Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10125/64924CEO Turnover Announcements and Information Frictions
| File | Size | Format | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HARC 2020 paper 264.pdf | 765.05 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Item Summary
| Title: | CEO Turnover Announcements and Information Frictions |
| Authors: | Kose John Xu Tian Christine Liu Haofei Zhang |
| Keywords: | CEO turnover information asymmetry corporate governance information disclosure market reaction |
| Date Issued: | 31 Aug 2019 |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the market reaction to CEO turnover announcements in the presence of information frictions. We find that the market reaction to forced CEO turnover announcements is negatively related to the level of asymmetric information between a firm and its investors. No such relation exists for voluntary turnovers. We also find that in cases where information frictions are high, companies attempt to present forced turnover as voluntary and this behavior leads to a less negative market response. Overall, our results suggest that firms act strategically when disclosing information about CEO turnover to avoid a negative market reaction. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10125/64924 |
| Appears in Collections: |
07 Financial: Disclosure |
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