Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Applying Models of Tax Collection to Contracting Out Federal Delinquent Income Tax

File Size Format  
HARC-2021 paper 32.pdf 795.86 kB Adobe PDF View/Open

Item Summary

Title:Applying Models of Tax Collection to Contracting Out Federal Delinquent Income Tax
Authors:Robert Eger
Sungkyu Jang
Keywords:Tax Collection
Agency Theory
Contract Incentives
Date Issued:30 Jul 2020
Abstract:The use of external tax collectors has been a highly politicized compromise between administrative effectiveness and procedural fairness. Addressing the issue of private tax collectors, we develop three basic analytical models of tax collection based on tax farming and agency theory. Our analytical results provide both clarity and ambiguity associated with contract types for external tax collectors. We then apply our analytical results to the current issue of contracting out federal delinquent income tax collection. The effectiveness benefits under incentive-based contracts are diluted not only by potentially increasing compensation but by a potentially more destructive result, the social costs associated with taxpayer harassment. Our results offer explanatory power for the resulting backlash to external federal tax collectors in prior iterations and potential hope for the current use of private tax collectors.
Appears in Collections: 05 Taxation

Please email if you need this content in ADA-compliant format.

Items in ScholarSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.