

CULTURAL MODEL AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
TO ANALYZE FAMILIAL TRANSFERS

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved wife, Diana Stojanovic Wongkaren, who had to endure endless discussions on new ideas for my dissertation topic, and to my late parents who unfortunately are not able to see one of their sons getting a doctorate.

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ABSTRACT

This study proposes an alternative approach in analyzing familial transfers, namely, by investigating how culture affects transfers through family roles.

In the first essay, the Single-culture Model, the basic model, is introduced. Culture defines active and passive roles of individuals. The incidents and size of transfers depend on the individual's hierarchy of roles. An empirical test on Javanese Muslims in Indonesia using the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) shows that the effects of being an oldest child, who in Javanese culture holds a specific position, on the likelihood of giving and receiving transfers among siblings and to parents.

In the second essay, the basic model is extended to incorporate multiple identities. The assumption is that individuals have more than one identity, and each of those identities carries a set of role expectations. An empirical test using the same data set as in the first essay shows that the effects of Islamic religiosity on transfers are not neutral but are influenced by the salience of the other identities that the respondents hold.

The third essay is an analysis of crowding-in and crowding-out effect of public transfer on private transfers to the elderly. Using an extension of the basic model on aggregate level, the results show that crowding-in and crowding-out effects can be explained partly by the expectations borne by the working-age population and the elderly themselves.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Transfer as a cultural object

Transfer is a cultural object, that is, an act of giving transfer has a specific meaning to a culture, and the meanings may be different from one culture to another. As cultural object, transfer is subjected to identity issue: how an individual transfers depends on how he/she views himself/herself and other people. For familial transfers, who give what and who receives how much depend on the giver and recipient's position in the family. A father, for instance, is expected to provide transfer to his children, but not necessarily to his brother. Despite this close relation between transfer and culture, there have been limited efforts in the literature to connect the two concepts.

The main objective of this study is to see the effects of culture on familial transfers. As cultural knowledge and activities are embodied in family roles, we will look at the effect of roles on transfer.

Currently, there are gaps in the existing literature on transfers: (1) there are only a limited number of studies that look at how culture affects familial transfers (Wolff, Spillerman & Attias-Donfut 2007; Lee and Kramer 2002, Kunemund & Reind 1999). (2) There are only few studies that look at the effect of identity on transfer. Even those studies attempting to relate identities and transfers (Lee & Aytac 1998) simply look at the differences, not at the mechanism that connects identity and transfers. (3) There is no study that looks at the impact of family roles, specifically multiple roles that an individual holds, on transfer. (4) Most studies on transfer only focus on certain dyadic relations in the family (e.g., children- elderly parents), neglecting the fact that any resource used for transfer come from the pool of resource that might be used for transfer to other family members. The present study tries to bridge those gaps by incorporating the concept of identity in the analysis of transfers.

Identity has emerged to be one of the most important issues in social sciences. Initially, it was confined to some fields such as anthropology (Barth 1969) and psychology (Tajfel & Turner 1979), but later it made roads in other areas as well, such as in economics (Akerlof & Kranton 2000).

There are many definitions of ‘identity’, but we take the simplest one, that is, it refers to how an individual views himself/herself. Burke and Stets (2009) suggests that there are at least three kinds of identity found in the literature: (1) *social identity*, which refers to membership in certain groups, such as female, white, Catholic, or Democrat, (2) *role identity*, which refers to the identity associated with individual’s position in social structure, such as father, mother, employer, manager, etc., and (3) *personal identity*, which refers to certain quality of individual, such as being an honest person, moral person, and so on. In the present study, we will focus on the first two kinds: social and role identities.

We argue that we need to bring the notion of roles to the analysis of family transfer for several reasons. First, roles bridge culture and family transfer. Family, regardless of how we define it, can be seen as a *role set* defined by culture. Each culture defines the expectations, duties, and rights associated with each role for each family member. Time may change, in contents and occupiers of roles, but the notion of roles in the family will never be obsolete. Studies on transfer will be better informed by incorporating roles to the analysis.

Second, by looking at family as a role set (Merton 1957) we will be able to analyze transfers among whole family members (both intra and inter household) as oppose to looking only at a dyadic relationship, such as between son/daughter and parents, a common practice in transfer literature.¹ A married woman has to play various roles such as spouse, mother, daughter, sibling, etc. Each role may be associated with specific duties and expectations regarding transfer to her counter-role. The transfer relationships are not either/or, as she is expected to fulfill every single role she occupies. Assuming she has limited resources, she has to distribute them according to different roles. Here, role expectations serve as a guideline.

Using family roles to analyze transfer, however, is not without problems. First, the use of roles in analysis of family has been done since the beginning of the last century and was popular in the middle of the 20th century, used mainly by scholars from two theoretical approaches: the structural functionalism and the symbolic interactionism. As

¹ Merton (1957: 110) wrote, “...by role-set I mean that complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status.” He gives example of a medical school student role in the university which is part of the role-relationships which include professors, secretaries, custodians, etc.

these two approaches became out of favor in the study of family, so did the use of roles. The main criticism against the use of family role in structural functionalism is that they are too deterministic, as if people just follow the scripts defined by roles. As for the symbolic interactionism, the main criticism was its overwhelming emphasis on ‘micro’ interactions where people create and use meanings at the expense of ignoring how the structure (such as culture) informs the interactions (Smith & Riley 2009). As we see later, the role theorists tried to combine the two perspectives in their analyses. We hold a dynamic understanding of roles: while roles provide some guidance to behaviors, they can be seen as constraining as well as a resource for individuals.

The second problem in bringing family role as manifestation of culture is that at any given time, at least the way we defined culture, a person belongs to more than one culture. An individual is at the same time a Filipino and a Catholic, for instance. The two cultures, the Philippines and the Catholic cultures, may assign different expectations, duties, and rights to a same role. Additional influences, such as those from (Western) modern ideas, may bring another complication to the issue.

1.2 Organization

The main part of the dissertation (beyond introduction, literature review and conclusion), is organized in three parts.

The first part of the dissertation presents the basic model. The model argues that culture affects familial transfers through expectations attached to family roles. It assumes that at any given time individuals hold multiple roles (as a daughter, a mother, a sister, and so on), and each role carries with it an expectation with regard to responsibility to care. The model posits that when it comes to transfers, there are two types of roles: *active roles* and *passive roles*. Active roles are those roles that carry expectation that the *role holders* to do something or act in certain ways. Meanwhile, passive roles refer to those that carry expectation that *other people* would do something for them.

The basic model consists of two parts: the structural and the individual components. The structural component lays out how culture defines relationship between a pair of roles, for instance, between mother and daughter, husband and wife, and so on. These dyadic relationships change over individual’s life course because (1) individual

acquires or loses roles, and (2) in some cases, the expectations change even inside the same role. Each culture has a hierarchy of roles for each person at any given point in his/her life. For instance, in a certain culture, a middle age married man is expected to put his wife (in relation to his role as a husband), his children (in his role as a father), and his parents (in his role as a son) high in his hierarchy of roles. Individuals, of course, may choose not to follow the hierarchy. Literature shows that individuals negotiate which roles they choose to hold and how they carry out the expectations (Finch & Mason 1993). This would be the focus of the individual component of the model. Drawing from the symbolic-interactionist literature, the model argues that the incidents and amount of transfers depend on the hierarchy of roles that individual holds. The first part ends with empirical tests of the model on a sample consists of Javanese Muslims in Indonesia. Since we use a secondary dataset, we do not have any information on individual hierarchy of roles. Hence, we test a constructed structural hierarchy of roles found in anthropological literature on Javanese culture. The tests focus on the effects of birth order—specifically the oldest child who in Javanese culture holds a specific role in familial transfers.

The main finding of the first part is that individual has multiple roles whose expectations are defined by culture. The incident and amount of familial transfers are influenced by those roles that one holds.

The second part is built on the basic model. While the basic model only deals with one culture, here we acknowledge that individuals are exposed to and influenced by multiple cultures at the same time. For example, a person can be a Javanese, a Muslim, and living in a metropolitan like Jakarta at the same time. Each of these characteristics (Javanese, Muslim, and living in a metropolitan) may form a separate identity, and each may have a distinct hierarchy of roles. A presence of multiple cultural-hierarchy of roles suggests that one may face the possibility of competing roles at the same time. For instance, one culture says as a married man he has to put his wife as a priority, while the other says he has to put his elderly parent on the highest rank in his hierarchy of roles. Which roles and in what order that a person considers the most important would be reflected on his transfers. The model suggests that the decision would depend on the salience of identity. At the end of the second part we carry out an empirical test of the

extension by looking at the interplay between being Muslims, being Javanese, and living in urban area.

The main finding of the second part is that since individual has multiple social/cultural identities, the incident and amount of transfers are affected by the interactions and the salience of those identities.

The first two parts focus on individuals, while the final, third part of the dissertation applies the model on a country-level data. The active and passive roles concept is used to analyze the direction of transfers to the elderly at a country level, as well as the issues of crowding-out and crowding-in effects. Since the 1970s, one of the most important public policy debates has been on whether public transfer crowd *out* familial transfers, or the opposite: crowd *in* familial transfers. Proponents of crowding-out transfers usually argue that public transfers would make other family members hesitant to give to family members who receive the transfers. With the supposedly needing family members now benefit from public transfers, there is no reason for other family members to provide help to them. Meanwhile, proponents of crowding-in transfers point out that since family members who receive public transfers now have more resources at their disposal, they would be able to provide familial transfers to other members. Hence, here, public transfers result in *crowding in* of familial transfers. The basic model with active and passive roles discussed in the first part provides an insight on how to deal with the issue with a fresh approach. Hypotheses coming from the model are tested on macro data of 16 countries. The results suggest that there is no global notion of crowding out or crowding in. We find support for *crowding out* effect in some situations, and *crowding-in* effect in other situations.

The main finding of this chapter is that crowding-in and crowding-out effects vary depending on the role expectations attached to the elderly.

1.3 Significances

The present study speaks to several literatures in different ways. To the literature on transfers, it offers a fresh approach in analyzing familial transfers, that is, by paying closer attention to culture. By doing so, the present study tries to rectify situation where transfer behavior is treated simply as an economic action without any relation to culture.

To the literature on culture, the study touches various aspects of the existing literature. First, it affirms the notion that culture is not a homogenous, coherent entity that is accepted and practiced uniformly by members of a cultural group. Instead, culture is heterogeneous, fragmented, layered and personal. Second, by using a broad definition of culture, it allows us to analyze multiple cultures that influence an individual. The treatment of multiple cultures is unique, as it suggests that multiculturalism resides not only at the societal level, but also at the individual level. Third, by using a social-psychological framework in analyzing culture and ties it with cognitive processes through schema, it relates to the current trend in cultural sociology where cognition is treated seriously.

The present study relates to the role theory literature in two ways. First, it extends the existing discussions on identity salience to a multiple-identity situation. Second, it applies the framework to familial transfers; hence, it adds another instance in which salience explains individuals' actions.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, we briefly review several literatures that are instrumental in the proposed cultural model on transfers. We start with the discussion of literature on transfer, followed by the literature on culture and end with the discussion of roles and role identity. Discussion on the last part is more detailed than others because the proposed model drew many insights from that literature.

2.1 Literature on transfer

Transfer is an interdisciplinary issue, so its key theoretical models come from various disciplines.¹ Theoretical models for intergenerational transfers can be grouped into four big frameworks.

The first one is based on the work of Australian anthropologist-demographer John Caldwell. His wealth transfers theory (1976) suggests that there are connections between the direction of wealth transfers over lifetime and fertility declines. In traditional societies, transfers flow from children to parents, so parents have incentive (economically) to have as many children as possible. In modern societies, transfers flow from parents to children so (economically) parents do not have any incentive to even have a child. There is a turning point when the divide takes place, that is, when transfers change direction from upward (children => parents) to downward (parents => children). Fertility starts to decline from that point. Caldwell's theory ignited much research and many debates around whether his model holds theoretically and empirically.

The second group of theories is based on the work on economic life cycle (Willis 1988, Lee 1994). The idea is that people consume more than they produce when they are young and old. The deficits in these two groups are covered by the working age people who make transfers to the young and the old (at the same time they also save for their old

¹ Unfortunately, there is no key model coming from sociology. This does not mean that sociologists do not work on transfers. It is just that their works in general use one of the existing frameworks. Martin Kohli, a sociologist working on the issue, suggests that this is a result of sociologists' focus on Durkheim-Parsonian modernization theory with its emphasis on the nuclearization of family with weakening bonds (Kohli 2004).

age). Preston (1984) points out that the two dependent groups may compete for the transfers, with the old-age group getting more shares at the expense of the young-age group. The recent works on this literature incorporate various ways in which people fund their consumption beyond through labor income: through private and public transfers and asset-based reallocations (Lee and Mason 2011).

The third group of theories is on motives of transfers (Becker 1974, Cox 1987). Initially dominated by economists, later the issue attracted some sociologists as well (Lee, Parish & Willis 1994; Kohli & Kunemund 2003). Two motives are often found in the literature: (1) *Altruistic motive*. Parents are said to have altruistic motives toward their children when they increase their transfers if they see that their children experience lower earnings. The model predicts that the higher the parents' lifetime earning, the bigger the transfer would be. On the other hand, the lower the children's earning, the bigger the transfer would be. An extension of this model includes the possibility of parents dealing with the differences in their children's endowments (Becker and Tomes 1986).

(2) *Exchange motive*. This model has been offered as the main alternative for altruism. According to this model, parents value their children's attention, and they purchase it by making larger transfers or by making a promise to give transfers including bequest (Cox 1987). The attention can be shown by visiting, taking care of daily chores, or giving monetary gifts, etc. We are assuming that children do not necessarily find these activities 'amusing', yet they still perform them in exchange for transfer. Variations of the basic exchange model include the strategic exchange model that involves bargain among many parties (Bernheim et al 1985), and insurance against income shock model (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981). Most motive-based theories focus on economic condition of either the giver, recipient, or both. In altruistic model, for instance, the important thing is whether the recipient's income (or wealth) is much lower than the giver's. In exchange model, what is important is whether each party can benefit from the interaction. They do not distinguish the difference in normative expectations among the parties involved.

One issue that often occurs on motive-base type of research is whether the transfer takes place inter or intra households. Most studies are done on inter-household transfers, since it is very difficult to deal with allocating individual transfer among household members. Becker (1974) suggests a pooling mechanism, in which household

head collects resources from all members and make decision to distribute them from members whose income exceeds their consumptions to members whose consumption exceeds their income.

The last group of theories on intergenerational transfers came from evolutionary biologists. While not new, social scientists have been very reluctant to embrace socio-biological models of human behaviors. In the past 20 years, however, interests in genetics and evolution have revived the socio-biological model. The main idea is that people try to preserve the continuation of their genes. One of the insights coming from evolutionary theories has been the direction of transfers. Contrary to Caldwell's prediction, the evolutionary theorists argue that in traditional societies transfers flow from the older to the younger generation (Kaplan 1994). Cox (2008) suggests that evolutionary theory is useful in transfer analysis because it looks at the characteristics of givers and recipients.

Most of the theories above focus on financial transfer, although they also recognize that there are several other types of intergenerational transfer such as time, emotion, and space. Most models were developed for familial transfers, although in their development they are also applied to public transfers.

Practically none of the theories above take culture as a starting point and see how the cultural meanings of the relationship between two actors influence the transfer flow. There have been some efforts to see the effects of culture by looking at transfers among people of different cultures (Lee & Aytac 1998, Wolff, Spillerman & Attias-Donfut 2007) or measuring transfers in traditional society (Lee and Kramer 2002). Kunemund and Rein (1999) incorporate norms in their analysis of crowding-out effect. Unfortunately, those efforts have been limited and have not yet gained attention they deserved.

2.2 Literature on culture

2.2.1 Culture

There are many definitions of culture (Smith & Riley 2009). In general, however, there has been a shift in the past 20 years in the definitions. In the earlier period, basically up to the last few decades of the 20th century, culture was seen as a coherent concept that is

more or less shared by all members of the culture. Geertz (1977) argues that “... cultural system must have a minimal degree of coherence.”

The emergence of various phenomena in academics with the rise of post-modernism, post-colonialism, gender studies, and other ideas that put emphasis on the diversity challenged the concept of a coherent culture. Culture is now seen as a contradictory concept and context specific. Ghaziani and Baldassari (2011) summarize the concept as follows: “Cultural elements will be internally heterogeneous, inconsistent, contested by members of different subgroups, and susceptible to change, often due to environmental fluctuations.”

2.2.2 Culture and action²

Up to the second part of the 20th century, most scholars believed that individual action is more or less ‘dictated’ by the culture in which he lives. Approaches such as structuralism dominated both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe (structuralists) Malinowski, Radcliff-Brown, and Levi-Strauss argue about the importance of social structure. In the United States, social sciences (perhaps with the exception of economics) were dominated by the work of Talcott Parsons. Two main features of Parsonian social sciences are its focus on social structure and its positivist nature. Parsons suggests that to do social sciences we need to look at the structure of the society, identify the roles and functions in that structure, and explain individual actions based on his/her role in the society. This approach, according to him, is applicable to every society (hence, the positivist nature in his theories).

There have been, however, responses to the Parsonian social sciences. Against the Parsonian structural-functionalism, which put emphasis on structure and tend to eschew agency, some social scientists focus on agency. They argue that the notion of individual as an agent who can evaluate, analyze, and decide for himself, is lost in Parsonian theory. While they all share emphasis on agency, they practically differ on everything else. In general, we can group them into two big groups: the interpretative social theorists (such

² Here we treat ‘culture’ the same as ‘structure’, even though some sociologists try to differentiate the two. ‘Structure’ is seen as ‘hard’, ‘material’ and determining, while culture is considered ‘soft’, ‘mental’, and derived (Sewell 1992).

as Erving Goffman, Herbert Blumer and Alfred Schulz. See Calhoun et al 2002 for summary of their works) and the rational-choice theorists (Coleman 1988).

The interpretative social theorists emphasize the importance of meanings in people's action. Unlike the structuralists, the interpretative social theorists are interested in how meanings are created through the interactions. Culture enters as 'raw materials' that people use in their interactions to create meanings. Meanwhile, even though most rational choice theorists have not yet incorporated culture, the more recent works have tried to bring culture in efforts to explain individual's behaviors (Akerlof & Kranton 2000, Chai 2001).³

Beside those who focus on agency, there is also another group of social scientists, such as Anthony Giddens (1979) and Pierre Bourdieu (1990), who argue for overcoming the agent/structure dichotomy. Giddens suggests that culture is both constraining and enabling individual's actions. It is constraining because an individual has to follow the rules that govern his society. Someone who wants to get a job, for instance, has to have relevant skills before she can be considered by a prospective employer. At the same time, knowing that some skills are important and relevant would enable her to work. Meanwhile, Bourdieu tries to overcome the agency/structure dichotomy by introducing the concept of *habitus*—a set of disposition behavior, demeanor and skills that we acquire from the culture that we live in.

A more recent approach in culture and action is drawn from cognitive science. Culture influences individuals through the way it filters and organizes mind (DiMaggio 1997, Zerubavel 1997, Cerullo 2010, Henrich & Henrich 2007). Based on works on cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology literatures, DiMaggio (1997) suggests two types of cognition processes in action: the unconscious one, which is automatic and guides our repetitive behaviors, and the conscious one, which is reflexive and based on

³ Due to its emphasis on principles of individual choice that is universal, most rational-choice works do not explicitly incorporate culture in their analysis. We can group recent works to do so into two groups of theories. The first one is by using variables (or constraints) that are specific to the situation in question. As Chai (1997) points out, however, such efforts of incorporating culture may lead to a tautological situation: a specification is chosen precisely because it would lead to explanations of certain outcome (p. 53). The second one is setting an a priori assumption about the existence of different cultures by identifying several categories of people, and making assumption that different groups of people have different preferences. This line of works can be traced to anthropologist Mary Douglas' works (1978) and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (1987).

reason. Individuals often behave based on the unconscious one even though they cannot provide coherent reason for their behavior (Vaisey 2008).

There are also theories that suggest culture as something at people's disposal. Swidler (2001) suggests that people have more cultural knowledge than they use, and they use the knowledge like they use toolbox.

While coming from different directions, the various approaches seem to agree on something, namely, individual actions are related to culture. They disagree on how culture is being reproduced and on the mechanism in which individuals use culture in their actions.

2.3 Literature on Role Theories

2.3.1 Role and role identity

The use of *role* in social sciences had its beginning in the early 20th century. The works of Charles Coole, George H. Mead, and R. Linton discuss the importance of roles in people's lives. However, there is no consensus among these earlier scholars as what they meant by *roles*. In its developments, there are many strands of role theory in the literature; each is associated with specific theoretical approach.⁴ Traditionally, role theories are divided into two groups: those based on the functionalist and those based on the symbolic interaction theory. We will discuss them briefly.

In the mid century, role concept is considered important in Talcott Parsons' work on structural functionalism (Parsons & Shils 1951). Roles are seen as shared, normative expectations that prescribe and explain individuals occupying certain social position (Biddle 1986). The expectations include the rights and privileges, the duties and obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to other positions in the social structure. These expectations are agreed upon by everyone, and people's behaviors would conform the roles' expectations.

Recognizing that individual may hold several positions in the social structure, functionalist approach highlight the possibility of role conflicts when obligations coming

⁴ Biddle's survey on role theory suggests at least five distinct strands in the literature (Biddle 1986). They are (1) Functional Role Theory, (2) Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory, (3) Structural Role Theory, (4) Organizational Role Theory, and (5) Cognitive Role Theory. It focuses on the relationships between role expectations and behavior. Attention has been given to social conditions that give rise to expectations, to techniques for measuring expectations, and the impact of expectations on social conduct.

from multiple roles require individuals to choose between competing courses of actions (Merton 1959).

Individuals are socialized about these norms since they were children, and when the norm expectations are internalized to their psyche, they motivate people to act. The stable social system is achieved when people behave according to the expectations coming from their roles. The expectations, then, are seen as the bridge between the social structure and individual behaviors.

Functionalist approach, however, shed little light in the mental, experiential dimension of the individual beyond the internalization process. It has difficulty in dealing with the possibility that individual negotiate multiple roles in their everyday lives. Because role expectation is seen as a ‘script’, any action differs from the role expectations is considered ‘deviant’ action.

The second main literature in role theory grew out of the Symbolic Interactionist (SI) approach, which can be traced to the writings of Charles Cooley and George H. Mead. This body of literature is known as ‘role identity theory’. While there are many differences among them, all strands of SI share a same tenet, that is, in order to analyze an issue, social scientist needs to understand individual’s definitions and interpretations of themselves, of others, and of their situations (Burke & Stets 2009). The traditional SI, as those espoused by Goffman and Blumer, focus on the micro interactions. They see society as fluid, being created and re-created through actors’ interactions.

There are several central concepts in role identity theory. We will discuss them briefly as they will be useful in subsequent discussions.

Role Identity

Like other symbolic interactionists, scholars of role identity theories hold that an individual has multiple roles in her/his life at any given time. An individual, for instance, may have roles as a mother, a teacher, a daughter, and so on. Each of these roles entails different expectation of behaviors, both from the individual herself and from other people. Each of them also entails interactions with different set of people. Each of these interactions is called ‘identity’. Note the difference between role and identity. Role is external concept: It is linked to social position within the social structure, while identity

is internal: It consists of internalized meanings and expectations associated with a role. When the terms ‘role’ and ‘identity’ are used together, role identity is understood as “Imaginative view of himself as he likes to think of himself being and acting as occupant of a particular social position.” (McCall and Simmons 1978).

While the earlier version of role identity see role as relatively static, as part of position in social structure, the more recent understanding involves more dynamic aspects. Role identity may create new position and establish social structure (Baker and Faulkner 1991), and bring resources for the individual (Callero 1994). As Stets and Burke (2000) state, “Having a role identity for individual means that she must act to fulfill expectation, coordinate and negotiate interactions with the counter-role, and manipulate the environment to control the resources for which the role has responsibility.” A husband, for instance, is expected to act in certain ways that ‘a husband’ does. However, unlike in functionalism, there are no strict scripts in how a husband has to act. In order to perform his role as a husband well, he has to coordinate and negotiate with his wife. He also has to manage the resources available to him because he occupies the role of a husband. Nevertheless, the expectations of a ‘husband’ in one culture may be different from the expectation in another culture.

McCall and Simmons (1978) suggest that there are two dimensions of role identity: the idiosyncratic dimension and the normative dimension. They focus their attention on the idiosyncratic dimension: individuals’ distinctive interpretations of a role, that is, on how individuals improvise and negotiate their identities. According to them, individuals try to legitimate their roles by enacting role performances, a set of behavior aimed to confirm their identity. The confirmation involves not only individual’s own view of himself, but also other people’s evaluation to his behaviors.

Hierarchy and Salience of Identities

All role identity scholars hold that individuals have multiple role identities that can be organized into some kind of order that forms hierarchy. The way they formulate the hierarchy, however, varies. McCall and Simmons (1978) introduce two kinds of ‘hierarchy’ of role identities. The first one is what they call a prominence hierarchy of identities, a psychological evaluation of what individuals see is important to them. The

more important a role is, the higher it is in the hierarchy. The higher the role in the hierarchy, the more the role guides a person's behavior across time and across situations. The second one is what they call a salience of hierarchy. Unlike the prominence hierarchy, the salience, according to McCall and Simmons, reflects the situational self rather than ideal self. It is identities that they may invoke in terms of more appropriate in certain situations. For instance, one sees being researcher as the most important identity that she has. Suppose she is in party with her students and other people. Even though her most prominence hierarchy is a researcher, it might be inappropriate to stress that identity in the party. Instead, she may invoke another role identity. Sheldon Stryker, another prominent researcher in role identity theory, offers another definition for role identify. For Stryker, role salience refers to the probability of a role being invoked in any given situation (Stryker 1980).

McCall and Simmons' hierarchy of prominence depends on several factors. The first one is how much individuals get support for the identity they are claiming, either from inside (self) or from outside (other people). The second one is how committed individuals are to the role identity. The more the identity results in self esteem, the higher it is in the hierarchy. The third one is the rewards from the identity, both internally (gratification individual experiences from role performance) and externally (money, power, or status one receives). The weight of the factors varies from one person to person.

Some scholars try to reconcile the functionalist and the symbolic interactionist approaches. While still in the realm of symbolic-interactionist approach, Stryker (1980) incorporates social structure in his analyses on interactions. He calls his theory Structural Symbolic Interactionism. It holds that while actors create and recreate social structure through interactions, the interactions are stable in the corridor of existing social structures. Actors are born to pre-existing social structures, and they are influenced by them.⁵

⁵ Burke and Stets (2009) suggests that *role identity* is only one of three identities found in the literature. Other identities include *social identity*, which refers to membership in certain groups, such as female, white, Catholic, or Democrat, and *personal identity*, which refers to certain quality of individual, such as being an honest person, moral person, and so on. At this section we will focus only on role identity. We will return to the other two identities later.

Stryker focuses on the normative dimension of role identity. This means that he uses the ‘conventional’ or shared meanings of role identities as a starting point of his analysis. As reflected in the term ‘structural symbolic interactionism’, Stryker is more concerned with how the social structure affects individuals (hence, their concept of ‘self and identity’) than in how identities are created and recreated in negotiations. He also holds that identity shapes one’s behaviors.

2.3.2 Role theory and cognition

Just like the development in the literature of culture and actions, the more recent development of role theory tries to incorporate cognition in their analysis (Danna-Lynch 2007, 2010). Drawing from cognitive psychology literature on cold and hot cognition, DiMaggio (1997) offers an explanation on how individuals manage to participate in multiple orientations of actions, even when those orientations contain inconsistent elements.

Cold cognition refers to automatic cognition, where individuals do not have to think too much to carry out routine as they rely on schema (Markus 1977). Schema is a knowledge structure that represents objects/events and provides default assumptions about those objects/events’ characteristics. It operates as a framework that organizes experiences (usually through typified the experiences), modifies itself to accommodate new experiences, and understands social objects and events. Our thoughts and actions are shaped by culture through schemas that come from cold cognition (Markus and Kiyatama 1991).

In contrast, hot cognition refers to explicit, deliberate cognition where individual processes information in a controlled fashion (D’Andrade 1995). Individual uses hot cognition when they think critically and reflexively. It allows individuals to take actions that override programmed, schematic mode of thoughts. Individuals move from cold to hot cognition when they are attracted to particular problem, motivated by dissatisfaction with the status quo and when schema fails to account for new stimuli (DiMaggio 1997).

Danna-Lynch (2007) suggests that cold and hot cognitions interact to generate differentiated role performances. Individuals may commit to actions that contain inconsistent elements coming from ‘conflicting’ role expectations.

2.3.3 Pro-social behavior

In identity theory, the core of identity is identification of self as an occupant of a role and the incorporation of meanings and expectations associated with roles (Thoits 1983). In the process, individuals behave according to the role expectations (from themselves and from others). The more he identifies himself with a role, the more he would behave according to the expectation. When a role carries an expectation of doing something for other people, then, we would see such behaviors. Role identity has been connected to giving blood (Lee Piliavin & Call 1999) and volunteering (Grube & Piliavin 2000, Finkelstein, Penner & Brannick 2005). So far, there has been no study that look at how roles and role identity in the family affects transfer behaviors.

The present study tries to fill the gap by looking at the effects of identification with certain role on transfer behaviors.

CHAPTER 3

CULTURAL MODEL OF FAMILIAL TRANSFER

In this chapter, we discuss the basic model of the proposed framework for analysis of familial transfers. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we provide some definitions needed for our model. Next, we present the basis of the proposed cultural model. In the last part, we test one aspect of our basic model on the case of Javanese culture. We test predictions based on the Javanese view on transfers among siblings and between adult children and their parents.

3.1 Definitions

To facilitate a better understanding of the proposed model, we need to clarify the meaning of some terms, and on those areas where cultures differentiate roles.

Role is understood as a person's position in a social category. With a role comes *behavioral expectations*. In this study, unless it is specified otherwise, we focus on family roles, such as father, mother, sister, brother, and so on. While the traditional understanding sees roles as a 'default' when one enters into a new position (such as when a woman marries, she becomes a 'wife'), a more recent understanding in literature is that role might be more fluid: people engage in role-making behaviors in the interactions, and also use one role to make another role.

Role set is defined as a group of roles that is associated with a certain role. For instance, a role of a student is part of a role set in the university domain that includes professors, secretaries, custodians, and so on. Similarly, in family, role as a mother is part of a role set that includes son, daughter, in-laws, and so on. Role set is closely related to **counter-role**. Here, counter-role is defined as a role that exists in relation to another role. For instance, role of a mother can only exist in the presence of a son or a daughter. Other examples would be a husband and a wife, a grandfather and a grandchild, and so on.

Hierarchy of roles refers to both cultural descriptions and individual's psychological evaluation of the importance of a role compared to other roles. The cultural hierarchy of roles shows the rank of roles that a culture considers important in relation to other roles (Qureshi 1990). Meanwhile, individual hierarchy of roles refers to what

McCall and Simmons (1978) call “prominence hierarchy,” that is, a psychological evaluation of what individuals consider important to them. We will discuss both hierarchies in detail later.

Transfer is conceptualized as a flow of resources between parties that are not a result of work or compensation for work. Transfer can take a form of money or time. It does not mean that there is no possibility that in the future the flow will be returned, either in the same form or in a different form. It is simply understood that the provider will not receive any benefit *immediately* from his action, nor is the flow to compensate for some actions such as work.

Any role in any given culture usually is formed based on the location of a person along the following four social categories: dyadic relation, age, sex, and birth order. There might be other factors that affect the dynamics of roles, such as economic ability and geographical distance, but we focus on family roles only.

3.2 Active and Passive Roles

Most discussions on the literature of roles refer to the expectations that a role holder is supposed to fulfill (Parsons & Shils 1951, Stryker 1981, Biddle 1986, Finch 1989). There is not much discussion, however, on the expectations from other people toward a person who holds a certain roles. Someone who holds a role as a father, for instance, is expected to provide cares for his children: to provide food, home, education, health, love, and so on. Meanwhile, the children *expect* to receive those cares from their parents. This distinction is not trivial, especially when it comes to transfers.

We call the two types of roles **active** and **passive** roles. By active, we mean that one is expected *to behave or act* in certain ways. By passive, we mean those roles that also come with ‘rights’ or ‘entitlement’; that is, the occupant of a certain role has some expectations about other people’s action or behavior *toward him/her*. The active and passive roles are key concepts in the present study. In the scope of this study, active roles are understood as roles that come with an expectation to give transfers, and passive roles as roles that come with an expectation to receive transfers.

The role theory literature has been quiet on passive roles as their stress is almost solely on the active roles. This is not surprising, since any studies on individual’s action,

especially role-based action, would inevitably focus on the person whose actions are in question. Any study on passive roles would require another person to act toward the person in question. Part of the reasons may also be cultural: in many cultures, including in the West, the notions such as ‘giving is better’ are quite prevalent.


By failing to conceptualize the passive roles, the existing literature on role theory only looks at one side of the equation. Exploration of passive roles allows us to develop the theoretical basis for transfer behaviors that covers the giver side and recipient side of transfers.

Note that active and passive roles refer to roles. While it is easy to assume that ‘active’ is equivalent to ‘giver’ and ‘passive’ to ‘recipient’, they are distinct concepts. Giver and recipient refer to the person who performs actual action, while active and passive roles refer to the expectations. The distinction becomes very important when we analyze the fact that all givers do not necessarily hold active roles, and all recipients do not necessarily hold passive roles.

People hold multiple roles at any given time. With the exception of the several years of their early lives, in general people have both active and passive roles concurrently. Meanwhile, family roles are not static: they depend on individual’s life course. There are two ways in which roles change across a life course. The first is because number of roles held by a person change over time, either from acquiring new roles, or losing the existing roles. The second is due to different expectations from the same role across the life course. The roles in parent-child relation, for instance, start from the parent taking an active role when the child is still small. When the child grows up and the parent is old, however, their role expectations may change: the child may now be taking the active role by taking care of the parent.

Due to such changes, the ‘strength’ of those roles in terms of active and passive roles changes over time. When an individual is young, passive roles dominate their roles: As a child, he/she holds roles that are associated with passive roles such as child, grandchild, nephew, niece, and so on. As he/she grows older, they would acquire other roles that have a stronger ‘active’ side to them, such as roles as a spouse, a parent, and so on. As time goes by, their role as parent may change content as well, from being dominated by active role to the one dominated by passive roles.

Figure 3.1
Hypothetical proportion of active and passive roles
over individual's life course



If we sum up the expectations of roles that one may hold throughout his life-course, we may get a picture like in the figure above. In infant age and several years of people's early life, there is no active role expected from them. At some point in a very young age, some active roles started to be imposed on them, although passive roles still clearly dominate the expectations. As age increases, the portion of active roles also increases. This corresponds to ages where one is expected to get married and have children. At certain point, however, the portion of passive roles again surpasses the portion of active roles. Portion of roles is not solely the result of individual's own action of role taking (e.g., getting married, or having a child). Other people's actions are also important: when a person's sibling gets married, he gets an additional role (as a brother in-law, or if the sibling has an offspring, an uncle).

The shape, the beginning age and the end age of active roles, and the height of the active roles' line vary across different cultures. In some cultures, children as young as seven years old are expected to work. Depending on the sizes of their labor income and consumptions, they may also start to provide transfers to other family members, such as their younger siblings. Likewise, in some cultures the elderly are expected to work until

they die or completely lose their ability to function, which will push the active-role age into a much older age.

The differences found in various cultures are due the expectations of roles that each culture defines. There are four factors that contribute to the way a culture differentiates itself from others through role expectations: dyadic relation, age, sex, and birth order.

Dyadic Relation

Dyadic Relation refers to a paired relationship that a person has with another person in the family: a child-parent, a sibling-sibling, a grandparent-grandchild, and so on. Here, the dyadic aspect shows that any interaction between two persons with two different roles is unique, and the interaction is partly governed by the roles. Different cultures define the parties involved in the paired relationship as well as the expectations differently.

Age

Roles are influenced by individual age, although the relationship usually is not direct. In some cases, reaching a certain age corresponds directly with the notion of ‘adulthood’ (for instance, age 18 in the United States). General classification of ‘young age’, ‘middle age’ or ‘old age’ are categories that are related to age but they vary by culture.

Sex

While each culture may have different understanding of what is considered ‘man’ or ‘woman’, the division of roles based on difference in sexes is prevalent in all cultures. For a long time, people believe that the biological differences between the two sexes make it ‘natural’ to assign them different roles. Recent theoretical developments, which conclude that sex-based roles are a socially-constructed concept, change the way people look at sex-based roles. Whether sex-based roles will disappear completely due to the acceptance of the new understanding remains to be seen.

Birth Order

One dimension that often is missing from the discussions on transfer is the birth order.

With the exception of the first child, birth order may change so long as the parents have not finished producing offspring. Two orders are particularly important: the oldest and the youngest. In many traditional cultures, the notion of primogeniture is very strong when it comes to various kinds of transfers such as inheritance of family land. For instance, among the nobility in Europe, only the first son would inherit the title and land associated with it.

Beside the differences in the expectation toward each role, different cultures would also differentiate themselves in two ways: (1) the hierarchy of roles and (2) the family boundary. In her study on whom an elderly person in Western countries should rely on for supports, Qureshi (1990) found a hierarchy of responsibility: first partners/spouse, then daughters, daughters in law, sons, sons-in-law, other relatives, and at the end, non-relatives. Qureshi does not elaborate further, but one may find a different hierarchy if they study the elderly of different cultures. What may be considered the most important role in one culture may be at the bottom of the hierarchy for another culture. Likewise, the hierarchy would also differ for people of different age groups.

The hierarchical ranks are not continuous. Culture defines how many roles in the hierarchy are considered very important and distinctly different from other roles on the list. This group of roles, the ones that each culture view important, is what we call *family boundary*; a role set in which members are obliged to care for other members. In modern Western countries, for instance, the roles associated with the members of nuclear family (father, mother, and their children) would be separated from other roles. This boundary, however, is not universal. In West Sumatran culture (Minangkabau), an adult man is also responsible for the children of his sister. For Javanese, the oldest child is expected to take care of his/her siblings. This means their family boundary for active roles would not be limited to the usual nuclear family members (father, mother, children), but may involve other family members as well.

Note that there may be a separate hierarchy of roles and family boundary for the active and passive roles. Qureshi's hierarchy of responsibility to the elderly, for instance, only applies to passive roles: *whom the elderly considers they can rely on for support*. The hierarchy may or may not be symmetrical when it comes to *whom the elderly consider themselves responsible for*. While 'spouse' may also occupy the highest place

on this hierarchy, the rest may be different. Also, there may be some roles that are on the active-role list, but are not on the passive-role list; for instance, the roles of the younger siblings and grandchildren. The differences between active-role list and passive-role list may be stark if we compare the hierarchies for middle age individuals, say those of age 30-49 years old. If these individuals have young children, their active-role hierarchy will include those children (in their role as parents), and their places will be on top of the hierarchy. However, those parental roles will not achieve a position at the top of the passive-role hierarchy. Chances are, they would not make it into the list at all.

One final note on the cultural hierarchy is that we need to distinguish between the importance of the relationships based obligation—something closer to the concept used here—and the importance based on respect. For instance, a married middle age woman with a child might view her parents with the utmost respects, but her main obligations may lie on her children, followed by obligations to her husband. As we are only interested on the importance of obligations, so whenever we mention ‘hierarchy’, it refers to the hierarchy of obligations, not hierarchy of respects.

Individual Actions


So far, we have discussed the structural side of the model. The cultural prescriptions on roles are assumed to affect individuals that belong to the said culture. There are several ways in which those roles affect individuals. Functionalists suggest that individual would follow the role expectations brought by culture (Parson & Shils 1951). The symbolic interactionists suggest that culturally-prescribed expectations are only ‘raw materials’ in which individuals use in creating their own ‘role’ through interactions. The structural symbolic interactionists try to combine both approaches by arguing that even though roles are performed through interactions, they are still inside the corridor of culture (Stryker 1981). At this point, we do not make any definite claim regarding the issue. It suffices to claim that—regardless the mechanism—culture affects various aspects of the individuals. We hold that if this is not true, we would not be able to distinguish people of different cultures beyond the labels that are associated with them (Javanese, American, Buddhist, and so on).

For the rest of the chapter, we discuss our basic model that consists both structural (cultural) level and individual level. In the next chapter, we will expand insights from this chapter by allowing individuals to have multiple social identities, each of which has its own role expectations.

3.3 Cultural model for transfer: basic model

Having established the definitions and basic information needed, we develop the basic model.

Figure 3.2
Cultural model for transfer: basic model



The basic model has three parts: (1) cultural norms, (2) individual schemata, and (3) transfers. In Figure 3.2, each part is represented by a box. The general idea is as that individual's actions—which in this study are defined as actions involving transfer activities (either giving or receiving)—depend on the roles that an individual has and how he views those roles. Those roles and the behavioral expectations associated with them come from the culture that on which individual belongs. We begin the discussion with the cultural norms.

Each individual holds a social identity that carries norms (Box 1). Cultural norms are a framework in which all phenomena are evaluated from the culture's point of view. Part of the cultural norms is how individuals are expected to behave in a normative sense. The expectations of behaviors are not random but are associated with the individual's position in the social category: In other words, expectations are associated with the role that the individual occupies. The cultural norms consist of two elements: the prescribed hierarchy of roles and the family boundary. Hierarchy of roles refers to the importance of a role in relation to other roles. The family boundary is a constructed boundary that separates a group of roles from other groups. Roles inside the family boundary are roles that are considered vital for the survival of individuals that occupy the *counter-roles* (in the figure above, they are *Role 1* to *Role 3*). The hierarchy of roles is shown by the numbers, and the family boundary is shown by the horizontal lines.

The two types of roles, the active and passive roles, would be present in all three boxes. Although they each may be separated into a different hierarchy (one hierarchy for active roles and another for passive roles), in many cases they have to be put in the same hierarchy.

The cultural norms would inform individuals' schemata. Schemata is a knowledge structure that organizes experiences and knowledge in understanding social objects/events. It would drive how individuals see things, including how they see their roles and associated role sets. Schema comes from the norms forms the "automatic cognition" whose elements are taken for granted by individuals. Behaviors come out of schemata do not need any deliberation (D'Andrade 1995, DiMaggio 1997). While schemata includes other aspects in life, for our purpose, individual's schemata contains understanding about role sets, including the hierarchy of roles and the family boundary (Box 2). As previously discussed, the role sets are not static. They change along individual's life course.

The relationship between cultural norms and individual schemata is not deterministic. The extent to which cultural ideals on hierarchy of roles and family boundary affecting individual's corresponded hierarchy and boundary would depend on two things: (1) identity commitment (the degree of individual's identification to the social identity), and (2) the affirmation from other people regarding the roles that one occupies.

By social identity, we refer to how individual identify himself with a social or cultural group. Here, ‘social group’ can be based on ethnicity, religion, origin, and so on. Individual would internalize a cultural schema if she considers herself as part of the cultural group. The process in which individuals acquire cultural identity can vary. Some of them might be imparted on them since they are young through the socialization in the family. Others may be through a process of choosing an identity when they are already adults. In any case, how individuals acquire cultural identity at this moment is not that important (yet), since we are only dealing with one culture.¹ The identity commitment here refers to the level of identification with the culture (Stryker & Serpe 1982). If the identity is religious identity, the commitment refers to his religiosity: how important his life is affected by his religion. Likewise, if the identity is ethnic identity, the commitment refers to how important ‘being Javanese’ is for the person.

Individuals use deliberate cognition in deciding whether or not they would follow the norms (DiMaggio 1997). The stronger the commitment to the culture, the more likely they choose to follow the norms. In any case, individual internal process is not the only factor in the process of adopting cultural norms into individual schema. External factors in the form of affirmation from other people to certain roles that one holds would also affect one’s role identity. The external factors that ‘direct’ individuals into adopting the schema can be ‘positive’ (provide a support for an individual in performing a role) or ‘negative’ (in a form of punishment to an individual who is not behaving in certain way). Recall that our hierarchy of roles is a psychological evaluation of what is important to a person. Suppose a man considers being a husband the most important role identity in his life. Without affirmation from his wife, or from other people, that he is a good husband, the place of being a husband in his individual hierarchy may change. The affirmation of a person’s role may take various forms, such as psychological and financial supports—including transfer. A wife, for instance, might find her role as a wife to be important when people holding the counter-roles support her in ‘performing’ as a wife.

Individuals’ role hierarchy and family boundary, in turn, affect transfers (both incidence and amount of transfer) (Box 3). The reason is that a person would share his/her resources only to those whose relationships with him/her are considered important

¹ We will deal with multiple social identities in the next chapter.

or valuable. Those roles that are high in the hierarchy show which relationships are important to the person. The family boundary is where an individual draws the line with regard to whom he/she considers 'close' family members.

The relationship between Box 2 and Box 3 is also not deterministic but is moderated by resources and the number of active roles. At any given resources, having more roles lead to resource depletion, which result in less transfer per receiver. This relationship especially holds for roles that are associated with family boundary that the person has in his individual schemata, not necessarily for all possible roles that he has.

Note that the order of transfer's size does not necessarily match the order of individual hierarchy because we need to take into account the needs of transfer associated with certain roles. For instance, one's transfers to children (role as a parent) may be much higher than transfers to his own parents (role of an adult son) even though he considers his role as an adult son the most important role in the hierarchy. The reason is simply that raising a child requires a lot of resources compared to 'taking care' a parent (except perhaps for an elderly parent with poor health). We will, however, be able to observe the relative proportions given respective transfer budgets from the comparison over different cultures. So, in a culture where the role of an adult son in taking care of his parent is paramount, we will see a bigger proportion of transfer devoted to parents compared to in a culture where there is no such expectation toward adult children.

The internalized cultural hierarchy of roles and family boundary would be reflected on an individual's transfer behaviors in two ways: (1) In the relative proportion of transfers, where it would follow the order of cultural ideals of hierarchy, and (2) in the incidence and amount of transfer. Note that transfers to people occupying the roles outside of the family boundary might only be done if expectations of transfers to people inside the role boundary have been fulfilled—at least to a certain level.

That individual has multiple roles at any given moment (e.g., as a husband, a father, a son, and so on) means decisions to provide transfers to different family members are not independent. Whether individuals give to their sister or their elderly parents, their brothers or their nephews, etc., depend on his family boundary and hierarchy of roles. Culture provides guideline as to whom he has to prioritize when he provides transfers given that he is facing limited resources (financial, time).

In the next section, we will empirically test one aspect of the basic model, namely, the effects of active and passive roles on familial transfers. We are not able to test all aspects of the basic model due to the data limitation.²

3.4 Empirical application: active and passive roles among Javanese siblings

In this section we will test the effects of active and passive roles on familial transfer in Javanese culture. Specifically, we will investigate transfers among siblings and to parents.

Javanese is a group of people who originated from the island of Java, particularly from the central and eastern-part of Java. Magniz-Suseno (1997) suggests that Javanese is a very hierarchical society. This stems from their belief in order (*tatanan*) that everything has its own place in the connected universe, and the harmony must be maintained.

As in other social relations in Javanese culture, there is a strict hierarchy that must be respected by all family members. The hierarchy is based not only on generations but also on other aspects such as social status based on occupation. In addition, there is also a horizontal hierarchy that suggests the importance of people is depending on the distance of their relationships. Geertz (1961) contends that the nuclear family is the most important form for the Javanese, although other related members of kin are also important. Members of nuclear family are expected to help each other in time of need. This is especially true for the members with more resources. Next group that is considered important is the kindred relatives, that is, those who share the same grandparents. They are considered important kin that they are called the ‘inside branch’. Beyond this, the relatives are called the ‘outside branch’.

Inside the nuclear family unit, the hierarchy that must be observed is based on generations (grandparents, parents, children), social status, and age. Mulder (1992) suggests that unlike in some other societies, the hierarchy among family members of a same generation is based mostly on age, not on gender. Among siblings, for instance, the one who is responsible the most is the oldest child, regardless of gender.

² The ideal would be testing the basic model—the hierarchy of roles—empirically. However, to do so we need information on role identity and transfers for individual. Currently, the author is not aware of any dataset that includes both sets of information.

The notion that Javanese society is an egalitarian society when it comes to gender has been a contention issue among scholars. The older generations of scholars tend to hold that most cultures in Southeast Asia, including the Javanese, are relatively egalitarian toward women (Reed 1987). The younger generation, especially those of feminist background, hold a more skeptical view. While it is true that Javanese women are relatively independent economically, as working outside the house has never been considered an issue, men still hold the power over women on other spheres (Wolf 1992).

We build our empirical test based on these competing hierarchical notions in the family. There have been several studies on Javanese familial transfer (Ravallion & Deardan 1988, Frankenberg & Kuhn 2004, Arifin 2006) but none of them use familial role as the point of departure.

3.4.1 Empirical Strategy

Our objective is to examine whether transfer flows from someone who holds an active role to someone who holds a passive role. Specifically, we investigate whether transfer behaviors of the oldest siblings are different from those of other siblings, particularly in terms of the likelihood of giving and receiving inter-household transfers among themselves and giving to parents. Based on Mulder's assessment of hierarchy (1992), we assign the oldest sibling in the family as the active-role holder, and the rest of the siblings as the passive-role holders. The Cultural Model suggests that transfers flow from the active-role holder (in this case, the oldest sibling) to the passive-role holder (other siblings). However, the actual giver and receiver do not always correspond with the active and passive role holders. It is possible that an active-role holder receives from a passive-role holder. This allows us to build testable hypotheses based on the norms and at the same time avoids tautological issue.

The hypotheses for transfers among siblings are as follows.

(H1) Being an oldest sibling correlates positively with the likelihood of giving transfers to other siblings.

(H2) Being an oldest sibling correlates negatively with the likelihood of receiving transfers from other siblings.

Meanwhile, the hypothesis for transfers to parents is as follows.

(H3) Being an oldest sibling correlates positively with the likelihood of giving transfers to parents.

In addition, we also test a competing set of hypothesis, the one that follows the notion that hierarchy in the family is based on gender, not birth order. In this set of hypotheses, male holds active roles and female holds passive roles. We focus on female, so the alternative hypotheses are as follows.

(H1a) Being a female correlates negatively with the likelihood of giving transfers to siblings.

(H2a) Being a female correlates positively with the likelihood of receiving transfers to siblings.

(H3a) Being a female correlates negatively with the likelihood of giving transfers to parents.

Note that we limit the predictions for parents to giving transfers only. This is because we are aiming to understand the effects of active and passive roles among siblings. While it is possible to see some kind of ‘division of labor’ among siblings with regard to whom among them would take care of the parents, the reverse (transfers from parents to children) would be more complicated because they might be related to investment strategy on the part of the parents.

3.4.2 Data

We use data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 1993 Wave. A rich longitudinal survey that collect various information regarding family members in 13 provinces in Indonesia. The surveys were conducted in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2007, by the RAND Corporation in collaboration with the Demographic Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (for IFLS1 and IFLS2), and with the Population Research Center, Gadjah Mada University (for IFLS3 and IFLS4). Unfortunately, the detailed-level of information on non household members and transfer are only available in the first wave. There is no information to match the transfer with the family member outside the surveyed households in the subsequent waves. For this reason, we only rely

on the 1993 Wave and do not take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data—except for when we have to make inferences based on some assumption that some things did not easily change over time.

Our sample originally is the 7,226 household heads from the first wave. However, since ILFS-1 did not collect information on ethnicity, we have to use IFLS-2 data to infer respondents' ethnicity, which result in the loss of some observations. Since we only use those who are Muslims, our main sample consists of slightly over 5,000 observations. The Muslim respondents are chosen so that we do not have to deal with too many sets of role expectations, although we will use the variation of role expectations among Muslims in the next chapter.

Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics of respondents
(Javanese respondents only)

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variables</i>					
Resp. give to siblings	1,776	0.144	0.351	0	1
Resp. receive from siblings	1,776	0.133	0.340	0	1
Resp. give to parents	1,776	0.145	0.352	0	1
<i>Main interest variables</i>					
Resp. is the oldest child	1,776	0.319	0.466	0	1
Respondent is female	1,776	0.144	0.351	0	1
<i>Resource and demographic variables</i>					
Total income (Rp 100,000)	1,776	1.339	4.668	0	72
Age	1,750	45.373	12.287	18	91
Number of siblings (inc. respondents)	1,776	3.864	2.174	1	15
<i>Multiple-role variables</i>					
Respondent is married with children	1,776	0.777	0.416	0	1
Resp.'s parents live in the household	1,776	0.041	0.199	0	1
Resp.'s siblings live in the household	1,776	0.030	0.170	0	1

For this chapter, we only use Javanese Muslim sub sample, about 1,800 observations. Of those about 14% involves in some type of transfers. The descriptive statistics of the data used can be seen on Table 3.1.

3.4.3 Dependent and Independent variables

For the sibling regressions, two dependent variables that we test are ‘whether household heads give transfers to their siblings’ and ‘whether household heads receive transfers from their siblings’. For the parental regressions, we only have one dependent variable, namely, ‘whether household heads give transfers to their parents’. For both sets of roles we use a same set of independent variables, which are divided into three groups: The main-interest variables, the multiple-role variables, and the control group.

The main independent variables consist of a binary variable on whether the household head is the oldest child (oldest=1, otherwise=0). Recall that being an oldest child is assumed to hold an active role, and all other children is assumed to hold a passive role in transfers. Another main variable, whether respondent is female (female=1, otherwise=0), is used to test the competing hypothesis.³

The second group is a set of variables set to capture the effects of multiple roles that the household head has. We limit the number of roles into four: a child, a spouse, a sibling, and a parent. For each of the head’s counter roles, there are some who live in the same household as the respondent, and there are others who live outside the household. Living in a same household indicates some kind of transfers happens between members. Interest in the effect of multiple roles that an individual holds also drives us to restrict our sample only to household heads. With only household heads, we can make some reasonable assumptions about intra-household transfers, namely, the head provides transfers to other family members who live in the household. Such assumption would be more difficult to make if respondents are not household heads.

We do not have any information on the intra-household transfers, so we use a binary variable to capture the effect of parent (for sibling regression) or sibling living in the same household as the head (for parental regression). We combine the head’s roles as

³ We use female as the ‘success’ event in the binary variable for two reasons. First, female household heads count for only about 15% of the sample. Second, as mentioned before, most studies on role literature focus

a spouse and a parent into one binary variable since in Indonesia usually being a parent happens in the context of marriage. Separating them may create a multicollinearity issue. A variable to capture the link between giving and receiving transfer is also used.

The last group of independent variables is a set of control variables. They consist of income and the respondent's demographic status (age and number of siblings).

A simple logistic regression method is used to analyze the data. We run three different regressions: (1) whether respondents give transfers to siblings, (2) whether respondents receive transfers from siblings, and (3) whether respondents give transfers to their parents.

The first and the third regressions are to test the hypothesis that respondents hold an active role (they are expected to give), while the second regression is to test the hypothesis that respondents hold a passive role (they are expected to receive). So, we expect the oldest-child variable to be positive on the first and third regressions, and to be negative on the second regressions. Since in the competing hypothesis, the gender hypothesis, woman is considered to be holding a passive role, we expect the opposite: female variable to be negative on the regressions for giving transfer to siblings and parents, and positive on the regression for receiving transfer from siblings.

3.5 Finding and discussion

3.5.1 Giving to and receiving from siblings

Table 3.2 shows the logistic results for transfers among siblings. Income seems to be important in decision to transfer, as it is significant in both regressions (although with different signs). Higher income correlates with higher likelihood of giving transfers to siblings, but lower likelihood of receiving transfers. The higher the income, the less likely the respondents receive transfers. These results suggest that economic needs are important factor in transfer decisions. Transfers flow from those with higher income to those with lower income. Age is not important for the likelihood of giving transfers to siblings, but it is on the likelihood of receiving transfers. There is a non linear relationship in the likelihood of receiving transfers. As respondent gets older, at first the likelihood decreases, but at one point it increases. This may reflect the life cycle of the

on active roles. Focusing on female would allow us to look at passive role in Javanese culture.

siblings. When they are relatively younger, they do not have enough income so they receive transfers from their siblings. As they get older and presumably make more money, they do not get as much transfers as before, until at certain age where they may not make as much money as before.

Having more siblings reduces the likelihood of engaging in transfer with siblings (either in giving or receiving transfers). More siblings provide an opportunity for some siblings to renege from their expected transfers. They shift their expected transfers to other siblings, or they simply rely on a particular sibling to take care of the rest of them. Another possibility is that there may be a division of labor: some siblings take care of other siblings while others take care of their parents. Either one would result in a lower likelihood of giving to/receiving from siblings.

Table 3.2
Logit estimates for giving to siblings and receiving from siblings:
Javanese Muslim respondents, 1993

	Give to siblings		Receive from siblings	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Respondent is the oldest child	-0.025	0.163	-0.015	0.165
Respondent is female	-0.670 **	0.272	1.198 **	0.241
Income	0.024 *	0.014	-0.037 *	0.022
Age	0.015	0.042	-0.107 **	0.036
Age – Sq	0.000	0.000	0.001 **	0.000
Total number of siblings (inc. resp.)	-0.207 **	0.042	-0.152 **	0.043
Resp. is married with children	-0.183	0.225	0.068	0.230
Resp.'s parent in the household	-0.099	0.393	0.113	0.389
Resp. receives transfer from siblings	1.997 **	0.168		
Resp. gives transfer to siblings			1.994 **	0.167
Constant	-1.199	0.962	0.449	0.875
Pseudo R-sq	0.133		0.154	
Sample size	1,754		1,754	

Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%.

None of the variables meant to capture multiple roles are significant. Being married with children is not significant for both giving and receiving models. Partly this is because of a high percentage of the respondents who are married with children, which reduces the variability of the variable. Neither does the presence of a parent in the household matter. While not significant, the negative signs on the first regression (whether respondents give transfers) suggest a trade off among various active roles: Those who are already taking care a parent (performing role of a son/daughter) and those who are married with children (performing roles of a spouse and a parent) are less likely to give to their siblings (role as a brother/sister). Meanwhile, the positive signs on the second regression (whether respondents receive transfers) suggest that other siblings may be more inclined to help respondents who hold many active roles.

One variable is included as an independent variable to see the possible link between giving and receiving. So, in the regression on ‘whether or not respondents give transfer’, we include a variable ‘whether or not respondents receive transfers’ and vice versa. The results corroborate the Cultural Model that an adult person holds both active and passive roles at any given time. Those who receive transfers tend to be the same set of siblings who also provide transfers. The likelihood of giving to siblings correlates positively with the likelihood of receiving transfers from siblings.

Being an oldest child does not correlate with either giving to or receiving transfer from siblings. Gender, however, matters. Being female reduces the likelihood of giving transfers, while at the same time increase the likelihood of receiving transfers from their siblings. These results lend support to the gender hypothesis: women are considered passive-role holders in the Javanese society. They are expected to receive, not to give. A standard explanation for the results would be that it might have something to do with the economic situation. However, recall that our respondents are household heads. They account for about 15% of the heads in the sample. Being a female household heads mean they are relatively more economic independent than other females. Indeed, according to the IFLS data, their average income is comparable to that of their male counterparts. So, while economic situation may play a role, another force may be at play here.⁴

⁴ The interaction between gender and birth order is not supported by the data (results are not provided).

Table 3.3
Logit estimates for giving inter household transfer to parents:
Javanese Muslim respondents, 1993

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Respondent is the oldest child	0.301 **	0.152	0.315 **	0.152	0.309 **	0.157
Respondent is female	-0.523 *	0.279	-0.652 **	0.294	-0.526 **	0.280
Income	0.025 *	0.013	0.009	0.017	0.026 **	0.015
Age	0.028	0.047	0.025	0.047	0.028	0.047
Age - Sq	-0.001 *	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001 *	0.001
Total number of siblings (inc. resp.)	0.129 **	0.031	0.128 **	0.031	0.129 **	0.031
Resp. is married with children	-0.112	0.226	-0.107	0.226	-0.111	0.226
Resp.'s siblings in the household	-0.695 *	0.410	-0.659	0.410	-0.696 **	0.410
Resp. receives transfer from siblings	0.405 **	0.195	0.400 **	0.195	0.405 **	0.195
Female x income			0.053 *	0.032		
Oldest x income					-0.006	0.032
Constant	-1.710 *	0.992	-1.625	0.993	-1.709 *	0.992
Pseudo R-sq	0.072		0.074		0.072	
Sample size	1,754		1754		1754	

Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%.

3.5.2 Giving to Parents

So far, our cultural model has not been successful in predicting transfers to siblings. Perhaps this is a good time to remember that one of the reasons we need to look beyond studies on one pair of relation only is that individuals hold multiple roles. Looking at only one role relation (in this case between siblings only) may not give us a complete picture. For this reason, we would shift our attention from ‘giving to siblings’ to ‘giving to other family members’, namely, parents.⁵

The results are provided in Table 3.3. Model 1 is the basic model, while Model 2 and Model 3 contain interaction variables between income and being a female, and between income and being the oldest, respectively.

In Model 1, income correlates positively with the likelihood of giving to parents. Number of siblings, which has shown negative relationship with giving to siblings, is actually positive here. The higher the number of siblings, the more likely the heads are to give to the parents. The presence of a sibling in the household affects the likelihood to give to parents negatively, a sign of trade off between the two roles (a brother/sister and a son/daughter).

Our main interest is on the effect of being the oldest child on transfers to parents. In contrast to the results for ‘giving to siblings’, our hypothesis is corroborated by the data. Compared to children with different birth order, the odds ratios of the oldest child giving to their parents are multiplied by 1.3.

Being a daughter reduces the likelihood of giving to parents. It seems to be counter-intuitive with the notion of daughters being the nurturer in the family. It may be the case that expectation for women is of transfer of a different kind: instead of money (which the only type of transfer we deal with in this study), they are expected to provide time, care, etc. This does not mean that economic factor escapes the equation completely. As income increases, the daughter’s likelihood to provide money to parents increases faster than the son’s likelihood to provide money to parents (interaction variable in

⁵ Another possibility is to look at the effect on giving to children. However, since respondents are in working-age group, their children would more likely be in school-age groups. Since parents—in most cultures, including Javanese—tend to put their role as parents the most important role, the likelihood of transfer to children would be very high.

Model 2 is positive). That is not the case with the oldest children. Their likelihood to provide transfer to parent does not vary when income increases (interaction variable in Model 3 is not significant).

The findings provide us with several insights. Javanese still hold traditional role expectation for oldest children. Being the oldest child in Javanese society carries additional responsibilities toward other family members compared to being a non-oldest child. They do not perform their roles indiscriminately, however. While they are more likely to give to parents, they are not different from other siblings in giving/receiving transfers among themselves. This may be a hint of hierarchy in birth-order-based transfers: for the Javanese, giving to parents is considered more important than giving to siblings. The oldest children, as the holders of active roles, are responsible for both parents and siblings, but their giving goes to the parents first. Transfer patterns strongly suggest gender-based roles, where male hold the active roles and female the passive roles.

To a degree, our findings support the functionalist prediction that role expectations serve as motivation for actions. Those with active roles are more likely to give compared to those with passive roles; and those with passive roles are more likely to receive compared to those with active roles. However, a problem arises when there is more than one factor that defines the active and passive roles, something that we have here with birth order and gender. Literature suggests that people negotiate their role expectations based on situation (Finch & Mason 1993). They would decide which action to take based on their cultural knowledge, like a toolbox (Swidler 2001).

The results lend more support to notion that Javanese familial hierarchy is organized on the basis of gender more than on age and birth order. While there is a gender component in Javanese hierarchical roles, it may also important to consider that the possibilities that the two competing hierarchies are reflections of two identities that the respondents hold. Recall that our sample consists only of Javanese Muslim respondents. This means respondents might be influenced by both cultures at the same time. Compared to Javanese culture, the gender component in Islamic social relations—including among family members—is very strong (Rahman 1980). So, there is a chance

that the results are influenced by the Islamic identity that the respondents hold.

In the next chapter, we will discuss an extension of the Cultural Model that incorporates multiple identities. The empirical analysis on the next chapter is a continuation of what we did on this chapter.

CHAPTER 4

MULTIPLE-CULTURE TRANSFER MODEL

In this chapter, we expand what we have done in the previous chapter by allowing individual to have more than one social identity.

4.1 Definitions

Expected behavior. The term ‘expected behavior’ has three possible meanings. The first one has the connotation of ‘good’ behavior and conforms to some norms. For example, listening to the teacher in class is an expected behavior for students. The second one refers to behavior than one believes *will* happen. For example, “I expect him to be here any minute now.” The last meaning of ‘expected behavior’ is related to preference or wish: “I expected him to come to me when he has any trouble, but he did not.” In this study, we will focus mostly on the first meaning: ‘good’ behaviors.

Norms. There are two understanding of norms found in the literature. The first one refers to the ‘ought-to behaviors,’ where norms are seen as a set of expected or acceptable behaviors. The second one refers to frequent behaviors, which do not necessarily overlap with the ‘ought-to’ behaviors. Here, the saying “an exception to the norm” means a behavior which happens so many times that any deviation from the behavior is seen as an exception. Sometimes, the first one is also called ‘moral norms’, while the second one is called ‘statistical norms’. The distinction is very important when we discuss cultural change: have the moral norms even been statistical norms in the past?

We also distinguish **cultural norms** from **social norms**. Here, *cultural norms* refer to those norms that come from some ideological concepts such as religion, ethnicity or ‘modern liberalism’. Since these norms usually are derived from some coherent worldview, they also are more likely to carry ideas about good and bad. In other words, cultural norms usually are ‘ought to’-type norms. Meanwhile, social norms refer to those that are present in certain locale. They maybe overlap with the cultural norms where certain religion and/or ethnicity dominate the locale, but may also be different. Many places have people with various cultures living in a same place, and they develop a set of

social norms that are not necessarily the same as their ‘original’ cultural norms. Norms in urban areas, for instance, are different from those in rural area.

It is important to note that while the cultural norms manifest in some ideal-type behaviors, we do not need to accept ‘essentialist’ ideas that those behaviors are considered the ‘essence’ of the ethnicity or the religion in question. Neither do we need to assume that such behaviors were the *actual* behaviors of the people in the past or present, although one might suggest that most knowledge about a culture that we know today came from anthropological accounts in the past. For our purpose, it is enough to have information regarding a set of behaviors that is considered good by the culture.

Identity is simply defined as ‘how individual views himself/herself in relation to other people.’ Following Burke and Stets (2009), there are three types of identity: (1) **Social identity**: identity that comes from being a member of a social group, such as based on ethnicity (Javanese), religion (Muslim), organization (Democrat), etc.; (2) **Role identity**: identity that is associated with one’s position in a social category, such as father/ mother (position in family), manager (position in business organization), professor (position in university), etc. (3) **Personal identity**: refers to certain quality of individual, such as being an honest person, moral person, etc. Each of these identities may be permanent or temporary. We will focus on social and role identities, and how they are connected.

4.2 Multiple-culture Model


The Single Culture Model assumes that individuals have only one social identity, hence one set of norms. However, in reality individuals have multiple social identities, which mean that they are exposed to several *cultural norms* at the same time. In addition to cultural norms, individuals are also exposed to *social norms*, the norms that are associated with a locale, rather than tradition-based culture such as ethnic or religious culture. Each of these cultures has its schema, including the hierarchy of familial roles and family boundary, which may or may not be compatible with each other.¹

¹ In this study, the term ‘culture’ is understood broadly, which include ethnic, religious, or other ideas and practiced associated to social groups.

According to certain religions, for instance, a man has to provide transfer mainly to his wife and children—the family boundary. This means the primacy of nuclear-family-related roles over other familial roles. In some ethnic cultures, however, the responsibility of raising children falls not on their biological father, but on the mother’s brother (such as in Padang, West Sumatra), or even the entire extended family members (e.g., *ohana* concept in traditional Hawaiian family). A person who adheres to a religion that defines family as ‘nuclear family’ and at the same time belongs to a culture that does not acknowledge nuclear-family boundary would have to decide which norms she would follow.

The Multiple-Culture Model is based on the basic model, the Single Culture Model, that we discussed previously. Instead of having one culture, however, we have two or more cultures where each has its own schema. Let us now look at Figure 4.1, which is a modification of Figure 3.2 in the previous chapter.

Figure 4.1
Multiple-Culture Model



The two figures are quite similar, except that now we have several social identities in Box 1. Each of those social identities has its own schema, which includes family norms, ideal types on hierarchy of roles and family boundary. The presence of more than one social identity would affect which roles that would be considered active or

passive. So, the main problem for us now is how a person would choose which hierarchy of roles that she would follow in forming his/her individual hierarchy of roles (Box 2). As we have seen in the previous chapter, even in the same culture, there is a possibility that two aspects (e.g., gender and birth order) compete for the basis for the individual in forming his hierarchy of roles.

In a multiple-culture setting, the first possibility is that the person simply chooses a hierarchy of roles from one culture completely. This would require two assumptions, namely, (1) the individual identifies himself/herself very strongly with the dominant social identity, and (2) the dominant identity requires a commitment like a lexical preference: all elements of the dominant identity must supersede elements of other identities. In a modern time, where people are exposed and interact with other people whose cultures are different from theirs on daily basis, such approach is very unlikely to hold.

The second possibility is for the individual to combine elements from different cultures. This requires an acknowledgement of those identities at the same time. Ann Swidler's suggestion (2001) that people have more cultural knowledge than they know and they use the knowledge like toolbox, take and use appropriate tools at the time, applies here. The tools in which individual use, however, are not random. Some would get picked more often than others. The cultural components that are picked more often reflect the salience of the social/cultural identity in which the components belong.

Before we continue, we need to clarify the understanding of social/cultural identity. We hold that individuals have *many identities*, but only some of them are acknowledged and even *fewer are claimed and enacted*. Some identities are from their genealogical background, while others are from their life experiences. It is common for a person to be, say, a 1/32-part Sicilian, but never identifies himself as a Sicilian even if he knows about the genealogy. Some people who lived for ten years in Hawaii would never call themselves 'local', but others simply do that after they have been living in Hawaii for three years only. Not only do they 'adopt' local pidgin language, they start to treat any elderly women as their 'auntie' or 'tutu'—practically change their own family boundary to include other people. So, identities are not automatically embraced by individuals, but need to be claimed. This applies even to the so-called ascriptive (hereditary) identities

such as race or ethnicity. Someone who has a Korean parent, for instance, does not necessarily accept Korean identity.

So, social identity in this study has a very broad meaning that covers ethnicity, religion, locale, and other groups. One important point is that identity is not an either/or affair. Individuals do have more than one identity *at any given time*. Some identities are dormant and linger in the background, while others are in the foreground. The number of identities is accumulated over a person's life course. Every time she moves to a new place, starts a new job, or meets a new group of people, the possibility of acquiring new identity occurs. With such a large number of possible identities, *salience* (and its hierarchy) becomes a very important concept.

In the social psychological literature, salience refers to the frequency in which individual invokes a social identity (Stryker 1980). Identities that are invoked most frequent are considered the most salient identities. Social-identity salience helps individual organizes various schemas into one *individual* hierarchy of roles by setting (1) the boundary and (2) the ordering of the identities.

Salience sets the boundary of a set of identity that matters to the individual. The number may vary, but it may not be more than five to six identities. They may be based on the person's religion, his ethnicity, 'sub ethnicity', and so on. Note that these identities may not need to be of a same level of dimensions (e.g., sex, gender, race); one can be very general and the other very specific identities. So, we may have man (sex, a general gender category), Hassidic Jew (a specific type of Judaism), and Iowan (a state identity) as parts of a set of the most salient identities for a person.

We argue that there is a hierarchy of social identity salience based on the ordering of the strengths of individual's commitments toward those identities. As discussed in Chapter 3, commitment refers to the strength of identification that one has toward a social identity (Stryker & Serpe 1982). Religiosity is an example of commitment. A person is considered to have a high commitment to Christianity if not only does he adhere to all teachings of the religion but also practices them. The two concepts, salience and commitment, are related, that is, the identity in which a person most committed to is the most salient one.

Because identities are accumulated over the life course through various claiming processes, the understandings and the enactments of those identities are different from one person to another. The claiming of each identity happens in the context of the existing identities that the individual already holds and are salient to him at that time. For this reason, the experience of each identity is influenced by the other identities that one has. A Muslim convert, for instance, is different from a born Muslim since the new convert brings with her a perspective from her old religion—even if she might try to suppress the influence. Likewise, a female African-American woman would view feminism differently from her white counterparts. The old adage that each individual is unique is strongly affirmed.²

The boundary and the hierarchy provide the basis for people to create their individual hierarchy of roles (Box 2).³ Identities inside this set would be the main sources for forming their individual hierarchy of roles. Yet, social-identity salience is not the only factor in the formation of a person's individual hierarchy of roles.

The second moderating factor from social identity schemas (Box 1) to individual hierarchy of roles (Box 2) is the affirmation from other people toward one's social identity. There are two ways external affirmations affect the individual hierarchy of roles. The first one is through its effects on a person's set of salient identities as we discussed above. The effects can be positive or negative, like in the case of being a Japanese in Hawaii after the Second World War, for instance. Some parents deliberately suppressed their children's Japanese identity by forbidding them to speak Japanese. The effect has been profound to the Japanese identity of a whole generation of American Japanese in Hawaii.

² The concept is overlapped with intersectionality, a feminist sociological theory that investigates how multiple dimensions (gender, race, sexual orientation, etc.) are interrelated in creating discrimination against African-American women (Collins 2000). However, our model is different from intersectionality in a couple of aspects. First, intersectionality focuses on discrimination, while our model is more general: it is applicable to various areas. Second, since the focus is on discrimination, multiple identities in intersectionality are given. Our model highlights *how* those identities come into being.

³ There are several studies in the literature that try to explain how individual forms their identity salience. Chai (2001) offers an answer by using *regret*, the difference between maximal utility possible in a given state with the utility coming from the chosen action. He suggests that individual would choose an identity that provides the minimum regrets over lifetime. Based on experiments on people who are exposed to two cultures in their daily lives (e.g., Chinese who have lived in the United States for long), researchers find that identity salience of each culture can be aroused using cues specific to the culture. The culture in which the external cues are strong would have higher salience (Hong et al 2007).

The second one is through direct evaluation of one's role. There may be cases where one receives affirmation for a role identity that a person holds but not for her social identity. In a conflict area, for instance, we might see people from the opposite sides of social identity extend their support to a female who is nurturing her small child. The opposite sides recognize her as a 'mother', even though they dislike her social identity. In such cases, individual may have a different ordering in her hierarchy of roles compared to when other people also affirm her social identity.

Rather than behaving like lexical preference, where one identity's components supersede other identities', the individual hierarchy of roles is a product of several identities in the set of salient identities. For illustration, let us suppose there are only two identities. Suppose according to the norms of the first identity, a married adult's hierarchy of family roles starts with role of a parent, followed by role of a wife, a daughter, and so on. Meanwhile, according to the second identity the hierarchy starts with being daughter-in-law, followed by role of a wife, a daughter, and so on. Let us further suppose that the first identity is more salient than the second identity. A person's individual hierarchy of roles may incorporate both identities; so, the ordering would be based on the first identity, but component of the second identity would be visible. So, the 'combined' hierarchy of roles would have the role of a parent (the highest role in the first identity) on top, followed by the role of a daughter-in-law (the highest role in the second identity), a spouse, daughter, and so on.

Once the individual forms her hierarchy of roles (Box 2), it would serve as the basis for her expected transfer behaviors. The same process we discuss in the previous chapter would occur: resources and number of roles would affect her actual transfers.

The whole model, then, hinges on the nature of the set of salient social identities that individuals have, namely, the boundary and the hierarchy of their identities. Assuming that a person's set contains 4-5 salient identities, the relationships among those identities become important to any behavioral changes. Since salience is influenced by commitments, the level of commitment is also important, although it cannot be separated from the hierarchy of salience itself.

The main prediction of the model is that the more salient an identity is, the more we see its norms affecting a person's individual hierarchy of roles. The effects of the norms, however, are moderated by other identities held by the person.

In the next section, we apply the model to Indonesian Muslims.

4.3 Empirical application: the effects of religiosity on receiving transfers

We test the model on the same data we previously used in the previous chapter. Instead of limiting ourselves on Javanese sub-sample, however, we will use the whole Muslim respondents.

The Qur'an proclaims reciprocal rights and obligations between husband and wife, but the man is the breadwinner and responsible for the maintenance for the wife (Rahman 1980). Husband's primary obligation, then, is providing 'maintenance' (food, lodging) for his family, while wife's primary obligations include maintaining a home, caring for children, and obeying her husband (Esposito & DeLong-Bas 2001: 24). Whether or not women should involve in economic area outside the household become a contestation issue among Islamic scholars. In any case, Muslim husbands are understood to be the head and sons are to assumed greater responsibilities in the family, especially at the deaths of their fathers (Yount 2005).

That men are the breadwinner suggests that when it comes to money, the responsibility to care for family members in Islam falls into the male members of the household. As the breadwinner, it is also expected that men would be the ones to assist their relatives, such as siblings and parents. From this notion, we construct an active-passive set of roles where the male family members hold active-role expectation while their female counter-parts hold passive-role expectations.

We hypothesize that stronger commitment to Islam (higher Islamic religiosity) would strengthen the passive role, which is reflected in the higher likelihood of receiving for women. Since identities are layered, however, the effects of the religiosity would be moderated by other identities that individuals hold.

4.3.1 Empirical Strategy

Even though Indonesia is a pre-dominantly Muslim country, the family practices among Indonesian Muslims are different from that of Muslims in the Middle East countries (Geertz 1968). The practice of kin endogamy, for instance, which data shows that as recently as 1995 about four in ten women in Egypt were married to their blood related (Yount 2005), is alien to most Indonesian Muslims.

From the 8th to 14th century, the area which is now known as Indonesia was a predominantly Hindu-Buddhist area. Islam entered Indonesia in 13th century through Indian merchants. The first area that embraced Islam was Aceh, a western area on the island of Sumatra. From Aceh, it spread to Sumatra, and other areas in Indonesia. In Java, the spread was mainly attributed to the Nine Saints (Walisongo) who used existing Hindu-Buddhist cultures in teaching Islamic tenets. As a result, the Javanese understanding and practices of Islam in general have been deeply influenced by Hindu-Buddhist cultures (Ricklefs 2002). Geertz (1960) classified the Javanese into three groups: *priyayi* (the aristocrat), *ulama* (the religious), and the *abangan* (the commoners). Except for the *ulama*, he contends that Javanese mix local animisms and Hindu-Buddhist cultures in their practices.

The late 20th century saw the rise of a different type of Islam in Indonesia, where the focus was in the purification of the teachings. The centers of this new wave were in the universities and urban areas (Feillard 2011).

Against such background on Indonesian Muslims, we will investigate the effects of higher religiosity on the performance of familial role, particularly the passive role among female respondents. To see the effects of multiple identities held by the Muslims, we look at the relationship between being Muslims and Javanese, and between being Muslims and living in an urban area with the likelihood of receiving transfers for women.

4.3.2 Data and Method

We are hoping to capture the effects of having three identities, namely being a Muslim (religious identity), being a Javanese (ethnic identity), and living in urban areas (locale) on the likelihood of transfers.

In addition to the variables coming from the 1993 IFLS data that we used in Chapter 3, we introduce a new indicator as a proxy of identity salience. The indicator is constructed from taking the average of respondents' religiosity scores from the 2007 IFLS for each Kabupaten (district) in the sample. We assume that the religiosity of each Kabupaten did not change much, or if they did, they changed in a manner that the order of religiosity by Kabupaten would be the same over the period of 14 years. To simplify the analysis, we make it a binary variable (high religiosity=1 and low religiosity=0).⁴

The constructed indicator is not ideal since in our model it is salience (the prominence of one identity over the others in the hierarchy) that is important, while religiosity refers to commitment to religious identity (in this case, Islam). While salience is based on the strength of religiosity, having religiosity data for one identity alone would not tell us a complete story. Ideally, we have the commitment levels for all identities we analyze; unfortunately, at this moment we do not have such luxury (Stryker & Serpe 1994).

As before, we have binary variables (receiving/not receiving from siblings) as dependent variables. The main independent variable is the interaction between being a female and religiosity indicator.

Since we want to see the effects of multiple identities that individuals have, we perform two different sets of logistic regressions: one for the Javanese/non Javanese respondents, and other for the urban/rural.

4.4 Finding and Discussion

The descriptive statistics of the data can be seen on Table 4.1. The proportion of Javanese and the urban-area respondents are roughly half of the respondents. In terms of religiosity, percentage of Javanese who live in high religiosity area (49%) is slightly higher than non Javanese's (47%). There is, however, a big difference in the percentage of high religiosity in the rural area (52%) compared to in the urban area (39%).

⁴ We tested two different indicators beforehand: (1) The percentage of Muslims in the province. This is to capture the amount of cues that might trigger a person's identity salience. As percentage of Muslims in the province increase, so does the number of cues in various forms, such as more people wearing Islamic attire, more *halal* restaurants or Islamic greetings when two persons meet. (2) Constructed, average religious commitment of the Kabupaten (district) from 2007 survey. The former did not give us satisfactory results, so we use the latter.

Since we have discussed the other variables in the previous chapter, in this section we will focus on the differences between two sets of social identities of interest, particularly on the effects of changes in the religiosity among the Javanese/non Javanese and among the urban/rural groups.

The results show that, among the non Javanese, as the average religiosity in the area increases the gain in the likelihood of receiving transfers for female respondents is bigger than that of male respondents (see Table 4.2, interaction variable). The coefficient of an increase in religiosity on female respondents is 0.99 (0.61+0.38), but only 0.38 for male respondents. In other words, as the area where the non Javanese respondents become more religious, female respondents become even more likely to receive transfers than their male counterparts. The gender gap in receiving transfer becomes wider. The passive role is strengthened. That is not the case, however, with the Javanese. Higher religiosity does not bring about any changes in the likelihood of receiving transfers among female respondents (the interaction variable is not significant).

The results highlight the differences between Javanese and non Javanese Muslims. The effect of higher religiosity is bigger among the non Javanese than among the Javanese respondents. While the Javanese have also been exposed to the stricter version of Islam since the late 1980s, the syncretic nature of Javanese Muslims may still be in place. Before the advent of Islam, there were several Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms in Java, where the two religions were practiced side-by-side. When the Nine Saints finished their works, the Javanese were not asked to leave their old practices, and the notion remained to the modern era.⁵

While we do not have hard data to infer their set of identity salience, we can make a conjecture that Islam may not be the most salient identity for the Javanese Muslims. Higher religiosity does not change their familial practices—at least not in transfer behaviors toward female siblings.

Non Javanese Muslims mainly are from the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan, and are of Sundanese ethnic—another major ethnic that lives in the island of Java. Those

⁵ Compared this to the Christian evangelization of Bataks, where the locals had to leave the practices of animism, or to the Minangkabau Muslims in the 19th century, where a war took place between the ethnic traditionalists and the *ulama*, as the latter tried to purify the practices. The *ulama* won (Rickfles 2002).

Muslims are known to practice stricter version of Islam. So, an increase in religiosity correlates with a movement toward stronger enactment of passive role for women.

Meanwhile, the results for urban/rural regressions show that the interaction coefficient is significant and positive among rural area, but is not significant among urban-area respondents (Table 4.3). An increase in religiosity widens the gender gap in the rural area: female become more likely to receive transfers from their siblings, but it does not change anything in the urban area. This suggests that respondents in the urban area do not have Islam as their most salient identity. It may reflect the fact that in urban area people are exposed to more diverse cultures and experiences, that allows them to acquire more identities than in the rural area.

So far, our results show that non Javanese and rural area respondents are sensitive to religiosity changes, while Javanese and urban area respondents are not. If religiosity keeps increasing in the future, the gaps in the practices of familial transfers among those different identities are getting wider. Any study on transfers will need to address the differences if they want to make a generalization of transfer behaviors in Indonesia.

Some caveats are needed. First, our main data is from 1993, shortly after a stricter version of Islam started to influence the Indonesian Muslims in the 1980s. An investigation of the effects for the 2000s may give different results. In the early 1990s, only a very few Indonesian women worn a *jilbab* (head cover). Today, majority of them do. Regardless their motivation of doing so, whether they simply follow a trend or really do so out of their religious conviction, the *jilbab* phenomena highlights the differences between the two eras. Second, the results come from a less-than-ideal indicator. We do not have the order of identity salience for all three identity-variables. This may affect the results.

In this chapter we show that the effects of religiosity and gender on transfers is not neutral. Other identities that the individual has, in this case ethnic and local identities, affect the relationship among those variables. This is the result of multiple identities that individuals held. Each of those *other* identities may bring influence to the practice of one identity, and researcher needs to take this fact into account.

Table 4.1
Descriptive statistics of respondents
(sample is Muslim respondents only)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variables</i>					
Resp. give to siblings	5,037	0.168	0.374	0	1
Resp. receive from siblings	5,037	0.154	0.361	0	1
Resp. give to parents	5,037	0.161	0.368	0	1
<i>Main interest variables</i>					
Resp. is the oldest child	5,037	0.329	0.470	0	1
Respondent is female	5,037	0.163	0.369	0	1
<i>Resource and demographic variables</i>					
Total income (Rp 100,000)	4,195	1.540	5.568	0	90
Age	4,911	44.579	13.614	15	93
Number of siblings (inc. respondents)	5,037	3.961	2.259	1	17
<i>Multiple-role variables</i>					
Respondent is married with children	5,037	0.732	0.443	0	1
Resp.'s parents live in the household	5,037	0.037	0.189	0	1
Resp.'s siblings live in the household	5,037	0.034	0.180	0	1
<i>Identity variables</i>					
Religiosity	5,037	0.464	0.499	0	1
Javanese	4,194	0.512	0.500	0	1
Urban area	5,037	0.466	0.499	0	1
Religiosity					
Javanese	2,148	0.487	0.500	0	1
Non Javanese	2,046	0.470	0.499	0	1
urban area	2,347	0.395	0.489	0	1
rural area	2,690	0.525	0.499	0	1

Table 4.2
Logit coefficients for receiving transfers from siblings:
Muslim respondents by ethnicity, 1993

	Javanese		Non Javanese	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Respondent is the oldest child	-0.009	0.165	-0.186	0.156
Respondent is female	1.239 **	0.328	0.226	0.309
Income	-0.035	0.022	-0.002	0.012
Age	-0.112 **	0.037	-0.020	0.037
Age – Sq	0.001 **	0.000	0.000	0.000
Resp. is married with children	0.047	0.231	-0.524 **	0.214
Resp.'s parent in the household	0.113	0.390	0.164	0.322
Total number of siblings (inc. resp.)	-0.149 **	0.043	-0.112 **	0.036
Resp. gives transfer to siblings	2.017 **	0.169	2.077 **	0.145
Religiosity	0.599 **	0.178	0.386 **	0.159
Female x religiosity	-0.126	0.367	0.614 *	0.350
Constant	0.233	0.891	-1.036	0.872
Pseudo R-sq	0.164		0.191	
Sample size	1,754		1,722	

Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%.

Table 4.3
Logit coefficients for receiving transfers from siblings:
Muslim respondents by location of residence, 1993

	Urban		Rural	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Respondent is the oldest child	0.050	0.159	-0.041	0.136
Respondent is female	0.738**	0.291	0.728**	0.274
Income	-0.013	0.013	-0.001	0.014
Age	-0.067**	0.034	-0.032	0.029
Age – Sq	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.000
Resp. is married with children	-0.353	0.224	-0.081	0.182
Resp.'s parent in the household	0.440	0.339	0.084	0.313
Total number of siblings (inc. resp.)	-0.134**	0.039	-0.116**	0.034
Resp. gives transfer to siblings	1.655**	0.159	2.327**	0.132
Religiosity	0.554**	0.171	0.412**	0.144
Female x religiosity	-0.128	0.347	0.528*	0.309
Constant	-0.416	0.822	-1.348*	0.719
Pseudo R-sq	0.135		0.203	
Sample size	1,808		2,309	

Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%.

CHAPTER 5
FAMILY ROLES AND CROWDING IN/OUT OF PUBLIC TRANSFERS
TO THE ELDERLY

5.1 Introduction

The objectives of this chapter are twofold: first, to see whether the cultural model we develop in the early chapters is applicable to a wider scope - a country; and second, to examine the effect of family roles on transfers between the elderly and their adult children. Our discussion so far has been under an implicit assumption that government does not exist. In modern times, it is very unlikely that families do not interact with the government. Some functions that used to be carried out solely by families have been taken over by the government. Primary education and social security are the main examples. Intergenerational transfers, then, are done not only by the family through familial transfers, but also by the government through public transfers. Literature has shown that the relationship between private and public transfers is not neutral; public transfers tend to affect the incidence and amount of private transfers, either negatively (crowd out) or positively (crowd in).

By applying our cultural model to macro-level multi-country data we attempt to see how private transfers respond differently to public transfers in various cultural settings. Data to construct cultural variables come from the World Values Survey, while data on transfers come from the National Transfer Accounts Project-a collaborative research project by researchers from more than 30 countries. The main finding of this chapter is that society's role expectations moderate the relationship between public and private transfers to the elderly. How people respond to public transfers and whether they would increase, decrease or maintain the current level of familial transfers depend on role expectations they have.

This chapter will be divided into several parts. In the first part, we briefly discuss the literature on crowding-in and crowding-out effects of public transfers. Next, we will discuss the cultural model and indicators developed to capture the cultural variables in the model. In the last part, using multivariate analysis, we will analyze the effects of family roles on familial transfers to the elderly.

5.2 Crowding-out and crowding-in effects

Whether public assistance crowds out private transfers has been one of the most contested ideas in the literature of public policy. Crowding-out effect refers to the concept that any public assistance given to a family would discourage the family members or relatives to provide transfers. So, in this case, additional public assistance would lead to the decrease of familial transfers. Some researchers, however, have argued against the crowding-out effect. In contrast to crowding-out, they argue that public support would have a crowding-in effect. Using the data on several industrial countries, Kunemund & Rein (1999) argue that public assistance in fact might increase familial transfers.

In the existing intergenerational-transfer literature, whether public transfers lead to crowding-in or crowding-out of private transfers depends on the motive of transfers—particularly of the giver. Motive-based theories that predict crowding-out effects include altruistic theory (Becker 1974, Barro 1974) and paternalistic theory (Pollack 1988). Those that predict crowding-in effects include exchange theory (Cox 1987) and family solidarity theory (Kunemund & Rein 1999). There are also theories that predict no effect of public transfer such as the warm-glow theory (Andreoni 1989).

So far, the empirical results of crowding out/in effect, which were mostly based on the United States and Western European countries data, have been inconclusive. It is still unclear whether public transfers crowd out or crowd in familial transfers. Often lost in the discussion of crowding-out/in is the different angle of the analysis. Proponents of crowding-out argument often focus on the situation where the elderly receive familial transfers from the children or relatives, while proponents of crowding-in argument focus on the situation where the elderly provide private transfer to their family members. Most of the existing theories, especially those that predict crowding-out effects, focus on the motives of the giver and their relation with the resources (income or wealth) of the actors (either the giver or the receiver). Often, motives of giving are treated as a function of the actors' resources, that is, givers perform strategic actions to optimize their resources. While resources are important in transfer activity, there are other elements that need to be taken into consideration. At a fundamental level, resources only matter when

the relationship between the two actors has been established; for instance, between parent and child, among siblings, and so on. While such relationships are usually taken for granted, it is important to realize that they are culturally constructed. In some societies, the relationship between biological father and a child is practically non-existent. On a practical level, even when the incomes of the two actors (or more) are the same, transfers can still happen. Suppose an elderly couple has two adult children with identical incomes and wealth. Culture may define who between the two children should provide more for their elderly parents (e.g., based on age or gender). Hence, treating motives of giver in relation to the relative resources alone misses the nature of the relationship between the actors.

In the proposed cultural model, we assume that both actors (givers and receivers) act out of their understanding of familial roles. There is a mix of internalized obligation and social pressure that manifests in the role expectation of each actor.

Before we discuss the cultural model, let us define the concepts of crowding-in and crowding-out effect used in this study. Crowding-in effect is defined as the *positive* relationship between government transfers to the elderly and private transfers from and to the elderly. In contrast, crowding-out effect is defined as the *negative* relationship between government transfer to the elderly and private transfers from and to the elderly. We call the government transfer to the elderly ‘government transfer inflow’, while the private transfer to the elderly ‘private transfer inflow’ and private transfer from the elderly ‘private transfer outflow’.

5.3 Cultural model and crowding-out/crowding-in


Let us review the cultural model discussed in the previous chapters. The model argues that culture affects transfers through familial roles. Each individual has multiple roles, e.g., as a husband, a father, a son, a grandfather, and so on. As far as transfers are concerned, a role may be active or passive. Active role refers to a role in which the individual is expected to provide transfers to other family members, while passive role refers to a role in which the individual expects to receive transfers from a family member or somebody else. What constitutes active or passive roles is defined by culture. While each individual may hold both active and passive roles at the same time, the strength of

those roles might be different depending on his age, sex, and birth order. A young child, for instance, has very weak active role and very strong passive role. At a given time, usually one of the two roles would be dominant. In general, when a person holds a dominant active role, there is a family member who holds dominant passive role, and vice versa. In the case of a young child (who holds passive role), their parents would be the active role-holders.

Active and passive roles should not be understood as actual giving and receiving transfers, since roles refer to the positions that carry certain *expectations* of giving and receiving, but the actual giving and receiving do not always follow the expectations. The distinction is important in our analysis as the initial actual situation may lead to a different result. Let us now introduce the concept of active and passive roles into the discussion of crowding-in/crowding-out.

For analytical purpose, we distinguish the initial situation of the elderly prior to receiving any public assistance: one where she receives familial transfers from her family, and another where she provides familial assistance to her family members. Suppose we call the elderly in the first situation 'recipient' and in the second situation 'giver'. We will show that in the presence of public transfer, whether private transfer would increase, decrease, or remain the same, depends on first, the initial status (recipient or giver of private transfer), and second, on the family role that they have (active or passive role). The four possibilities (recipient/active, recipient/passive, giver/active and giver/passive) would help us to better understand the effect of public transfer on private transfer.

Figure 5.1
Effects of government transfers on familial transfers



We begin with the initial situation in which the elderly person is a recipient of private transfers. Suppose in the culture that she belongs to, an elderly with adult children has a net active role (she is expected to give more than to receive). If she initially receives private transfers from her adult children (action 1 in Figure 5.1 Panel A), her receiving public assistance (action 2) might result in a one-on-one reduction of the transfers or ceasing to receive private transfer altogether (action 3). The reason is that her son has not been expected to provide her with support in the first place. It is she who is supposed to give. Now that the elderly receives public transfers, her son may reallocate his support somewhere else, to other passive-role holders in his role set; for instance to his own children. Now, suppose the elderly holds a net passive role (Panel B). Here, the elderly is expected to receive private transfer from her son. The effect of her receiving public

assistance may be different. The adult son may simply continue his transfers, or he may start to reduce his transfers although he may never withdraw his support completely. In other words, the effect would not be straightforward; it would depend on other factors. Our model provides a possible insight on this issue by examining the other roles that one has.

Let us now consider a different initial situation in which the elderly is a giver of private transfer. It means the elderly provides supports to her children or grandchildren (Action 4 in Panel C). Suppose her role expectation is an active one. When she receives public transfers (action 5), she now has more resources, and would use the additional resources to assist those family members who have passive roles (action 6). This results in a crowding-in effect: additional unit of public transfer generates an increase in private transfer outflows.

Suppose, however, her role expectation is a passive one, i.e., instead of being expected to provide transfer, she is expected to receive transfer. The results would still be a crowding-in effect, but the magnitude may not be straightforward. When she receives public transfers, she has more resources than before. Whether she would increase support to her family is up to her individual discretion, since, based on her role expectation, she is not expected to provide any support to her family members. In any case, we can expect that the additional support would not be as big as if she had an active role.

In summary, the concepts of crowding-in or crowding-out in this study apply to the inflow and outflow of private transfers and public transfers. Inflow refers to the flow of resources going to the elderly, and outflow refers to the flow of resources going from the elderly. For private transfers, action 1 on Panel A and action 3 on Panel B are inflows; while action 3 on Panel A, together with actions 4 and 6 are outflows. Since we are interested in the effects public transfer on private transfers, we only have public transfer inflow (actions 2 and 5). Crowding-out effect happens when the relationship between public transfer inflow and private transfer inflow is negative: private transfer inflows to the elderly drop (in Panel A) or decrease (in Panel B) as a result of the public transfer given to them. Meanwhile, crowding-in effect happens when the relationship between public transfer inflow and private transfer outflow is positive: private transfer outflows from the elderly increase due to them having more resources (Panel C and D).

Note that above analysis assumes that the elderly person has initially received or given private transfer. If the elderly did not receive any familial transfer before, any public transfer by her would not change anything, regardless her role. If the elderly did not give anything before, having more resources from the public transfer may trigger her to start giving, particularly if she holds an active role.

Based on the above discussion, we can develop testable hypotheses regarding the effect of public transfers on private transfers.

(H1) Higher public transfer inflow to the elderly with active-role leads to a large decrease in private transfer inflow

(H2) Higher public transfer inflow to the elderly with passive-role leads to a small decrease (or no change) in private transfer inflow

(H3) Higher public transfer inflow to the elderly with active-role leads to a large increase in private transfer outflow

(H4) Higher public transfer inflow to the elderly with passive-role leads to a small increase (or no change) in private transfer outflow.

The rest of the chapter is on testing the above hypotheses.

5.4 Indicators and Method

5.4.1 Indicators

a. Indicators for Transfers

We use data generated by the National Transfer Accounts project (www.ntaccounts.org). A multi-country research project aimed to develop a system to measure economic flows across age groups in a manner consistent with National Income and Product Accounts. The project provides information on private and public transfers, both inflows and outflows. For each variable, we have per capita value by single age group. We use data for the elderly (age 60-79) for 16 countries. Each country only has one or two years of data, and to simplify, we pick only one year for each country. Not all countries have the same base year, but all are from around the year 2000.

Table 5.1
Per capita private and public transfers to/from the elderly
(Expressed in average labor income of working-age population age 30-49)

Country	Private transfer inflows (TFI)	Private transfer outflows (TFO)	Public transfer inflows (TGI)
Brazil (BR)	0.43	0.84	1.09
Chile (CL)	0.39	0.47	0.50
Costa Rica (CR)	0.36	0.45	0.47
Germany (DE)	0.15	0.19	0.64
Hungary (HU)	0.27	0.27	0.58
Indonesia (ID)	0.24	0.48	0.08
Japan (JP)	0.27	0.33	0.57
Mexico (MX)	0.22	0.49	0.29
Slovenia (SI)	0.13	0.12	0.56
South Korea (KR)	0.43	0.45	0.31
Spain (ES)	0.31	0.36	0.49
Sweden (SE)	0.07	0.14	0.84
Taiwan (TW)	0.40	0.18	0.29
Thailand (TH)	0.51	0.38	0.13
Uruguay (UY)	0.14	0.23	0.32
United States (US)	0.20	0.25	0.40

Source: Calculated from NTA Project (2012).

Due to the discrepancy in the base years, together with the fact that each country data uses its own monetary currency, we need to standardize the data so that they are comparable. For each country, we standardize the data by dividing values of transfers by the average per-capita labor income for working-age population (ages 30-49). The numbers represent the proportion of respective transfer variable to the average labor income of working-age group. So, a value of 0.3 for transfer inflow for age 65 means that those who are 65 years old receive on average 30% of average working-age labor income.

b. Construction of Indicators for Role Expectations

We construct the indicators for active and passive roles based on the answers in opinion surveys conducted by the World Values Survey (WVS). We take the proportion of those

who answered ‘yes’ on the two questions in the survey, and use them to construct the indicators (see Table 5.2). The indicators represent the active and passive roles for the elderly (50+) in relation to their working-age adult children (age 30-49 years old). We take into account the working-age population’s views on the issue since they hold the counter-role to the elderly.

We assume that when an elderly person says ‘parents should do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being’, she would take an active role toward her adult children. Correspondently, for an adult child, a ‘yes’ answer to the same question can be interpreted that they expect their parent to take care of them. In other words, they assume a passive role in their relationships with their elderly parents. Combined, the two numbers indicate the strength of the elderly’s active role in the society.

Meanwhile, when a working-age person said he ‘respects his parents unconditionally’, he would be willing to take an active role in caring for his elderly parents. Correspondently, when an elderly person answers ‘yes’ to the same question, we view it as her expectation to be respected, and with it, be taken care of by her children. Combined, the two numbers indicate the strength of the elderly’s passive role in the society.

We match the information for the 16 countries where information from the World Values Survey and the National Transfer Accounts are available.

Table 5.2
Construction of indicators for role expectations

	Working-age group (Respondents age 30-49)	The elderly (Respondents ages 50+)
Active roles for the elderly (expectation: the elderly gives to the working-age)	Proportion who answers ‘yes’ to ‘Do the best for the children’	Proportion who answers ‘yes’ to ‘Do the best for the children’
Passive roles for the elderly (expectation: the working-age gives to the elderly)	Proportion who answers ‘yes’ to ‘Respect parent unconditionally’	Proportion who answers ‘yes’ to ‘Respect parent unconditionally’

For our current purpose, we focus on the elderly. This means that we limit our analysis on the actions of giving transfers (outflow) and receiving transfers (inflow) by

the elderly. Let us denote role expectation by RE , active role by A , and passive role by P . We define the value of role expectation for the elderly (50+) as follows:

$$RE_{50+}^j = \left(\frac{A_{50+}^j + P_{30-49}^j}{2} \right) - \left(\frac{A_{30-49}^j + P_{50+}^j}{2} \right)$$

Our indicator for role expectation for the elderly is the difference between their active role expectation (A) and passive role expectation (P). The first term on the right-hand side indicates the strength of the elderly's *active* role. Note that it includes what the elderly think they should do to the working-age population (A_{50+}) and what the working-age population expects from the elderly (P_{30-49}). The second term indicates the strength of the elderly's *passive* role. Here, it includes what the working age population thinks they should do to their parents (A_{30-49}) and what the elderly expects from the working-age population (P_{50+}). The superscript j denotes countries.

A positive RE value indicates that the elderly's active role is stronger than their passive role, which means that the elderly are expected to be *net givers*, i.e., they are expected to give financial transfers to the working-age population more than to receive from them. Conversely, a negative value indicates that the elderly's passive role is stronger than their active role; they are expected to be *net receivers* of transfers.

Table 5.3
Active and passive role expectations for the elderly (50+)

	The elderly's (50+) active role 'Do their best for children'			The elderly's (50+) passive role 'respect parents unconditionally'			Net strength (active - passive) for age 50+
	Percent of 50+ who answered yes	Percent of 30-49 who answered yes	Strength (average)	Percent of 30-49 who answered yes	Percent of 50+ who answered yes	Strength (average)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) : (3)-(6)
Brazil	0.89	0.86	0.87	0.92	0.96	0.94	-0.06
Chile	0.86	0.80	0.83	0.87	0.90	0.88	-0.05
Costa Rica	0.84	0.78	0.81	0.80	0.92	0.86	-0.05
Germany	0.62	0.56	0.59	0.54	0.71	0.62	-0.03
Hungary	0.78	0.68	0.73	0.79	0.89	0.84	-0.11
Indonesia	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.90	0.91	-0.05
Japan	0.46	0.42	0.44	0.71	0.80	0.75	-0.31
Mexico	0.77	0.71	0.74	0.83	0.84	0.83	-0.10
Slovenia	0.85	0.79	0.82	0.81	0.89	0.85	-0.03
South Korea	0.69	0.53	0.61	0.94	0.95	0.94	-0.33
Spain	0.91	0.78	0.84	0.82	0.92	0.87	-0.03
Sweden	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.46	0.59	0.53	0.15
Taiwan	0.82	0.79	0.80	0.94	0.94	0.94	-0.13
Thailand	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.93	0.93	0.93	-0.04
Uruguay	0.84	0.77	0.80	0.75	0.84	0.80	0.01
tates	0.78	0.80	0.79	0.76	0.79	0.77	0.02

Notes:

We convert percentages into proportion, with 100% equals to one.

The elderly's passive role expectations (*P*) are computed based on the survey question 'should you respect and love parents regardless their fault'.

The elderly's active role expectations (*A*) are constructed based on the survey question 'should parents do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being'.

Source: Calculated from World Values Survey (2011).

Of the sixteen countries in our sample, only three countries have a net active-role expectation: Uruguay (0.01), US (0.02), and Sweden (0.15). Elderly in those countries are expected to provide private transfers to the younger population. It is difficult to say what makes the elderly in those countries hold strong net active-role expectations since they have different economic, geographic, and cultural characteristics. All other countries have net passive-role expectations. Three East-Asian countries, South Korea, Japan and

Taiwan, have the highest values for net passive-role expectations: -0.33, -0.31, and -0.13 respectively. The elderly in those countries have strong expectations to receive private transfers from their younger generations. That these countries are located in a same geographical area (East Asia) and are influenced by a same culture (Confucianism) suggest that the respondents' opinions might be informed by their culture. The complete answers by respondents in all countries and the constructed indicators are provided in Table 5.3.

5.4.2 Empirical Strategy

We perform two regressions, one for private transfer inflow and one for private transfer outflow. Multi-level analysis is used where single-year per capita values for the variables serve as Level-1 variables and country as Level-2 variable. The multi-level analysis is needed because our data on transfers mostly consist of transfers by single age groups. This suggests strong correlation among the errors for observations from the same country. The model, following the linear random-intercept model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008), is as follows.

$$TFI_i^j = (\beta_1 + \zeta^j) + \beta_2 TG_i^j + \beta_3 RE^j + \beta_4 PRAT + \delta Z_i^j + \varepsilon_i^j$$

$$TFO_i^j = (\beta_1 + \zeta^j) + \beta_2 TG_i^j + \beta_3 RE^j + \beta_4 PRAT + \delta Z_i^j + \varepsilon_i^j$$

TFI and *TFO* refer to private transfer inflow and outflow, respectively. The first two terms on the right hand side refer to the intercepts for individual age and country, respectively. *TG* is the per capita public transfer received by the elderly, *RE* is country-specific role expectation variable (from column 7 in Table 5.4), *PRAT* is population ratio, and *Zs* are control variables. The subscript *i* refer to age-specific variables (Level 1), and superscript *j* refers to country-specific variables (Level 2). The epsilon refers to age-specific residuals. There are 320 observations (20 ages times 16 countries) in the sample.

For each dependent variable we run two models. Model 1 includes the main effects only, while Model 2 includes an interaction between the net strength of role expectation (*RE*) and the public transfer received by the elderly.

Independent variables

There are four independent variables: the amount of public transfer received, the role expectation-related variable, population ratio, and the control variables.

Public transfer received. The main independent variable is the per capita public transfers received by the elderly (age 60-79). It is expressed in terms of average labor income of the working-age population (age 30-49). We are interested in the effect of culture on the relationship between public transfers and private transfers, so we will interact this variable with other variables. This means the interpretations will not be done separately but together with its interactions.

Role-expectation indicator (RE). This is an indicator to capture the relationship between the net strength of a role with the amount of transfer flows. It comes from the column (7) in Table 5.3.

Population ratio (old/young). This indicator is used to capture the effect of multiple roles that people in one generation has. We assume that the higher the ratio of old to young people, the smaller the number of roles that a typical elderly has since she has to deal with relatively few people in her role set. The ratio is calculated by dividing the number of people ages 60-79 by the number of people ages 0-14 in each country.

Control variables. The last set of variables consists of control variables: the single age, the per capita income by age, and the per capita GDP for each country. The last indicator is a context variable; each country only has one value.

Table 5.4
Regression results for per capita transfer received by the elderly (inflows),
16 countries (N=320 single age groups)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Amount of public transfers received	-0.041	0.039	-0.025	0.040
Net strength of role expectation	-0.502	0.244 **	-0.671	0.262 **
Ratio pop age 60-79 to 0-14	-0.124	0.081	-0.118	0.083
Age	-0.002	0.001 **	-0.002	0.001 **
Income	-0.033	0.027	-0.024	0.027
Country's per capita GDP	-0.002	0.004	-0.002	0.004
Interaction public transfer x net strength			0.319	0.159 **
Constant	0.547	0.076 **	0.526	0.078 **
rho	0.901		0.904	
R-Sqr	0.464		0.451	

Notes:

** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

5.5 Findings and Discussion


The results of Model 1 show that net strength of role expectation is negatively correlated with the per capita private transfer received by the elderly (Table 5.4). This means that the lower the net strength of role expectation (*RE*)—indicating passive role expectation), the higher the private transfer to the elderly. The main effect of the amount of public transfer received, however, does not correlate with the amount of private transfer received by them (the coefficient is not significant). Since we are interested in seeing how role expectation affects the relationship between public and private transfers, we look at the interaction between the net strength of role expectation (*RE*) and the public transfer received by the elderly in Model 2. The coefficient of the interaction is significant, and the value is positive. However, as both are continuous variables, it is not easy to interpret the coefficient. To be able to proceed with the analysis, we calculate the predicted values of private transfer inflows for two values of role expectation: -0.3 and

0.3. Negative value indicates net passive role, while positive value indicates net active role.

In countries with net passive role of the elderly, when per capita public transfer received by the elderly increases, the predicted values of private transfer inflows decrease (solid line in Figure 5.2 Panel A). The result lends support to our Hypothesis 2, which predicts small decrease or no change of private transfers. It means that even when role expectation suggests that the elderly should receive (not give) transfers, i.e., they have net passive role, the presence of public transfers affects private transfers negatively. This suggests that family members accept the role of government as a provider and shift their resources somewhere else. Recall that individuals hold multiple roles. When the elderly receive public support, their adult children (who hold active roles) may reallocate the transfers previously given to the elderly to some other passive-role holders, such as their own children.

The regression results, however, do not provide much support for Hypothesis 1. Instead of a large decrease of private transfers as the hypothesis predicted, additional public transfer in countries where the elderly hold active role expectation leads to a slight increase in private transfer inflows to the elderly (dotted line in Figure 5.6 Panel A). This may be related to the nature of active role itself. When an elderly person is an active-role holder, there is a third party (beyond herself and her adult son) involved, that is, the passive-role holder with whom the elderly person is associated with. In developing Hypothesis 1, we did not take into account the existence of the third party. The effect of the third party on transfers depends on the dynamic between the elderly, the adult children, and the third party (which could be the elderly person's grandchildren). One existing model in the literature, the exchange model (Cox 1987), provides insights into the dynamics among the three actors.

Figure 5.2
Predicted values of private transfers with different values of *RE* strength



Cox suggests that in the situations where there is an exchange relationship between the elderly parents and their adult children, i.e., where the elderly are taking care of the grandchildren and the adult children are providing financial transfers to the elderly, introduction of public transfers increases their opportunity costs to take care of their grandchildren. To ensure the same level of care that the elderly parents provide, their adult children have to provide more transfers to the parents. This results in a positive relationship between the public transfer received and the private transfer received by the elderly.

Table 5.5
Regression results for per capita transfer given by the elderly (outflows),
16 countries (N=320 single age groups)

tfo	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Amount of public transfers received	0.184	0.050 **	0.211	0.051 **
Net strength of role expectation	-0.404	0.228 *	-0.684	0.254 **
Ratio pop age 60-79 to 0-14	-0.181	0.076 **	-0.171	0.076 **
Age	-0.014	0.001 **	-0.014	0.001 **
Income	-0.088	0.036 **	-0.073	0.036 **
Country's per capita GDP	-0.006	0.004	-0.006	0.004 *
Interaction public transfer x net strength			0.530	0.218 **
Constant	1.430	0.084 **	1.394	0.085 **
rho	0.802		0.803	
R-Sqr	0.628		0.598	

Notes: ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Let us now examine how role expectation moderates the relationship between public transfer received and private transfers given by the elderly (outflows). The main effect between the public transfer and private transfer outflow is positive (see Table 5.5). An additional unit of public transfers received by the elderly leads to an additional 0.18 unit of private transfer given by the elderly (see Model 1). When we introduce the interaction variable between public transfer and net role expectation, the interaction is also significant (Model 2). As before, we use predicted values to analyze the effects of the interacted continuous variables.

The lines in Figure 5.2 panel B show positive slopes: an increase in per capita public transfers to the elderly correlates with an increase in private transfer given by the elderly (a crowding-in situation). The magnitudes of the slopes, however, are different for countries with different role expectations. The line for those with low *RE* values, i.e., countries in which the elderly hold net passive role expectations, is relatively flat (solid line), while the line for those with high *RE* values, i.e., countries with active role

expectations, is steep (dotted line). The results provide supports for both Hypothesis 4 (small crowding-in) and Hypothesis 3 (large crowding-in). An increase in public transfer inflows results in an increase in private transfer outflows. This is partly due to the fact that the elderly now have more resources than before. Those who have active roles can afford (and are expected) to give more to their family members. Meanwhile, those who have passive roles can also afford to give more. However, without role expectation to give, private transfer outflows do not increase as much as for the elderly who hold active roles.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we examined how role expectation moderates the relationship between the public and private transfers to and from the elderly. We conclude that while there is no universal effect, crowding-in effect occurs in most contexts. Public support brings in more private transfers (crowding-in) than the opposite (crowding-out). In our discussions we engaged the current literature on crowding-out and crowding-in, and we found contexts in which the predictions from the existing literature may be supported.

Crowding-out effect happens when the elderly are passive-role holders who receive private transfers from the working-age population. Altruistic model (Becker 1974) predicts a crowding-out effect, but it does not take into account the different roles held by the donor and the recipient, which count for its failure in predicting crowding-in.

The findings also show that in all other contexts that we investigated (i.e., the elderly as receivers with active role, givers with active role, and givers with passive role) the relationships between public transfer and private transfers are positive, which suggest that based on our data, crowding-in effects are taking place. The magnitude of the effects, i.e., weak versus strong crowding-in, depends on the net strength of the role expectations.

Our model is different from the existing crowding-in models in the way it approaches the actors. The exchange model suggested by Cox looks at the issue from the angle of the elderly as a receiver of private transfers. The exchange made by working-age population and their elderly parents includes both financial transfers and non-financial transfers. As a result, if we examine the inflows and outflows of financial transfers, we may not see the relationship since the outflow part would be very low (or even zero). The proposed cultural model takes into account both angles: the elderly as the receiver and as the giver of private transfers. Theoretically, this would allow us to investigate the relationship between the receiving and the giving of private transfers in the presence of public transfers. Unfortunately, the nature the dataset used here, a macro-level data that does not distinguish the receivers and the givers, does not allow such investigation.

An ideal empirical investigation would need a micro-level household dataset, where information about household expenditures and transfers as well as perceptions on familial roles is available. So far, we assume that one country holds one, homogenous culture. A complete analysis would also take into account various social identities (based on ethnicity and religion) and their respective salience.

The findings of the cultural model seem to be consistent with family solidarity model by Kunemund & Rein (1999), although the mechanisms in which crowding-in effect takes place are slightly different. While both consider the availability of additional resources after the elderly received public transfers as important factor, the proposed cultural model takes into account the multiple roles that the elderly and the working-age population hold. This allows us to make further predictions regarding the magnitude of the crowding-in.

The present study investigates the effects of overall public transfers without taking into account different types of public transfers. Paternalistic model by Pollack (1988) suggests that the effect of public transfer will depend on its type (health, education, and so on). We plan to investigate this in future work.

Another possible extension would be using a micro-dataset. The ideal empirical investigation would need a micro-level household dataset, where information about household expenditures and transfers as well as perceptions on familial roles is available.

So far, we assume that one country holds one culture. A complete analysis would also take into account various social identities (based on ethnicity, religion or others) in the society.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The present study offers a new approach to analyze family transfers using culture as a point of departure. Culture affects transfers through two mechanisms. First, it defines a set of family roles that is important to individuals. With regard to transfers, the roles are divided into two: the active and passive roles. Second, since individuals are not robot, whether and how much they perform those roles depend on how much they identify themselves with their cultures.

Methodologically, the approach requires researchers to start their study from some initial understanding of the society in question. It also acknowledges a version of social constructionist view. We do not a priori assume that a person with Javanese parents to behave like 'Javanese', for instance, since we need to know whether the person *identifies himself* (claims the identity of being) as a Javanese, and how much he commits to the identity, before we can make any inference of his actions (Stryker & Burke 2000). That being a Javanese might be only one identity in a set of identities that the individual holds might complicate the researchers' task, but it is something that needs to be done.

The approach can be used for further investigations. One possible extension would be on family decision-making. So far, our empirical analyses have been individual-base. However, many decisions in the family are actually taken together, or through some mechanisms in which either husband, wife, or both, decides. Our cultural model may provide an insight on how couples reach decisions to provide familial transfer by looking at a person with higher salience. That person would have more influence on the family decisions.

This dissertation is not a complete work. It is a work in progress that sets the agenda of an interdisciplinary research that calls for the use of various disciplines and approaches.

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