Coalition Formation with Multiple Payoff Pots

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2015-05

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University of Hawaii at Manoa

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We study the behaviors of individuals who form groups in order to cumulate power to win payoffs in theoretical scenarios. Individuals are given an arbitrary power and must form coalitions in multiple successive game rounds with multiple payoff pots of varying and decreasing value. Individual powers are additive in a coalition and must be large enough in order to overcome the collective powers of other coalitions that may form. All individuals have the option to form, join, or not join a coalition presented by either themselves or other agents in a given round. A consolatory pot in a later round may yield a higher payout for a certain agent if that agent does not need to share it with other agents, exposing a high level of strategy for each individual playing the game. We present several different theoretical scenarios using test groups of three individuals with predetermined powers and calculate the rational course of action for each individual based on their power. Generalized three-agent models are presented. Additionally, scenarios of larger four agent coalitions are also analyzed for the best courses of action. Focus is put on analyzing the differences in strategy that arises in differences in sharing type and payout pot size.

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Coalition, Payoffs, Game Theory

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32 pages

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