly forecasts of the secularization of the world have proven especially inaccurate, as religion remains a significant personal and socio-political force (Baker, 2014, pp. 2-3).

The geographical concentration of this study is on Indonesia—a complex case of cultural diversity, with over 375 ethnic groups, 700 languages, six officially recognized creeds (i.e., Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism), the greatest number of Muslim adherents in the world, and the fourth highest population on the planet (i.e., 237,641,326 people) scattered across 6,000 inhabited islands (Ananta, 2013; Central Intelligence Agency, 2011; Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics, 2010). Tensions arise as Islam accounts for 87.18% of Indonesians, and the Javanese ethnicity—which is almost entirely Muslim—constitutes 40% of the inhabitants, while wielding the majority of political power.

Since there is no absolute ethnic majority, the absolute religious majority (Muslims) versus minority (non-Muslims) has emerged as a focal point.

The Indonesian nation-state was built on the premise of its diversity, as articulated by the national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) (Bigalke, 2007; Legge, 1964; Martano, 2009). *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the entryway into my analysis of diversity in Indonesia because, compared to other possible terms, it is known by all citizens; “something that is inside Indonesian people,” in a participant’s words. It is studied in school, is part of the public discourse, and is written in the national emblem of the Garuda Pancasila. It also embodies the friction between unity and diversity, which is a key challenge for Indonesia as well as for other multicultural societies. It is relevant also outside Indonesia, since countries like the United States, European Union, Ghana, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and South Africa have adopted national mottos that evoke the spirit of “out of many, one.”

Two questions guide my dissertation: What does *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* mean in the Indonesian higher education context? What are the supports, barriers, and potentials for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in the Indonesian higher education context? My case-study is the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) because it is the oldest, largest, and one of the three premier universities in the nation (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2009, 2010b, 2010c; Universitas Indonesia Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning, 2004). It is also a leading institution in educational reform. It is located in the city of Yogyakarta, also known as Yogya or Jojya, the “city of tolerance.” In addition, references to national educational policy and higher education are part of this study.

In chapter 2, I present my theoretical framework. I draw from the fields of education, political science, and international cultural studies. I start with notions of nationalism—to illuminate the realm of unity—and of ethno-religious identity—to illuminate the realm of diversity. I continue with a discussion of multiculturalism and grounded cosmopolitanism to reveal the local, national, and global allegiances that shape both individual and institutional hybrid identities in today's globalized era. Later, I focus attention to the context of the university by introducing four relevant discourses: multicultural education, religious education, intercultural contact theory, and universities as public spheres. This interdisciplinary approach informs how socio-political constructs affect perspectives on unity and diversity, without neglecting the active role that both students and faculty play in this dynamic process of contextual and international influences.

In chapter 3, I complete my literature review with an introduction on Indonesia. I present matters of regionality, religion, and ethnicity, with close attention to Islam, the majority's religion. I report on the historical developments of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as they concern matters of unity and diversity in education.

In chapter 4, I describe my Grounded Theory methodology, which encompasses document analysis, observations, 633 survey responses, and 57 interviews conducted with UGM administrators, faculty members, and students from various backgrounds, as well as with other key informants off campus. In Indonesia, professors generally serve as administrative executives; therefore, I often refer to students and professors only in my narrative. In the methodology section, I describe both concepts and strategies that guide my study. I address issues of

surveying, interviewing, transcribing, coding, and positionality because of their impact on my study.

The possibility of social desirability biases exists in any study that is based on human self-reports (Roccatò, 2003). The social desirability bias refers to the respondents' tendency to answer questions in a manner that is likely to be viewed favorably by others. For instance, participants can over-disclose "proper" behaviors and attempt to hide "undesirable" behaviors. Most strategies of social desirability control are used in the field of psychology. However, I employed strategies that are more generally available. First, I triangulated surveys, interviews, and observations. Second, the surveys were anonymous and the interviews were confidential, so that the participants could feel unhampered in providing their answers. Third, I worded my questions in a neutral and non-sensational fashion. Fourth, in order to move beyond rhetorical statements, I asked participants about examples; for instance, about their implementation of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and perspectives on some controversial topics, namely the lesbian Muslim author Irshad Manji, the film "Innocence of Muslims," the Islamic groups of Ahmadiyah and Kejawen, as well as their beliefs regarding what happens after death to adherents of other religions. Fifth, I reported on a variety of voices, including any outliers, to show individual differences. My final arguments are built at the intersection of these approaches; they do not prioritize one method over the others and do not emerge from exclusively one tool. For example, no triangulated evidence emerges about UGM possibly preferring the enrollment of students from Java; therefore, I do not state this in my study.

In chapters 5 to 9, I present my findings on the meanings of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* among UGM faculty and students. These chapters are not heavily analytical; I refer to my theoretical framework only sporadically, in order to bridge the concepts in chapter 2 with my analysis in chapter 10. Participants describe the supports, barriers, and potentials towards *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at UGM. They discuss UGM regulations, curriculum, teaching and research, and campus life. These accounts are not a mere list of technical strategies for the educational system. While suggesting pragmatic plans for action, they illustrate the complexity of praxis—the process by which the concept of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is enacted in the life of individuals and institutions (Freire, 1970). Inter-personal contractions and intra-personal variations occur, because they are part of individual and group processing as shown by the ethno-nationalist and critical theories in chapter 2.

In each section of the findings, participants express a variety of perspectives, preferences, and prepositions. Even when they agree about a certain matter, they have different analyses of the causes and resolutions. Nobody thinks completely alike. Some accounts sound quite exceptional (e.g., the high school student who dropped out from a *pesantren* because he disagreed with the strict curricula); these stories usually disappear in meta-narratives. In my findings, for each example there is a counter-example. For instance, the UGM community is more differentiated than other contexts, but representation remains inadequate. Some faculty teach according to inclusive pedagogies, whereas others infuse the lessons with their own religious beliefs. The rector prefers campus life to develop autonomously from students themselves, but some staff members' biases influence student organizations. The university

encourages students to be in charge—for example, through the Student Association and AAI Islam class—but political parties and off-campus organizations infiltrate campus life. Through UGM experiences, some students overcome their biases, while others do not. Most students engage in intercultural contact, while others isolate themselves in self-segregated cliques. Most students are moderate in their religious practice, but a few are pious and exclusivist. Between these farthest points, infinite positions exist. Indonesian college communities are conservative, progressive, and a hybrid mix of all combinations between the two extremes.

In chapter 10, I bring the findings in conversation with my theoretical framework and propose my final arguments. First, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* frames multiculturalism as grounded cosmopolitanism (Kahn, 2004). In fact, multiculturalism is an open concept; it refers to the manners of responding to multiculturalism and it has been associated to various ideologies (2004). In particular, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (or grounded cosmopolitanism) means to hold grounded (e.g., ethnic, religious, national) and cosmopolitan (e.g., humanist and global) allegiances. In particular, participants refer to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as a historical concept that advocates both contextual and broader affiliations amid the challenges to become reality. In addition, participants refer to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as an “identity blending” in the context of their UGM experiences. Regardless of the specific shapes and proportions, grounded and cosmopolitan allegiances are present and interacting in each person. For instance, in various degrees, students may be protective of their local language and some of their traditions; loyal towards Indonesia and critical of the government; immersed in foreign stimuli from the West, Asia, and the Middle East (as also well described by Nef-Saluz, 2007). Hybridization takes form horizontally as well

as vertically—within and across students, faculty, and administrators as well as the university structure itself. Both individuals and institutions experience the process of cultural interactions among the local, national, and global.

Second, a “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika education” (or a grounded cosmopolitan education) means to support the agency to blend grounded and cosmopolitan allegiances within a hybrid identity. While the dominant discourse attempts to restrict hybridity, counter publics advocate further hybridization. On one hand, some of provisions in public higher education have fallen into accommodative multiculturalism, in support of Javanization and Islamization, for example through the national admissions, curriculum, teaching methods, and student affairs (Parekh, 1997). An interesting part of my findings refers to how participants internalize both overt and disguised narratives against hybridity (Bourdieu, 1979).

On the other hand, counter narratives formulate alternatives that promote hybridity (Fraser, 2007; Giroux, 1988). They encompass individuals of all ethnicities and faiths. Their oppositional discourses translate in either immediate actions or propositions for the future with regard to governmental policies, university regulations, pedagogy, formal curriculum, and campus life (Freire, 1970). They suggest that the UGM’s original aspirations and annexed values should be enacted in all aspects of the university, rather than being limited to a few classes. Participants call for (a) more students and faculty from outside Java, (b) considerable alterations to religion and citizenship/Pancasila classes, (c) inclusive and progressive pedagogies, (d) professors and administrators who model pluralist life choices, (e) interventions on groups that do not embody multicultural values, and (f) further opportunities for intercultural contact.

Examples of implementations are already in place—for instance, in UGM international programs and in other universities—so the reform can expand from them. Yet, the ministry has to support these efforts towards more inclusive and diverse education.

This study is not intended to be and cannot be taken as a representative investigation of all Indonesian universities. As chapter 3 notes, Indonesian universities greatly differ according to time, location, private versus public status, confessional versus non confessional mission, as well as the leadership of the moment. No university is a “typical” university, including UGM, which has specific purposes and provisions. Further studies are needed to clarify how other university communities and structures are situated in the discourse about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*.

This study does conclude that all Indonesian or UGM college students, faculty, and administrators have one perspective of unity and diversity. In addition, it does not focus on one specific group and its possible collective views of unity and diversity (e.g., Chinese Indonesian or Hindu students). This study is built on the theoretical underpinnings that individuals are distinct, because they draw from unique combinations of cultural resources (Brubaker, 2002; Duara, 1996; Jiang, 2006). Group membership is not homogenous; it has many contested and contradictory shades of grey. Social roles can shift from dominant to subaltern according to the context (Fraser, 2007; Giroux, 1988).

This study complicates notions of diversity by showing individual heterogeneity within groups and by considering the simultaneous influence of local, national, and international allegiances. All three memberships consistently emerged from my study, which was surprising to me because only a few cultural studies address this dynamic (for example Setijadi, 2012 among

others) whereas most scholarly work focus on either local or national belongings. My interest is about showing all the variations that I encountered, with all their inconsistencies. For accuracy, I point out some majority trends; yet, they should not be viewed as generalizations. In my narrative, I employ majority-minority dichotomies—such as Javanese vs. non-Javanese, Muslim vs. non-Muslim, Java vs. outside Java—because they are used by participants and are useful for the analysis of socio-political dynamics. However, I depict the variety within each categorization and I frame my final analysis in terms of forces for/against hybridity, rather than other ethno-religious approaches.

This study is significant for multiple reasons. First, it expands the discourse on diversity in education beyond the dominant Anglo-American axis, by focusing on Indonesia and relying on scholars from Asia. Much of the literature on multicultural education and related fields that treat issues of diversity stems from debates in the West (Bokhorst-Heng, 2007). I broaden that purview by bringing experiences and contexts from Asia. I attempt to further decenter the center, by drawing attention to the contributions of a majority-Muslim, Southeast Asian “developing” country like Indonesia, which has received little academic notice compared to other neighbors in the region, such as China and India. Current events on democracy, migration, and freedom of speech in the West and the “Muslim World” demonstrate the importance of enhancing intercultural understanding in all its forms, including within tertiary education, as it impacts young citizens and future leaders in their formative years.

Second, it problematizes the motto “Unity in Diversity” and variations like *E Pluribus Unum*. The Indonesian state carries on efforts to shape the development of the next generation of

citizens according to the principles of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. Yet, it has lost Timor-Leste, has assigned special autonomy to Aceh, and is struggling to keep Papua due to local requests for independence from the central power. Today, reaching an inclusive and differentiated nation-state remains a great challenge for multicultural societies and their educational systems. How to translate the principle into practice is still an unanswered question. Although formal education alone cannot resolve all social predicaments, schooling continues to be one of the major ways in which a society can stimulate intellectual growth, promote professional skills, and influence cultural norms and personal values.

Third, it illustrates the significance of educating citizens who are committed to plurality. The transformative potential of universities is palpable in a rapidly developing country like Indonesia (Goastellec, 2003, 2008; Institute of International Education, 2010). Indonesia needs expertise, but less than 32% of its college-age population is enrolled in tertiary education (UNESCO, 2012). Graduates from these institutions are thus likely to enter influential careers and their ability to deliver on the national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* will influence the direction of Indonesia (Soedijarto, 2000, 2003, 2009; Soedjatmoko, Soemardjan, & Thompson, 1994; Surakhmad, 2003). While universities aim to reach “world class” status, they should also continue prioritizing students and faculty’s representation across all national differences, including religions, ethnicities, and provinces of origin.

Despite the vast implications of higher education for Indonesian leadership and society, little has been published about the current process through which universities approach cultural diversity. I found relevant cultural studies of K-12 schools and institutional analyses of higher

education, but a dearth of literature on the tie between culture and universities. Although college experience is influenced by learning within family, K-12 schooling, and other social enclaves, this dissertation focuses on higher education. During my field study, leaders at universities from all corners of the archipelago—from Kalimantan to Timor and Java—confirmed the need for such study. There is a lacuna in empirical research on the perception of or commitment to cultural diversity among students, faculty, and administrators. My study helps to fill this gap and contributes to better practices across culturally diverse campuses in Indonesia and beyond.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Religion

Nationalism, ethnicity, and religion continue to be intertwined phenomena and contested fields across academic disciplines. Two classical perspectives dominate the study of nationalism. On one hand, the primordial (or ethno-symbolist) view considers the nation as a continuation of ancient cultural foundations (Geertz, 1973; A. Smith, 2003). On the other hand, the modernist (or constructionist, instrumentalist) approach sees the nation as a result of industrialization and Enlightenment ideas (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992). Through both primordial and modernist lenses, nation, ethnicity, and religion overlap. Recent scholarly developments identify a middle ground by building on both primordial and modernist theories (Brubaker, 1999, 2002; Duara, 1996; Eriksen, 2002; Jiang, 2006; Reid, 2010; Shin, 2006). This latter hybrid model reflects my conceptual understanding of multicultural societies, including Indonesia.

Primordialist theorists maintain that the nation exists on the premises of shared history, genealogical relations, and religious beliefs before the modern state mobilizes it. Smith (2003) defines a nation as “a named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members” (p. 24). Two of the nation’s most “sacred foundations” are *ethnie* (ethnic core) and religion, which can be approached both substantively—as an individual’s spiritual quest—and functionally—as a social force that unites its adherents in a single moral community (A. Smith, 2003, p. 18).

Smith (2003) approaches national identity as the perpetuation and reinterpretation of the values, symbols, and traditions that constitute the distinctive heritage of the nation. He assigns five key dimensions to the nationalist belief-system: (a) “a sacred communion,” which binds individuals as a distinctive people; (b) “the cult of authenticity,” which separates a group from all others; (c) “the return to roots,” which connects adherents with their cultural resources; (d) “the sacrificial virtue of heroes and prophets,” which illustrates the strengths of the nation and inspires its members; and (e) “elevation of their voice,” which contributes to both official and popular discourses (A. Smith, 2003, pp. 18-42). In Smith’s (2003) words, “it is in and through the interplay between these pre-existing cultural resources and the nationalist belief-system that the power and durability of national identities can be found” (p. 43). Thus, nationalism is “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (A. Smith, 2003, p. 24).

Geertz (1973) theorizes that primordial attachments generally stem from the “givens,” namely kin, religion, and social practices (p. 259). They are felt to be ancient, eternal, natural, and often spiritual. Membership in a primordial community is hereditary, exclusive, and loyal (i.e., one can be a member of one primordial community only). Affiliation is first learned within the family and later generalized to the greater community. Under particular conditions, these lifelong ties can lead to conflicts with other human loyalties and possibly destroy civic society. Therefore, national identity is a much more complex shared aspiration than the simplistic

objective of gaining autonomy. States are modern phenomena that always try to make use of the heritage of an existing nation.

Modernist scholars argue that the nation is a modern ideological construct arising from the process of state-building around the 17th century. Through political legitimation and emotional power, it forges a link between a self-defined cultural group and the state. Ethnic communities cannot be counted as nations if they do not have a political and legal system within the modern industrial economy. According to Anderson (2006), nationalism spread with the advancement of the print industry, state power, and modern bureaucracy, while filling the social vacuum created by urbanization and industrialization. Anderson proposes that a nation is “an imagined political community”—inherently limited, sovereign, and comradeship-based (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). It is imagined because its members “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6).

Hobsbawm (1992) pays special attention to “invented tradition,” meaning the set of fixed rules and symbolic practices that impose values and behaviors of repetition, by a formalized and ritualized factitious continuity with a historic past (p. 1). Processes of inventing traditions seem to occur more frequently with rapid transformations of society, which require new norms and interventions around key institutions (e.g., army, legal courts, schools), objects (e.g., flag, statues, buildings), and intangible material (e.g., national anthem, folksong, ceremonies). Invented traditions can be established to create social cohesion, to legitimize authority, and to socialize according to certain beliefs, values or behaviors. Hobsbawm (1992) also distinguishes

tradition from custom and convention. Customs lack the invariable nature of tradition; they are rules and practices, which do not preclude change as long as it is compatible with precedent requirements. Conventions lack the symbolic and ritual nature of tradition as well as its invariability; they are mainly technical procedures and practical operations, and can be *de facto* or *de jure* formalized. Change in custom and convention may modify the tradition with which they are intertwined.

In Indonesia, Anderson and Hobsbawm's approach is supported by Heryanto (2006) who agrees that nationalism is not old, inherited, natural, but rather a "mania" for seeking "absolutely splendid ancestors," which typically gives rise to "dangerous nonsense" (p. 27). He defines ethnicity as a "modern fiction" (Heryanto, 2008, p. 78) and "political invention" (Heryanto, 2004, p. 33). He is concerned about the myths of authenticity that separate "us" from "them," one's privileged group from all others. He echoes the deconstruction of the concept of culture as unchanging, essential, and existing from the beginning (Heryanto, 1998, 2004, 2008).

Recent theoretical developments have moved beyond the primordialist-modernist binary by first identifying a common ground. In Jiang's (2006) words, despite the variance of approaches, scholars of nationalism seem to agree on a few key points:

1. A nation is an aggregate of persons who associate with each other by common descent, language, religion, or history, although the sense of communion may be imagined rather than actual.

2. National identity is a feeling that one has towards one's imagined community, the fundamental features of which include a homeland, a common myth and historical memory, and a common, mass public culture.
3. The consciousness of national identity makes possible or helps the arising of nationalism and nationalist movements, which pursue the political goal of self-determination. (p. 147)

In regard to the nation, ethnicity emerges as a key dimension, echoing both primordialists and modernists. As stated by Eriksen (2002), "the first fact of ethnicity is the application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders, between 'us' and 'them'" (p. 19). Ethnicity tends to emerge from "myths of common origins" as well as a myriad of possible cultural criteria such as language and political organization (Eriksen, 2002, p. 13). However, describing what "cultural distinctive" means is problematic, as shown by researchers who found unbearable barriers in listing who a certain ethnic group is and in which ways it is unique from other communities (Eriksen, 2002).

Despite the complexities of definitions, Eriksen (2002) advances five categories of ethnicity and I add examples from the Indonesian context: (a) "urban ethnic minorities" (e.g., Indonesian people of Chinese descent in Jakarta); (b) "indigenous people" (e.g., the Dayak in Kalimantan); (c) the "proto-nations" demanding their own nation-state (e.g., some Acehnese); (d) "ethnic groups in plural societies" or colonially created states with cultural heterogeneous populations (e.g., all ethnic groups in Indonesia); and (e) "post-slavery minorities" (e.g., not existent in Indonesia, but referring to the African Americans in the U.S.) (pp. 14-15). These

categories are not mutually exclusive; for instance, the first four categories can be found in Indonesia simultaneously.

Ethnicity is not given, but a “contextually fluctuating conceptual variable” that is conditional to a particular event or setting, according to Brubaker (2002, pp. 167-168). It is “embedded” in a particular society and history, “contingent” (not inevitable), and “contested” (emerging from contention among different kinds of nationalism or different ethnic groups seeking state power) (Shin, 2006, pp. 8-11).

The nation is a terrain of conflicting narratives because national identity is multi-layered, complementary, changeable, and socially constructed (Duara, 1996; Jiang, 2006). Each member of the nation draws from a plurality of sources of identification that do not necessarily harmonize with one another (Duara, 1996). Brubaker (2002) critiques “groupism” for its “tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial or cultural blocs” (p. 164). Ethnicity does not always crystallize itself, polarize society, or cause ethnic conflicts. Various kinds of organizations are the agents of conflict, by claiming to speak and act in name of an ethnic group, without honoring the heterogeneity within it. Shin (2006) states that a nation can be analyzed through theories of inter-group and intra-group differentiation (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). According to the “black sheep effect,” “unlikeable ingroup members will be evaluated more negatively than unlikeable outgroup members” because they represent the greatest threat to ingroup conformity (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988, p. 288). The internal repression of differences is divisive, as it raises

the question of who can define the group norm and by what criteria. Thus, the commitment to the ethnic nation can function as a unifier but also as a divider.

Cultural practices are not unchangeable but fluctuate over time, by “softening” or “hardening” their boundaries (Duara, 1996, p. 49). They hold soft boundaries if they do not prevent the group from sharing or adopting the ways of another group. By contrast, when boundaries are hard, groups are intolerant, exclusive, and suspicious of others’ cultural resources. Boundaries harden when politicized and polarized, for instance through census categories or dichotomous labels (Jiang, 2006). Human capacity for multiple identities is one of the key factors that makes democracy possible, along with a political roof of equal citizenship and human rights.

Nationalism is ancient in terms of political self-consciousness but novel in terms of a system of nation-states (Duara, 1996). Nationalism is a double-edged phenomenon—it can be associated with either xenophobia and ethnocentrism or self-determination and solidarity (Brubaker, 1999). Brubaker (2002) rejects the classic distinction between civic nationalism (i.e., legitimate, liberal, voluntaristic, universalist, inclusive) and ethnic nationalism (i.e., illegitimate, illiberal, inherent, particularist, exclusive), because he finds them both “differently inclusive”—inclusive and exclusive based on the selected criteria (p. 65). For example, a civic nation includes all citizens but excludes all non-citizens.

Eriksen (2002) argues that the link between ethnic ideology and state apparatus is common, especially through symbols that have the power of creating loyalty and belongingness. Yet, it is not necessary. For instance, nationalism may sometimes express a polyethnic or supra-

ethnic ideology that emphasizes shared civil rights rather than shared cultural roots. Certain categories of people may find themselves in a grey zone between civic and ethnic categories (Eriksen, 2002). For example, if some of their members want full political independence, others limit their demands to linguistic and other rights within an existing state.

Reid (2010) also complicates the notion of nationalism by forging four typologies—*ethnie*, state, anti-imperial, and outrage at state humiliation (OSH). *Ethnie* nationalism echoes Smith's primordial approach, where *ethnie* is "a group with a strong sense of being similar" based on shared collective name, myth of descent, history, distinctive culture (usually including language or religion), association with a territory (either present or past), and solidarity (Reid, 2010, p. 6). Reid chose the analytical term *ethnie* because it transcends the positive association with nation, the negative concept of race, and the sub-national notion of ethnic group. State nationalism evokes the modernist approach, where the state is a construct of the Enlightenment age and rules in name of the people, rather than by divine right. The anti-imperial nationalism stands between the primordialist and modernist approaches. On one hand, it recognizes the existence of separate primordial *ethnies* and their willingness to create "multi-ethnic solidarities against alien rulers" (Reid, 2010, p. 5). On the other hand, it refers to an imaginative and invented phenomenon, "the alchemy that sought to turn empires into nations in the middle of the 20th century" (Reid, 2010, p. 9). The outrage at state humiliation (OSH) nationalism also falls between primordialist and modernist approaches. It operates in states that are formally independent and is expression of the discontent against the compromises made by the government. In Indonesia, all four nationalisms can be found, including *ethnie* nationalism in

every sub-national group to a certain extent, anti-imperial nationalism in the pre-independence era, state nationalism in the post-independence era, and OSH among some Papuan people today.

Multiculturalism and Grounded Cosmopolitanism

Much of the literature on multiculturalism stems from debates in the West, mainly in Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA (Bokhorst-Heng, 2007). According to the Indonesian scholar Budianta (2004), concepts and definitions of multiculturalism based on the situations in the West do not translate directly into the Indonesian context; nevertheless, they are useful as a comparative means to critically reflect on the realities on the ground.

Culture is an ambiguous concept, which has acquired a number of different, often contradictory, meanings over centuries of usage (During, 2007; Fox, 2004b). Parekh (2000) criticizes definitions of culture as a static, unchanged, unified, homogenous, autonomous entity with fixed boundaries and no internal contradictions. He emphasizes variations within and across cultures, and raises questions about what may be considered as defining for a particular culture. Similarly, Budianta (2004) approaches culture as a continuous process of becoming, a hybrid field of cross-cultural interaction, and a set of reference that is socialized to members for specific interests and according to different contexts.

Multiculturalism has also been defined in multiple ways. Sunarto (2004) points out that the suffix “ism” attempts to make the extrinsic factual realm (i.e., plurality or multiculturalism) into the intrinsic ideology or doctrine working inside people’s minds (i.e., pluralism or multiculturalism). According to Budianta (2004), multiculturalism is to socialize, negotiate, and reposition cultural identity as a multilayered entity. Individuals should have the agency to select

from available cultural references in order to create an understanding of their selves. They should be free from external forces that restrict individual identity, by excluding certain cultural options, denigrating others, and imposing stereotypical categorizations.

Parekh (1997) interprets multiculturalism as the manners of responding to a plurality of cultures and distinguishes five main types of multiculturalism. I add to the typology by providing examples from Indonesia. First, in isolationist multiculturalism, cultural groups interact when absolutely necessary. In Indonesia, some indigenous communities practice their Animist beliefs, distinct norms, and localized way of life in separation from the rest of society (Scott, 2009; Tsing, 1993). Second, in accommodative multiculturalism, a culture remains dominant but makes some provisions for the needs of minority groups. For instance, the Javanese Muslim culture maintains its dominance, but compromises with other cultures in order to avoid threat to the unity of the state (Budianta, 2004; Heryanto, 2006). Third, in autonomist multiculturalism, cultural groups seek equality while maintaining their autonomy. For example, some Acehnese people demanded political autonomy and the rights to adopt the Sharia law (Aspinall, 2009; Bertrand, 2004; Reid, 2010). Fourth, in critical or interactive multiculturalism, minority communities challenge the dominant group and aim to create a collective culture that reflects their distinct perspectives. Christian communities, for instance, seek recognition in the Islam-dominated national culture (Andaya, 2011; Yang, 2005). Finally, in cosmopolitan multiculturalism, individuals are not committed to specific cultures, but rather freely engage in intercultural experiments. Such dynamic seems to be absent in the literature on Indonesia, where ethnicity and religion continue to be defying parts in people's life.

Sunarto (2004) examines multiculturalism as a middle ground between the two predominant, and often opposing, discourses—namely the state’s “formal discourse” with a priority on unity, and the people’s “discourse from the ground” with a priority on diversity (p. 2). He proposes that a state must engage its people to participate in a process of negotiation and power sharing in order to create an authentic *unum* that has moral authority and legitimacy. The process has to end with *e pluribus unum* (out of many, one).

The theory of grounded cosmopolitanism focuses on the hybrid intersect of local, national, and global dynamics which are relevant for the understanding of youth in the 21st century. In relation to my study, “grounded” refers to ethnic and religious as well as national subjectivities, whereas “cosmopolitan” addresses both universal humanist and global phenomena (Kahn, 2004). This conceptual approach goes beyond Parekh’s (1997) ideal of cosmopolitan multiculturalism, for instance, which suggests the irrelevance of ethnic and national boundaries in the worldwide community of human beings. Nilan and Feixa (2006) write that “the process of hybridization looks towards an ambivalent and complex third space of cultural practice, in which new authority structures pull young people towards different narratives of identity” (p. 108). Hybridization is a process of cultural interactions between the local and the global, the hegemonic and the subaltern, the center and the periphery. Global influences transform in local traditions, locality is assimilated with globality, and a hybrid realm of new meanings emerges. Hybridization offers especially young people a place to construct an alternative identity.

In Indonesia, the college students’ world is drenched with globalized forces, including electronic music (Richter, 2008), Islamic fashion (Nef-Saluz, 2007), billboard advertisement

(Abdullah & Sairin, 2003), and TV gossip news (Yulianto, 2008). University students live in one hybrid space of local and international stimuli from the West, Asia, and the Middle East. These spheres are not perceived as oppositional, but rather overlapping, melting, and becoming compatible. Religiously, for example, college students do not reside in two different worlds, in a devout one and in a secular one, nor do they switch between the two (Nef-Saluz, 2007). Instead, they blend their being religious, modern, and worldly.

Cultural studies in Southeast Asia illustrate phenomena that are relevant to university students and can be borrowed to better understand college life. As the newest generation of indie films that they both produce and mirror, the youth possess “nomadic trajectories,” namely polymorphous qualities that travel between “imaginaries of the national and logics of the trans(national)” (Harvey, 2007, p. 273). They embody the tensions that emerge from local experiences being “saturated into global popular culture, capitalist consumption, media and technological networks, and the flows of human creativity, labor, thought and emotion” (Khoo, 2008, p. 232). They are concerned with reinventing and preserving traditions even as they also embrace a culture of the future (Hanan, 2008). Expanding from Setijadi’s (2012) analysis of Indonesian independent cinema, three key motivations lie underneath the youth’s choice to reframe local issues as universal problems: (a) to express their both grounded and cosmopolitan identities, (b) to critique and transcend rigid categorizations and instrumentalization of differences, and (c) to facilitate the access into international circuits.

Multicultural Education and Religious Education

Multicultural education, as the approach to diversity in schooling, is also subject to multiple interpretations. According to Sunarto (2004), multicultural education might be seen as a practical dimension of multiculturalism—a set of concepts and practices that might officially be formulated through governmental policies, school regulations, curriculum design, teaching methods, and school-society relationships. An inclusive multicultural education should be constantly adjusted (as cultures constantly change) and infuse both formal and informal curricula, including the hidden curriculum. According to Sunarto (2004), “culture change seems to start from school” and the challenge is “to make multiculturalism curricula become the students’ cultures” in a natural manner (p. 4). Multicultural education is associated with multiple objectives, such as appreciation of cultural diversity, ability to function in various cultures, acceptance of alternative life choices, as well as promotion of social justice, equality, and democratic goals.

Based upon her view of multiculturalism as repositioning cultural identity as a multilayered entity, Budianta (2004) proposes a multicultural education that fosters the constructivist socialization of cultural hybridity and develops understanding of cultural blending as a common norm, rather than a mere appreciation for difference. Critical thinking towards ethnocentric interpretations of culture is essential. Through this process, multicultural education can help to create a society that lives comfortably in diversity. Along with other Indonesian scholars (Semiawan, 2004; Sunarto, 2004; Therik, 2004), Budianta (2004) suggests that multicultural education requires an integral reform, including revision of teaching pedagogies

and materials, involvement with the broader community, and diversification of space, staff, faculty, and students.

Drawing from his concept of cosmopolitan multiculturalism, Parekh (2000) argues that multicultural education is a critique of the monocultural, and especially Eurocentric, content of the prevailing educational system. He finds that monocultural education “is simply not good education” because it stunts students’ critical faculty and intellectual curiosity about other cultures, while breeding arrogance, insensitivity and racism (Parekh, 2000, p. 227). By contrast, Parekh (2000) says the following about multicultural education:

Far from ethnicizing education, it deethnicizes cultures and makes them a shared human capital. It encourages a dialogue between cultures, equips students to converse in multiple cultural idioms, and avoids the cacophonous incomprehension of the Tower of Babel. It challenges the falsehood of Eurocentric history, brings out its complexity and plural narratives, and it also fosters social cohesion by enabling students to accept, enjoy and cope with diversity. (p. 230)

To conclude this section on multicultural education, I want to add a brief review of religious education, which is relevant for my study but rarely included in the literature on diversity. Religious education has both opponents and advocates. Critiques target it for being divisive, due to its “distinctive non-common educational aims” and “restricted non-common educational environments” (Halstead & McLaughlin, 2005, p. 63). By providing a specific curriculum designed for a sub-group of society, it creates a sense of self-identity forged in opposition to the broader society and cultivates disruptive beliefs, such as other creeds being

false, immoral, or suboptimal. Therefore, it fails to nurture the attitudes that are necessary for the well-being of a democratic society.

Supports for religious education assert that the cause of community conflict is not faith-based schooling, but rather socio-political discrimination, exclusion, and despair. In addition, religiosity has been positively associated with thriving outcomes among youths, such as academic success (Jeynes, 2003), good behaviors (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Wagener, Furrow, King, Leffert, & Benson, 2003), physical health (Dowling et al., 2004), civic integration (Kerestes, Youniss, & Metz, 2004), and social capital (King & Furrow, 2008). Yet, later studies do not replicate these results, finding weak correlations between religious commitment and overall well-being (Furrow, King, & White, 2004).

Nonetheless, various types of religious education exist and, in order to understand them, one has to first grasp the spectrum of possible theological foundations (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004). Within the field of theology of religions, three models are generally formulated about the perceptions of Others' creeds—exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The first two approaches to faith are common, while the third one is rare and yet exists, as shown by both the literature and my study. To explain the three models, Eck (2005) poses a simple question: is “our” God listening to the prayers of people of “other” faiths? For the exclusivist, God is not listening to those of different religions because their beliefs are false. For the inclusivists, God is listening to the prayers of a member of another religion, but it is their God as they understand God. Like the exclusivists, the inclusivists maintain the superiority on their own dogma, but they approach distinct creeds more positively, as products of divine revelation and legitimate paths to

salvation. For the pluralists, God is listening to everybody, because God transcends human understanding and does not belong to any specific group. With the famous quote “God has many names,” Hick (1982) illustrates that people perceive the divine reality under different forms but none of them can claim absolute validity. Pluralism does not imply superficial tolerance, relativism, or syncretism. In other words, it does not aim to foster mere coexistence, to prove that all religions are the same, or to dissolve elements from all traditions in a new religion. Pluralism is about commitment to one’s own faith, to adherents of all creeds, and to social transformation across religious boundaries.

Theological orientations depend on a various factors, including the interpretations of the sacred texts (Nuryatno, 2011). Normative passages are akin to the divine and eternal principles, such as equality, tolerance, and justice. Contextual verses are related to the human and are specific to socio-historical problems of the time. According to Nuryatno (2011), writings that do not support diversity should be viewed as contextual and abrogated, whereas texts that foster plurality should be approached as normative and maintained as prerequisites for a harmonious society.

Religious education can be shaped in numerous forms, based on the respective exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist theology at its foundation. It can be monoreligious, multireligious, and interreligious (Sterkens, 2001). In other words, it can refer to teaching religion (i.e., transmitting religious beliefs from one generation to the next), teaching about religion (i.e., studying dogmas in an intellectual manner), and teaching from religion (i.e., understanding how faith can contribute to improve human life and resolve human problems)

(Grimmitt, 1987). An alternative terminology refers to confessional education into religion and non-confessional education about religion (Felderhof, Thompson, & Torevell, 2008).

Seymour (1993) develops the metaphor of the wall to illustrate the above types of religious education. *Behind* the wall is the site for faith formation, where students belong to their religious community and speak a communal language. *At* the wall is the site of interreligious dialogue, where pupils open up to the world and speak a public language. Christiani (2005) adds a third dimension, *beyond* the wall, the site of faith transformation, where people of distinct creeds work together to build justice and peace. In the context of Indonesia, she argues that religious education should take place *behind*, *at*, and *beyond* the wall simultaneously, because faith is not only individualistic experience for the fulfilling of one's soul, but also a social strategy for the improvement of humankind. Suitable pedagogies for this multidimensional religious education are pluralist, inclusive, humanist, student-centered, experience-based, critically reflective, socially active, attentive to problem-solving, engaging the whole school, focused on contextual and empathetic readings of holy texts through the eye of the marginalized (Christiani, 2005; Sunarto et al., 2004).

Intercultural Contact Theory

College years are influential for students' development because they are times of discontinuity, discrepancy, and transition (Gurin, Nagda, & Lopez, 2004). They foster cognitive growth by putting students into new situations involving uncertainty and requiring knowledge. In addition, late adolescence and early adulthood are the unique time when a sense of personal and social identity is formed (Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002). Gurin (2002) suggests that

identity develops best when young people are given a “psychological moratorium”—a time and a place in which they can experiment with social roles before making permanent commitments to an occupation, to intimate relationships, to social and political groups and ideas, and to a philosophy of life (p. 334). Such a moratorium should ideally involve a confrontation with diversity and can be provided by universities. In the latter case, the idea of campuses as moratorium resonates with Pratt’s (1991) imaginary of classrooms as “contact zones”—“social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (p. 1).

Since Allport’s (1954) seminal work on contact theory for reducing prejudice, research has used his framework to explore the conditions and interventions for ideal intercultural interaction (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Adherents to contact hypothesis believe that segregation is a source of ignorance and ignorance is a breeding ground for derogatory stereotypes and racial hostility. Prejudice lessens when members of two hostile groups are forced to cooperate with one another. Contact affects the availability of information and provides counter-examples to stereotypes. In the past five decades, scholars have revisited contact theory in order to examine the frequencies and patterns of intercultural contact at multicultural universities (Gurin et al., 2002; Halualani, 2008; Halualani, Chitgopekarb, Huynh, Morrison, & Dodge, 2004; Nagda & Gurin, 2007; Sorensen, Nagda, Gurin, & Maxwell, 2009).

Universities with greater demographic diversity in their student body have more likelihood that students from different backgrounds will interact with each other, that the

students' opinions will be more variable, the topics of conversation will be more diverse, and that both ingroup and outgroup positive exemplars will exist (Antonio, 2001, 2004; Halualani et al., 2004; Sorensen et al., 2009; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Nevertheless, mere co-existence does not guarantee the educational benefits of diversity. According to Antonio (2001):

[On one hand], higher education leaders typically have embraced the growing diversity of their campuses, asserting that a racially diverse student body is necessary for preparing students to be effective citizens in a multicultural society. Critics of the university, on the other hand, point to reports of increasingly tense racial climates on campus and racial self-segregation among students; they maintain that such racially "balkanized" environments produce students with greater levels of racial intolerance and ethnocentrism than when they entered college. (p. 64)

Students "report a considerable amount of interaction across race and ethnicity, yet they also describe their campus environments as characterized by racial conflict, prejudice, and isolated ethnic enclaves" (Antonio, 2004, p. 554). They verbalize a desire for more experiences with diversity, but actually cluster according to one main dominant trait of commonality: ethnic affinity (Duster, 1991). Ethnicity takes precedence over other dimensions in friendship selection, such as personality traits, interests, attitudes, and values (Antonio, 2004).

Halualani (2004) finds that students generally perceive engaging in intercultural interaction as merely being among or within a demographically diverse campus, and as an event that takes place outside their own personal friendship or social network. In addition, ethnically

diverse students seem to have limited interaction with each other, despite the multicultural university's promotion of plurality. On one side, they may express support for diversity because of the larger societal emphasis on such issue and the need for social approval. On the other side, they are not engaging in actual contact because of the already entrenched ethnic fragmentation (Halualani et al., 2004, p. 369). Intergroup interactions can invoke anxiety or sense of threat (Barna, 1998; Bennett, 1998; Sorensen et al., 2009). Dalton (1991) suggests a number of factors that have contributed to the rise of racial polarization, including: (a) lack of knowledge, experience, and contact with diverse peers; (b) peer-group influence; (c) increased competition and stress; (d) the influence of off-campus groups and the media; (e) changing values; (f) fear of diversity, and (g) the perception of unfair treatment.

Engberg's (2004) study also confirms the existence of racial biases on campus. He defines them as the "systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members" (p. 576). Intergroup bias incorporate four main components: prejudice, stereotypes, affective reactions, and discrimination. Bias can occur unconsciously or intentionally, implicitly or explicitly, at different degree of strength, and at personal and public levels. Allport (1954) approaches prejudice based on six distinct lenses: historical, sociocultural, situational, personal, phenomenological, and stimulus object.

The type, quality, and effectiveness of contact can depend on a variety of elements. Allport and others who have built upon his theory, such as Robinson and Preston (1976) and Chavous (2005), tend to agree that the effects of contact may be either negative or positive,

depending on the nature of the contact situation, the characteristics of the participants, and the types of activity which occur. In particular, interracial contact is most likely to yield favorable results (i.e., reduce prejudice) when participants from different groups are: (a) of equal status; (b) in a voluntary contact situation; (c) pursuing common goals; (d) in meaningful associations with one another; and (e) encouraged by the authorities.

Antonio (2004) identifies four types of friendship: homogeneity as deliberate (survival), diversity as deliberate (common value), homogeneity as incidental, diversity as propinquity. The type of friendship “depends on previous socialization as well as current social context, and can vary as a social construct linked to culture, social position, or intergroup relations” (Antonio, 2004, p. 572). Previous socialization can refer to students’ demographic background, personality characteristics, diversity of pre-college friends, attitudes and values toward cultural diversity. Ellison and Powers (1994), for instance, show that when interracial contact occurs early in life, the likelihood that blacks and whites will develop close friendships is greater. Also, Hallinan and Williams (1989) find that high-school students are one-sixth as likely to choose a cross-race than a same-race peer as a friend. According to this investigation, the effect of reciprocation is the strongest for interracial friendships, followed by same gender, and same academic track.

The majority of the literature agrees that curricular and co-curricular experiences with diverse peers have a crucial role in the success of intercultural contact. Of the 73 studies on intercultural interventions reviewed by Engberg (2004), 52 were positive, 14 were mixed, and seven were nonsignificant. Thus, the overall findings show that multicultural courses (e.g., required diversity courses, non-required diversity courses, ethnic studies, women’s studies),

diversity workshops and trainings, peer-based interventions (e.g., peer-facilitated training, living-learning communities, intergroup dialogue, collaborative learning), and service-based interventions (e.g., service-learning, community service, volunteer work) can decrease student racial bias. For instance, Intergroup Dialogue programs (IGD) are effective in promoting intercultural relationships, understanding, and collaboration (Gurin et al., 2004; Nagda & Gurin, 2007; Sorensen et al., 2009). Similarly, intercultural trainings and courses, like Pratt's (1991) class on "Program in Cultures, Ideas, Values," have positively changed prejudice (Robinson & Preston, 1976).

In addition to these formal interventions, students can benefit from the informal, voluntary or involuntary, interactions that take place between diverse peers outside of class, including rooming, dining, studying, discussing, gathering, participating in student organizations, attending campus events, sharing friendship, dating, and taking time to learn more about others (Antonio, 2001). For over 50 years, empirical studies on contact theory have been consistently showing the positive benefits of interracial interaction (Antonio, 2001, 2004; Chavous, 2005). In the context of American higher education, Gurin (2002) finds that intercultural interaction enhances students' college satisfaction, academic performance, cultural awareness, social self-concept, and postgraduate aspirations. Some of the outcomes are also relevant to the field of community psychology, including intellectual engagement, motivation to think actively about social phenomena, commitment to promoting intercultural understanding, perspective taking, sense of commonality with others, involvement in political affairs, and belief in the power of individuals to change society.

University as a Public Sphere

The approach to universities as contact zones does not only have inter- and intra-personal implications in terms of prejudice; it also relates to the socio-political dimension of universities as public spheres. The notion of public sphere was originally developed by Habermas in reference to the eighteenth-century world of London coffee houses and publishing salons, where middle class men assembled for a reasoned debate over key issues of mutual interest (Crossley & Roberts, 2004). For Habermas, the public sphere mediates between the state and the private realm, which includes both work and home. Over the decades, Habermas's conception of the public sphere has been expanded beyond white male bourgeoisie, in order to include all individuals across races, classes and genders. Public sphere has also become a more fragmented concept, which considers issues of culture and subjectivity.

Cohen and Arato suggest a four sphere schema, which distinguishes among the administrative state, the public sphere, the market economy, and the intimate life (Crossley & Roberts, 2004). The public sphere is also partitioned into two levels:

(a) The level of implicitly known traditions and background assumptions embedded in language and culture, which are drawn upon by individuals in everyday life; (b) the level of three distinct structural components, namely culture, society and personality. Both aspects of the lifeworld are reproduced through the communicative process of cultural transmission, social integration and socialization. (Crossley & Roberts, 2004, p. 13)

Fraser (2007) advances the complexity of the public sphere even further, by arguing that there is no one public sphere but rather a plurality of competing publics, which are unequally tied

to the institutions of decision making. While some public spheres serve the hegemony of the dominant group, others host competing “subaltern counter-publics” namely “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 2007, p. 497).

According to Giroux (1988), universities are public spheres, where both hegemonic and subaltern counter-publics cross. In Giroux’s (1988) words, “schools are anything but ideologically innocent, nor are they simply reproductive of dominant social relations and interests” (p. 168). As a referent of reproduction, universities embody ideological and political interests. With limited autonomy, universities function as a terrain out of which the dominant culture manufactures and legitimates its hegemonic structures. Therefore, universities are manifestations of culture and can be investigated through Bourdieu’s (1979) notion of cultural capital and Foucault’s (1995) concept of power.

Bourdieu (1979) distinguishes among three states of cultural capital (my translation and examples): (a) the embodied state, when social structures become internalized as a natural part of the individual (e.g. behaving by certain school rules); (b) the objectified state, when culture materializes in the form of cultural goods (e.g. textbooks); and (c) the institutionalized state, when objectivity is mediated by institutions, conferring some guarantee of unique properties upon its owner (e.g. college degree). In Bourdieu’s (1979) notion of learning, students absorb the dominant culture not only via the overt official discourse of schools (symbolic mastery), but also through the persuasive messages embodied in the “insignificant” practices of daily campus life.

Foucault (1995) explores the discursive social practices through which external forces of control are internalized. He states that individuals learn to conform to the norms of external surveillance and hence to control themselves. The social meanings of normalcy, for example, force them to try to conform to dominant views of what is a socially acceptable behavior. The modern world is marked by a ubiquitous discourse that serves to “normalize” people and to subordinate them to certain regimes of knowledge and power. Knowledge can no longer be seen as objective, but has to be understood as part of the power relations that not only produce it but also those that benefit from it. In other words, individuals internalize external norms of surveillance and subordinate themselves to regimes of knowledge, which is part of the power relations that create it and benefit from it.

As a referent of resistance, universities host forces that interrupt, interrogate, and ultimately resist standard practices and socially constructed meanings. Giroux (1988) highlights that universities contain points of agency, where ideological and material conditions exist to produce oppositional discourses and practices. Therefore, campuses are places where hegemonic and subaltern counter-publics “constrain each other through an ongoing battle and exchange in response to the sociohistorical conditions ‘carried’ in the institutional, textual, and lived practices that define school culture and teacher/student experiences” (Giroux, 1988, p. 168). University life is a plurality of struggles, wherein students, faculty, and administration impose, negotiate, and resist how educational experiences and practices are named and accomplished.

According to Giroux (1988), the recognition of campuses as sites of both cultural reproduction and resistance interrogates the political nature of the university as both a sphere of

critique and as a medium of social transformation. Universities contain a discourse that combines “the language of critique with the language of possibility” (Giroux, 1988, p. 195). Funded upon a theory of both structure and agency, critical pedagogy calls for transformative intellectuals and authentic pluralism within the day-to-day working of schools:

The role that teachers and administrators might play as transformative intellectuals who develop counterhegemonic pedagogies that not only empower students by giving them the knowledge and social skills they will need to be able to function in the larger society as critical agents, but also educate them for transformative action. That means educating them to take risks, to struggle for institutional change, and to fight for both against oppression and for democracy outside of schools in other oppositional public spheres and the wider social area. (Giroux, 1988, p. xxxiii)

Giroux (1988) detaches the term “intellectual” from its traditional lingering notions of elitism, eccentricity, and manipulation of ideas, and fills it with a commitment to critical engagement. Educators need to legitimate schools as democratic public spheres, which provide an essential service in the construction of active citizens through civic literacy, social participation, and moral courage. Through critical pedagogy, transformative intellectuals challenge existing “regimes of truth” and translate social theory into forms of praxis that contribute to the notions of active citizenry. Such praxis is effective if it takes place more extensively in public, by forming alliances with other oppositional public spheres, popular constituencies, and social groups outside of the limiting contours of the disciplines and academia. To promote this resistance, various pedagogical methods are employed, including

critical literacy, democratic engagement, and authentic pluralism (Hyttén, 1999). The ultimate goal is to provide students with the knowledge and skills they need to navigate and transform the larger status quo. Education should be a democratic, participatory, and transformative experience.

This approach to education takes seriously Gramsci's (1975) notion of all society as a vast school and of "organic intellectuals" who could bridge the gap between academic institutions and everyday life. Gramsci (1975) viewed organic intellectuals as mediators, legitimators, and producers of ideas, social practices, and moral leadership. While Gramsci believed that organic intellectuals had to emerge exclusively from the working class, later interpretations believed that such intellectuals can rise from and work with any number of groups which resist the suffocating knowledge and practices that constitute their social formation.

In his vision of education for social transformation, Giroux (1988) also calls for authentic pluralism, where the demands, cultures, and social relations of diverse groups are recognized:

Difference is not reduced to the possessive individualism of the autonomous subject at the heart of liberal ideology. On the contrary, difference would be grounded in various social groups and public spheres whose unique voices and social practices contain their own principles of validity while simultaneously sharing in a public consciousness and discourse. Central to this form of radical pluralism is a public philosophy that recognizes the boundaries between different groups, the self and others, and yet creates a politics of trust and solidarity that supports a common life based on democratic principles that create

the ideological and institutional preconditions for both diversity and the public good. (p. 172)

This theory considers democracy as an active social movement based upon competing ideological interpretations of social justice, equality, and diversity. It also does not see schools as mere extensions of the workplace, but as forms of critical inquiry that dignify human agency and social responsibility. Viewing universities as democratic public spheres provides a rationale for defending them, ideologically and financially, as essential institutions and practices on the performance of an important public service. Although universities play a significant role in establishing local democracy, they work best in collaboration with other public spheres which act at the state level of government.

The discourse on resistance and critical pedagogy finds in Freire (1970) a pioneering supporter. He suggests that an unfair system of norms and procedures forces individuals to believe that injustice is an inevitable part of human existence. This social myth is not the result of the individual inner self, but of the historical and cultural factors which govern the world where the oppressed and oppressor live in (Freire, 1970; W. Smith, 1976). As a consequence, the oppressed is afraid of embracing freedom, while the oppressor is afraid of losing the freedom to oppress. Freire (1970) proposes a pedagogy for the oppressed, which is designed to liberate both the oppressor and the oppressed from the victimization of the dominant system: “Animated by authentic, humanist (not humanitarian) generosity, the pedagogy of the oppressed presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind” (Freire, 1970, p. 54).

Freire conceptualized *conscientizacao*—a development process of consciousness-raising leading toward liberation for both oppressed and oppressor. This process of social transformation has two key characteristics: a personal self-affirmation and rejection of the oppressor, as well as an active effort to replace the oppressive structure with a just system (W. Smith, 1976). Therefore, in Freire’s vision, liberation is praxis, “the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it” (Freire, 1970, p. 79). If reflection is sacrificed, action becomes isolated activism for action’s sake. If action is sacrificed, reflection becomes verbalism or rhetoric. In praxis, individuals name the roots of a predicament, reflect upon them, and act in the attempt to resolve it.

Smith (1976) created an instrumental definition of *conscientizacao*, a coding system which highlights Freire’s praxis and measures the level of consciousness in an individual. Smith’s model allows to gauge at what stage of *conscientizacao* individuals stands, based on the answers they provides to three existential questions: (a) Naming: what are the problems in this situation? (b) Reflecting: why do these problems exist? (c) Acting: what can be done to change the situation? (W. Smith, 1976, p. 3). This model is relevant for my later analysis because it points out that naming, reflecting, and acting upon a predicament can be about physical behaviors or activities and intellectual positions—the envisioning of strategies that can eradicate marginalization and injustice.

Chapter 3: The Indonesian Context

Regionality, Ethnicity, and Religion

Regionality, ethnicity and religion are deeply intertwined across the archipelago, where *asal* (origin) generally determines *suku bangsa* (ethnicity) and *agama* (religion) (Song, 2008). For instance, Western islands are mostly Muslim; Eastern islands are mainly Christian; the island of Bali is almost exclusively Hindu. This construction ethnicizes religion so that each faith is attached to certain ethnic groups. It also accepts difference within the strict limits of what is perceived as “Indonesian”; the term ethnicity, *suku bangsa*, means “a constituent part of the nation” because ethnic (and ethnicized religious) groups are to be subordinate to the nation-state, Indonesia (Aspinall, 2009; Bigalke, 2007; Martano, 2009).

In terms of provinces, 57.49% of the people live on the island of Java, which includes six of the 33 provinces (i.e., Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, and Banten) (Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics, 2010). Ethnically, Javanese people account for 40% of the population and the other 375 groups encompass smaller percentages (e.g., Sundanese 15.51%, Malay 3.70%, Batak 3.58%, Madurese 3.03%, Betawi 2.88%, Minangkabau 2.73%, Buginese 2.71%, Bantenese 1.96%, Banjarese 1.74%, Balinese 1.66%, Acehnese 1.44%, Dayak 1.36%, Sasak 1.34%, Chinese 1.20%, and all other groups less percentages) (Ananta, 2013). It is important to notice that Chinese Indonesians have been perceived as opposite to *pribumi* (sons and daughters of the soil) or *asli* (indigenous) since the colonial era through geographical, cultural, economic, and constructionist explanations (Heryanto, 1998, 2004, 2008). According to the hierarchy of the time, the Dutch were at the top, the native royalty and prominent Eurasians

below, Chinese businessmen a step lower, and various layers of the indigenous people as the broad base (Reid, 2010; Song, 2008). Currently, Chinese Indonesians' overall economic power still exceeds their number and makes them a prime target of resentment. In May 1998, right after Suharto's resignation, more than 1,000 people, mostly Chinese and Christian minorities, were killed and hundreds of Chinese women were raped.

Recent migration waves across the archipelago have increased the ethnic diversity of the population (Sunarto, 2004). Interinsular settlements and rural-urban mobility have shifted the composition of local communities. For instance, Muslim relocation from Java to Kalimantan, Ambon and Poso has caused fierce economic, political and social frictions and even deadly conflicts (Bertrand, 2004; Sullivan & Lucas, 2001; van Klinken, 1999). The village (*desa*) remains an important social unit, which attempts to maintain its own traditions, customs, and conventions as exclusionary patterns of self-protection (Scott, 2009; Song, 2008; Tsing, 1993). Communities are scattered over 6,000 islands and endless boundaries, including hill-valley, upstream-downstream, inland-sea, and urban-rural.

Since there is no absolute ethnic majority, the absolute religious majority (Muslim adherents) versus minority (non-Muslim adherents) has emerged as the focal identity-marker. The population is spread across Muslim (87.18%), Protestant (6.96%), Catholic (2.91%), Hindu (1.69%), Buddhist (0.72%), and Confucian (0.05%) (Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics, 2010). Indonesia is neither a confessional nor a secular state, but an in-between model of religion-state relationship (Binawan, 2011). The 1945 constitution formalizes both monotheism and indigenous privileges (Heryanto, 2008; Parker & Hoon, 2013); the first rule of the national

ideology *Pancasila* (Five Principles) imposes the belief in one God; by law, citizens must choose one of the six legally accepted religions, whereas all other unofficial faiths are treated as cultural expressions of local communities (Forge, 1980; Said, 2007; Yang, 2005). All Indonesians have to either register as a member of one of the six religions or become part of the “other” category (Hefner, 1985; Kipp & Rodgers, 1987). The religious affiliation is listed on the identity card with overt consequences in daily life. Being atheist is illegal and in 2012 two Indonesian Facebook users were imprisoned for posting atheist and blasphemous messages on their personal pages (Schonhardt, 2013).

At the crossroad of global trades for at least two millenniums, Indonesia has adapted incoming influences to local cultures (Andaya, 1992; Kipp & Rodgers, 1987). World religions and colonizing powers have been influential on Indonesian identities. Hinduism and Buddhism reached Indonesia through Chinese and Indian merchants around the 2nd century. Islam reached Indonesia through traders from Arabia, Persia, India, and China in the 13th century. Catholicism was introduced by the Portuguese in the 16th century and Protestantism spread during the Dutch colonization of 1602-1942. These external forces had the greatest impact on indigenous elites, who were in closest contact with foreign merchants and administrators. New ideas slowly trickled down into subaltern classes, but were always localized into preexisting customs and lost their orthodoxy (Eiseman & Eiseman, 1989; Geertz, 1960). For instance, Hindu *sati* (i.e., a widowed woman commits suicide by fire on the husband’s funeral pyre), Chinese foot binding, and Islamic complete seclusion never existed in Indonesia (Andaya, 2008).

In recent decades, Indonesia has been losing its syncretic openness. Extremist Islamic forces from Saudi Arabia and evangelical missions from the United States have shifted local balances between religion and culture, by imposing purist and exclusivist theologies (De Jong, 2012; Woodward, 2011). The politicization and radicalization of religion fuel tension into the Indonesian social fabric, which is already vulnerable due to political and economic challenges (Christiani, 2005). Java- and Islam-centered policies have especially been condemned, as they impact political representation, economic development, and all fronts of social organization, including the educational system. The inter- and intra-religious delicate dynamics become clearer with a closer analysis of Islam, the majority creed in Indonesia.

Islam

“Indonesia has some of the richest and most diverse traditions in the Islamic world” because of its “historical receptiveness,” according to Fox (2004a, p. 2). In the 13th century, Islam reached Indonesia through traders from both the Middle East and Asia (Ricklefs, 2008). Generations of Muslim Indonesians visited and studied in Mecca, Cairo and other Middle Eastern centers of learning (Fox, 2004a). By the late 18th century, a religious consensus had emerged in Indonesia from Sufism and its blending with local customs. This “mystic synthesis,” was characterized by a strong sense of Islamic identity, observance of the five pillars of the faith, and acceptance of local spiritual forces (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 115). With the arrival of European-style modernity and global Islamic reform, from 1830 to 1930 every element of mystic synthesis came under challenge and Indonesian Islam started to split across evolving divides.

According to Mietzner (2009), the most important of these distinctions refer to *abangan* versus *santri* and traditionalist versus modernist. The terms and precise nature of these oppositions are still in dispute (Frederick & Worden, 1993). Abangan Muslims (also known as adherents of Javanism or Javanese religion, in Indonesian language: *Kejawen, Kebatinan, agama Jawa*) combine Islamic and pre-existing beliefs, such as from Hindu-Buddhism and Animism. Politically, they have voted for secularly oriented parties, such as nationalist, communist, and socialist. In contrast, Santri Muslims adhere strictly to the rituals prescribed by scriptures, especially in the pesantren (Islamic boarding schools, but literally the place of santri). They have supported Islamic parties with demands for Islamic law and state structures.

The second dichotomy is more current and distinguishes the “Old Group” of traditionalists and the “Young Group” of reformists or modernists (Fox, 2004a; Hefner, 2009; Mietzner, 2009; Ricklefs, 2008). Traditionalists generally live in the rural areas of Central and East Java, attend pesantren, and work in lower-class jobs as farmers, small traders, and laborers away from the multiethnic macrocosm of the global economy (Hefner, 2009). They rely on the teachings of the scholars, or *ulama*, of the past (Fox, 2004a; Hefner, 2009). In accordance with the ideas of Sufi teachers, they believe that it is possible to strive for the ideal union with God. All that is not forbidden (*haram*) can be made Islamic and all actions can be made into worship with the right intention. According to Nasr, “everything is essentially sacred and nothing is profane because everything bears within itself the fragrance of the Divine” (cited in Fox, 2004a, p. 8). In Fox’s (2004a) words, “Islamizing the world has more to do with consecrating the world than with transforming it” (p. 9). Thus, traditionalists often blend Islamic and indigenous

practices. These forms of syncretism include chants of Quranic verses and ceremonies at the tombs of local ancestors, Muslim saints, and religious teachers (Fox, 2004a). All these syncretic beliefs and rituals are regarded as blasphemous by reformists. Traditionalists adjust their attitudes towards models of state organization on the basis of what is best for the political interests of the *umat* (members of the community) at that particular point of time.

Reformists or modernists generally live in urban areas of the Outer Islands, attend *madrassa* (Islamic school), belong to the middle and upper class, and work as traders, entrepreneurs, and professionals (Hefner, 2009). Doctrinally, reformists find their sources in Wahabism and other traditions that refer to strict Islamic prescriptions from the Quran and the Sunnah (compendia of the exemplary behavior of the Prophet Muhammad) (Fox, 2004a). They aim to transform the Muslim community and ultimately the world at large; “how radical a transformation is needed depends on how alien or threatening the ways of the world are seen to be” (Fox, 2004a, p. 8). They plan to revive the pristine and eternal truths of Islamic revelation through modern learning (Ricklefs, 2008). They rally to a profession of Islam that is more universal, easily transmitted, separated from any particular place, ethnicity, and custom (Hefner, 2009). They condemn Islamic mysticism and indigenous syncretism as ignorant, superstitious, idolatrous, and deviant from the “true” Islam. Despite many internal variations, the Young Group tends to agree that the state has to be based on the purest Islamic faith.

Great variations exist within and among traditionalists and modernists. On the traditionalist extremist side, radical NU-members have attacked Muhammadiyah institutions in various instances. Since the 1980s, some traditionalists have embraced a “devotional Islam” with

new emphasis on rituals (Fox, 2004a). For example, Abdullah Gymnastiar (known as Aa Gym) founded an Islamic school in Bandung as a “workshop for morality,” where one of the chief devotional practices involved weeping for one’s sins to achieve purity of heart. He has become one of the most popular Islamic preachers in Indonesia, combining various strands of Sufi ideas in a popular revivalist mode. On the traditionalist moderate side, members of Sufi thought emphasize the importance of preserving Indonesian unity and of supporting interfaith harmony and gender equality based on readings of the holy scriptures (Ricklefs, 2008). For instance, the village of Ngruki is well-known for both the violent group *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) as well as a mystical group that brings together Islamic and Christian believers.

On the modernist extremist side, there are leaders who are intolerant of all non-purist forms of Islam, contrary to gender equality, opposed to local culture and mysticism, committed to get rid of any pre-Islamic legacy, including puppet shows (*wayang*), martial arts (*silat*), crop-cycle rituals, and local dances (Ricklefs, 2008). In the middle ground, some organizations present internal contradictions, such as the Quranic Interpretation Council (*Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran*, MTA) and Islam Tauhid, which formally refuse indigenous beliefs but in practice use *wayang*, musical ensemble (*gamelan*), daggers (*kris*), and amulets. Islamic divisions can also split rural villages, for example, when young men decide to embrace “total Islam” and start condemning local beliefs as superstitious heathenism. Around small incidences, tensions can erupt and escalate with the arrival of Islamist militias.

Across both traditionalist and modernist supporters, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis-majelis Ulama*, MUI) can also be an intolerant force. Established in 1975 among

prominent Islamic teachers, MUI gives Islamic rulings (*fatwa*) and advises the government regarding Muslim matters in order to maintain national stability. Since the 1980s, MUI has issued a fatwa in opposition to pluralism, liberalism, and secularism (Gillespie, 2007) as well as against the Muslim sect Ahmadiyah because it declares its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the last prophet, after Prophet Muhammad. MUI asks the government to ban these heretical (*kafir*) forces.

Over the decades, an Islamic umbrella organization has appeared impossible and Islamic parties have proliferated (Mietzner, 2009). Since the early 1900s, the interests of the Old and Young Groups have been represented by two major, and a number of smaller, organizations (Fox, 2004a; Mietzner, 2009; Ricklefs, 2008). The main traditionalist organization is Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Islamic Scholars, NU), which was founded in 1926 to defend the localization of Indonesian Islam and counts 35 million members especially across East and Central Java (Mietzner, 2009). The *ulama* and *kyai* (religious clerics) have traditionally dominated the course of the organization.

The largest modernist organization is Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad), which was established in 1912 to cleanse Indonesian Islam from syncretistic influences and counts around 25 million adherents especially in the Outer Islands (Mietzner, 2009). With members from the urban upper and middle classes, it has gained considerable human and financial resources to develop a wide network of schools, libraries, hospitals, and state bureaucracy. The latest wave of purification resulted from the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and has been disseminating the puritanical Wahabi ideology from Saudi Arabia—a branch of Sunni Islam that

advocates greater orthodoxy and stringency while purging Islam of “impurities” (Bigalke, 2007). The impact of this Islamic revival is apparent in the increasing use of headscarves (*jilbab*) and other signs of outward Islamic piety.

Both Sukarno’s Old Order (1945-1966) and Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998) used inter- and intra-religious divisions as means of political legitimacy. At the time of the independence in 1945, Sukarno with non-Muslims and abangan nationalists opposed santri demand for Islamic law in the constitution. He did not allow dominance by Islam and recognized six official religions by law (Forge, 1980; Yang, 2005). Suharto manipulated religion in his race for power—a tactic that “threatened the most precious of Indonesia’s democratic resources: the depth of tolerance and nationalist pride among citizens of all faith” (Hefner, 2000, p. 19). First, he suppressed both political and cultural Islam, secularizing life practices and preventing Islamic advancement in politics (Hefner, 2000). Later, he encouraged cultural Islam, for instance by supporting Islamic mosques, banks, universities, and pilgrimages to Mecca. In 1978, laws against proselytization and missionary activities targeted Christians. Public initiatives penalized marginal Muslim communities, including the restriction of Ahmadiyah in 1989, after the MUI fatwa. Radical clerics and activists developed ties with central figures of the regime, in particular around Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto (Mietzner, 2009). The NU and Muhammadiyah’s involvement in authoritative regime in exchange for political concessions signaled that political representation was a priority over commitment to non-violence, democracy, and fair settling of societal disputes.

In 1998, with the opening of the Reformation era, “the advent of post-Suharto democracy, coupled with the impact of the South-East Asian economic collapse in 1997, and the arrival of a tough new breed of Middle Eastern Islamic preachers, sowed the seeds of new challenges to Indonesia’s moderate Islam” (Duff, 2002, 25 October). In the name of democracy, a political space has been allowed for ethnic and religious communities to organize and mobilize. According to Mietzner (2009):

All major Islamic groups decided that they had to engage in party politics, whether in direct or indirect manner. Some of them chose to use Islam as their ideological foundation, while others increased the emphasis on their Islamic identity but retained Pancasila as an over-arching principle. Most significantly, however, almost all major Muslim leaders opted to establish separate parties that appealed to their core constituencies rather than to an electorate spanning religious and ideological boundaries. [...] The ideological and political fragmentation within the Muslim community, which had stretched from the colonial period to the final days of the New Order, was about to extend into the new political system. (p. 254)

The 1999s regional autonomy act prompted the search for cultural roots and the rebirth of traditional institutions that were previously eliminated in the homogenizing policy of the New Order. Sharia law has been adopted in Aceh fully and in several townships across Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi to cover both criminal and family rules (Bertrand, 2004; Conte, 2006; Sullivan & Lucas, 2001).

New international linkages have fueled modernist views. Saudi-inspired Salafism aims to implement a strict and putatively literalist interpretation of the Sharia in personal life (Hefner, 2009). Dakwah movement (also known as Tarbiyah or Salman Mosque) obeys the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fox, 2004a). The “Pamphlet Islam” refers to anonymous publications that tend to be anti-Western, anti-capitalist, and anti-all-foreign-ideas that taint contemporary Muslim culture (Fox, 2004a). Pamphlets that are translations from the Arabic and come from the Middle East are generally accorded a certain authority, even when the publisher is unknown.

Investigations on the bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 as well as in Jakarta in 2003, 2004, and 2009 pointed to connections between Indonesian terrorist cells like *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) and the worldwide Al-Qaeda (Mulyadi, 2003).

In addition to JI, a variety of Islamic organizations with militia auxiliary have emerged, including the anti-vice militia Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) and the paramilitary group *Laskar Jihad* (Fox, 2004a; Mulyadi, 2003; Ricklefs, 2008). These *mujahidin* (defenders of the faith) advocate the implementation of Sharia law, the reconstitution of the caliphate, and the restoration of the prestige of the Muslim community by all means (Fox, 2004a). They trace back to *Darul Islam* (House of Islam), which operated from the mid-1950s to 1962 and promoted a militant *jihād* (holy war) against perceived enemies of Islam (Fox, 2004a; Ricklefs, 2008). Founded in 1998, FPI has fought against immorality, by raiding on cinemas, restaurants, discos, prostitution venues, and areas with alcohol. It recruits most of its militia from unemployed urban masses. Established in 2000, Laskar Jihad trained, armed, and shipped to Ambon, Maluku and Poso thousands of warriors to fight against local Christians. Ward (2008)

argues that these movements survive because of their enduring family links of *jihadis*, secretive stratagems, and ability to spread extremist thinking and pass on skills through committed individuals.

Since 2010, cases of religious violence in Indonesia have increased by 20%, including 264 documented attacks in 2012 alone, mainly by Islamic Sunni hard-liners against Christian, Ahmadi, and Shia communities (Human Rights Watch, 2013). After the Bali bombing of 2002, Islamic schools have been accused of serving as a fertile terrain for radicalization, because the terrorist leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the founder of Pondok Ngruki Pesantren in Java (International Crisis Group, 2002). Weak institutions, including the executive and judicial branches of government, play a key role in allowing a small number of radicals to paralyze the country.

After 2004, despite their intra-religious differences, Islamic groups have been able to consolidate their power and influence political affairs to their advantage (Ricklefs, 2008). Within the government, stringent interpretations of Islam infuse regulations on gambling, media, marriage, and worship (Binawan, 2011). For example, the 2008 Anti-Pornography Law outlawed any “man-made sexual materials in the form of drawings, sketches, illustrations, photographs, text, voice, sound, moving pictures, animation, cartoons, poetry, conversations and gestures” (Gelling, 2008, October 30 ; Tedjasukmana, 2008, November 6). Public kissing as well as dresses or performances which “incite sexual desire” can be prosecuted under the new law. Anyone caught “displaying nudity” in public could spend up to 10 years in prison and be fined up to \$500,000. Downloading pornography from the internet could net up to four years in prison.

The Islamization in the public domain and the overall governmental inaction towards violence across the country threaten the fabric of the Indonesian nation. The Indonesian rock star Nazril “Ariel” Irham was sentenced to three and a half years in jail after several homemade sex tapes found their way onto the internet (retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/31/indonesian-singer-jailed-sex-tapes>).

Today, Indonesia has the largest Muslim community in the world, with 87.18% of its population, an estimated 207 million people, identifying themselves as followers of Islam (Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics, 2010). Almost all Muslims are Sunni and adhere to the five pillars of faith (i.e., the declaration of faith, the five daily prayers, fasting during Ramadan, paying alms, and undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca) (Fealy & White, 2008). Islam shapes their daily lives in many ways, including spiritually, economically, politically and culturally. Nevertheless, Indonesian Islam is a heterogeneous force with different practices, doctrinal beliefs, political viewpoints, and regional variations. In Fealy and White’s (2008) words:

Some don traditional Islamic dress, buy only *halal* products, put their money in Sharia bank accounts, log on to Islamic websites, observe voluntary prayers and engage in charitable work for Islamic foundations. Others wear Western-style clothing or the latest Muslim fashions, watch television broadcasts of their favorite preachers, take part in mass religious ceremonies, make pilgrimages to the burial sites of Islamic saints and buy Islamic art to display in their homes and workplaces. Some activists seek to strengthen the role of Islam in the state and society through laws and regulations and place great emphasis on the need to guard Islamic morality in a time of cultural disruption and

materialism. Others are less concerned with outer manifestations of faith and engage instead in intellectual discourse, challenging traditional interpretations of Islamic teachings and interacting not just with other Muslims but with critical Western thought as well. All of these aspects, and many more besides, make up the contemporary landscape of Islam in Indonesia today. (pp. 2-3)

According to Ricklefs (2008), the current public discourse on Indonesian Islam is articulated along the radical-liberal and extremist-moderate binaries. On one hand, there is an “increasing strength and influence of an Islam that is puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of other cultures and faiths, rejecting of local culture, opposed to mysticism, hoping to impose its version of Islam from the top down, and assertive or even willing to use violence” (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 133). On the other hand, there are “people and organizations that are liberal in their interpretations, supportive of gender equality, supportive of multiculturalism and welcoming of other faiths, valuing local culture, accepting of mysticism, politically disinterested and peaceful in their approach” (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 133). Yet, this dualism is too simplistic and the reality on the ground is one of much “complexity, confused and confusing” (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 133).

Ricklefs (2008) differentiates Islamic movements in Indonesia based on (a) basic theology, (b) interpretation of that theology, (c) attitude towards women, (d) attitudes towards indigenous culture, (e) attitude towards mysticism, (f) attitudes towards other religions, (g) political posture, and (h) modus operandi (Ricklefs, 2008, p. 123). Along these parameters, multiple combinations and permutations of Islam exist.

Indonesia continues to share greater similarities with its Southeast Asian neighbors than with other Islamic societies (Andaya, 2008). According to Azra (2002) and Hefner (2002), Indonesian Islam presents a variety of observances and tends to be compatible with democracy, because of its slow penetration over centuries, its accommodation to local customs, and its embedment into a flexible social fabric like Indonesia. Recent polls confirm that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are moderate in their beliefs and do not support the Sharia law in Indonesia (Hefner & Azra, 2002). While the vast majority of Indonesian people are undoubtedly hostile to the radical agenda of some Islamists, some analysts warn that too harsh a crackdown can threaten those very values of free speech and tolerance that underpin a democracy (2002, 25 October).

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is the official national motto of Indonesia (Farisi, 2014). The phrase is Old Javanese and loosely translates as “Unity in Diversity.” It is a quotation from a poem by Mpu Tantular during the Majapahit Empire in the 14th century, when tensions had risen between the two religions of the time, Hinduism and Buddhism. This poem promotes reconciliation between the two parties:

It is said that the well-known Buddha and Shiva are two different substances.

They are indeed different, yet how is it possible to recognize their difference in a glance, since the truth of Jina (Buddha) and the truth of Shiva is one.

They are indeed different, but they are of the same kind, as there is no duality in Truth.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is inscribed in the Indonesian national symbol, Garuda Pancasila, which was designed by Sultan Hamid II from Pontianak in Kalimantan and was adopted as the national emblem in 1950. The Garuda is the carrier or of Lord Vishnu and appears in many ancient Hindu-Buddhist temples in Indonesia, such as Mendut, Borobudur, and Prambanan. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is also mentioned in Article 36A of the Constitution of Indonesia, “The national coat of arms shall be the Pancasila eagle (Garuda Pancasila) with the motto Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika).”

The motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika should be understood within the context of constructing and maintaining a one nation-state in such a diverse context. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika reflects the aspirations of the state’s founders to build a sense of one nation in the newly born, post-colonial, independent Republic of Indonesia. It captures the essence of the anti-colonial spirit “united we stand, divided we fall” as well as the post-colonial national philosophy known as Pancasila, which I will discuss later. It calls for unity as the only option for the archipelago to break away from the colonial legacy and to survive in the increasingly globalized world. It also recognizes the internal challenges to create nationhood across the differences in the archipelago.

In 1928, at the Youth Congress, various regional, ethnic, and religious student groups subscribed to an oath of unity (*Sumpah Pemuda*) later celebrated as the defining moment of Indonesian identity: one homeland (*Indonesia*), one nation (*bangsa Indonesia*), and one language (*bahasa Indonesia*). According to Reid (2010), the first two represented “the classic tool-kit of anti-imperial nationalism in claiming the imperial unit as their own (Reid, 2010, p. 25). Yet, the last one was a unique post-colonial choice for Indonesia. The founders of the new nation chose

neither a local language (e.g., Javanese, which was mother tongue to almost half the Indonesian population, but unknown to most others and difficult to learn) nor the colonial language (i.e., Dutch, which was spoken by the Indonesian elite, but considered the oppressor's language) to become the national language. Instead, they selected the *lingua franca* of trade, Malay, which was mother tongue to a small minority of islanders, but understood in all the cities and easy to learn. Malay was adopted as the Indonesian language, a neutral language, free from any communal and colonial ties.

With independence in 1945, the founders of Indonesia obtained the former Dutch-held territories and a few Portuguese colonies in the East side of the archipelago. The newly-formed Indonesian state nationalism inherited two potent lineages of past rulers: "One was that of the state as a supernatural source of power, awe, fear and belonging" and the other one was the imperial lineage of the state "as an essentially alien but necessary construct, which opened doors to a broader modernity than would otherwise be possible" (Reid, 2010, p. 26). This double lineage created genuine new imagined communities, which outlasted most instances of ethnic nationalism. Even ethnic groups with strong and recent memories of proudly independent states, like Aceh and Bali, were passionately caught up in the unitary ideal as a means of overthrowing Dutch rule. The new state built heroic myths of revolution, such as the flag and national martyrs.

The national philosophy of the Pancasila was formulated by the 62 representatives of the main ethnic groups of Java and Madura, who participated in the Investing Committee for the Preparation of Independence a few months before Indonesian independence in August 1945 (Song, 2008). All educated within the Dutch system, the "founding fathers" of Indonesia brought

together Western, Eastern, and Javanese ideas. The incoming president, Sukarno, was the prime politician involved in the conceptualization of the Pancasila and guided the legal process to have it formally selected as the national philosophy of Indonesia.

The term Pancasila is a combination of the Sanskrit words five (*panca*) and principles (*sila*). By evoking the ancient past with its influence from India, Indonesian leaders attempt to transcend differences and to create a mystical aura around their posts as rulers. The five principles of the Pancasila (i.e., belief in one supreme God, internationalism or humanitarianism, national unity, democracy based on deliberation as well as consensus, and social justice) are included in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution:

The independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall be built into a sovereign state based on a belief in the One and Only God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and democratic life led by wisdom of thoughts in deliberation amongst representatives of the people, and achieving social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

These five principles are vaguely described by the founders and differently applied by distinct governments.

First, belief in one supreme God was formulated as the last principle of the Pancasila, but became the opening one to accommodate some Muslim demands. It proclaims that Indonesia is neither secular nor theocratic, but a religious state based on no particular faith. It acknowledges that the state is tolerant of religious diversity, but imposes monotheism and prepares to intervene in religious matters. This principle is formalized in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution: “The

state is based on the belief in one, supreme God” and “the state guarantees freedom of every resident to adhere to his/her respective religion and perform religious duties in conformity with his/her religion and faith.” Second, humanitarianism or internationalism refers to a fair treatment of others, including foreigners and foreign countries, by both Indonesian citizens and the Indonesian state. This principle is also a rejection of foreign imperialism and an assurance that Indonesian citizens are sovereign human beings. Third, national unity was proposed by Sukarno as the first principle as he recognized the priority of creating a sense of one nation across regional, ethnic, and religious divides. According to Hefner (1987), this principle reflects the postcolonial nationalist idea that “primordial ties of kinship, language, ethnicity, and religion would gradually give away to a more encompassing sense of national political community and expanded civic sense,” which “would be paralleled by the development of economic, educational, and even religious institutions similarly premised on a broader, more socially accommodative, and self-consciously sustained concept of community” (p. 491). Fourth, the principle of democracy is a resolution to solve internal conflicts within ethnic and religious groups. Through consultation and consensus, decisions should be reached after all participants have had the chance to present their opinions and unanimously agree on a consensual harmonious decision. Finally, the social justice principle aims to achieve fair distribution among groups, to shrink social gaps, and to prevent possible conflicts. Hefner (2001) explains the importance of social justice in a highly pluralistic society:

[W]hen the market works in such a manner as to distribute its benefits evenly across cultural divides, it can reinforce democratic ideals of civic harmony and citizenship.

However, when market processes concentrate wealth and power in the hands of one ethnic, religious, or other cultural segment, they are just as likely to exacerbate tensions and undermine the civic accommodations on which long-term prosperity depends. Any effort to understand the new face of ethno religious pluralism [...] then [...] must assess the impact of market-making and nation-building on existing and emerging social divisions. (p. 8)

Over the decades, the Pancasila, along with its attached motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, has been criticized both conceptually and practically (Song, 2008). Social scientists view it as an odd mixture of individualistic Western concepts and communalistic Eastern values, which are incompatible in practice. Economists find that capitalist market mechanism and a socialistic moral economy are irreconcilable. Many intellectuals point out that the Pancasila can be recklessly interpreted without a formal standard and is destined to remain a national symbol rather than a guiding principle. The hope of achieving harmony across ethnically and religiously sensitive divisions has been seen as too rosy. Conflicting interests are difficult to negotiate, including the ever-lasting dilemma between guaranteeing religious freedom and keeping religious harmony. The Pancasila has been condemned as an empty slogan, and a euphemistic disguise for authoritarianism and corruption. Pancasila-based initiatives, like indoctrination courses, have been especially attacked as state's brainwashing strategies and manipulations. Radical Muslim organizations criticize the absence of Islam and the inclusiveness of all monotheist religions in the Pancasila. By contrast, secular groups advocate a separation of

religion from politics, equal treatment of all citizens, and no religious privileges. Therefore, neither group is satisfied with the vague position of the Pancasila.

On the ground, attempts to implement the concepts of the Pancasila have also seemed unrealistic and unattainable. Sukarno's initial Parliamentary Era (1949-1958) of liberal democracy and economy failed, because of economic difficulties and political chaos. Parties, for instance, were often factionalized along ethnic and religious lines, hostile to one another, internally corrupted, and unable to find agreement on public matters. Therefore, in his Guided Democracy Era (1959-1965), Sukarno shifted to a family state model of strong government, socialistic economic approach, and deideologized political parties; it also failed. In name of the Pancasila, Suharto's New Order suppressed civil society, labor organizations, and political rivals, while consolidating corporatism, the military, and its power. The government emphasized the moral character of the Pancasila to cope with the public criticism of its corruption and to show that it cared about social justice (Bresnan, 1993; Watson, 1987). During the post-Suharto era (1998-present), liberal democracy has also failed to provide a perfect apparatus for dealing with diversity, as the Muslim majority has imposed pro-Islam initiatives against the will of non-Muslim and moderate-Muslim minorities.

The constant return to the Pancasila and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* over the decades indicates that the Indonesian masses find value and meaning in them (Anggraeni, 2011, September 30; Darmaputera, 1982; Intan, 2006; Lattu, 2011, September 30; Magnis-Suseno, 2004, December 30, 2011, June 1; Nugroho, 2009, September 30; Song, 2008). Most Indonesian people believe that the Pancasila is a constructive system and effective mechanism for balancing the interests of

a diverse society. They see the Pancasila as a panacea to ethnic, religious, and regional differences for the maintenance of an independent state. In the Indonesia public discourse, the Pancasila remains the correct idea, whereas its incorrect applications are the problem. Non-Muslims and moderate-Muslims support the Pancasila stand against special Islamic privileges in society, because such favoritism for majority groups would be destructive to Indonesian democracy (Hefner, 2000). They seek to modernize Islam so it can flourish within the context of cultural diversity, religious harmony, and social equality. Moderate Muslim leaders, for instance, often say that without the Pancasila, Indonesia would cease to be a state and that Pancasila is a political compromise which allows all Indonesian people to live together in a national unitary state (The Jakarta Post, 2011, June 2).

Various research institutes and notable scholars have continued to formulate possible guidelines and implementations of the Pancasila, including at the Economy Center of Pancasila at UGM, which was established in 2002 (Song, 2008). In 2006, the Indonesian Survey Circle (*Lingkaran Survei Indonesia*, LSI) released the result of its survey of how Indonesian people felt about the necessity of the Pancasila (Song, 2008). Sixty-nine percent of the respondents favored an Indonesian society based on the Pancasila. In the same year, a symposium entitled “Restoration of Pancasila: Reconciliation of Politics of Identity and Modernity” was held at the University of Indonesia on how to revive the Pancasila and to make it a viable mechanism for resolving the ethnic and religious polarization, radicalization, and exclusivism. Unlike past leaders who had asserted a strong role of the state, the presenters suggested a greater participation by the civil society in the implementation of the Pancasila, including dialogue

among groups, moral education, and interactive policies. Together with Pancasila, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is seen as the only possible path to peace. As one of the student interviewees said, “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is not just a term, a theory, or motto. But how to make it work in reality?”

Culturally, Budianta (2004) argues that Indonesia has adopted an accommodative form of multiculturalism, meaning that the Javanese Muslim culture remains dominant but makes some provisions for the needs of minority groups. She evokes the *gado-gado* metaphor used by the novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, which refers to a dish that retain the textures and flavors of various mixed vegetables, but with the peanut sauce as one strong uniting element. In practice, the *gado-gado* or “salad bowl” paradigm only allows tokenistic acknowledgements of the diversity of cultures and does not change the Javanese Muslim orientation of the Indonesian culture. An example that will turn useful for my study is the Javanese custom of *gotong royong* (mutual assistance or pitching in), which has been exported to all other islands in the form of volunteering harmoniously together for the common good (Bowen, 1986). It is one of the many cases of Indonesian constructs that are depicted as “national culture.”

Budianta (2004) also views Indonesia as a case of “selected multiculturalism,” where political structures determine areas of inclusion and exclusion within intergroup relations (p. 30). She adds that “group exclusivism and primordialism result from such identity politics, a move towards essentialism and monocultural perspective that are actually the antithesis of the basic tenets of multiculturalism” and worsen rather than improve social relations (p. 26). Since 1998, multiculturalism has become “a panacea for all the ills and complex problems of a diverse

population, or a rosy blanket term to cover them” (Budianta, 2004, p. 22). As noticed by Heryanto (2006), the usage of the word multiculturalism in Indonesia has often betrayed double-faced racism, Chauvinism and fundamentalism.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in Higher Education

In this politicized context, the university is entrenched with ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. Prior to contact with external influences, no institute of higher education existed in Indonesia (Buchori & Malik, 2004). By the 7th century, Hindu and Buddhist monasteries offered monks access to basic literacy and religious knowledge. Once Islam arrived in the 13th century, advanced teaching for notable men started to be recorded in the pesantren, predominately located in the island of Java (Latief, 2003). Schools were not part of a structured system and were autonomous with respect to curriculum and organization. Usually, after learning the Quran and the Arabic language, a few male students proceeded with further religious specialization directly under a *kyai*. Graduates either created their own pesantren or pursued additional training in the Middle East, such as at al-Azhar University in Cairo, where they were admitted to the postgraduate level. Returning students often became *ulama* who produced internationally renowned works.

In the colonial era, the Dutch established the first formal and official universities in Java, according to current cannons of organization and pedagogy. The medical school and law school in Batavia (current Jakarta), the engineering institute in Bandung, and the agriculture center in Bogor aimed to provide public and private administrations with necessary manpower—especially during World War I when the colony faced a shortage of Dutch experts. The small

student bodies in these institutions of higher education reflected the colonial hierarchy, with the Dutch at the top and the indigenous people at the bottom. Dutch was the exclusive language of instruction and served as an effective means of selection of notables across the thin numbers of high school graduates.

According to Alisjahbana (1966), colonial universities were “an arena for a tragic social and cultural conflict” (p. 26). On one hand, indigenous people increasingly attached more value to education, because it appeared as the only chance to climb the colonial hierarchy towards a higher social milieu, better job, and further respect in their local communities. On the other hand, they feared that the Dutch schools could manipulate their children, with consequential loss of their traditions and stability. Indeed, Alisjahbana’s accounts show that the new ontology and epistemology changed local life, but also unintentionally created the advocates for an independent Indonesia, including the first President of Indonesia Sukarno.

In 1930, 106 university students were children of Indonesian parents (Buchori & Malik, 2004) and, in 1938, their number rose to 200 out of the total 1,000 students (Cummings & Kasenda, 1989). After 1945, secular and religious universities were formally established as a reflection of the spirit of independence (Nizam, 2006). The first official Islamic university (Universitas Islam Indonesia) was founded in 1945. The first Indonesian secular university with no colonial legacy (UGM) was created in 1949 (Buchori & Malik, 2004). Up to this day, religion-based universities fall under the Ministry of Religion, whereas secular universities fall under the Ministry of Education (Asari, 2007; Lukens-Bull, 2001; Pohl, 2006; Saeed, 1999).

The 1945 Constitution dedicates articles 31 and 32 to education. Article 31 stipulates the rights and duties for both citizens and state, including an emphasis on growth of individuals' morality and national well-being:

1. Every citizen has the right to receive education.
2. Every citizen has the obligation to undertake basic education, and the government has the obligation to fund this.
3. The government shall manage and organize one system of national education, which shall increase the level of spiritual belief, devoutness and moral character in the context of developing the life of the nation and shall be regulated by law.
4. The state shall prioritize the budget for education to a minimum of 20% of the State Budget and of the Regional Budgets to fulfill the needs of implementation of national education.
5. The government shall advance science and technology with the highest respect for religious values and national unity for the advancement of civilization and prosperity of humankind.

Article 32 protects local cultures:

1. The State shall advance the national culture of Indonesia among the civilizations of the world by assuring the freedom of society to preserve and to develop cultural values.
2. The State shall respect and preserve local languages as national cultural treasures.

Indonesian higher education has made remarkable advancements in its relatively young life (Aanenson, 1979; Muhaimin, 1987; Rais, 1987). Indonesia currently has one of the largest higher education systems in the world, with over 2,800 institutions serving four million students (Jackson & Bahrissalim, 2007). Of the total institutions, approximately 95% are private and enroll 60% of the total students, 16% are Islamic and enroll 11% of the total students (Buchori & Malik, 2004; Jackson & Bahrissalim, 2007). In 70 years of history, the number of university students has increased from 200 in 1938 (Cummings & Kasenda, 1989) to 6,233,984 in 2012 (UNESCO, 2012). Every year, more than 450,000 high school graduates take the national public university entrance examination to compete for 75,000 seats (Nizam, 2006). Recognizing that education leads to better employment opportunities, parents and youth value it as an avenue to social mobility and economic gains (Nizam, 2006; Oey-Gardiner & Suprpto, 1996). Accessible education, in terms of proximity and cost, is essential to guarantee equal access (Buchori & Malik, 2004).

The massification of higher education has brought tremendous challenges in providing adequate quality of teaching, material, and facilities for its diverse student body (Mason, Arnove, & Sutton, 2001; Tadjudin, 2009; Welch, 2007, 2011). Qualified faculty, technology-based research, and scientific equipment demand a budget and organization that is rarely available in the existing public universities and virtually unthinkable in the underfunded private institutions (Buchori & Malik, 2004; Nizam, 2006). Less than 21% of its college-age population is enrolled in higher education and 74% of all Indonesian college students are clustered on the island of

Java, where the majority of universities and all premier institutions are concentrated (Buchori & Malik, 2004; Nizam, 2006).

In regard to content subject knowledge, I want to draw attention to the courses that are relevant for diversity, namely civic and religious education. In 1959, Sukarno launched the first indoctrination courses among students at the secondary and tertiary levels as well as among public employees (Douglas, 1970). The objective was to build one civic nationalism across the archipelago, which could transcend communal divisions among ethnic and religious groups (Nishimura, 1995). At the university, every semester students had to enroll in a mandatory course on the Pancasila and the government. They studied various textbooks of civic education: “Under the Revolutionary Flag” (a collection of Sukarno’s essays and speeches), two volumes of “Documents on the Preparation of the 1945 Constitution, Man and the New Indonesian Society,” and the 850-page volume “Seven Basic Indoctrination Materials” (Song, 2008). The Ministry of Education and Culture was responsible for the design of the curricula and resources. In addition, Watson (1987) observed:

On various occasions, the whole campus of a university was assembled to hear speeches of political importance. [Students] were also obliged to do military training, and in that forum they received instruction on international relations, their patriotic fervor being stimulated by various anti-Western jingles which they sang with relish on their marches and exercise. Once a week they had to assemble for a flag raising ceremony when again a consciousness of pride in the nation was stressed. (p. 32)

The Higher Education Law of 1961 stated that the purpose of education was to build a society that embodied the spirit of the Pancasila, through Five Principles of Education (*Panca Wardhana*)—moral, intellectual, emotional-artistic, handicraft, and physical development. The material stated that people who opposed the direction of the government were hypocrites (*munafik*). Ideological freedom was restricted on and off-campus life; the press was censored; and free interpretations of the Pancasila were banned to avoid contradictory meanings and chaotic situations. The three higher education objectives are still in effect today: teaching, research and community (Buchori & Malik, 2004). Known as *Tri Dharma* (three teachings in Sanskrit), this model implies that the advancement of knowledge should be accompanied by character development and benefit Indonesia as a whole (Wahyuningsih, 2000). Thus, multiplicity is supported as long as is compatible with national unity.

The New Order brought previous attempts of cultural imposition to a much higher level (Nishimura, 1995). The ultimate goal was to create new Indonesian citizens or a Pancasila People (*Manusia Pancasila*), who were obedient to hierarchy, devoted to national development, and depoliticized (Muhaimin, 1987; Rais, 1987; Song, 2008). Anti-Pancasila statements could be charged with the crime of subversion. At a symposium in 1974 at UGM, Suharto invited professors, lecturers, and researchers from various universities and ad hoc institutes to conceptualize a single interpretation of the Pancasila as a clear life guide for the people. Yet, interpretations were not consistent with one another, so Suharto gave up producing the single exegesis. He moved ahead by creating a far-reaching heavy indoctrination plan, which included compulsory courses in the school, at the universities, and in the community.

Starting in 1978, Suharto created several new bodies in charge of indoctrination, including the Supervisory Body for the Implementation of the Guide to the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila or BP-7, which was made of high ranking members, such as Panggabean (Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security), Soedharmono (Minister Secretary of State), Daoud Joesoef (Minister of Education and Culture), and Padmo Wahyono (law professor at the University of Indonesia). *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was printed in textbooks and became the central theme of the indoctrination training (Budianta, 2004). All educational materials were controlled directly from Jakarta, were written from the urban Java-centric perspective, benefited urban Javanese students, and left no room for dialogue on diversity. In 1984, censorship was issued on four sensitive areas known as SARA, namely ethnicity (*suku*), religion (*agama*), race (*ras*), or class (*antar-golongan*) (Heryanto, 2008). Schooling was used as an instrument for total assimilation of Indonesian people of Chinese descent into Indonesian mainstream culture, while the government attempted to erase all things Chinese (e.g., schools, organizations, media, languages, celebrations) (Heryanto, 2008; Pelly, 2004).

In 1979, the indoctrination courses began on civics, morality, history of national struggle, the 1945 Constitution, and guidelines of state policy. A Guide to the Realization and Implementation of the Pancasila or P4 was provided to university students and was preceded by Pancasila Moral Education or PMP, which was taught across elementary, secondary and tertiary schools. The P4 course also aimed at the entire adult population, starting with educating centers, down to local villages, new immigration settlements (e.g., Javanese in the Poso area of Sulawesi), and especially regions with a strong independence fervor (e.g., Aceh and former East

Timor—now independent Timor Leste). The P4 and PMP materials included guidelines for the daily lives of the Indonesian people, such as thirty-six behavioral codes in line with the Pancasila. For instance, the third principle, “unity of Indonesia,” was made up of five values: (a) placing the unity, integrity, safety and interests of the nation and state over individual and group interests; (b) being willing to sacrifice for the interests of the nation and state; (c) loving homeland and nation; (d) being proud to be Indonesian and possessing Indonesia as a homeland; and (e) preserving friendship to maintain the nation’s unity in diversity (Song, 2008).

In response to public criticism against ineffective teaching, more classroom discussion was introduced and new strategies were designed, including Pancasila cultural festivals, Pancasila song festival, and Pancasila quiz competitions. To improve teaching, the BP-7 made available further trainings, an association, and Ethics Code for P4 instructors. Through a top-down strategy, the government controlled all university’s curricula, funding, decision-making, staff selection, and professional development. Elected student councils were banned and civic education classes “became a form of ideological indoctrination through which the government suppressed critical thinking, restricted the exchange of ideas, and ultimately impoverished its own understanding of social dynamics” (Kraince, 2007, p. 347).

Yet, the indoctrination failed because the compulsory courses were abstract, vague, superficial, tedious, static, and based on memorization. The public was especially aware of the discrepancy between the theory of the Pancasila and the practice of governmental corruption. The government did not persuade students as to why and what they were being educated about. Most instructors were not prepared and did not allow any space for discussion. Bresnan (1993)

noted that the indoctrination programs, which Indonesian people had to take part throughout their lives induced resentment against the word Pancasila. College students objected to the undemocratic dictatorship and the inability to carry on free dialogues on socio-political matters. In 1998, they took the street for a mass protest, which played a pivotal role in President Suharto's resignation (Altbach, 1999; Goastellec, 2004; Heryanto, 1996).

It is also important to notice that during the Suharto regime, State Institutes of Islamic Studies increased in number and their status became equivalent to that of secular state universities (Hefner, 2000). Under Muslim pressure, the headscarf was allowed and even promoted in public schools. Religious education became compulsory from kindergarten to college, but students could only study their own religion. Even today, students continue not to be allowed to attend a religion class that is different from their own creed, so schools and universities are required to provide religious teachers in accordance with pupils' faith (e.g., Hindu lessons by Hindu teachers for Hindu students) (Parker, 2010). Freedom in curriculum design is substantial because the government provides no clear guidelines about religious education and excludes it from national examinations (Parker, 2010).

With the opening of the post-Suharto era, all Pancasila-related legal ordinances and institutions were abolished. Amendments to the Constitution introduced certain articles on human rights, which guarantee the right of freedom, cultural identity, and traditional communities, as well as protection from discrimination (e.g., based on ethnicity, religion, language, gender). Such recognition is reinforced in the 1999 Law No. 3 concerning human rights. With the recent revival of the Pancasila, a new Civic Education curriculum was

established in 2004 (Song, 2008). It focuses on government, constitution, democratic institutions, rule of law, rights and responsibilities of citizens, the process of democracy, active participation in civil society, political system, public administration, legal system, social justice, socio-culture, environment, human rights and civil society. The theme of living in harmony in a plural society is emphasized through the discourse of democracy and human rights rather than a discourse on the Pancasila. In addition, the material suggests that the religious and ethnic conflicts should be resolved through establishing a tradition of mutual respect and positive recognition among societal groups. The history section in the new civic education was also changed, losing the binary of order and disorder.

Indonesian scholars have also started to examine multicultural education as an instrument to teach ethics through the values of tolerance, democracy, plurality and civil society (Sunarto et al., 2004). They tend to agree that multicultural education is a necessity in their diverse country, but it is still a discourse in its early stages and attached to Western experiments (Sunarto et al., 2004). Various conceptual and pedagogical initiatives show the attempts by the Indonesian state and universities to ensure both differentiated and united learning experiences, including the constitutional right to an education for all and call for moral character as well as *Tri Dharma*. Some history projects are now being conducted by civil society as well as by the government to rewrite Indonesian history towards a more multicultural collective memory, which includes different perspectives of the past, gives room to acknowledge contributions by groups that were marginalized in historical accounts, finds a space for healing intergroup traumas (Adam, 2003). In Indonesia, the academe and the civil society work closely together. On one hand, a large

number of civil society organizations have been providing services to support multicultural programs (Sunarto, 2004). On the other hand, universities organize trainings, workshops, and seminars involving a broad network of educators and community leaders. These partnerships are an attempt to bridge formal and informal education, as the two sides of the coin of multicultural education (Sada, 2004).

According to Sunarto (2004), university professors tend to have a relatively higher freedom and capacity to initiate educational innovations, both pedagogically and financially. Courses on multiculturalism using the critical perspective of cultural studies have been taught in Indonesian universities in a more sophisticated manner than in primary and secondary schools. For instance, Budianta (2004) teaches undergraduate courses in diversity at the University of Indonesia, where students discuss the difficulties in unlearning cultural biases and intergroup prejudices that are nurtured at home, in the neighborhood, and by the mass media and numerous social institutions. Alatas (2004) provides an interesting example of multicultural education within a Muslim-majority class at the university level, by emphasizing inter-civilization encounters, the point of view of others, and the multicultural origins of modern civilization. Overall, an education with appropriate adjustments and provisions for minority cultural needs is still missing in Indonesia. The existent multicultural education can be labeled as a “selected approach” (Budianta, 2004).

Despite these improvements, criticisms still target Javanese-Muslim dominance through which an over-emphasis on unity is constructed as well as the sense of what it means to be a true and good Indonesian. The central government in Jakarta determines educational reforms, which

are then disseminated in a trickle-down or top-down manner through the use of homogenous standards, uniform tracking, mainstream curricula, and centralized instructional materials (Sunarto et al., 2004). These initiatives foster conformity and unity at the cost of originality and diversity. Indonesian education has generally adopted an accommodative or selective form of multiculturalism, meaning that the Javanese Muslim culture remains dominant but makes some provisions for the needs of minority groups (Sunarto, Heng, and Saifuddin 2004). It can also be defined as a “tourist approach” (Derman-Sparks, 1989) or “contributions approach” (Banks & Banks, 2007). For instance, minorities’ cultural contributions are not mentioned in textbooks, the capital city of Jakarta remains the center of the educational system, and divergent thinking is usually not encouraged (Adam, 2003; Sunarto et al., 2004). Interreligious dialogue is almost nonexistent, and all students are still required to study their own religion, from kindergarten to college; as a result, their knowledge about other religions is limited.

With regard to K-12 grades, many more studies exist compared to higher education. In 2004 the “competence-based curriculum” was launched in primary and secondary schools, to include integration of various subjects, multicultural principles, and concern for society’s diversity (e.g., call for interreligious tolerance) (Adam, 2003; Sunarto et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the information about cultural diversity is limited to memorization of heroes, holidays, and discrete cultural elements. Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic influences are acknowledged, while Catholic, Protestant, Confucianism, Animist and other beliefs are not considered. Chinese influence is also not mentioned in textbooks and the list of hundreds of national heroes has nobody ethnically Chinese (Adam, 2003; Antara, 2011, November 8; JP, 2011, November 9).

Divergent, innovative and global thinking is not fostered so that the status quo is maintained (Semiawan, 2004). Educators are bound by ready-made formulations and their autonomy to adjust their teachings is limited. In addition, in many parts of the Outer Islands, teachers come from Java and their culture can clash with the students' world (e.g., difference in language, intonation, mannerism, interpretation of words) (Sada, 2004; Sunarto, 2004; Therik, 2004).

Empirical case-studies of K-12 schools show that the approach to religious teaching tend to be de-contextualised, confessional, dogmatic, exclusivist (Christiani, 2005; Hoon, 2011; Nuryatno, 2011; Raihani, 2011). In the national curriculum, only citizenship courses call for harmony, but slightly and superficially, without including dialectic cooperation among various communities (Baidhawry, 2007; Parker, 2010; Said, 2007). However, some experiments engage students with diversity, including in Hindu (Tamatea, 2006), Confucian (Setijadi, 2010), Catholic (Christiani, 2014), Protestant (Hoon, 2011), Muhammadiyah (Baidhawry, 2007), and *pesantren* (Ishom, 2007; Pohl, 2006; Raihani, 2012) schools as well as through teachers' individual efforts in public institutions (Parker, 2010).

Within higher education, the geographical concentration of universities on the island of Java is problematic for families who do not have the financial means to send their children off-island to study or are uncomfortable being so far from their sons and especially daughters. For instance, among the Dayak in Kalimantan, most parents want education for their children but are reluctant to send them to higher education because it will draw them from their local reality and not teach them real-life skills (Sada, 2004). In academia, essentialist and ethnocentric

interpretations of culture remain prominent, whereas socialization to cultural hybridity is rare (Heryanto 1998).

In more recent years, universities have also turned into a breeding area for underground extremist Islamic networks (Chandrakirana & Chuzaifah, 2005). Scholars refute the linkage of Indonesian Islamic education with ideological radicalization and violent extremism (Azra, Afrianty, & Hefner, 2007; Kholis Setiawan, 2005; Woodward, Rohmaniyah, Amin, & Coleman, 2010), but marginal cases of extremist student organizations do exist. Members of *Laskar Jihad* (Paramilitary Jihad) were part of the *resimen mahasiswa* (student regiment) from universities in Java (Mulyadi, 2003). The modernist Dakwah movement spread across campus organizations, such as Campus Preaching Organization and KAMMI (Fox, 2004a). Small groups of university students undergo intensive training to lead to a personal transformation as “complete” or “total” Muslims. A distinctive expression of life-style is required, such as *jilbab* for women, beards for men, appropriate forms of music, and so on. At the end of the training, participants commit to the group cause and future mentoring. The teachers are graduates from the same training, rather than *ulama*.

Indonesian scholars propose various strategies to improve multicultural education in Indonesia (Sunarto et al., 2004). First, textbooks should be inclusive of the perspectives and contributions of diverse cultural groups in a balanced, accurate and unbiased manner (Budianta, 2004; Sunarto, 2004; Therik, 2004). Merely adding fragmented information or stereotypical imaginaries about minority groups as “exotic others” to the core curriculum is not a solution. Second, in pluralistic societies, teaching approaches should consider and draw from the students’

backgrounds and experiences, as they navigate through diverse local customs, mainstream national culture, and international standards (Semiawan, 2004; Therik, 2004). Teachers should be provided with broad course outlines as well as the freedom to develop the specifics based on their creativity and context (Sunarto, 2004). Multicultural sensitivity can fill all subjects, including scientific courses, through conscious use of verbal and non-verbal communication as well as a variety of resources and perspectives. Third, campuses and schools should be a common ground of interaction which facilitates cross-cultural experience (Budianta, 2004). Faculty, staff and students from different cultural backgrounds should be recruited in order to increase equity for marginalized groups and to foster collaboration among groups. Fourth, multicultural education cannot occur in isolation on campus and detached from the surrounding communities (Budianta, 2004). The arena for multicultural education should be extended to the wider society and involve as many diverse participants as possible.

According to Indonesian scholars, the design and implementation of a holistic multicultural model is challenging, due to insufficient funding, human resources, political will, and social disparities (Budianta, 2004; Saifuddin, 2004; Sunarto, 2004). First, adequate funding of a comprehensive educational reform on a nationwide scale is not available in Indonesia (Sunarto, 2004). From the Ministry of Education to local schools and universities, the access to educational resources is limited. Second, teaching staff at all levels do not receive adequate training on multicultural education (Sunarto, 2004). And, even if they did, their own prejudices may remain the key obstacle to multicultural education (Budianta, 2004). In Indonesian schools, local children are often taught by migrant teachers, mainly from a different ethnic group

(Sunarto, 2004). Third, disparities across ethnicities, religions, regionality, gender and class distort equal access across educational levels and disciplines, therefore hindering concepts of multicultural education (Sunarto, 2004). Economic hardships suffered by teachers as well as students also stand in the way of meaningful teaching-learning processes.

Fourth, Sunarto (2004) underlines that reforms can find resistance not only at the macro level (e.g., central government), but also at the meso level (e.g., school districts) and micro level (e.g., schools, including staff, parents, and students). On the ground, the implementation of multicultural education can be perceived as ideologically and/or monetarily incompatible with vested interests. In addition, new educational policies are often misinterpreted by stakeholders, such as educational administrators, faculty, authors or publishers of textbooks. Sunarto (2004) also points out that new educational initiatives are often developed without assessing to what extent the previous programs succeeded, and what supports, barriers and unintended consequences were. Without careful planning and logistical support, there is a strong possibility that “a new curriculum runs the risk of suffering the same fate as previous ones –becoming ‘old wine in new bottles’” (Sunarto, 2004, p. 49). According to Saifuddin (2004), although regional autonomy has been implemented since 2001, the provincial policy orientation has still been centralistic, and few officials in the provinces and districts have sufficient understanding of the ideas. Regulations in the autonomy of education implementation lack clarity and generate confusion for all parts involved.

Chapter 4: Methodology

Overview of Grounded Theory

Grounded Theory methodology is at the foundation of my study. In this chapter, I describe the concepts and strategies that guided my study. I integrate theoretical underpinnings and applied methods in order to fully illuminate my approach. Grounded theory is a research methodology introduced by sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967) to advocate theories rooted in the data, rather than in preexisting formulations. The emerging theory is not formal or “grand,” but rather “substantive,” referring to everyday-world situations and having usefulness to practice (Merriam, 2009). Glaser and Strauss argued for systematic data analysis through (a) simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis; (b) analytical construct of codes and categories from data, not from preconceived hypotheses; (c) constant comparisons across data; (d) theory development at each step of data collection and analysis; (e) memo-writing to produce categories and to examine their properties, relationships, and gaps; (f) sampling aimed towards theory construction, not necessarily for population representativeness; and (g) literature reviews after developing an independent analysis, to avoid seeing the world through the lens of extant ideas (Charmaz, 2010). Glaser and Strauss explained the guidelines of the research process thoroughly, while also inviting their readers to use grounded theory strategies with flexibility.

Over the years, a growing number of scholars adopted and adapted grounded theory across many disciplines. Two major forms of grounded theory crystallized: objectivist grounded theory which derives from positivism, and constructivist grounded theory which is part of the interpretative tradition (Charmaz, 2010). In my dissertation, I follow Charmaz’s (2010)

constructivist approach, which is “a way of doing grounded theory that takes into account the theoretical and methodological developments of the past four decades” (p. 9). She considers grounded theory “as a set of principles and practices, not as prescriptions or package” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 9). Therefore, she engages in some earlier grounded theory strategies, refuses some others, and creates her own.

First, she repositioned grounded theory away from the founders’ positivist and discovering approach. Her primary attention is on showing multilayered connections rather than linear trajectories. In her words, grounded theory “assumes emergent, multiple realities; indeterminacy; facts and values as inextricably linked; truth as provisional; and social life as processual” (Charmaz, 2010, pp. 126-127). Charmaz (2010) agrees with Glaser that “all is data,” but she also adds that all data are constructed either by the researchers or by other individuals, as in the case of documents, records, and censuses (p. 16). She assumes that

Neither data nor theories are discovered. Rather, we are part of the world we study and the data we collect. We *construct* our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices. My approach explicitly assumes that any theoretical rendering offers an *interpretative* portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it. (Charmaz, 2010, p. 10)

This approach also echoes Merriam’s (2009) description of the four characteristics of qualitative research: (a) the focus is on process, understanding, and meaning; (b) the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis; (c) the process is inductive; and (d) the product is richly descriptive.

Second, Charmaz (2010) clarifies the role of the literature review in grounded theory. A study should begin with “guiding empirical interests,” “sensitizing concepts,” and “disciplinary perspectives” that “give a loose frame” to the study and provides “points of departure for developing, rather than limiting, our ideas” (Charmaz, 2010, pp. 16-17). Achieving deep familiarity with the researched phenomenon is a prerequisite. However, this does not mean to superimpose theories on the data. In Charmaz’s (2010) words, “preconceived theoretical concepts may provide starting points for looking *at* the data but they do not offer automatic codes *for* analyzing these data” (p. 68). All theoretical concepts from a discipline or previous study should “earn [their] ways into the analysis” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 68). A grounded theory “*refines, extends, challenges or supercedes* extant concepts,” but “these concepts remain in the background until they become relevant for immediate analytic problems” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 169). The best approach to grounded theory is to define what is happening in the data first and delay the substantial review for later. This methodological position resonates with Silverman and Marvasti (2008), who suggest writing the literature review chapter toward the end of the research.

Ultimately, despite these conceptual differences, Charmaz (2010) retains most practical guidelines established by Glaser and Strauss, including a focal point on data, coding, memo-writing, and theoretical sampling. Grounded theory starts as researchers enter the field where they gather data. Charmaz (2010) advocates collecting rich, thick, detailed, and full data which reveal participants’ ideas, feelings, intentions, and practices as well as the contexts and structures of their lives. Although nobody’s perspective can be replicated, a grounded theorist aims to enter

the participants' settings as deep as possible, in order to see their world as they do—from the inside. In Charmaz's (2010) words, "like a camera with many lenses, first you view a broad sweep of the landscape. Subsequently, you change your lens several times to bring scenes closer and closer into view" (p. 14). Diverse kinds of data can be used depending on the research problem, access and resources. On one hand, methods are tools to enhance seeing but do not guarantee good research or astute analyses. On the other hand, methods have consequences, because "*how* you collect data affects *which* phenomena you will see, *how*, and *where*, and *when* you will view them, and *what sense* you will make of them" (Charmaz, 2010, p. 15).

Data Collection

I conducted my study for a year in 2012 upon IRB approval. My study is centered at the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), which was founded in 1949 in Yogyakarta, the first capital of the independent republic. It comprises 18 faculties, 68 undergraduate majors, 23 diploma study programs, 104 master and specialist degrees, 43 doctorate programs, over 25 centers of studies (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). It has approximately 55,000 students (of which 1,187 are foreign students) and 2,500 faculty members (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). I also visited other universities, educational organizations, and public offices, as my description of participants will explain later. The snow ball technique was suitable for Indonesian customs, which value relationships, protocol, and hierarchy.

I employed the principle of theoretical sampling, in which "the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in

order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45). Charmaz (2010) explains the process clearly:

Suppose that you have arrived at some preliminary—and perhaps tentative—categories. While making earlier comparisons between data, you selected some focused codes and wrote memos on them. Now several categories look like promising abstract tools for rendering your data analytically. Yet one quick reading of these memos tells you: These categories are intriguing but thin. You have not yet defined your categories and their properties clearly. Too much still remains assumed, unknown, or questionable. Instead you want robust categories that stand on firm, not shaky grounds. What do you do? How can grounded theory strategies advance your analytical thinking at this stage of the research? The answer is to gather more data that focus on the *category* and its properties. This strategy is *theoretical sampling*, which means seeking and collecting pertinent data to elaborate and refine categories in your emerging theory. (p. 96)

Therefore, theoretical sampling implies that the total sample is not selected ahead of time. The researcher begins with an initial sample chosen for its relevance to the research problem. The data lead the investigator to the next participant, setting, document, interview questions, and so on. Theoretical sampling involves starting with data, constructing tentative ideas about data, and then examining these ideas through further empirical inquiry. It is strategic, specific, and systematic. It can use tactics like maximum variation or snowball effects, as long as they follow the direction given by the preceding data and analysis.

Theoretical sampling does not necessarily address the initial research questions, population distributions, and negative cases (Charmaz, 2010). By contrast, theoretical sampling aims “to delineate the properties of a category, to check hunches about categories, to saturate the properties of a category, to distinguish between categories, to clarify relationships between emerging categories, to identify variation in a process” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 104). Such sampling stops when properties of the category emerging during data collection become redundant. In other words, the researcher “saturates the categories with data and subsequently sorts them to integrate the nascent theory” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 100). Charmaz’s (2010) approach to theoretical sampling is different from Silverman and Marvasti (2008), for instance, who claim that theoretical sampling should represent a wider population and incorporate deviant instances. Nonetheless, all authors agree that theoretical sample can be adjusted; for example, its size and typology can be modified as new factors emerge, as more depth becomes needed, or certain information is necessary until no new information is forthcoming.

I have used four types of memo writing throughout my entire study. According to Silverman and Marvasti (2008), all journaling should be organized by date and into four different categories. First, “observation notes” address unplanned and improvised observations, events, and conversations, including informal talking before and after the formal interview. Second, “methodological notes” are messages to oneself regarding accomplishments, problems, surprises, future directions in data collection. Third, “personal notes” record feelings and thoughts about the research, relevant correspondence, meetings, and other people’s comments on the study. Fourth, “theoretical notes” present ideas, achievements, difficulties, false leads, dead-ends,

reactions to readings and presentations that arise during the fieldwork. According to Charmaz (2010) and Saldaña (2009), theoretical memos provide ways to examine emerging codes, compare data, reflect on the process, and direct further data-gathering from early on in the research process. Throughout the research, they become increasingly more conceptual and potentially generalizable while preserving specific connections with the data. Analysis and writing are not separate and sequential stages, but intertwined and simultaneous (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008; Wolcott, 2001).

Observation and document analysis. I recorded in fieldnotes my observations of campus life, such as in classrooms, offices, cafeterias, club meeting points, student elections, special events, and sites of the annual admission examination (Janesick, 2004; Merriam, 2009). I included photos to remind me of certain spaces, moments, or objects like t-shirts that promote UGM values at the campus bookstore. I also wrote fieldnotes on the conversations that happened before and after the interviews as well as on exchanges with people who were not my formal interviewees, such as Indonesian scholars, my host family, various friends, and individuals whom I met during my travels across the archipelago.

At UGM I gathered public documents on student body, departments, and policies. Students provided me with relevant material, such as on student elections and organization events. Upon the rector's approval, the Academic Administration office provided some public documents on student enrollment in the years 2006-2012. The documents are limited and contain no confidential information. The Ministry of Education and Central Agency on Statistics had no relevant recorded information, with the exception of census data on population distribution

according to province and religion. In order to generate some comparative indicators, I calculated totals and percentages as well as synched the information from UGM and the 2010 national census (I gathered both sets of information in 2012).

Surveying. In my study, the questionnaire has two main objectives. First, it gathers information from a relatively large number of UGM students about their views of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika at UGM and the impact of UGM on their approach to diversity. Second, the questionnaire helped me to identify diverse participants for in-depth interviews. For this dissertation, I employed descriptive statistics, leaving quantitative analysis for future study. Percentages tend to be high so my analysis often highlights differences of a few points. I state clearly when I report on survey results; in all other incidences, the word “participants” refers to interviewees.

At UGM, I distributed my survey among 633 students. The participants are (a) 55% female and 45% male; (b) from 30 of the total 33 provinces (62% from the island of Java and the remaining 38% from all other provinces with the exception of Gorontalo, Central Kalimantan, and Northern Moluccas); (c) of 38 ethnicities (62% Javanese and 38% from other groups); (d) from all six religions plus agnostic, atheist, and Kejawen (64% Muslims and remaining 36% adherents of other beliefs); and (e) mainly from cities (41% from large cities, 36% from small cities, 23% from villages). Growing up, participants lived and studied with people of various ethnicities and religions (on one extreme of the spectrum, 15% or less of the participants had no neighbor or classmate of other ethnicities or religions; on the other extreme, 3% or less of the participants had no neighbor or classmate of their own ethnicity or religion). In addition, they did

not have many opportunities to interact with foreign people (21% travelled abroad, 3% lived abroad for three months or longer, 15% had foreign neighbors, 10% had foreign high-school classmates). At UGM, they are (a) from all 18 colleges; (b) from all years (17% freshman, 25% sophomores, 43% juniors, and 15% seniors); (c) 33% first generation in college (i.e., neither father nor mother attended tertiary education); and (d) mainly living on their own (72% in *kos* or guest house, 2% live in the dormitory, 26% live with their family). In reporting my survey results, I include information that are relevant for my qualitative analysis only. I combine categories when percentages are the same (e.g., UGM students, administrators, professors) and I merge “strongly disagree” with “somewhat disagree” answers as well as “strongly agree” with “somewhat agree” answers.

I disseminated the questionnaire in the Indonesian language at classes across campus (Harkness, Vijver, & Mohler, 2003; Marsden & Wright, 2010; Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005; Thurgood, 2003). I approached professors in various colleges and asked the permission to use the first 15 minutes of their class for my survey. Based on my experience, I knew that emailing and online surveys are not effective tools in Indonesia. Prior to distributing the questionnaire, I explained the purpose of my study, guaranteed confidentiality, and answered questions (for ethical guidelines on confidentiality, I followed Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The survey itself also opened with a paragraph on the objective of and ethics around my study (Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005). If students were unsure about a question, I suggested them to interpret it as they preferred or I restated it in different words. Finally, I collected all responses, asked if respondents had any questions, and thanked them again for their participation. Because the majority of the

students were Javanese and Muslim, I used snowball tactics to reach out to participants from diverse backgrounds, including through informants' friends and religious student clubs. All responses were translated into English and imported in both quantitative software SPSS and qualitative software NVivo. I segregated all answers by gender, in order to address possible differences between women and men's views and experiences (Cook & Fonow, 1986).

I developed my questionnaire draft in three phases. First, I used items from a survey that I designed in 2007 with the assistance of a consulting group, in order to assess the long-term impact of cross-cultural and international programs on college students. Second, I extrapolated and adjusted questions from studies on the nature and frequencies of intercultural contact in higher education (Antonio, 2001, 2004; Chavous, 2005; Dixon et al., 2005; Ellison & Powers, 1994; Engberg, 2004; Gurin et al., 2002; Gurin et al., 2004; Hallinan & Williams, 1989; Halualani, 2008; Halualani et al., 2004; Nagda & Gurin, 2007; Robinson & Preston, 1976; Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Sorensen et al., 2009; Tsukashima & Montero, 1976; Wright et al., 1997). Third, I added questions based on my general understanding of cultural diversity in Indonesian higher education, where courses, community service, student clubs, events/programs, and get-together gatherings are potential venues for intercultural interaction and student development.

Control variables included respondents' demographic and academic background. Questions addressed the meanings of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, institutional support towards diversity, and impact of intercultural interactions. The questionnaire encompassed: (a) demographic information; (b) open-ended questions; (c) closed questions ranging from yes/no

response, approve/disapprove alternative along a five-point likert scale, to check all that apply; and (d) and optional contact information with a consent box for possible follow-up interviews. A few contingency questions accompanied some closed questions. I attempted to create balance among the various types of questions, because they each hold certain advantages and disadvantages (Payne, 1951; Pennell, Alcsér, Hansen, & Harkness, 2010; Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005).

Interviewing. I audio-recorded 75 hours of interviews and transcribed them into over 700 single-spaced pages. The final count of 57 interviews was determined by the saturation principle and exceeded what is generally suggested in the literature, due to the need of my study for a diverse pool of voices across backgrounds (i.e., province of origin, ethnicity, religion) as well as positions (i.e., students, faculty, administrators) (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

At UGM I interviewed 31 undergraduate students from (a) all six religions plus agnosticism; (b) 20 ethnicities (i.e., Aceh, Bali, Banjar, Batak, Belitung, Chinese, Flores, Javanese, Komerling, Lampung, Makassar, Minahasa, Minangkabau, Dayak, Sunda, Belitung, Nias, Palembang, Papua, Riau); (c) 17 provinces (i.e., Aceh, Bali, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, East Kalimantan, Lampung, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, Riau, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, Yogyakarta); and (d) 10 religious, political, and hobby-based campus organizations. Ethnic and religious diversity opened the doors to other important traits; for example, interviewees applied to UGM for various reasons and entered on distinct application tracks so they can illuminate matters of admissions from

many perspectives. For the sake of clarity, I want to point out that in Indonesia people use the term Christian to refer generally to Protestant and rarely to both Protestant and Catholic.

In addition, I interviewed 15 faculty members (some of them are also heads of administrative units), the 2012 outgoing rector and the 2012 incoming rector (the transition occurred in Fall 2012), and two recent alumni. Off campus, I interviewed the members of three educational non-governmental educational organizations, two students from a private Protestant University in Yogyakarta, a professor from a public university in Kalimantan, and the president of a private university for impoverished students in Timor. I interviewed these non-UGM informants in order to find further confirmation and broader validity for my case-study at UGM.

I created this purposeful sample of interviewees in order to gather a wide spectrum of backgrounds and perspectives. Among the survey respondents, I identified diverse student interviewees: (a) female and male; (b) from the six official religions as well as other spiritual preferences; (c) from various ethnicities across Java as well as from Western, Central, and Eastern Indonesia; (d) who provided insightful survey responses; and (e) who agreed to be contacted by checking the relevant box on the questionnaire and sharing their contact information. I chose faculty interviewees from various backgrounds, disciplines, and leading positions (because in Indonesia professors also serve as directors of administrative units) as well as overt interest in matters that relate to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. For formal interviews, I met with participants between one and three times, in order to understand their background, experiences, and aspirations as well as overall insights in terms of unity and diversity in Indonesian higher education. I also had regular informal conversations with key informants at least twice a month.

Almost all conversations were in English because students, staff and faculty members at top institutions tend to know English well. In few instances, the interviewee came to the meeting with a friend who could translate for him or her. I preferred this approach, rather than bringing my own interpreter, so the interviewee was comfortable in discussing sensitive matters (predicaments around interpreters are analyzed by Herod, 1999; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam & Juanita, 2001; Tayeb, 2001). At times of uncertainty, students consulted Google Translate to pick their words of choice.

In all cases, I used an informed consent form in the Indonesian language (for ethical guidelines on consent, I followed Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). To preserve confidentiality, I employ pseudonyms for faculty/administrators, generic titles for students (e.g., member, rather than president of X club), and do not mention informants' backgrounds with the rare exceptions of when religion, ethnicity, or group membership are significant for my analysis (ethical guidelines on consequences are discussed by Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

During the interviews, professors were generally informative, straightforward, and articulate. Students were reflective and committed to provide relevant contributions. They took time to ponder before answering. They sometimes mentioned that they never thought of that matter before and that our conversation was "leading to a kind of realization," as a student said. They were occasionally surprised or puzzled about my approach. Some of them arrived with written notes and talking points to make sure to cover what mattered to them the most. If a friend was accompanying them, they often discussed the answer together and then formulated a full response for me. When they were uncertain about some information, for instance demographics

or dates, they asked me to double-check online for accuracy or later texted me the virtual links to the source. They gave answers responsibly and only talked about facts they knew. For example, a student said “I never joined [the strict Muslim student organization] KAMMI so I do not know, but you can interview my friends who have.”

They lowered their voice when talking about people of other religions and ethnicities. For instance, participants whispered when speaking of Jakarta-based cliques, ethnic insults, Muslim students wearing religious attires, or Christian evangelization. Students told me that they appreciated the opportunity to practice their English, to meet an international person, to remember their past experiences, and to think about interesting topics. They suggested books, gave me articles, and connected me with peers who could fill my dissertation gaps. They were open with me in their answers. An informant stated, “You are European, most of you are liberal, so I think I want to share.” Another peer said, “You can read my mind!”

According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), “an interview is literally an *inter view*,” where knowledge is constructed in the “inter-action” and “inter-change of views” between the interviewer and the interviewee (p. 2). It is a professional conversation that goes beyond the spontaneous exchange of ideas in everyday life, and “becomes a careful questioning and listening approach with the purpose of obtaining thoroughly tested knowledge” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 3).

Grounded theorists do not set exclusive guidelines on what type of interview is most suitable, as long as it is with a purpose (Duffy, Ferguson, & Watson, 2004). Unstructured interviews may be important in the early stage of a research, when little is known about a

problem area (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). By contrast, structured interviewing may be suitable for later stages of data collection, when the researcher seeks focused responses and has specific questions to gain them. In all cases, grounded theorists tend to leave space for flexibility, in order to clarify respondent's answers and to use the knowledge that constantly emerges during the research process (Charmaz, 2010). At the same time, they also plan ahead, both logistically and conceptually.

Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) find that interviews tends to be between five and twenty-five in common studies, depending on the resources available for the investigation as well as on “a law of diminishing returns (beyond a certain point, adding more respondents will yield less and less new knowledge)” (p. 113). The researcher is responsible for deciding when a theme has been exhausted and the data saturated. However, they suggest fewer, longer and more intensive interviews in the study, with more time to prepare and to analyze them. Seidman (1991) advises 90 minutes long interview with three to seven days in between interviews, in order to mull over the preceding interview without losing the connection with it. Such an approach is key in grounded theory, since the researcher needs time to analyze the interview and plan the next step accordingly. As I mentioned earlier, my study required more interviews to reach a saturation point and sometimes fewer days between interviews to fit both my schedule and participants' availability. Further important considerations include the number, content, and form of good questions, as well as the structure, mechanism, and participants of fruitful interviews (Charmaz, 2010; Janesick, 2004; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Seidman, 1991).

As I interviewed, typed the transcripts, and then coded them, I kept in mind issues concerning memory. Psychologists Tessler and Nelson assert that “the relation between autobiographical memory and a sense of self is a dynamic, interactive process in which self and memory organize, construct, and give meaning to each other in a way so intimate that we can truly say that we are what we remember and that our memories are ourselves” (cited in Yow, 2005, p. 36). As suggested in the literature, participants remember events, or parts of events, that are important for them. They also seem to recall more easily incidences that were firsthand experienced, emotionally charged, mentally involved, or atypical. Cases of “collective memory” also took place in my study. Collective” or “social” memory refers to people remembering as a group (Yow, 2005). It can be thought of as a term converging two different kinds of remembering: official memory and popular memory. During my field study, students often came to the interview with friends and consulted them in moment of uncertainty. They also reported on official and popular narratives to build their argument. Individual memories and collective memory can be contradictory although both are “seriously believed and simultaneously held” (Yow, 2005, p. 52). Human memory is both fallible and trustworthy. In fact, it is informative and significant, but also influenced by personal and socio-cultural experiences.

Data Analysis: Transcribing and Coding

Both transcribing and coding are consequential processes in research. Transcribing was my first step in my interview analysis. In addition to my fieldnotes, I transcribed the 75 hours of audio-recorded interviews in over 700 single-spaced pages (Charmaz, 2010; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). I mainly used a denaturalist

approach to transcribing, with some rare incidences of naturalism; for instance, I made a note of overt changes in voice tone, speech speed, and body language (Davidson, 2009; Oliver, Serovich, & L., 2005). Naturalism is most often seen in conversation analysis studies in which the transcription includes as many details as possible, including stutters, pauses, emphasis, laughs, accents, and involuntary vocalization. Denaturalism finds relevance in grounded theory and is concerned with the content of the interview, instead of idiosyncratic elements of speech. Between the naturalist and denaturalist approaches are endless variations using elements of each to achieve certain analytical objectives and research goals.

My second step in my analysis was coding the survey open answers, fieldnotes, and interviews transcripts. Coding means to “take segments of data apart, name them in concise terms, and propose an analytical handle to develop abstract ideas for interpreting each segment of data” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 45). It is a “focused way of viewing data” and of gaining “a deeper understanding of the empirical world” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 70). Codes arise from the reading of the data and shape the analytical frame from which the grounded theory is built. They do not emanate from preconceived schemes and do not rush theory making. In order to strengthen the foundations of the study, data collection and analysis is built step-by-step from the ground up, without any immature theoretical flight. In Charmaz’s (2010) words:

Coding is the pivotal link between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data. Through coding you *define* what is happening in the data and begin to grapple with what it means. The codes take form together as elements of a nascent theory that explains these data and directs further data-gathering. By careful attending to coding,

you begin weaving two major threads in the fabric of grounded theory: generalizable theoretical statements that transcend specific times and places and contextual analyses of actions and events. (p. 46)

Language plays a crucial role in “how and what we code,” because it “confers form and meaning on observed realities” and “reflects views and values” (Charmaz, 2010, pp. 46-47). Researchers choose and construct each code as it defines what they see as significant in the data and describes what they think is happening. Yet, coding also encourages examining hidden assumptions in both researcher and participant’s use of language. It is not a lifeless labeling, but an interactive process where the researcher reads, re-reads, and re-examines many times the participants’ words and actions. By studying the data, a researcher makes fundamental processes explicit and render hidden assumptions visible. Coding forces the researcher to think about the material in new ways that may differ from the participants’ interpretations.

Charmaz (2010) identifies two main phases of coding—“initial” and “focused coding.” The initial cycle involves naming each word, line, or incident of data. Each initial code is a short “label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, and accounts for each piece of data” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 43). It shows processes, actions, events, contexts, relationships, viewpoints, explanations, dilemmas, and identifying moments. Coding moves the researcher toward fulfilling two criteria for completing a grounded theory analysis: fit and relevance. A study fits the data when codes capture and condense meanings and actions. A study is relevant when it offers “an incisive analytical framework that interprets what is happening and makes relationship between implicit processes and structures visible” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 54).

This initial reading of the data prompts researchers to study the data closely, analytically, and critically so they begin conceptualizing their ideas. Being critical about the data does not mean to be critical of the participants, but rather asking questions about the data. According to Charmaz (2010), “initial codes are provisional, comparative, and grounded in the data” (p. 48). Researchers should create codes that best fit the data, while remaining open to other analytical possibilities. From the earliest stage of research, coding provides insight about what kinds of data to collect next in order to strengthen certain segments or to fill certain gaps in the data collected to that point. Therefore, simultaneous data collection and analysis assist researchers “to go further and deeper into the research problem as well as engage in developing categories” (Charmaz, 2010, p. 48).

Charmaz (2010) provides helpful practices for initial codes. They are assigned spontaneously and quickly to spark the researcher’s fresh thinking about the data. They condense meanings while being simple, precise, short, and analytical (not merely descriptive or summarizing). They stick with the data, stay in the context, and start from the words and actions of the respondents. Initial codes can employ “in vivo codes,” when they adopt the participant’s exact telling terms—words that are known by everybody, specific to a certain group, or unique for the participant (Charmaz, 2010; Saldaña, 2009). Initial codes can also use “process codes,” when they use gerunds, rather than nouns, in order to help the researcher to focus on dynamic processes, rather than on static topics (e.g., experiencing rather than experience, leading rather than leader) (Charmaz, 2010; Saldaña, 2009). Codes can be revised to improve the fit, but never adjusted based on pre-existing or emerging codes; each code is tied to a specific segment of the

raw data. Certain codes can be placed in parentheses if are less apparent than others and represent ideas to look for in further data. I started by coding line-by-line and then moved to sentence-by-sentence because codes tend to reappear. According to Charmaz (2010):

Coding every line may seem like an arbitrarily exercise because not every line contains a complete sentence and not every sentence may appear to be important. Nevertheless, it can be an enormously useful tool. Ideas will occur to you that had escaped your attention when reading data for a general thematic analysis. (p. 50)

Transcripts are coded and then codes are compared. Special attention is addressed to similarities and differences. A grounded theorist use “constant comparative method” to establish analytical comparisons and distinctions within and across various data sets (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Focused codes constitute the second major coding cycle. These codes are always close to the data but more directive, selective, and conceptual than initial codes. Focused codes are core, central, and salient categories, which emerge from constantly comparing and reorganizing initial codes. Categories have “properties and dimensions—variable qualities that display the range or distribution within similarly coded data” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 42). Focused codes can employ “axial codes,” around which several initial codes revolve and synthesize (Charmaz, 2010; Saldaña, 2009). In this case, focused codes use the most frequent, significant, and analytical initial codes as well as thematic or conceptual similarities and differences.

Focused codes can also refer to “theoretical codes,” which identify the primary theme of the research (Charmaz, 2010; Saldaña, 2009). Glaser (1978) identifies 18 theoretical coding families (e.g., causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances, conditions, degree,

dimension, type of a phenomenon). In addition, each coding family contains various structural units (e.g., group, family, organizational, aggregate, territorial, societal, status and role).

Charmaz (2010) clarifies that lists of coding families are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. They can be established based on different criteria, level and type of abstraction. For example, Glaser himself has revised his list of coding families over the years and recent theoretical currents, such as feminist theory and postmodern concepts, have proposed new families (Charmaz, 2010).

Echoing some of the key principles of grounded theory, Merriam (2009) suggests that the researchers analyze data in conjunction with data collection to (a) force them to make decisions that narrow the study; (b) force them to make decisions concerning the type of study they want to accomplish; (c) develop analytical questions; (d) plan data collection sessions according to what they find in previous observations; (e) write many “observer’s comments” as they go; (f) write memos to themselves about what they are learning; (g) try out ideas and themes on participants; (h) begin exploring the literature while they are in the field; (i) play with metaphors, analogies, and concepts; and (j) use visual devices (pp. 171-172).

The use of computer-assisted analysis of qualitative data improves the speed of handling data and the rigor of the study, including the counts of phenomena and search for deviant cases (Richards & Richards, 1994). A limitation that has been reported about such software is the risk of imposing a narrow approach to the analysis of content (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). In fact, the full interview tends to disappear from the researcher’s sight and to be reduced to fragments generated out of queries. A strategy to avoid this disadvantage is to refer back to the full data,

during both coding and interpreting. Among all possible software, I chose NVivo because it offers an easy format, flexible applications, and the possibility to attach photos, videos, and file sounds to the raw text. Coding text involves operations that are similar to highlighting text in a word processor. Complex searches are straightforward, especially for users familiar with database queries. NVivo has also a built-in modeler, which allows mapping out ideas in visual displays where nodes are linked to the underlying data associated with them. Through conceptual mapping, NVivo is useful not only for coding and retrieval of text segments, but also for theory building (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008).

Concepts of Positionality

My field experience shows that positionality fluctuates across specific contexts, moments, and dynamics (as theorized by Merriam & Juanita, 2001; Tayeb, 2001). According to Banks' (1998) categorization, I was an "external outsider," because I am not Indonesian. However, my theoretical framework argues that culture is not a monolithic entity to which one belongs or not. Internal variations exist within all cultures and life experiences are mediated by the interaction of complex factors. For instance, being Indonesian is not a sufficient criteria to qualify for the insider status; various qualities are necessary and are sometimes in opposition to one another. For instance, being an insider means coming from a specific village or city, ethnic group, religious interpretation, gender, age, social class, educational level, and occupation. Some of the participants felt more affiliation with me than with some of their fellow Indonesians, based on our same gender, religion, career in teaching and higher education administration, for example.

The fluidity of positionality is demonstrated by the variable dynamics of power and modes of entry that I experienced (predicaments of power in research are examined by Herod, 1999; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam & Juanita, 2001; Shah, 2004; Silverman & Marvasti, 2008; K. G. Ward & Jones, 1999). “Getting in” was sometimes easy and sometimes difficult. Being able to finally schedule an interview does not necessarily mean that the participant will disclose personal views (barriers and supporters to access are described by Herod, 1999; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Oinas, 1999; Sabot, 1999; K. G. Ward & Jones, 1999). Ultimately, I receive all interviewees’ responses as true and valid. Even when I problematize certain statements, my analysis is still anchored within the participants’ voice and experience (concepts of representation are examined by Herod, 1999; Merriam & Juanita, 2001; Mullings, 1999). This approach is aligned with Grounded Theory.

For example, students always made themselves available to meet me or help me. They offered to accompany me to distribute the surveys. They periodically texted me to ask me how my study was going and to offer further assistance. They invited me to join them at relevant events, such as the Hindu Melasti celebration in Parangtritis beach, the Buddhist Waisak in Borobudur temple, the Christian Easter celebration on campus, the annual interfaith forum, and the yearly student elections. Professors were usually easy to reach via text messages and to schedule appointments. I generally met them in their office or for a meal on campus, but at times we had meetings in their homes and even at the hospital room where a professor’s husband was being treated for dengue fever. The faculty suggested readings, contacts, and interview questions. For instance, one of the professors advised me to ask questions that are more focused on practice

and examples. Leaders from other universities and organizations were also prompt in responding and beneficial to my study, likely because of their commitment to the cause of diversity in Indonesia.

However, my abroad experience was not always easy. At the national level, some radical Muslim groups attacked American buildings and businesses due to the release on youtube of the film “Innocence of Muslims.” In Jakarta, Lady Gaga had to cancel her concert due to Islamic threats. Locally, in Yogyakarta, the presentation by the lesbian Muslim scholar Irshad Manji was interrupted by Islamic violence; some of my classmates, friends, and participants were injured.

At UGM, I had to adjust to a Muslim-majority university and overall non-secular environment, with faculty and administration members displaying religious symbols in their offices, students interrupting interviews for the daily calls to prayers, and professors making a point to say, “let’s meet at 1pm, after the Friday prayer,” for instance. Some of the members of Muslim organizations did not shake my hands when we met and asked about my religious beliefs in gender equality; my explanations were not satisfactory to them, and some comment, “You do not know your religion.” They did not invite me to any event, or to enter the office or mosque, which explains why I have no information on those matters.

Some minority students had heart-breaking accounts about experiences of discrimination and mistreatment. A minority student was so nervous about having his responses overheard that he answered in writing and later he emailed further reflections. Finding a confidential, comfortable, and safe space for both participants and myself was a challenge, but we overcame it

with a variety of arrangements (considerations for a safe space for interviewing are presented by Shah, 2004).

Thus, on one hand, participants confirmed that they were excited to meet a foreigner and practice their English. They were impressed that a person from overseas was interested in studying *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in education (similar experiences as a foreign researcher are reported by Herod, 1999). They felt comfortable in discussing sensitive topics because of my being a Western woman, which means “liberal” and “open minded” to them. They were at ease even in criticizing some aspects of Christianity and the USA, even if they knew my association with them. On the other hand, I experienced a few incidences of closure based on exactly those same characteristics, namely being foreigner, Western, a woman, and a Ph.D. student.

All studies are contaminated to some extent by the researcher’s situatedness and values (Charmaz, 2010; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam & Juanita, 2001; Mullings, 1999; Shah, 2004; Silverman & Marvasti, 2008; Tayeb, 2001). The implications of the researcher and participant’s subjectivities gain more complexity across cultures. Becoming familiar with the participants’ social structures, cultural contexts, and behavioral patterns has great significance for all phases of the study, including access to the fields, data collection, and making meaning. I prepared for my field study on various fronts (Barna, 1998; Bennett, 1998; Shah, 2004). Over the years, I took classes on Indonesian language, Southeast Asian studies, and intercultural communication. I dedicated substantial time to conduct my field study. Throughout the whole process, I discussed methods, interpretations, and cultural etiquettes with my Indonesian friends, colleagues, and participants.

Chapter 5: Meanings of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

This chapter describes the concept of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika according to participants. Students and professors—who also serve as administrative executives in Indonesian universities— explain their ideals of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. These information are relevant for my first question: What does Bhinneka Tunggal Ika mean in the Indonesian higher education context? Or in other words, what does unity in diversity mean for Indonesian intellectuals (i.e., students and faculty at UGM)? In chapter 10, I will propose that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika frames multiculturalism as grounded cosmopolitanism. In particular, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (or grounded cosmopolitanism) means to hold local, national, and global memberships. In fact, the multiple and contested meanings of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika are situated in a third space of grounded (i.e., ethnic, religious, national) and cosmopolitan (i.e., humanist and global) allegiances.

I start this chapter by reporting on the results from the student survey, which introduce the general translations and meanings of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Then, I explain three deeper interpretations that have emerged from the surveys, interviews, and observations. Students and professors view Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a historical concept, a sense of togetherness and altruism, and a process of identity blending. These approaches to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika are heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting. They refer to public and private spheres, to interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics. Participants demonstrate the complexity of defining ideas that are rooted in both personal values and the broader society. For instance, they recognize that the motto is unattained in practice, and yet they articulate how it remains the best

possible response to multiculturalism in Indonesia. As an NGO representative declares, “the challenge is how to make it work in reality.”

The 633 students who filled out the survey confirm that the old Javanese saying *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, along with its Indonesian translation *berbeda-beda tetapi satu* (different but one), is the closest concept to multiculturalism in the Indonesian setting. Alternative terms include academic jargon (e.g., *multi-kulturalism* and *trans-kulturalism*) or generic expressions for a pluralist society (e.g., *majemuk masyarakat*), variety (e.g., *keberagaman* and *keanekaragaman*), various cultures (e.g., *ragam budaya* and *berbagai budaya*), and tolerance (e.g., *toleransi*). *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the preferred terminology to enter the examination of diversity because “everyone knows this phrase and its meaning; it is something that is inside Indonesian people,” according to the president of a university in Timor.

Survey respondents provide the official translation of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, such as “different but one” and “united in diversity.” They describe the ideal of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* with numerous qualities. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the absence of discrimination, self-segregation, and conflict. It is the ability to accept, understand, and accommodate others. It is the willingness to build friendships, to work together, and support policies that are based on the same rights and duties for all. It is the feeling of mutual assistance, harmony, and humanity. It is evoked through the metaphor of a rope, glue, and protection that keeps Indonesia together. Ultimately, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* allows individuals “to complete each other’s differences,” without having to be the same” or “renouncing their own background.”

Ninety-seven percent of the survey participants believe that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is important for the well-being of Indonesia. Students show a timeless commitment to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. They define it as “something holy” that “needs to be respected all the time” and “cannot be broken apart” because it is the “foundation of the country,” “our life itself.” They want Bhinneka Tunggal Ika “to happen in daily life” and “to never get lost.” They believe that “it can transform Indonesia, resolve conflicts, and make a peaceful country.” It is still “the solution to the problems of religion and all differences in a plural society.” However, 24% of the respondents point out that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is an ideal that cannot become reality. Some of them define it as a utopia, an illusion, or even a lie.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a “Historical Concept”

Participants agree with Professor Patra that “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is a historical concept that swings throughout time, rather than being a static condition.” In their view, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is different and more complex than multiculturalism in other countries, including in the United States. Professors Agus and Dimas emphasize that Indonesia has numerous islands, indigenous groups, and a collectivist culture compared to the United States, where “people are from many countries” and tend to be “individualistic.”

Both students and faculty members declare that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika emerged as (a) unity that attempts to represent all diversity, then evolved into (b) unity that imposes Javanization, and finally became (c) parochialism that threatens unity. They explain that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika was created in the 14th century by poet Mpu Tantular to advocate peace among religious communities. His message was that religious beliefs are distinct paths towards the same

ultimate Truth. As I will explain in chapter 10, this original meaning of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* evokes the theory of cosmopolitan multiculturalism, which emphasizes that humanity transcends primordial attachments, such as ethnic, religious, and national affiliations.

Much later, during the revolution against Dutch colonization in the 20th century, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was mobilized as “a deliberate effort to create unity” (Professor Zainuddin) and as “a source for the nation in order to claim that we are one” (Professor Patra). Professor Patra notes that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* became part of the Garuda Pancasila emblem; thus, it was “visible in all houses, offices, schools, gates, everywhere.” Survey respondents declare that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* “was built by the founders of Indonesia” and “allowed Indonesia to reach independence” as well as “to unite all the people from Sabang to Merauke” (the two opposite farthest cities in the archipelago). They recall the saying that “if we are united, we are strong; if we are apart, we fall.” They define *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as the “conceptual foundation” and “construct of the idea of Indonesia.” They state that this “extraordinary motto” is “our ancestors’ legacy that had to be fought for and preserved.”

On one hand, “Indonesia became possible because the majority gave up the right as a majority,” according to Professor Patra. He explains that “representation is not a matter of mathematical calculation of the different sizes of ethnicities, religion, and islands.” For instance, Javanese is the language spoken by the most numerous ethnic community, but it is not the official language—Indonesian, a variation of Malay, was adopted as the neutral national language. Similarly, Islam is the religion of the majority of the population, but it is not the

official religion—a generic monotheism was chosen for the constitution to accommodate broader groups.

On the other hand, most cultural foundations that were employed to construct a sense of unity belonged to Javanese heritage, such as the glorious past of Majapahit (i.e., archipelagic empire based on the island of Java in the 14th-16th centuries) and one of its leaders Gadjah Mada. For instance, students from a Protestant university find problematic that “Sukarno and the founding fathers of Indonesia did not look deeply into the local contexts; for example, they did not visit Batak people and discuss what diversity was for them.” In my later analysis in chapter 10, I will examine how, at the time of independence, the meaning of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* moved across various types of multiculturalism (e.g., accommodative, interactive, cosmopolitan) and revealed the significance of both primordial and modernist lenses (i.e., the state was created in recent times within the anti-colonization movement; yet, it only exists through the solidarities among pre-existing ethnic communities).

During the Suharto regime, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* meant imposing Java-based unity and suppressing diversity, because differences were seen as a potential for conflict. A researcher in Social and Political Sciences recalls that in his island, *wayang* (Javanese puppet) performances toured the villages and disseminated cultural and political values that disempowered the people to the advantage of the elite. Professor Erwin recalls that “in schools across the archipelago teachers emphasized the importance of being one as Indonesians, rather than being different.”

Since Suharto’s fall in 1998, the pendulum of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* has swung towards further parochialism, especially in regard to Javanization, Islamization, and defensive reactions

by minority groups. Participants criticize these exclusivist forces, which “break down Indonesia and push it away from the pluralistic way.” According to my theoretical framework, the notion of parochialism is linked to processes of hardening boundaries and groupism (described by recent ethno-nationalist theories) as well as isolationist multiculturalism or restricting hybridity (as argued by multiculturalist scholar Budianta, 2004).

Javanization takes place through indoctrination, development, and migration. Professor Thomas argues that “based on the data, Indonesian culture is still dominated by Javanese culture and many people in Indonesia feel colonized by the Javanese ideology.” He explains that “the center is considered more important than the periphery, so more attention and respect is put to develop it; the farther you go from it, the lower power and services you find.” He refers to Benedict Anderson’s chapter on “Language and Power” to elucidate that “the Javanese political culture historically positioned the king in the *kraton*—the center of the universe, the core of power—and this is why the focus still remains on Java, with the pivot in Jakarta and the satellite cities of Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang, and so on.” He cites Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and cultural leadership to explain how “all Indonesians have been Javanized—indoctrinated and socialized according to the Javanese political ideology.” For instance, up to today, school textbooks have been written by Javanese authors, printed in Java, and focused on the Javanese context with only marginal references to the larger islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan.

In terms of development, students from regions outside Java report that they “never felt Indonesian” because “the government does not care” about their provinces. For example, a

participant lives on an island with only a small hospital and no university. An interviewee from Java recommends that the government “build schools and streets in Papua, rather than sending the military.” Corruption is seen as the cause of many social predicaments: “The top people in the government just want to make themselves richer, rather than to think about the people.”

Migration also solidifies Javanization, because numerous Javanese people leave their native overpopulated island for other provinces. This phenomenon has created tremendous tension over recent decades. A peer from Eastern Indonesia explains,

When Javanese people move to our island, they only eat at the Javanese *warung* (street food stall), buy in Javanese-owned stores, and try to get a lot of influence. They never want to mingle and always exclude themselves. Many are criminals or people without identity cards, skills, or purpose. Javanese migrants create conflicts and terrorism in islands of different ethnicities and religions, such as in Kalimantan, Ambon, and Bali.

This statement introduces implicitly the association of Java with Islam, since Javanese people are predominantly Muslim.

Islamization is a concern for participants in terms of policy and society. Students declare that “we have six religions but the government gives preference to one, Islam.” For example, minorities can only access lower public positions, whereas “Javanese Muslim people are the majority and they are permitted to move to higher posts, including the Indonesian presidency.” A professor comments that “the majority imposes decisions in name of Indonesia and the minority has to listen and give the way to the majority.” For instance, she articulates that the latest law on pornography has been forced on all Indonesians, “with no consideration for diversity in cultures

and values.” In society, there is a growing tendency to bring Islam into the public sphere. For example, a Muslim professor critiques the trend “to show that wearing a scarf is better, to tell the religious affiliation to Muhammadiyah or NU, and to send children to Muslim schools.”

Challenging Islamization is a difficult task, due to Islamic fundamentalist groups, which employ street marches, violent intimidation, and terrorist attacks to impose their views on the whole country. During my semester at UGM, I was aware of one case of Islamic violent threat (i.e., in conjunction with Manji’s presentation) but, at least twice a month, 10 students or more from strict Muslim organizations gathered with signs at the entrance of UGM to protest non-violently against a wide arrays of mattes, as I will explain later. The professor of the university in Kalimantan notes that the problem is leadership, not faith per se: “The Quran never teaches to kill, to hate, to be disrespectful, to remind others about their sins.”

Although Javanization and Islamization are the primary concerns due to their predominance in the national political realm and use of terrorism, Christianization is also perceived as a danger for Indonesian unity and diversity. It is mainly limited to the social sphere within certain provinces, because of its low number of adherents in the country and even more in the government. A professor at a Protestant university showed me books that are published by an evangelical group in Los Angeles (USA) to instruct fellow believers on how to convert people around the planet. He finds these efforts detrimental for Indonesia and dangerous for world peace. A student from Bali confirms that “Christians have huge support from other countries and are converting people in unfair ways, such as putting bulletins by schools so children pick them

up and end up in churches where they are brainwashed.” He is concerned that “if all Christians do that, our culture is gone.”

The growth of Javanization and Islamization ferments resentment within religious and ethnic minorities, which often results in further parochialism. Professor Thomas states that “people think in primordialist ways not only in Java but everywhere; for example, even myself, I vote for a *bupati* (head of a regency) who is from my place, rather than voting based on his abilities and leadership.” In a minority student’s words:

If your culture is different from the dominant culture, you have to push hard to protect it. It is very normal and natural that each ethnic group wants to survive and save its identity, especially when its number is shrinking. If you lose one of your identities, you are not yourself anymore. What I fear the most is that my culture is gone. In my island, we are in a dangerous situation, we may become extinct because we are only few.

He recognizes that variations exist within each religious group and that all his friends are exceptions to the rule—“the majority of Muslims and Christians accept, but do not respect, people of other religions; whereas the majority of non-Muslims and non-Christians accept and respect everyone.” For example, he criticizes the fact that Muslim and Christian adherents ask about others’ religions and then argue that their own faith is superior. They also “do not seem” happy when followers of other creeds pray. In a public school in Yogyakarta, he met a Muslim first grader who was told by his teacher that Hindu people worship statues, stones, trees, and non-living objects. A Protestant student comments, “The majority of Muslims do not want

Christian fellowship—when we walk to Church with our bible, they do not say anything and look us badly; but if we do not have the Bible, they greet us.”

Ultimately, participants agree, that “we cannot only speak about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, but we must behave that we are *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*.” Professor Zainuddin points out the need of moving beyond majority-minority dichotomies: “With more democracy and decentralization, the various identities have emerged and started to claim privileges based on the argument that they are the majority in one area or in the whole of Indonesia.” Professor Helen believes that Indonesia has to resolve its “identity crisis” and find a “renewed pride in being Indonesian.” Professor Gerardus agrees that Indonesia has “almost finished the project of state-building,” and now has to complete the “project of nation-building.” Students and faculty recommend a general commitment towards *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at the macro, meso, and micro levels—from policy making, to people’s movements and interpersonal contact. However, change in the political posture is the primary concern, because the central government is seen as “forgetting about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” and “being so far from people’s hope.” A political commitment towards a diverse and united Indonesia is the first step “to make *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* diverse, stable, and sustainable—meaning with a lot of cultures living in peace and harmony forever.”

***Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as “Togetherness” and “Altruism”**

Besides approaching *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as a historical and political concept, informants expand its meaning into the interpersonal sphere. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is “a moment when people experience and feel being together; then they are hardly able to forget it and cannot resist it,” Professor Patra says. Survey participants believe that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* makes

them feel that they are “not alone,” but rather in “a relationship with other Indonesian people.” They perceive *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as embedded in the heart, soul, and blood of all Indonesians since birth. However, they also recognize that some people “forget about it.” They agree that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* can “become real and make a peaceful country” only if all Indonesians “build it inside themselves.”

In particular, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is “renouncing selfishness for the sake of the nation,” according to Professor Patra. Students also believe that “we have to unite and push our ego on the side, so *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* can become real.” The 2012 incoming rector explains, “We have to develop unity but at the same time we have to maintain the diversity; diversity is very important.” As I will clarify in chapter 10, these participants’ statements evoke ethno-nationalist theories and illustrate how the primordial feelings of sacrifice, authenticity, and sacredness are transferred into the Indonesian national motto. They also introduce the complex interplay between diversity and unity within the country. What does make Indonesia diverse and united?

Overall, participants regard national diversity as a unique strength of Indonesia: “A gift given to Indonesians” and “a specialty that other countries rarely have, so we should be proud of it.” They frame differences within primordial attachments, such as place of origin, language, traditions, and beliefs. They agree that religion is the most divisive trait, although language and other ethnic characteristics are influential as well. They also expand the sources of identification to social class, education, occupation, age, gender, political preference, and sub-cultures (e.g., punks) as well as a myriad of other personal belongings.

Through this wider lens, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* gains a global and humanist relevance, which leads to theories of cosmopolitan multiculturalism and grounded cosmopolitanism, according to my later analysis in chapter 10. Both students and faculty members view diversity as “being human,” because “all humans are unique”—“different in some ways and similar in others.” They agree that “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is so important because all humans in this earth must live together peacefully.” According to Professor Dimas, the globalized world is meaningful when it is approached with inclusiveness, emancipative attitude, and awareness that we need others. Professor Patra explains that the international significance of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is rooted in the establishment as the national motto, “at a time when Indonesians started to study the world and felt that they were facing it together.” Among other faculty, Professors Tirta and Helen agree that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, with its annexed Pancasila, is essential in the 21st century, because it allows Indonesia “to face globalization” while “holding on core ethics.” Professor Thomas draws from the initial intention of the Mpu Tantular’s poem—to create communion across all human beliefs based on the recognition that truth transcends all of them.

While participants can easily articulate what makes Indonesians different, they find difficulty in explaining what makes them united. First, they mention the history of self-determination: “We fought, heroes won, we value their struggle, and that is why we want to keep Indonesia.” They recall the continuous commitment to the oath of youth and the Pancasila. Professor Agus explains in detail how the Pancasila was manipulated in the past and, as a result, lost people’s support. Yet, he concludes,

Without Pancasila there is something lost in our life. We need Pancasila in our lives. The movements against Pancasila—such as groups who want to replace Pancasila with Sharia Islam or with communism—are not good matches because we need something that is neutral, not referring to one religion or one ideology, so that all people in difference can be united and live together in this place. This is Pancasila.

Second, participants regard the goal of shared prosperity as a renewed unifer. Professor Johan advances that “the common objective is to overcome suffering,” such as colonial oppression in the past and marginalization today. A student proposes a focus on primordial attachments that benefit the whole country:

Local cultures contribute to the national culture—the culture of Indonesia is created by the peak of each sub-culture. So protecting local cultures strengthens the national culture—protecting sub-cultures (smaller scope) directly leads to protecting the country (bigger scope). But protecting the country alone does not necessarily mean protecting the local identity.

Ultimately, what makes Indonesia united is its common diversity. Participants agree that “differences cannot be combined in one and all we can do is to be *united* (not one), through our shared targets.” “Heterogeneity is not a problem” as long as it “does not obstruct the peace and unity of the nation.” As explained in the previous section, participants believe that the current causes of conflict are hegemony by a dominant group, repression of minorities, and any hardbound postures. All participants insist that “Indonesia should be one, not separated.” In

chapter 10, I will examine how these views of unity and diversity are between interactive and cosmopolitan multiculturalism, in the middle way of grounded cosmopolitanism.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as “Identity Blending”

In the intrapersonal sphere, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is about reconciling all the identities inside oneself,” according to Professor Gerardus. In the context of college life, Professor Gerardus identifies two main predispositions to identity among UGM students. A few students “defend” their primordial attachments, mainly through religious fundamentalism and marginally through ethnic isolation. Most students “blend” a variety of sources of identification from with-in and with-out their group: “They play with differences in their own terms and celebrate being Indonesian in plural terms, for example by using various symbols that they find in campus and attach to their bodies.” In the later chapter on campus life, I will provide examples of defensive and blending responses in the context of higher education. Here, I present some overarching comments. According to my theoretical framework, the meaning of Bhinneka Tungga Ika as identity blending is close to grounded cosmopolitanism and to Budianta’s (2004) approach to multiculturalism, with their emphasis on hybrid identity.

With regard to the defending stand, in earlier sections I have reported on the predicaments of Javanization, Islamization, and minorities’ defensive ethno-religious reactions. Students also reveal constraints to their processes of hybridization. A Muslim gay participant explains,

In Indonesia we cannot be different—for example, a lesbian and Muslim at the same time. We only have two spaces, “they” or “we,” we do not have space in-between where

we can be “them” and “us.” What kind of diversity is that? It is not only about day and night, but also about mornings, afternoons, evenings, nights.

A Buddhist Javanese student also criticizes narrow approaches to identity in Indonesia, while implicitly accepting the indigenous/nonindigenous dichotomy:

If you are Javanese, you must be Muslim or Christian. If you are Chinese you can only be Christian or Buddhist. If you are Balinese, you must be Hindu. There is no more choices. But, if you go to Borobudur or other Buddhist temples, you will not see Chinese people only, but also Indonesians, local people!

In terms of the blending posture, students mix ethnic, religious, and national as well as global allegiances in a myriad of individualized combinations. For example, participants who move to Yogya for college adopt the “Yogyakartaese” characteristics that they like, such as smiling, being soft spoken, and having gentle manners. An informant from Jakarta started to admire the Yogyakartaese collectivism: “People here are welcoming, humble, *gotong royong* and do not live individualistically as in Jakarta; now Yogyakarta suits me more and I do not want to live in Jakarta anymore.” The hybridization of ethno-national sources of identity is well described by Professor Erwin’s personal accounts:

When I left [island in Eastern Indonesia] to become a student at UGM, I became less [Eastern Indonesian], I started looking at the bigger scope. I learned that expressing our differences is important *and* that not insulting other people is also important. So I have to strike the balance between how to make sure I am still [Eastern Indonesian] and at the same time part of the larger society. My feeling of being [Eastern Indonesian] is always

changing, fluid, unstable, and fragmented as a result of dealing with so many people from different backgrounds.

The blending approach can stretch to international terrains, where students add cosmopolitan influences to their grounded identity. Students enjoy a lifestyle that is international, including traveling across Indonesia, studying abroad, dating peers from other countries, and dressing and behaving more worldly. I met students with boyfriends from Australia, Japan, and the United States. They are proud of their international affiliations; for instance, a student from Bali mastered Japanese language and mentions that his island is “the main gate of Indonesia to the international world.” A student journalist feels a “citizen of the world” when she interviews diverse voices and some participants are part of a youth peace organization that advocates universal solidarity for all marginalized communities.

Their life is infused with virtual experiments through ebooks, online news, blogs, Wikipedia, Google Translate, social media, and Blackberry messaging. Professor Erwin notes that “students estheticize themselves with a Che Guevara t-shirt and a Japanese kimono; they can be revolutionary on the blog or facebook.” Based on my observations, I could provide numerous similar examples of hybridity. I met many female students wearing all sorts of headscarves, with a Playboy bunny sticker on their helmet and rushing home to watch Korean soap operas. They use their smart cell phones to check online the latest trend on how to tighten the veil and to dance a Lady Gaga’s choreography. The hybridization between primordial and broader allegiances continues after graduation. Among the faculty, Professor Gerardus feels “100% Indonesian, 100% [Eastern Indonesian], 100% Catholic, and 100% part of this world community, without the

need to trade off.” Now some of my participants have graduated and are working in Japan or pursuing graduate studies in Australia and England, with the objective to return to Indonesia and thrive.

However, most students do not sacrifice their ethno-religious and national belongings for global and humanist references. They are *both*, all of them. For example, they believe in and act upon pluralist values, but they also want to preserve their primordial attachments. They enjoy popular culture and global goods, while simultaneously criticizing reckless capitalism in higher education. They find English trendy and appealing, yet they also enjoy speaking Indonesian and their local languages. An interviewee recalls his unusual decision of moving from Sulawesi to Java to attend a pesantren in high school, but soon dropping out because of the strict rules; for example, pupils could speak English and Arabic only, and they were punished physically if heard communicating in Indonesian or their native language. He wants to speak all four languages, not being forced into two. Students desire to be “modern.” For example, a student mentions, “Jakarta is a modernized city, where people abandon traditional life, so what defines me is the capital, being from Jakarta.” And yet, he also describes how he is committed to his family’s values and religious beliefs.

This ability for hybridity can be misunderstood as renouncing grounded belongings for global influences. Only a student finds that “youth do not know, or do not want to show, their identity because they like to live in pop culture; globalization is the unity in diversity they are interested in, not the local contexts.” In regard to consumer culture, Professor Erwin suggests that students are not Indonesian, but “consumers, with no specific ethnic tensions, because they

want to be the same by sharing the same symbols; for example, they all use a mobile phone, but you cannot create your national identity by a mobile phone.” Besides these two voices, no other participant report an irresolvable conflict across local, national, and global memberships; participants resolve any possible tensions in their own ways.

Among the myriad of conflicting international influences, students select what suits them the most. For instance, a Hindu student resists religious customs from overseas (e.g., Hari Krishna groups): “We do not need to be somebody else to conduct our beliefs.” Most Muslim students criticize the Wahabi pressure from the Middle East: “The Middle East is a total different place and wants to change our society into Arab.” At the same time, a minority of Muslim students prefer to purify Indonesian Islam according to stringent Middle Eastern demands. In this latter case, adopting international cultural resources limits, rather than adds to, grounded belongings. Other ethnic traits, such as language and customs, remain. Yet, overall hybridization is restricted, because new influences replace, rather than being added to, pre-existing belongings.

Summary

In this chapter, I started by reporting on how students use the term *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as a synonym of multiculturalism in the Indonesian setting. The word multiculturalism broadly means the manner of responding to a plurality of cultures, rather than a specific ideology that relates to the U.S. or other foreign contexts. Ninety-seven percent of the survey participants believe that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is important for the well-being of Indonesia. However, 24% of the respondents point out that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is an ideal that cannot become reality.

Students and professors view Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a historical concept, a sense of togetherness and altruism, and a process of identity blending.

Throughout history, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (a) emerged as unity that attempts to represent all diversity, in the 14th century and at independence time; (b) evolved into unity that imposes Javanization, partially during the Sukarto government and more prominently during the Suharto regime; and (c) became parochialism (i.e., Javanization, Islamization, and defensive reactions by minority groups) that threatens unity after 1998.

In the interpersonal sphere, participants approach Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a sense of togetherness and altruism. They feel different but united. They frame Indonesian differences within primordial attachments as well as within an infinite number of possible belongings because “all humans are unique.” Students and faculty point out that the humanist and transnational significance of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which (a) was part of the original usage of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in Mpu Tantular’s poem in the 14th century, (b) remained in the establishment of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as the national motto at the time of independence in the 20th century, and (c) still endures in the 21st century because it allows Indonesia “to face globalization” while “holding on core ethics.” Participants frame Indonesian unity based on the history of self-determination (i.e., the continuous commitment to the oath of youth and the Pancasila), the goal of shared prosperity (i.e., overcoming suffering and sharing primordial attachments that benefit the whole country), and the common diversity (i.e., each group is different from others and can contribute to make Indonesia unique in the world).

In the intrapersonal realm, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* refers to identity blending—“reconciling all the identities inside oneself.” At UGM a few students “defend” their primordial attachments, mainly through religious fundamentalism and marginally through ethnic self-segregation. Most students “blend” a variety of sources of identification from with-in and with-out their group. Within this latter position, some students criticize narrow approaches to identity, which constrain their processes of hybridization in Indonesia. The mixing of ethnic, religious, national and global allegiances can result in a myriad of individualized combinations. Most students add and integrate local, national, and international influences. By contrast, a minority of Muslim students abandon local traditions to adopt stringent foreign demands from the Middle East.

Chapter 6: Provisions for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in University Regulations

As discussed earlier, students and faculty think of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a historical concept, a sense of togetherness and altruism, as well as a process of identity blending without dominance by any group. Participants agree that their views of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika have not been fully implemented in society. Yet, partial attempts have been made. In chapter six to nine, I present informants' views of the barriers, supports, and potentials for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika at UGM. These accounts illustrate their concepts of unity in diversity in the reality of the university. Participants have heterogeneous thoughts about Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Therefore, their actions, critiques, and propositions for change about the university are also varied. These information are relevant for my second question: What are the supports, barriers, and potentials for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in the Indonesian higher education context? In chapter 10, I will propose that a "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika education" (or an education based upon grounded cosmopolitanism) means to support the agency to blend grounded and cosmopolitan allegiances within a hybrid identity.

In this chapter, I report on the participants' accounts about how UGM has executed Bhinneka Tunggal Ika through its mission design, admission processes, and faculty recruitment. In the chapters 7-9, I will consider other three relevant areas that participants underline: curriculum, teaching and research, as well as campus life. For each area, I report on what enables, hinders, and could further sustain Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. In regard to the paths for improvement, I only list specific recommendations that add to the initiatives that participants have already either endorsed (so they should be kept) or rejected (so they should be removed).

Ultimately, a comprehensive approach to plurality is needed, including interventions across formal and informal practices, overt and hidden discourses, so that the implicit potential of the university as a contact zone can flourish (as also proposed by my scholars of multicultural education and critical theories).

The survey results provide some overarching perspectives about the status of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at UGM. In my methodology chapter, I have provided explanations about the survey that are important in understanding the following information. Students affirm that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* should be promoted by universities (96%) and by college graduates in their private and professional lives (92%). According to 94% of the participants, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is supported at UGM by students, administrators, and professors. Discrimination is considered rare at UGM—9% of questionnaire takers state that at UGM there is discrimination based on religion and ethnicity.

Mission

The leading values of UGM are the foundational support for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* within the institution. In a student's words, "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the reason for Indonesia and also for UGM to exist." The vision of UGM is "to be an excellent and innovative world class university, imbued with nation's cultural values based on Pancasila as the state ideology and dedicated to the nation's interest and humanity" (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). Its mission is "to carry out education, research and community service as well as preservation and development of knowledge that is excellent and useful for society" (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). UGM has four identities (*jatidiri*), namely being (a) a national university,

(b) a Pancasila university, (c) a university of the struggle (*universitas perjuangan*) or of the people (*universitas kerakyatan*) for a better society, and (d) a cultural university. According to interviewees, the four foundational pillars of UGM are still valid and are “one of the uniqueness to be at UGM.” They demonstrate that “we believe in pluralism, tolerance, and unity, with each person providing for others,” according to Professor Sunardi. Professor Erwin states that they “mean a lot in terms of values and orientations of our teaching.” Recently, a fifth aspiration has been added to the UGM mission—to become an international world-class research institution. These five goals foster *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in various manners.

First, UGM is the original national university (*universitas nasional, universitas kebangsaan*) that was built by Indonesian people at the time of independence from the Dutch colony. It was envisioned by the nationalists and the sultan of Yogyakarta as a “miniature of Indonesia,” with students from all religions, ethnicities, and provinces. Professor Gerardus explains that “it is very important for this county, not only for UGM, to make sure that every part of the community has its place here at this university.” The 2012 incoming rector adds,

We try our best to have students, lecturers, and researchers coming from the whole country regardless of their religion and ethnicity. They have the opportunity to be in the highest position in this university—the first rector was Yogyakartaese; the second rector was Timorese; others were from Aceh, Bangka-Belitung, and Madura; I am from East Java and my predecessor was from Central Java.

Second, UGM was founded to foster both knowledge (*kehilmuya*) and the Pancasila. Professor Agus notes that “all our subjects and programs should have these two principles

because here we develop science and values—this is the characteristic of UGM, not of other universities.” Professor Dimas affirms that “UGM developed the school of thought of how Pancasila should be implemented in Indonesia.” Pancasila is also viewed as a basis for ethics, which ties to the next mission.

Third, UGM is the university of the struggle, or of the people, because its goal is to prepare the leaders who can improve the country and the world. Universities are generally valued as the source of future leaders in Indonesia, and UGM is regarded as a prime creator of leadership along with UI (*Universitas Indonesia*), IPB (*Institut Pertanian Bogor* or Bogor Agricultural University), and ITB (*Institut Teknologi Bandung* or Bandung Institute of Technology). Professor Zainuddin foresees that “in the coming few years the people who are now studying at the university will be the actors.”

Faculty members and students agree that academics and character building are equally important, in order to develop leaders who “care for the marginalized” and “give to society.” The latest UGM slogan, named “CORNEA” underlines the principles of intelligence (*cerdes*), organization, religiosity, nationalism, elegance, and responsibility (*amanah*). Other key values include collaboration as well as dialogue across domestic and international divides. For example, the “UGM character” is about “seeing others as friends rather than competitors.” The 2012 incoming rector believes that “strong leaders will come from diverse campuses, where they trained on managing complexity through dialogue.” Professor Patra also sees the university as “strategic institution, where young generations have the opportunity to sense the feeling to be united diversity.” The NGO representative states that universities have to be the leading

examples of “how to execute *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in reality; if the college population does not respect others, how can we expect the average people in Indonesia to do it?”

Cultivating these leaders’ attitudes is seen as vital for Indonesia. Professor Thomas asks, “Can you imagine the damage alumni can make if they have no strong multiculturalism?” The consequences would be very serious. According to the president of a university in Timor, “If higher education does not train now the next generation to be sensible about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, the unity of Indonesians is a question mark; we have already lost East Timor and we could lose Aceh or Papua.”

Fourth, UGM is the cultural university because it is located in Yogyakarta, often referred to as the capital of both tolerance and highest Javanese culture. Participants agree that there is a mutual relationship between Yogyakarta and UGM—UGM contributes to Yogyakarta with its critical minds and Yogyakarta influences UGM with its values of “inclusiveness for all” and “love for local cultures.”

On one hand, Yogyakarta is a special and unique city, which shows that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is possible in Indonesia. It exemplifies the “miniature of Indonesia, where pluralism and peace prevail.” Professor Patra contrasts Yogyakarta to the Balkan region and wonders if Indonesia history will move towards the unity of Yogyakarta or the divisions of former Yugoslavia. A student explains, “Whoever you are, of whatever identity, from whatever backgrounds, you can live in Yogya.” For example, in her Buddhist temple, “Christians and Muslim women with the veil meditate together; this would not happen in other cities.” She brought me to several places of worship, schools, and events where people of various ethno-

religious backgrounds converge to study, pray, or dialogue, including a pesantren for transgendered students. Other sections of this dissertation will confirm participants' positive views about Yogyakarta, as they relate to a wide array of matters.

Participants view the sultan as the root of the city inclusiveness, due to his commitment to education and pluralism. They remark that “the history of UGM is about the sultan’s love for education—he gave space for this university.” Today, Yogyakarta is designated as a center of learning by the existence of 120 state and private tertiary educational institutions, with a student population of over 300,000 (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). Students point out that “the sultan is very tolerant,” “accommodates all people from different cultures,” “does not force the university to choose only the Javanese.” Yet, he is also firm in rejecting religious extremism; for example, through public statements about protecting local cultures from Arabic influences and demanding fundamentalist Islamic organizations “to get out, because here is unity in diversity.” The staff of the *kraton* (sultan’s residency) also leads demonstrations in support of peace and pluralism. As a result, fanatic Islamic organizations rarely attack sites in Yogya; for example, their intervention in the Manji’s case, which I will explain later, shocked the community because “it never happens in Yogya.”

On the other hand, Yogyakarta is well-known for valuing and protecting its traditional culture. For this reason, the sultan remains the governor, syncretic Javanese Islam is still practiced, and a class on the local language, Javanese, is mandatory in all k-12 schools. In regard to the latter point, all local languages struggle to survive and further develop, because Indonesian is the official “neutral” language, including in schools. Although Javanese is spoken by the

largest ethnic group, people tend to use it only for conversation and with increasingly limited attention to vocabulary, syntax, and levels of formality. In addition, Yogyakartaese culture is associated with kindness, politeness, and humility. During my travels across the archipelago, people often referred to Yogyakartaese manners as the nicest in Indonesia as well as different from the rest of the Java.

The fifth mission was added in 2007—“to be a World Class Research University (WCRU), which is oriented toward meeting the needs of the nation, based on Pancasila” (retrieved from <http://ugm.ac.id/en/>). The aspiration towards internationalization is overt. As the 2012 incoming rector says, “We want to become one of best universities in the world.” The process of identity blending, which I presented in the previous chapters, can also extend to institutions. UGM integrates grounded (i.e., primordial and national) and cosmopolitan (i.e., universalist and global) influences. UGM provisions for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* illustrate the interplay of these memberships, as well as UGM attempts to resist accommodative multiculturalism. I consolidate here examples from chapter six to nine.

With regard to university regulations, the mission of UGM is to be a world class research university, embedded in the local fabric while serving humanity. UGM attempts to find a balance between domestic and international objectives. “Affirmative actions” and ad hoc scholarships reach out to qualified students across the archipelago, despite governmental demands for standardized admissions and inadequate financial support. At the same time, foreign students are encouraged to join UGM international degrees in English or regular degrees in Indonesian language; they pay higher tuitions and are accepted in the “right” number in order to leave

“enough” space for Indonesian students (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2011a). The ministry is finally adjusting its policies in order to reflect both domestic and international needs. The national law Number 12 Year 2012 indicates that all public universities should place special attention on recruiting both domestic unprivileged students and foreign applicants. Faculty members tend to be UGM alumni with graduate degrees from abroad.

In terms of curriculum, UGM provides the most comprehensive list of majors in Indonesia. Courses range from intercultural communication and international politics, to indigenous psychology and Pancasila economics. UGM requires students to attend classes on community service, Pancasila, and English language, which are respectively linked to local, national, and global values. The community service program is internationally renowned and has served as example for numerous countries. The campus is alive with artistic events from various provinces, national summits on controversial topics, and international conferences. For instance, seminars discuss how local solutions (e.g., herbal medicine) and national values (e.g., Pancasila) can resolve global issues. International initiatives are contextualized, such as for the Fulbright interfaith training on LGBT issues in Yogyakarta. Despite its cancellation due to security reasons, Manji’s planned presentation (discussed in the chapter on curriculum) shows the willingness of UGM to discuss matters that are controversial nationally and internationally. Teaching and research bring in local knowledge, international scholars, and humanist values. Campus life is entrenched with processes of hybridization, especially through experiences of intercultural contact.

UGM approaches internationalization as contributing to and from global knowledge. Most participants insist that national and international standards should never limit local inclusiveness and representation within the university. Yet, they do not accept all primordial influences unconditionally; for example, they reject teachings that are infused with Muslim values, rather than with humanism. They ask for a wider spectrum of foreign references to draw from, including more Indonesian translations of non-English texts in order “to build more solid global citizenship and to gain broader global perspectives.” In addition to national authors as H.A.R. Tillar, students and professors admire foreign writers, including Karl Marx (Germany), Ali Shariati (Iran), Antonio Gramsci (Italy), Ikujiro Nonaka (Japan), Muhammad Iqbal (Pakistan), Edward Said (Palestine/USA), and Benedict Anderson (UK/USA).

Participants appreciate the increasing international presence on campus, because it encourages UGM to provide wider services for everyone, including minority students. For instance, some cafeterias are remaining open during Ramadan, in order to demonstrate that UGM takes care of its foreign community and is committed to become a global campus. International degree programs are more innovative than their domestic counterparts. They do not admit students based on the national examination, but on a variety of criteria. Their curriculum includes an interreligious course and interactive pedagogy. Foreign students in domestic degree programs are also free to enroll, or not, in the monoreligious class that they prefer.

Indonesian concepts that can be offered to the international discourse include *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, Pancasila, the model of Yogyakartaese pluralism, local values and practices, and Indonesian views of Islam. UGM is aiming to produce intellectuals who can be important for the

world. Students believe that UGM benefits from international students, value the learning on global matters that they have acquired at UGM, and hope to work in international organizations upon graduation.

Ultimately, grounded and cosmopolitan belongings are framed in terms of *and/and* not *either/or*. Local, national, and global traits are seen as all important and complementary. The UGM community is constantly searching for “what works for us, what is best for us, what is the fit for Indonesia,” according to Professor Helen. She adds, “We can take some from the US but not all; we need a special formula for Indonesia.” This is a widespread challenge across the archipelago. The president of the university in Timor emphasizes that “universities neglect local cultures and promote the idea that the university is universal, regular; but what is universal and regular? American? European? We do not know.”

UGM’s espoused values appear across campus, from banners to street names (e.g., Jalan Pancasila, Jalan Tri Dharma) and t-shirts at the campus bookstore. In the latter case, the merchandise evokes the UGM pride to be the first national university that continues to be academically excellent and socially engaged, while also expanding into an international institution. Some UGM t-shirts illustrate grounded pride: “The 1949 rule of success,” “The best never ending,” “Superstar of education,” “United top creative talent,” “Be a good designer in Indonesia.” Others feature global and humanist aspirations: “Worldwide campus,” “Born to color the world,” “Lifetime learning,” “Sharpening your brain,” “Broadening your insight,” “Stop global warming.”

Student Admissions

The UGM process of undergraduate admissions is complex and contested. On one hand, the ministry prioritizes merit and requires public universities to admit students according to national examination results only. This standardized assessment creates an imbalance in student representation, because top applicants tend to be from cities in Java, where the best K-12 schools and overall development are concentrated. During my field study, I met teenagers who moved from Eastern Indonesia to boarding schools in Yogyakarta, in order to receive a better education and succeed in the national examination. The daughter of the president of the university in Timor is also doing the same.

On the other hand, UGM prioritizes both merit and diversity, thus it needs a variety of instruments for admissions. According to all participants, since its origin UGM has been a pioneer institution in creating “affirmative actions” in order to recruit students from all provinces. Upon its establishment, UGM was a strong nationalist institution; it built the first generations of Indonesian intellectuals across the archipelago. After 1998, reaching out to diverse students started to become more difficult, due to the ethno-religious conflicts in various parts of Indonesia and the growth of standardization in education. However, UGM attempts have endured. For example, in early 2000s, UGM employed both national examination and an ad hoc “UGM exam.” Upon pressure by the ministry, in 2011 UGM replaced its ad hoc exam with an “invitation process.” According to a professor, “the central government does not allow us to have our own selection, so we say: ‘this is not a selection, this is an *invitation*’” (I will explain these two options of admissions later).

Before introducing the findings, I want to re-emphasize the predicaments of representation in a country with hundreds of ethnic groups, languages, official and unofficial religions scattered across 6,000 inhabited islands. Indonesia is also a developing country with the fourth highest population on the planet; thus, financial constraints are a significant factor for both government and citizens. Flying to Java and covering all college expenses is impossible for most Indonesians. Although UGM students from outside Java are a minority (17%), they are more numerous than in other universities and they impact the overall students' development, as I will report in the later chapter on campus life. Students have never experienced as much diversity as at UGM in their lives. Most of my interviewees were from middle-class families; only a few were from the working-class or the upper-class. They explain that they “studied hard” and their families “worked hard” in order for them to attend UGM. In chapter 10, I will point out the connection of representation at UGM with multicultural education, intercultural contact theory, and notions of university as a public sphere.

Admission data. This section is based on public data that the UGM administration provided in 2012. UGM is a competitive and popular institution. Incoming students at UGM range from 15,757 in 2008 to 15,951 in 2011, including all degree seekers (e.g., undergraduate degrees, diploma study programs, master and specialist degrees, doctorate programs). Incoming undergraduate students for B.A. and B.S. (*Sarjana 1* or S1 in the Indonesian system) range from 5,636 in 2008 to 7,612 in 2011. Between 2007 and 2013, 4.93% of the applicants were accepted. Some departments are more competitive than others—the three most selective degrees are Computer Science in the college of Mathematics and Natural Sciences (1.76%), Health Nutrition

in the college of Medicine (2.08%), and Medical Education in the college of Medicine (2.30%), whereas the three least selective degrees are Archipelago Literature in the college of Cultural Studies (31.60%), Animal Science and Industry (35.87%), and Philosophy (38.98%). UGM is also a popular choice—in 2012-2013, 92.88% of the admitted students accepted the offer (registration data are not available for other years). The numbers of application and selection on the two existent tracks of admissions are also balanced; in 2012-2013, 54.27% of the applications were invitation-based (*Undangan*) and the remaining 45.73% was national examination-based (*Terlulis*); the admission rate was 5.95% for the invitation track and 7.05% for the national examination track.

At UGM students coming from outside Java are underrepresented, despite the various and persistent forms of affirmative action. The comparison between national census and UGM data on distribution according to province for the year 2010 shows that residents in Java constitute 57.49% of Indonesian population, while undergraduate students from Java at UGM are 82.99%. On the other hand, students from Sumatra are 10.72% rather than 21.31%, students from Kalimantan are 3.42% rather than 5.80%, students from Sulawesi are 0.54% rather than 7.31%, students from Bali are 1.21% rather than 1.64%, students from Nusa Tenggara are 0.60% rather than 3.86%, students from Papua are 0.47% rather than 1.51%, and students from Maluku are 0.04% rather than 1.08%. The discrepancy is also at the graduate level, but at a lesser degree. Although I do not have data on just graduate students, the combined information on incoming undergraduate and graduate students equal to 76.49% for participants from Java in the year 2010. This overrepresentation is consistent over the years as shown by the data from 2008-2012.

At UGM, distributions according to religion and gender represent the national data (Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics, 2010). Between the academic years 2006-2007 and 2012-2013, of the undergraduate students: 84.85% were Muslim, 6.39% were Catholic, 6.97% were Protestant, 1.13% were Hindu, 0.53% were Buddhist, 0.13% were Others (including Confucian). In the same years, 50.79% of the students were female; yet, discrepancies exist across majors, with the lowest enrollment in the college of Engineering (29.05%) and the highest presence in the college of Dentistry (80.54%).

Admission procedures. Professor Bimo explains that “the relationship of UGM with the Ministry of Education is a long story,” swinging back and forth between autonomy and centralization. Within the government, the decision making is controlled by the ministry (level one), director general (level two), and director (level three). At UGM, both rector and board of regents have executive power. Since 2000, state centralization has increased; for instance, by assigning to UGM the status of State-Owned Legal Entity (*Badan Hukum Milik Negara*, BHMN) (also confirmed in Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2009, p. 6). In addition, the central government has designed a centralized system of selection based on national examinations.

However, Law Number 12 Year 2012 has increased university autonomy. The law indicates that all public universities have to accept *at least* 60%, rather than 100%, of students through national examination. In addition, it gives special support to matters of social class and campus internationalization, by encouraging universities to admit 20% of students from the lower economic status as well as foreign countries. Each university is free to choose the specifics about the implementations (at the time of my field study in 2012, universities were just starting

to consider possible strategies). The 2012 outgoing rector explains that “UGM always attempts to develop more autonomy and accountability because the central authority sees universities as average, but UGM, IPB, UI are not average.”

According to national law, students can apply to public universities up to two years from their high-school graduation (e.g., a high school graduate in 2012 can apply for Fall 2012, 2013, and 2014—a maximum of three times). Every year, students can apply for a maximum of two public institutions, two majors each, for a total of four options in order of preference. If they are accepted, they must register; if not they will be “black listed” for two years, which means that they will never be able to access public institutions due to the two-year cut off. Therefore, applicants must be strategic with their choices. To clarify the process, let me explain a scenario of a high-school graduate who wants to enter medicine at UGM. The student first indicates medicine at UGM as her sole choice. If rejected, she tries again. If rejected, she has a last chance to enter public universities; she selects medicine at UGM as her first choice and adds three other alternatives. In addition, she applies to international programs at UGM as well as to private universities, which do not have the same restrictions. Public universities announce the admission results first, so students have time to meet the later application deadlines for private universities. Once registered into a major at UGM, students cannot change it.

The undergraduate national entrance examination (*Ujian Masuk Perguruan Tinggi Negeri*) is offered on the same day throughout the archipelago, in various cities in each province, usually at state universities. The exam on social sciences (*Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial, IPS*) is in the early morning and the exam on natural sciences (*Ilmu Pengetahuan Alam, IPA*) is in late

morning. Students can take both exams (*Ilmu Pengetahuan Campuran*, IPC) if they are applying for both types of majors. The disciplinary partition between social and natural sciences starts in the second year of high school, when students are placed on distinct tracks, based on their grade: “If you have enough good grades, you are put automatically into natural science because it has higher status.” In the cases of similar exam scores, UGM has 28 indicators to select students according to backgrounds and special talents, such as in sports, arts, and scholastic achievements related to the major (e.g., biology gold medal for biology major). Through these criteria, UGM attempts to reach out to diverse students. These 28 indicators are also used in the invitation track (I was not given the list of indicators).

The invitation system involves local high-schools, district officials, and private corporations. Each high-school can recommend up to 50%, 30%, 15%, or 5% of its best graduates, based on the accreditation status (i.e., schools with the higher accreditation status can recommend more students). UGM does not accept applicants from non-accredited schools or schools that defrauded in the past. The headmaster of the high-school enters the online system with a password and starts the application for each invited student who will later complete it. Hard-copies of documents are sent as proof of validity. Among the invited applicants, students who agree to pay the highest tuition (SPMA4) follow a special admission track (School Based Assessment, *Pentaksiran Berasaskan Sekolah*, PBS).

A total of four different levels of tuition exist, depending on parents' salaries (Contribution of Academic Quality Improvement, *Sumbangan Peningkatan Mutu Akademik*, SPMA). Besides the PBS track, the Admissions staff does not see the students' finances until the

selection is made, so decisions are not influenced by a household's income that determines the tuition level. UGM makes the final selection by applying its 28 indicators, which consider diversity, as I explained previously. The invitation by high-school has limitations, such as favoring high-accreditation institutions—which tend to be located in Java—and students who can afford to pay the PBS tuition—who come from wealthy families. However, it does allow UGM to reach out to all accredited schools across the archipelago and select students who would have not entered based on their national exam scores.

In addition, the invitation process involves districts and corporations, which provide scholarships for students from their areas. Across the archipelago, UGM collaborates with about fifty-eighty districts (i.e., subdivision of provinces). University staff meet the various education authorities (*dinas pendidikan*) to introduce programs and requirements so they can forward the information to high school principals. Each principal selects the best students and UGM makes the final decisions for admissions. Local governments provide five-to-ten scholarships for their students. UGM also works with enterprises like Chevron, Pertamina (state oil and natural gas mining company), and Perusahaan Listrik Negara (state electricity company). These companies tend to be in islands with high natural resources (e.g., Papua and Kalimantan) and provide scholarship for students from those areas.

To fill the possible gap in incoming students' scholastic preparation, UGM Academic Affairs (*Rektorat Akademik*) has been providing the so-called *matrikulasi* or “bridge program,” which helps students understand academic requirements and strengthen competency in their field of study so they can succeed. Professor Sunardi explains that this initiative is for undergraduate

students from Papua and Maluku, as per central government regulations. Participants must complete the program in order to continue their degree. The length of the program varies between three to six months in the summer, fall or spring of their freshman year. The content is partially designed by the faculty because they know the needs of the academic major.

Participants agree that both merit and diversity must be criteria for admissions. Students have to be able to manage the workload at a top institution like UGM. At the same time, they have to represent the whole country, because diversity is crucial for both UGM mission and student development. Professor Agus finds that “if we only admit by merit, just people in Java can study at UGM, so we would be a regional university, not a national university.” Professor Gerardus suggests that “we cannot simply forget about students from impoverished areas because they do not meet the qualifications—what would happen?” The 2012 incoming rector adds,

UGM has the responsibility to develop justice and to make the development more equal. So, we have to give priority to remote, poor, and underdeveloped regions. This is not the concern of one or two people; this is the concern of the majority of the people of UGM. Diversity is also key for student “cognitive and practical development.” The widespread conviction is that “students cannot learn to respect people from other provinces, religions, and perspectives if they have nobody to practice with.” According to the 2012 outgoing rector, “diversity provides a kind of challenge so students can discuss their problems and think about solutions for the future. We encourage them to know each other and, by default, we think that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* will come.” The widespread appreciation for diversity is depicted by the

survey results as well—93% of the participants believe that UGM benefits from students of all religions, ethnicities, and nationalities. In chapter 10, I will examine how intercultural experiences at UGM compare to existent studies on contact theory.

Participants believe that the limited representation on campus is caused by structural issues that are outside UGM control. The government is seen as the primary problem because it does not provide the same infrastructure and services across the whole archipelago. In addition, it hinders diversity through inadequate admission regulations and financial support for education, including scholarships. Professor Patra affirms that “there is never enough money in education to allow students to perform well—poor students have no chance.”

Due to the lack of public investment into education, UGM tuition and living expenses are out of reach for the majority of Indonesian youth, especially for students who have to travel afar. Students find that UGM is increasingly a “business-driven enterprise” because departments that charge higher tuition can offer better facilities and services. Each major at UGM determines its own tuition (e.g., Medicine is among the most expensive departments). Professor Helen clarifies that UGM costs less than most private universities: approximately one million rupiah (\$100) per term, for a maximum of twenty-four credits per term, three credits per each class. This is confirmed by a student who mentions that he pays “75,000 rupiah (\$7.5) per credit, whereas “UI costs 300,000 rupiah per credit (\$30).” Upon admission, students also have to pay a one-time fee, which is determined by family’s salary. Students report paying from 5-15 million rupiah (\$500-1,500) if they entered through national examination, to 35 million (\$3,500) if they entered through PBS. A participant points out that the minimum wage in Yogyakarta is 880,000 (\$88)

per month for a family with at least two children so UGM tuition are “big money.” Around 18% of the students receive free tuition based on both financial need, academic merit, and extra-curricular activities such as sports or arts. Scholarships are supported by local governments, corporations, and private businesses as well as programs that generate income.

Other reasons for the limited diversity on campus, which are also outside UGM control, include the following: (a) minorities fear discrimination in public schools so they opt for private institutions; (b) some Chinese-Indonesian students choose to study abroad, if they can afford it, to escape the sense of not belonging to their own country; (c) rural parents’ are concerned in sending their children far away from home; (d) youth prefer to enter the job market and get married rather enrolling into college; and (e) new universities are opening across the archipelago, offering closer and cheaper options to local students; however, the most prestigious universities remain in Java.

Students suggest a variety of ways to promote diversity through admissions. Seventy-three percent of the survey respondents note that UGM should give special support to students from religious and ethnic minorities. Interviewees call for a closer monitoring of the invitation system, so that biases and corruption among principals, district officials, and corporation staff do not influence the admission process. They are in favor of different tuition based on family income, but agree that wealthier candidates should not have a privileged entryway into UGM, for example, through PBS. UGM should use the invitation track to recruit students from outside Java more heavily; currently around 50% of the freshmen are accepted via invitation but only 17% of the students are from outside Java. Some students consider a quorum system, so each province

has a proportionate numbers of students, with the exception of Yogyakartaese people, “who are the hosts so they should have more seats than everyone else.”

Students’ experiences with admissions. Participants applied for a variety of majors in public and private universities in Java as well as in their native islands. UGM was their favorite option along with the other three top public universities (IPB, ITB, UI), followed by institutions that are close to their hometown or provide scholarships. Public universities are always considered of better quality than private counterparts: “My dream was to attend a public university.”

Students choose UGM because is “the best university in Indonesia.” At the time of the application, they were attracted to the diversity of UGM, where they knew that they could find peers from all backgrounds as well as fellow minority students. For example, an interviewee reports, “I wanted to know the situations of other islands.” A Buddhist participant was looking forward to finally having peers of her same religion, because in her hometown she was “the only one.” Students also valued Yogyakarta because of its rich culture, friendly manners, and limited entertainment, so they could be productive in their studies. Finally, non-Yogyakartaese students wanted “the big experience outside my safety box,” “away from my parents,” “to grow up” by themselves.

Parents were mainly concerned that their children choose majors with guaranteed professional outcomes. They also worried about their children being away from home for the first time. Most parents influence their children’s choices, during college and beyond. For instance, interviewees often mention that they do not want to disappoint their family: “In my first

semester, I was not serious and got bad grades; I felt ashamed, I did not want to let my family down.” Some students complied with parents’ requests and others did not, in regard to both major and location. Some interviewees from Yogyakarta remained at home, even though they would have preferred moving to a different city for college. Some non-Yogyakartaese informants chose UGM, rather than universities closer to home: “I did not tell my parents I applied because they would have not allowed me to.”

Participants entered UGM on distinct tracks, including through national examination, school invitation, PBS, and scholarships from the government. They took the national exam in their hometowns or a few hours away. In some cases, they had to fly to the closest examination center on a neighboring island. Few applicants enrolled in preparation courses of various lengths, whereas most peers studied on their own, through websites and friends’ book.

Students mention some ways that may have helped them be admitted into UGM, such as good high-school grades, personal motivations, leadership in local organizations, participation in international activities, and support by parents, teachers, classmates, friends, and God: “I kept praying.” When students received the notification about admission into UGM, they felt “surprised,” “happy,” “blessed,” “forever grateful.” A student recalls, “I screamed all the way home on my motorcycle.”

Faculty Recruitment

The current faculty community comes from various islands (e.g., Ambon, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Flores, Kalimantan). According to students, a few instructors are Catholic, Hindu, and Protestant, but nobody is Buddhist or Confucian. Participants agree that the current faculty is the

product of the student quotas from the past. As students lose heterogeneity, the pool of minority faculty applicants shrinks as well and hires become increasingly Javanese and Muslim. The connection between graduates and faculty is especially robust at UGM, where professors tend to be UGM alumni: “It is not a policy, it is a kind of sentiment—we think we are the best.” As faculty become more homogenous, UGM executives do too.

Minority students and faculty believe that high-status public positions are inaccessible to them in practice, although no formal barrier exists. In chapter 10, using critical theories, I will illuminate the concealed, but persuasive, dominant discourses that influence campus life. A professor explains,

I come from a minority group and I am not supposed to be in the rector position. I can be in other positions, where I feel more comfortable, happier, I can do a lot of things for others, rather than be in that critical position where I am opposed, attacked by so many forces that I cannot do anything and I lose my opportunity. So I rather move to other posts as a minority. I always tell my friends and students, “Know yourself, do not ask for what you are ineligible for, just be yourself, there are plenty of opportunities for us to express ourselves, not only in the rector and dean positions. If the community trusts you in a position, then take it. But do not be greedy to take a position that will kill you one day.”

Participants believe that a dearth of faculty representation limits the perspectives in the classrooms. Yet, they do not support affirmative actions for faculty; merit is non-negotiable at such a competitive university. As a minority professor points out: “I only have ten staff, so

affirmative action would compromise the performance of this unit. But when it comes to student recruitment, there is quite enough room for affirmative action.”

The 2012 incoming rector points out that national law on civil servants contributes to restraining the UGM’s ability to diversify its hiring. UGM is a public university and its employees are civil servants. Lecturers have to navigate a complex and fixed structure to move up the ladder to professorship, through teaching, publishing, presenting at conferences, and serving in various administrative posts within the university. Working outside UGM does not count towards promotions, even if in influential positions at prestigious institutions. The 2012 incoming rector’s explains,

We expect Indonesia to have soon a new law on civil servants (*Undang-Undang Aparatur Sivil Negara*). It is currently at the draft stage and the bureaucracy is unhappy with it because they will be endangered—strategic positions will be open for free competition, based on competence. For instance, we can recruit talented candidates at the professor level without the gradual system of points and promotions that we have right now. You can start your career at high levels because of your high qualifications, rather than from the bottom because you have not been working as civil servant up to that moment. We will be able to be more flexible and hire the faculty members we want. We can integrate educational backgrounds, competence, reputation as well as the citizenship, ethnicity, religion if we want. I am not worried with what UGM will do with the opportunity, because up to now we are very eager to maintain the diversity, the representation.

As a former dean, the 2012 incoming rector has appointed non-Muslim and non-Javanese faculty to top academic and administrative positions.

Some interesting remarks emerge about the internationalization of faculty. Many professors earned their graduate degrees abroad, including in Australia, Germany, the United States, and United Kingdom. They also collaborate on projects with international organizations (e.g., World Bank), foreign governments (e.g., Sweden and Sri Lanka), and overseas universities (e.g., in Malaysia and Japan). Faculty believe that their international experiences impacted them professionally and personally. Professor Dimas states,

The most valuable learning from my degree in the US was not about science, but about values—the US and Indonesia have very absolutely different values, 360 degree different values. I am fine with having differences so we can combine distinct values, become a new person, and live together. I do not want my students to copy their parents, but to create their own person. I tell my students and colleagues that they should go to other places with different ideas—few go to the US because it is far and expensive but many go to Malaysia, which is now ahead of Indonesia, while Indonesia used to be ahead until 20 years ago.

Most students consider these international experiences as “one of the advantages of UGM.” In their view, faculty who studied abroad expanded their multicultural lens, by learning how “to treat people equally,” “to accept differences,” and “to understand Indonesia from the outside rather than from the inside.” However, exceptions do exist; some professors with foreign degrees “still have narrow minds,” including KAMMI alumni. In addition to holding a Ph.D.

from overseas, ideal faculty also come from a variety of islands within Indonesia: “It would be much better if professors *also* brought different backgrounds within Indonesia.” Visiting professors are valued at UGM. For instance, the 2012 outgoing rector says that “although the financial support is hard, I want to implement a world view together by inviting professors from many parts of the world, so they learn about Indonesia and we learn about their countries.”

Summary

This is the first of four chapters about the barriers, supports, and potentials for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at UGM. In particular, I reported on UGM mission design, admission processes, and faculty recruitment. The process of identity blending, which I presented in the previous chapters, extends to UGM as an institution. UGM integrates grounded (i.e., primordial and national) and cosmopolitan (i.e., universalist and global) influences. UGM purposes and provisions illustrate the interplay of these memberships.

Interviewees generally view the UGM mission as the foundational support for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* within the institution. UGM admissions are situated between the ministry’s priority on merit through national examination, and UGM’s priority on both merit and diversity through “affirmative actions” (i.e., recruitment by “invitation” and “bridge program”). The predicaments of representation are substantial: around 5% of the applicants are accepted into UGM (half through national examination and half through invitation) and 83% of the students are from Java. According to the questionnaire, 73% of the respondents advocate affirmative actions to increase minority representation. Interviewees usually believe that the limited representation on campus is

caused by structural issues that are outside UGM control, including inadequate admission regulations, financial support for education, and development across the archipelago.

The current faculty community is mainly Muslim and from Java; however, a few professors are from other islands and religions. Participants believe that a dearth of faculty representation limits the perspectives in the classrooms. Minority students and professors view high-status public positions as inaccessible to them in practice, although no formal barrier exists. Faculty think that their international experiences impacted them professionally and personally. Most students favor professors with a Ph.D. from overseas *and* from a variety of islands within Indonesia. A heterogeneous student body and reform of civil servant law are seen as key in guaranteeing diversity among faculty.

Chapter 7: Provisions for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in the Curriculum

Courses

Among the Ministry of Education regulations is the requirement that all undergraduate students have to pass 144 credits, including the mandatory courses on religion, citizenship, and Indonesian language. For these compulsory classes, students have to earn a minimum of a B grade; otherwise, they have to retake the course. In addition, UGM requires students to attend a two-month community service program (*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*, KKN) as well as courses on Pancasila and English (the latter for students who have not earned a minimum of 500 points in the TOEFL exam). Each mandatory course covers at least a semester, for a minimum of three credits, as decided by each college. For instance, in some departments, student must take two semesters of Pancasila or religion, if relevant to the discipline (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2012). The president of the university in Timor clarifies that “currently most Indonesian universities have adopted community programs, so students interact with a village for two or three months while living together with peers of different ethnicities.” However, UGM is very established and massive. Some exceptions to these requirements exist, including in the religious class, as I will soon explain. Per the rector’s decree, the philosophy department designs and teaches the courses on Pancasila, citizenship, and religion. Yet, some departments—like Social and Political Sciences—find that those philosophy-based classes are not contextual and significant; thus, they “integrate more substantive perspectives.”

For the purpose of my study, I focus on courses on religion, citizenship, and Pancasila as well as community service because they are mandatory and considered the closest topics to the

value of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. Professors explain that these courses interface with one another and hold a great potential for impact, since all students have to take them. Overall, they “build the consciousness that students are from different academic departments and personal backgrounds, but together in helping Indonesia for the future.” In chapter 10, I will connect these findings on overt and hidden curricula with critical theories and multicultural education.

Before moving into the discussion of each mandatory course, I want to point out that youth learn about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* from first grade throughout college, especially in mandatory classes on civics and Pancasila (*Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan*, PPKN), morals, and history. It is never a prominent subject and tends to lessen as pupils move up in grade. Children learn about the flag, mottos, and constitution as well as values of respect and cooperation. Instructional methods include attending the “Monday’s ceremony of the flag” and participating in the *gotong royong* (mutual assistance or pitching in), which is “a symbol that we do better together.” Examples in the lessons are about “helping a person who gets into an accident” and “greeting people from other religions properly.” Students believe that “being exposed to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* since an early age is important in order “to create the mindset about diversity in this country: we are different but one country, Indonesia.” However, they find that the teachings about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* are superficial, disconnected from reality, and irrelevant for daily practice: “I did not understand *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* well and did not know how to implement it in reality; it was just a topic to memorize in order to pass the exam.”

Community service. The community service program (*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*, KKN) is “a unique learning activity for undergraduate students that has been running since 1971; its main

goal is to increase students' empathy and to empower the low income communities/societies to solve their problems" (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2010a). Professor Wisono is the head of the Institute for Research and Community Service (*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat*, LPPM), which includes the KKN unit. He explains the program in detail. In his words, "KKN contributes to make UGM very special in Indonesia." It has received international awards, including from the United Nations University in Tokyo in 2007, and is one of the forty regional centers of expertise. He affirms that "KKN is working, it is a very good model for universities; all universities should have it."

Each year 7,000 UGM students move to villages for two months of community service. Around 4,000 students opt to go during their summer vacation, in July and August, while the rest go in January and February. Usually students schedule KKN program towards the end of their degree, when "they have already learned about their academic subject, UGM character, and culture in Yogya, where people give respect to others, so it is easier for the lecturer to deliver the program." Each group collaborates on a project and consists of a faculty leader, four additional professors, and a minimum of thirty students from different disciplines. It takes approximately a year to arrange for the project in collaboration with ministries, local governments, industries, and other universities. The community service course has also international connections, including with Australia, Czech Republic, Germany, Malaysia, and Netherlands. UGM students go abroad and foreign students come to UGM.

UGM provides around 200 topics every year and Professor Wisono lists a few examples. The Ministry of Fisheries/Maritime Affairs donates transport on ships to Saban islands in

Northern Sumatra so that students can learn about biodiversity and sustainable economy in coastal communities. In conjunction with the Community Empowerment Learning (*Pembelajaran Pemberdayaan Masyarakat*, PPM), students help building small enterprises in the areas of technology, management, and marketing. Over the years, KKN has developed the best literacy program in the country. While other initiatives by the government and Ministry of Education take at least six months to teach basic reading, the UGM program takes only two months by first teaching how to read in the mother tongue and then in Indonesian. Some of the interviewees attended KKN in rural Java and Flores, working on projects that related to waste management, tsunami prevention, and creating maps for the village.

Students report that they improved skills in time management, adaptation, and cooperation. They had to complete their project in two months. They lived in small groups with local families and had to adjust to the new setting. They had to work effectively within their UGM team as well as with community members. For instance, if they did not speak the local language, they had to rely on the head of the village and local partners to enable the project. On one hand, students learned about other cultures, local wisdom, applying knowledge, and resolving a problem with peers from different backgrounds and disciplines. On the other hand, the village improved technical expertise and met students from other parts of Indonesia. Students found the experience enjoyable and sometimes remain in contact with members of the community. They believe that KKN is useful and promotes *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, because participants strengthen intercultural capacity and serve the whole country. A Hindu student remembers,

I lived in a 100% Muslim village in Java. They were good to me, they welcomed me, they did not talk about religion, and they respected when I used my free time to pray. I also visited a neighboring village where Hindu, Muslim, and Christian people live together—they were really tolerant, all helped each other, more than in big cities.

Professors underline the importance of KKN for UGM mission and student character.

Professor Patra explains that “KKN is about experience, reflection, and helps to compensate for when the learning process in the institution does not work.” The 2012 incoming rector adds that “KKN aims to train students to have more responsibility and sensibility for the marginal groups in the remote regions.” Professor Bimo confirms that “KKN is a lesson about empathy that UGM alumni maintain and makes them different from their UI or ITB peers, for instance; UGM alumni have that sentiment—work in remote areas helping people and dealing with problems of other regions.”

Criticisms against KKN are rare. Proposals for improvement mainly refer to attention to indigenous culture, people’s movement, and practical relevance for the country. A student recommends that KKN be careful in not “invading villages and contaminating their traditional lives.” Professor Patra proposes that “community service should be a movement, rather than being institutionalized into a curriculum and a business.” Professor Erwin problematizes “the idealistic way of seeing ourselves as future leader for the marginalized.” He points out that living in a remote village can be “just a trend, a way of stylization, rather than a substantial move.” Professor Dimas looks at Japan and Thailand for better models of community service, because they connect governmental plans with university research. Students believe that KKN works

better for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* outside Java, so students can widen their perspectives about minority cultures.

Courses on Pancasila and citizenship. The courses on citizenship and Pancasila tend to overlap so participants refer to both of them simultaneously. Students recall that the two classes cover the constitution and laws. Professor Agus explains that the instructors employ both lecturing and activities, such as discussions and project-based learning. For example, students visit traditional and modern markets to examine the Pancasila economy, or they interview museum staff to better understand Indonesian history. Students believe that the purpose of these classes is important and needed in order “to put morals on students across all disciplines” and “prevent the feeling of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* to get forgotten.”

However, both students and professors heavily criticize the current curriculum and pedagogy. Students believe that “the classes do not work, because it is all just theory, rather than true comprehension and practice.” They define the courses as “nothing,” meaning easy to pass, hard to absorb, and irrelevant for their degrees: “I just want to be a nurse.” It is also redundant: “Just a repetition of the class that we took from kindergarten on.” Professors “do not even mention *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” and teach poorly. For example, they sometimes do not show up for class or leave after ten-twenty minutes. They mainly lecture from textbooks and ask students to copy notes from the white board. Even in the case of field studies, students just write a report with no discussion about it. As a result, “students do not care about those courses—everyone sleeps, chats, skips class, and arrives late.”

Philosophy Professors Agus and Tirto acknowledge the difficulty in teaching the classes effectively “with over one hundred students in a lecture hall and limited time.” They also point out that the passive learning styles that students carry on from K-12 schooling is a barrier to teaching interactively. Professor Helen indicates the conceptual predicaments around the courses: “What does it mean to be Indonesian? What skills students should acquire to implement the Pancasila? How should students approach the gap between family’s values and UGM’s views of the Pancasila?”

With regard to what actions could be taken about the two courses, students suggest to either “forget about them, get rid of them” or redesign them. Some students propose replacing the classes with a course on multiculturalism, intercultural communication, or ad hoc topics relevant to each college, such as ethnographies about various communities or studies of peace and conflict. They also advance the idea that teaching *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* should not be limited to a course: “Professors should put a little message about how to respect others and to be tolerant in all their classes, some people may not be interested but at least they hear it and maybe listen to it.” Overall, they prefer interactive pedagogies and contextual content, such as following field studies with substantial discussions. They admit that students have passive attitudes in class; thus, they propose incentive mechanisms to foster participation, such grade points.

Faculty members agree that extensive revisions of the courses are needed. Some professors view the lack of multicultural education in Indonesia as a cause of ethno-religious conflicts. Professor Zainuddin recommends that Pancasila and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* be taught “as open concepts to be discussed, interpreted, filled with more meaning, rather than just

accepted.” The 2012 incoming rector emphasizes that “the mandatory courses are not enough to facilitate appreciation for diversity; Pancasila is not just a course to be taught.” He proposes a comprehensive approach through affirmative action to recruit diverse students and faculty, intercultural student activities, and inclusive facilities. He adds that courses and every day habits are also key in understanding diversity and Pancasila. He recognizes that “it is not easy. How to translate the idea of Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in the way we are doing our job and dealing with others?” Although his words may sound rhetorical, professors and students speak highly about his commitment to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in his teaching, decision-making, and overall interaction. For example, Social and Cultural Studies faculty told me that when the 2012 incoming rector was the dean of their college, he led the idea of having interfaith praying rooms in the new building; due to the resistance of some conservative Muslim groups, such plan did not materialize. These testimonies will emerge in later chapters.

Course on religion. Departments request either one or two religion courses, for approximately two hours of lectures per week. As for the courses on citizenship and Pancasila, the philosophy department generally coordinates the religion class. The faculty of philosophy is expected “to teach religion as a science, not as propaganda.” However, some departments prefer to have one of their own faculty members teaching religion (e.g., Engineering) or to bring an instructor from off campus (e.g., Psychology).

As in K-12 schools, the government prescribes students to study their own faith. Muslim students take the Islam course within their department, whereas minority students go to the Philosophy building because they are not enough in their college to form one class. However, a

few exceptions to the national law exist. A Confucian class is not offered because “a minimum of five students is required,” a student was told by the administration. Therefore, Confucian students have to select another faith of their choice. Moreover, some students study other creeds beyond their own, such as in history and archeology majors. International students are free to take, or not, whatever religion classes that they prefer. The religion class is optional in certain departments and is about world religions—rather than one’s own creed—in international degree programs.

On one hand, some students value the fact that UGM offers different religion classes for all students, because other universities do not have this kind of arrangement. They find that studying one’s own religion is important, because it provides good knowledge and character. They believe that every religion teaches positive values, such as assisting others no matter who they are. Minority students appreciate the opportunity to meet peers of the same faith and study their own religion deeper. A Buddhist interviewee recalls the hardship of being “the only one” in K-12 school:

When the time for the religious class came, Muslim students stayed in class while all others had to leave. I went with the Catholic students because the Buddhist monk did not come just for one student. It is not a good feeling to have to leave the class and have nowhere to go. They never did anything bad to me, but being the only one in class makes you feel different and makes you wonder, “why am I the only one?” That is the question that you always have in your head.

Another Buddhist participant attended a Protestant school all his life so he appreciate the opportunity to finally take a class on his religion: “What I got from twelve years with my school teachers was that Buddhist and Hindu people pray stones and altars, and that is all wrong. But at UGM I learned that everything in Buddhism has meaning and is symbolic.”

On the other hand, most students do not find value in the religion course. They comment that it is redundant and irrelevant for their major. Almost all Muslim students condemn the Islamic Assistance (*Asistensi Agama Islam*, AAI)—weekly discussions in smaller groups that are part of the Islam course. These lessons were created to make religious education more interactive, because “a professor lecturing in front a big hall is not effective.” The instructors are senior students, who have completed the religion course previously.

Participants view AAI as “an indoctrination group, which is on paper connected to the religion class, but in reality is connected to KAMMI”—the right-wing and pious Muslim Student Action Union (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*). AAI instructors discuss Islamic material (e.g., how to pray, how to read the Quran) “without any consideration for cultural elements” and try to convert Shia, Kejawen, and Ahmadi students into their strict Sunni interpretations. They teach that “there is only one truth, Islam” and give lower grades to students who believe that “pluralism is to recognize other religions as existent and with their own truth.” The 2012 outgoing rector confirms,

The problem with AAI is that seniors with certain beliefs dictate their juniors. Muslim students who are involved in multicultural activities, even if at the mosque, do not get an

A, because their responses are not aligned with the teaching assistants' position. When I was dean in Engineering, I told them not do that, but maybe only 25% listened.

Valuable suggestions arise from the criticisms against the religion course, including making the class optional, removing it completely, or adjusting it. First, the Confucian students advocate a class for each of the officially recognized creeds, regardless of the number of adherents: "UGM should care about minority students like me and about our religions; just because we are minority, they cannot get rid of or forget about us. That is racist." Second, participants recommend that UGM allow students to enroll in the religion class they prefer: "University comes from universe, so students should be able to study anything they want here, with an open learning scope, regardless of their religion." Third, students request AAI instructors to bring inclusivist and pluralist views into the classroom. The difficulty in this endeavor is that "changing AAI requires communication at the national level with the political party that is connected to KAMMI" (more information on this topic in the forthcoming section on student organizations). Fourth, numerous students propose replacing the monoreligious course with a multireligious or interreligious class:

What is necessary is multidisciplinary discussions on ethnic and religious perspectives about the world and the Indonesian context—what are these diverse perceptions about current crises, such as energy, food security, corruption, poverty? And how do these diverse perceptions interact? Religion must have political dimensions and better social engagement.

Professor Thomas states that “when people have rich education on different religions and cultures, they can respect them. In Indonesia we have a saying *Tidak kenal, maka tidak sayang* or ‘when you do not know someone, you will not love.’” As I will explain in chapter 10, this widespread belief in the impact of diversity mirrors contact theory, which demonstrates that intercultural interaction is the precondition to breaking the cycle of segregation, ignorance, and prejudice while building effective citizenship in a multicultural society (Allport, 1954; Antonio, 2001, 2004; Chavous, 2005; Halualani et al., 2004; Sorensen et al., 2009; Wright et al., 1997).

Based on my interviews and observation at the interfaith forum, multireligious knowledge is limited; for instance, many students are not aware that Confucianism is the sixth official religion in Indonesia and that eating beef is permitted in Balinese Hinduism. Students believe that the university should be used as the place where students of different creeds can “discuss peacefully and fairly,” “gain different knowledge,” “feel each other and go deeper,” and “reach the final agreement that we have different religions because we must have others.” They opine, “We claim to be a world class research university, so we should have the values from the world and feel that we are part of it.”

This alternative curriculum should be designed attentively, including strategies to avoid debates and to promote dialogue “with open views so we can see others’ perspectives, we cannot use our own religious lenses.” For instance, a student proposes that “experts and classmates from each religion explain their faith, then the docent can introduce a certain topic and moderate the discussion.” The two students from the Protestant university emphasize the importance of interfaith praxis in society. For example, they benefitted from participating in the Peace Center’s

mediation between Christians and Muslims in Ambon or praying with people of other creeds. They also underline the importance of stopping approaching “religion as identity,” “being Indonesia as being religious.” They suggest that religion should be seen as “a way of life, which allows kindness with everyone and doing something relevant for the whole society,” rather than “identity, which becomes conflicts due to selfishness, exclusiveness, and limited discussion among Indonesians of different religions.”

Informants mention that initial attempts at UGM exist, including a class on world religions in the international programs and a variety of graduate opportunities at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) as well as ad hoc lessons in various colleges. For instance, a student from nursing explains, “In my department, we have a class on ethical dilemmas and talked about different religious opinions on controversial issues, like abortion.” However, the content can be skewed: “The teacher showed us the Bible, the Quran, and various religious books that prove that all religions oppose abortion. I agree. Abortion is mean.”

Only a handful of students disagree with multireligious or interreligious classes, mainly to avoid sensitive influences and information that is not needed. A Catholic student affirms,

I do not know much about other religions and I am not interested in knowing more because I have a good life and do not want to learn about something that maybe makes me confused or makes me think about problems. I want an easy life.

Muslim participants cite that the Prophet’s saying “my religion is my religion, and your religion is your religion” and interpret it as “my religion is my business and your religion is your business.” In other words, “there is no need to know other religions, interreligious studies, or the

specifics about what other people do; just respect others.” The two students from a Protestant university point out that most Indonesian people fear disagreements: “In daily life, when the religion topic comes up, we change subject, because we do not like conflict.”

Events

UGM hosts a variety of programs on campus about diversity that can be seen as supports to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. I will first illustrate some brief examples and then delve into one key occurrence, the Manji’s case. According to students, “UGM is promoting *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* through a lot of events across campus and many people attend to share their opinions; it is good.” They generally find UGM to be courageous in hosting programs on controversial topics, such as conflicts in Papua, interfaith dialogues, tension between Sunni and Shia. For instance, a participant reports that at a discussion:

The presenter stereotyped LGBT, especially *waria* (transgendered) as stupid. I felt sad that he did not support LGBT being part of diversity. Then, the thirty students in attendance disagreed with him—wow! Amazing! I felt happy, not alone. But I did not see any students who are active in Muslim organizations at the presentation. It is a pity.

UGM facilitates student leadership programs in Indonesia and abroad, including in the United States, Australia, Japan, Thailand. Some interviewees participated and refer to those experiences as a source of learning and reflection on the reality in Indonesia from the outside. An interviewee remembers the Fulbright Interfaith Training on LGBT issues as one of the most impactful experiences in her life:

After a week of discussion, we split in four groups and lived with HIV victims, homosexuals, a transgender community, and a transgendered pesantren which is owned by a transgendered who wears the veil and organizes regular programs, such as praying, *pengajian* (reciting from the Quran), teaching by an *ustad* (a religious teacher). She has been confronted by strict Muslims, of course there is trouble. Even the *ustad* is questioned, “Why do you want to teach there? They are *haram*! You make yourself dirty.” She adopted a baby, maybe an unwanted baby from a prostitute, who is now around six years old. It is good.

A student recalls an anecdote that demonstrates UGM’s attempts to accommodate diversity: during commencement, Muslim female students who do not want physical contact with men wear white gloves, so that the rector see their preference and does not shake their hands. The option of the rector shaking hands with men only is not even considered—it is unthinkable among the vast majority of Indonesians.

The UGM orientation for incoming students is considered an initiation into the character of the university. It includes the screening of a DVD on the philosophy of UGM (*ke-UGM-an*), which highlights UGM history, mission, and values (UGM Pusat Studi Pancasila, 2010). In 2012, the incoming rector chose the theme of “UGM: A cultural heritage and awareness” (*UGM adalah cagar kebudayaan dan kepedulian*). He explains his choice:

We declared the *sumpah balapan* (oath race) or *sumpah nusantara* (oath archipelago)—we want to integrate, we want to unite the nation although we are different. More than 10,000 incoming students gathered in *Lapangan Pancasila* (field Pancasila) and created

the map of Indonesia through a sort of flash mob, while dancing *poco-poco* from Papua—we put the last first. Each island had students from the eighteen colleges and the largest islands represented the largest UGM departments. The idea came from the students as a way to create friendships across departments, religions, and regions since the first day.

The faculty and students I talked to were thrilled by the activity.

Barriers exist in the realm of co- and extra-curricular events. Limited time, money, and advertisement constrain students' attendance, despite their "big willingness to talk about diversity." In addition, Professor Erwin explains that each student has certain boundaries of acceptance and refusal of certain topics. These underlying openness or closeness shape the propositions for resolutions. For example, a few students from conservative Muslim organizations argue against interfaith discussions or groups because they create "blaming between religions." They prefer state holiday, national events, and working together instead. Most students believe that "UGM should not be afraid to talk about diversity, even if it is a sensitive topic, because UGM is a university, a place where we can say our thoughts." Events should include seminars on *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, cultures from each province, dialogue among religious leaders, perspectives of different ethnicities in the Indonesian and global context. They recommend that the interfaith forum not be for a foreign audience only, but also for national students. In addition, it should discuss more relevant and influential topics. Similarly, they propose that the annual cultural night should include contributors from all provinces, not solely from abroad.

The Manji's case: LGBT, religions, cultures, and freedom of speech. As mentioned earlier, UGM hosts programs on controversial topics. However, during my field study, UGM support for intellectual freedom came under scrutiny when the 2012 outgoing rector cancelled Irshad Manji's presentation. Irshad Manji is a Canadian author and Lesbian Muslim who advocates liberal interpretation of Islam. In addition to the Islam-specific considerations, Professor Erwin argues that "the Manji case is about traumatic differences; for many Indonesians homosexuality is a scandal, a sin, is not human so they do not tolerate it."

In 2008, she gave talks in Indonesia with no resistance. In 2012, she returned to present her latest book, "Allah, Liberty and Love" and arranged various presentations, including at UGM's Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) in the morning and at the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (*Lembaga Kajian Islam Dan Sosial*, LKIS) in the evening of Wednesday May 9th. Four students whom I interviewed reconstructed the events around the Manji's case at UGM, including a journalist for the campus newspaper, a member of the organizing committee, and two other peers who attended Manji's events in Yogyakarta. I find these accounts valuable in order to understand the heterogeneity within interreligious, intrareligious, and cultural views among Indonesian youth.

During the week prior to the event, the police stopped by UGM several times to check on the status of the program. Student organizations split between pro- and anti- Manji's talk. Student groups against Manji's discussion included JS (*Jama'ah Shalahuddin*) and KAMMI (I will report on student organizations later). Student organizations for Manji's presentation included the campus newspaper Balairung—which collected signatures for a petition to the

rector—and the Movement Collaboration Commercialization (*Gerakan Kola Komersialisi Kampus*, GERTAK)—which gathered in black t-shirts in silence outside the rector’s office to protest the death of freedom of speech. No Muslim club took part in the movement in favor of Manji’s presentation.

Anti-Manji students held a meeting in Social and Political Sciences without asking permission to use the room, according to Professor Helen. A faculty member from Anthropology was in attendance and encouraged the students to allow Manji to speak, even if he also rejected her ideas about Islam because the holy books condemn lesbians as *haram*. Yet, students went ahead and prepared signs, posters, and a letter for the 2012 outgoing rector to demand the cancellation of Manji’s talk. The night before the event, phone calls and text messages by the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, MMI) demanded organizers to revoke the presentation. Some of their members went to CRCS and asked the security guard for 200 tickets for Manji’s program as a way to show their presence.

The morning of the event at UGM, approximately forty college-age protesters gathered outside CRCS with signs against LGBT, lesbians, and Manji. Female and male protestors stood separately. CRCS Director Zainuddin, announced in Indonesian language that the talk was called off due to the 2012 outgoing rector’s ordinance. Manji made her statement in English, highlighting that many UGM professors supported her discussion. She continued twittering to encourage Indonesian people to speak up, to stand up for their rights, and to stop hiding and

being silent. A student comments, “The problem is that Manji can leave and smile in her beautiful country but we are stuck here, cannot go anywhere, so what will happen to us?”

The afternoon preceding the event at LKIS, around twenty MMI members arrived, took photos of people on site, and yelled to stop the program. They posted on facebook the driver’s plate of the student organizer; they wrote that he was an infidel and they were going to hurt him. In the evening, guests parked their scooters by a Buddhist temple to keep them safe from possible vandalism. No police or any other type of security were present. The audience slowly reached approximately fifty people. At 7pm Manji arrived and spoke for thirty minutes about moral courage and the fears behind the cancellation of her talks, including the rejection of LGBT, atheist, and secular adherents in Indonesia. She encouraged people to break free from the self-censorship and self-imposed fear. For instance, she recalled that during an interview in Jakarta a reporter advised her not to name FPI and other radical groups in order to avoid tensions—Manji commented that there was already conflict regardless of whether she spoke about it or not. At LKIS, she took a question from a woman in the audience about how to reconcile her two identities, Muslim and abortion activist.

Manji was going to take a second question when the FPI and MMI mob arrived (all men). Two intruders in the audience screamed “FPI and MMI are outside, let’s save our lives” so people started panicking. Some people ran upstairs and others left. Manji stayed still and approximately five women sat quietly around her, acting as a human shield. A few women were hit, including some wearing the headscarf—one got stitches on the head, one got a broken arm, and a few were slapped on the face. The attackers yelled, “You bitch, hypocrite, *kafir* (infidel),

dismiss, you are not Muslim!” In ten minutes, they destroyed everything while screaming “*Allahu akbar*” (Allah is the greatest).

As soon as the mob left, the police arrived and one woman confronted them. She asked why they did not intervene earlier, since everyone knew that the fundamentalist mob was going to disrupt the program. In the days after the incident, the student organizer hid his motorcycle, borrowed a friend’s scooter, left town for a week, and ignored the calls and text messages that kept coming in from FPI and MMI. A demonstration in Malioboro took place, but mainly by the Sultan’s staff and community members. Discussions at UGM were held by Balairung and Social Studies, for instance. Then, the actions for freedom of expression stopped.

Manji’s case is controversial for both religion- and culture-based reasons. Among the interviewees, seven students believe that banning Manji’s discussion is an enactment of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* because it shows respect for Indonesian culture and religions as well as security. They articulate in detail how Indonesian culture and “all ulamas in the world” do not accept LGBTs. Among my faculty interviewees, only the 2012 outgoing rector and Professor Agus confirm the necessity to revoke the event due to security reasons. Five students find no connection between Manji’s case and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, because the national motto does not refer to international people, LGBT members, and intra-religious dynamics.

Most informants condemn the cancellation of Manji’s talk as a violation of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. They include people who disagree with Manji’s ideas and yet support her discussion at UGM. They feel “so sorry” and “sick” about the ban and find it “humiliating,” “embarrassing.” A student is appalled that “the leading university in the country did nothing.”

Professor Zainuddin comments that the cancellation is “an indication of lack of commitment to academic freedom and tolerance for different views.” Professor Johan adds that “once violence comes as solution, there is no more an academic environment.” Professor Tirto states that “we fought so much for freedom of speech and I felt it was destroyed in one night.”

Participants acknowledge that silencing Manji was caused by the broader Indonesian context, where the government allows radical Islamic groups to spread and the police do not provide protection. They were surprised that this group acted in Yogyakarta where fundamentalist accidents do not usually happen. A student explains that in her three years at UGM the rector never rejected an event, including at the CRCS Wednesday Forum, which discusses topics of religion, secularism, and LGBT. The difference this time was the external intervention by FPI. Compared to 2008, when Manji first came to Indonesia, FPI has gained more power through violence and influence on the government. According to Professor Gerardus:

Just like for the Lady Gaga case, Manji is part of the discourse that she is against Muslim culture, beliefs, religion, so we have to refuse her. But, many of the activists who support her visit are also Muslim. Hardliners are a bad instance for Indonesia and we cannot leave room for them to continue their direction.

Some interviewees believe that the cancellation was caused by the 2012 outgoing rector’s disciplinary and personal perspectives. Individuals in the STEM fields are considered more conservative and “right wing Muslims.” A student wonders “how can he have such a limited view on diversity when he has lived for sixty years and even studied abroad?”

An international student finds that the lack of movement against the radical Muslim protestors is also a significant factor in the Manji's case: "There is no movement, the only movement is the extremist." When she expressed her concern with her Indonesian classmates, they passively commented: "Yes, this is Indonesia, we are used to it." This apathy is indirectly confirmed by informants who spoke openly to me in support of Manji and yet did not take any action on the case.

Ultimately, students and professors who supported Manji's discussion suggest that UGM should have held the event at all costs, with or without the protection of the police and NU bouncers (they sometimes intervene in similar case and their presence "scare fundamentalists away, because nobody wants to mess with them"). According to Professor Gerardus, "the rector is the highest authority holder in this university and he has to be strong in enhancing that here we have academic freedom and everyone is welcome to give a talk. If you disagree with those ideas, confront them through discussion, not through force." A student affirms, "I want my university to be a place where everyone can speak about any ideas. I do not propose banning or limiting extreme organizations, but filling the counters to those groups so students can have options."

The "Innocence of Islam" case: More about freedom of speech. To further understand participants' views about freedom of speech, I asked their comments on the "Innocence of Islam" film and related protests. These accounts offer heterogeneous and conflict perspectives; yet, predominant trends exist. Directed in California, Innocence of Muslims is an anti-Islamic video that denigrates Prophet Muhammad. After its release on YouTube in 2012, demonstrations

and violent protests spread across Arab and Muslim countries, leaving hundreds of injuries and over 50 deaths, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens.

All students condemn both the movie and the violence that resulted from it. They find that the film mocks Prophet Muhammad, discredits Islam, and increases religious tensions. A KAMMI member explains,

This is not the first time that people from different countries make films and comics that hurt Muslims. If somebody makes a movie that attacks your mother, of course you become angry, right? It is just a human automatic response. Muslims respect the Messenger more than anybody else. He is the person we learn from, the deepest belief in our heart. Muslims never make films that scold a Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, or Jewish. So why do not people respect Muslims? Maybe it is a joke for the filmmaker, but what about others' feelings?

Students affirm that protests should be a network for justice, not for violence. They recommend that “we should first watch the film, second understand the filmmaker’s intentions, third have good discussions, and then we can protest. Instead, so many people never saw the movie but they protest. We have to be more intellectual than that.” Most participants emphasize that radical Islamic people do not know about religion because “their actions have nothing to do with the Quran.” Several Muslim interviewees highlight that “if somebody hurts a beloved one, protesting is a normal human response.” A KAMMI member moves farther as she mentions that “I question the faith of Muslim people who are not angry with the film, who do not protest

through demonstrations or mere disagreements; they do not love and respect the Messenger.”

She questions the news reports and doubts that Muslim people are committing violence:

Have you heard of the False Flag Operation? People dress as Muslims and bomb churches, do harm, because Muslims are easy to be recognized just by what they wear. So bombing can actually be done by anybody, by Muslims or by people who simulate Muslims. The media makes the news bigger. If the bombing of the church is really done by a Muslim, he is a wrong Muslim because Muslims are strict in religion but do no violence in social life. He failed to learn about his own religion.

Resolutions to the case refer to inaction, dialogue, national punishments, and international interventions. Most students call for freedom of speech and complain for its scarcity in Indonesia. They disagree with legal actions against freedom of speech, including SARA, which is used to stigmatize people, to constrain discussion, and to corrupt the election process. They propose that the film should be ignored. They suggest dialogue “to understand the situation.” They underline that the filmmaker does not represent the whole USA; for instance, Americans can be Muslim too. A respondent reports that she received a text message from friends saying: “In Indonesia we are united, nobody can separate us, let’s not allow the film to influence us so we prove to the world that we are not affected and we prefer focusing on other things that are more important.” In a call for more public space, a Muslim lecturer points out that “Islamic cultures have lost their brilliant thinkers because until now they have no freedom of speech.”

Around five student interviewees believe that “freedom of expression should have some limits,” but for two different reasons—for respect towards religious beliefs and to prevent violence. On one hand, a non-Muslim interviewee proposes “a law to control freedom of speech to prevent angry people from starting wars, because there are very sensitive and reactionary fanatics.” On the other hand, four conservative Muslim agree that “We believe in freedom and tolerance, but our freedom is restricted by other people’s freedom as well as by norms, values, local wisdom. Tolerance is not appropriate when one’s freedom to talk hurts others’ feelings so it must be restricted.” A KAMMI member adds, “It is the human right of Muslims not to have the Messenger scolded so the film breaks the law.” These few Muslim students propose that the U.S. government should take legal action against the filmmaker. They believe that every country should have a law against blasphemy, such as SARA in Indonesia. Due to the lack of action by the American government, a KAMMI adherent proposes that “the filmmaker should be prosecuted by the United Nations or Muslims in the world should agree on what to do with him, even if he is not Muslim.”

Summary

In this chapter, I presented participants views about the barriers, supports, and potentials for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in UGM curriculum. The Ministry of Education requires all undergraduate students to study their own religion, citizenship, and Indonesian language. In addition, UGM requires students to attend a two-month community service program as well as courses on Pancasila and English. However, some exceptions to these requirements exist in practice, including in the religious course.

The community service program (KKN) is massive, well established, and recognized internationally. Criticisms against KKN are rare and suggestions for improvement mainly refer to attention to indigenous culture, people's movement, and practical relevance for the country. The courses on citizenship and Pancasila are highly criticized because their content is irrelevant and distant from students' contextual realities; they are merely a collection of historic and legal clauses. Students suggest to either remove or redesign the courses according to principles of multiculturalism, intercultural communication, and praxis. Most students are religious and value religions because they teach positive values; however, they do not find value in the religion course because it is redundant and unrelated to their majors. Almost all Muslim students condemn the Islamic Assistance (AAI) for its exclusivist views and practices. Students suggest making the class optional, removing it completely, or adjusting it according to pluralist approaches. One of the difficulties in this endeavor is that AAI is connected with the student organization KAMMI and KAMMI is connected with a political party.

UGM hosts a variety of programs on campus about diversity that can be seen as supports to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, including discussions on sensitive topics, student leadership programs, and the UGM orientation for incoming students. The Manji's case shows the changing mood of Islam in Indonesia, since Irshad Manji gave talks in Indonesia with no resistance in 2008 but was unable to speak in 2012 due to Islamic threats. It also demonstrates the disproportional impact of a minority of Islamic radicals, due to their intimidating tactics and governmental inaction. The actors in Irshad Manji's case also depict the heterogeneity within Islam. Most informants condemn the cancellation of Manji's talk as a violation of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. They include

people who disagree with Manji's ideas and yet support her discussion at UGM. Students' comments on the "Innocence of Islam" film also confirm that most students call for freedom of speech and complain for its scarcity in Indonesia. Five student interviewees believe that "freedom of expression should have some limits" in order to respect religious beliefs and to prevent violence.

Most students think that UGM should not be afraid to talk about diversity. However, each student has certain boundaries of acceptance and refusal of certain matters; for example, a few students from conservative Muslim organizations argue against interfaith events or organizations.

Chapter 8: Provisions for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in Faculty's Contributions

Faculty's Teaching

UGM expects faculty to fulfill three responsibilities (*Tri Dharma*)—teaching, conducting research, and engaging in community service. Professor Helen finds *Tri Dharma* important, but adds that “there is not enough time for all”; for instance, administrative roles often take precedence over teaching, since managers are professors. As I will explain in chapter 10, the following accounts show how faculty can either limit or support hybridization in the classroom and through the university.

Some professors attempt to integrate character building in their lessons. A student recalls that in her nursing program, a professor teaches “to serve patients with your heart and professionally, regardless of religion.” Professor Gerardus, a Catholic, states that “very small things can make a difference to the big idea of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.” For example, when there is the call for prayer during his lesson, he asks students “if you want to say a little prayer, please do so, and I will pray with you based on my religion.” He also models religious openness in the relationships with his colleagues, by celebrating religious holidays together and building collaborative teams:

As vice dean, I try to flourish this idea as a part of our work culture: We do not care what your belief is, how you behave, what your wearing is, because here we work as professionals and mostly important as human beings. Some people push me to use my position to advocate for my fellow Protestants but I say no. That is precisely what the majority group does and I do not want to follow that. If you follow religious practices

with a closed mind, you are trapped in the politics of faith. I want to go out of it, outside the box.

Professor Erwin agrees, “Putting more emphasis on pluralism and tolerance does not mean that pluralism and tolerance become a subject we teach, but they become the basis through which we interact with each other.” Students generally believe that professors treat everyone equally, including in grade assignment; however, some criticisms do exist, as I will discuss later.

UGM has been implementing a hybrid form of teaching, which combines student-centered learning with teacher-centered learning. Professor Dimas, Director of Center for Learning Development (*Pusat Pengembangan Pendidikan, P3*) explains that “maybe for this session TCL is more appropriate, but for the next topic SCL is more appropriate.” He considers a full student-centered approach “inappropriate” in Indonesian higher education, because K-12 schooling is teacher-centered, so college students need support to adjust to different pedagogies. Across disciplines, a variety of professors report that they use newspapers and real case-scenarios to connect the curriculum with real problems in order to make teaching more effective. During my observation in the classrooms, I found that Professor Helen employs critical pedagogies. Professor Gerardus makes the class atmosphere as friendly as possible, gives incentives for critical comments, and allows students to choose between contributing orally or in writing. He encourages research studies on sensitive topics, such as interfaith experiments:

A Muslim student was interested in conducting a study on inclusive education at a Catholic school and I responded “go there, you are not Muslim, you are Indonesian, your idea is brilliant, they will welcome you.” He came not only with his thesis, but also with a

new understanding about being Catholic and Catholic education. We have to open alternatives; if you only look at this way without looking at the other way, you will simply get lost.

Professor Erwin challenges students when they express narrow views, for instance, against Jewish people:

I tried to correct it by noting that we cannot measure or respond to people's opinions based on their religious backgrounds. You cannot have a tolerant behavior and pluralist environment if you treat people like that. Students are surprised because they did not have this kind of responses in high-school. They were told by their preachers, parents, or teachers that Jewish is enemy without any explanation and they just take it.

The faculty generally expose students to both national and international landscapes. In addition to Indonesian authors, students and professors admire foreign writers from Europe, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, and the United States. They conduct research projects and write theses on the intersect between international theories and local contexts, including on feminist studies, intercultural communication, and Javanese thinking about the world. The international programs are considered more "open minded"; for instance, they offer interreligious studies, rather than a monoreligious course, and pedagogies are more interactive. A student in the international programs, states that "I never experienced lecturers with exclusive views, even when we talk about 9/11."

Barriers to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* exist in teaching. Teaching character building is challenging. Professor Helen wonders, "How can we broaden students' perspectives and

awareness in all levels? The potential is there but how can we manage?" In addition, several faculty members find that some lecturers intertwine character building with Islam and "push values indirectly, even if through metaphors, about what it means to be a good Muslim." For instance, a Muslim professor, who does not wear the headscarf, recalls a female colleague asking her "why are you nude?" She remembers her time in college with nostalgia: "We did not think about being different, we did not look what religion we were from, no one was wearing the veil; college was just studying and going out together." Students criticize faculty members who place their interpretations of Islam into their teachings. Both Muslim and non-Muslim students provide various examples.

A professor advised boys to sit on the left and girls to sit on the right; students sat mixed anyway but they "got the sense that women and men should be separated." An instructor laughed at students' rejection of polygamy and commented: "When you know how sex is, you will support polygamy!" A female lecturer recommended, "Obey your husband, if you do not want him to choose polygamy." In front of a full auditorium, a faculty member told a female student, "Do not dress like that; it is not polite," because her blouse was slightly tight. A professor told the class that "it is good for a girl to use the *jilbab*: do you want a candy with or without wrapper?" Students generally respond to these "bad jokes" by laughing, but a few are stunned. They feel "like a stranger in the class" and "make a bad face" to show their disagreement. A gay student confronted an instructor who had not intervened when a classmate defined LGBTs as "half cooked"; the lecturer responded that students are free to express their ideas in class discussions.

During my observations, I found in most offices religious symbols, such as the praying mat on the chair, miniature of the Mecca on the desk, Islamic verses on the walls. In addition, professors mention their religious schedule; for instance, “to meet at 2 pm on Friday, after the Friday prayer,” rather than simply stating the time with no religion-specific reference. Minority students comment that “here it is the behavior—it is an announcement of their identity, Muslims in Indonesia have to show their existence.”

Islamic interpretations can also infiltrate formal lecturing. A student asked the lecturer of Islamic Law to talk about Iman Samudra, one of the main terrorists behind the Bali bomb, as well as the concept of *Jihad*; she received no answer but a failing grade at the end of the course. Another participant complains that one of her instructors related sociological theories to Islam, for example by stating, “We, Muslims, believe bla bla bla, so we have to re-think Durkheim.” Overall, students find that teachers rarely “discuss diversity” and “give chances to talk about pluralism in class.” Minority participants also lament that some teachers use Javanese language in informal conversations in class.

Suggestions for improving the promotion of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* through teaching are numerous. Professors suggest that UGM “have more control of lecturers’ exclusive attitudes,” especially in the STEM field, which is the largest and often considered the most “closed minded.” Various female Muslim professors recommend that faculty not wear religious symbols, including the headscarf, “to help students to be open minded.” All professors encourage multidisciplinary collaborations and would like the government to stop the science versus no-

science tracking in high-school. The president of the Student Association supports scientific values of open-mindedness, critical thinking, and multidisciplinary discussions:

These principles rely on the awareness that you do not hold the ultimate truth, you are open to criticism and different perspectives, and you are willing to discuss any topics within and across disciplines.

Students reflect on the problematic relationships between contextual and broader perspectives. On one hand, they ask for more local context in the class, rather than having lecturers merely regurgitating books from the West. They recognize that foreign concepts have to be adapted to the Indonesian setting, including matters of multiculturalism, freedom of speech, and sexuality. For example, “homosexuality is according to the culture and the place—in the West you guys are equal, we do not have that equal, even in same sex partnerships, the younger person has to pay more respect to the older one and addressing him as *mas*, not with his first name.” In addition, a peer claims that “the West needs a deeper understanding of Eastern views of Islam and cannot force the world to accept one interpretation—for instance of democracy and freedom—while neglecting all the other views, especially religious views.”

On the other hand, students advocate more international views: “If UGM wants to be a world class research university, we should learn global values and feel part of the world.” They ask UGM “to remove religious matters from the teachings” and “offer courses that are relevant for a wide audience” because people adhere to different religions. They also argue against dress codes: “We go to class to learn so I do not care about the way people dress and do not understand why clothing disturbs others.” They encourage lecturers to “use Indonesian so everybody in the

class can understand” and to “prescribe electives in cultural and political sciences as well as some sort of recognition for students who attend discussions outside their disciplines.”

Both students and professors call for more socially relevant and practical teaching. Students want professors to lead the path to social improvement, for instance by writing in the national newspapers and mediating between conflicting groups. Professor Helen recognizes that teaching cannot resolve all social predicaments by itself and that a broader campaign in support of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* has to take place:

Students go back from school in their home and learn from the culture; if the situation there is not in line with what they have here, the material becomes just material. So *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is at three levels: macro, meso, and micro. Policy makers cannot just impose change from the top, without the support from the educators at the bottom.

Faculty Research

A few research institutes aim to be relevant for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. The Center for Pancasila Studies (*Pusat Studi Pancasila*) attempts to revive and mainstream the Pancasila in Indonesia. It organizes conferences, seminars, and publications with collaborators with scholars, politicians, members of NGOs, and students from multiple perspectives. Advocacy in the field of education is a high priority and the ministry has appointed Professor Agus to revise the national curriculum on Pancasila studies. Professor Tirto, head of the center, explains that its objective is to influence policy and curriculum:

We have been calling for the return of Pancasila in the schools. In 1998 the Pancasila ideology collapsed and in 2003 Law National Education number 20 removed Pancasila

from the curriculum, leaving civic education only. Based on a Ministry of Education statement, in 2013 Pancasila will be returned and will be combined with Civic Education in one subject in K-12. Yet, UGM never left Pancasila education.

Professor Thomas confirms that the government has been designing a new curriculum with more Pancasila because “schooling has neglected Pancasila and Indonesia had gone too far from Pancasila, causing internal conflicts and reckless capitalism.”

The Philosophy department established the Archipelago Laboratory (*Nusantara laboratorium*) “where we try to elaborate local wisdom so students write group projects, theses, and dissertations about cultures in Indonesia,” Professor Agus explains. He adds that “similarly, other departments provide programs on indigenous psychology, local medicine, Pancasila economics, saving the forest—all these topics are correlated with each other.”

The Center for Asia-Pacific Studies (*Pusat Studi Asia-Pasifik*), for example, “provides an interdisciplinary and intercultural alternative movement to APEC, with attention to political, economic and cultural matters,” according to Professor Patra, head of the center. In five years it has offered scholarships for intercultural and interreligious studies to over sixty master’s students. It also publishes an intercultural journal as well as books and booklets on intercultural methodologies.

The Center for Security and Peace Studies (*pusat studi keamanan dan perdamaian*) has multiculturalism among its seven objectives and many programs. The Institute for Research and Community Services (*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat, LPPM*) provides funding for research projects at UGM, including on matters of diversity.

Professor Erwin is working on a five-year project on democracy and one of the main targets is to reactivate the Inter-University Center (*Pusat Antar Universitas*), an institution that functioned as a network, with UGM as the hub, to support other universities around the country, for instance in terms of curriculum and faculty development. The program was financed by the World Bank in 1980s and early 1990s but then lost funding.

Participants suggest research that revisits the Pancasila in modernity, by expanding the notion of diversity beyond ethnicity and religion. Professor Patra advocates publications in local language and Indonesian. He condemns the requirement to publish in English in order to proceed in the academic career, because “people are oppressed when they do not express themselves in their own language.” Students condemn the fact that research funding is driven by the market and “the issue about getting understanding across ethnicities gets no place in the university.” Research funding is available in limited disciplines and topics, so some professors admit that they are left at a disadvantage. A participant proposes that fines from people who are persecuted for corruption should go to university research.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented participants views about the barriers, supports, and potentials for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in teaching and research. The faculty generally expose students to both national and international landscapes. Some professors attempt to (a) integrate character building in their lessons, (b) model religious openness in the relationships with their colleagues, and (c) employ interactive and critical pedagogies. Other professors do not; in particular, most students criticize passive instructional designs and teaching according to professors’ interpretations of

Islam. Suggestions for improving the promotion of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika through teaching include monitoring faculty more closely, minimizing religious symbols, increasing socially relevant and practical teaching, encouraging multidisciplinary collaborations, and finding balance between contextual and international perspectives.

A few research institutes aim to be relevant for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, such as the Center for Pancasila Studies, the Archipelago Laboratory, the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, the Center for Security and Peace Studies, and the former Inter-University Center. Participants suggest research that revisits the Pancasila in modernity, employs local languages, and is supported financially.

Chapter 9: Provisions for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in Campus Life

I start this chapter by reporting on some overarching survey results about campus life. Ninety-four percent of the respondents believe that UGM fosters relationships among students of different religions, ethnicities, and nationalities. Eighty-nine percent of the informants self-report that they have made personal efforts to advance Bhinneka Tunggal Ika on campus. According to 94% of the respondents, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is supported through courses, community service, student clubs, and campus events.

Intercultural contact appears to be a more effective channel for learning and experiencing Bhinneka Tunggal Ika than formal classes. Respondents find that their views of religious and ethnic diversity in Indonesia have been impacted by friendships (90%), conversations with students outside of class (87%), dining together (81%), student clubs (78%), campus events (77%), living together (73%), conversations with professors outside of class (66%), mandatory community service (63%), dating (58%), conversations with administrators (54%), and courses (49%).

Higher impact through intercultural contact is also demonstrated by the fact that students have learned more about the perspectives of people from other ethnicities (87%) and other religions (86%), rather than their own religion (81%), their own ethnicity (74%), and other nationalities (68%, mainly because international students at UGM are few, so opportunities to interact with them are limited). They have become more skilled in working cooperatively with diverse people (97%), appreciative of being part of a community with a variety of beliefs (96%),

able of discussing controversial issues (94%), open to have their own views challenged (94%), able of seeing the world from someone else's perspective (93%).

At UGM, students perceive to have acquired more analytical knowledge and skills on global matters rather than on domestic issues, such as in the realms of religion and ethnicity. In other words, they self-report better understanding of the causes underlying global issues (92%), rather than religious issues (80%), ethnic issues (80%), and own biases (73%). Similarly, they feel better prepared on how to respond to global issues (90%) compared to ethnic issues (73%) and religious issues (72%). Students seem to place more academic value on international matters as well as dynamic relationships across ethnicities and religions, rather than separated information about various groups. At UGM, they call for more programs on global (92%), multiethnic (83%), and interfaith (75%) perspectives, rather than others' ethnicities (68%), their own religion (66%), others' religions (59%), and their own ethnicity (53%).

Upon graduation, students plan to have intercultural contact in both personal and professional arenas, and yet also expect to prioritize the learning of their own religion upon all other cultural resources. Students commit to promote international (92%), multiethnic (90%), and interfaith (85%) understanding, rather than their own religion (70%) and ethnicity (70%). They plan to remain in contact with their diverse UGM peers (98%) as well as to build professional and personal relationships with people from a variety of ethnicities and religions (95%). However, in their personal lives, they foresee spending more spare time in learning about their own religion (97%), their own ethnicity (95%), and others' nationalities (95%) compared to others' ethnicities (93%) and especially others' religions (77%). Eighty-four percent of the

participants plan to send their children to schools of diverse religions and ethnicities. Overall, students appear to focus on their own religion and in regard to others, they are more drawn to ethnic and international matters, rather than creeds.

Space

Participants mention some aspects of cafeterias, prayer rooms, and housing that are relevant to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at UGM. Students report that before 2010, all cafeterias at UGM were closed during Ramadan, the fasting month (*bulan puasa*). Not having access to food was “very hard” for people who were not fasting, especially freshmen who were new to the city and not used to Ramadan in their hometowns. Professor Thomas frames the unavailability of cafeterias as “unequal treatment at UGM. We are not Muslim, why do we have to fast? Do we have to behave like Muslims? We will pay respect by not eating in front of them but they also have to pay respect to us by providing food.” Since approximately the year 2010, some of UGM cafeterias have been open during Ramadan and the students believe that the change is due to the internationalization of UGM: “People from other countries need to eat.” Professor Thomas points out that keeping the cafeteria open makes minorities “feel respected.”

In regard to places of worship, UGM has *musollah* (Muslims’ prayer room) in each department as well as a large mosque, which was built by the UGM Foundation. No place of worship for other creeds exists. For weekly prayers and meetings, followers of other creeds ask permission to use classrooms, but a Muslim student reports that “Christian and Catholic group had to wait a very long time to have a room in my college, even if there are a lot of classrooms and at least one is always available.” Participants explain that public universities generally have

mosques and *musollah* only, because the majority of the students are Muslim and few students would use other prayer rooms. A student advances that “if the number of non-Muslims goes up, the rector will probably accommodate such requests.” Yet, some informants report that UGM attempted to build a church and interfaith prayer rooms, but never succeeded due to minorities’ limited power, lack of willingness within the UGM leadership, and especially Islamic resistance. According to Professor Gerardus: “the effects of ignoring the huge opposition could be more devastating, because they are capable of using force, intimidating students, and destroying the facility.”

The arguments around places of worship or interfaith prayer rooms are framed within issues of national representation and religious needs. Professor Thomas claims that “UGM is a national university, it used to be very nationalistic, but now it does not follow the first mission to be for all, implicitly it seems to say that best religion is only Islam.” A minority student defines this lack of representation in places of worship as “unfair” whereas a Muslim peer defines it as “a little example of religion-based discrimination, but not really significant, a small problem.”

Professor Thomas proposes that “all universities in Indonesia should provide in each department a room for people to meditate and be silent, like in European airports, I heard.” Only a Buddhist student agrees with the construction of a “neutral place for praying,” whereas eight of his peers of other religions prefer distinct places of worship for each creed for three main reasons. First, “if Muslims get a place, why cannot we?” Second, “so people do not bother others.” Third, “a common praying room is impossible because people prefer to go to their own” and because “Buddhists and Hindus would be open for that, but Christians and Muslims would

definitively say no, a big no.” A participant envisions places of worship, side by side, just like in the town of Nusa Dua in Bali, “why such a small minority group like the Balinese could do it and the majority cannot even open the heart to welcome us?”

Opponents to change the current setting draw from the argument that minority religions do not need a place of worship on campus. A Protestant participant affirms that “there are a lot of churches near UGM and students would just keep going there.” A Catholic interviewee adds, “We have a lot of churches near UGM and we just go to mass on Sunday; we are not like Muslims who need to pray five times a day. They need the mosque.” A Buddhist student notes that sacred spaces should be off campus, in their own special location. A Muslim informant affirms that “UGM does not need that, I do not think there is space, I do not know if they want it because they never had demonstration for that.”

In regard to housing, UGM students can choose among four types of accommodation. On campus, UGM has a few large dorms (*asrama*). Off-campus, students can live in a room in a family’s guest house (*kos*), rent a property with a group of friends (*kontrakan*), or join a small dormitory (*asrama*) which is run by either a religious/ethnic organization or the local government of a certain province. I visited *asrama* that are affiliated to the local governments of East Kalimantan, Bali, and Sunda, as well to the Batak ethnicity. Students share detailed accounts about the importance of having a comfortable living space: “Home is the first place to make friends and to start a new family.”

Most participants live in *kos* with students of various backgrounds, although the majority is Muslim. There are generally no tensions with housemates. For example, a Confucian student

has a positive experience living with eighteen Buddhist, Christian, and Catholic peers in a house run by a Javanese Muslim family: “For Eid Fitr, the landlady invited us to eat together; when I fell sick in my second month at UGM, my housemates cared for me, came to my room, brought food, took me to the doctor, and bought me medicines.” An informant had to stop doing fellowship in her room not because of her landlady or housemates, but because of the neighbors’ opposition. A few interviewees live in *kos*, *kontrakan*, and *asrama* for Muslim students only because it is “comfortable” and they enjoy praying together. Yet, they emphasize that housemates are from a variety of provinces, religious perspectives, departments, and student organizations.

Criticisms of some cases of isolation and segregation emerge among both students and faculty. A student finds that living separately by religion or ethnicity “is not effective because students should socialize with students from other backgrounds.” Professor Patra states that “now students live separate lives, they live in separate *asrama*, they do not interact with their landlords, they do not assimilate as in the past.” Professor Zainuddin recognizes that *asrama* with fellow students from the same island help freshmen to settle in the new life, but he adds that “it is also important to try to make students from different backgrounds meet and develop a sense of unity.” An alternative model of co-existence is provided by two students from a Protestant university who live in a dorm with 100 students from various universities, religions, and islands. The administration requires the three roommates to be from different backgrounds “so we discuss different habits, for example, how to treat girls.” In chapter 10, I will examine how the predicaments of representation around campus life relate to both critical and contact theories.

Student Organizations

Student organizations have always had a relevant role in campus life at UGM. Professors recall their years of activism as UGM students. Today, the UGM community remains “active on all sort of issues” and campus organizations are “one part of the room for interaction,” according to the 2012 incoming rector. The president of the university in Timor confirms that UGM is well-known for its many student activities; other institutions do not have as many. He states, “Jakarta is very busy and my university is new. We have to create the academic environment and everything, plus our students are poor and need support to attend activities, for instance for fees or transportation to reach campus.” Forty percent of the survey respondents report to be involved with organizations that support interfaith/multiethnic understanding.

Student groups are based on religions, hobbies, politics, and academic studies. They can be either department-based or campus-wide with possible branches in each college as well as liaisons to national or even international organizations. Most of them are not formally affiliated to UGM, even though they are formed by UGM students and gather on the UGM campus. All student organizations recruit during orientation in order to “welcome and help freshmen to feel comfortable in this university.”

Participants explain in detail the benefits of joining an organization. They develop friendships, collaborative skills, and learning about Indonesia and the world. An alumnus confirms the longitudinal strength of these relationships: “My organization became my second family, more than friends, because we had so many activities over the years, and these strong bonds last forever, we are still connected.” Group members work together with peers from all

backgrounds. Even in monoreligious organizations, students experience diversity in terms of islands and ethnicities among other traits. For example, they adjust their communication style: “I try to speak more softly because we Batak people have loud voice and Javanese people get scared because they think we are angry, they do not say it but I can tell from their faces.” They perceive these efforts as a testament of altruism: “If I am selfish and only think about myself, I could never be successful in conducting these national and international events with others.” Participants learn about the surrounding communities as well as national and global phenomena. A student remember that “the critical point in my life was in my freshmen year, when I joined different organizations, I exposed myself to issues and contexts that I never considered before.” One of the student journalists explains, “I report on many events and interview Muslims, Christians, atheists, agnostics, LGBTs, people with many interests and multicultural perspectives. When we are reporting we are citizens of the world.”

UGM-affiliated student organizations. Forty-seven campus-wide groups formally belong to the Student Activity Unit (*Unit Kegiatan Mahasiswa*, UKM) within Student Affairs (Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2011b). This department covers part of the budgets of the student clubs; for the remaining expenses, clubs fundraise through alumni’s donations, merchandise sales, and various events. Professor Sunardi, head of UKM, underlines that students are in charge of their programs; his office and faculty mentors only guide them.

The 47 groups are hosted in the Gelanggang Mahasiswa building, but with some exceptions. For instance, the Muslim group, JS, is located in the mosque. In Gelanggang, a few largest groups have their own office (e.g., orchestra) whereas smaller organizations share a room

(e.g., Buddhist and Hindu clubs; Protestant and Catholic clubs). Students have positive views of the Gelanggang staff, especially of the manager, Mr. Wayuh: “He is my favorite person at UGM; he is Javanese and Muslim but helps us a lot with all our activities, without asking about our backgrounds or taking us into complicated bureaucracy.” Professor Sunardi explains that the Gelanggang building will relocate by 2017 to a larger space in order to accommodate the increased number of UGM students.

Under the Student Affairs, hobby-based clubs include the marching band, choir, orchestra, public health organization, military training group, and Balairung press among others. The UGM Student Association (*Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa*, BEM) is the most influential political group and has branches in each department. For the first time after thirteen years, the 2011-2012 president was not affiliated to KAMMI. He explains that, of the 38,000 undergraduate students at UGM, 12,000 students usually vote. KAMMI mobilizes a minimum of 3,000 voters, who are enough to win the president post. The remaining votes spread across moderate alternatives: “UGM is very blended and plural, and people here do not want polarization, they want a common ground.” His committee includes students from Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua; “this would have not been seen in the previous presidencies,” he comments.

Among the 47 UGM-affiliated organizations, five confessional groups exist for each religion, with the exception of Confucianism due a limited number of adherents on campus. Their missions are similar, mainly to serve their religious community on campus through praying sessions, discussions, events, and community service. Members want to “learn deeper” about

their dogma, “pray together,” and “develop character while away from family.” A student participant points out: “It is important to have spirituality in our heart, because it helps us to be respectful and do good things.” The Muslim group is also politically active; it organizes protests on national and international issues, such as preventing Manji’s presentation and defending Muslim communities in Palestine, Turkey, Syria, and Myanmar.

Each confessional club carries internal distinctions in terms of religious denomination, interpretation, and practice. For example, inside the Catholic group, “some friends are very spiritual and some are not; it is not a problem.” A member of the Protestant club recognizes that some teammates are “fanatic”; during my observation, a few students started the meeting with the greeting *Shalom* (the Hebrew word for “peace”), the recent Christian alternative to the Muslim *Assalamualaikum* (which means “peace be upon you” and finds response in *Walaikumsalam*, meaning “upon you be peace”). A Balinese official of the Hindu club explains that “we learn a lot from our Javanese Hindu fellows: when they do rituals and chant mantras, it is peaceful, neat, and really from their hearts.” Within the Muslim organization, “diversity is accepted as long as we respect the important things,” a member said. As the next pages will show, intra-religious diversity is apparent in both students’ personal interpretations and group approaches.

Minority-religion organizations have more opportunities for interfaith collaboration compared to the Muslim group. Sharing two offices in the Gelanggang building encourages them to communicate and coordinate effectively. They alternate in the cleaning of the room, respect others’ religious décor, borrow each other’s equipment, and leave the entrance key just outside

the door in an open box. Their physical proximity facilitates their encounters, including inviting each other to various club events. Being close also gives them more opportunities to show mutual respect: “We try not to be loud during others’ praying times.” The presidents of the four organizations participate in the bi-annual interfaith dialogue, ongoing intercultural programs, and social activities by other groups. At the department-level, the Catholic and Protestant groups sometimes pray together, for instance in psychology, geography, and forestry. Students generally believe that these groups are “open,” because anybody can join their events and benefit from their support. For example, a Buddhist student remembers,

During orientation members of the Christian club saw my confused face and asked if they could help me. I had just arrived to the city, I did not know anybody, I had nowhere to stay, I was afraid to ask. They came first to me and helped me to find my first home. We did not even know each other, they were Christian and I was Buddhist but they helped me. I think it only happens in Yogyakarta.

Barriers and potentials. Participants identify various barriers to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* within student organizations, mainly in regard to confessional clubs, minority representation, and student movement. Both students and professors view confessional organizations as possibly “exclusive” and “more closed” compared to academic and hobby-based clubs. The highest concern refers to Muslim fundamentalist organizations, which are not part of UGM Student Affairs but recruit and gather on campus. These groups are relatively small in number of adherents, but great in their influence on campus life due to their forceful tactics of action. A

student points out, “Radical organizations may be marginal, but are strong enough to force the 2012 outgoing rector to cancel Manji’s discussion.”

Violent off-campus Islamic organizations include the national Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia*, MMI) and Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI) as well as the international *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI). Other fundamentalist groups also recruit and meet at UGM, but they are “underground” and “unidentified—we do not even know their name or what they do, they keep it very secret.” UGM students rarely come to contact with these subversive organizations. A Buddhist student recalls “the only bad experience” she had on campus in terms of diversity:

In my first year, a man, dressed in very Muslim way, used to walk around and to yell if he saw a boy and girl talking, “you are not allowed to do this! You are not even married! You behave badly! It is bad!” Even when I was walking alone, he used to get angry and yell at me, “Hey! What are you doing? A woman here at night and you dress inappropriately!” I was so scared of him.

Professors state that students’ radicalization now starts in high-school and proceeds through college. Fanatic groups have “systematic recruitment procedures, packaged very nicely, to attract a lot of incoming students and make them closed-minded.” Just as at the national level, hardliners come into educational institutions and use force to win their agendas. Professor Zainuddin explains the ties between national and university-level phenomena in terms of fundamentalist groups:

Just like in Indonesia in general, fundamentalist groups are not helpful at UGM. After 1998, in Indonesia everywhere is more open and the question is who is entering and influencing. Sometimes I think it is too open, everyone can come in and do whatever, such as certain fundamentalism Muslim groups who recruit people and try to influence what happens. This is the challenge in Indonesia now.

Professor Thomas adds,

Now at UGM, there is a Wahabi group that indoctrinates fundamentalist ideology. You may have seen students with very long outfits, fully covered *hijab*, which I think it harms our culture because we do not practice those customs. Wahabism is a teaching from the Middle East that insists that being Muslim means to become like the people in the Middle East. But, Indonesia is not the Middle East, is different in concepts, it does not practice those customs. Indonesian Muslims are different from Muslims in the Middle East, just like Indonesian Catholics are different from Catholics in Rome. If students start following the teachings, it will be a very big problem. UGM does not prohibit these groups from entering and let something not good to spread.

Most students are also concerned about UGM inaction against these radical infiltrations:

“International fundamentalist streams with ramification to the national level all the way down to the university; it is a big issue at UGM but nobody cares about what they do on campus.”

Non-violent Muslim organizations are many. Participants describe them in detail and agree with the 2012 incoming rector: “All Muslim organizations at UGM are very monolithic and monopolized by one single group, KAMMI, the biggest group.” Most participants define

KAMMI as “strict, for pure Islam and extreme Islamic ways that cannot be argued against; other things are not as important, so KAMMI members make friends or work together with people from other religions.” They criticized it for not speaking up against Islamic violence: “KAMMI and JS are Muslim and have solidarity with other Muslims, so they do not see HTI as destruction.” The 2012 incoming rector advocates diversity across all divides and does not “expect good leaders to come out from a uniform student organization like KAMMI.”

Two current KAMMI members confirm that all members “have the same ideology,” which is carried forward through educational and political programs: (a) discussions on religious knowledge (e.g., “how you should worship God”); (b) social activities (e.g., teaching how to read the Quran to children in the village); (c) demonstrations on socio-political issues (e.g., against LGBTs, rise of gas prices, corruption, president who is not in line with the vision of the organization); (d) protests on religious matters (e.g., Ahmadiyah, Muslims’ condition in Palestine and Burma); and (e) collaborations with off-campus organizations that work on relevant matters.

Two former KAMMI members explain that the group was born in 1998-1999; thus some of the young professors are KAMMI alumni. The KAMMI membership varies across departments, with the highest presence in the STEM field. KAMMI employs political and educational strategies. It is connected to the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) and aims to implement *sharia* in Indonesia. At UGM, it organizes three-stage boot camps, so that both male and female members are “not only smart but also fit.” It maintains control of influential positions, including in the Student Association and AAI, as articulated in earlier

sections. Women are generally excluded from the leadership, a trend that “does not come from culture, but from certain interpretations of Islam.” An informant recalls,

A female Muslim friend of mine wanted to run for the president post in the Student Association of our department but the outgoing official told her “you cannot do this because we are members of KAMMI and in Islamic law there are no female leader, especially when there are capable men” so she withdrew. They often do not say the reason, but every time a woman wants to be a leader, they always give this kind of defensive face.

As a result of KAMMI control on campus life, non-Muslim students are rare in the leadership of student organizations. Non-Muslim students become leaders of their respective religious organizations or, in limited cases, of hobby-based clubs. Yet, they believe that the leadership of political organizations like the Student Association are unattainable for them. A student remembers,

I experienced discrimination in my first year when I tried to join the Student Association, which is the only way to be an activist at UGM. But they look down at me due to my appearance and my religion. The main committee never told me about when and where to meet for the campaign events; I always found out about them through my best friend, who is Muslim. They did not see me at all. I was invisible.

Another minority student explains that these exclusive dynamics often instigate a vicious cycle of reactions: “Some minority students do not join other organizations aside their own community because they think of themselves as a minority who need to be together.” The

“missing representation” in membership influences the club agenda. For instance, a student journalist remembers that the conservative Muslim editors of her campus newspaper declined a special issue on LGBT: “My friends and I felt alone; our advice was not even heard. We should put aside our personal views. We should be real journalists.”

Some students criticize the Office of Student Affairs for being distant from students’ concerns and sometimes privileging Muslim matters. A student notes that “the *Rektorat Kemahasiswaan* building is like a palace, an administrative place, where students just do not go to.” The director of *Rektorat Kemahasiswaan* “is usually very Islamic; for example, he wears the Islamic hat every day.” A club member remarks that some arts organizations feature genres from a variety of religious traditions and face resistance by both Muslim students and administrators. He explains that “it happens a lot that some Muslim students do not want to execute non-Islamic pieces whereas non-Muslim students have no objection; the administration has also encouraged us to limit the non-Muslim portfolio.”

Despite the existence of campus organizations and activities, some students and professors express concern for youth’s increasing disengagement from both college and public life. Compared to the past, students are becoming “only interested in academics and personal hobbies. For instance, current clubs struggle in recruiting new members, and especially leaders. During the Student Association campaign, most students do not exercise their right to vote. Only the leaders of fifteen clubs attend the monthly Communication Forum at the Gelanggang building. Participants point out that the responsibility of such apathy is of both students and UGM itself. Departments encourage students to excel in academics, only take classes within

their major, and graduating quickly. Professors refer to broader issues, such as the lack of a “common enemy” after the fall of Suharto and the citizens’ tendency “to look at the government, rather than resolving problems themselves.”

Some students are also disengaged from the broader public sphere. They show no trust in their government and no plan to join it in their careers. One of them comments that “politicians use stories to make lies; I am more a student, a learner, and I want to become an intellectual.” Students hope to “get a good career,” “be the first one with a law degree in my village,” “and bring my success back to my island.” A participant states that “if I become a successful person, I contribute to my island and I also contribute to Indonesia because Indonesia is composed of the big achievements of all cultures.” According to the questionnaire, working for the government is the least preferred professional prospect (65% of participants) along with the non-profit sector (67%). The most favorable options are international organizations (86%) and the private sector (84%). Students intend to foster *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* in their future career (95%). Some of them plan to make a difference for Indonesia (73%).

Participants recommend various paths for improvement. They advance that lecturers should “encourage students to enjoy their studies and interact with others,” so that activism and engagement can expand at UGM. In regard to creed-based clubs, a Protestant student recognizes that “religious groups have to prove that we are not exclusive—members must be more cooperative and open minded in creating programs that benefits people out of the club.”

The prospect of UGM intervention in the activities of extremist organizations is debated. Some professors and students advise the university to ban radical groups: “Why should we keep

them if they want everyone outside of them to vanish?” A student points out the broader issues in possibly banning student organizations because of their ties with political parties. Other participants argue against “top-down” interventions on student organizations but advocate collaborative interventions. Professor Zainuddin elaborates,

It would be helpful if UGM could deliberately try to nurture the spirit of diversity. I am not for control, discrimination, or banning but I am for taking position—UGM is not neutral, has its values, and has to implement them and not just leave it to anybody who comes in.

The 2012 incoming rector claims that “banning fundamentalist organizations will encourage them to become bigger, because youth like what is prohibited, it is the most interesting for them.” He suggests encouraging “diversity among student organizations” and to urge non-monolithic Muslim organizations “to come back” because “students have to be familiar with managing the complexity, this is the life they are going to see in the future.”

In terms of non-religious clubs, students would like changes within the Student Affairs office so it can “open its mind to another way of thinking,” “encourage organizations to accept minority students,” and “stop putting us in religious groups since our first step into the department, during orientation.” Some students call for a peace organization “to have some discussions and forums.” A student articulates the impact of a possible peace organization:

When I was freshman I felt alone, I had nobody here. I almost became a Catholic fanatic, because of the oppression of the Islamic groups. I felt like I had to be more religious and I had to really learn about Catholicism. Then I realized that I did not need to be like that,

I had another way to make a movement and see the world, and I joined an off-campus peace youth organization, Peace Generation, with members from all backgrounds. This is the Indonesia that I look for, these are the real people I want to meet and have a dialogue with. It is a big problem that UGM is a public school and does not have at least one student organization that is concerned about peace, interfaith, pluralism.

A fellow member confirms that in such peace youth organization, “we have a complete representation of our nation and I learned to understand more deeply about people from different backgrounds, why they became as they are, why I became myself.” These Peace Generation members encourage students “to speak up against discrimination, choose one way that fits you, and do something. If we keep silence, nothing will change or happen.”

Intercultural Contact

Intercultural contact is the most influential force in learning about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. Students criticize the fact that the UGM student body is not proportionate to Indonesian population, because of the excessive number of students from Java, big cities, and wealthy families. At the same time, they perceive that UGM is diverse compared to other contexts. They often grew up with no interaction with people of other ethnicities and faiths, including in their schools, neighborhoods, or even islands. For instance, a student recalls that all her school classmates were from Yogyakarta, but now her college friends are from other religions, places, cultures: “it feels so different, I really enjoy it.” A Hindu student from Bali says that she had no friends from other provinces and religions; at UGM she “can view Indonesia in broader sense.” At UGM, they develop meaningful and everlasting relationships across ethno-religious

differences. During my field study, I constantly witnessed these intercultural bonds: when interviewees came along with their best friends from different backgrounds, when I met participants' friends in the cafeteria or at events. Although students from outside Java and Islam count for 17% of undergraduate students, they are a key component of campus life. As a result of this intercultural interactions, survey participants note that students are from various religions (99%), ethnicities (99%), and nationalities (96%). Similarly, they note that professors are also from a variety of religions (97%) and ethnicities (93%).

The understanding of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* changes over the years due to lived experiences. Students who attended demographically diverse K-12 schools remember the early impact of interacting with children of different backgrounds. For example, a participant admits that her father always told her that "Chinese people are mean and cannot be friends with Javanese people." Yet, in her school half of the students were Chinese: "I could not avoid them, I learned a lot from them, and now we are still best friends." Interviewees remember that the ethnic and religious conflicts during the Reformation era influenced their perception of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as a goal to be attained, "something that was crucial for this country." A student points out that entering into adulthood meant also the realization to be part of the minority: "When I was a kid I did not feel like a minority, I just thought about friends and children's things. Now I am older and I feel like a minority in my country and at sometimes it feels difficult, sometimes it feels normal."

UGM is the most impactful experience in their practice of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, in participants' view. Universities, in general, are contact zones, According to the president of the

university in Timor, “the university is major, so big, for interaction, it is a place where people come from different islands, cultures, ethnicities, and they interact with each other.” He adds that “by interacting, students learn from each other and from the local community too, and get good understanding of each other.” The potential for intercultural contact is greater at UGM than in other public universities, because it is more diverse. At UGM, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* becomes alive, real, wider, and dynamic for all participants. They learn *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* more through student organizations and “the daily living in community,” rather than in class.

Most students believe that they show their commitment to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* by respecting others daily and interacting with others meaningfully. They give instances of “simple practices” of respect. They use the Indonesian language with people of other ethnicities and learn a few Javanese words while in college in Yogyakarta. When they meet people for the first time, they do not ask about religion or ethnicity. They do not “make groups” and do not give information that they are unsure about. In terms of religious differences, students are aware of the various commitments and keep them in consideration. For instance, non-Muslim participants show their friendship to Muslim peers by holding their bag while they pray, sending Ramadan wishes via text messages, keeping their dietary needs in mind, and breaking the fast together. Similarly, Non-Christian subjects remember that their Christian classmates may be unavailable for meetings on Sunday. Students build personal relationships with peers of distinct backgrounds, through studying together, being friends, and having romances. I met a Balinese Hindu girl dating a Minangkabau Muslim boy, a Catholic Javanese girl dating a Japanese boy, a Lampung Muslim girl dating a Chinese Muslim boy.

Survey participants had to describe their three closest friends—collectively they are from all colleges, all religions, 53 ethnicities, and all provinces with exception of Gorontalo.

Interviewees repeat that they have “friends from everywhere” and “it is so much fun.” Being friend means “to hang out together,” “to help each other,” and “to be good with each other.”

Some friends talk about their distinct religious practices, such as places of worship, sacred texts, prayers, and celebrations. For instance, a Protestant student spoke about “the discrimination against fellowships” with her Muslim friends and “they felt sorry.” Others discuss the disparity between Java and the rest of Indonesia as well as regional challenges. In moments of disagreement, an informant realizes, “It is OK to be different and I trust that we can face the problem, rather than cutting our friendship and becoming strangers.” A few students engage in friends’ religions or in intercultural events. For instance, a Buddhist respondent mentions,

I pray with friends in their Christian or Catholic churches, Hindu temples, and Muslim gatherings for Eid Fitr—I enjoy having different experiences and understanding more about people’s religions because in Indonesia a lot of people’s opinions come from the religion. So when you know the background, you understand why he thinks like that or why she does like that. There are differences within each religion too.

Through these relations, some students can overcome their prejudices. In terms of ethnicity, a student admits, “I thought Lampung was the best culture because I did not know the others, but now I know that each ethnicity has good things and that we are all humans and we should not differentiate.” With regard to religion, an informant reports,

I studied in a pesantren, where I did not have many opportunities to meet people with different backgrounds and I used to pay attention to other religions. Something changed when I moved to Yogyakarta, where I met many people from different religions. The more I socialized with them, the more I did not have the same feeling. I realized that religion is a personal choice so paying attention to it or asking about it is not my business.

Another participant remembers,

My department is very diverse, with students who like to party and others who wear big veil [from head to toe, but face and hands are exposed], for example. The best thing I found from that group of friends with big veil was that from the outside they look fanatic but in the inside they are open minded. I prefer a friend strict outside but open inside, rather than a friend who looks OK outside but strict inside.

Fifty percent of the respondents also have friends from other countries. Interviewees are generally proud of being part of a “world class university” and appreciate its opportunities to interact with foreign peers and visiting professors. They want “to connect with other cultures and to have friends all over the planet.” Some students report to gain insightful perspectives from friends and partners from other countries, including regarding sensitive issues that they choose not to discuss with co-citizens. They felt freer to talk with their foreign peers than with some of their co-nationals, because they consider Westerners “more open minded” and “liberal.” For example, the interviewee discussed the professor’s metaphor of veiled women as wrapped candies with her American boyfriend, but she did not mention it to other peers, “I did not talk to my friends about the incident because it is a very awkward topic.”

Intercultural relationships take time and effort. In particular, non-Yogyakartaese students have to adapt to be away from home in a new culture. During the first semester, students felt homesick, alone, and sad. A student recalls, “Cultural shock sucked, I felt ‘this is not really me.’” They progressively became more comfortable with simple changes in the diet to more complex cultural challenges. For example, a participant recalls, “People were strange for me—so calm, polite, smooth talking.” Being surrounded by a different local language was also difficult. An interviewee explains the adversity in adjusting from 15 years in a private Catholic school to a public university where Muslim adherents are the majority: “I used to say Catholic prayers and to sing Catholic songs, but at UGM everyone says *Assalamualaikum*, nobody cares about my religion or my need to pray. This is real life, this is a jungle for me. It is hard.” In addition, a student from Sumatra voices the difficulty in overcoming the ingrained assumption that Javanese students are better than others:

I felt that UGM is the university with the smartest students and I am one of the stupid ones. I was not confident in myself. Nobody made me feel down, but I just felt in that way. Everybody knows from TV, magazines, newspaper, internet, and media that Java is better than other islands— smarter, more developed, with better educational services. But as the time went by, I realized that I could compete with other students. Some students from outside Java feel “appreciated” and “special” because of their low number. For instance, a student explains, “My friends are so kind with me; maybe because I am a minority so they care about me.”

Barriers and potentials. Obviously, some cases of self-segregation and prejudice do exist. Thirty-one percent of survey participants state that religious and ethnic cliques exist; 18% of the survey participants feel threatened around people of other religions and ethnicities. Professor Zainuddin believes that “UGM has become almost segregated—there are many religious and ethnic groups here and they do not meet or talk to each other; students do not seem to connect, to communicate well with each other beyond daily conversations.” These cliques are not static but change within different contexts. For instance, a student explains that “anything can happen in UGM”—students can become more fanatic or liberal according to the group they join or become influenced by. Another participant explains that incoming students tend to connect according to ethnicity, but later expand beyond these divides:

At the beginning people sit in class in different groups based on ethnicity—it is normal, because of adaptation, people are more comfortable to be friends with people from the same ethnicity, it takes more effort to become friends with other ethnicities. I had friends from my own province, but now I am not close with them, I have more friends from the same academic interest. There are still groups, but less of them.

In terms of religious divides, most criticisms target radical Muslims, who “do not want to talk with anybody else except their own group,” “make a boundary by sitting separate and not shaking hands with people of the opposite sex.” Among the participants, only one of the two students from KAMMI acknowledges that she does not have “friends from other religions, but just classmates.” A participant explains, “There is a dominance by one group but fortunately this does not disturb, we can still have good personal relationships across groups.” Students are also

divided by ethnicity and city of origin. Some participants find that “ethnic affinity” is sometimes palpable, especially through the use of local languages. They mention about groups based on Jakarta, Medan, and Papua.

In addition to ethno-religious self-segregation, some prejudices are also a barrier to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* on campus. Prejudice generally hides behind accepted forms of teasing. Participants point out that culture-based “jokes” are widespread in Indonesia, even though people could technically be prosecuted for offending SARA (i.e., ethnic group, social class, race, and religion). “Mocking” tends to target ethnicity and gender, but not religion due to its sensitivity. For example, an informant testifies that he sometimes addresses Chinese-Indonesians with the derogatory term *Cino*: “They just keep silent and never react; it is like a game, I do not feel it is bullying.” Professor Erwin explains that “students make fun of the Papuans’ *koteka* because they see it as backward; when they see the *koteka*, they feel some sort of a traumatic feeling that limits and compromises the way they see differences.” Javanese people are teased for preferring etiquette to truth and “stabbing people on the back.”

Most participants recognize that mocking others is not a “good habit” and “try to avoid stereotypes” because “characteristics depend on people.” Some participants take these jokes as an opportunity to dismantle stereotypes. A respondent from Kalimantan explains to her friends that her region does not only have “huts in the jungle and a funny accent.” An interviewee from Minangkabau takes his friends out for meals so they can understand that people from his community are not as stingy as depicted in the media. He also tells them that his society is matrilineal society, “but this does not mean that marrying a Minangkabau girl is like being

bought out.” Some students intervene also on jokes against others’ cultures or sexual orientations.

Prejudice can also determine the boundaries of accepted diversity. It targets people who do not belong to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* until they adjust. Professor Erwin states that “students accept diversity as long as it does not yield traumatic feelings for them.” The shades of prejudice are many and subtle. Most interviewees accept everyone in diversity, even if at different degrees. For instance, they may criticize people of other religions or ethnicities, but they do not suggest that they should be rejected as Indonesians. Their beliefs about people’s fate after death provide an example of how participants’ values do not translate in socio-political action. They have different explanations for followers of other religions, ranging from exclusivist views (e.g., “they are not accepted in heaven”), to inclusivist or pluralist approaches (e.g., it depends on “God’s will, “what they do in the world,” or “what is required by their religion”). However, they are sure that their views do not affect their personal relationships: “It does not mean that I have the right to marginalize or stigmatize others.”

Only three participants demand institutionalized exclusions or adjustments of some of their fellow Indonesians. The first case refers to a KAMMI member who proposes “all people in the world to become Muslim, united in an international government, because Islam is the greatest religion.” He adds that “I am not happy about other religions because in the world; in the future Islam will be superior.”

The second case refers to the two KAMMI members and one other student who suggest that “Ahmadiyah is out.” They demand that the government confirm that Ahmadiyah is a

different religion and prosecute adherents who do not comply. The first KAMMI student recognizes that “according to the Bhinneka Tunggal Ika perspective, there is no problem about Ahmadiyah; but in my perspective, something is wrong with Ahmadiyah, because they do not want to acknowledge that they are a different religion.” The second student explains,

There are two basic principles in Islam—believe in God and in Prophet Muhammad as the last messenger. Ahmadiyah believes in another prophet, so I can say that they break the most basic principle. There are so many differences in Islam. I respect that. We can still live peacefully with others, but we cannot break the principle, we must be the same, we must be on the same line. It hurts when you have principles as a community and there are some people who suddenly come with new ideas, but they still want to stay in your community. I do not agree with any violence against them. Violence is not the solution.

The third case refers to around five Muslim students, who believe that Kejawen followers should be educated in order to convince them to abandon the cultural practices that do not belong to Islam. In the KAMMI follower’s words:

In my village, in East Java, most people are farmers and do not have good knowledge about Islam, including the *kyai*. They believe in healers and magicians according to the traditions of old Java. In my SMA pesantren, I learned about Islam, the Quran, and *ulama*’s explanations in religious classes. I realized that Kejawen is prohibited and started to educate people in my village. Now my family does not believe in magicians anymore because I gave them information and they understood.

Similarly, the other KAMMI member adds, “I do not want to hurt them so I have to find the best way to make them know my idea, even if it needs a very long time.” Other student confirms that “we must tell them that what they are doing is false.” For instance, when she witnessed the *padusan* (ritualistic bathing), she confronted the participants: “I think my Prophet did not teach me that.”

They affirm that “people who embrace Islam should leave preexisting traditions,” “should not combine culture and religion because it destroys the true way of religion.” People of other religions can stay with their religions, but “if you are Muslim, you must be in the Muslim context.” They propose that “we have to find the Prophet’s first way, the right way, we have to learn again what Islam is truly in Arabia.” A KAMMI member explains the origin and developments of Kejawen:

A long time ago, maybe the 1500s, *ulama* came from abroad, from Mecca and Palestine for example, as traders and they found in Indonesia a Hindu culture with *wayang*, *gamelan*, and Javanese old songs. Indonesian people’s life was not good enough—for instance, they drank alcohol, which is not good for the health. Slowly, the *ulama* tried to teach the people how to live well—for example, to wake up early in the morning, to work, to cultivate the rice fields, to trade, and to behave in social life, to be good people. They used the cultural way so society could accept Islam—for example, they filled stories and songs with Muslim values and wisdom. With the passing of time, these rituals remained but their meaning became blur. For instance, *kunungan sakatenang* used to be a pile of rice that was donated by people to the poor but now people just take some to get

good luck. That is wrong, it is not true. Believing in good luck makes people lazy, it is a wrong paradigm in social and personal life.

Students generally want UGM to intervene in maximizing the opportunities for interactions and improving relationships on campus, rather than just providing “space to gather.” They highlight that “bringing people from all Indonesia to UGM is not enough to create understanding; gathering does not mean understanding each other.” For instance, UGM should “remind students to take care of minority students” and “to make friends without caring about where we come from, what is our religion, what is our culture.” Participants believe that “students should have free mind and be free to hear other opinions.” The two students from a Protestant university propose that conflicts are “part of life,” “potential for greater understanding,” and “can be transformed into progress through discussions and studies about religions without claiming that a religion is better than the others.”

Professor Zainuddin agrees that “students are not getting enough exposure to diversity.” He met with a few colleagues to advocate “more deliberate efforts to force different groups to meet and talk with each other; meeting people from different backgrounds is a very important opportunity for students, they cannot find in many other places, so it is good to exploit it.” The 2012 incoming rector aims to continue his predecessor’s objective to break down the wall across disciplines as well as between intra- and extra-curricular.” For instance, he combined the positions of vice deans for academics and student affairs when he was the dean of Social and Cultural Studies, and the posts of vice rectors for academics and student affairs during his rector term.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented participants views about the barriers, supports, and potentials for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in campus life. With regards to space, participants mention some aspects of cafeterias, prayer rooms, and housing that are relevant to Bhinneka Tunggal Ika at UGM. Some criticisms of cases of isolation and segregation emerge among both students and faculty. Participants generally advocate for more openness, inclusiveness, representation, and intercultural opportunities.

Student organizations are an important part of UGM campus life. Forty percent of the survey respondents report to be involved with organizations that support interfaith/multiethnic understanding. Student groups are based on religions, hobbies, politics, and academic studies. Most of them are not formally affiliated to UGM, even though they are formed by UGM students and gather on the UGM campus. Forty-seven campus-wide groups formally belong to UGM Student Affairs, including five confessional groups.

Students generally believe that these groups are “open,” because anybody can join their events and benefit from their support. However, some participants point out that confessional organizations can be exclusivist, especially in the case of strict Muslim organizations like KAMMI and violent Islamic groups. These clubs are relatively small in number of adherents, but great in their influence on campus life due to their forceful tactics of action. KAMMI, for example, control both the Student Association and the AAI program. Students’ Islamic radicalization starts in high-school, proceeds through college, and has ties with political parties and international organizations.

Most students are concerned about UGM inaction against these radical infiltrations. The Office of Student Affairs is also criticized for being distant from students' concerns and sometimes privileging Muslim matters. Participants recommend faculty and staff to encourage students to engage in multicultural organizations. UGM should also intervene about extremist organizations, for instance by either banning them or facilitating counter movements.

Intercultural contact is the most influential force in learning about *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. UGM is the most impactful experience in their practice of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, in participants' view, especially through student organizations and "the daily living in community," rather than in class. Students provide examples of how they respect and interact with others meaningfully. Through these relations, some students overcome their prejudices. Intercultural relationships take time and effort, in particular during the adaptation phase.

Obviously, some cases of self-segregation and prejudice do exist, mainly by religion and marginally by ethnicity. Grouping tends to decrease as the semesters pass by and students become more comfortable. Most criticisms target radical Muslims and ethnic prejudice, which often hides behind forms of "teasing." Most participants recognize that mocking others is not a "good habit" and try to counter stereotypes. Most interviewees accept everyone in diversity, even if at different degrees. Two KAMMI members suggest institutionalized exclusion of Ahmadiyah. Around five Muslim students believe that *Kejawen* followers should be educated in order to convince them to abandon the cultural practices that do not belong to Islam.

Students generally want UGM to intervene in maximizing the opportunities for interactions and improving relationships on campus, rather than just providing "space to gather."

Chapter 10:

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: Moving Multiculturalism towards Grounded Cosmopolitanism

Indonesian scholars have attempted to detach the term multiculturalism from previous ideological categorizations. Sunarto (2004) stresses that multiculturalism means the manners of responding to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is an open concept that is filled with specific meanings as it moves through time, space, and individuals. Through this wider lens, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika means multiculturalism in the Indonesian context. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is the intrinsic processing of diversity that works inside Indonesian people's minds.

In my study, I focused on students, professors, and administrators' reflections on Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. In Indonesia, professors are also administrative executives; therefore, I generally refer to students and faculty members only in my narrative. I investigated the qualities that they assign to multiculturalism in the Indonesian context (a.k.a. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). After clarifying their thinking, I examined how they illustrate it in the practices of higher education. In particular, they discussed university regulations, curriculum, teaching and research, as well as campus life. Their descriptions, criticisms, and propositions for change assist in the understanding of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Their accounts show a variety of perspectives and points of tension, as well as some predominant trends.

Thinking of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as a "Historical Concept"

My first question asked, What does Bhinneka Tunggal Ika mean in the Indonesian higher education context? In other words, if Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is multiculturalism in the Indonesian context, what type of multiculturalism is it? As I discussed in my theoretical framework, models

of multiculturalism are numerous and distinct. Thus, where do Indonesian intellectuals situate Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in the global discourse on multiculturalism? In analyzing my findings, I find that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika has two sets of meanings based on Indonesian history and UGM experience.

Throughout history, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika has shifted across multiple interpretations of multiculturalism. In the 14th century's poem by Mpu Tantular, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika emerged as cosmopolitan multiculturalism—one of Parekh's (1997) categorizations. It advocated peace among religious communities by suggesting that distinct beliefs are paths towards the same ultimate Truth. Individuals and groups may have distinct convictions, but at the end they share universalist values. Universalist belongings transcend all differences.

At the time of independence in 1945, Mpu Tantular's quotation was revitalized and its new meaning endures today. The founders of Indonesia expanded the attributes of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika through the formulation of the national philosophy Pancasila (five principles). The second principle on "internationalism," with an emphasis on justice and humanity, maintains the essence of cosmopolitan multiculturalism. Yet, the other four conceptual foundations are grounded into the specific reality of Indonesia. For example, they endorse a generic monotheism, a united country, and social justice for the people of Indonesia across all ethno-religious differences. In this way the meaning of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika diverged from cosmopolitan multiculturalism in advocating local and national commitments *in addition to* broader allegiances (Parekh's model of cosmopolitan multiculturalism suggests that people leave their primordial and national loyalties).

As a result, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika became grounded cosmopolitanism (Kahn, 2004). On one hand, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika cares for ethnic, religious, and all other primordial or local affiliations (Geertz, 1973; A. Smith, 2003). It is also concerned about national loyalty, since the new Indonesia is a modern imagined community, which was constructed in 1945 in opposition to colonization (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992). These local and national belongings are examples of grounded traits.

On the other hand, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika preserves a commitment to cosmopolitanism. It endorses humanist and global values. For example, the Indonesian movement for self-determination had been inspired by scholarly work from overseas; after independence, the founders of Indonesia wanted to contribute to human civilization and justice. Indonesia felt part of the world. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is not only for Indonesia, but for all humankind. Beyond national borders, it refers to living together as humans in peace, with the awareness that “we need others.” Up to today, both Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila are considered essential “to face globalization,” as they keep Indonesia connected to its roots while branching out to the world.

As a result, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (or grounded cosmopolitanism) means to hold local, national, and global memberships. It is about “striking a balance with no need to trade off.” Primordial cultures are important because they make the country unique and contribute to an Indonesian shared heritage. Through their mutual solidarities, Indonesia was made possible in the first place. The national state is also essential because it allows pre-existing communities to

survive in the 21st century's global arrangements. Despite criticisms against the government, participants support a united Indonesia.

Unity and diversity cannot be separated: with no diversity the country would split and with no unity the various regions would probably fall back under foreign imperialism. The primordial feelings of being sacred, authentic, ancient, and based on predecessors' sacrifice (as described by A. Smith, 2003) expand to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. For example, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is defined as an extraordinary and holy legacy that was fought for; thus, it must be respected at all time because it is life itself inside Indonesians' hearts. In a united *and* diverse Indonesia, people can "complete each other's differences" "without having to be the same" or "renouncing their own background." Participants do not prioritize diversity over unity (as suggested by Sunarto, 2004), but rather call for both simultaneously. In a grey zone between ethnic and state nationalisms, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is a polyethnic ideology based upon shared civil rights rather than communal cultural roots (Eriksen, 2002). The common ground includes values of collective safety, dialogue, inclusion, and prosperity. The city of Yogyakarta is the closest realization of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, because the sultan preserves local traditions, makes people from all Indonesia feel "at home," and openly resists Islamic radicalism.

The ideal of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* has found challenges in becoming a reality. It has deteriorated into a mixture of accommodative and interactive multiculturalism—two of Parekh's (1997) categorizations. On one hand, Javanese and Muslim cultures remain dominant, but make some provisions for the needs of ethno-religious minority groups (as also argued by Budianta,

2004; Heryanto, 2006). On the other hand, minority communities challenge the dominant group and aim to create a collective culture that reflects distinct perspectives.

However, some majority groups *also* join into these counter endeavors (a difference with Parekh's model of interactive multiculturalism, which only mentions minorities). For example, many Muslim Javanese participants in my study risked their lives during the Manji episode, are part of peace youth organizations, and reject the marginalization of any group. Minority-majority dichotomies are necessary to unravel predicaments of power. Yet, they often hide their heterogeneity within their groups. They also carry the tendency towards *groupism*— the representation of groups as monolithic blocs with no internal diversity and tension (Brubaker, 2002). The difficulty of implementing the ideal of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is mainly caused by the “hardening” of certain ethno-religious boundaries (Duara, 1996). For example, the divisive phenomena of Javanization, Islamization, and reactive minorities' parochialism arise from hardbound religious interpretations and ethnic affiliations. The hardening and softening of cultural boundaries is relevant for both socio-political dynamics and identity processes, as shown by the following section.

Experiencing *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as “Identity Blending” at UGM

At UGM, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (or grounded cosmopolitanism) remains holding local, national, and global memberships; yet, it intensifies the concept of hybridity. Budianta's (2004) approach to multiculturalism endorses individuals' agency to freely select from available cultural references. Grounded cosmopolitanism elaborates the process of hybridization further and allows broader space for applications. Based on my analysis, hybridization occurs horizontally as well

as vertically—within and across students, faculty, and administrators as well as the university structure itself. Both individuals and institutions experience cultural interactions among the local, national, and global. In chapter 5, in the sections on *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as “togetherness and altruism” and “identity blending,” I reported on examples of hybridization among UGM students. In chapter 6, in the section on “UGM mission,” I described the UGM “special formula” for a contextual and universal university. Here, I focus on students’ experiences of grounded cosmopolitanism.

At UGM, students live in a third space of cultural practice, where grounded belongings (i.e., ethnicity, religion, and nationality) amalgamate with cosmopolitan allegiances (i.e., humanism and globalization) (Kahn, 2004; Nilan & Feixa, 2006). Youth embody and endorse hybridity. They draw from a plurality of cultural criteria from the local, national, and international spheres. They amalgamate these polymorphous attributes, resolve intrinsic tensions, and create their own narratives of identity (Hanan, 2008). They pick and choose what suits them the most. They do not sacrifice their grounded affiliations in name of cosmopolitan influences, or vice versa; they enjoy and navigate both worlds. Hybridization allows them to reframe local predicaments through broader lenses, to express themselves more fully, and to better prepare to access international circuits (Setijadi, 2012).

In these ways, young people resist attempts to restrict their identity and break down dichotomous barriers. They call for a space in-between “us” and “them” where they can be both; for example, between being gay and Muslim, Catholic and lesbian, Buddhist and Javanese, Indonesian and a citizen of the world. They want to construct their individual identity without

restricting categorizations. They aim to move outside the box of politics of ethnicity and faith, in order to reconcile all their given and chosen identities. They desire to access the full spectrum of diversity, because in a student's words, "a day is not split in day and night, but in morning, afternoon, evening, and night."

Even though they may believe in salvation, many carry inclusivist or sometimes even pluralist theologies. They have no interest in converting others and their beliefs about the after-death do not affect their personal relationships. They are religious, but believe that religion "gives no right to marginalize others." They recognize that religion and ethnicity per se are not the roots of tensions. Political and ethno-religious leaders carry most of the responsibility of hardening boundaries; they politicize majority-minority dichotomies, by imposing polarizing views and refusing the heterogeneity inside each ingroup (Brubaker, 2002; Jiang, 2006).

The hardening and softening of cultural boundaries change according to circumstances. For example, being LGBT, wearing the *koteka* (penis gourd), or embodying any other "traumatic feeling" may be generally respected and accepted, but not among family members and best friends. With regards to family and close friends, cultural expectations have harder boundaries.

While extreme hardening of cultural practices is rare, when it occurs, it makes individuals exclusivist or even hostile against others' cultural resources. My study shows that it mainly takes place with religion. Rejection of people of other creeds happens, but rejection of ingroup "black sheep" is more common and outspoken (Shin, 2006). In particular, within exclusivist Islam, members of the LGBT, Shia, Ahamadiyah, and Kejawen communities are marginalized for "breaking the basic principles." A purist approach to Islam constrains other cultural practices,

including pre-existing primordial traditions. A student notes, “People should not combine culture and religion, because it destroys the true way of religion.” The Indonesia that preceded Islamization is considered backwards; Islam improved and modernized life, for example by prescribing to its followers to abstain from drinking alcohol, to wake up early, to farm, to trade, and to behave well in society.

Besides believing in Allah and the Prophet Muhammad, the boundaries of the rejected area are highly disputed. The actors in Irshad Manji’s case illustrate the heterogeneity within Islam: moderate college students, academic organizers, abortion activists, and women who acted as a human shield around Manji while violent radicals attacked the venue. The majority of Muslim youth are moderate. For instance, in Java, they still blend Islam with older practices and beliefs, such as *wayang* theater, *gamelan* music, propitious ceremonies, and healers. They express concern towards increasing pious rules, such as avoiding physical contact with the individuals of the opposite sex, wearing a long veil for women and short pants for men, as well as refusing relationships with people of different views. They believe that Indonesia is different from other countries and practices its own customs.

UGM: A Hybrid Space of Dominant and Counter Discourses on Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

My second question asked, what are the supports, barriers, and potentials for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika in the Indonesian higher education context? As I proposed earlier, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (or grounded cosmopolitanism) means to hold local, national, and global memberships. Here, I suggest that a “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika education” (or a grounded cosmopolitan education) means to support the agency to blend grounded and cosmopolitan

allegiances within a hybrid identity. Therefore, I frame my answer to my second question in terms of the interplay between forces that either constrain or promote hybridity at UGM.

From the literature on the public sphere, I draw the notion of the university as a contested terrain of competing publics (Bourdieu, 1979; Foucault, 1995; Freire, 1970, 1998; Giroux, 1988). In my analysis, the dominant discourse aims to restrict hybridity, whereas counter narratives aspire to expand it. In addition to overt discourses, I attempt to illuminate the concealed messages which are portrayed as insignificant, but in reality are consequential. I consider all aspects of the university, including governmental policies, university regulations, teaching methods, formal curriculum, and campus life. This wide lens reflects a comprehensive approach to multicultural education (Budianta, 2004; Semiawan, 2004; Sunarto, 2004; Therik, 2004).

Dominant discourses. UGM is not neutral, but political (Bourdieu, 1979; Foucault, 1995; Freire, 1970, 1998; Giroux, 1988). In chapter 6, in the section on “UGM mission,” I presented the connection between the philosophy of Gadjah Mada (*ke-UGM-an*) and the history of Indonesia. UGM is entrenched in the ethno-religious solidarities and state-building efforts at the time of independence from the Dutch. Its mission reflects the ideal meaning of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as grounded cosmopolitanism that I presented earlier in this chapter. However, over the decades, some of its provisions have fallen into accommodative multiculturalism (Parekh, 1997). Both external and internal forces have supported Javanization and Islamization, rather than hybridity. These dominant practices normalize certain behaviors as socially appropriate, for example by infiltrating the national examinations, curriculum, and student life (Bourdieu, 1979; Foucault, 1995; Freire, 1970, 1998; Giroux, 1988).

The national examination determines university access based on scholastic merit, according to the Ministry of Education. Yet, the quality of K-12 education is greater in Java than in other islands, so pupils do not have an equal chance to thrive in the national exam. In Eastern Indonesia, social services are especially scarce and families increasingly send their children to boarding schools or pre-college preparation institutes in Java, in order to enhance their opportunity to enter public universities. Most universities, and all top institutions, are also found in Java, but the Ministry of Education does not provide adequate scholarships for students to relocate and cover all college expenses. As a result of standardized policies and dearth of investments in education, the UGM student body is facing an overrepresentation of students from Java and higher social classes. The growing homogeneity among students also increases homogeneity among faculty, who are predominantly UGM alumni.

The national curriculum limits students' hybridity, especially in terms of religious, civic, and scholastic preparation as well as character building. From elementary school to college, students have to study their own religion, in order to strengthen their faith, ethics, and commitment to the first Pancasila rule (i.e., belief in one God). This confessional arrangement divides students according to their own dogma and restricts their knowledge about other creeds. In addition, monoreligious teachings are sometimes based on exclusivist theologies (Eck, 2005). In this case, their "distinctive non-common educational aims" generate the disruptive beliefs that other creeds are false and inferior; consequently, a sense of self-identity is forged in opposition to the broader society (Halstead & McLaughlin, 2005, p. 63).

The course on citizenship is also mandatory, but its content remains distant and irrelevant from students' contextual realities. It is a collection of historic and legal clauses, rather than a discussion on what Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika mean and how they are embodied in students' life. The overall pedagogy is teacher-centered, with little opportunities for critical thinking and discussions. In addition, since high-school, national tracks divide students between social and natural sciences. As a result, students lack a broader understanding and perceive character building as unrelated to their studies. Student life becomes limited by mono-disciplinary interests and hobbies, rather than also involving an interdisciplinary movement for social change. For example, students in the STEM fields have a greater tendency to join conservative religious groups and to avoid campus discussions compared to students in the social sciences.

The hidden curriculum reflects the dominant values, with limited considerations for intrareligious variations and other creeds. At UGM, some professors infiltrate teachings with their personal religious beliefs. For example, they present their personal perspectives against abortion and the LGBT community, without acknowledging the disputes about those topics within and across religions. They also propose a re-reading of the sociologist Durkheim according to Islam and encourage female students to wear the veil, "because a candy with a wrapper is more beautiful." In the Islam course, exclusivist theologies are widespread among the AAI teaching assistants, who penalize students of inclusivist and pluralist perspectives as well as of different Islamic interpretations. AAI instructors are students who are affiliated to the

conservative Muslim organization KAMMI and are selected by senior fellows, rather than through fair and transparent processes.

Government inaction towards fundamentalist Islamic movements also contributes to exclusivist Islam in campus life. The government adds to the perception that Islamic extremism is inevitable by allowing radical Islam movements to proliferate in the country and leaving campuses unprotected from violent attacks. Islamic hardliners are possibly the most debilitating forces against students' hybridity, as they threaten to assault UGM activities that are not in line with their position. They jeopardize academic freedom and multicultural inclusiveness, as in the case of Irshad Manji's presentation, which was cancelled due to security reasons.

Off-campus violent Islamic factions recruit and organize at UGM. Simultaneously, nonviolent, but exclusivist, Muslim student associations impact UGM political life. They promote a monolithic approach to reading the Quran, to worshipping God, to favoring men in leadership, and to rebuking ingroup members who do not meet their strict religious criteria, such as adherents to Shia, Ahmadiyah, and Javanese Islam as well as LGBT Muslims. They have been active in gaining a presence within influential circles, including for thirteen consecutive years the presidency of the Student Association.

Disguised narratives. Subordinated individuals internalize both overt and disguised narratives, including the "insignificant" practices of daily campus life (Bourdieu, 1979). They include religious and ethnic minorities as well as the many moderate Muslims who support hybridity. The majority of the UGM Muslim constituents are moderate in cultural views and become paralyzed in front of Islamic terrorism. The threat of violence is magnified due to police

inaction and nonviolent protests by many exclusivist Muslim groups. Yet, only few moderate members take part in street marches and petitions, whereas everyone else escapes polarization and embarks onto self-censorship. For example, minority students suggest limits to freedom of expression as a manner “to prevent angry people from starting wars.” In addition to fear of violence and conflict, a sense of ingroup solidarity may also prevent moderate Muslims to organize in a robust counter movement. Therefore, it often seems that “the only movement is extremist.”

The “feeling” of being a non-Javanese or non-Muslim minority emerges in silent, implicit, and “normalized” manners, so participants struggle in pointing out what exactly causes it (Foucault, 1995). For example, a Catholic participant recalls that she started “to feel like a minority in [her] own country” during adolescence and that “at times it feels difficult, other times it feels normal.” When a Protestant informant walks to church with her Bible, some Muslim neighbors “do not say anything”; they change facial expression and do not greet her. An interviewee remembers the hardship of growing up as the only Buddhist pupil in a majority-Muslim school—“they never did anything bad to me but being the only one in class makes you feel different and makes you wonder, ‘why am I the only one?’ That is the question that you always have in your head.” To escape the fear of discrimination in public campuses, Chinese-Indonesian students generally enroll in private universities or study abroad.

At UGM, students from outside of Java perceive that Javanese people consider them as less capable intellectually. A participant comments, “Nobody made me feel down, but I just felt in that way; everybody knows from TV, magazines, newspapers, internet, and media that Java is

better than other islands: smarter, more developed, with better educational services.” For example, informants from Eastern Indonesia notice that their Javanese peers are surprised if they do well in college. An informant admits to sometimes address Chinese-Indonesians with the derogatory term “Cino” and “they just keep silent and never react.”

Non-Muslim students point out that everyone greets others with *Assalamualaikum* and does not care about their faiths. By closing cafeterias during Ramadan and offering spaces for worship to Muslim adherents only, “UGM implicitly seems to say that the best religion is Islam.” The lack of available land to build sacred locations for other creeds is often used as an excuse, to possibly avoid other more problematic explanations about accommodative multiculturalism (Parekh, 1997). The office of Student Affairs encourages campus organizations to minimize non-Muslim artistic genres through subtle mannerisms. For instance, they say it with a soft voice and a smile. Student organizations of minority creeds have sometimes to wait for a space to gather, even though at least one classroom is always available.

Although formally anyone can become a leader at UGM, Muslim people are implicitly favored at all levels of the institutional hierarchy, with more impact on higher posts (e.g., rector and vice rectors) than on lower strata (e.g., faculty and students). Non-Muslim professors feel that they are “not supposed to be in the rector position,” so they prefer other positions where they can be supported and effective. Non-Muslim students withdraw into hobby- and faith-based clubs, because they are not given a real chance to become leaders of UGM political organizations like the Student Association.

Counter Discourses. Yet, within the above-discussed context, subaltern groups advance competing counter-publics to formulate alternative interpretations of identities, interests and needs (Fraser, 2007; Giroux, 1988). They encompass individuals of all ethnicities and faiths who support hybridity. They suggest that the UGM's original aspirations and annexed values should be enacted in all aspects of the university, rather than being limited to few classes. Their conceptual positions resonate with the literature on multicultural education as a comprehensive educational reform, which shapes all layers of the educational system, so that it can become part of the constituents' cultures (Budianta, 2004; Semiawan, 2004; Sunarto, 2004; Therik, 2004). Their oppositional discourses translate in either immediate actions or propositions for future change with regard to governmental policies, university regulations, teaching methods, formal curriculum, and campus life (Freire, 1970).

Upon pressure from counter publics, with UGM on the frontline, the ministry has been revisiting some policies, as I described in chapter 6. The Ministry of Education passed Law Number 12 Year 2012, which indicates that other criteria than national examination can be considered for admissions and that university admissions have to pay special attention to less privileged students. It has also expanded the number of new universities across the archipelago, although they are not comparable to the institutions in Java in terms of quality. The national government has also been considering a reform of the law on civil servants, which would facilitate the hiring and promotion of the faculty, based on both merit and background. UGM has been a pioneer institution in creating affirmative actions to recruit students from diverse demographics. It takes time for social inequality to adjust and UGM leaders believe that

they “cannot wait that long to educate people.” The invitation-based admission assists a more inclusive representation, as it reaches out to students across the archipelago. Participants advocated transparent strategies that expand the number of students for outer islands, countryside, and poorer families.

Any reforms on the mandatory courses about religion, Pancasila/citizenship, and community service should be carefully pondered, since they involve all students and carry a great potential for impact. As I described in chapter 7, the obligatory two-month community service (*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*, KKN) is generally valued for the opportunities in hands-on learning, cooperation in diverse teams, and leadership building as well as contribution to communities in need. It is an attempt to make education into a democratic, participatory, and transformative experience (Sunarto, 2004).

Participants propose considerable alterations to religious education. Some interviewees advise replacing the current class on teaching religion (or monoreligious education *behind* the wall) with a class on teaching about religions (or multireligious education *at* the wall), so that further knowledge on different creeds can increase mutual respect (Christiani, 2005; Felderhof et al., 2008; Grimmitt, 1987; Seymour et al., 1993; Sterkens, 2001). Other informants suggest educational programs on teaching from religions (or interreligious education *beyond* the wall) so that creeds can become socially relevant by resolving current crises, such as poverty and corruption. These alternative forms of religious studies rely on pluralist, or at least inclusive, theologies which can contribute to personal growth and civic integration (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Kerestes et al., 2004; Wagener et al., 2003).

Students and faculty advance numerous suggestions for the improvement of the Pancasila and citizenship courses. They emphasize praxis as well as multicultural and interdisciplinary approaches (Freire, 1970). They view the hidden curriculum as the most powerful space for the teaching of values, as suggested by critical theories (Bourdieu, 1979; Foucault, 1995). Overall, the content of formal curriculum should be academically challenging, pertinent to the student's major, socially relevant, and connected to daily practice, so participants understand how to implement it in their lives. Regardless of the consequences, UGM has to continue being a space for intellectual freedom, by endorsing educational programs on controversial topics.

As I reported in chapter 8, some professors challenge students' narrow views and encourage dialogue by monitoring discussions so that they do not degenerate into debates, and by encouraging students to look at a situation through peers' perspectives. To overcome the passive culture that students carry on from K-12 schooling, they provide incentives for class participation. Some courses are becoming more experience-based, socially active, and attentive to problem-solving. Students are in favor of progressive pedagogies and advocate teaching that does not favor a certain religious or ethnic background.

Some faculty members embody the key objectives of multicultural education, such as appreciation of cultural diversity, ability to function in various cultures, and promotion of social justice (Sunarto, 2004). Regardless of the department they teach in, they critique ethnocentrism, groupism and prejudice while fostering intellectual curiosity about other cultures. They model pluralist life choices, for instance by minimizing religious symbols, by speaking in Indonesian so that all students can understand, as well as by celebrating Christmas and Eid-Fitr with colleagues

of all faiths. However, only few professors extend multicultural education to the constructivist socialization of cultural hybridity, which is based upon the understanding of cultural blending as a common norm, rather than a mere appreciation for difference (Budianta, 2004; Parekh, 2000).

Within informal education, intercultural contact is the most effective area of counter-public (Allport, 1954; Antonio, 2001, 2004; Chavous, 2005; Halualani et al., 2004; Sorensen et al., 2009; Wright et al., 1997). As I explained in chapter 9, UGM is a “contact zone,” where people from different ethnicities and religions interact with each other in supportive and oppositional ways (Pratt, 1991). While students from outside Java count for 17% of the student body, they have a substantial impact on the overall university atmosphere and students’ development. UGM is a “psychological moratorium,” where students experiment with a greater variety of perspectives and life choices compared to their pre-college years (Gurin et al., 2004). Students sometimes shift religious interpretations, leave dogmatic religions, join their LGBT community, and change opinions about all sorts of personal and socio-political subjects. With regard to contact theory, my study on UGM provides different results compared to the empirical studies in American universities (Duster, 1991; Halualani et al., 2004). The majority of UGM students report a considerable amount of interaction across religions and ethnicities. Unlike in the United States campuses, academic cohort, interests, and personality take precedence over ethnicity and gender among the criteria for friendship.

At UGM, “balkanization” is less prominent than in the U.S. (Antonio, 2001). However, limited cases of self-segregation exist, mainly according to religion and only marginally according to ethnicity. A small number of students who join exclusivist Islamic organizations

harden their cultural boundaries during college. Yet, in the case of my interviewees, this process started in high-school, when clubs taught them about “total Islam” and how to convince their families to renounce to all other local beliefs. They verbalize a desire for more experiences with diversity, but only in regard to Muslims from other ethnicities and from other *accepted* interpretations of Islam. In other words, religious outgroups and ingroup “black sheep” fall outside their interest in diversity.

All conditions of negative contact that were found in the United States emerge from my study, such as influence by peer-group and off-campus organizations, as well as the perception of unfair treatment in the case of ethno-religious minorities (Dalton, 1991). The criteria of positive contact are also similar, including the pursuit of common goals and meaningful associations with one another (Allport, 1954; Antonio, 2004; Chavous, 2005; Robinson & Preston, 1976). In particular, my participants find that their views of diversity have been impacted more by friendship and membership in student organizations than by courses.

Intercultural friendships are visible in real and virtual life, including in all aspects of campus. They are considered fun and educational, because they allow people to expand knowledge and overcome stereotypes. Many students voice the ways in which intercultural contact increases their college satisfaction, cultural awareness, and social self-concept as well as postgraduate aspirations. For example, a student who grew up in a mono-ethnic community in Sumatra thought that her culture was “the best,” but at UGM she recognized that each ethnicity has positive traits and started to overcome her ethnocentrism. Similarly, a Muslim student from a pesantren used to “pay attention” to other religions, but at UGM she recognized that “religion is

a personal choice” and stopped “asking about it.” A Buddhist participant discovered that her favorite classmates were Muslim girls “with the big veil,” although she originally expected that they were going to reject her because of the different creed.

Participants give examples of “simple practices” that show their respect for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, such as keeping others’ religious commitments in consideration when scheduling the time for a meeting or the dishes for a meal, as well as holding Muslim friends’ bags while they pray. These examples may sound irrelevant for some readers, but I believe that they are not so given in other countries, including in the West. Few students engage in friends’ religious events, such as praying or going to places of worship together. They try not to ask about others’ religion or ethnicity right away when they meet, but to slowly get to know each other so they can accommodate mutual habits. Candid conversations on ethno-religious divides are rare because they are considered sensitive, awkward, and often deteriorating into debates. Yet, they do take place, including about distinct religious practices and incidences of discrimination against Christian gatherings and LGBT members, for example. In the multicultural environment of UGM, culture-based insults or “jokes” are less common than at the time preceding college.

Some UGM leaders believe that intercultural contact per se is fruitful, because through knowing each other *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* will occur by default. Others suggest deliberate efforts to “exploit” the opportunities for interactions, rather than just providing a space to gather, because “gathering does not mean understanding each other.” Prior and after UGM, students rarely have the chance to build relationships with people of many different backgrounds.

Therefore, UGM should give students more opportunities to talk with each other, cooperate on

projects, make friends across all divides, and to take care of minority students. This position resonates with the majority of the literature which agrees that curricular and co-curricular experiences with diverse peers have a crucial role in the success of intercultural contact (Engberg, 2004).

UGM is well-known for its many student activities and organizations. Campus clubs become “second family,” where members develop lifelong relationships, collaborative skills, and learning about Indonesia and the world. Students remember joining student associations in their freshmen year as “the critical point in their life,” because it exposed them to situations that they had never considered before. Students appreciate student organizations, but suggest that the Office of Student Affairs promote pluralist, or at least inclusivist, views, and cooperative across religious differences.

Chapter 11: Conclusion

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is the Indonesian contribution to the global discourse on multiculturalism. In this dissertation, I argue that Bhinneka Tunggal Ika frames multiculturalism as grounded cosmopolitanism. In particular, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (or grounded cosmopolitanism) means to hold local, national, and global memberships simultaneously. On the “ground,” individuals are committed to their primordial affiliations, including religion and ethnicity. They aim to preserve their place of origin, language, traditions, and beliefs. They are also attached to their country, which contains multiple cultures in the case of pluralist societies. In their “cosmopolitan” being, individuals engage in global and humanist experiments. They are connected to globalized influences, such as popular and consumer culture. In addition, they carry humanist values and universal solidarities, as they feel part of humanity.

As a result of this approach to multiculturalism, a “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika education” (or a grounded cosmopolitan education) means to support the agency to blend grounded and cosmopolitan allegiances within a hybrid identity. Both individuals and institutions experience the process of cultural interactions among the local, national, and global. While the dominant discourse aims to restrict hybridity, counter publics aspire to expand it. Both overt and implicit narratives about hybridity affect all aspects of the university, including governmental policies, university regulations, teaching methods, formal curriculum, and campus life.

Supporting hybridity among the youth is important for several reasons. Hybridization allows individuals to reframe local predicaments through broader lenses, to express themselves more fully, and to better prepare to engage in international circuits (Setijadi, 2012). This personal

expansion can improve academic, professional, and civic contributions. Human capacity for multiple identities is one of the key factors that makes democracy possible, along with a political roof of equal citizenship and human rights (Jiang, 2006).

Hybridization thrive in campuses that are culturally diverse in all their provisions. With the term diversity, I mean what Hershock (2010) defines as “a qualitative index of self-sustaining and difference-enriching patterns of mutual contribution to shared welfare” (p. 11). When exposed to these “new modalities of interaction,” students can fulfill their human capacity for hybrid identity in alternatives manners. Hosting a variety of domestic and international students as well as academic and experiential programs is just a first important step. As Hershock (2010) explains, “variety is a quantitative index of simple multiplicity that connotes things simply being-different” (p. 11).

In diverse campuses, students come in contact with a greater selection of grounded and cosmopolitan references. They pick and choose the cultural criteria that they prefer. They preserve their cultural traditions *and* adopt traits that they admire, in other communities in their country as well as abroad. They maintain certain intellectual positions *and* revise others. Throughout this process of hybridization, individuals constantly resolve internal tensions and find new equilibria. Grounded and cosmopolitan belongings are framed in terms of *and/and* not *either/or*, because they are both important and complementary. Individuals do not sacrifice their ethno-religious for their national belongings. Similarly, they do not renounce their grounded affiliations for cosmopolitan influences. They are *both*.

Being a diverse campus implies taking a stand against forces that aim to constrain hybridization. Within both grounded and cosmopolitan spheres, some influences attempt to constrain individual identity, by denigrating certain cultural sources and marginalizing others. For instance, in the case of Indonesia, purist Islamic interpretations from overseas require individuals to abandon some of their cultural beliefs. They may keep their language, but they have to substitute completely their attire and rituals. In this case, individuals do not add to their plurality of sources of identification, but replace some of them with new dogmas. Hybridization loses its *and/and* openness and is restricted into *either/or* narrowness.

My study illuminates how most students continue to blend, mix, and amalgamate cultural resources, despite the restricting forces that arise from both inside and outside the country. The youth play with their cultural boundaries, by softening and hardening them according to the circumstances. The challenge for UGM and all other universities is be the contact space that enables and encourages hybridity, so students can flourish in constantly new and expanded beings.

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