Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/77063

Outside investor access to top management: market monitoring versus stock price manipulation

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Title:Outside investor access to top management: market monitoring versus stock price manipulation
Authors:Schroth, Josef
Keywords:Managerial compensation contracts
Stock price manipulation
Firm disclosure policy
Cost of capital
Date Issued:2021
Abstract:This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent
research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase in resources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/10125/77063
Appears in Collections: 04 Managerial (MAN)


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