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The South China Sea Dispute: Bridging Position and Motivation for China, Vietnam, and the Philippines
|2016-05-ma-huynhkhoaanh_r.pdf||Version for non-UH users. Copying/Printing is not permitted||1.85 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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|Title:||The South China Sea Dispute: Bridging Position and Motivation for China, Vietnam, and the Philippines|
|Date Issued:||May 2016|
|Publisher:||[Honolulu] : [University of Hawaii at Manoa], [May 2016]|
|Abstract:||The purpose of this study is to investigate the motivations behind the positions held by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines regarding the South China Sea dispute. Interviews, governmental speeches and documents, notes verbales, treaties, and data generated by various governmental agencies were among the sources used to quantitatively and qualitatively explain their positions. It argues, generally, that the policies of the three nations are meant to address other, mainly domestic, but also international, concerns of an economic, political, military, and social nature, both current and historical. Specifically, China’s is vague, non-conforming, maximalist, and aggressive, yet measured, and is intended to maintain its stature as a world leader, which in turn helps in terms of regime survival and support at home. Vietnam’s is nationalistic, expansionistic, and protectionist in its position as well as continuing uninhibited oil and natural gas exploration in which it favors foreign sales. These positions reflect its historical fear of and resistance to external encroachment, its general policy orientation toward popular mobilization and control of the population, and its emphasis on economic security. The Philippines’s position, being the weakest and least effective bilaterally or multilaterally, is mainly rhetorical and meant for domestic, political consumption. It therefore focuses on legalistic approaches while promising to accommodate internal power centers, and notably the military. It aims to use whatever windfall there might be from the SCS’s oil and gas reserves to combat socioeconomic inequalities and rectify its tarnished national identity internally and externally.|
|Description:||M.A. University of Hawaii at Manoa 2016.|
Includes bibliographical references.
|Appears in Collections:||
M.A. - Asian Studies|
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