Applying Models of Tax Collection to Contracting Out Federal Delinquent Income Tax

Date
2020-07-30
Authors
Eger, Robert
Jang, Sungkyu
Contributor
Advisor
Department
Instructor
Depositor
Speaker
Researcher
Consultant
Interviewer
Annotator
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Volume
Number/Issue
Starting Page
Ending Page
Alternative Title
Abstract
The use of external tax collectors has been a highly politicized compromise between administrative effectiveness and procedural fairness. Addressing the issue of private tax collectors, we develop three basic analytical models of tax collection based on tax farming and agency theory. Our analytical results provide both clarity and ambiguity associated with contract types for external tax collectors. We then apply our analytical results to the current issue of contracting out federal delinquent income tax collection. The effectiveness benefits under incentive-based contracts are diluted not only by potentially increasing compensation but by a potentially more destructive result, the social costs associated with taxpayer harassment. Our results offer explanatory power for the resulting backlash to external federal tax collectors in prior iterations and potential hope for the current use of private tax collectors.
Description
Keywords
Tax Collection, Agency Theory, Contract Incentives
Citation
Extent
Format
Geographic Location
Time Period
Related To
Table of Contents
Rights
Rights Holder
Local Contexts
Collections
Email libraryada-l@lists.hawaii.edu if you need this content in ADA-compliant format.