Counterbalancing the Asymmetric Information Paradigm on High-Value Low-Frequency Transactions

Date
2020-01-07
Authors
Hoksbergen, Mark
Chan, Johnny
Peko, Gabrielle
Sundaram, David
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on the purchase of high-value infrequently traded assets. If a high-value asset is infrequently traded in a market its valuation becomes less predictable and more tension can exist between the vendor and the purchaser. Often the vendor possesses more knowledge of the asset, which leads to an asymmetric information paradigm between the two parties, nurturing a dark side of information and knowledge management. Using the New Zealand real estate industry as the context of a design science research study, a purchase decision process model for high-value infrequently traded assets has been developed. It aims to support the novice real estate purchaser to realise the potential pitfalls they should avoid. The study also calls for a unified system with codifiable, explicit information that can be used by all stakeholders in high-value infrequently transactions. Thus reducing the asymmetric information imbalance between vendor and purchaser.
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Keywords
Illuminating the Dark Side of Knowledge, asymmetric information, communication models, explicit knowledge, high value low frequency transactions, tacit knowledge
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