Location Privacy in the Era of 5G

Abstract

Fifth Generation (5G) wireless technology is usher- ing in a new age of interconnectivity, and as it does definitions of privacy may well change with it. In this paper we will focus on the changing nature of location privacy, while aspiring to increase community cognizance of vulnerabilities within the 5G network that threaten end-user privacy. To this end, we will address the statistical efficacy of a multilateration attack utilizing timing advance commands within the 5G cloud radio access network, by showcasing that such an attack meets the Cramér-Rao Lower Bound across each subcarrier spacing. We will also demonstrate how position estimates within 5G can be further refined using methods previously shown to be effective in Long Term Evolution Networks. Lastly, we will demonstrate the attack in a simulated environment modeled after the conference grounds, using current real-world deployments of 5G on Kauai