Incentives: Theory In Network Games And An Application For COVID-19 Vaccination
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2023
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University of Hawaii at Manoa
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This dissertation consists of three essays on the intersection of incentives in theoretical network games and an application of incentives. The first essay studies a buyer-seller network where sellers offer sign-up bonuses to buyers using points, a currency whose value depends on buyers' effort to learn how to use it. Buyers choose the optimal level of learning based on the total amount of points they can obtain. Based on the level of learning, they decide which offers from sellers to accept, with a heterogeneous transaction cost for each offer accepted. Real-world examples include sign-up bonus points for bank credit cards, chain hotel points, and chain restaurant points, where the value of the points is subjective to buyers' effort to learn how to use them. The paper explores the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) on sellers' choices of sign-up bonus points offered to buyers. In addition, the paper provides comparative statics evaluating changes in the expected revenue return from buyers and network connections in the game. The second essay starts with modeling a price transmission for intermediaries in a market network for identical goods. Intermediaries simultaneously post prices for their intermediation services, followed by producers choosing their connection strategies, and consumers choosing their buying decisions. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of non-cooperative Nash Equilibria. Meanwhile, we prove the natural existence of cooperative outcomes under intermediaries' collusion. Furthermore, we provide comparative statics on the network expansions with new connections. The third studies vaccine hesitancy in the Hawaii population. Understanding contributors to vaccine hesitancy and how they change over time may improve COVID-19 mitigation strategies and public health policies. To date, no mechanism explains how trust in and consumption of different sources of information affect vaccine uptake. A total of 1594 adults enrolled in our COVID-19 testing program completed standardized surveys on demographics, vaccination status, use, reliance, and trust in sources of COVID-19 information, from September to October 2021, during the COVID-19 Delta wave. Of those, 802 individuals (50.3%) completed a follow-up survey, from January to February 2022, during the Omicron surge. Regression analyses were performed to understand vaccine and booster uptake contributors over time. Individuals vaccinated within two months of eligibility (early vaccinees) tended to have more years of schooling, with greater trust in and consumption of official sources of COVID-19 information, compared to those who waited for 3--6 months (late vaccinees), or those who remained unvaccinated at 6 months post-eligibility (non-vaccinees). Most (70.1%) early vaccinees took the booster shot, compared to only 30.5% of late vaccinees, with the latter group gaining trust and consumption of official information after four months. These data provide the foundation for a mechanism based on the level of trust in and consumption of official information sources, where those who increased their level of trust in and consumption of official information sources were more likely to receive a booster. This study shows that social factors, including education and individual-level degree of trust in (and consumption of) sources of COVID-19 information, interact and change over time to be associated with vaccine and booster uptakes. These results are critical for developing effective public health policies and offer insights into hesitancy over the course of the COVID-19 vaccine and booster rollout.
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Game theory--Economic aspects, Consumer behavior, Decision-making, Equilibrium (Economics), Incentive (Psychology)
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