1 - 4 of 4
ItemSustaining Harmony through Professional Roles([Honolulu] : [University of Hawaii at Manoa], [December 2015], 2015-12)The Korean Airlines “nut rage incident” of December 2014 was for many Westerners another sensationalized glimpse into the social and cultural phenomenon that is one of the most rapidly modernizing nations and globally dominating technology developers in East Asia: South Korea. This incident, and many others like it, appear to be a Gordian knot for the country’s further cultural, social and economic development and Western acceptance, with threads tracing back 2500 years ago to ancient China. The purpose of this thesis is to “unravel” these threads which include Classical Confucianism; Korea’s adoption and adaptation of Confucianism, and breakneck industrialization; and the philosophy of professional ethics. By identifying each in relation to one another, a nuanced understanding of roles ethics will emerge as a pragmatic paradigm to facilitate the sustainment of social harmony in South Korea and societies writ large.
ItemThree theories of just war : understanding warfare as a social tool through comparative analysis of Western, Chinese, and Islamic classical theories of war([Honolulu] : [University of Hawaii at Manoa], [May 2012], 2012-05)The purpose of this analysis was to discover the extent to which dictates of war theory ideals can be considered universal, by comparing the Western (European), Classical Chinese, and Islamic models. It also examined the contextual elements that drove war theory development within each civilization, and the impact of such elements on the differences arising in war theory comparison. These theories were chosen for their differences in major contextual elements, in order to limit the impact of contextual similarities on the war theories. The results revealed a great degree of similarities in the conception of warfare as a social tool of the state, utilized as a sometimes necessary, albeit tragic, means of establishing peace justice and harmony. What differences did arise, were relatively minor, and came primarily from the differing conceptions of morality and justice within each civilization--thus indicating a great degree of universality to the conception of warfare.
ItemArisotelian and Confucian cultures of authority : justifying moral norms by appeal to the authority of exemplary persons( 2005)This thesis attempts to argue that exemplary persons-teachers, parents, etc.-are norms in their own right. They do not merely exemplify virtues or demonstrate a life according to duty, nor are they simply the embodiment of a bunch of moral principles. Rather, they are a unique variety of norm altogether, and, as Aristotle and Confucius illustrate, can be a moral system's most basic norm-that is, the source of justification for all other norms, and the source of their own normative justification. To defend these claims I begin, in the first chapter, by discussing the meaning of the word "norm," and then turn to a consideration of the requirements for justifying moral norms. This consideration touches directly upon whether exemplars can carry their own justification, and uncovers one of the major obstacles involved in successfully arguing for the normative justification of exemplars qua exemplars. That is, the Kantian line of thought that holds two things: (1) that all moral norms must be justified on a priori grounds, and (2) that if exemplars were basic norms, they would condition moral blindness on the part of the emulator-that is, the inability to think critically about the moral worth of one's exemplars. Because the normativity of exemplars comes from experience, they can never be necessarily and universally normative; so to agree with the first of these Kantian claims is to preclude the possibility a normative justification of exemplars qua exemplars. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle I problematize the Kantian position by arguing that the justification of any of our moral norms-not just exemplars, but principles as wellcannot be secured a priori. This forces us to look for normative justification from within experience-proving the possibility, at the very least, of the claim that exemplars can be a moral system's most basic norm. In the second chapter I use the ethics of Aristotle and Confucius to illustrate how one can treat exemplary persons not only as norms, but also as the most basic norms in one's ethics. In the last chapter, after exposing and attempting to overcome the shortcomings of the moral systems of Aristotle and Confucius, I endeavor to undermine the second of these Kantian claims by showing that the very nature of an Aristotelian or Confucian exemplar's authority forestalls if not moral blindness altogether, then at least the major problems with moral blindness.