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Mechanistic Explanations and Deliberate Misrepresentations

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Item Summary Siponen, Mikko Klaavuniemi, Tuula Nathan, Marco 2020-01-04T08:22:02Z 2020-01-04T08:22:02Z 2020-01-07
dc.identifier.isbn 978-0-9981331-3-3
dc.description.abstract The philosophy of mechanisms has developed rapidly during the last 30 years. As mechanisms-based explanations (MBEs) are often seen as an alternative to nomological, law-based explanations, MBEs could be relevant in IS. We begin by offering a short history of mechanistic philosophy and set out to clarify the contemporary landscape. We then suggest that mechanistic models provide an alternative to variance and process models in IS. Finally, we highlight how MBEs typically contain deliberate misrepresentations. Although MBEs have recently been advocated as critical realist (CR) accounts in IS, idealizations (deliberate misrepresentations) seem to violate some fundamental tenets of CR and research method principles for CR. Idealizations in MBEs, therefore, may risk being regarded as flawed in IS. If it turns out that CR cannot account for idealizations, naturalism can, and it does so without extra-philosophical baggage.
dc.format.extent 10 pages
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
dc.rights Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subject Knowing What We Know: Theory, Meta-analysis, and Review
dc.subject mechanisms
dc.subject naturalism
dc.subject philosophy of science
dc.title Mechanistic Explanations and Deliberate Misrepresentations
dc.type Conference Paper
dc.type.dcmi Text
dc.identifier.doi 10.24251/HICSS.2020.699
Appears in Collections: Knowing What We Know: Theory, Meta-analysis, and Review

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