Network Inspection Using Heterogeneous Sensors for Detecting Strategic Attacks Mccann, Bobak Dahan, Mathieu 2021-12-24T18:22:04Z 2021-12-24T18:22:04Z 2022-01-04
dc.description.abstract We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender positions heterogeneous sensors according to a probability distribution in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. We assume the defender has access to multiple types of sensors that can potentially differ in their accuracy. The objective of the defender (resp. attacker) is to minimize (resp. maximize) the expected number of undetected attacks. We derive a Nash equilibrium of this zero-sum game under the assumption that each component in the network can be monitored from a unique sensor location. We then leverage our constructed Nash equilibrium to provide approximate solutions to the general case by solving a minimum set cover problem. Our results illustrate the performance and computational advantage of our solution approach, as well as the value of strategically leveraging heterogeneous sensors to protect critical networks against attacks.
dc.format.extent 10 pages
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2022.822
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-5-7
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subject Organizational Cybersecurity: Advanced Cyber Defense, Cyber Analytics, and Security Operations
dc.subject cyber-physical security
dc.subject game theory
dc.subject network inspection
dc.subject network resilience
dc.subject sensor placement
dc.title Network Inspection Using Heterogeneous Sensors for Detecting Strategic Attacks
dc.type.dcmi text
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