

**Epistemic Challenges and speaker legitimacy:  
Evidence from an L1-L2 Japanese podcast**

**Joseph Iseri**

**Abstract**

Epistemics, originating in cognitive linguistics, have been shown over the past four decades to be a core issue in the organization of interaction. It should thus come as no surprise, then, that issues of knowing and not knowing are fundamentally moral questions, enforced moment-by-moment in interaction. While omnirelevant during any interaction, the case of L1-L2 talk is particularly enlightening because issues of linguistic competence may be topicalized more frequently in these interactions. How is it that L2 speakers, especially those with advanced competency, deal with contestation of their proclaimed linguistic competence?

Utilizing a conversation analytic-inspired approach, this paper analyzes the interactions between an L1 and L2 speaker of Japanese on a co-hosted podcast marketed for L2 learners of Japanese. In particular, I take up instances where a speaker challenges the epistemic claims made by the other in relation to their linguistic competence. Through microanalysis of their talk, I aim to show how these *epistemic challenges* are designed to both enforce their local epistemic claim and defend their epistemic territory on one hand while simultaneously asserting their macro-level claim to legitimacy as a competent L2 speaker on the other.

**Key Words:** epistemics, speaker legitimacy, conversation analysis, media discourse

## **1 Introduction**

Asserting and contesting who knows what is an integral part of everyday interaction. In any exchange, participants must closely attend both to what their interlocutor knows and claims to know, as well as how that knowledge may become relevant for the ongoing interaction at hand. Research on epistemics has repeatedly demonstrated how such knowledge and claims to knowledge are critical for the architecture of interaction, as speakers utilize epistemics to carefully tailor their responses to be *recipient designed* (Sacks et al., 1974). Speakers both assert what they and others know in even the simplest exchanges, such as question-answer sequences. By asking a question, a questioner assumes that the questioned party has the knowledge to provide as an answer. However, not all ascriptions are positive ones; *epistemic challenges* – or instances where a speaker insists that a party does *not* have some knowledge – are interesting cases precisely because they are typically *anti-cooperative* and threaten the social face of the challenged party. As Goffman (1971) notes, epistemic territories are territories of the self; a failure to contest a challenge can be seen as a failure to defend oneself.

Drawing on conversation analysis (CA), this paper presents how epistemic challenges surrounding an L2 speaker's linguistic competency are interactionally organized and how speakers launch and respond to these challenges. Taking an L1-L2 podcast marketed as listening practice for L2 learners of Japanese as data, the analysis shows how epistemic challenges function in the local project at hand, such as confirming knowledge of a linguistic item, and in macro-level interactional projects, such as debasing or enforcing one's claims to legitimacy as a competent speaker of Japanese. The study concludes with a discussion of L2 speaker legitimacy and how epistemic challenges work to assert or debase these identity positions.

## 2 Literature Review

### 2.1 Epistemics in interaction

Epistemics is a field of study with a long history about *who* knows *what* and *how*. Traditionally studied in linguistics, epistemics was a field concerned with the linguistic means of expressing a speaker's state of knowledge and the evidence for such knowledge through means of the syntactic structure, semantic content, or evidentials (Chafe & Nichols, 1986). Early works focused on issues like certainty (Givón, 1982) and reliability (Chafe, 1986). However, researchers concerned with interaction rather than language (as a system) present a very different perspective on what the enterprise of epistemics consists of. The sociological tradition of CA, for one, specifically deals with "knowledge claims that interactants assert, contest and defend in and through turns-at-talk and sequence or interaction" (Heritage, 2013, p. 370). This stands out from other traditions that may seek to typify different types of epistemic events (i.e., Labov & Fanshel, 1997, p. 100) or theories that deal with how native speakers use a variety of individual linguistic items to index their knowledge states (i.e., Kamio, 1997).

The major departure from the 'pure' linguistic franchise of epistemics can be seen in how researchers of interaction demonstrate 'knowing' as a dynamic, co-constructed process that occurs *between* individuals rather than a static object contained *within* the mind of an individual. From an interactional perspective, epistemics is not just a matter of what one knows (i.e., issues of *epistemic access*), but also what one purports to know and how one interprets others' claims to know (i.e., issues of *epistemic primacy* and *responsibility*). This is succinctly captured in the distinction made between epistemic *status* and epistemic *stance*. While status deals with what participants may know or not know on some gradient from less knowledgeable (K-) to more knowledgeable (K+), stance deals with the moment-by-moment expression of that relationship. More specifically, status accounts for the relative difference between speakers in "absolute epistemic advantage," such as 'knowing' or 'unknowing' (Heritage, 2013).

On the other hand, epistemic stance is something negotiated in interaction. Epistemic status involves (i) what is known, (ii) how it is known, and (iii) peoples' rights, responsibilities, and obligations to know it (Drew, 1991; Stivers et al., 2011). While stance and status are typically congruent, such that what one claims one knows is what one actually knows, being able to make claims to knowing, knowing better than another, or having a responsibility to know are all processes that emerge within the interaction and are available for contestation. Accordingly,

certain epistemic stances have reciprocal stances they ascribe to the other collocutor; if person A postures as ‘knowing’, it necessarily follows that A expects B to posture as ‘unknowing’. As Heritage (2013) notes, “congruent epistemic stances are only realized as an intersubjective fact across turns and sequences in which parties adopt reciprocal positions” (p. 379).

There are a number of resources speakers utilize to negotiate epistemic stance which have been divided largely into two categories by researchers: universal interactional infrastructure, including turn-taking, turn-construction, repair, sequentiality, embodied gestures, and gaze (among others), and linguistic resources, such as grammar and syntax or lexical, phonological, or morphological items. One major resource in epistemic stance taking is turn-design. Heritage (2012a) importantly notes that the epistemic status of an interlocutor consistently triumphs over the linguistic form when considering action formation. For example, even though a turn may be grammatically a declarative, the information being securely within Pat’s *epistemic territory* allow Pat to hear the Doctor’s turn in line 5 as a request for further information:

- (1) (MidWest 2.4 in Heritage, 2010, p. 43)
- |   |      |                                     |
|---|------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | Doc: | Are you married?                    |
| 2 |      | (.)                                 |
| 3 | Pat: | No.                                 |
| 4 |      | (.)                                 |
| 5 | Doc: | -> You’re divorced (°cur[rently, °) |
| 6 | Pat: | [Mm hm,                             |

In his study, Heritage shows how in telling sequences, raising information is either understood as a continuation or a genuine questioning based on the intersubjectively established epistemic statuses of the information raiser. In the data examined within, epistemic challenges are formulated as direct interrogatives and yet, in terms of their action formation, do not function as simple confirmations or requests for information.

Other works on epistemics in interaction have investigated individual linguistic resources such as ‘oh’-prefacing (Heritage, 1984), ‘yeah’-prefacing (Beach, 2020), ‘achso’ in German (Golato & Betz, 2008), ‘I think’ in Finnish (Karkkainen, 2006, and ‘I don’t know’ (Beach & Metzger, 1997) as means to construct epistemic stance. Yet others have examined ways of mitigating an epistemic stance, such as hedging in first assessment sequences (Pomerantz, 1980) and tag questions in first position (Heritage & Raymond, 2005), or upgrading one’s claim to epistemic primacy, such as *yo*-marked utterances in Japanese (Hayano, 2011) and tag questions in second positions (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Kim (2011) shows how the sequential location of Korean utterance final *-tayme* can work either to downgrade a speaker’s epistemic stance and invite confirmation or claim epistemic authority by ‘reversing’ the sequential position of participants’ turns. These studies reveal how epistemic status, linguistic resources, and the sequentiality of talk weigh on the issues of knowing that speakers routinely encounter.

Epistemics is also about who ought to know what, or epistemic responsibility. Researchers have found that certain identities (e.g., doctor-patient, parent-child, teacher-student) come with

categorically bound expectations for knowing. As Drew (1991, p. 45) puts it, there is a “conventional ascription of warrantable rights or entitlements over the possession and use of certain kinds of knowledge.” In the introduction to their edited volume, Stivers et al. (2011) discuss knowing as a ‘moral domain’ governed by normative social practices which has implications for the interaction at hand and the relationship between speakers. For example, in institutional settings like professional consultations and medical encounters, it is regularly expected that an epistemic asymmetry exists between the participants. In general, a client will receive advice in a professional consultation precisely because they do not know how to do something (e.g., fix a toilet, repair a shelving unit) and patients will expect doctors to wield their knowledge of medicine to properly diagnose and treat their symptoms. A lack of acquiescence to an epistemic stance normatively associated with an identity position can have serious consequences for the relationship between speakers or the claims to identity a speaker can make.

## 2.2 Previous research on epistemic challenges

This paper examines epistemic challenges, which I operationalize here as events in which a speaker insists another speakers’ epistemic stance and status are incongruent. In other words, an epistemic challenge is when a speaker challenges the epistemic claims made by another. For example, (2) is an excerpt taken from the same corpus and is not classified as an epistemic challenge despite using much of the linguistic formatting also present in analysis section.

(2) Season 1, Episode 5

- 1 → Y .hhh ne: ne: kudoki jyoozu tte imi wa↑ka↓ru?  
*IP IP persuasive QT meaning understand*  
 Hey, hey, do you know what *kudokijyoozu* (‘persuasive’) means?
- 2 A ku↑doki jyoozu↓ no imi ga, (0.3) hh. wakarimasen ne:  
*Persuasive GEN meaning NOM understand-NEG-HON IP*  
*Kudokijyoozu* (‘persuasive’)’s meaning, I don’t understand
- 3 Y +otto to otto to to to to  
*oops oops, oops oops oops oops*  
 Oops oops, oops oops oops oops  
*y +stabilizing glass*  
*a +pouring drink*  
 ((35 omitted while A and Y manage pouring alcohol))
- 38 A eetto, kudoki joozu (0.3) tte (0.5) doo yuu imi deshoo ka.  
*um persuasive QT how C meaning COP-MOD Q*  
 Umm, *kudokijyoozu* (‘persuasive’), what does it mean?
- 39 (0.5)
- 40 → Y kudoku tte imi wakaruru?  
*persuade QT meaning understand*  
 Do you know what *kudoku* (‘persuade’) means?
- 41 A ku- kudoku.=  
*persuade*  
*Ku- kudoku?* (‘P- persuade?’)

- 42 Y =mmm=  
mm  
Mmm
- 43 A =mm wakaranai.  
mm *understand-NEG*  
Mm I don't know

This sequence emerges out of an episode on *sake* ‘rice wine’ tasting where both hosts are pouring and drinking *sake* while conducting the podcast and the term *kudokijyoozu* ‘persuasive’ is brought up by one host. The two instances where Y does the questioning (line 1 ‘Do you know what ‘persuasive’ means?’ and line 40 ‘Do you know what ‘persuade’ means?’) directly calls into question A’s epistemic status. However, as A’s responses show, A does not lay claim to knowledge of these lexical items. In other words, A displays an epistemic stance of unknowing. Here, (2) represents the typical functioning of polar questions: there is a type-conforming answer (i.e., *yes* or *no*) that is produced with delay on account of its dispreferred status (Pomerantz, 1988; Stivers et al., 2009; see Heritage & Raymond, 2005 for an overview). Furthermore, we see participants’ alignment to the projected stances of the interactional project (i.e., the asking party’s stance of K+ and the asked party’s stance of K-). As such, the epistemic challenges analyzed in this paper are defined with respect to their sequential position, the interactional work done by them, and the incongruency between party’s claimed epistemic stances more so than the linguistic means by which they are accomplished.

Despite such a plethora of work done on epistemics, very few studies have examined epistemic challenges in particular. To the author’s wit, Mondada (2013) is the only researcher to target the specific phenomenon of epistemic challenges. Mondada examined how participants on a guided tour reversed category-bound epistemic stances and shows how the K- category participants being guided make and revise epistemic stances in interaction with the K+ category tour guide. By collecting instances in which the guided participants launch informing or questioning sequences, Mondada captures the ways in which epistemic stance and membership categories are reflexively reorganized during the course of the tour. Mondada’s findings show that epistemic status and stance are elaborated, challenged, and transformed through whose stances are ratified and at which sequential positions they are ratified.

Other works of relevance focus on category-bound predicates (i.e., category membership associated knowledges, entitlements, rights, obligations) among different membership categories. Fukuda’s (2006, 2014) work on the *exoticization* or *gaijinization* ‘foreignerization’ of NNS foreigners shows how certain categories such as NNS or ‘intercultural speaker’ are made relevant through talk-in-interaction. For example, topicalization of developing-vs-developed countries and the implicit positioning of a Chinese L2 speaker of Japanese within that nexus was used by an L1 couple to frame the L2 speaker as unknowledgeable of Japanese culture and values (Fukuda, 2006). In other cases, the use of even sociopragmatically appropriate contributions can be treated as laughable or topicalizable when uttered by a NNS (Fukuda, 2014; Iino, 2006). Kasper and Burch’s (2016) study show how an L1 speaker and L2 speaker dyad co-construct social identities as learner-teacher and orient to the category-bound rights they each held. The authenticity of each

participant was negotiated moment-by-moment as L1 speaker Keiko's momentary inability to recall the final strokes of a Chinese character was taken up as a moral issue by both speakers and prompted a teasing sequence between the participants.

However, more research is required to examine how epistemic authority and legitimacy are negotiated in interaction from a CA perspective. Bushnell (2008), in criticizing previous studies on category-bound epistemics that focus on prescriptively inappropriate language corrections and word searches between NS-NNS dyads, importantly reformulates the challenge for researchers studying epistemics in interaction. As he argues, "it [is] difficult for the analyst to warrantably claim that participant actions (such as orienting to linguistic expertise) alone work to make relevant the categories of NS/NNS in the interaction in the same way that such actions do make relevant certain 'situated identities' (Bushnell, 2008, pp. 23-24). While this study is not centrally focused on the categories of NS and NNS, this paper represents an attempt to warrantably show how challenges to participants' epistemics claims contribute to interactional projects such as debasing or claiming legitimacy as a competent speaker of Japanese.

### 3 Data and Methodology

The data for this study comes from the *TokiniGatari* podcast, a series of podcasts produced on YouTube by married couple Andy and Yuki. The podcast is marketed as "listening practice" in which Andy and Yuki participate in semi-scripted talks that are video recorded and then transcribed for viewers. Listeners then have the option to either listen to the podcast without the transcript or pay for access to the transcripts to read along while they listen. Videos are formatted such that either Andy or Yuki comes prepared with a topic (e.g., *What is on your 'bucket list', Talking about our camping trip*) which the other has not prepared to discuss beforehand. The data is naturalistic in that the talk is produced for some purpose outside of the research project (i.e., it passes Potter's (2002) *dead social scientist test*).

This paper adopts a CA methodology for approaching data analysis, which embodies a radically emic perspective of talk in order to understand the ways in which talk is *orderly at all points* (Sacks, 1984). Emerging from sociology, CA analyzes naturalistic, mundane talk at a microanalytic level to demonstrate how each speaker makes sense of what the other says and what they are doing together, as well as elucidate how local displays of sociality are reflexively tied to the global organization of social interaction (e.g., Goodwin, 1984).

The total corpus of recorded videos consisted of 30 episodes, consisting of roughly 12 hours of video recordings. The researcher listened to each episode and read along with the participant-produced transcripts to produce transcriptions according to Jeffersonian conventions (Jefferson, 2004). The researcher then selected instances in which an epistemic challenge emerged and further supplied transcriptions for the embodied actions of participants based on Mondada (2008). The analysis of these is presented here.

### 4 Analysis



## Excerpt 1.1 – Reformulations of the sheet

- 10 A e he [e he ma >bura-< buranketto na no [ka.  
*blank-blanket COP NO Q*  
 (I wonder if) it's a blanket
- 11 Y [e he e he .hhh [.hhh12  
 (0.5)13 Y [tabun (.)=  
*probably*  
 Probably
- 14 A [nanka  
*like*  
 Like,
- 15 Y =tapesutorii ka na:  
*like tapestry Q IP*  
 It's like a tapestry I guess
- 16 A °soo na n da°  
*that COP NO COP*  
 I see.
- 17 Y wakannai kedo, buranketto da to omoima:su  
*know-NEG but blanket COP QT think-hon*  
 I don't know, but I think it's a blanket
- 18 A sokka  
*is.that.so*  
 Is that so
- 19 (0.6)

In the next turns, A takes question with Y's formulation (line 10) and after a 0.5 second gap (line 12) and simultaneous bid for the floor (line 14-15), Y wins out for the floor bid and classifies it as a 'tapestry' (line 15). Notably, the categories of 'tapestry' and 'blanket' may be treated as the participant as mutually exclusive; while 'tapestry' denotes both a material dimension (i.e., a textile fabric) and a functional dimension (i.e., as a piece of art or as a design feature), 'blanket' more generally refers to "large pieces of woolen or similar material used for covering or warmth" and primarily highlights a functional dimension (Oxford Languages Dictionary, n.d.). These distinctions are also made in the Japanese dictionary entries for these words as loanwords (Iwanami, 2008). However, it's unclear whether the English 'tapestry' and 'blanket' still hold their nuance in the English-based loanwords *tapesutorii* and *buranketto* that are used by participants; A may claim a stronger epistemic stance in line 10 because of his L1 knowledge of the differences between the two categories.

This potential for mutual semantic exclusivity may be the motivating factor for the incremental hedge added by Y to her most sequentially recent description of the sheet as a blanket (line 17) after A gives a receipt token in a quiet voice in line 16 (°soo nan da° 'I see'). A's use of interactional particle *no* likely indicates that Y's formulation of the sheet as a tapestry is heard by A as a "fact" or that the evidence for Y's evaluation is unquestionable (Aoki, 1986, p. 229, but see also Cook, 1987). Y goes on to restate that she 'think[s] it is a blanket' in line 17 utilizing the self-presentational *desu/masu* form, which receives another receipt token *sokka* from A in line 18 and in turn leads to a 0.6 second gap where neither party takes the next turn.



In line 21, Y gives another re-formulation of the sheet, saying ‘it’s like the sheets you’d drape over a bed’ and A once again offers a receipt token *hai* ‘yes’ repeated three times in quick succession.

### Excerpt 1.2 – A’s disalignment with the formulation of ‘blanket’

- 20 Y anoo beddo no ue ni +shiku shiitsu mitai na yatsu  
*um bed GEN above DAT drape sheets like COP one*  
 y-bd +pinch BHIF together and rotate  
 Um, it’s like the sheets you’d drape over a bed
- 21 A hai hai hai  
*yes yes yes*  
 Yes yes yes.
- 22 Y da to omoimasu=  
*COP QT think-hon*  
 I think
- 23 A =kore wa: (1.0) amari buranketto de tsukaitakunai ka  
*this TOP not.very blanket as use.want-NEG Q*  
 This- I wouldn’t really want to use it as a blanket
- 24 na:, +(.) nanka  
*IP like*  
 a-gz +gz>table  
 y-gz +gz>table-->33  
 y-bd +BHPD touching tablecloth  
 I guess.
- 25 Y maa [ne:::  
*well IP*  
 Well, yeah.

*Hai* ‘yes’ is most often used when there is no incipient speakership by the *hai*-turn producer and can function as a continuer that projects further talk from the interlocutor (Tanaka, 2004). In this case, however, it is likely that the triplicated *hai* are not a continuer and rather a display of A’s acknowledgement or agreement with Y’s formulation. A’s trailing off prosody and sequential placement of the triplicated backchannel lends credibility to Tanaka’s argument that A may be impatient or have nothing further to contribute to the current topic. Y incrementally hedges her formulation of the sheet once more in line 24 (*da to omoimasu* ‘I think’) before A latches on to the end of Y’s TCU to begin an assessment of the blanket (‘I wouldn’t really want to use it as a blanket I guess’) while both of them gaze at the tablecloth. A’s assessment is seemingly taken up by Y as a disalignment with her formulation of the sheet as a blanket, as she agrees with (but does not upgrade) A’s assessment.

This exchange likely points to the differing local goals each speaker is pursuing; while Y is focusing on describing the sheet through a variety of functional distinctions, A centers in on the evaluation of the tablecloth as something suitable to use as a covering. This is shown in line 26, where A then produces an mimetic expression *chikuchiku (suru)* ‘scratchy’ to describe how the sheet feels, adding a new dimension – haptic feel – to the formulation of the object. While he

produces this turn, he simultaneously rubs the tablecloth with both hands palm-down, producing two pulses of the gesture (i.e., two rubs). However, in place of aligning with A's assessment, Y then asserts what the fabric is made out of – hemp.

### Excerpt 1.3 – Final reformulation

- 26 A +[chikchiku shi +soo da +ne  
*rubbing do-HRSY COP IP*  
 a-gz +gz>table-----+gz>Y---+gz>table  
 a-bd +BHPD rubbing tablecloth, 2 beats  
 It looks like it would be scratchy.
- 27 Y are da yo ne, anoo asa da yo ne, kore.=  
*that COP IP IP um hemp COP IP IP this*  
 It's that one, right, um, hemp is what it is
- 28 A =ah:::=  
*oh*  
 Oh.
- 29 Y =asa da to omou.  
*hemp COP QT think*  
 I think it's hemp
- 30 A hai hai hai  
*yes yes yes*  
 Yes yes yes.
- 31 (0.6)

Y's turn in line 27 begins with a placeholder using a distal demonstrative pronoun *are* 'that', which is used in tandem with the withholding of gaze towards A to show she is undergoing some solitary word search (Hayashi, 2003). She additionally uses interactional particle *yo ne* to indicate the searched-for object is something Y has independent access and epistemic independence to (Hayano, 2017). In other words, Y's formulation of the word search shows that the word she will recall is a result of her direct access to the referent (i.e., independent access) and is her independently reached conclusion based on that access (i.e., her epistemic independence). Additionally, her formulation includes prosodic emphasis on *asa* 'hemp,' which may serve to emphasize her strong epistemic stance on how the sheet should be formulated as.

A then issues a newsmark *ah:::* 'oh' (line 28) latched onto Y's formulation and is immediately followed by Y's restatement *asa da to omou* 'I think it's hemp' in line 29. Once again, A uses a triplicated *hai hai hai* in line 30. However, given the sequential position and turn design of Y's previous contribution (i.e., as a searched for and the epistemically upgraded formulation), A's use of *hai hai hai* rather than some stronger confirmation of second assessment may serve as evidence for a lack of A's agreement or epistemic access to the descriptor *asa* 'hemp' that Y uses. The absence of such may contribute to the 0.6 second gap that emerges on line 31 and the epistemic challenge that begins on line 32.

### Excerpt 1.4 – Challenge on the meaning of *asa*

- 32 Y +asa wakaru?  
*hemp understand*  
 y-gz +gz>a  
 a-gz +gz>y  
 a-bd +eyebrow flare  
 Do you understand *asa* (*hemp*)?
- 33 A wa+↑ka↓ru.  
*understand*  
 a-bd +nod  
 I understand (that *asa* is *hemp*).  
 (0.7)
- 34 Y +asa wakaru?  
*hemp understand*  
 y-bd +head slightly raise up  
 You understand *asa* (*hemp*)?
- 36 A wakarimasu.  
*understand-HON*  
 I understand that *asa* is *hemp*.

While both participants had been gazing at the table up until now, Y's turn at line 33 causes nearly simultaneous reestablishment of mutual gaze in addition to an eyebrow flare from A. A gives a positive response *wakaru* 'I understand' and coproduces a nod with notable prosodic emphasis. A 0.7 second gap emerges and Y relaunches the question in the same format, this time slightly raising her head on the turn-initial mora. A, however, does not verbatim recycle his utterance from 34 and instead shifts to the self-presentational *desu/masu* form, *wakarimasu* 'I understand'. According to Cook (2008), *desu/masu* forms directly indexes a self-presentation stance, which in turn can be used to indirectly index other social meanings, such as institutional identity or authoritative 'voice'. Thus, A's style shift in line 37 likely is motivated by the contesting of his authority as a legitimate speaker and reasserts his claim to knowing what *asa* refers to as a legitimate one.

This claim is initially accepted by Y in 38 with newsmark *ah* 'Oh' but a more adequate response is once again pursued by Y through asking for A to produce the English equivalent of *asa* to demonstrate, not simply claim, his understanding of what *asa* means. A, however, references the institutional nature of the talk as a podcast for Japanese listening practice, saying '[We/I] decided not to try and not use English, right?'. Hence, Y's pursuit for a demonstration is shut down by virtue of A making relevant the context of the talk and Y stifles laughter as A begins to initiate a topic shift.

### Excerpt 1.5 – Refusing to demonstrate

- 37 Y +ah. (0.5) +nani? eego de  
*oh what English in*

- y-gz +gz>dwn----+gz>a  
 Oh...what is it? In English
- 38 A eego wa tsukawanai yoo ni shi[mashita, ne?  
*English TOP use-NEG way DAT do-PST-HON IP*  
 [We/I] decided to try and not use English, right?
- 39 Y +[.hhh  
 +gasp  
 y-bd +eyebrow flare,smile mouth  
 ajar
- 40 A kono poddokyasuto.  
*this podcast*  
 On this podcast.
- 41 Y +°hah hah hah hah°  
 +holding back laughter  
 y-bd +mouth close
- 42 A choodo ii n jan.  
*just good NO NEG*  
 That's just right

Excerpt 1 demonstrates how the triplicated acknowledgement tokens (i.e., *hai hai hai*) were treated by Y as insufficient and that, given Y's turn design in the informing turn, 'It's that one right, um, hemp is what it is' (line 28), Y's assessment is sequentially due some stronger form of alignment or assessment given that preferred responses to informings are upgraded (Pomerantz, 1984). However, A's previous use of the triplicated continuers in line 22 as well as the prosodic contour of his turns in 29 (*ah:::*) and 31 (*hai hai hai*) may very well be attempts by A to close the sequence rather than evidence of his lack of understanding. Provided that A did not proactively offer any formulations of the sheet and simply aligned or disaligned with Y's repeated reformulations, A may simply have had nothing more to say on the topic. Y's first question *asa wakaruru?* thus can be heard as a confirmation of A's epistemic *status*, despite A's *stance* through his use of acknowledgement tokens that he claims understanding of what *asa* means. In other words, Y implies that there is an *epistemic incongruence* between A's *stance* and *status* (Heritage, 2013).

However, after receiving the projected preferred SPP *yes*-type response (line 34, *wa↑ka↓ru*), a 0.7 second gap emerges and Y relaunches the question. It is here I claim the epistemic challenge occurs. Y's relaunching of the question in the same format after receiving the projected preferred SPP shows how Y does not treat A's response as adequate, insufficient, or untruthful. Doing so is a marked action that denies the epistemic *stance* claimed by A in his previous turn and is thus markedly different from the interaction between A and Y up until that point, which had been a smooth exchange where each ratified the other's epistemic positions (Excerpt 1 – A: line 16 'I see', line 17 'Is that so'; Y: 'Well, yeah') and mitigated the imposition of their own epistemic claims (Y: line 15 'It's like a tapestry I guess', line 22 'I think'). This leads A to shift from casual / plain style to *desu/masu* style as a means for him to reassert his legitimacy to and authority over his epistemic *stance*.

Excerpt 2 is similar to Excerpt 1 in that Y's challenge is sequentially launched after A has already given interactional evidence for his understanding of the lexical item in question but is left seemingly unresolved as A immediately moves on to the next sequence. The excerpt begins after A asks Y whether Japanese people other than Yuki still use *kaomoji* 'emojis' and, after Y's reply, A begins a joint word search for *garakee* 'old flip phone'.

### Excerpt 2 – *Kaseki* (fossil)

- 25 Y +e::::: do:: daroo: (.) watashi::: (.) igai no hito:::::¿  
*what how COP-MOD FPP other GEN person*  
 Um, I wonder. People other than me?  
 y-gz +gz>upleft->27
- 26 (0.3) .hhhhhhhhhh ↑kaomoji::: wa::::: ammari  
*emoji TOP not.really*
- 27 +tsukawanaku nat̄ta yo ne, +minna yappari  
*become.used IP IP everyone after.all*  
 y-gz +gz>a  
 a-gz +gz>away
- 28 A tabun: #nanka +ano:: .hh (0.2) +(0.6) koo yuu keitai  
*probably like um this called phone*  
 a-gz +gz>BH  
 a-bd #flip phone mime, fig. 1 & 2



- #fig 1 #fig2
- 29 (0.3) ka+chi tto +suru keitai wa nan tte yuun dakke sono  
*with.a.click do phone TOP what TOP called MOD that*  
 a-gz +gz>y  
 a-bd +flip phone mime as fig. 2, then resumed->42  
 Probably. Like, umm, what do you call that cellphone that was like this, that opened like this

30            furui yatsu  
                  old one  
                  The old one

A's word search begins with fillers (*nanka, ano::*) as he begins to produce a mimetic for a flip phone, gazing at his own gesture at the start of the word search before gazing at Y in line 29. The miming physically embodies the referent he is searching for, as he further specifies it is *koo yuu keitai* 'this kind of cell phone' and incrementally adds information to jointly search with Y, such as the sound it makes (line 29, *kachi tto suru keitai* 'the phone that opens with a click') and reformulates it as a *furui yatsu* 'the old one'.

Y shows her participation in the search with prosodically emphasized change-of-state token *AH* 'OH' (line 31) that shows Y also has epistemic access to the physical object based on A's miming and describing, but similarly can't recall the term used to describe it. She then goes on to search (line 31, *eeto ne::* 'umm'), but after a 1.5 gap while Y searches, A inquires whether there was any special term to refer to specifically that type of phone, asking *keitai dake* '(Is it called) only a phone?' (line 32). However, Y overlappingly proffers a candidate response – *kaseki* 'fossil'. Obviously, the actual referent to the old style of flip phone is not a fossil and this is treated by A as a joke, evidenced by his eyebrow flare and smile during his try-marked repetition of the candidate in 34 (*kaseki?*). After a quiet confirmation by Y in line 35, A begins to laugh and Y laughs along with him.

### Excerpt 2.1 – Candidate proffered and laughed at

31    Y        +AH. eeto ne::  
                  oh    um    IP  
                  y-bd +smile  
                  Oh, umm  
                  (1.5)

32    A        +keitai da[ke?  
                  phone only  
                  +trailing off  
                  Only a phone?

33    Y                            [kaseki.  
    fossil  
    A fossil

34    A        ka+seki?  
                  fossil  
                  A fossil?  
                  a-bd    +eyebrow flare, smile

35    Y        °un°=  
                  yeah  
                  Yeah

36    A        =hhhe [heh heh .hhh

37    Y                            [he he he

A then overtly rejects this candidate and Y begins to search again. A overlaps her prosodically elongated ‘umm’ in line 39 to respecify further that the referent is called a ‘flip phone or the like’ in English (line 40-41). Y gives another elongated newsmark *a:::::* ‘oh:::::’ (line 41) while A adds an increment with seemingly no major semantic value (line 42, *y- yuu n da kedo* ‘is what it’s called, but’). Finally, Y seems to prepare to give some candidate answers by hedging her turn with *nan dakke* ‘what was it...’ and produces *PAKA PAKA* ‘clamshell’ in a loud voice. After a 0.4 second pause and a head tilt from A, Y understands A to have not been searching for *paka paka* and tries *gara kee* ‘old flip hone’. A repeats this candidate in a loud voice and nods once, finally concluding the flip phone mime (which had been continuous from the beginning of the word search) and points at Y for one pulse, indicating that it was precisely *gara kee* that he had been searching for.

### Excerpt 2.2 – Finishing the word search

- 38 A *iya +nan tte yobareteta [n dakke*  
*no what TOP was.called NO MOD*  
*a-gz +gz>BH*  
 No, what was it called again?
- 39 Y [eetto:::::[::  
*um*  
 Umm
- 40 A [eego da +to flip phone  
*English COP QT*  
*a-gz +gz>y*  
*+toka*  
*+trailing off*  
 In English it’s called a flip phone or the like  
 (.)
- 41 Y *a:::::*  
*oh*  
 Oh
- 42 A *y- yuu n da kedo,=*  
*c- called NO COP but*  
 But,
- 43 Y *nan dakke. PAKA PAKA. +(0.4) GARA KEE*  
*what MOD clip-clop flip.phone*  
*a-bd +head tilt left*  
 What was it...a ‘CLAMSHELL’? An ‘OLD FLIP PHONE’?
- 44 A *+GARA KEE. (.) .hh soo yuu [yatsu*  
*flip.phone that called one*  
*a-bd +head nod, finish flip phone mime and RHIF>y for 1 pulse*  
 An ‘OLD FLIP PHONE’. That one.
- 45 Y [+°k(h)aseki(h)?°  
*fossil*  
*y-bd +smile wider*  
 A fossil



After an in breath and producing a potential grammatical subject (*soo yuu yatsu* ‘that one’) that signals a return to the sequence before the word search, Y smiles widely and softly produces *k(h)aseki(h)* ‘a fossil’ with interpolated particles of aspiration (IPAs, see Potter & Hepburn, 2010), inviting A to laugh along.

A, however, does not overtly laugh either. As he produces a repetition of the word *kaseki*, he similarly inserts IPAs and uses a softer volume than usual (line 46, *k(h)aseki*). This repetition, by recycling the prosody and embedded IPAs, thus treats this as another insert sequence that temporarily halts the progressivity of his turn. However, after a 0.3 second pause, A turns to the camera and addresses the audience ‘out there’ saying *kaseki wakarimasu ka? minasan* ‘Does everyone understand *kaseki*?’. In other words, A shifts the participation framework to include the non-present listeners to be addressed recipients, thus orienting to the institutional nature of the podcast talk. Here, Y’s epistemic challenge is made relevant by its sequential position; A’s question to the viewing audience as a sort of third party is clearly not done so for a response, similar to those of display questions in classroom interaction (Long & Sato, 1983). In asking the audience if they understand what *kaseki* means, A simultaneously asserts his epistemic access to the referent.

### Excerpt 2.3 – Challenge on the meaning of *kaseki*

- 46 A +°k(h)a+seki° (0.3) *kaseki wakari+masu ka? mina+san,*  
*fossil fossil understand-hon Q everyone-*  
 HON  
 a-gz +gz>away +gz>cam +gz>y  
 a-bd +BH>home position  
 A fossil...does everyone understand a ‘fossil’?
- 47 Y +kaseki wa↑ ka↓ +ru::?  
*fossil understand*  
 y-bd +eyebrow flare +slight head dip  
 You understand ‘fossil’?
- 48 A ka+seki wakarimassu yo:↑:::  
*fossil understand-HON IP*  
 I do understand ‘fossil’.
- 49 Y mm::::[::::  
 Hmmm

However, Y does not orient to A’s participation framework shift and instead launches a challenge in line 47 directed at A (*kaseki wa ka ru::?*). A gives a type-conforming and preferred projected *yes*-type response *kaseki wakarimassu yo:↑:::* ‘I do understand ‘fossil’ in the *desu/masu* form, to which Y then produces what can be heard as a marker of doubt *mm:::::* (line 49). Through his authoritative voice indexed by the *desu/masu* style and by interactional particle *yo*, A upgrades his claim to epistemic primacy over his status as either K+ or K- (e.g., Hayano, 2011). Even so, Y’s response disaligns and once again shows her disagreement with the epistemic stance A claims.



A overlappingly produces the same elongated *mm:::* in line 50. However, he simply continues to address the audience by gazing at the camera and treats Y's challenge as having been answered and the sequence complete. Even though Y's *mm:::* ostensibly still projects further turns (i.e., in which A would demonstrate, not claim, his understanding of *kaseki* and the joke), A ends the sequence by finishing the insertion sequence he himself launched (i.e., the talk to the audience) and then returns to the sequence initially abandoned in lieu of the word search (i.e., 'when I used that kind of phone, (I/everyone) used emojis').

- 50 A [mmmmmm dakara +(n) +yomichan o tsukatte,  
*because Yomichan ACC use*  
 a-gz +gz>cam +gz>dwn  
 a-bd +mimes typing on a keyboard
- 51 shirabete kuda:::sai. +.hhhhh ano::: soo yuu keetai o  
*look.up please-hon um that called phone ACC*  
 a-gz +gz>y  
 a-bd +BHPC, held frozen until 1 pulse-|  
 y-gz +gz>dwn
- 52 tsukatta toki:, kekko: (0.3) kaomoji toka tsukai:mashita,  
*used time quite emoji etc. used*
- 53 ne.  
*IP*  
 Hmm so everyone at home please use Yomichan and look (it) up. Umm when I  
 used that kind of phone, (I / everyone) used emojis  
 ((Andy launches a telling about arriving in Japan 9 years  
 earlier and using emojis on his cellphone))

Thus, in Excerpt 2, we see a different resolution to the challenge. While in Excerpt 1, Y's repetition of the question *wakaru* 'do you understand?' strongly projects a *yes*-type response by A (*wakarimasu.*), Y's disagreement through elongated *mm:::* in Excerpt 2 does not strongly enough project a SPP and A, while acknowledging the challenging nature of Y's turn (i.e., overlapped *mm:::*) is still able to continue with the initial project launched by this addressing of the audience. While A gives interactional evidence to demonstrate his epistemic status through change-of-state tokens (Excerpt 1's *ah:::*) and laughter (Excerpt 2's *k(h)aseki*), both cases have Y launching a challenge and thus calling into question the identity claims A has made in the talk by virtue of his epistemic claims. As a resolution, A makes use of the institutional context of the podcast talk to avoid making further demonstrations of the epistemic stances he's claimed in both cases and thus reaffirms his stance as K+ and as a competent speaker of Japanese.

## 5 Discussion

The analysis shows how epistemic challenges are sequentially formatted and in what types of ongoing social projects they are deployed in, namely being attempts to debase and in response claim legitimacy to a social identity of a competent speaker. In Excerpt 1, A and Y engage in a sequence attempting to pin down the description of the tablecloth and an epistemic challenge emerges from A's lack of alignment with Y's final formulation. Despite A giving

acknowledgement verbally through triplicated *hai*, Y first questions whether A has access to her description and A provides a type-conforming response that he does. However, Y calls into question the validity or appropriateness of A's answer by recycling the polar interrogative question which prompts A to upgrade his epistemic stance through style shifting to the *desu/masu* form and utilizing *yo* (Cook, 2008; Hayano, 2011). Excerpt 1 is a case where there is weak interactional evidence that A has epistemic access to the challenged lexical item; acknowledgement of the assessment is taken as not just disalignment but rather as potential evidence that A is providing a 'let it pass' type of response (Firth, 1996).

Excerpt 2, on the other hand, is a case where A provides strong interactional evidence for his understanding of the lexical item at hand; A both laughs along when Y provides *kaseki* 'fossil' as a joking candidate to the word search and asks a display question to the camera intended for the viewing audience. Despite A making relevant his epistemic status as K+, Y initiates a challenge by asking if he understands the item and by extension retroactively challenges his understanding of the joke and his claim to identity as a 'teacher' to the audience. In this case, epistemic challenges clearly threaten the identity claim A makes to competent speakership by virtue of participating in an institutional form of talk (i.e., broadcast talk) that is intended to serve as a model for L2 listeners at home.

In a very different way than discussed in the field of SLA (e.g., van Compernelle, 2016), legitimacy and authenticity are here shown to be a dynamic process that *participants* make relevant through epistemic challenges rather than broad issues that are omnirelevant. In fact, epistemic challenges in the corpus are overwhelmingly few in number. Provided that human interaction is overwhelming cooperative in nature, this is likely due to the nature of the sequences carrying some negative social value. Perhaps more importantly, however, is that epistemic challenges emerge out of specific sequential contexts that allow for them to happen. Only by virtue of the opaqueness of A's acknowledgement in Excerpt 1 or the relevance of A's epistemic status are Y's sequences capable of being launched.

## 6 Conclusion

In summary, epistemic challenges have been underrepresented in research on epistemics in interaction and deserve further investigation. This paper examined episodes of epistemic challenges surrounding particular linguistic items in L1-L2 interaction on a podcast to show how these challenges serve to forward the L2 participant's identity as a L2 learner and debase his sequential claims to understanding and macro-level claims as a competent speaker. Micro-analysis shows how the L2 participant dealt with these challenges by either utilizing the institutional nature of the talk to deny a further demand of demonstration (Excerpt 1) or by not taking it up only in acknowledgement through a 'mirrored' overlapping and continuing with the previously launched sequence (Excerpt 2). These types of interactions, while not frequent in the current corpus, nevertheless bare important implications for the ways which speakers manage their claims to legitimacy as a competent speaker of a language. This work hopes to have shown the warrantability

for participant-relevant categories like ‘competent speaker’ invoked through epistemic challenging sequences.

Finally, further work is needed to address how epistemic challenges are done cross-linguistically and for what purposes epistemic challenges emerge in interaction. The type of negative sociality represented by epistemic challenges poses further questions about how humans utilize the *epistemic engine* (Heritage, 2012b) for interactional projects.

## References

- Aoki, H. (1986). Evidentials in Japanese. In W. L. Chafe & J. Nichols (Eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, (pp. 223-238). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Beach, W. A. (2020). Using prosodically marked “Okays” to display epistemic stances and incongruous actions. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 169(2020), 151-164.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2020.08.019>.
- Beach, W. A., & Metzger, T. R. (1997). Claiming insufficient knowledge. *Human Communication Research*, 23(4), 562-588.
- Bushnell, C. (2008). ‘Lego my keego!’: An analysis of language play in a beginning Japanese as a foreign language classroom. *Applied Linguistics*, 30(1), 49-69.
- Chafe, W. & J. Nichols (1986). *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*. Ablex.
- Chafe, W. (1986). Evidentiality in English conversation and academic writing. In W. Chafe, & J. Nichols (Eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology* (pp. 261-272). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Cook, H. M. (1987). Group and individual evidentials: Sentence-final “No” and bare verbs in Japanese. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America.
- Cook, H. M. (2008). Style shifts in Japanese academic consultations. In K. Jones & T. Ono (Eds.), *Style shifting in Japanese*. John Benjamins.
- Drew, P. (1991). Asymmetries of knowledge in conversational interactions. In I. Markova & K. Foppa (Eds.), *Asymmetries in Dialogue*, (pp. 470-520). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Firth, A. (1996). The discursive accomplishment of normality: On 'lingua franca' English and conversation analysis. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 26(1996), 237-259.
- Fukuda, C. (2006). Resistance against being formulated as a cultural other: The case of a Chinese student in Japan. *Pragmatics*, 16(4), 429-456.
- Fukuda, C. (2014). Identities and linguistic varieties in Japanese: An analysis of language ideologies as participants’ accomplishments. *Pragmatics*, 24(1), 35-62.
- Goffman, E. (1971). *Relations in public: Microstudies of the public order*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Golato, A., & Betz, E. (2008). German *ach* and *achso* in repair uptake: A resource to sustain and remove epistemic asymmetry. *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft*, 27(2008), 7-37.
- Goodwin, C. (1984). Notes on story structure and the organization of participation. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*, (pp. 299-345). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Givón, T. (1982). Evidentiality and epistemic space. *Studies in Language*, 6(1), 23-49.
- Hayano, K. (2011). Claiming epistemic primacy: *Yo*-marked assessments in Japanese. In T. Stivers, L. Mondada, & J. Steensig (Eds.) *The morality of knowledge in conversation*, (pp. 58-81). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayano, K. (2017). When (not) to claim epistemic independence: The use of *ne* and *yone* in Japanese conversation. *East Asian Pragmatics* 2(2), 163-193.  
<https://doi.org/10.1558/eap.37470>.

- Hayashi, M. (2003). Language and the body as resources for collaborative action: A study of word searches in Japanese conversation. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 36(2), 109-141.
- Heritage, J. (1984). A change-of-state token and aspects of its sequential placement. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*, (pp. 299-345). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heritage, J. (2010). Questioning in medicine. In A. F. Freed & S. Ehrlich (Eds.), *'Why do you ask?': The function of questions in institutional discourse*, (pp. 42-68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heritage, J. (2012a). Epistemics in action: Action formation and territories of knowledge. *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 45(1), 1-25.
- Heritage, J. (2012b). The epistemic engine: Action formation, sequence organization and territories of knowledge, *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 45(1), 30-52.
- Heritage, J. (2013). Epistemics in conversation. In J. Sindell & T. Stivers (Eds.) *The handbook of Conversation Analysis*, (pp. 370-394). Wiley-Blackwell.
- Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in talk-in-interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68(1), 15-38.
- Iino, M. (2006). Norms of interaction in a Japanese homestay setting: Toward a two-way flow of linguistic and cultural resources. In M.A. DuFon & E.E. Churchill (eds.), *Language Learners in Study Abroad Contexts*, (pp. 151-173). Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters.
- Jefferson, G. (2004). Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction. In G. H. Lerner (Ed.), *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the first generation*, (pp. 13-31). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Kasper, G. & Burch, R. (2016). 'Like Godzilla' – Enactments and formulations in telling a disaster story in Japanese. In M. T. Prior & G. Kasper (Eds.) *Emotion in multilingual interactions*, (pp. 57-85). Benjamins.
- Kamio, A. (1997). *Territory of information*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Karkkainen, E. (2006). Stance taking in conversation: From subjectivity to intersubjectivity. *Text & Talk*, 26(6), 699-731.
- Kim, M. (2011). Negotiating epistemic rights to information in Korean conversation: An examination of the Korean evidential marker *-tamyē*. *Discourse Studies*, 13(4), 435-459.
- Labov, W., & Fanshel, D. (1997). *Therapeutic discourse: Psychotherapy as conversation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Long, M., & Sato, C. (1983). *Classroom Foreigner Talk Discourse: Forms and Functions of Teachers' Questions*. In H. Seliger, & M. Long (Eds.), *Classroom-Oriented Research in Second Language Acquisition*, (pp. 268-286). Newsbury House.
- Maynard, D., & Zimmerman, D. (1984). Topical talk, ritual and the social organization of relationships. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 47(4), 301-316.
- Mondada, L. (2008). Using video for a sequential and multimodal analysis of social interaction: Videotaping institutional telephone calls. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 42(4), 329-361.

- Mondada, L. (2013). Displaying, contesting, and negotiating epistemic authority in social interaction: Descriptions and questions in guided visits. *Discourse Studies*, 15(5), 597-626.
- Iwanami. (2008). *Tapesutorii*. In *Koojien* (6<sup>th</sup> edition). Iwanami Shooten.
- Oxford Languages Dictionary. (n.d.). Tapestry. In *OxfordLanguage Dictionary*. Retrieved December 11, 2022, from <https://tinyurl.com/5mtwf5n7>.
- Oxford Languages Dictionary. (n.d.). Blanket. In *OxfordLanguage Dictionary*. Retrieved December 11, 2022, from <https://tinyurl.com/3dyhmcfa>.
- Pomerantz, A. (1980). Telling my side: 'Limited access' as a 'fishing' device. *Sociolinguistics* 50(3-4), 186-198.
- Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes'. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 57e101.
- Pomerantz, A. (1988). Offering a candidate answer: an information seeking strategy. *Communication Monographs*, 55(4), 360-373.
- Potter, J. (2002). Two kinds of natural. *Discourse Studies*, 4(4), 539-542.
- Potter, J. & Hepburn, A. (2010). Putting aspiration into words: 'Laugh particles', managing descriptive trouble and modulating action. *Journal of Pragmatics*, 42(2010), 1543-1555.
- Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.) *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*, (pp. 21-27), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sacks, H., Schegloff, E., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language*, 50(4), 696-735.
- Stivers, T., Mondada, L. & Steensig, J. (2011). Knowledge, morality, and affiliation in social interaction. In T. Stivers, L. Mondada & J. Steensig (Eds.), *The morality of knowledge in conversation*, (pp. 3-26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stivers, T., Enfield, N. J., Brown, P., Englert, C., Hayashi, M., Heinemann, T., Hoymann, G., Rossano, F., de Ruiter, J.P., Yoon, K., Levinson, S. C., (2009). Universals and cultural variation in turn-taking in conversation. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 106(26), 10587-10592.
- Tanaka, L. (2004). *Gender, language and culture: A study for Japanese television interview discourse*. John Benjamins.
- van Compernelle, R. A. (2016). Sociolinguistic authenticity and L2 learners: Production, perception, and metapragmatics. In R. A. van Compernelle & J. McGregor (Eds.), *Authenticity, language, and interaction in second language contexts*, (pp. 61-81). Multilingual Matters.

**Author's Information:**

Joseph Iseri  
 University of Hawai'i at Mānoa  
 iserij@hawaii.edu

**Appendices****Appendix A: Transcription conventions**

Transcription notations follow Jefferson (2004). Embodied talk is transcribed alongside verbal conduct in the following way: verbal conduct comes first, followed by an interlinear gloss, a description of the verbal conduct of the turn-participant, the visual behavior of the turn-participant, the bodily behavior of the turn-participant, the visual and bodily behaviors of other participants in relative order to their status as a reciprocity, and finally a translation of the turn into idiomatic English at the bottom. An example is provided below:

#	A	+words words words words gloss gloss gloss gloss
	a	+description of verbal conduct a
	agz	+gz>b
	abd	+description of bodily conduct of a
	bgz	+gz>a
	bbd	+description of bodily conduct of b idiomatic translation

Gestures are noted as stopping through the following:  
 ...-># The number indicates until which line a gesture continues

Descriptions of hand gestures are denoted as the following:  
 RH / LH / BH Right hand, left hand, both hands  
 PU / PD / PC Palms up, palms down, palms centered  
 IF Index finger  
 ...>x ...pointing at *x*

**Appendix B: Gloss conventions**

ACC	accusative case marker
BENF	benefactive construction
C	complementizer
COP	copula
DAT	dative case marker

FPP	first person pronoun
GEN	genitive case marker
GER	gerundive form
HON	honorific marker
HRSY	hearsay marker
IP	interactional particle
MOD	modal
NEG	negation morpheme
NO	nominalizer no
NOM	nominative case marker
PST	past tense
Q	question particle
QT	quotative
TOP	topic case marker