Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Core and no-treat equilibrium in tournament games with externalities
|Title:||Core and no-treat equilibrium in tournament games with externalities|
|Publisher:||University of Hawaii at Manoa|
|Abstract:||We consider a situation where coalitions are formed to divide a resource. As in real life, the value of a payoff to a given agent is allowed to depend on the payoff to other agents with whom he shares a common interest. There are various notions of equilibrium for this type of game, including the core and no-treat equilibrium. These stabilities may exist or not, depending on the power structure and the rule for allocating the resource. It is shown that under certain conditions, the no-treat equilibrium can exist even though the core is empty.|
|Description:||Plan B paper, M.A., Mathematics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2010|
|Rights:||All UHM dissertations and theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission from the copyright owner.|
|Appears in Collections:||M.A. Plan B Theses- Mathematics Department|
Please contact firstname.lastname@example.org if you need this content in an alternative format.
Items in ScholarSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.