THE ROLE OF ANTIMILITARISM IN POSTWAR
JAPANESE POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

DECEMBER 2002

By
David B. Fouse

Dissertation Committee:

Yasumasa Kuroda, Chairperson
James Dator
Doug Bwy
Lonny Carlile
Patricia Steinhoff

Acknowledgements

First of all I would like to thank all of the members of my committee for their continued support during the long period in which the research and writing of this dissertation was carried out. I hope that the end result will in some way justify their long-term commitment to the project.

Chairperson Dr. Yasumasa Kuroda provided early stimulus for my research into Japanese politics and has been a continual source of inspiration and support throughout the dissertation process. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. Kuroda for challenging me to learn the Japanese language at an early stage in my doctoral studies. As he predicted, the time and effort exerted during that process have since paid huge dividends for me both in terms of cross-cultural understanding and in helping to garner the necessary financial support to complete this study. Without Dr. Kuroda's support and advice, this dissertation could not have been completed.

Two other committee members from inside the Political Science Department have also provided critical support for the dissertation and have been generous with their time and advice. Dr. James Dator has been an unwavering source of encouragement and taught me early on that "history is not destiny," an approach to academic study that I hope to have done justice to in this dissertation. Dr. Douglas Bwy provided a great deal of constructive criticism of the statistical analyses carried out in the dissertation and helped significantly in making their presentation more palatable for general readers.

Two outside committee members provided an enormous source of knowledge and insight into the politics of postwar Japan. Dr. Patricia Steinhoff of the Sociology Department has given generously of her time and has been an invaluable source of

Abstract

The dissertation confronts the dominant view over the past twenty years regarding the role of economic factors in postwar Japanese democratic support. I argue that the dominant economic model of Japanese postwar democratic legitimacy relies disproportionately upon analysis of elite level political actors at the expense of a proper consideration of mass attitudes and value priorities. The central theme of the analysis is a comparison of the influence of economic factors with the impact that postwar antimilitarist values have had upon Japanese democratic system support. I set the data analysis within the backdrop of a historical narrative of the early postwar peace movement that established a broad consensus upon citizens' control over decisions related to national defense as the bedrock of legitimacy in a democratic state. The data analysis is then composed of two parts. The first part compares Japanese democratic system support with the United States, West Germany and Spain using data from the 1995-1997 World Values Survey. A second regression analysis is then carried out using data collected in a nationwide survey by the author during a period of peak economic instability early in 1999. Results of these analyses demonstrate that diffuse support for democratic values in Japan is firmly based in a postwar political culture that rejects a return to the militaristic form of government that preceded democracy. The antipathy to militarism in postwar Japan provides roots for democratic values that can aid in sustaining the political system during periods of economic and political turmoil. Thus the implications of the empirical results point toward a much more stable political system than popular economic models of Japanese postwar legitimacy would suggest.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1

Legitimacy and the Developmental State

1.0 Introduction: Theoretical Background

The initial motivation for this study of postwar Japanese political legitimacy

originated during my reading of Chalmers Johnson's *Japan Who Governs?: The Rise of*

the Developmental State. [1] In this book Johnson flushed out ideas concerning the

capitalist developmental state model that he earlier developed in *MITI and the Japanese*

Miracle.[2] In *Who Governs Japan?* Johnson emphasized that legitimacy in postwar Japan

has more closely resembled "revolutionary states" such as China and the former Soviet

Union than it has liberal democracies of the West. Johnson argued that the common bond

between the revolutionary states and Japan is that political legitimation takes the form of

a hegemonic project, which in Japan has been aimed at economic development rather

than an abstract ideological object. This key conceptual feature is what Johnson believes

distinguishes the capitalist developmental state from what he terms capitalist regulatory

states, where legitimacy is said to have rested upon the outcome of democratic processes.

In Johnson's view the economic achievements of the postwar government have been

imposed upon the Japanese people, gaining legitimacy for the government after the fact.

For this reason he has sometimes described the Japanese government as a "soft

authoritarian" regime.

---

[1] Chalmers Johnson, Japan *Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State.* New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995.
[2] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Johnson's ideas on comparative legitimation, while widely influential, have yet to undergo serious empirical study. Most scholars concerned with Japanese legitimacy have tended to focus solely upon the policies and viewpoints of Japanese government officials. The so-called "Yoshida doctrine"[3] that dominated early postwar conservative politics is often cited when discussing postwar legitimacy, without any serious attempt at analyzing the development of democratic system support from a citizen-oriented viewpoint.

In this dissertation I intend to argue that the legitimacy obtained by the postwar government may be more properly characterized as bartered or negotiated legitimacy than "imposed legitimacy" if we consider the many possible roads that postwar Japan could have taken. In particular I will highlight the role that popular postwar values of antimilitarism have played in support of the constitution and the democratic system in postwar Japan. I believe it is critical to our understanding of postwar Japanese legitimacy that we recognize that the postwar consensus upon economic growth was forged in the wake of the battles over rearmament and security policy of the 1950s and 60s that were crucial in shaping a new national identity and the defense of democratic values in postwar Japan. Moreover, I will argue, the widespread rejection of prewar militarism continues to play a significant role in the democratic system support of contemporary Japan.

By empirically separating the support Japanese people give to incumbent officials from their support for democracy as a system of government it will be possible to compare the influence of economic considerations and feelings of antimilitarism on Japanese democratic system support. Before going into further detail regarding the conceptual approach of this dissertation the following section will attempt to highlight the

---

[3] The Yoshida doctrine of relying upon the U.S. for security while focusing upon high speed economic growth will be discussed in chapter two.

limitations of the dominant developmental state model as a means of describing system legitimacy in postwar Japan.

1.1 Legitimacy in the Developmental State: The Hegemonic Project

In a recent essay entitled, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept"[4] Chalmers Johnson reviews the development and response to his influential model of the Japanese political economy over a period of nearly twenty years. Recounting the publication process of his widely heralded *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975,* Johnson reveals that the original manuscript lacked the final chapter of the published version that was added at the behest of his editor J.G. Bell. Bell suggested a final chapter to set forth "a Japanese model" that would summarize his narrative in the rest of the book. Johnson initially resisted the idea, feeling that bureaucracies are rarely studied in the form of a narrative history and that this in part under lay the originality of the work Bell however persisted and Johnson eventually acceded to his request by writing chapter nine "A Japanese Model?". Johnson now agrees that this chapter of the book was necessary, but also insists that, " analytically speaking, the issue still remains that it is hard to abstract a 'model' from historical reality."[5]

Ironically, the popularity of the model Johnson created may have inspired substantial reductionism in the paradigm through which many political scientists view Japan today. Logical inconsistencies of the original narrative have been neglected while at the same time conceptual clarification of the model has lead to a largely one-dimensional depiction of state-society relations in postwar Japan.

---

[4] Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed. *The Developmental State.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.32-60.
[5] Ibid., p.43

1.2 The Early Work

The concept of the capitalist developmental state first put forward by Chalmers Johnson grew out of a case study of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The work laid a great deal of emphasis upon the continuity between prewar and postwar bureaucratic dominance of Japanese policymaking. Johnson argued that the primary role of the political elite in postwar Japan has been to shield the bureaucracy from interest group demands that would inhibit its ability to implement industrial development.

While the long dominant Liberal Democratic Party is given credit for playing a valuable mediating role between the bureaucracy and private interests, it is not to be considered a ruling party in the same way that governing parties in other Western industrialized democracies are. The primary role of the LDP "is to strive to legitimate the work of the bureaucracy while also making sure that the bureaucracy's policies do not stray too far from what the public will tolerate."[6]

The LDP brokers the interests of privileged businesses competing for economic advantages that bureaucratic regulators can provide. This group of actors forms what has been often referred to as the "iron triangle" in Japanese politics. Non-privileged groups are largely ignored unless they become powerful enough to cause the LDP electoral problems. This state of affairs is tolerated, Johnson argued, because "the Japanese people understand these relationships and support them not as matter of principle but because of the results they have achieved."[7]

---

[6] Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, p.50.
[7] Ibid., p.51

4

In addition to the people's support for economic development, popular respect for the bureaucracy as an impartial agent of the national interest is argued to underlie system legitimacy. In *MITI* Johnson went so far as to argue that should the corruption scandals that were common among Japanese politicians begin to tarnish the image of the bureaucracy, it would "signal the need for quick surgery and reconstitution of the system." [8]

While the fuller elaboration of the model in terms of state-society relations and the nature of Japanese political legitimacy would come in later works, the outlines of the model were firmly established in *MITI*. Two points, however, need to be emphasized before turning to the later refinements of the model. First, while the emphasis in *MITI* is upon the LDP's role as an arbiter of power rather than a policymaking entity, one can still see some linkage between the electorate and the formation of public policy by the political elite in this work. The special treatment afforded farmers as a major constituent of the LDP is noted in this regard.

A second point to be made with regard to this earlier work is that Johnson was decidedly skeptical of other countries' ability to import the Japanese model of economic development, based as it was in the "situational nationalism" of the Japanese people during the 1950s and 1960s. Here Johnson argued, "it was the history of poverty and war in Japan that established and legitimized Japan's priorities among the people in the first place." [9]

Whether the legitimacy of economic priorities came before or after economic success is unclear in *MITI* and remains something of an enigma throughout Johnson's later

---

[8] Ibid., p.317.
[9] Ibid., p.317.

writing as well. The apparent contradiction arises when Johnson shifts his focus from the

political and bureaucratic elite to the Japanese people in general. When focusing upon the

elite Johnson emphasizes the heavy-handedness with which policy is carried out. On the

few occasions when Johnson ventures an explanation as to why the Japanese people

accommodate such behavior in a formally democratic system he refers either to

traditional passivity or attempts to merge elite prerogatives with a generalized sense of

"economic nationalism".

1.3 The Model Refined

The theme of economic nationalism would take on more emphasis in Johnson's later

writing as his ideas were assimilated by writers concerned with rapid development in

South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. With growing interest in Japan as a

new model of political and economic development, Johnson's thesis in *MITI* began to

take on a paradigmatic role. Johnson responded to the interest in his work by attempting

to clarify key analytical distinctions in a series of articles that were published collectively

under the title *Japan Who Governs: The Rise of the Developmental State*.

In this work Johnson brought increasing emphasis to both economic nationalism and

the role of the "strong state" in Japanese development. In doing so he moved to clearly

differentiate the Japanese state from pluralist models prevalent in the political science

literature of the United States. Johnson's article on "comparative capitalism" in this book

gives the clearest explanation of what he means by a strong state legitimized through

economic nationalism.[10] Key to this discussion is the way that the "state" is separated

---

[10] This article was originally published as Chalmers Johnson, "Comparative Capitalism: The Japanese Difference," *California Management Review*, Summer 1993.

from any linkage to the formal political system. Moreover, the "state," becomes its own

source of legitimacy:

> When a state substitutes itself for society and legitimates
> itself through some political project such as a social
> revolution or economic development, we have a strong
> state and a weak society...[11]

In this manner the postwar Japanese state resembles revolutionary states such as the

old Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Economic development replaces

the ideological project of communism in Japan, but in both cases the state does not rely

upon electoral processes for its legitimation. The dynamics of political support for the

Japanese state is portrayed one-dimensionally as a post-hoc result of economic success:

> Contrary to American political science theory, the power of
> the Japanese state has not been delegated to it by the
> elected representatives of the people; the state has instead
> imposed its economic achievements on the people and won
> their allegiance in doing so. The American state is
> legitimated by its processes, whereas the Japanese state is
> legitimated by its achievements.[12]

Johnson believes that American theorists have been generally unable to recognize

the dominance of the state in Japanese politics because "Japanese nationalism is

expressed almost entirely through economic claims and achievements."[13] Japan's

inability to project military power allowed it to come in under the radar of scholars on

the lookout for threats to American interests until its economic power began to be

perceived as a threat in the 1980s.

---

[11] Johnson, *Japan Who Governs?*, p.67.

[12] Ibid., p.67. Johnson restates these premises in Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.32-60.

[13] Ibid., p.97.

Probing further the psychological aspects of Japanese development, Johnson explains

that economic nationalism "means both more and less than forced development from

above." Here he draws upon Liah Greenfield's understanding of nationalism in terms of

self-respect and overcoming a sense of national inferiority. In the wake of the devastating

war, "Japan chose to regain its national self-respect through economic achievements and

economic leadership."[14]

1.4 Antimilitarism, Democracy and Postwar Japanese Nationalism

One can certainly not deny that the Japanese people became increasingly proud of

their country's economic success as it grew into an economic power and that this pride is

now part of the national identity. Whether or not this sense of pride constitutes in of itself

the base of Japanese political system support, does, however, appear open to question.

While decrying those who would "forget, the strikes, riots, demonstrations, and sabotage

that marked the period 1949-61"[15] Johnson's model of postwar Japanese society seems to

omit the fact that a battle over national identity has been a key feature of the postwar era.

Johnson faces these related issues only in the context of Japanese security policy.

The same problem arises here, however, as was noted above with regard to public support

for economic growth. In discussing "The Dilemma of Japanese Defense" Johnson credits

Yoshida Shigeru with laying down "conservative pacifism" as a fundamental policy that

has carried throughout the postwar era. This interpretation complements the top down

model of state-society relations in his model well. Yet in the same article Johnson

observes that, "popular attitudes, including the widespread belief in Japan that it was the

---

[14] Ibid., pp.104-105.
[15] Ibid., p.197

8

'victim' in World War II, remain the greatest obstacle to a realistic defense policy in Japan."[16] This point *does not* seem to fit the paradigm of state dominance very well, but remains dangling outside the confines of the social model.

Johnson has been forthright in his criticism of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance for its capacity to insulate Japanese politicians from international politics and responsible policymaking. Thus he looks favorably on Japanese politicians who have attempted to move Japan out of its subordinate status in the alliance. Johnson is probably correct in pointing out that dependence upon the United States for security has inhibited the debate on foreign policy within Japan and thereby thwarted its democratic development to a certain degree. In this context he has recognized the public's support for a pacifist foreign policy and the link between this attitude and democratic system support. In "Japan in Search of a Normal Role", he goes so far as to state, "Most Japanese equate Article 9 of the Constitution with democracy itself; to alter one is to alter the other."[17] This link is seen, however, only as a roadblock to a more "realistic" foreign policy and not as part of the heritage of a negotiated political legitimacy in postwar Japan. The relationship between victim consciousness, antimilitarism, and the battle to maintain "peace and democracy" in the postwar era do not filter into the overall model of Japanese society.

Johnson's seeming unwillingness to integrate security issues in a larger societal framework contrasts with a number of recent authors emphasizing the role that cultural norms and social identities that emerged in the postwar period have had on Japanese security policies. While avoiding oversimplified and reified notions of culture, Peter Katzenstein has developed an analytical framework that recognizes the enormous

[16] Ibid., p.279. This article was originally published in *Asian Survey*,vol.26, no.5, 1986.

[17] Chalmers Johnson, *"Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role." Daedalus*, 121.4, 1992 pp.1-33.

importance many Japanese party politicians attach to public opinion and the social norms it expresses when constructing both internal and external security policy.[18] Thomas Berger and Glenn Hooks have emphasized that the democratic legitimacy of the postwar regime has been maintained within the constraints that a pervasive postwar culture of antimilitarism has placed upon Japanese security policy.[19] While each of these authors recognizes incremental changes in public opinion and social norms over the postwar period that have allowed for a gradual strengthening of the Self Defense Force, all are careful to point out that there has been no fundamental shift away from the early postwar consensus and that the crux of the issue remains the Japanese peoples' desire to retain democratic control over their government and armed forces.

T.J. Pempel has recently pointed toward limitations of the developmental state model, arguing that constitutional democracy is deeply embedded in Japanese society and provides the standard guarantees of individual and civil liberties found in North American and Western European democracies. Further, Pempel states, "As such this places important constraints on the autonomy of the Japanese state."[20] Pempel argues that in order to understand why equality of income has been far less extreme in places like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan demands that one look beyond the state as a reified concept separate from society.[21] His call to include the interaction between specific social sectors and key state institutions in the formations of "developmental regimes"

---

[18] Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996.

[19] See Thomas Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Antimilitarism" *International Security* 1993, vol.17, no.4, p119 and Glenn Hooks *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

[20] T.J. Pempel, "The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy," in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed. *The Developmental State.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, p149.

[21] Ibid., p.156.

recaptures some of the dynamism lost in the developmental state model, especially his

emphasis upon the exchange relationship between incumbents and supporters as the

essence of state action.[22]

The focus upon the institutional mechanisms that have promoted Japanese economic

growth has left the questions of how the norms of constitutional democracy became

embedded in Japanese society and why this support has persisted largely unanswered.

The emphasis that has been placed upon the economic basis of Japanese system support

has left widespread doubt as to whether the stagnation of economic growth will lead to

the decay of democratic institutions. This dissertation will attempt to address these

concerns in the chapters that follow by suggesting an alternative basis for Japanese

democratic system support.

1.5 Incumbent versus System Support

The goal of this thesis will be to examine some of the fundamental assumptions that

underlie the predominant economic model of Japanese postwar political legitimacy. One

implicit assumption of this model is that the amount of support generated by incumbent

politicians and the amount of support for the political system as a whole amount to the

same thing. This assumption is often said to be easier to make in Japan because of the

dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party in postwar politics. Having known only one

party leadership from 1955 through 1993, it is argued, makes it nearly impossible for the

Japanese people to distinguish between the Liberal Democratic Party and the system of

government as a whole. Support for democracy can thus be seen merely as support for the

economic accomplishments of the incumbent party.

---

[22] Ibid., p.159.

The consequences of this one-dimensional type of political support can be dramatic

however, if, as in the case of the Soviet Union, support for the ruling party collapses.

Without any distinction between the incumbent politicians and the political system, the

failure of one can lead quickly to the failure of the other. This type of logic has lead some

observers to view the economic stagnation in post bubble Japan as a reason to begin to

doubt the stability of the democratic system.

Similar concerns had been raised in the United States during the post-Watergate era

of the 1970s. With the end of an unpopular war, an economic recession, and the

resignation of the President all coming one upon another in such a short time span, trust

in the country's politicians suffered serious declines. Some scholars began to talk of the

potential for lasting damage to the American people's support for their democratic system.

It was at this time that a famous debate emerged between authors Arthur H. Miller[23] and

Jack Citrin.[24] Miller had argued that, along the lines stated above, the dramatic loss of

confidence of American citizens in their political leaders did not bode well for American

democracy as a whole. Citrin, on the other hand, argued that significant declines in trust

for incumbent politicians did not necessarily mean that Americans felt less of a stake in

maintaining a democratic system of government. The distinction between incumbent

support and system support has since been adopted by the majority of American political

scientists and the two components recognized as the most basic elements of political

---

[23] Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," *American Political Science Review*, 68-3 (September 1974), pp.951-972.

[24] Jack Citrin, "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review*, 68-3 (September 1974), pp.973-988.

support generally.[25]

In previous work I have utilized national time-series data from the Japan Election

Series to validate the distinction between incumbent support and democratic system

support in Japan.[26] Unfortunately, the Japan Election Series data lacks what could be

termed "pure indicators" for democratic principles, in that the items most closely related

with democratic values actually conflate efficacy with support for democratic ideals. One

further problem with this prior analysis was that these datasets could not be compared

cross-nationally with data from other countries.

In this dissertation I will utilize the 1995-1997 World Values Survey data in an

attempt to overcome the shortcomings of my earlier work. Here I will take the analysis

beyond a validation of the incumbent-system analytical distinction by going forward with

an explanation of why I believe the incumbent-system distinction is supported by the

Japanese data. Here I will offer the counter-hypothesis that strong feelings of

antimilitarism that developed among the Japanese people in the early postwar period

offer a better causal explanation for democratic system support than do attitudes related

to economic satisfaction.

In addition to having pure indicators of support for democratic principles, the World

Values Survey dataset contains a group of items that measure support for non-democratic

forms of government. Support for a strong authoritarian leader, government by

technocrats, and a government run by the military are also measured. These indicators

will allow us to compare the impact of economic factors with the rejection of anti-

[25] Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Support," *American Political Science Review*, 71-4 (December 1977), pp.1561-1595.

[26] David Fouse, *Japan's Democratic System Support: A Multidimentional Analysis*. Unpublished dissertation for The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, Japan, 2001.

democratic alternatives on democratic system support. Comparing these two hypothetical sources of system support will aid us in assessing the validity of the developmental state model of Japanese political legitimacy.

1.6 Legitimacy as Political Support

The approach taken in this dissertation will be to assume the type of legitimacy to be studied in Japan is democratic legitimacy. While it is true that systems with authoritarian or totalitarian governments may be able to maintain political stability for lengthy periods of time through coercion, it is by now a cardinal tenet of empirical democratic theory that stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy as system of government. As Lipset (1959) argued, "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society."

By rendering our definition of legitimacy in terms of attitudes and beliefs we can then equate it with the idea of political support. The degree to which citizens support democratic ideals then becomes our measure of system legitimacy. In dealing with the issues raised earlier concerning the capitalist developmental state model of Japanese political legitimacy, it will be important go beyond the degree of system support to ask why Japanese citizens support democracy. First, however, it is important to clarify the conceptual framework of political support to be used in this research.

1.7 Conceptualization of Political Support

Research into the topic of political support has a long and varied history. Most researchers in this field have come to agree that political support needs to be understood as a multidimensional phenomenon. David Easton (1965, 1975) was one of the first to

provide a multidimensional framework for the study of political support. Easton made a conceptual distinction between what he termed "diffuse" and "specific" areas of political support. Within this framework Easton distinguished the political community, regime, and political authorities as separate objects of political support (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Easton's Conceptual Framework of Political Support

Types — Specific

Diffuse

Political Authorities

Regime

Political Community

Political Support Objects

Easton conceived diffuse support to be a generalized psychological attachment to the political community and regime (political system) that built up over time. Specific support derived more directly from citizen's satisfaction with the authorities and their policy outputs, making it much more susceptible to periodic fluctuations.

While Easton's scheme did provide a clear conceptual basis for distinguishing between diffuse and specific types of political support, the three objects of support that he identified have remained problematic for many subsequent scholars. Easton's conceptualization of the regime did not allow for the capacity of citizens to be both supportive of democratic principles, and yet at the same time strongly critical of the way the democratic government functioned in practice. Empirical research in this field has shown that citizens do have that capacity, however, and it has therefore become

15

necessary to distinguish further between general satisfaction with system performance and support for democratic values (Norris, 1999).

The distinction between regime performance and support for democratic values has been key to understanding why in countries where performance has been exceptionally bad people nonetheless have remained committed to their democratic systems. Very low scores on measures of "satisfaction with democracy" have not always correlated with people's responses to questions that probe whether "democracy is the best system of government for a country like ours".[27] Distinguishing the level of support for democratic values from citizen's satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the actual performance of their institutions helps to explain why people continue to support those institutions with the hope that they may someday do a better job of emulating people's democratic ideals.

Despite the limitations of Easton's original framework, the conceptual distinction between a generalized loyalty to the political system (diffuse support) and an orientation to specific actors and policy outputs within that system remains useful. In one sense it can be seen simply as the difference between democratic ideals and perceptions of current political reality. So long as specific support does not sink so low as to create lasting damage to the support for democratic ideals, diffuse (system) support can be said to be intact.

1.8 The Need for Empirical Research

The lack of any substantive empirical basis for Chalmers Johnson's claims regarding the capitalist developmental state model of legitimation in Japan becomes harder to

---

[27] Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.69.

accept when one recognizes that a significant amount of related empirical research has been carried out in Japan during the postwar period. Studies of system legitimacy and stability in Japan carried out prior to Johnson's *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* included works by Watanuki Joji, Flanagan and Richardson and James White.[28]

While publicly promoting the need for more empirical research into the workings of the Japanese government and state-society relations in Japan, to the time of this writing Johnson and his followers have continued to ignore this thread of research, which has attempted to ascertain what the Japanese people want from their government using survey data.

The reason for the lack of interest in empirical research can be seen as a direct byproduct of Johnson's singular focus upon the political elite. And while his analysis has aided our understanding of the financial mechanisms that helped to foster Japan's remarkable economic growth, his seemingly one-sided approach to the study of the Japanese state-society relationship may stand in the way of a more comprehensive understanding of the development of Japanese political legitimacy.

---

[28] Watanuki, Joji, *Politics in Postwar Japanese Society.* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977. Scott Flanagan and Bradley Richardson, "Political Disaffection and Political Stability: A Comparison of Japanese and Western Findings," *Comparative Social Research*, 1980, Vol. 3, 3-44. James White, "Civic Attitudes, Political Participation, and System Stability in Japan," *Comparative Political Studies* 14-3 (October, 1981), 371-400.

Chapter 2

The Emergence of Antimilitarism and its linkage to Democratic Consolidation in Early Postwar Japan

2.0 Introduction

In hindsight it is clear that the political left in early postwar Japan was not successful in opposing the mutual security treaty between Japan and the United States or of stopping gradual rearmament in Japan. These failures should not cause us to overlook the importance of the debate in protecting the new democratic constitution from revisions sought by conservative forces within Japan. A great deal of attention has been given to the way in which Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and subsequent conservative leaders utilized the popular distaste for remilitarization in their negotiations with the United States over rearmament, allowing them to "free ride" on security provided by the United States while concentrating Japan's resources upon economic development. In this sense widespread sentiments of antimilitarism in Japan are often taken for granted as a "given" that political actors merely use to their own purposes.

The narrative in Chapter two will focus upon the dynamic process by which the postwar consensus around pacifism developed. The first 15 years of the postwar era were a time when disparate social forces of protest were mobilized at a critical juncture in Japanese history that would set the tone for politics in the postwar era. The interaction of political and social elites with the general public not only influenced the development of Japanese security policy, but also helped to forge the symbolism through which national identity and a new democratic system would be linked.

While spokesmen for promoting democracy were found in the Occupation leadership,

the so-called liberal elements of the Japanese aristocracy, and the newly invigorated

Communist Party, in the end each of these groups focused more upon promoting their own

separate agendas than the democratic process. Of significance to this discussion is the

manner in which each group attempted to forge its own legitimacy based upon the Japanese

people's sense of victimization during the war and thereby helped to create the space for an

ideological discourse that would be utilized by peace activists to support the fledgling

democracy when it came under duress.

As Peter Katzenstein has noted, "the Japanese public did not emerge from World War

II with a new, readymade pacifist identity."[1] The legitimacy of pacifism as a Japanese ideal

was fostered by the intersection of competing interests in the early Occupation period and

capitalized on by insightful political entrepreneurs as a means of linking the idea of

democracy with social practice in the developing consciousness of the Japanese public.

This chapter will attempt to highlight the significance of the peace movement for

democratic consolidation in Japan by locating it within the dynamic historical process from

which it emerged.

2.1 Preserving the Emperor and Despising the Military

To a great degree the United States government and its occupation forces shaped the

basic outlines of early postwar politics. Within the policies established by the Supreme

Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) at the outset of the Occupation, political-

ideological spaces were created through which domestic actors in Japan attempted to

secure their interests. As has been well documented, the first years of the occupation

opened doors for social activism that had been slammed shut under the prewar regime.

---

[1] Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p.199.

These years were characterized by the implementation of reforms declared necessary by the Allies in the Potsdam Declaration. The main thrust of these reforms aimed at demilitarizing Japan and encouraging democracy among its people.

Planning for the Occupation reforms in the United States had begun as early as 1943. Among the top concerns of presurrender planning was the question of how to deal with the emperor in post-surrender Japan. While it was perceived that abolishing the emperor system could be useful as a means of curbing future Japanese nationalism, a consensus on the utility of retaining the emperor for purposes of maintaining domestic stability and legitimizing postwar reforms seems to have been reached early on.[2] To this purpose Japan specialists such as Joseph Grew of the Postwar Programs Committee stressed the "essential neutrality" of an imperial institution that had been exploited by the military for its own purposes.[3]

Joseph Grew had been the United States ambassador to Japan from 1932 until the Pacific War started. He had maintained close links with the Imperial Court and a connected group of aristocrats during his time in Japan. Grew was himself born of a wealthy and socially prominent family in Boston and related well with the aristocrats, many of whom had studied in the United States and spoke English. Ideologically Grew shared a common antipathy to communism with the group that included Yoshida Shigeru, one of Grew's most important liaisons to Japanese political circles during the 1930s.[4] Yoshida and his father-in-law Count Makino Nobuaki were among those who attempted to persuade Grew

---

[2] Robert E. Ward, "Presurrender Planning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes," in Ward, Robert E. and Sakamoto Yoshikazu ed. *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987, pp.3-7.

[3] Ibid., p.14.

[4] Howard Schonberger, Aftermath *of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952.* Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989, p.14.

that moderate forces were on the rise in prewar Japan. Through his relationships with this small group of aristocrats Grew derived his view that militarists were responsible for aggressive Japanese expansionism into China and that U.S. support for the Emperor and moderate forces would eventually turn things around. Grew remained sympathetic to the Japanese position in China even after more than two years of war. It wasn't until the fall of 1940 that Grew began to see the fallacy of his "constructive conciliation" policy. [5]

Grew lambasted the ruthless militarists after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but as the war turned in America's favor he began to reemphasize the presence of "liberal elements" inside Japan that the United States could deal with in reaching a postwar settlement. Grew told friends that it was foolish to contemplate a full-fledged democratic system in Japan and that the imperial institution was the only stable foundation upon which to rebuild Japanese society.[6] Despite being sharply criticized in the press for being soft on Japan, Grew was appointed undersecretary of state in December of 1944. From this position Grew and other members of what became known as the "Japan Crowd" planned for an occupation that would utilize the so-called liberal elements within Japan to bring order and stability in the post surrender period.

Despite the early consensus regarding the utility of retaining the emperor, questions began to be raised as the war came closer to an end and the planners realized that American or Allied public opinion could necessitate putting the emperor on trial for war crimes. A competing clique within the State Department known as the "China Crowd" was especially critical of Grew's close associations with the aristocrats in prewar Japan and his determination to protect an imperial institution that had been at the apex of prewar

---

[5] Ibid., p.16.
[6] Ibid., p.21.

nationalism.[7] Pressure from the American public, critics within the United States

government, and Allies such as Australia forced Grew to keep plans regarding the

Emperor's treatment open.

In November 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff radioed General MacArthur and instructed

him to gather information relating to the possibility of the emperor's war guilt.

MacArthur's delayed response to the directive in January of 1946 foreshadowed the

priorities that SCAP policy would take as the Occupation wore on. MacArthur's statement

emphasized that to indict the emperor would bring "a tremendous convulsion among the

Japanese people" such that it would be necessary to station "a minimum of a million troops

in Japan" for an indefinite number of years. The General envisioned guerilla warfare

springing up in the countryside and chaos so devastating that:

> All hope of introducing modern democratic methods would
> disappear and that when military control finally ceased
> some form of intense regimentation probably along
> communistic lines would arise from the mutilated masses.
> This would represent an entirely different problem of
> occupation from the one now prevalent.[8]

MacArthur's apocalyptic vision of a communist revolution effectively put an end to the

discussion of whether or not to try the emperor for war crimes inside the United States

government.[9] Democratization was fused with maintaining the imperial institution from the

outset while the perceived threat of a communist takeover was clearly an overriding

concern of SCAP even during the initial stages of the Occupation.

---

[7] T.A. Bisson was a leading critic of Grew and the Japan Crowd. See Schonberger, pp.90-110.

[8] General Douglas MacArthur quoted in Robert E. Ward, "Presurrender Planning: Treatment of the *Emperor and Constitutional Changes*," p.16.

[9] Robert Ward, p.16-17. John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999, p.325

Planning for the Occupation reforms focused upon driving a wedge between the military and the emperor in popular opinion.[10] The plan to separate Hirohito from the militarists in order to retain him as a constitutional monarch was code-named Operation Blacklist. Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, MacArthur's military secretary and chief of psychological-warfare operations was in charge of this task. Though Fellers himself had acknowledged that as head of state Emperor Hirohito could not avoid war guilt, he and his men began a campaign to convince the Japanese that "gangster militarists" had not only duped them, but also betrayed the emperor as well.[11] A month prior to the Japanese government's surrender the psychological-warfare section began sending shortwave radio broadcasts into Japan that derided the militarists for having betrayed the emperor and brought catastrophe to Japan. The Allied mission was portrayed as one of reuniting the emperor with the peaceful wishes of the Japanese people.[12]

The objectives of the United States occupation planners coincided well with those of the aristocrats in Japan. Japanese concerns during the negotiation of surrender had centered on the preservation of the *kokutai* or national polity, which in general terms meant that the emperor system should remain as the core of Japanese political identity. SCAP officials readily accepted their portrayal of the emperor as an unwitting pawn in the military's aggressive wars. This included the claim that the emperor did not intend the Imperial War Rescript of December 8, 1941 to be used in the manner that Prime Minister Tōjō had used it.[13]

---

[10] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp.277-301.
[11] Ibid., p.281. See also Herbert Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. New York: Harper Collins, 2000, pp.544-545.
[12] Ibid., 285.
[13] Ibid., p.298.

With the dismantling of the Japanese military came an opportunity for an aristocratic group of "antimilitarists" under Prince Konoe to take power. Konoe and his group had urged an early end to the war when it became apparent that the tide had turned against Japan. Their somewhat belated and ineffectual antimilitarist stance bought them a certain modicum of legitimacy at war's end. Yoshida Shigeru was one of the principal actors of a group that believed carrying the war out to its bitter end could not only cost Japan its foreign possessions, but also endanger the existence of the imperial institution. More than losing the war, this group feared a popular revolution that could put an end to the system of patronage upon which their status depended.[14] Their views meshed well with the Japan Crowd planners as well as many of the U.S. military commanders in Japan, who were primarily motivated by anticommunism and a desire to maintain effective control in the war devastated country.

The Konoe group was just as eager to separate the Emperor from the military leadership in the eyes of the Japanese public as were the Americans. Concern among the conservative elite regarding the development of antimilitarist sentiment in the population began even before occupation forces arrived. Reports of the Japanese *Kempeitai* or military police noted an intensifying sense of public distrust and antipathy toward the military and government in general.[15] As the news of the devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki began to make its way across the country, the absurdity of the militaristic government's demands for the emperor's loyal subjects to take up bamboo spears to defend the country began to

---

[14] John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954.* Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp.227-272.
[15] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp.303-304.

sink in.[16] Veterans returning from the war were often treated with contempt and in some

cases officers who had been abusive during the war suffered retaliation by subordinates

after surrender.[17] The conservative elite was alarmed by these developments and

cooperated with the Occupation in driving a wedge between the Emperor and growing

antimilitarist sentiment. They explained to the press that the Emperor had not been a party

to government decisions for the war and touted his role in bringing the disastrous war to an

end.[18]

2.2 GS versus G-2 and the Communist Front Line for the Democratic Revolution

While there was a convergence of the Japanese and American agendas on the symbolic

importance of retaining the emperor, significant differences emerged as to the depth and

breadth of democratization. Changes at the State Department after the end of the war left

members of the China Crowd in control of many aspects of the early Occupation reform

agenda. Critics such as T.A. Bisson argued that the liberal elements within the oligarchy

had been compromised by their participation in the repression that took place in the prewar

and wartime eras and would resist any reforms aimed at making Japan an authentic

democracy.[19] This group envisioned a much more thorough reform than aristocrats such as

Yoshida were open to, and the conflict between the liberal "idealists" in the Government

Section (GS) of SCAP and the aristocrats under Yoshida prefigured the struggle between

domestic forces in postwar Japan.

---

[16] John Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," *Diplomatic History* Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1995): p278. Also see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p.66.
[17] Ibid., pp 58-59.
[18] Stephen Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography*. London: Routledge, 1992, p.144.
[19] Schonberger, p.27 and p.97.

The General Section under Major General Courtney Whitney pushed through a series

of reforms aimed at securing basic political liberties and freeing political prisoners. Facing

criticism in the press at home because of the decision to employ the emperor as a "junior

partner," General MacArthur issued a directive on October 4, 1945 that ordered the

Japanese government to remove all restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties;

free all political prisoners; abolish secret police organizations; permit restricted comment

about the emperor and the government; and remove the minister of home affairs and all

high police officials responsible for the enforcement of measures limiting freedom of

thought, speech, religion, and assembly.[20]

As Howard Finn notes, "the provision for freeing political prisoners jolted the Japanese

the most." The Japanese conservatives found this aspect of the directive especially

"excessive" or "foolish" and Yoshida proposed to MacArthur's chief of staff General

Richard K. Sutherland that in the future there should be better consultation before such

important actions were taken. He complained to the foreign press that this measure would

make it difficult to preserve order and attempted to apply the directive only to

noncommunists without success.[21]

For the time being MacArthur was preoccupied with critics at home. MacArthur's plans

to enter the presidential election in 1948 made him especially vulnerable to criticism by the

American press. He made the small, six hundred member Communist Party legal in

October of 1945. In December 1945 the release of several thousand political prisoners from

jails helped to spawn a huge surge in labor organization and protest activity. The handful of

---

[20] Howard Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArtbur. Yoshida, and Postwar Japan.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992, pp.47-49.
[21] Ibid., pp.49-50.

Communists who had maintained steadfast resistance to the prewar military regime

garnered enormous prestige in the changing political climate of the early postwar. Leaders

such as Shiga Yoshio loudly proclaimed that, "only the Communist Party maintained their

battle against the war" to an increasingly receptive audience.[22]

While socialists and other labor activists participated in rallying popular protest against

the scarcity of food and stable working conditions in the early postwar period, the

Communists were the most effective in organizing the public.[23] The JCP bolstered its

legitimacy by making frequent visits to the Government Section of GHQ and proclaiming

the support of the Occupations forces. JCP leader Nosaka Sanzō gave the party further

credibility when the press popularized his declaration stating, "we must become a lovable

communist party." Nosaka attempted to weaken resistance to the party by signaling that

their present task was to complete the democratic revolution peacefully through the Diet.[24]

The squalid economic conditions of the immediate postwar period contributed to the

appeal of Communist campaigns. While democracy was a new and somewhat vague

concept, the scarcity of food and jobs were concrete issues that provided ample motivation

for public protest. The Communists utilized discontent to embarrass the newly forming

Yoshida cabinet in the *Shokoryo Meidei* (Food May Day) protest of 1946. Some 250,000

people gathered in front of the imperial palace and demanded a better food delivery system,

along with various appeals for a united front of workers, farmers, Socialists and

Communists to carry out the democratic revolution. Though the confrontation was

---

[22] Shinobu Seizaburo, *Sengo Nihon Seijishi: Volume 1, Senryou to Minshushugi 1945-1952.* (Postwar Japanese Political History, The Occupation and Democracy 1945-1952). Tokyo: Keisou Shobou, 1965,p.233.

[23] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p.270.

[24] Masumi Junnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955.* Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985, p.90.

nonviolent, General MacArthur felt compelled to warn the Japanese people "that the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan." MacArthur's statement came as a severe shock to union leaders and left wing parties. On the other hand conservatives displayed "undisguised jubilation."[25] The refortified Yoshida formed a cabinet the next day.

The sudden growth of Communist popularity not only sent chills through the Japanese conservatives, but also some sections of General Headquarters (GHQ). Military staff united under Major General Charles Willoughby of the Civilian Intelligence Section to oppose the plan by the General Section to purge right wing militarists and nationalists in early 1946, fearing a chaotic situation that could end in a communist revolution.[26] While unable to stop the purge, Willoughby's section, known as G-2, began enlisting former officers of the Japanese military to track the movements of Communist organizers.

Willoughby's section operated in secrecy from both General Section and General MacArthur during the first years of the occupation. Willoughby was an ultraconservative who, John Welfield notes, "observed the occupation's attempts to restructure and democratize the Japanese state with ill-concealed horror." [27] Willoughby, like Joseph Grew, saw the containment of communism as the occupation's top priority. He was in charge of censorship that prevented criticism of the Emperor or anything that even hinted at

---

[25] Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* New York: William Sloan Associates, 1948, pp.226-232. Reprinted in Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather eds. *Postwar Japan 1945 to the Present* New York: Random House, 1973, pp.145-148. Also cited in John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p.265.
[26] Ibid., pp.93-94.
[27] John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System*. London: The Athlone Press, 1988, p.66.

undemocratic practices of the Occupation force.[28]

Labor militancy increased in the summer and autumn of 1946. During this time there was a growing suspicion at SCAP that the Communists were attempting to sabotage the economy in order to depose the government. On August 27 the Supreme Commander issued another warning, declaring, "Strikes, walkouts, or other work stoppages which are inimical to the objectives of the occupation are prohibited."[29] Labor activity continued however, as MacArthur was preoccupied with completing the centerpiece of his democratization masterpiece for presentation to the American public in the upcoming presidential campaign.

2.3 Bartering a Constitution: The Emperor and Article 9

Although the creation of a new constitution was not part of MacArthur's original directive concerning the establishment of new liberties in Japan, plans to revise the existing Meiji Constitution were considered early on. At the outset of the occupation MacArthur's first inclinations were to leave the revision up to Japanese government officials. MacArthur had suggested the revision of the Japanese constitution to Prince Konoe of the Privy Seal Council back in September of 1945. Konoe had formed a group to begin writing a draft of the revised Constitution, but the news was not well received in the United States press, where Konoe was perceived as a possible war criminal.[30] After taking note of the reaction in the U.S. Macarthur pulled the rug out from under Konoe, who later committed suicide after being purged by SCAP. Japanese preparation for constitutional revision was taken

---

[28] Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp.406.

[29] Miriam Farley, "Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems," Reprinted in Jon Livingston, Joe Moore and Felicia Oldfather eds. *Postwar Japan 1945 to the Present*, New York: Random House, 1973, pp.149-152.

[30] Koseki Shōichi, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*. Trans. Ray A. Moore. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p.10-23.

over by the Shidehara cabinet's Committee to study Constitutional Problems. Matsumoto Jōji headed the committee on the insistence of Yoshida Shigeru.[31] Matsumoto and his committee worked on their draft until a version was published in the Mainichi Shimbun in February 1946. The draft was strongly criticized by the Japanese press for omitting all of the reforms of the earlier SCAP directive and for maintaining the sovereign status of the Emperor. The draft was an embarrassment to MacArthur, who had come under increasing pressure from the Far Eastern Commission (FEC). The FEC included China, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand, all of which hoped to see much more substantial changes in the Japanese government, as well as the trying of the Emperor for war crimes.

MacArthur instructed General Whitney of the Government Section to prepare a model constitution for the Matsumoto-Yoshida group. Colonel Charles Kades, a former New Deal lawyer now under Whitney, led the group in charge of creating the model constitution. The constitution was to be based upon three principles that MacArthur deemed essential. The first principle dictated the emperor's role as the head of state with duties and powers exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsible to the basic will of the people. The second principle stipulated the ideas that would later be encapsulated in Article 9 of the new constitution:

> War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan
> renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes
> and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the
> higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its
> defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy or Air
> Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency
> will ever be conferred upon any Japanese forces.[32]

---

[31] Ibid., p.51.

[32] MacArthur cited in Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p.361.

The third principal dealt with the elimination of the feudal system in Japan. Rights of peerage and nobility would be eliminated except where the Imperial family was concerned.

As John Dower has noted, it was no accident that the first principle listed dealt with the status of the emperor. MacArthur's three principles maintained the same priority present in the presurrender planning, namely the preservation of the imperial institution as an ideological base for the Japanese political system. The second and third principles were designed to ensure the preservation of the first. As Dower writes, "The constitutional renunciation of war was a brilliant example of SCAP's wedge tactic, for the sovereign linked only yesterday with war was now formally associated with a radical antimilitarism."[33] The Government Section proceeded to create a new constitution that, while following the format of the Meiji Constitution, incorporated both MacArthur's three principles and a wide array of modern political and civil liberties. Colonel Kades also saw to it that the status of the emperor would be that of a symbol of the state and Japanese unity, foregoing MacArthur's cryptic "head of state" language.

In the end this is exactly how the model constitution put forward by SCAP was sold to the Japanese government. In presenting the model constitution to Yoshida and Matsumoto, General Whitney made it perfectly clear that while they would not be forced to accept the model constitution, it was being offered for the explicit purpose of protecting the emperor. [34] The Japanese conservatives were made aware that the introduction of a 'renunciation of war' clause would be the only way to set at ease FEC countries fearing a revival of Japanese militarism should the emperor be left on the throne. Further, it was becoming

---

[33] Ibid., pp.362-369. Dower does not think the priority MacArthur placed upon preserving the imperial institution detracts from MacArthur's role in democratizing Japan. This seems to beg the question of whether or not a more thorough democratization could have been accomplished had this not been the case.
[34] Koseki Shōichi, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution,* p.100-101.

clear that the Japanese public was growing more inclined toward republican ideas. Public

opinion polls of the time revealed that only 16 percent of the people supported imperial

sovereignty of the type proposed in the Matsumoto draft.[35]

Seeing no other options the Japanese government accepted the SCAP model

constitution and began drafting a Japanese version based upon it. A last ditch attempt was

made by the conservatives to undermine the concept of popular sovereignty by substituting

the word *shikō* for *shuken* in the Japanese version. The English version, which stated, "the

sovereignty of the people's will", was translated as "the supremacy of the people's will" in

the Japanese. This attempt to obfuscate the location of sovereignty in the new constitution

was called into question at the June 28 plenary session of the House of Representatives by

Nosaka Sanzō of the Communist Party. Nosaka and Shiga Yoshio were adamant in their

attempts to have the government clarify once and for all whether the people or the Emperor

possessed sovereignty. When SCAP became aware of the discrepancy Colonel Kades

insisted that the issue of popular sovereignty be clarified. The term *shikō* was then

grudgingly replaced with *shuken* to indicate sovereignty rested with the people.

During the development of the new constitution MacArthur refused to submit to

oversight by the FEC and ignored requests from the U.S. State Department that he do so.

The FEC was in favor of a more deliberative process for establishing the new constitution

that included "the due consideration of the Japanese Diet and people." These demands

echoed those of the public in Japan at the time and it was undoubtedly clear to MacArthur

that the window of opportunity for securing the role of the imperial institution and its

conservative supporters was short. Though food shortages were first and foremost on

---

[35] Ibid., p.124.

32

Japanese people's minds, this very fact lead to an extremely volatile political situation. The Communist Party's slogan *"Kempō yori meshi da"* or "food before a constitution" rang true in the people's hearts and gave the Communists considerable popularity. MacArthur ignored the public outcry, stonewalled the FEC and his own government, and moved quickly to present the world with a *fait accompli*.

The conservatives were able to salvage one public relations triumph by adopting the antimilitaristic principles of article nine as their own. In this Yoshida positioned himself to the left of even the Communists. During Diet discussions Yoshida was questioned by Nosaka as to whether it would be better to renounce only preparations for aggressive war, while leaving open the possibility for developing measures for the nation's self-defense. Yoshida responded by taking the high ground on the issue, arguing that to even recognize such a thing is harmful because "most modern wars have been waged in the name of self-defense." [36] Two months later on the first anniversary of Japan's surrender Yoshida repeated this interpretation in a radio broadcast to the nation and indicated that Japan could find a unique sense of pride in unqualified demilitarization. Renunciation of war was to be Japan's future contribution to a world of peace. [37]

2.4 Democracy's Downward Spiral

With the constitution on its way to promulgation on November 3, 1946 and set to take effect 6 months later, MacArthur's tolerance of the radical left grew increasingly thin. The more radical tactics of the Communist affiliated labor unions fostered his contempt. The *Sanbetsu* labor federation was organized in August of 1946 under the influence of the Communists. Sanbetsu attempted to build a national-level labor movement from plant-level

---

[36] Koseki, p.193.
[37] John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p.380.

struggles. From this power base it would seek to take control of national politics through national strikes. Its stated objective was to overthrow the reactionary Yoshida government in order to establish a "democratic popular government".[38]

Though the Socialists and their allied labor organization *Sōdōmei* initially opposed the extra-parliamentary tactics and violence promoted by the Communists, Yoshida's New Year's Day statement of January 1947 ended up drawing the two labor organizations together. Yoshida cemented his reputation as a reactionary by denouncing the union strategy and calling union organizers "a lawless gang." Sanbetsu and Sōdōmei united under Zentō, the newly formed National Alliance Council of Unions, and planned a general strike for February 1 to protest Yoshida's statement and call for its retraction. MacArthur's last minute decision to ban the general strike delivered a major blow to the Sanbetsu strategy and signaled to many the end of democratization in Japan. Though union leadership described the cancellation as a matter of "one step backward, two steps forward," the union movement would never regain the vitality it had moving into the general strike.[39] While MacArthur's move to protect Yoshida only lasted until the election was held in April, the Communist leadership of the "democratic revolution" was badly damaged. The Socialist party won 146 of 466 seats and was able to organize the Katayama cabinet with the Democratic and National Cooperation parties, but the Communists and Sanbetsu affiliated candidates lost badly, falling from 35 to only 4 seats.[40]

---

[38] Ikuo Kume, *Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. p.55-56.

[39] Masataka Kosaka, *100 Million Japanese: The Postwar Experience.* Tokyo: Kodansha International LTD, 1972, p.72.

[40] Kume, *Disparaged Success,* p.56. Also see Masumi, pp.112-132.

The marginalized Communists and their affiliated labor unions became more militant, spawning greater repression by GHQ, which in turn brought an ever more radical posture from the Communists. The Communists' timing could not have been worse, for a variety of reasons. Closest to home, MacArthur was intent on wrapping up the Occupation and heading back to the United States to start his presidential campaign. Promoting himself as an effective governor was going to be a hard sell if the Japanese economy continued to deteriorate.

At the same time, U.S. geopolitical considerations toward Asia took a major turn. Whereas China had been the focus of U.S. policy under Truman, the Chinese Communists had begun to take the offensive against the Nationalists, leaving Japan as the default center of U.S. policy in the region. Power moved back toward the Japan Crowd in the U.S. State Department, while MacArthur shifted towards the G-2 view inside GHQ.[41]

Plans to revitalize the Japanese economy became paramount. Elaborate plans to restructure and decentralize the power of the prewar industrial conglomerates, known as *Zaibatsu*, were drastically revised. Sensing the change in SCAP priorities, the Japanese conservatives began to take the offensive. In 1948 the Japanese Ministry of Labor gained GHQ support for its plan to revise the Labor Union Law. The MOL proceeded under the premise that many unions were dominated by a small number of leaders in a totalitarian and undemocratic manner. Despite strong opposition by labor, the bill passed in May of 1949. The overall effect was to weaken labor's power within companies and place limitations on union activity in the public sector.[42]

---

[41] Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History.* New York London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997, pp.270-271.
[42] Kume, p.59.

35

A new SCAP imposed deflationary economic plan sent Japan into a period of deep economic contraction in 1949. Due to the great number of dismissals of national public servants, including National Railway workers, as well layoffs in private enterprises, the labor movement as a whole was weakened. The escalating cycle of labor violence and government repression peaked in the summer of 1949. GHQ and the Yoshida cabinet took advantage of a series of violent incidents at Shimoyama, Matsukawa, and Mitaka to turn public opinion against communism and open the way for a purge of all top JCP officials.[43]

Meanwhile Willoughby's G-2 section began putting its lists of undesirable "Reds" in Japanese public life to use. Laws originally intended to deal with militarists and ultranationalists were applied to union activists in an attempt to break radical unions at the company and industry level, resulting in 11,000 union members in the public sector being fired between the end of 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.[44]

This coincided with the de-purging of militarists and ultranationalists, many of whom would soon rejoin the conservative government. In January 1950 the Kremlin-controlled Cominform criticized Nosaka for his "lovable Communist" policy, further denigrating the party's image with the Japanese people, who began to see it as a tool of Moscow.[45]

As the Communists entered into a self-destructive campaign of industrial sabotage and militant organization in 1950 that was more in line with Cominform policy, mass support dwindled and Japan faced what some have referred to as its "darkest hour" in postwar

---

[43] Masanori Nakamura, "Democratization, Peace, and Economic Development in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952." In *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences*. Friedman Edward ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p.70.
[44] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p.272.
[45] Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, p.62.

history.[46] The Red Purge was extended to claim one thousand university and school faculty.[47] As had been the case in the prewar era, the avowedly Communist purge absorbed many liberals on the left. Initial optimism toward Occupation reforms turned to despair as the Red Purge reminded Japanese people of the repressive era of the prewar.

2.5 Rearmament, Retrenchment and the Peace Revolt

President Truman's decision to enter the Korean War in 1950 put renewed emphasis on U.S. policy in Japan. Although Prime Minister Yoshida had initially voiced strong support for Article nine and its strict prohibition of Japanese rearmament, the U.S. began pressing him to take steps toward creating a military force. Yoshida viewed the U.S. policy shift as an opportunity to secure Japanese independence on relatively generous terms. He also saw that to deny U.S. demands would be to delay independence and risk the involvement of FEC countries in the negotiations for a peace treaty, which would undoubtedly involve more concessions for reparations than the Americans required.

The G-2 section of GHQ under Willoughby had in secret been preparing for the reorganization of the Japanese military almost immediately after the end of the war.[48] With his links to G-2, Yoshida was aware that it was only a matter of time before the United States began pressing Japan to rearm as an ally in the anticommunist alliance. Though he retained fears that "latent militarism" could once again put the imperial system in danger, in 1948 Yoshida began planning for a peace treaty that would gain Japanese independence at the earliest possible date by offering the U.S. rights to maintain bases on Japanese

---

[46] Nakamura, pp.69-70.
[47] LaFeber, p.277.
[48] John Welfield, p.62.

37

territory.[49]

In May 1950 Yoshida dispatched a secret mission to Washington to offer these terms to the United States. Though there was no immediate reply, the U.S. appointed John Foster Dulles as President Truman's special ambassador to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. The outbreak of the Korean War in late June highlighted the value of the Japanese archipelago as a forward base of operations for the United States military in East Asia. In this regard the U.S. was determined to seek not only bases in Japan, but also a commitment from Yoshida to begin rebuilding the Japanese military.

The departure of many U.S. troops for Korea in 1950 lead to the development of the Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR). Discussion for the creation of this 75,000 strong "internal security force" took place in secret, bypassing both the Diet and national public opinion. Coming on the heels of the red purge, the disguised establishment of the NPR served to reinforce existing fears that the military posed a threat to Japanese democracy.[50]

It was in this period of intense ideological polarization that the writings of a group of intellectuals in the journal *Sekai* were offered as an alternative to Japan's further participation in the Cold War alignments taking shape both internationally and inside Japan. An initial statement signed by fifty-five scholars was published in November 1948 on the topics of war, peace, and social justice under the heading of the *Heiwa Mondai Danwakai* (hereafter abbreviated as Heidankai) or Peace Problems Symposium.

The Heidankai was formed in 1948 after a statement, "Social scientists appeal for peace", was issued by a group of scholars in Paris in the summer of 1948 in response to a

---

[49] Ibid., p.46. For a detailed discussion of Yoshida's fears of "Red Fascists" in the Japanese military see Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp.265-272.

[50] Joseph Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures.* Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1993, pp.31-32.

request by UNESCO to study the possibility of world peace. SCAP passed the UNESCO statement to Yoshino Genzaburō, editor-in-chief of *Sekai*, an influential liberal monthly magazine that had begun publication after the war. Yoshino then brought together a wide spectrum of Japan's most widely respected intellectuals in order to discuss the issues of war and peace raised by the UNESCO statement.[51]

More than just an opportunity to review the general principles that underlie war and peace, the UNESCO statement provided the Japanese intellectuals with an opportunity to deal with past issues of war responsibility among themselves in a manner that was gaining increasing relevance as the United States began to push Japan toward rearmament in the new Cold War realignment.[52] With mounting evidence that the reverse course in American policy was leading toward the restoration of the imperial system at home and the danger of involving Japan in military campaigns abroad, the scholars recognized an opportunity to take responsibility for postwar developments in Japanese society in a manner that had not been possible in the prewar era.

As news circulated in November 1949 that the State Department had almost finished drafting a peace treaty, the group began composing a second statement to deal with treaty issues. The group issued a "Statement by the Peace Study Group in Japan on the Problems of the Japanese Peace Settlement" in January of 1950. This statement opened with an apology for the lack of resistance shown by Japanese intellectuals toward Japan's entry into

---

[51] "Sengō Heiwaron no genryū: Heiwa Danwakai o chūshin ni," *Sekai*, July, 1985. This special issue commemorating the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II contains the three statements of the Heiwa Mondai Danwakai. A partial translation of the third statement appears in Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan 1, no.1 (April 1963):13-19. For background on the development of the Heidankai see Glen Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan.* London: Routledge, 1996, pp.26-27 and Takeshi Igarashi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 11:2, 1985, pp.345-347.
[52] Rikki Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the search for autonomy.* London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp.180-181.

World War II, and emphasized the group's determination to develop democracy in Japan in accordance with the reforms of the early Occupation period and the Potsdam Declaration.

The second statement presented two fundamental principles by which Japan should reenter the international community. First, the statement regarded "the sacred obligation to contribute to world peace according to the peaceful spirit declared in the Constitution" as grounds for avoiding getting caught up in Cold War ideological tensions and establishing a comprehensive peace that included both the Soviet Union and Communist China. Secondly, the attainment of economic self-sufficiency could be impeded by a separate peace with the United States that damaged Japans relations with China, a natural trading partner. Takeshi Igarashi points out the awkward position this statement put the government in, "While the Yoshida Cabinet expected that the people would recognize the inevitability of a separate peace with the United States, the Peace Issues Discussion Group emphasized the necessity of an overall peace because it thought that only this could guarantee a national identity internationally consistent with the Constitution." [53]

The third and most influential statement of the Heidankai was issued in December 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War and the open emergence of Japanese rearmament. Drafted largely by Maruyama Masao and Ukai Nobushige, this statement aimed to put the issue of Japanese neutrality on firm theoretical ground. They rejected the assumptions of the "realists," who saw conflict between liberal democracy and communism as inevitable. The realist position was portrayed as a self-fulfilling prophecy that overlooked the positive role that nonaligned nations could play in minimizing conflict among antagonists. National interest, rather than ideological views were argued to be central to world conflict, thus

---

[53] Takeshi Igarashi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics," p.345.

making accommodation more feasible than realists acknowledged. Above all else the advent of the nuclear age was said to have rendered war obsolete as an avenue for the pursuit of national interest.

Placing the debate in the context of national interest rather than ideology was also important to making the case that Japan itself would be better served through a neutralist stance. A stance of "peaceful coexistence" and unarmed neutrality would give Japan an opportunity to assert its independence and make it easier to achieve self-reliance in the economic sphere. In this sense the Heidankai appealed to the broader sense of Japanese nationalism that had been cultivated for many years under the prewar system.

A further appeal to the Japanese public aimed at the same sense of victimization that the Americans had attempted to cultivate during the early stages of the occupation. Yet whereas the American use of victimization propaganda aimed at ensuring the survival of the imperial institution and its conservative supporters, the Heidankai attempted to thwart a retrenchment of conservative power by reminding people of the unequal burden of suffering that modern war produces for the government and the "peace-loving citizens". The statement paints a dark picture of government leaders being whisked away to secure areas while the innocent masses wander around with their homes aflame and their relatives lost.[54]

The Heidankai's dramatic attempt to foster antiwar feelings in the Japanese public was more than a mere demagogic appeal to populist sentiment. The appeal to the people's sense of victimization aimed specifically at linking support for the "peace constitution" with a defense of democracy itself. Here it is important to realize that Japan emerged from the war

[54] "Mitabi Heiwa ni Tsuite," reprinted in *Sekai*, July 1985, p.122. Glen Hook discusses this point in *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*, pp.36-37.

without any ready-made liberal ideology that would underpin democratic consciousness in its people. There was Imperialism and Marxism and not a whole lot in between. And while some scholars have attempted to brand the peace movement as predominantly "red," it is clear that leaders of the Heidankai attempted to unite intellectuals in a fight that raised the issues of peace and democracy above an association with socialist revolution.[55]

The Heidankai emphasized the unequal risk that citizens face in war in order to promote democratic participation in decisions affecting this risk. Peace was thereby not an end in itself, but the foothold by which the Heidankai attempted to leverage social autonomy from the state.[56] Maruyama stated the idea forthrightly in a later article entitled "Some Reflections on Article IX of the Constitution":

> The conviction that those most affected by a policy
> decision should be qualified to pass final judgment over
> that policy must find its most effective utilization in the
> people's power of control over the government in order to
> prevent war.[57]

The overall peace statement articulated by the Heidankai provided a coherent ideological basis for mobilization along three levels: from basic human concerns of life and livelihood, to support for the peace constitution and the democratic system, and only from there to engage in broad international issues of war and peace.[58]

---

[55] For the "red" version see George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo: *The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp.26-28. See Rikki Kersten's critique of Packard in *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, p.185.

[56] For a discussion of how Maruyama's theory of social autonomy surfaced in the Heidankai statements see Rikki Kersten, pp.164-195.

[57] Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. Expanded edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, p.301.

[58] See John Dower's discussion in, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict." In *Postwar Japan as History*. Andrew Gordon ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 19

Although Yoshida dismissed the Heidankai as a bunch of "literary sycophants," their

passionate appropriation of "peace and democracy" was not a mere theoretical gambit by a

group of obtuse intellectuals. The response to the Heidankai statements was so great that

Sekai is said to have doubled its circulation at the time.[59] The Socialist Party adopted many

of the ideas put forth by the Heidankai in their opposition to the Peace Treaty being

negotiated between Yoshida and Dulles.[60] The Socialist's "Three Principles on Peace"

statement of April 1950 demanded a comprehensive peace settlement, unarmed neutrality,

and no offer of military bases in Japan.[61] The idea of a peace treaty that included all of the

former Allied powers also gained widespread acceptance with the public. A poll by the

Yomiuri newspaper in April of 1951 indicated that 57 percent of the Japanese favored a

comprehensive settlement while only 21 percent thought it was best to deal only with the

United States.[62] Though they were ultimately unsuccessful in their fight to win a peace

treaty along these lines, the Heidankai can be credited with articulating an indigenous

philosophy that comprehensively linked the pacifist ideals of the constitution with

democratic practice. In doing so, the Heidankai put ideological legs under a democratic

system that would come under increasing attack as Cold War pressures intensified during

the 1950s.

2.6 Public Opinion and the Domestic Reverse Course

In evaluating the significance of the early peace movement it is important to keep in

mind that public opinion, while generally supportive of the reforms instituted by the

---

[59] John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems", p.9.
[60] Though the Socialist Party split into left and right factions in 1951 over opposition to the Security Treaty with the United States, both factions remained united on the issue of opposing Japanese rearmament.
[61] Igarashi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics", p.348.
[62] Yomiuri poll cited in Welfield, p.57.

Occupation, had not yet coalesced behind the "peace constitution" at the time of the signing

of the peace and security treaties in 1951. In the face of the nascent peace movement,

American diplomats did a turnabout and openly courted popular support for Japanese

rearmament. One famous instance of this was John Foster Dulles' remark in 1951 that

"Japan's crisis of militarism is now over". As the American "reverse course" policy came

out into the open, Japanese peace activists feared that reviving the military could rekindle

old feelings and patterns of behavior in the Japanese people. As Hitoshi Yamakawa wrote

in 1952, "A mere five years was not sufficient to erase seventy long years of spiritual

indoctrination related to nationalism, militarism and patriotism."[63] Peace activists saw the

issue of rearmament not only in terms of war and peace, "but as life or death for the

democratic system inside Japan."[64]

Public opinion polls carried out by major newspapers during the early 1950s tend to

bear out the concerns of peace activists such as Yamakawa. As Figure 2.1 demonstrates,

from 1952 to 1957 a strong majority of Japanese did believe that it was necessary for Japan

to maintain an army. And as Table 2.1 shows, the majority of Japanese were also in favor

of revising article nine of the constitution to allow for rearmament up until 1954.

From1955 onward, however, a growing majority of Japanese voiced opposition toward

revising article nine. This raises the question of why many Japanese people saw the

necessity of maintaining a military, yet at the same time became unwilling to countenance

constitutional revision.

---

[63] Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Nihon no Saigumbi* Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1952, p.51.
[64] Ibid., p.50.

Figure 2.1 Does Japan Need a Military Force?

Source: Adapted from Wada, p.89.

Table 2.1 Revise Article 9?

	agree	disagree
1952.2 Asahi	31%	32%
1952.3 Mainichi	43%	27%
1952.4 Yomiuri	48%	39%
1953.1 Asahi	31%	42%
1953.3 Yomiuri	41%	38%
1954.7 Yomiuri	38%	30%
1955.11 Asahi	37%	42%
1957.11 Asahi	32%	52%
1962.8 Asahi	26%	61%
1968.12 Asahi	19%	64%

Note: Results do not add to 100% because they omit
"Don't Know" responses.

Source: Postwar Public Opinion History Illustrated,
2nd Ed., NHK Public Opinion Bureau, 1982

The key to unraveling the apparent contradiction in Japanese public opinion on defense

can be found in the success that the peace movement had in linking the domestic reverse

course against occupation reforms led by Yoshida, to policies of rearmament forced on

45

Japan by the United States. During the second through fifth Yoshida cabinets much of the original occupation reform agenda was undermined. Yoshida led campaigns to depoliticize labor, recentralize the police, and reassert central control over the educational system. The Yoshida cabinet also intended to submit bills simultaneous with ratification of the peace and security treaties that would severely limit freedoms of speech and organization. The proposed bills included a peace-protection law, prohibition of general strikes, regulations governing meetings and demonstrations, a press code, and a draft anti-espionage law. Public outrage against this agenda was so "swift, vociferous, and broadly based" that Yoshida was forced to rethink the legislation. The result was the Subversive Activities Prevention Law, which reportedly underwent twenty-three revisions and four name changes before the government submitted it to the Diet in April 1952. Its critics immediately compared the law to the infamous prewar Peace Preservation Law. Another Yoshida project that evoked a comparison to the prewar era was the Military Secrets Law of 1954. This law, passed the same year as the creation of the Self Defense Force, also faced widespread public opposition.[65]

Yoshida's move to place all of the occupation reforms under review in order to counter "excessive democratization" moved hand in hand with the creation of a military force in Japan. Thus while the peace movement dealt seriously with matters of international peace on one level, fears related to militarism were just as much aimed at the revival of the

---

[65] For details on the conservative counter-offensive see John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp.305-368 and Wada Susumu, *Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki: Kurashi no nakano Kempo. (Postwar Japan's Peace Consciousness: the constitution in daily life)*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997, pp.85-106.

emperor system that had supported it in the prewar era.[66] The shift in public opinion

towards article nine was the result of the peace issue becoming inseparable from issues of

freedom, human rights and democracy in the people's consciousness.[67] In this manner the

"peace constitution" became a symbol for democracy as the confrontation over rearmament

became a battle over two different systems of government.[68]

2.7 Yoshida's Folly

Cold Warriors in the United States paid little heed to the gradual shift in popular

opinion in Japan. While Yoshida slowly acceded to U.S. demands for remilitarization, his

early public support for article nine left him in an awkward position after U.S. policy

changed. In a poll conducted in February of 1952, 48 percent of the Japanese people

believed that Yoshida was lying when he said that Japan was not rearming, compared with

40 percent who were not sure. Only 12 percent thought that they could believe what the

prime minister said.[69] Ironically, while Yoshida agreed to increase the size of the NPR

from 75,000 to 110,000 in 1952, he had resisted U.S. demands for a much larger increase to

over 300,000 men. What has come to be commonly referred to as the "Yoshida doctrine"

was born out this period of sluggish resistance to U.S. rearmament demands during the

negotiations for the peace treaty and the years that followed immediately afterward.

Through delaying increased military expenditures Yoshida is credited with fostering the

beginnings of Japan's unprecedented economic expansion.

---

[66] Otake Hideo, *Saigumbi to Nashonarizumu-Hoshu · Riberaru · Shakaiminshushugi no Boeikan.* (Rearmament and Nationalism: Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic Views) Tokyo: Chuo Shinsho, 1988.

[67] Wada Susumu links the counter-offensive with the change in public opinion toward article nine, *Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki,* pp.99-100.

[68] Takeshi Ishida, *Nihon no Seiji to Kotoba: Heiwa to Kokka.* (Japan's Politics and Language: "Peace" and "Nation") Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989, pp.111-112.

[69] Poll cited in John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath,* p.385.

As the Korean War economic boom came to an end in 1953, securing economic assistance to support the economy became a top priority. Yoshida's negotiations with the United States over the Mutual Security Act aimed at gaining the maximum amount of economic assistance from the United States while limiting the amount of increases in Japanese military forces.[70] One of the additional factors prohibiting Yoshida from increasing the size of the Japanese army to more than 110,000 was the fear that they would become mere pawns of American foreign policy objectives in the Far East. Yoshida's negotiators recognized that for increased security spending to lead toward greater independence for Japan they would need a more well rounded defense plan than the United States desired, one that included air and sea forces along with ground troops.[71]

Further evidence suggests that Yoshida did truly harbor reservations regarding the overall impact of remilitarization. As mentioned previously, General Willoughby of GHQ's G-2 section had begun organizing former Japanese military officials shortly after the Occupation began. Willoughby, who would go on to advise General Franco after retiring from the United States army in the early 1950s, had taken an active interest in Japanese large-scale rearmament from early on. In preparation for the time when rearmament would become possible he had been grooming Hattori Takushirō to lead a new Japanese military force. Hattori had been the Principal Staff Officer with the Kwantung Army at the battle of Nomanhan and later General Tōjō Hideki's private secretary. Hattori, John Welfield writes, "was the very embodiment of that military-political tradition that had caused Prince Konoe and Yoshida to lose so much sleep in the dark days of 1944-45."[72] Hattori developed a

---

[70] See Joseph Keddell, p.32-33.
[71] Welfield, pp.102-106.
[72] Ibid., p.68.

nationwide organization of some 400 ex-military men ready to assume control of the new

Japanese military once it was created. One of Yoshida's objectives in resisting the type of

large-scale rearmament that the United States demanded was to limit the influence that the

Hattori clique would gain in the new Japanese military.[73]

Though Yoshida was able to block Hattori's ascendance by placing his own man in

charge of the NPR, he was not able to dissuade the United States from its desire for greater

rearmament during his administration. At the same time, losses suffered by the ruling

Liberal Party in the April 1953 general election caused concern. Gains by the socialists

enhanced their relative influence over defense policy and provided them with the one-third

Diet representation necessary to block constitutional revision. The result was a compromise

that placed a ban on overseas dispatch of Japanese forces when the two laws passed that

created the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Force in 1954.

The fact that the new Self Defense Force was limited to only 180,000 men did not sit

well with many in the United States government.[74] While patience was running out with

Yoshida in the State Department, defense officials were even more adamant about

increasing Japanese ground troops after their experience in Korea. In Tokyo, General

Carter B. Magruder, chief of staff of the Far Eastern Command, even proposed that in order

to foster a more militant outlook, the United States might indicate that it "would view

favorably the re-establishment of the Japanese Empire under a moderate Japanese

Government."[75]

---

[73] John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, p.387
[74] Joseph Keddel, p.34.
[75] Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.71.

Even while Washington grew tired of Japanese excuses for what it regarded as foot-dragging on the rearmament issue, an event known as the Lucky Dragon incident inflamed popular resentment toward the security alliance. On March 1, 1954 while the United States was testing its first hydrogen bomb at the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, a Japanese fishing boat named the *Fukuryu Maru*, or Lucky Dragon, was caught in the radioactive fallout of the unexpectedly powerful 15-megaton blast. After news of the exposure leaked out, the U.S. government was slow to take responsibility for injuries suffered by the crewman, causing an uproar in the Japanese Diet, press and public opinion. By the time the Yoshida government responded to the popular outrage and demanded compensation for the victims, it was too late. The U. S. delayed payment of compensation until Yoshida had been ousted from office, objecting less to the $2 million payment than to Yoshida's lack of control over the bureaucracy and public opinion.[76] In December 29, shortly after Yoshida's resignation, Dulles approved the $2 million in compensation for the crewmembers. The new prime minister, Ichiro Hatoyama, portrayed this as evidence of Washington's support for his leadership.

2.8 U.S. Pressure Backfires: The Antinuclear and Antibase Movements

The period 1955-1960 was characterized by the return of politicians who had been purged for wartime offenses to the top leadership positions in the Japanese government. Both Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-1956) and Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960) had been part of the political class of Japanese leaders who were purged after the war for their participation in prewar activities that were thought to have been inimical to the creation of a new democracy. Both men were traditional nationalists, in that they advocated constitutional

---

[76] Ibid., p.73-74.

50

revision and remilitarization to permit Japan to pursue an independent foreign policy. Hatoyama had been in line to assume the premiership in 1946 when revelations of his 1938 book *Sekai no Koe* brought to light his prewar support for Hitler and Mussolini style labor control tactics, which led to his last minute purge and the rise of Yoshida to power. By 1954 the United States was much less concerned with prewar behavior and intent on finding someone to bring Japanese remilitarization up to speed. Though Washington favored Kishi over Hatoyama in 1954, both men openly pushed for revising article nine to make way for Japanese rearmament, giving Washington hope for a more viable partner in the anticommunist alliance.[77]

In 1955 Hatoyama presided over the merger of the conservative Liberal and Democratic parties, brought about largely because of big business concerns with the rise of Socialist influence. Though Washington was not happy with Hatoyama's attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet Union, it was supportive enough to begin covert funding to the Liberal Democratic Party through the CIA in 1955. An estimated $2 to $10 million dollars per year flowed to Japan through the 1960s.While paying off the conservatives, the CIA also infiltrated the Japanese left, including the giant trade union *Sōhyō* (the Japanese General Council of Trade Unions). In doing so they attempted to split the labor movement or convert them to anticommunist policies present in the American labor movement.[78]

Despite being heavily outspent by the LDP, opposition forces continued to cause problems for the remilitarization plans of the conservatives and the United States government. One aspect of disruption that derived from the Lucky Dragon incident was the development of a powerful anti-nuclear movement within Japan. Over 30 million people

---

[77] Michael Schaller, p.77.
[78] Walter Lafeber, p.335-336.

participated in a signature campaign that began in May 1954 to protest further nuclear tests

and call for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. The campaign culminated in the formation

of the *Gensuibaku Nihon Kyōgikai* (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb) in

September of 1955. The new organization commonly referred to as *Gensuikyō* sought to

abrogate the United States –Japan Security Treaty as part of its efforts to stop the

development of all nuclear weapons. [79]

The development of a broad based antinuclear movement came just as the nuclear

missile race between the United States and the Soviet Union began to heat up. In this

context the United States began to alter its military strategy in the Far East from one based

on conventional forces to reliance on nuclear deterrence. Under the Eisenhower New Look

strategy the United States reduced forces in Japan from 200,000 in late 1954 to 90,000 in

December 1956. During August of 1955 the United States began deployment in Japan of

Honest John missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads. With the horrors of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki still fresh in Japanese memory, and coming so soon after the Lucky Dragon

incident, it was not hard for the Socialist and Communist parties to stir up protest against

the presence of the Honest Johns on Japanese soil. Protests lasted through the winter and

into the spring of 1956, with much greater ferocity than the Hatoyama government had

expected. In the end, the United States and Japanese governments recognized that U.S.

bases would have to be limited to a conventional, supporting role in America's Far East

strategy. Moreover, the Honest John incident indicated clearly that the use of United States

bases in Japan was circumscribed not only by Japanese policy, but by public opinion as

---

[79] See the *Encyclopedia of Japan*, Kodansha, (software version) 2000.

well.[80]

The atmosphere created by the Lucky Dragon incident and the Honest John protests

contributed to the hardening of public opinion in support of article nine. A committee

established by Prime Minister Hatoyama to review the constitution for possible revision

languished behind the scenes and did not finally deliver its bland report until the mid 1960s.

Meanwhile, another incident involving the shooting of a Japanese woman outside a U.S.

military base on January 30, 1956 contributed to the antibase movement. At issue was

Japan's right to try Specialist Third Class William S. Girard.[81] Though the case was

eventually resolved more or less to both countries' satisfaction, the feeling that the U.S.

bases did not serve Japanese interests became a predominant one in Japan (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 National Opinion On American Bases 1950-1958 (In Percent)

	Approve	Oppose	Don't Know
September, 1950	30	38	32
June, 1953	27	48	25
October, 1957	18	60	22
February, 1958	8	58	34

Source: Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A Study of Public Opinion
in Post-Treaty Japan. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1961, p.102. Note: September, June,
surveys are form Asahi Shimbun. Ocotber survey is World Poll survey released Ocotber 20, 1957
in the New York Herald Tribune. The 1958 survey was conducted by the Chuo Chosasha for
Douglas Mendel, January 31-February 1, 1958.

The 1957 poll results shown in Table 2.2 are taken from a poll conducted in a variety of

countries where U.S. bases were present. Of all the host nations surveyed, Japan had the

least amount of support for United States bases. The comparative results, shown in Table

2.3, indicate that the supposedly docile Japanese public had become the biggest thorn in

---

[80] Martin Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, pp.80-83.

[81] Tetsuya Kataoka, The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics. New York: Crane Russak, 1991,p.172.

United States strategic planning. Japanese support for U.S. air and naval bases did not

improve even after the United States began pulling troops out of Japan. A national survey

conducted by Douglas Mendel in February of 1958 asked the question: "American ground

forces are leaving Japan, but do you favor or oppose the continued presence of American

air and naval bases in Japan?" Only 11 percent of the respondents favored retention of the

air and naval bases, while 54 percent opposed retention and 35 percent were undecided.[82]

Given the public mood of the time, it is not surprising that the Hatoyama administration

quickly distanced itself from a proposal for security treaty revision being negotiated by

then Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu that would obligate Japan to cooperate in

collective defense of the Western Pacific area. When a communiqué from Shigemitsu was

made public in Tokyo, Socialists charged Hatoyama with violating the Peace Constitution.

Shigemitsu responded by charging that the communiqué had been misinterpreted and

Hatoyama shelved his plan for treaty revision.[83] Hatoyama settled for a Joint Declaration

with the Soviet Union on October 19, 1956 that left the status of the Kurile Islands

unresolved. He stepped down soon afterward.

Table 2.3 National Opinion On American Bases 1957 (In Percent)

	Approve	Oppose
Japan	18	60
Britain	53	32
Netherlands	52	28
Germany	46	25
Italy	33	33
Belgium	27	52
France	22	45

Source: World Poll results published originally in the New York Herald Tribune,
Ocotober 20, 1957. Cited in Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign
Policy: A Study of Public Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan. Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 1961.

[82] Douglas H. Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A study of Public Opinion in Post-treaty Japan.* Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, p.104.
[83] Martin Weinstein, pp.79-80.

2.9 Toward the Point of No Return: The 1960 Security Treaty Crisis

Polls carried out during the late 1950s demonstrated that even supporters of the

conservative camp were not happy with the presence of U.S. bases in Japan.[84] In this sense

the nationalism of the left blended with the right's desire to free Japan from its subordinate

status in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. While the left demanded that the treaty be

abrogated, the right sought a more mutually beneficial treaty that would at the very least

ensure that the United States would come to Japan's defense if it were attacked. The United

States was unwilling to make such a commitment without Japan first taking steps toward

rearmament so that it would be capable of participating in collective security agreements.

With the failure of the Shigemitsu negotiations in the background, it was clear that any

attempt to meet U.S. demands would cause major protest inside Japan.

With pressure mounting against the presence of U.S. bases in Japan, Kishi Nobusuke

ascended to the Japanese premiership in 1957. Kishi, a former bureaucrat who had served

as a minister in General Tōjō's cabinet and served three and a half years in prison as a

Class A war criminal, was welcomed in Washington for his strong anti-Communist foreign

policy stance. Kishi was a strong advocate of constitutional revision and large-scale

rearmament that would allow Japan to participate as an equal partner in a revised security

treaty with the United States. With security treaty revision in mind, Kishi visited

Washington in June of 1957, where he was received warmly and with much public fanfare.

When Kishi met with Eisenhower and Dulles at the White house on June 25, Dulles

remarked that "We all believe that the important thing is to develop a relationship of real

mutuality and real cooperation and our best chance to do that is under the leadership of the

---

[84] Ibid., p.106.

present prime minister... in whom we can have confidence and who has a genuine dedication to the principles of the free world."[85] A joint communiqué issued at the meeting restated a Japanese commitment to increase responsibility for its own defense that had been initiated under the previous security treaty.

For his pro-American stance, the United States was willing to overlook Kishi's attempts to dismantle many of the occupation's democratic reforms. Kishi believed that democracy could only function in the context of strong leadership, hierarchy, and respect for authority.[86] With this in mind he worked to strengthen government control over the contents of school textbooks, promote patriotic education, and create stronger internal security laws. He even floated the idea of restoring the Emperor as head of state, although without former claims to divinity.[87]

Having observed the failure of the Hatoyama administration to renegotiate the 1952 Security treaty, Kishi moved to revise the Occupation-era Police Duties Law in order to pave the way for tighter controls on public protest during the upcoming security treaty negotiations. The bill was prepared in deep secrecy within Prime Minister Kishi's inner circle and introduced during a special session of the Diet in the fall of 1958. The bill drew an immediate reaction from the Socialists and Communists, who resisted what they considered to be an unconstitutional attempt to limit their activities. They were not alone in their opposition, for the public reacted to the vague language of the amendment that seemed to give unnecessarily wide powers to the police. Thus instead of preempting the

[85] John Foster Dulles cited in Tadashi Aruga, "The Security Treaty Revision of 1960," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen eds. *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989, p.64.
[86] John Welfield, p.120.
[87] Walter Lafeber, p.315.

opposition, the bill galvanized a wide social coalition that would remain active throughout

the negotiation of the security treaty. A nationwide anti-police law revision movement was

formed and on November 5 and 7 of 1958 four million Japanese demonstrated and staged

strikes across the country to protest the proposed amendment. Although the bill was

eventually abandoned, it solidified the public's perception of Kishi as a reactionary bent on

undermining Japanese democracy.[88]

Buoyed by the defeat of the Police Duties Law revision bill, Sōhyō took the initiative in

March of 1959 to organize a mass movement against Kishi's proposed security treaty

revisions. The Socialist party (JSP) joined the People's Council for Preventing Revision of

the Security Treaty (Ampo Jōyaku Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi) and reluctantly agreed to

cooperation with the Communists (JCP), due to the JCP's influence in nationwide peace

organizations. The labor union backed Socialist party had a voice in parliamentary politics

while the Communist party's overall organizational strength would be necessary for a mass

movement of sufficient strength to overcome the LDP majority in the Diet.

Despite their cooperation, the two parties had substantial differences in their approach

to security treaty revision. First the Socialist party split again over the issue into left and

right factions. Then there were strong ideological and tactical divisions between the

Socialists and the Communists. The Socialist party opposed the new security treaty because

it pushed Japan farther into the U.S. camp, potentially alienating the Chinese People's

Republic, toward whom they had a sympathetic concern out of a sense of war guilt. The

Socialists desired neutrality and a posture that would contribute to global peace and

---

[88] This summary is based upon descriptions by Martin Weinstein, pp.90-91 and Andrew Barshay, "Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-90" in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ed. *Modern Japanese Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

disarmament. Their focus was to disrupt the Kishi government. The Communists, on the

other hand, pursued a long-term strategy for undermining U.S. control over Japan, which

they believed had been codified through the unequal security treaty of 1951. Thus their

focus was primarily anti-Americanism. The JCP opposed the inclusion of a renegade

faction of the major student organization *Zengakuren*, which despite its Communist

ideology did not follow the JCP. The JCP feared (probably out of its own experience) that

violence committed by the antiparty radicals in Zengakuren would undermine chances for

disrupting the alliance with the United States.[89]

As in the build up to the original peace and security treaty protests, the progressive

intellectuals of the Heidankai played an important role in providing the left with a coherent

ideology from which to protest the security treaty revision.[90] Once again the key would be

to link opposition to the treaty with the development of Japanese democracy. In September

of 1959 the Heidankai and its offshoot the Kokudankai (International Problems Discussion

Group) issued the statement "Criticizing the Government's Plan to Revise the Security

Treaty". This statement emphasized the importance of the upcoming treaty revision to the

general public and criticized the government's desire to keep the details of the new treaty

hidden from the public.[91]

After a draft of the revised treaty was released on October 6 1959 the sense of crisis

intensified. The revision removed provisions calling for United States intervention in a

domestic insurrection in Japan, strengthened consultation between Japan and the United

---

[89] Tadashi Aruga, "The Security Treaty Revision of 1960," pp.69-71.

[90] In George Packard's book length treatment of the crisis he writes, "The judgment here is that they [the Heidanakai] had considerable influence in stirring up the protest movement in 1960." *Protest in Tokyo*, p.30.

[91] Rikki Kersten, p.203.

States with regard to deployment of U.S. forces, and also set a term for the length of the agreement. One of the alarming aspects, from the pacifist point of view, was the specification that the purpose of the pact was " the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." This widened the geographical scope of military cooperation much in the same way that the rejected Shigemitsu proposal had.

The failure of the government to give a convincing answer as to what the geographical definition of the Far East was during Diet interpellation received widespread criticism in the media and contributed to public concern as to whether the new treaty would oblige Japan to develop large-scale military forces. Editorials focused upon the need for a clear understanding of the problems involved in the treaty and recommended that the Diet discuss them thoroughly.[92]

In December of 1959 the Heidankai-Kokudankai group released a second statement on the security treaty revision written by Sakamoto Yoshikazu. The logic of the 1959 statement moved from security issues per se to the process by which such decisions are made. The government was accused of not taking sufficient consideration of the issues and more importantly not allowing sufficient time for public debate on the treaty. The emphasis on this statement was that the Japanese government and people would have to take responsibility for any new treaty in the eyes of the world, whereas in 1951 they had been forced into signing the security treaty in order to gain independence. It was therefore incumbent upon all Japanese to participate in the making of such an important decision.[93]

[92] Tadashi Aruga, p.72. Also see Masumi Junnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*. Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p.39.
[93] Rikki Kersten, pp. 204-206.

The shooting down of a U.S. U-2 spy plane over Russia and the subsequent cancellation

of a U.S.-Soviet summit conference in May of 1960 raised public anxiety over a closer

alliance with the United States when it was disclosed that three of the U-2 planes were

based in Japan. Prime Minister Kishi's weak assurance that U-2s operating from Japanese

bases engaged only in weather observation did not assuage the public's uneasiness.

Khrushchev reinforced these fears by threatening to deal a "shattering blow" with nuclear

tipped rockets against any country from which American aircraft intruded into Soviet

airspace.[94]

By the middle of May, the U-2 incident had caused the two wings of the Socialists to

reunite in order to block an extension of the Diet session planned by Kishi. On May 19,

when a proposal for a fifty day extension was submitted to the Lower House, a number of

socialist legislators staged a "sit in" in front of lower house speaker Kiyose Ichiro's office.

That evening, the chairman of the committee holding hearings on the treaty called a snap

vote to report out the document, which prompted a walkout by opposition members. The

LDP-controlled committee then endorsed the treaty and sent it to the full Diet. Just before

midnight Speaker Kiyose had the police clear away the Socialists from his office and

proceeded to move for a 50-day extension of the Diet session after reaching the podium.

With only LDP members present the resolution carried. Shortly after midnight on May 20

the same members approved the treaty. This insured that even without approval by the

Upper House the treaty would come into force on June 19, just as President Eisenhower

was due to arrive in Japan.[95]

---

[94]See Michael Schaller, p.149.
[95] Ibid., p.150.

60

Had Prime Minister Kishi called for general elections prior to the decision on the treaty, as many people wanted, he could have possibly prevented what turned out to be the largest mass based public protest in Japanese postwar history. As it was, his decision to ramrod the treaty through the Diet in late night sessions played right into the hands of the protest movement, which was able to vilify Kishi based on the idea that he had violated the spirit if not the law of democratic politics. For the protestors the spirit of democracy was contained in the idea that parliamentary politics should reflect the will of the people. Whether the conservative government had actually broken any laws was seen as secondary to the manner in which it defied public outcry for more debate. At this time the pacifist discourse truly revealed itself as a metaphor for a debate on the future of Japanese democracy. A speech by Maruyama Masao on May 24, 1960 entitled *Sentaku no Toki* (Time for Choice) encouraged all the disparate forces for change to come together in defense of democracy:

> At this moment in history let us rise above our differences and join hands so that the security of our nation may be guaranteed, not against any foreign country but first of all against the authorities.[96]

Kishi's prewar background made the task of dichotomizing between democracy and dictatorship all the more easy for the protestors, many of whom referred to him as the "yōkai of the Showa era".[97] Kishi became a stand in for the prewar military regime, against which the Japanese should have fought collectively prior to the war but did not. He also symbolized the humiliation that the defeat in the war had caused. When it was revealed that Japan would remain a subordinate member in the military alliance, pent up feelings of national pride were unleashed in the context of a battle over the survival of democracy.

---

[96] Maruyama Masao, "Sentaku no Toki" speech cited in Rikki Kersten, p.218.
[97] See Yoshikuni Igareshi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p.136. Igareshi explains, "yōkai are monstrous premodern creatures that survived in the liminal space of modern Japan, defying scientific explanations."

Another factor that contributed to the size and scope of the security treaty protest was the concurrent strike at the *Miike* coal mine. The Miike struggle began in the spring of 1959 and in January 1960 turned into a lockout and a strike that lasted 282 days. The mobilization of hundreds of thousands of people for the Miike strike, in which organized labor confronted a united front of big business backed by the government, contributed to the general anti-Kishi atmosphere. When gangsters hired by management stabbed a union member to death, it added to the aura of prewar repression that dogged the Kishi administration.[98]

In the month that followed the Socialists and Communists boycotted parliament, while outside the Diet demonstrations and protest marches grew larger. The prime minister's residence was attacked and rioting students fought battles with police in the Diet compound. 6 million men people went out on strike twice within a two-week span. Finally, on June 18, the day the treaty was to be automatically approved by the Upper House, a crowd estimated at over 300,000 people gathered in front of the Diet to protest. When the Japanese cabinet ratified the treaty on June 21 another huge strike of some 6.25 million workers ensued, reportedly the largest strike in the nation's history.[99] In the end Prime Minister Kishi was forced to resign, though the treaty itself remained intact.

In discussing the "Cold War inside Japan" Japanese political scientist Kabashima Ikuo cautions that although the security related axis in Japanese politics was submerged to some extent during the later 1960s and 1970s, it did not disappear. The peace movement of the late 1950s would provide organizational as well as motivational inspiration for anti-

---

[98] See Masumi Junnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, p.40.

[99] See John Welfield, p.138.

Vietnam protests in the late 1960s and the consumer based movements of the early 1970s. These later movements included greater participation in the political process by a broader spectrum of Japanese people, especially women.[100]

Conservative governments that followed the crisis of 1960 were notably cautious around security related issues, steering clear of anything that would incite further mass movements. In this respect Prime Minister Ikeda was noted for following a policy of *teishisei* or "laying low" during his tenure while concentrating on economic development.[101] While also maintaining a low posture on security issues, Prime Minister Satō, Ikeda's successor, made an earnest attempt to cultivate a sense of *Bōei ishiki* or defense consciousness in the Japanese people without success.[102] Limitations on defense policy such as a ban on the export of weapons, 1 percent of GDP as a defense budget ceiling, and the three principles of nuclear disarmament all resulted due to the impact of the security treaty protests.

While there remain a variety of views on the overall impact of the early peace movement, many scholars have argued that it provided the initial baptism of the Japanese public in the theory and practice of extra parliamentary democratic expression.[103] In this Nakamura Masanori provides the compelling view that, while the occupation's reverse course contained the seeds of democracy's possible negation, the incompleteness of the occupation reforms permitted a peaceful process that incorporated most of the nation in a

---

[100] Kabashima Ikuo and Takenaka Yoshihiko, *Gendai Nihonjin no Ideorogi* (Political Ideology in Japan) Tokyo: University of Tokyo press, 1996, p.108.
[101] Yoshikuni Igareshi, p.102.
[102] Martin Weinstein, p.103.
[103] See for example, John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems," p.20.

consolidated democracy.[104] In chapter three we will take up the historical legacy of the

peace movement in greater detail.

Chapter 3
The Legacy of the Early Postwar Peace Movement

3.0 Introduction

In chapter one opposition was expressed to the notion that Japanese democratic system

support has developed primarily as a byproduct of economic growth imposed from above.

Scholars committed to this line of thinking, it was argued, are not unaware of the

tumultuous period of ideological struggle that raged during the early postwar era and its

continuing impact upon security policy debate. What this dissertation finds problematic is

the tendency to underestimate the relevance of the peace movement for the formation of

social and political norms that have played a significant role in the consolidation of postwar

Japanese democracy.

In recognizing the failure of the peace movement to block the ratification of the Japan –

United States Mutual Security Treaty (Nichibei Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku), or Ampo, it is

important that we do not overlook the long-term influence that this movement had on

subsequent politics in Japan. The imprint of this struggle can be found on many later

political developments, both inside and outside of the formal political system. The battle

for the heart of Japanese postwar national identity and political culture did not end with the

ratification of the Security Treaty. Although the salience of defense related issues in

national elections would wane in the 1970s, established antimilitarist norms became

enmeshed with new attitudes toward political participation that continue to shape thinking

with regard to Japan's national identity and its place in the international community. In this

sense it is impossible to divorce the ongoing security debate from the underlying issue of

Japan's contemporary democratic system legitimacy.[1]

In chapter three the peace movement's legacy will be discussed with regard to its

contribution to the development of new organizational norms for social networking, the

development of the "1955 System" of parliamentary politics, and the formation of social

norms linking issues of peace and democracy in a manner that has remained remarkably

impervious to challenge throughout the postwar period.

3.1 The Peace Movement's Contribution to Japanese Social Capital

The idea that "social capital" plays an important role in the proper functioning of a

democratic polity has been of considerable interest to democratic theorists over the past

decade. In 1993 Robert Putnam's study of civic traditions in modern Italy popularized the

notion that social capital, a byproduct of longstanding networks of horizontal civic

engagement, contributes to the process of a well functioning democratic government.[2]

Putnam's work contrasted the vertically oriented networks of civic engagement visible in

the poorly functioning local and regional governments of southern Italy with that of highly

rated governments in areas of the north that had accrued long-standing patterns of

horizontal associational networks. According to Putnam, communities with histories of

horizontal civic organizations (such as sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid societies,

cultural associations, and voluntary unions) also tend to share positive associational norms

such as reciprocity and trust. In contrast, areas dominated by vertical networks of

association, no matter how dense and important these associations to their participants,

---

[1] On this point see Glenn Hooks, "Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japan's Foreign and Security Policies" in Bert Edström, ed. *Japan's Foreign and Security Policies in Transition*. The Swedish Institute for International Affairs and the Center for Pacific Asia Studies, 1996: 44.
[2] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. In this sense, "networks of civic engagement

embody past success at collaboration, which can serve as a culturally-defined template for

future collaboration." [3]

Putnam's notion of social capital may be of use in attempting to come to terms with the

long-term influence of the peace movement upon contemporary Japanese politics. The

movement's confrontation with the Kishi administration did not block the Security Treaty

from being ratified, but did end with Kishi being forced from power and subsequent LDP

administrations avoiding controversial issues that would fuel further protests (at least until

the late 1970s). In this respect, the Ampo movement can be considered a partial success on

its own merits. When considering the patterns of hierarchical status relationships that have

characterized Japanese social structure, even the partial success of the Ampo movement

represented a major milestone to progressive forces. [4] Yet the enduring legacy of the Ampo

movement probably is best characterized in terms of the organizational and philosophical

foundation it laid for later protest movements that enhanced "citizen consciousness" and

participation in the Japanese political process; thereby consolidating public support for the

democratic regime.

In attempting to explain the tendency to downplay the long-term influence of the Ampo

movement that peaked in the May 1960 protests, Wesley Sasaki-Uemura notes that some

scholars have perpetuated the claim laid forth originally by the Kishi administration that the

---

[3] Ibid., p.174.
[4] For hierarchy in traditional Japanese social structure see Nakane Chie, *Japanese Society*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1970. Also see Ruth Benedict's classic war era text, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946.

protestors were controlled by "outside agitators" through the opposition parties.[5] The only

major work in English on the protests, written by an employee of the U.S. Embassy,

"frequently lapses into the simplistic claim that Ampo was the result of an international

conspiracy."[6] While acknowledging that opposition party leaders did attempt to maintain

ideological and organizational unity, Sasaki-Uemura argues that the majority of

participants were conscious political actors rather than an unconscious mass. According to

Sasaki-Uemura, earlier scholarship that concentrated upon government and party leaders

fails to explain the size and vehemence of the protests. His work aims to restore the

political significance of the movement by recovering the voices of the participants through

the various groups' own publications, participant-observer accounts, and interviews with

members. Sasaki-Uemura traces the development of four different citizen groups that

participated in the Ampo movement, three of which continue to operate in Japan today.

The largest and most famous group among Sasaki-Uemura's case studies is known as

the "Voiceless Voices" (Koe Naki Koe no Kai). The existence of a group such as the

Voiceless Voices runs counter to the Communist conspiracy explanations of the protest, for

it was formed without support from the Socialist or Communist parties or their affiliated

labor federations. The Voiceless Voices are representative of a number of similar citizen

groups that came to the protests of their own volition and that spontaneously organized

themselves through face-to-face contact. When asked by reporters about the group's

membership, the spokesperson's reply was that anyone who had gathered and did not

---

[5] Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.

[6] Ibid., p. 217. Sasaki-Uemura's criticism is aimed at George Packard's *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

belong to any particular organization was a member.[7] The group advocated a philosophy of

"just do what you can" in order to attract bystanders to join the protests. They were thereby

able to gain support from working people unable to fully commit themselves because of

restrictions of time and profession.[8] This approach clearly had drawbacks with regard to

long-term commitment and continuity, but during the demonstrations it helped create an

alternative to the obligatory participation demanded by the opposition parties.[9] The group

assiduously avoided attempts to centralize leadership because it would tend to encourage

executive style decision-making. The Voiceless Voices did not promote attempts to educate

or enlighten the masses, but rather encouraged participants to give further attention to

"voiceless voices" that remained as yet unheard. Their only acknowledged premise for

being was a general theme of noncooperation with any war effort. As Sasaki-Uemura

states, "they consciously aimed at a formless solidarity that was nonsectarian and

nonpartisan and focused on debate and political engagement."[10]

Sasaki-Uemura's treatment of the Ampo protests locates their importance in terms of

the social consequences they engendered. He views the May 1960 Ampo protests as the

peak in a long arc of debates focused upon redefining the nature of social relations within

the "imagined community" of Japan, "not a brief event that began and ended with an

outburst of street demonstrations."[11]

---

[7] Sasaki-Uemura, p.159.
[8] See Takabatake Michitoshi, "Citizens' Movements: Organizing the Spontaneous" in J. Victor Koschman ed., *Authority and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978: p.191.
[9] Sasaki-Uemura, p.161
[10] Ibid., p.166.
[11] Ibid., p.22.

The failure of the Ampo movement to block ratification of the 1960 Security Treaty led to a period of reflection and soul searching among many of its participants. Many of the activists that had reveled in the new air of self-expression catalyzed by the Ampo protests began to rebel against the discipline and authority of the leadership in the opposition parties. Many placed a new priority upon protest as a means to make individual voices heard without regard for the type of organizational and ideological unity demanded by leaders of the Communist and Socialist Parties. The shift in orientation toward greater individual self-expression and the development of new "horizontal associational networks" was therefore a byproduct of the activists' Ampo experience. This philosophical transition was documented in Ellis Krauss' 1974 follow-up study of the Ampo protestors. Krauss interpreted the 1960 activists as a transitional generation, noting that, "since 1960, independent expression of political views and emphasis on grass-roots participatory democracy have been increasingly stressed in the student movement and in the multiplying citizen's action groups of the new Left."[12]

Although it is hard to know with any degree of certainty how much the individualism evident in the Ampo movement penetrated the larger society, longitudinal survey data gathered by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo does seem to indicate a shift in public opinion related to the principle of individual self-expression in the Ampo period and beyond. The institute's Japanese National Character Study, conducted every five years since 1953, asks whether or not the Prime Minister should pay a visit to the Imperial Shrine at Ise after taking office. The question aimed at identifying the Japanese

---

[12] Ellis Krauss, *Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974: p.69.

people's postwar view of the relationship between the state and religion. Shortly after the end of the Occupation in 1953, a majority of Japanese held the view that the Prime Minister either "should go" or that it was "better for him to go". By 1958, these two categories had declined to a combined 38 percent, while respondents who thought it "better that he not go" or that he "should not go" increased from 8 to 17 percent. When the survey was conducted in 1963, however, a noticeable shift away from both ideological positions toward the response "suit himself" (41%) can be detected.[13] The idea that the Prime Minister should be allowed to decide for himself whether or not to visit Ise has subsequently grown to a majority of over 60 percent in the 1990s (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Some Prime Ministers, when they take office, pay a visit to the Imperial Shrine at Ise. What do you think about this practice?

	Should go	Better to go	Suit himself	Better not to go	Should not go	Others	D.K.	Total (%)
1953	7	50	23	6	2	2	10	100
1958	5	33	27	12	5	2	16	100
1963	4	28	41	9	5	3	10	100
1968	3	28	33	14	6	6	10	100
1973	4	21	48	10	5	3	9	100
1978	3	17	51	7	5	8	9	100
1983	2	19	52	6	4	9	8	100
1988	2	16	59	6	4	7	6	100
1993	2	17	64	6	3	1	8	100
1998	2	16	62	6	4	1	9	100

Source: Japanese National Charcter Survey

Responses to another question on the Japanese National Character Survey display the growing reluctance of Japanese citizens to submit to political authority during this period. The question asks whether or not the respondent agrees that the best way to improve the country is to leave everything to outstanding political leaders, rather than for the people

---

[13] Chikio Hayashi and Yasumasa Kuroda discuss the postwar trend toward a more individual level orientation evident in the Japanese National Character Survey data in *Japanese Culture in Comparative Perspective*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997:pp.55-71.

to discuss things among themselves. In 1953 when the question was asked for the first time, a plurality of the respondents agreed that leaving politics to outstanding leaders was best for the country (see Figure 3.1). By 1958, however, the response rate had been reversed, with a plurality of respondents unwilling to submit to political authority. By 1968 the response "disagree" had become a majority with 51 percent. This trend has continued to grow into the 1990s as well.

Figure 3.1 Leave Decisions to Politicians

Japan National Character Study, Surveys 1-10

Note: Response categories were changed after the
1973 survey to exclude the "it depends" category.

The expansion of American military involvement in Vietnam during the mid 1960s gave renewed life to the peace movement at a time when many Japanese had become focused upon their new sense of economic prosperity. Strategic arguments raised by the protest movement in opposition to the 1960 Security Treaty now could be evaluated in a much less abstract manner, as Japan became a staging ground for United States troops preparing to enter Vietnam.

Previous warnings that Japan would "automatically" become embroiled in American

led wars took on enhanced meaning as American bombers moved through bases in

Okinawa on their way to carpet bomb cities in Vietnam. Reminisces of the air raids on

Tokyo during the Pacific War, along with the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

encouraged a great deal of empathy for the Vietnamese, especially among the war

generation.[14]

Perhaps of more importance, in this respect, was the rekindling of still unresolved

issues of war responsibility that mingled amongst the feelings of empathy for Vietnamese

as victims. Watching the Americans launch an unpopular war from Japanese soil on an

Asian neighbor heightened popular consciousness of Japan's role as an aggressor during

World War II.

Within a renewed discourse aimed at the withdrawal of American bases and

protecting the Peace Constitution, came a more direct call for Japanese people to

overcome the sense of victimization that had dominated past protest movements. Anti-

Vietnam War protest leaders such as Oda Makoto reasoned that without accepting their

own responsibility as past victimizers, peace activists (and the Japanese people in

general) would be unable to achieve the self-autonomy necessary to challenge

government policy and affect change.[15]

Emphasis was placed to a greater extent upon self-criticism and personal

responsibility than was the case during the 1960 Ampo era protests. Whereas the Ampo

struggle had aimed primarily at preventing the Japanese government from impinging

---

[14] See Wada Susumu, *Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki: Kurashi no nakano Kempo. (Postwar Japan's Peace Consciousness: the constitution in daily life)*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997: 109-111.

[15] Oda Makoto, "The Ethics of Peace," in J. Victor Koschman ed., *Authority and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1978.

upon the representation rights of Japanese citizens, the current era demanded that one explicitly separate oneself from the government's policy (of supporting the United States war efforts) or face unavoidable complicity in the war against Vietnam.[16]

While the socialist affiliated labor federation Sōhyō took initiative in organizing labor strikes to protest against the government's policies, new groups such as the Citizen's Federation for Peace in Vietnam (abbreviated as Beheiren in Japanese) played a key role in the anti-Vietnam War movement. With many of its members drawn from Ampo era citizen's groups such as the Voiceless Voices, Beheiren also took the form of a loosely connected horizontal network. Membership in Beheiren did not preclude simultaneous membership in other groups and Beheiren made no attempt to centralize control over affiliated citizen's groups. Like the Voiceless Voices, Beheiren refused any partisan affiliation or adherence to a particular ideological stance beyond the desire to end the war. This antagonized the Communist and Socialist parties to such an extent that they appeared to consider Beheiren and its "unenlightened bourgeois movement" a larger threat than the Liberal Democratic Party.[17]

By declaring its purpose to be expressly connected to ending the Vietnam War and committing itself to dissolution when this task had been accomplished, Beheiren distinguished itself as a model for many other issue oriented citizen groups. Through adopting a plan of limited objectives and avoiding long-range ideological commitments, these groups opened themselves to greater citizen participation and connected with broader stratums of Japanese society.

---

[16] Ishida Takeshi, *Nihon no Seiji to Kotoba: Heiwa to Kokka (Japanese Politics and Language: Peace and the State)*. Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1989: pp.116-117.
[17] Thomas R.H. Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965-1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987: 55. Also cited in Sasaki-Uemura, p.208.

The new climate of self-expression and personal responsibility contributed to the success of loosely structured organizations such as Beheiren in mobilizing anti-war rallies and maintaining links with other anti-war movements outside of Japan. Beheiren exchanged information regarding tactics of passive resistance such as sit-ins and teach-ins with a variety of protest movements that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[18] Other citizens' movements of this era also adopted a decentralized model of network organization as a means of ensuring free expression and open debate.

Among the most successful of the postwar protest movements that emerged during this period were the resident-based environmental movements. In his recent survey of the environmental movement Jeffrey Broadbent places the movement within a cycle of protest that began with the Ampo era protests.[19] Broadbent argues that student veterans of the Ampo movement contributed to the environmental movement by seeding communities that wished to protest pollution with leaders having good knowledge of organizing and tactics.

Similarly, David Apter and Nagoya Sawa have linked the viability of the Sanrizuka protest movement to support it received from members of New Left movements such as Beheiren, who had cut their political teeth in the Ampo 1960 era movement.[20] Residents protesting the development of nuclear power plants, bullet train lines, and many other public works projects in the 1980s drew from the organizational and philosophical legacy

---

[18] Ibid, pp.105-106.
[19] Jeffrey Broadbent, *Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest.* Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998.
[20] David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa, *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan.* Cambridge, Massachusetts and London England: The Harvard University Press, 1984. The Sanrizuka protests arose when a group of farmers refused to surrender their land to the Japanese government for the building of the Tokyo International Airport.

passed down from the early Ampo movements.[21]

The organizational networks have often outlasted the individual protest movements from which they emerged and continue to provide support for a variety of causes. In the 1990s "Trial Support Groups" have formed to help civil plaintiffs combat social pressure to give up their battles with the government and provide support for prisoner's detained for extended periods prior to trial. These groups work to correct miscarriages of justice in the trial system and also participate in related reform movements.[22]

Although the various protest groups mentioned above have had mixed results in obtaining their stated goals, they contributed to the creation of anti-hierarchical organizational norms and helped to legitimize the idea of protest and opposition in a society lacking a strong tradition of the right to dissent.[23] It is in this sense that we can conclude that the early postwar peace movement made a major contribution to the social capital of postwar Japanese democracy.

3.2 Antimilitarism and the "1955 System"

While many post Ampo social activists began to focus upon politics at the regional and local levels in the 1960s, the Japan Socialist Party continued to carry the banner of the peace movement in parliamentary politics. After forming a coalition with the Right Wing Socialists in 1955, the party appeared to be on the verge of challenging the conservatives for control of the government. Socialist gains motivated the conservative Liberal and Democratic parties to merge in 1955 in an attempt to head off the Socialist

---

[21] Sasaki-Uemura, p. 212.

[22] Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Civil Society and Japan's New Left: Autonomy and Resistance." Invited presentation at the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Washington, May 10, 2002.

[23] See Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Protest and Democracy," in Takeshi Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss eds., *Democracy in Japan*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989.

76

challenge. [24] The subsequent conservative attempt to rollback Occupational reforms (described in chapter two) inspired a wave of social protests that helped push the Socialists over the threshold of seats necessary to block any attempt at constitutional revision in the Lower House election of 1958.[25]

The 1960s were a different story for the Socialist Party. The JSP's level of support stagnated at roughly one-third of the voters, and hopes of obtaining control over the government were dashed (see Table 3.2). By the late 1960s the JSP had become desperate to stem the tide of its own decline. While Socialists elsewhere were developing less ideologically divisive platforms suited to a more broad based appeal, the JSP renewed their commitment to the strong antimilitarist themes that had been the boon of the party's early success. This strategic decision contributed to the Liberal Democrats remaining unchallenged at the national level and helped to lock the Socialists into a position of perennial opposition until 1993, when the end of the Cold War and a new debate regarding Japan's international role began to undermine the party's traditional support base.

It is important, however, not to let the JSP's failures at the national level of electoral politics blind us to achievements of the party in other areas. The party's doctrinaire defense of antimilitarist norms must be considered within the context of a long-term ideological battle for the heart and soul of Japanese democracy. This section will therefore attempt to highlight in rather broad strokes some of the trade-offs inherent in

---

[24] Masumi Junnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955.* Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985, p.306.
[25] Constitutional revision requires a two-thirds majority in the Lower House.

the "1955 system".[26]

A number of factors contributed to the Socialist Party's stagnation in the 1960s.

Conflict between the left and right wings of the party over support for the Security Treaty

led to a split and the creation of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in January of

Table 3.2 Seats obtained in House of Representatives by Party:1946-1993

year	Liberals/ LDP	Progressives/ Democrats*	Rt. Wing Socialist/ DSP	Komeito	Lft. Wing Socialists/JSP	JCP
1946		94			92	5
1947	131	121			143	4
1949	264	69			48	35
1952	240	85	57		54	0
1953	199	111	66		72	1
1955	112	185	67		89	2
1958	287				166	1
1960	296		17		145	3
1963	283		23		144	5
1967	277		30	25	140	5
1969	288		31	47	90	14
1972	271		19	29	118	38
1976	249		29	55	123	17
1979	248		35	57	107	39
1980	284		32	33	107	29
1983	250		38	58	112	26
1986	300		26	56	85	26
1990	275		14	45	136	16
1993	223	55	15	51	70	15

Source: Adapted from Tanaka Aiji, 1996, p. 33
*Merged with the Liberal Party in 1955.
Note: Smaller parties have been omitted.

1960.[27] In the early 1960s the JSP also faced increasing competition for the opposition

vote from the renewed Communist Party (JCP) and its strong local organizational

networks. In 1964 the Sōka Gakkai (a proselytizing Buddhist sect) organized the

Komeitō (Clean Government) Party under a mantle of anti-corruption that also pandered

---

[26] Japanese political scientists have characterized the ideologically based battle between the LDP and the JSP that resulted in one-party dominance as the "1955 system".

[27] Ibid., p.55. The split between the JSP and the DSP in 1960 helps to explain why the JSP actually lost votes in the 1960 election, but does not explain the JSP's continued decline later in the decade.

to the ideals of international peace supported by the JSP.[28] Both the Communists and the Komeitō benefited from strong organizational support, though they were limited in their mass appeal and were unable to challenge the JSP's support base among the largest labor federations.

The JSP's base of support in the left oriented Sōhyō labor federation was itself a mixed blessing. After the departure of the right wing Socialists, the JSP became increasingly dependent upon support from Sōhyō, which made it difficult for them to fashion a more broad based platform that would appeal to farmers, small-businessmen and the general middle class.[29]

The Ampo generation's search for greater autonomy described above also had a deleterious effect upon the Japan Socialist Party's (JSP) parliamentary fortunes in the 1960s. A critical factor contributing to the JSP's devastating defeat in the 1969 election (a loss of 50 seats in the Lower House) was the mass exodus of activists from the party's youth organizations.[30] The exodus was in part catalyzed by the expulsion of the Anti-War Youth Committee, which had originally been established as a moderate vehicle for attracting young activists to the labor federations. It was not long before the young trade unionists who were active in protests against the United States involvement in the Vietnam War, began to challenge their superiors in the labor movement. Disturbed by these attacks within its constituent organizations, Sōhyō demanded that this group be

---

[28] For the Komeitō Party's lukewarm commitment to the peace movement see Stephen Johnson, *Opposition Politics in Japan: Strategies under a One-Party Dominant Regime*. London and New York: Nissan Institute/Routledge, 2000: p.17.

[29] Robert A. Scalapino and Masumi Junnosuke, *Parties and Politics In Contemporary Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962: pp.76-77.

[30] Stephen Johnson, p.64.

expelled from the JSP.[31]

The expulsion of the Anti-War Youth Committee severely damaged the JSP's popular base among young, urban voters. The JSP's electoral decline in urban areas also came at a time when economic expansion was undermining the JSP's appeal for a class-based political struggle against the reactionary LDP government and its big capitalist allies. With little popular support for a socialist transformation of society, the JSP found itself caught between the need to maintain its core support within the militant unionists of Sōhyō and the desire to shore up its shrinking support among citizens' groups and the general populace.

The strategy pursued by the JSP was to concentrate its efforts upon citizens concerned with tendencies of the LDP government toward "fascism and militarism". Thus while socialist parties in Europe were transforming their ideological platforms to conform with growing political apathy associated with postindustrial affluence, the JSP remained locked into a more traditional leftist ideological stance that focused criticism upon rearmament as a conservative tool for re-instituting authoritarian control.[32]

One factor that contributed to the differences in strategy between the European and Japanese Socialists was proximity to the Soviet Union. Because the Soviet Union posed a less credible threat in Japan than in Europe, steps taken by the Japanese government to rebuild military strength were looked upon with greater suspicion by a broader section of the public (including the mass media) in Japan than in Europe.

---

[31] Ibid., p.64.

[32] Hideo Otake, "Defense Controversies and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany," in T.J. Pempel ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University press, 1990: p. 159.

Conservatives in Japan were less concerned with the Soviet Union as a real threat to security and felt freer to challenge the Left for control over public opinion. By linking issues of defense and security together with other ideologically charged issues such as constitutional revision and educational reforms aimed at increasing patriotism, conservatives prolonged an ideological debate that was put to rest much earlier in countries like West Germany. As Otake Hideo writes, "there has been no shortage of rightist statements or policy proposals from LDP politicians, which could be interpreted as reflecting a desire to restore the prewar regime; these opinions have been most saliently manifested on defense issues."[33] With little in the way of contrasting economic policies to offer, the JSP came to be seen as a single-issue veto group, rather than a true alternative governing party. In the process the war renunciation clause of Article 9 of the constitution was infused with symbolic meaning as the last line of defense for the liberal democratic constitutional regime.[34]

When attempting to assess whether or not the JSP's obstinate position on defense issues and constitutional revision was warranted, it is important to keep in mind that a positive appreciation of "democracy" took hold in public opinion only gradually. As shown in Table 3.3, during the 1960s less than 40 percent of the public viewed democracy as an unquestionable "good." As late as 1973 only 43 percent of those polled gave democracy their unqualified support.

---

[33] Ibid., p. 159.
[34] Ibid., p.159.

Table 3.3 Support for Democracy by Year

	1963	1968	1973	1993
good	38	38	43	59
Depends on*	49	52	46	33
not good	3	3	2	1
Don't Know	10	7	9	7

Source: Japanese National Character Survey, Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Research Report General Series no.75.

Figures given are for percentages. * Depends upon circumstances

In his comparison of the JSP with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Otake points to an ironic difference between the two parties in terms of their electoral strategies and policy achievements. The SPD, Otake notes, possessed a much larger organizational support base and was freer to moderate its ideology in order to broaden its mass appeal. By taking a more moderate stance toward rearmament, the SPD was able to enter a governing coalition in 1966 and gain control of the government as early as 1969. The cost of policy flexibility was that the SPD failed to prevent Adenauer's rearmament policy and has played only a marginal role in defense policymaking overall. In contrast, the JSP, while unable to participate in government through most of the postwar era, has had considerable success in making its imprint felt in Japanese defense policies. This impact can be seen in Japan's three non-nuclear principles, the 1 percent of GNP limit on defense spending, and the considerable difficulties the Japanese defense agency has encountered in its efforts to engage in strategic planning.[35]

---

[35] Otake, p.160. For a detailed discussion of domestic constraints on defense planning see Joseph Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

Despite the JSP's inability to increase its support beyond roughly one-third of the electorate, social norms regarding antimilitarism remained remarkably stable.[36] While most Japanese have accepted both the necessity and constitutionality of the SDF, very few have supported increases in the military budget.[37] Public opinion polls also show that opposition to revising the Constitution continued to increase through 1990 (see Figure 3.2).

One of the most significant challenges to postwar antimilitarist norms came from the Nakasone administration in the 1980s. As the head of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) from 1970-1971 Nakasone had advocated a more autonomous defense posture for

Figure 3.2 Should Japan Revise its Constitution for the purpose of maintaining a Regular Military?

Source: Asahi Sonorama, 1994. Asahi Shinbun Survey Research Division.
Note 1: "Other" and no answer omitted.
Note 2: The question in 1970 is slightly different.

Japan. It therefore came as no great surprise that after becoming prime minister, Nakasone was intent upon breaking the military taboo embodied in Article 9 of the Peace

[36] See Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996: p.116.
[37] See Glen Hooks, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996: 105-110.

Constitution.[38] In order to do this he proposed a more independent defense posture within

the framework of the Mutual Security Treaty and a more hard-line approach to the Soviet

Union during the 1980s. From a realist perspective on foreign policy, both could be seen

as rational responses to increasing regional instability and the perceived decline of United

States power and commitment in the region.[39] Yet, despite couching his rhetoric within

established political discourse (references to the "Peace Constitution", the "three non-

nuclear principles", etc.), Nakasone and the LDP suffered one of their largest electoral

setbacks since 1955 in the 1983 elections. Nakasone's announced desire to break the 1

percent of GNP ceiling on defense spending prior to the 1983 election brought strident

criticism from opposition parties. Opinion polls also demonstrated that the public

perceived a conspicuous tilt to the right in the government's attitude on defense and

constitutional questions.[40] Many observers thus attributed the defeat in 1983 to

Nakasone's hawkishness. It was only after Nakasone moderated his stance that the LDP

was able to recoup its losses in 1986.[41]

Rather than attributing the defeat of Nakasone's defense agenda to geo-strategic

factors or domestic political groups attempting to obstruct closer relationships with the

United States, Thomas Berger has located the source of Nakasone's failure in the ability

of ad hoc alliances between the political Left and Center to block proposals that they

perceived to be the first steps toward the dismantling of postwar Japanese democracy.[42]

Writing of Japan in the late 1990s, Berger continues to see a society with deep suspicion

---

[38] Ibid., p.119.

[39] Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan.* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998: p.196.

[40] Glen Hooks, p.188.

[41] Katzenstein, pp.117-118.

[42] Berger, p.196.

regarding the intentions of conservative policymakers. According to Berger, the idea that antidemocratic forces remain ready to engineer a reactionary takeover is deeply ingrained in the nation's political-military culture, despite the gradual moderation of right wing rhetoric and the reformation of the party system following the end of the Cold War.[43]

The 1990s have indeed brought numerous changes to the Japanese political landscape. The end of the Cold War externally contributed to the end of the ideologically divided "1955 System" in Japan. Within 5 years of the end of the Cold War both the LDP and the JSP had suffered considerable electoral setbacks. The Gulf crisis of 1991 brought increasing pressure for Japan to make an "international contribution" and provided stimulus for a renewed debate on Japanese security issues. Saber rattling in the Taiwan Straits during the mid 1990s along with North Korean missile launches in 1998 have further increased defense consciousness, moving Japan toward what one analyst has characterized as a "reluctant realism".[44] Other analysts have already predicted Japan's return to a "normal state" status on defense policy.[45] Ozawa Ichiro, a former secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party, has even staked his political reputation on Japan's becoming a "normal country". [46]

At this time it remains to be seen how the reformation of the political parties will affect the future role of the Self Defense Forces. What is apparent, however, is the importance of understanding popular attitudes in shaping the eventual outcome of party

---

[43] Ibid., p.196.
[44] Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power.* N.Y., New York: Palgrave, 2001.
[45] See A. Arrington, "Cautious Reconciliation: The Change in Society-Military relations in Germany and Japan since the end of the Cold War," *Armed Forces and Society.* July 2002, vol.28, no.4, pp.531-554.
[46] See his *Blueprint for a new Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation.* Tokyo, Kodansha International, 1994. Ozawa led his faction of supporters out of the LDP in 1993, causing the LDP to fall from power for the first time since 1955.

positions. In the next section we will therefore attempt to ascertain how public opinion is responding to the various challenges of the contemporary era.

3.3 Persistence and Change in Japanese Public Opinion during the 1990s

Thus far we have seen how Japanese defense and security policies became a major source of controversy in the post-1945 period. The Japanese people's own sense of victimization under a militant regime, cultivated by Occupation forces and later championed by pro-democratic forces in the early postwar period, has played a pivotal role in the development of national identity and politics.

Social norms based upon mass attitudes are of course not set in stone. Both long-term historical forces as well as shorter-term influences of specific domestic and international events shape Japanese attitudes related to defense and security issues. As was previously noted, a number of events in the 1990s have given impetus to a reevaluation of Japanese security policy. Some scholars have also reported a shift to a more nationalistic attitude in public memory of the past, as economic uncertainty whittles away at the new postwar identity.[47] Whether or not these changes have penetrated society in a way that may alter the course of Japanese democracy in the foreseeable future will be the subject of this section and the chapters that follow.

One of the most significant changes in public attitudes to take place during the 1990s pertains to revision of the Constitution. As discussed earlier, opposition to revision of the Constitution had grown steadily up until 1990. This trend made a sudden shift in the early 1990s, due primarily to the controversy surrounding the Gulf War crisis that lead to the passage of new legislation allowing for the overseas dispatch of the SDF. The ban on

---

[47] Carol Gluck, "The Past in the Present," in Andrew Gordon ed., *Postwar Japan as History*. Berkeley and Loa Angeles: University of California Press, 1993: pp.64-95.

overseas dispatch of the SDF had been instituted in 1954 as part of a compromise

between the conservative and opposition parties at the time of the SDF's creation (see

chapter two). The compromise maintained the spirit, if not the letter of Article 9, which

was written with the intent of preventing Japan from engaging in the type of aggressive

war that had led to the country's devastation.

The ban on overseas dispatch was put to the test during the Gulf War of 1990.

Criticism by the United States and other foreign governments of Japan's refusal to

contribute militarily to the "international effort" fueled controversy in Japan that led

eventually (after the war was over) to the passage of the United Nations Peace-Keeping

Operations Bill (PKO Bill) in June 1992. This bill allowed Japan to contribute to

peacekeeping operations overseas, but contained five restraining principles necessary to

win over the support of the centrist DSP and Komeito parties. The criterion for the SDF's

participation in a UN peace-keeping operation include: 1) a ceasefire agreement has been

reached between the parties to the conflict; 2) the agreement of the parties to the conflict

on Japan's participation in the operation; 3) strict observance of neutrality; 4) withdrawal

of Japanese forces from participation when the above conditions are not met; 5) limits on

the use of weapons to the necessary minimum for self-defense.[48] The restrictions

essentially blocked the SDF from participating in military action abroad while allowing it

to play a support role once hostilities have ceased.

The government's argument for overriding the postwar ban on overseas dispatch of

the SDF played upon the Japanese people's desire to contribute to international peace and

prosperity. Now recognized as a world economic power, it was necessary for Japan to

---

[48] Glen Hooks, p.91.

make an "international contribution" commensurate with its new status on the world

stage. Though critics urged that the government's action did not go beyond making an

"American contribution," the rhetoric of Japan making an "international contribution"

had powerful mass appeal. [49]

Evidence of this mass level appeal began to show up in polls carried out by the

Yomiuri Shinbun between 1991 and 1993. As Figure 3.3 demonstrates, a majority of

Japanese began to favor revising the Constitution at this time.

The shift in public support toward revision of the constitution has emboldened the

efforts of conservative leaders such as Nakasone and Ozawa to build support for a new

Figure 3.3 Support for Revising the Constitution

identity for Japan as a "normal state". Yet before concluding that their efforts will be

successful, it is important to consider the motivations behind the change in public support

for the Constitution. A follow up to the question on revising the constitution above asks

[49] Ibid., p.95.

respondents to indicate why they support revision of the constitution. The response

frequencies (shown in Table 3.4 below) indicate that the majority of Japanese supporting

revision of the Constitution has done so in order for Japan to make an "international

contribution". Of the five reasons for supporting revision listed, the response "in order to

stipulate clearly the state's right to self-defense and establish a regular military" has

consistently received the least support.

Table 3.4 Reason for Supporting Revision of the Constitution

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
(1)	55.7	62.0	56.9	53.7	49.9	50.3	45.8	45.7	50.7
(2)	31.1	30.6	28.8	29.5	32.3	30.0	28.8	29.6	27.1
(3)	23.1	28.0	22.3	26.8	29.9	22.2	23.8	27.9	24.3
(4)	20.8	21.1	22.2	27.3	26.7	32.3	30.1	30.8	30.6
(5)	—	—	21.0	17.8	20.9	17.8	20.0	21.7	18.9

Reasons for supporting revision (responses in percentages)

1) Because new issues like international contribution have arisen which cannot be dealt with under the present Constitution.

2) Because confusion will arise if responses are made by the interpretation and application of the Constitution.

3) Because the Constitution was imposed by the United States.

4) Because there is too much emphasis on rights and a neglect of duties.

5) In order to stipulate clearly the state's right of self-defense and establish a regular military.

Source: Nihon no Yoron (Yomiuri Shinbunsha Yoron Chousabu, 2002)

Further evidence that the public has not yet abandoned the notion of a "peace

state" (*heiwa kokka*) can be seen in surveys directed specifically at the issue of revising

Article 9. Figure 3.4 combines responses from a series of surveys carried out by the

Mainichi newspaper from 1982 to 1994 with two surveys carried out by the *Asahi*

Shinbun in 1997 and 2001. In this survey data it becomes apparent that the general

support for revising the Constitution seen in the Yomiuri survey data above is not

matched by an equal desire to revise the "no war" clause of the Constitution symbolized

89

Figure 3.4 Support for Article 9

Source: (1982-1994) Mainichi Newspaper Surveys (1997 and 2001 Asahi Shinbun)
Note: Response "Other" and no answer omitted.

in Article 9. Support for Article 9 grew throughout the Nakasone years of the 1980s and

has held at between 70 to 80 percent throughout the turbulent 1990s and into 2001.

The Asahi survey of 1997, carried out on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the

postwar Constitution, asks whether or not the decision to renounce war and never

maintain military forces embodied in the postwar Constitution was a good idea.[50] Eighty-

two percent of Japanese indicated that it was, while only 10 percent disagreed. Seventy-

two percent of the respondents in the same survey believed that the declaration of the

"renunciation of war" has contributed to peace in the Asia-Pacific region and seventy-

three percent also believe that the idea of "renunciation of war" in the Constitution will

contribute to future peace in the world.

Poll data like those referred to above give some insight as to why Prime Minister

Koizumi, despite assuming office in April 2001 with the highest rates of support in the

postwar era, soon relinquished his desire to revise Article 9 in order to make way for

---

[50] Survey on the Constitution reported in the *Asahi Shinbun*, April 26, 1997.

Japan to participate in collective self-defense. In his first news conference as prime minister, Koizumi acknowledged that revising Article 9 would be "politically difficult" to accomplish at this time and instead settled upon a more popular plan to make the office of prime minister a directly elected position.[51]

Public opinion trends with reference to the SDF also indicate that support for revising the Constitution does not yet mean that popular support for a "regular military" exists.[52] In this regard it is important to differentiate increasing public support for the SDF in its support of peacekeeping operations under the auspice of the United Nations from a desire to see Japan become a military power in its own right. As Figure 3.5 indicates, public opinion at the time of the original PKO legislation was fairly evenly divided as to whether or not SDF participation in these operations would constitute a violation of the Constitution. The most recent data show that the majority of the public has come to accept the argument that overseas dispatch of the SDF in this context does not present a Constitutional problem.

Figure 3.5 Does sending the SDF overseas to participate in PKO represent a Constitutional problem?

year / month	No	Yes	Other	No answer
1992/4	44.9	41.1	1	12.7
1992/6	34	55.9	0	9.3
1993/3	45.4	42.6	1	10.8
1994/3	45.8	44.8	0	9.2
2001/3	69.2	19.2	0	10.7

Source: Nihon no Yoron (Yomiuri Shinbunsha Yoron Chousabu, 2002)

---

[51] Saeki Toshiro, "Amendment is Just a Grand Illusion," *Japan Quarterly*. October-December 2001: p.77.
[52] On this point see Glen Hooks, pp.103-104.

The new role of the SDF as a means for Japan to make a contribution to United

Nations peacekeeping operations has enhanced its image in the 1990s. As Figure 3.6

indicates, a growing number of Japanese have gained a positive general impression of the

SDF during the 1990s, with a related decline in those holding a negative impression of

the SDF generally.

Figure 3.6 General Impression of the SDF

year / month	good	not bad	do not know	not good	bad
1969.9	26.7	42.1	17.1	10.8	3.4
1973.11	16.5	42.4	16.9	19.5	4.8
1975.1	21.1	48.1	13.1	13.5	4.1
1978.12	22.6	52.8	11.1	11.2	2.3
1981.12	20.1	51.1	11.2	14.4	3.1
1984.11	20.1	54.2	9	13.7	3.1
1988.1	22.6	54.1	7.8	13.1	2.4
1991.2	20.3	47.2	13.1	15.3	4.1
1994.1	26.4	50.4	9.9	11.4	1.9
1997.2	30.7	49.8	7.8	10.5	1.2
2000.1	31.5	50.7	7.3	8.8	1.6

Percentage

Source: Bōei Nenkan 2001.

92

The trend toward a more positive view of the SDF in recent years does not belie the fact that a majority of Japanese people remain unwilling to lend it a wholesale endorsement, choosing the response "not bad". In this sense there appears to be a continued desire among the majority of Japanese to hold the power of the SDF in check. This trend becomes more apparent when viewing data on defense expenditures. The trend toward a more positive view of the SDF has yet to motivate a corresponding desire to see the SDF expand. When questioned as to whether the budget for the SDF should increase, decrease or remain the same, a growing majority has opted for the status quo (see Figure 3.7).

Figur 3.7 Defence Expenditures

year / month	strengthen	status quo	don't know	decrease
1969.9	24.1	38.2	23.9	13.8
1973.11	9.8	42	25	23.2
1975.1	12.7	48.2	23.6	15.4
1978.12	19.8	47.6	22.6	10
1981.12	20.1	47.3	17.6	15
1984.11	14.2	54.1	14	17.7
1988.1	11.2	58	11.7	19.2
1991.2	8.1	55.6	10.3	26.1
1994.1	6.2	58.5	15.6	19.7
1997.2	7.4	56	14.7	21.9
2000.1	10.7	61.7	13.7	13.9

Percentage

Source: Bōei Nenkan 2001.

The majority preference for the status quo in Japanese security policy can be seen also in support for the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Resistance to the Security Treaty has gradually withered away, with an increasing majority seeing their security interests best served by a limited SDF in conjunction with the United States-Japan Security Treaty (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8 Method of Protecting Japan's Security

Legend:
- ■ Abort Security Treaty and Increase SDF
- □ Maintain Security Treaty and SDF
- ■ Abort Security Treaty and Decrease SDF
- ■ Other
- □ Don't know

year / month	Abort Security Treaty and Increase SDF	Maintain Security Treaty and SDF	Abort Security Treaty and Decrease SDF	Other	Don't know
1969.9	12.9	40.9	9.6	1.3	35.3
1973.11	10.8	40.7	15.5	1.1	31.9
1975.1	8.6	54.3	9.5	0.6	27
1978.12	8.2	61.1	5	0.8	24.9
1981.12	6.1	64.6	7.6	0.9	20.8
1984.11	5	69.2	6.8	1.1	17.9
1988.1	5.9	67.4	7.2	1.3	18.3
1991.2	7.3	62.4	10.5	1	18.7
1994.1	4.3	68.8	7	0.7	19.2
1997.2	7.1	68.1	7.9	0.6	16.3
2000.1	8	71.2	5.8	1.2	13.8

Percentage

Source: Bōei Nenkan 2001.

94

Trends in Japanese public opinion during the 1990s, while clearly indicating a greater legitimacy for the military in certain contexts, have yet to indicate a significant break with the antimilitarist Japanese postwar identity established over the past 50 years. Attitudes related to the "no war" clause of Article 9 have remained remarkably resilient, despite the public's desire for Japan to make an international contribution to peace consonant with Japan's status as an economic superpower. Attempts by conservative leadership to link the dissolution of Article 9 with other popular causes have as yet failed to crack the hold that this symbol has on the Japanese imagination. In chapters 4 and 5 we will see how the strong antimilitarist norms embodied in Article 9 have remained intertwined with support for Japanese democracy itself.

Chapter 4

Causal Analysis of Political Support Components in Four Nations

4.0 Introduction

In chapter one the theoretical importance of distinguishing between incumbent support and support for democratic ideals in Japanese political attitudes was discussed. There it was argued that a lack of political support for incumbent politicians does not in and of itself represent a threat to system legitimacy so long as support for democratic values remains strong. In chapter four we will attempt to confirm that the theoretical distinction in political support attitudes discussed in chapter one is empirically valid for Japan and three other industrial democracies using survey data and factor analytic techniques. After confirmation of the theoretical distinction between incumbent and diffuse support (support for democratic ideals) a causal analysis of the two independent political support components will be carried out. The causal analysis will aim to determine the relative influence of economic factors and antimilitarist values upon both incumbent support and support for democratic ideals.

Countries chosen for the comparative analysis were the United States, West Germany, and Spain. Selection of these countries for the comparative analysis was based upon the theoretical considerations discussed previously in this dissertation as well as the availability of necessary items for the data analysis. The developmental state literature has distinguished the legitimation process in Japan from the United States and other Western industrialized democracies. West Germany and Spain are countries with post-authoritarian regimes that have developed along trajectories similar to Japan in the post World War II era.

In the following sections the data set to be used in the analysis will be described before proceedings to an investigation of the structure of political support in each country. Correlation and regression analyses of the political support components for each country will then be compared.

4.1 The World Values Survey 1995-97

The survey data to be utilized in the analysis was collected in the World Values Survey 1995-1997. This survey was carried out as part of a series begun in 1981 under the leadership of Ronald Inglehardt of the University of Michigan. The survey has been conducted during the periods 1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997. The series is designed to enable a crossnational comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. For the 1995-1997 survey data to be used in this analysis over 60 surveys representing more than 50 countries were carried out. All of the surveys were carried out through face-to face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens, ages 18 and over. In the usual sampling design, within each country, a multi-stage, random selection of sampling points is carried out, with a number of points being drawn from all administrative regional units after stratification by region and degree of urbanization. Response rates for the industrialized countries used in this analysis were estimated between 62 and 71 percent. The sample sizes for the country surveys utilized in the analysis are as follows: Japan N=1,054; West Germany N=1,017; United States N=1,542; Spain N=1,211. Further detail on the data collection methodology can be found in the codebook for the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-, 1990-

1993 and 1995-1997 available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR 2790).

4.2 The Structure of Political Support

As was stated in chapter one, there has been a wide consensus in Western political scholarship over a period of more than twenty years regarding the importance of distinguishing between diffuse and specific levels of political support in the attitudes of citizens. Using the World Values Survey data of 1995-1997 it is possible to confirm the validity of this distinction in the political attitudes of citizens across the globe. Prior research into political support using the World Values Survey data has been conducted by a group of international scholars that has been published in Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance.*[1] In this work Norris and her collaborators emphasized a three-layered model of political support; in which a commitment to the "political community" or nation defines the broadest layer of political allegiance and underlies support for democratic values at the diffuse end of the spectrum, while support for regime performance and political actors are identified as specific objects of political support. Hans-Dieter Klingemann's analysis in chapter two of *Critical Citizens* provides an initial mapping of the pooled data for the 1995-1997 data for 37 countries. The eight indicators used in this analysis are listed below:

Political Community Indicators

- How proud are you to be a citizen a citizen of this country? (4) Very proud, (3) quite proud, (2) not very proud, (1) not at all proud.

---

[1] Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

- Of course we all hope there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (1) yes, (0) no.

Democratic Principles

- I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each would you say it is (4) a very good, (3) a fairly good, (2) a fairly bad, or (1) a very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic system.

- I am going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic system. Could you please tell me if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly, after I read each of them? Democracy may have many problems but its better than any other form of government.

Regime Performance

- People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: (1) means very bad and (1) means very good. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?

- How satisfied are you with how the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are (4) very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, (2) fairly dissatisfied, or (1) very dissatisfied?

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (4) a great deal of confidence, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) not very much confidence, or (1) none at all? The Parliament, The Government in (Capital City).

Klingemann's factor analysis verified that the three levels of political support could be separated the pooled dataset for 38 countries.[2] In Table 4.1 a factor analysis verifies the triadic structure for each of the four countries to be used in the causal analysis of this dissertation. The factor analysis results confirm that the three dimensions associated with political community, democratic ideals and regime performance can be separated in Japan as well as the three other countries under study. These results concur with the analysis I carried out in previous work using Japanese datasets ranging over a twenty-year period.[3]

Although the factor analysis results presented in Table 4.1 confirm the analytical separation of the three dimensions of political support posited by Klingemann, this dissertation will not include the dimension of "political community" in its causal analysis of democratic system support. Klingemann's general suggestion that low scores on this political community dimension do not bode well for democratic system support are questionable due to the inclusion of a variable dealing with a respondent's "willingness to fight for their country in a war". Low scale scores on this dimension for post authoritarian Japan and Germany do not take into consideration the strong traditions of antimilitarism that developed after World War II in these countries along side the growth of democratic traditions.[4] While it may be valid to consider a commitment to the larger political community as a necessary precursor to support for the democratic system, the

[2] Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s," in Pippa Norris ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.37.
[3] David Fouse, *Japan's Democratic System Support: A Multidimensional Analysis.* Unpublished dissertation for The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, Japan, 2001.
[4] See Thomas U.Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

presupposition that a willingness to fight for one's country is a valid indicator of this type

of support may not be warranted in all cases.

Table 4.1 Factor Solution of System Support Variables

Japan Data

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Dembet	.009	.791	-.068
Demsys	-.056	.787	.024
Curregim	.735	-.035	-.021
Incumsat	.569	.146	.065
Natgov	.850	-.128	.129
Parliam	.850	-.109	.144
Proud	.095	-.028	.773
Wilfight	.079	-.013	.762
Percentage of Total Variance Explained	31.1%	15.9%	13.8%
Label of Factor (Interpretation)	Incumbent Support	System Support	Political Community

USA Data

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Dembet	.012	.834	-.057
Demsys	-.083	.831	-.045
Curregim	.723	-.101	.066
Incumsat	.662	.006	.164
Natgov	.828	.015	-.041
Parliam	.778	-.025	-.004
Proud	.076	.051	.784
Wilfight	.034	-.145	.691
Percentage of Total Variance Explained	29.1%	18.0%	13.1%
Label of Factor (Interpretation)	Incumbent Support	System Support	Political Community

101

West Germany Data

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Dembet	-.113	.823	.033
Demsys	-.083	.845	.006
Curregim	.655	-.271	-.068
Incumsat	.734	.050	.217
Natgov	.854	.002	.192
Parliam	.776	-.147	.010
Proud	.140	.133	.791
Wilfight	.060	-.084	.813
Percentage of Total Variance Explained	32.8%	19.5%	13.2%
Label of Factor (Interpretation)	Incumbent Support	System Support	Political Community

Spain Data

Variables	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Dembet	-.104	.851	-.008
Demsys	-.026	.855	.028
Curregim	.716	-.136	-.148
Incumsat	.680	.041	-.027
Natgov	.815	-.015	.141
Parliam	.768	-.116	.160
Proud	.091	-.017	.758
Wilfight	-.030	.037	.792
Percentage of Total Variance Explained	29.5%	17.9%	15.2%
Label of Factor (Interpretation)	Political Trust	System Support	Incumbent Support

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Data Source: World Values Survey 1995-96.

Cross-tabulation analysis of respondents' ideological self-identification with

willingness to fight in a war confirms these reservations. Table 4.2 demonstrates that for

each of the post-authoritarian countries willingness to fight is closely associated with

102

right wing or conservative political views. This distinguishes Japan, West Germany and

Spain from the United States, where there is no statistically significant relationship

between the two variables.

Table 4.2 Willingness to Fight By Ideological Stance By Country

Country		far left	left	center	right	far right	Statistics
Japan	yes	16	20	22	36	61	C.V. = .207
	no	84	80	78	64	39	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	Sig. = .000
USA	yes	72	78	78	81	79	C.V. = .045
	no	28	22	22	19	21	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	Sig. = .682
W.Germany	yes	19	36	56	66	91	C.V. = .286
	no	81	64	44	34	9	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	Sig. = .000
Spain	yes	54	53	66	71	50	C.V. = .150
	no	46	47	34	29	50	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	Sig. = .003

Data Source: World Values Survey1995-96.
Note: C.V. = Cramer's V

In order to avoid the spurious intervention of ideological preferences in our

evaluation of democratic system support, chapter four will limit analysis to scale scores

for the dimensions of democratic values and regime performance. Further, the component

labeled "regime performance", which does not analytically separate support for the

regime institutions from current officeholders, will be interpreted as "incumbent support"

in this dissertation in order to remain consistent with the theoretical discussion in chapter

one. A scale of democratic values and an incumbent support scale were therefore

constructed in order to evaluate directly the impact that economic factors and

antimilitarism (and more broadly antiauthoritarianism) have had on political support in

Japan and three other industrialized democracies. The frequency distribution for each

country in terms of high, middle and low levels of support for each component of

political support are given below in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

Table 4.3 Incumbent Support (Regime Performance)

	Low	Middle	High
Japan	30%	64%	6%
USA	19%	67%	14%
WGermany	22%	67%	11%
Spain	31%	59%	10%

Table 4.4 Support for Democratic Ideals

	Low	Middle	High
Japan	3%	9%	88%
USA	5%	7%	88%
WGermany	2%	5%	93%
Spain	3%	5%	92%

Data Source: World Values Survey 1995-96.

The scale scores in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate that, with some mild variation, the distribution of political support attitudes for the four countries is comparable. Poor economic performance in Japan and Spain during the mid 1990s when the survey was conducted may have contributed to the higher percentage of respondents with low scale scores for incumbent support. Lower scale scores for incumbent support items did not seem to have a detrimental effect upon support for democratic ideals in these countries, however, as all four nations show scale scores at or above 88 percent.

Now having established that the conceptual framework separating democratic ideals from incumbent support can be verified in the empirical data for each of the four countries, the following sections will move to a causal analysis of the factors which contribute to these distinct objects of political support in Japan and the three other industrial democracies.

104

4.3 Analysis of Political Support Components

In the previous section the analytic distinction between support for the ideals of a

democratic system and the actual performance of incumbent politicians was verified for

datasets from Japan and three other industrial democracies. In the following sections

these separate components of political support will be analyzed in order to determine the

influence that economic factors have on each component. In doing this we will be testing

the argument set forth in the developmental state literature, namely, that in Japan a

respondent's economic outlook is largely responsible for their democratic system support.

Correlations between economic items and the two dimensions of political support in

Japan will be compared with those in the United States, West Germany, and Spain to

determine the relative importance of these items. Here we would expect that if the

developmental state model were valid, correlations between economic items and political

support components would be stronger in Japan than in the other three countries.

The counter-hypothesis being developed in this dissertation begins by asserting that

while economic factors may be strongly associated with *incumbent support* in Japan, this

is typical of political support patterns in industrialized democracies generally. The more

critical element of long-term system support in our conceptual framework is the diffuse

acceptance of democratic ideals. This chapter will investigate whether or not intrinsically

political values, such as the rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy, play a

more significant role in fostering Japanese support for democratic ideals than do

economic factors. In particular this chapter will investigate the extent to which

antimilitaristic values highlighted in chapters two and three continue to influence

Japanese support for democratic ideals. Correlations among these various attitudes will

be investigated, after which a regression analysis developed specifically for use with categorical variables will be used to compare the influence of the respondent's economic outlook with their support (or rejection of) alternative political systems for democratic system support. This causal analysis will be carried out for each of the four countries to provide interpretive context for the Japanese results.

4.4 Economic Self Interest vs. Alternative Systems: Political Support Correlations

Three economic variables dealing with a respondent's economic self-interest that were available across all four of the country datasets were selected for this part of the analysis. The three variables include a statement of the respondent's household income, the ability of the family of the respondent to save money (or on the negative side to have to borrow money), and a general measure of the respondent's financial satisfaction. While each of these measures was self-reported, here it is understood that the perception of the respondent is the key measure when attempting to determine mass attitudes toward democratic system support.

Three political variables that probe a respondent's attitude toward authoritarian alternatives to democracy are included in the World Values Survey 1995-1997. Testing this aspect of democratic support is important in determining whether a short-term failure in regime performance could lead to systemic change. This aspect has sometimes been referred to as the "default" level of democratic system support.[5] The three items included in the survey offer rule by a strong authoritarian leader, a technocratic elite and rule by

---

[5] See Leonardo Morlino and Jose R. Montero, "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," In R. Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and H. Puhle eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 231-260. Also see David Fouse, "Exploring the Default Dimension in Japanese Democratic System Support During Hard Times," published in *Behaviormetrika*, January, 2001.

the military as alternative methods of governing the respondent's country. The full

statements for the economic and authoritarian alternatives to democracy are listed below:

Economic Self-Interest

- Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. (1-10).
- During the past year, did your family: (1) save money (2) Just get by (3) Spent some savings (4) Spent savings and borrowed money.
- How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If "1" means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and "10" means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation?

Alternatives to Democracy

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about

each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good,

fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this country?

- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- Having the army rule

The scale values (1-10) for two of the economic variables were collapsed into

variables of 5 categories for all of the tests below. Scale scores for the items in the

democratic system and incumbent support dimensions were constructed and then

categorized into high, middle and low levels of political support. Table 4.5 lists the

Spearman correlations for the economic and authoritarian system alternatives with the

incumbent support component.

Table 4.5 Correlations with Incumbent Support

	Japan	USA	W Germany	Spain
Not Able to Save Money?	-.012	-.061*	-.062	-.059
High Household Income	.064	.035	.034	-.005
High Financial Satisfaction	.079*	.117**	.077*	.037
Against Strong Leader	.016	-.048	-.013	-.003
Against Experts Run Govt.	.069*	-.029	.069*	.038
Against Army Rule	-.011	-.040	-.041	.008

Table 4.6 Correlations with Democratic Ideals Support

	Japan	USA	W Germany	Spain
Not Able to Save Money?	-.033	-.069*	-.057	-.056
High Household Income	.060	.085**	.119**	.053
High Financial Satisfaction	.030	.049	.065	.020
Against Strong Leader	.055	.138**	.228**	.149**
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.020	.053	-.005	.011
Against Army Rule	.217**	.179**	.174**	.259**

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

In Table 4.5 significant correlations between incumbent support and at least one of the three economic variables can be seen in all of the countries except Spain. The item dealing with the financial satisfaction of the respondent correlates significantly with incumbent support in Japan (.079), the United States (.117) and West Germany (.077), while in the United States the "save money" item also correlates significantly at the .05 level. It should also be noted that none of the correlations are particularly strong, with only the United States having a significant correlation over .10. Among the political variables only Japan and West Germany show any significant correlation with incumbent support. The item related to technocratic rule achieves a small, but significant correlation in both of these countries (.069 for Japan and W. Germany). This correlation may result from the strong bureaucratic traditions in both of these countries.

Table 4.6 presents the correlations between democratic ideals and the same six items above. Here we find that the item offering (or rejecting) military rule as an alternative to democracy is significant for all four countries at the .01 level. Spain, with the most recent history of military intervention in politics, achieves the highest correlation on this item (.259) followed by Japan (.217), the United States (.179) and West Germany (.174). West Germany, where the legacy of Hitler remains strong, has a relatively strong correlation with the rejection of the "strong leader" alternative (.228), while Spain (.149) and the United States (.138) also have significant correlations.

Correlations among the economic items are found only in the United States and West Germany. Two economic items in the United States, household income (.085) and "save money" (.069) are significant. West Germany is the only country to gain a correlation above .10 on any of the economic measures (.119 for household income).

In terms of the preceding theoretical discussion it is important to note the following observations. First, the correlations of economic and political variables with the democratic ideals and incumbent support components do seem to coincide with the conceptual framework laid out earlier in this dissertation. That is, economic correlations are stronger with regard to incumbent support than with the democratic ideals that were theorized to be the critical area of democratic system support. Further, in Japan only the "military rule" item maintains a significant correlation with democratic ideals, while none of the economic items achieve statistical significance in this test.

The above stated results add to our understanding of the relationships involved in political support in Japan and the other three industrialize democracies, but before going into further interpretation of these results it is important to move beyond bivariate

109

correlations to a more thorough examination of the causal structure of these items using regression analysis.

4.5 Regression Analysis

In order to take a closer look at the relative impact of the two sets of variables in the above analysis on support for both incumbent support and democratic ideals a regression analysis designed for categorical variables was carried out. This procedure quantifies categorical variables using optimal scaling, resulting in an optimal linear regression equation for the transformed variables. The variables can be of mixed optimal scaling levels and no distributional assumptions are made about the variables.[6] This is important in the quantitative analysis of sociological data, where the distributional assumptions for linear regression analysis are often not met.

Table 4.7 displays the standardized beta coefficients, standard errors, F scores and Pratt's importance statistic[7] for each of the four countries using incumbent support as the dependent variable. The respondent's age (recoded into 5 subcategories) has been used in all of the regression analyses as a control variable. The results of this analysis for the Japanese data demonstrate that financial satisfaction (.340) has the largest influence among the variables tested for incumbent support, followed by the age of the respondent (.196). These results are similar to those found in the analysis of the data for the United States and West Germany, where financial satisfaction (.535 and .321 respectively) also gains the highest score on the importance statistic. In Spain, the newest of the democratic regimes, age differences appear to have the greatest influence upon incumbent support

---

[6] For more information regarding this technique see the manual *SPSS Categories 8.0* SPSS, Inc., 1998.
[7] This statistic defines the importance of the predictors additively, so that the importance of a set of predictors is the sum of the importance of the individual predictors. The measure is calculated as the product of the regression coefficient and the zero-order correlation for a predictor divided by R^2.

Table 4.7 Categorical Regression Analysis: Influences on Incumbent Support

Japan

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	-.108	.046	5.588	.118
Against Experts Run Govt.	.109	.045	5.716	.125
Against Army Rule	-.040	.043	.865	.033
High Household Income	.047	.045	1.086	.056
High Financial Satisfaction	.148	.045	11.000	.340
Not Able to Save Money?	-.080	.044	3.290	.133
Age Categories	.130	.043	.102	.196

Adj. R Square .055

USA

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	-.031	.036	.753	.055
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.003	.035	.007	.002
Against Army Rule	-.052	.036	2.114	.126
High Household Income	-.083	.035	5.497	.192
High Financial Satisfaction	.120	.035	11.537	.535
Not Able to Save Money?	-.040	.036	1.234	.076
Age Categories	-.018	.035	.279	.015

Adj. R Square .018

West Germany

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	.115	.038	9.110	.173
Against Experts Run Govt.	.108	.039	7.537	.198
Against Army Rule	-.061	.038	2.609	.049
High Household Income	.035	.038	.830	.017
High Financial Satisfaction	.150	.039	15.108	.321
Not Able to Save Money?	-.108	.038	8.060	.180
Age Categories	.089	.038	5.465	.064

Adj. R Square .073

Spain

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	-.061	.044	1.944	.074
Against Experts Run Govt.	.100	.044	5.277	.245
Against Army Rule	-.016	.042	.144	.006
High Household Income	.020	.042	.227	.009
High Financial Satisfaction	.070	.042	2.773	.166
Not Able to Save Money?	.053	.042	1.620	.065
Age Categories	.122	.042	8.702	.438

Adj. R Square .024

Data Source: World Values Survey 1995-96.

Table 4.8 Categorical Regression Analysis: Influences on Democratic Ideals

Japan

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	.018	.047	.147	.010
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.040	.046	.738	-.005
Against Army Rule	.228	.047	23.769	.572
High Household Income	.083	.047	3.093	.086
High Financial Satisfaction	.092	.046	3.949	.084
Not Able to Save Money?	-.028	.046	.359	.019
Age Categories	.158	.046	11.833	.234

Adj. R Square .078

USA

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	.072	.039	3.446	.118
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.054	.038	2.055	-.034
Against Army Rule	.174	.038	21.363	.410
High Household Income	.169	.034	23.983	.355
High Financial Satisfaction	.045	.034	1.735	.031
Not Able to Save Money?	-.022	.034	.421	.005
Age Categories	.095	.035	7.496	.113

Adj. R Square .078

West Germany

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	.264	.041	42.106	.656
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.060	.038	2.406	-.009
Against Army Rule	.121	.039	9.655	.195
High Household Income	.089	.039	5.317	.092
High Financial Satisfaction	.046	.038	1.469	.027
Not Able to Save Money?	-.020	.038	.278	.011
Age Categories	-.046	.038	1.485	.027

Adj. R Square .116

Spain

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Against Strong Leader	.078	.044	3.231	.106
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.064	.043	2.231	-.014
Against Army Rule	.266	.043	38.374	.648
High Household Income	.074	.041	3.192	.059
High Financial Satisfaction	-.082	.041	4.001	.031
Not Able to Save Money?	-.145	.041	12.637	.157
Age Categories	.043	.041	1.101	.012

Adj. R Square .096

Data Source: World Values Survey 1995-96.

(.438), with attitudes toward technocratic rule (.245) and financial satisfaction (.166) also having some impact. In general, we see the correlation between economic outlook and incumbent support that our conceptual framework would lead us to expect.

The results of the regression analysis using support for democratic ideals as the dependent variable are stated in table 4.4. Here the relative influence of the two sets of independent variables is clearly reversed for three of the four countries. In both Japan (.578) and Spain (.648) the military rule item has by far the strongest impact upon the dependent variable, while in West Germany the "strong leader" alternative has the greatest influence on support for democratic ideals (.656). Only in the United States data does one of the economic variables (household income: .355) explain a large percentage of the variance for the dependent variable. This finding is somewhat ironic given the assertions of the developmental state theory discussed in chapter one. Yet, we would not want to carry this distinction for the United States data too far, given that the combined influence of the authoritarian alternative items are stronger than the economic variables. In general we see that democratic ideals are supported more by the rejection of alternative political systems than by economic considerations in all of the four countries. Thus the causal analysis of the two distinct dimensions of political support has validated the conceptual framework of this dissertation across the four cases, including the Japanese data.

In connection with the second part of the hypothesis of this dissertation, it is important to emphasize the dominant role that the military rule item plays in support for democratic ideals in the Japanese data. The historical residue of previous authoritarian regimes is also evident in the West German and Spanish data. In West Germany the

113

"strong leader" item dominates, as might be expected given the emergence of Hitler from the democratic system that preceded him. Spain under General Franco was a military dictatorship ruled by an autocrat and the data reflect that as well. In the United States, which lacks a past tradition of authoritarian government, a much wider spread of the variance on the dependent variable can be seen. In summary, it appears that the historical trajectories of the post authoritarian regimes have had a significant impact on the nature of contemporary support for democratic values. Yet before concluding that our hypothesis concerning the relative importance of antimilitarism in the maintenance of Japanese democratic support has been validated, one further aspect of the respondent's economic outlook will be probed for its impact upon support for democratic ideals.

4.6 Sociotropic Economic Outlook vs. Antiauthoritarianism

Up to now the analysis has compared the influence of personal economic indicators with attitudes toward alternative systems upon democratic system support. One possible objection to this mode of inquiry would be to argue that Japanese people do not base their support for democracy upon individual economic considerations, but rather, their support is based upon a mediated evaluation of collective system economic performance. This type of evaluative scheme, commonly referred to in voter behavior studies as the sociotropic model, would imply that a Japanese respondent's support for democracy is based upon the system's ability to generate economic prosperity for society as a whole, regardless of the economic experience of individual citizens.[8]

---

[8] See Ronald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, 23-2 (August 1979), pp.495-527.

The World Values Survey 1995-1997 does not provide a pure measure of sociotropic

economic evaluation that can be easily utilized to explore both incumbent support and

support for democratic ideals.[9] It does, however, provide a battery of questions aimed at

measuring traditional antipathy toward democracy that may be of use in this type of

analysis. The three items in this battery of questions ask whether "democracy is bad for

the economy," "democracy is too indecisive" and if "democracy lacks order". The full

question items are stated below:

I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political

system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree

strongly, after I read each one of them?

- In democracy, the economic system runs badly.
- Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling.
- Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.

The first question item in this battery implies a generalized evaluation of economic

performance and links it directly with an evaluation of democracy as a political system.

This item is combined with two other items that measure traditional authoritarian

attitudes explicitly critical of democratic openness and tolerance. Because these items

were measured during the period of the post economic bubble recession in Japan, they

provide a further opportunity to probe the validity of the developmental state model.

One of the often-cited implications of the developmental state model is that because

support for democratic values developed hastily in response to high-speed economic

growth, it remains vulnerable to any protracted slump in the Japanese economy. In this

---

[9] Evaluation of the sociotropic economic model of democratic system support will be developed further in chapter 5 using only Japanese data collected by the author. Correlations between incumbent support and the 6 items utilized in the regression analysis below were confirmed to be too weak to provide results of any significance.

line of thought traditional antidemocratic values are said to hover closely under the

surface of a democratic veneer, poised to reemerge should the economic juggernaut ever

Table 4.9 Categorical Regression Analysis: Influences on Democratic Ideals (2)

Japan

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Democracy bad for economy	.094	.045	4.384	.126
Democracy too indecisive	-.095	.050	3.556	-.002
Democracy lacks order	.100	.053	3.537	.100
Against Strong Leader	.011	.047	.050	.008
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.050	.044	1.283	.008
Against Army Rule	.257	.044	33.364	.660
Age Categories	.103	.043	5.835	.100

Adj. R Square .10

USA

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Democracy bad for economy	.174	.033	27.808	.362
Democracy too indecisive	.103	.032	10.139	.175
Democracy lacks order	.103	.033	9.904	.176
Against Strong Leader	.079	.032	5.897	.083
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.073	.032	5.102	-.030
Against Army Rule	.087	.032	7.305	.114
Age Categories	.124	.029	17.621	.119

Adj. R Square .122

West Germany

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Democracy bad for economy	.199	.036	30.579	.375
Democracy too indecisive	-.093	.034	7.450	.024
Democracy lacks order	-.038	.034	1.268	-.002
Against Strong Leader	.194	.036	29.137	.389
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.082	.033	6.154	.011
Against Army Rule	.117	.034	11.604	.189
Age Categories	.080	.033	5.888	.015

Adj. R Square .12

Spain

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Democracy bad for economy	.248	.038	43.657	.483
Democracy too indecisive	-.053	.037	2.081	-.031
Democracy lacks order	.094	.036	6.678	.105
Against Strong Leader	.085	.037	5.309	.098
Against Experts Run Govt.	-.138	.035	15.911	.036
Against Army Rule	.190	.036	28.190	.306
Age Categories	.031	.033	.886	.004

Adj. R Square .158

Data Source: World Values Survey 1995-96.

falter.[10] The severe economic slump of the early to mid 1990s in Japan can therefore

serve as a backdrop to an investigation of the influence that these traditional value items

have on support for democratic ideals. The impact of the three traditional value items on

support for democratic ideals was compared with the alternative system items using

categorical regression analysis. The results of this analysis for each of the four countries

are presented in Table 4.9 for comparison.

Table 4.9 demonstrates that despite the economic recession in Japan preceding the

World Values Survey of 1995-1997, traditional criticisms had little impact upon support

for democratic ideals when compared with the military rule item. The importance of the

"democracy is bad for running the economy" item (.126) is dwarfed by the military rule

item (.660) and is small in comparison with each of the other industrialized democracies.

The importance of the economic item is much greater in both West Germany (.375) and

Spain (.483), where it tends to offset the importance of the alternative system items

("strong leader" and "military rule" respectively). In the United States, which lacks an

authoritarian heritage, the traditional authoritarian items clearly have greater influence

upon support for democratic ideals. Notably, concerns about the ability of democracy to

foster economic growth (.362) appear to have the greatest influence upon support for

democratic ideals in the United States.

4.7 Summary of analysis results

The results of the various analyses run in this chapter all point toward the validation

of the conceptual framework for political support offered in chapter one as an alternative

---

[10] See Chalmers Johnson's warning regarding Japanese political underdevelopment in, Japan *Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995, pp.48-49.

the developmental state model. The investigation of the Japanese data of the World

Values Survey 1995-1997 has demonstrated that while economic factors are important in

determining incumbent support and the short-term evaluation of political institutions, this

effect does not carry over into respondent's long-term support for democratic ideals.

Moreover, economic factors do not appear to have a stronger influence upon incumbent

support in Japan than in the three other industrialized democracies.

The results of the analysis indicate that critical support for democratic ideals is more

greatly affected by the rejection of alternative systems of government than by economic

considerations. In countries such as Japan, the recent historical experience of an

authoritarian regime tends to strengthen the relationship between support for democratic

ideals and the rejection of alternative systems.

The nature of the previous authoritarian regime was also shown to have some

relationship with the character of democratic support. For Japan, the relationship between

postwar antimilitarism and democratic ideals is clearly evident in the results of each of

the analyses presented above. In chapter five we will explore some of the implications of

this type of political support for the present and future of Japanese democracy.

Chapter 5
Antimilitarism as Default Support for Democracy in Japan

5.1 Introduction

In chapter four we explored the relative influence of economic satisfaction and

alternative system values upon both incumbent support and democratic ideals using

comparative data from the World Values Survey of 1995-1997. The comparative analysis

demonstrated that Japanese support attitudes follow a pattern typical to other large

industrial democracies, in that economic satisfaction has a greater degree of influence on

incumbent support than for rudimentary democratic ideals. The analysis results also

confirmed the important role that antimilitarism has played in support for democratic

values in postwar Japan.

As the historical discussion in chapter two indicated, one of the most important

legacies of the early pacifist movement was to secure support for democratic values

during a period of political crisis and initial economic hardship. Some have argued that

the relevance of the pacifist movement has declined over the years, making Japanese

democracy vulnerable to a contemporary crisis in economic performance. Critics of

central government control of textbooks used in public schools have often made the

charge that government censorship has lead to a generalized historical amnesia

concerning the human suffering caused by the wartime government both domestically

and overseas. In chapter 4 we began testing that assumption using available data from the

World Values Survey of 1995-1997. In chapter 5 this aspect of Japanese democratic

support will be explored further using data collected in a nationwide survey by the author

during the economic crisis of the late 1990s. In addition to providing data from a peak

119

period of economic distress in early 1999, this data includes a direct measure of sociotropic economic evaluation that aids us in rounding out our assessment of the developmental state model of Japanese political legitimacy.

The developmental state model specifies that a generalized sense of economic nationalism lie at the heart of Japanese political support. Support for the political system is said to be a byproduct of the economic achievements the state has imposed upon the Japanese people. Because the model does not specify whether Japanese economic achievements are evaluated at the personal or collective level, it is important that we investigate both types of causal models when comparing economic factors with the influence of antimilitarism on Japanese support for democratic principles. In the sections that follow the dataset to be used will first be described, after which a causal analysis of support for democratic ideals will be carried out in order to compare the influence of both types of economic indicators with a respondent's historical view of the militaristic wartime government.

5.2 Data Source and Timing of Data Collection

The primary data for use in the following analysis was collected during the Institute of Statistical Mathematics' Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values, March 1999. A multi-stage random sampling survey of men and women 20 years old and above was carried out. The original sample size was 2000 with a response rate of 66.6%, giving a valid sample of 1331.

The survey was carried out in March of 1999 during one of the sharpest economic downturns in postwar Japanese history. After recovering to a real economic growth rate

of 5 percent in 1996, the Japanese economy retreated to 1.6 percent growth in 1997 and

subsequently contracted by 2.5 percent in 1998 (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Japan's Real Economic Growth Rate (1983-1999)

Source: Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics
Japan and Other Major Countries (Dec. 22, 2000)
International Department, Bank of Japan

The financial collapse of Yamaichi Shōken, one of Japan's top four securities firms,

in November of 1997, was among the high profile bankruptcies that brought the issue of

bad debt to the forefront of Japanese political debate and popular consciousness during

this period. In September of 1998 Japan suffered its worst financial collapse since World

War Two when the Long Term Credit Bank was declared insolvent. Adding to the

historic sense of economic crisis, unemployment levels in Japan continued to set new

records monthly as major companies announced restructuring plans that included laying

off thousands of Japanese workers.

Results from the Institute of Statistical Mathematics 10th Japanese National Character

Study Survey were released in the first part of 1999, showing a dramatic loss of

confidence in the nation's economy and a general drop in levels of social satisfaction (see

Figure 5.2). As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the number of positive views of the country's

121

economic strength and general living standards, as well as respondents' overall

satisfaction with society all suffered remarkable declines in the 1998 survey.

Figure 5.2 Evaluation of Economy, Living Standards, and Social Satisfaction

Source: Japanese National Character Survey

5.3 Background to the Survey Questions

Three questions adopted from a prior survey of post authoritarian countries in

Southern Europe were contributed to the Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values in March

of 1999 by the author.[1] Leonardo Morlino and Jose R. Montero developed these

questions as a means of testing what they describe as the "default" dimension of

democratic support in post authoritarian societies. Morlino and Montero argue that either

through personal experience or collective memory, citizens of post-authoritarian societies

are in a unique position to separate the legitimacy of a regime from perceptions of its

efficacy. Thus, in evaluating democratic commitment in countries with past authoritarian

---

[1] See Leonardo Morlino and Jose R. Montero. "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," In R. Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and H. Puhle eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 231-260. The four countries surveyed in this work are Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal.

experience, it may be relevant to determine to what extent citizens conceive of preferable

alternatives to the democratic system. To the extent that authoritarian alternatives have

lost their appeal, diffuse democratic system support can be considered strengthened "by

default."

The approach taken by Morlino and Montero in their study of the post authoritarian

regimes of Southern Europe is well suited to the exploration of the role of antimilitarism

in postwar Japanese political legitimacy. The three survey questions, adopted with minor

modification from the Four Nation Survey of Southern Europe, deal with democracy as a

preferred form of government, attitudes toward a previous authoritarian regime, and the

perceived efficacy of democracy as a system of government. The full statements for the

three survey questions adopted for the Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values March 1999

are listed below.

A. Diffuse Legitimacy
Now we will ask about various political systems. From among the following, which
statement is closest to your own opinion?
1. Democracy is preferable to any other regime
2. In some cases an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable
3. For people like me it is all the same

B. Past Authoritarian Government
Now we will ask about Japan's political system during World War Two. What do you
think about the wartime political system? Please choose from among the following.
1. All considered, it was good
2. It was in part good and in part bad
3. It was only bad

C. Perceived Efficacy of Democratic System
From among the three following statements about Japan's current democratic system
please choose the one closest to your own opinion.
1. Our democracy works well
2. Our democracy has many defects, but it works
3. Our democracy is getting worse, and soon it will not work at all

As noted above, the Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values March 1999 was carried out during a period of intense economic contraction. The economic crisis of the late 1990s came at the end of nearly a decade of economic stagnation that followed the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble of the late 1980s. Four survey questions on the survey attempted to measure Japanese respondents' outlook toward the economy. The four questions asked for the respondent's view of the overall strength of the Japanese economy, the extent of their own current economic fear, a comparison of the respondent's current economic situation with that of ten years past and the respondent's outlook toward their future living standard. These four different economic measures allow us to test various aspects of the economic model of Japanese democratic support. The first question provides us with a direct measure of sociotropic economic evaluation, in that it asks for an opinion on the state of the Japanese economy as whole. This type of measure is essential for testing the collective aspect of economically based democratic support. The three other questions allow us to test the influence of economic self-interest on Japanese support for democracy, including the respondent's immediate, retrospective and prospective judgments of economic self-interest. Thus we have a well-rounded group of indicators to utilize in our analysis of democratic support during a period of economic decline.

5.4 Survey Results

Figure 5.3 displays the response frequencies for the three political support items in the nationwide survey. The results displayed in Figure 5.3 demonstrate that despite the economic crisis, a majority of Japanese remained supportive of democracy as a preferred form of government in early 1999. Only 8 percent of the respondents believed that in

some cases an authoritarian regime would be preferable to democracy. A vast majority of the respondents felt that while the Japanese democracy has many defects, it remains a functional political system (73%). Only 10% of respondents perceived that the system was getting worse and soon would not work at all.

Figure 5.3 Democratic Support in Japan, March 1999

The results for the item dealing with the past authoritarian regime show that while a plurality of Japanese respondents retain mixed feelings toward the wartime government; only 3 percent considered it "good". Moreover, the number of respondents who viewed the wartime government as "only bad" overshadowed those who reflected upon it positively by greater than a 10 to 1 margin (36%). These findings are especially notable given the ongoing efforts of right-wing activists to rehabilitate the image of the wartime government. Endeavors such as the release of the high budget movie "Pride, the Fateful Moment" in 1998, which attempts to portray wartime leader Tōjō Hideki as an Asian liberator instead of an aggressor, clearly have not effaced the negative image with which many Japanese view the wartime militaristic government.

125

Simple cross-tabulations between the three political values indicators demonstrate a

significant level of inter-correlation. As can be seen in Table 5.1, respondents that

perceive the democratic system as functional are also more likely to believe that

democracy is always the best form of government. Respondents that feel the democratic

system is getting worse and soon will not work at all are considerably more likely to

think an authoritarian system is preferable in some cases and also make up a higher

percentage of those selecting the response "its all the same". The significant Cramer's V

score of association (.124) demonstrates that belief in democracy as a preferred form of

government and belief in the fundamental efficacy of democracy as a political system are

interlinked.

Table 5.1 Democracy Always Best By Democracy Works

			Democracy Works			
			WksWell	DfctsWks	SNW	Total
Democracy	Democracy Best	%	69	67	44	64
Always	All the Same	%	21	25	38	27
Best?	Authoritarian	%	10	7	18	9
Total		%	100	100	100	100

Source: Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values March 1999.

N=1112 Missing=220 (Missing= Don't Know Responses)

Cramer's V=0.124, Sig.=.000

Table 5.2 Democracy Always Best By War Govt

			War Govt			
			Good	Pt.Good, Pt.Bad	Only Bad	Total
Democracy	Democracy Best	%	62	58	73	64
Always	All the Same	%	14	31	23	27
Best?	Authoritarian	%	24	11	5	9
Total		%	100	100	100	100

Source: Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values March 1999.

N=1031 Missing=301 (Missing= Don't Know Responses)

Cramer's V=0.137, Sig.=.000

The cross-tabulation shown in Table 5.2 demonstrates that the relationship between the respondent's preferred form of government and their view of the wartime government is also significant. Respondents that viewed the wartime government as "only bad" chose "democracy always best" at a 15 percent higher rate than did respondents with mixed views of the wartime government. As might be expected, respondents that favored the wartime government gave higher support for an authoritarian system while those with negative views gave the least amount of support for authoritarianism.

5.5 A Comparative Look

In order to get a better idea of how support for democracy in Japan compares with other industrialized countries we can utilize comparative data from the Eurobarometer Survey of 1997. Table 5.1 displays the Japanese data of 1999 for the diffuse legitimacy item (democracy always best) along with responses to the same item from 17 European countries.[2] Results of this simple comparison of response frequencies indicate some degree of weakness for democratic support in Japan, in that Japan ranks near the bottom of the 18 countries with only 56 percent of respondents selecting "democracy is always best." The comparatively low response percentage for "democracy always best" in Japan results from a high number of Japanese choosing the "all the same" response for this item. In contrast, the 8 percent of Japanese respondents that indicated, "in some cases an authoritarian regime is best" is roughly equal to the average of the 17 European countries.[3]

---

[2] West Germany and East Germany were surveyed separately and are counted as two independent countries.
[3] I use the term "roughly" here because of the need to be cognizant of sampling error and translation nuances when comparing cross-national survey data.

In prior work I have argued that the comparatively large number of apathetic

responses to the "democracy always best" item in Japan does not necessarily carry a

threat to long-term democratic support in Japan.[4] In making this argument I focused upon

the sociological differences between the apathetic and authoritarian respondents. Older

women in Japan, especially those of lower educational backgrounds and living in rural

areas, figure disproportionately in the number of apathetic responses to this question.

Respondents choosing the authoritarian response, like those selecting the "democracy

always best" response, tend to have higher education and come from urbanized areas.

Thus I have argued that the preference for authoritarianism in contemporary Japan is

likely to spring from a principled decision-making orientation that is not likely to

increase during periods of economic crisis. Still, it may be argued that during periods of

economic crisis in Japan authoritarian leadership will be able to persuade the apathetic

segment of the Japanese citizenry of the superiority of an authoritarian political system.[5]

In the following sections I will attempt to show that while economic crisis may cause an

increase in apathy toward the political system, antipathy to the militaristic wartime

government remains a strong source of default support for democracy even during

troubled economic times.

5.6 Economic impact on democratic support

Before moving to a regression analysis we will first examine the bivariate

relationships between the individual economic indicators and the diffuse legitimacy

---

[4] David Fouse, " Exploring the Default Dimension in Japanese Democratic System Support During Hard Times," *Behaviormetrika*, Vol.28, No.1, 2001, pp.1-22. See pages 8-11 for a comparison of the apathetic and authoritarian respondents.
[5] See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's discussion of the threat of populism in mixed political cultures in *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989 (1963), pp.25-26.

(*democracy always best*) *item*. Cross-tabulations between "democracy always best" and

each of the four economic indicators are displayed in Table 5.3. Among the economic

indicators the sociotropic economic evaluation "country's economic strength" and the

retrospective evaluation of personal living standard (present living standard vs. 10 years

ago) have significant associations using the Cramer's V test (.130 and .115 respectively).

For the item "country's economic strength" the variation appears to be limited to the

categories "democracy always best" and the apathetic response "its all the same". Very

little variation is found among the authoritarian respondents at different levels of this

economic indicator. The retrospective evaluation of personal living standard does seem to

have some effect upon support for authoritarianism as economic evaluations worsen,

though there is also stronger movement from unconditional support for democracy

Table 5.3 Democracy Always Best by Economic Indicators

			Democracy Always Best?				
			Democracy Best	All the Same	Authoritarian	Total	Statistics
Country's	very good	Row %	86	4	10	100	Cramer's V=0.130
economic	fairly good	Row %	70	21	9	100	Sig.=.000
strength	fairly bad	Row %	61	31	8	100	N=1145
	very bad	Row %	54	37	9	100	Missing=187
Personal	no fear	Row %	56	35	9	100	Cramer's V=0.069
economic	a little fear	Row %	61	28	11	100	Sig.=.081
fear?	some fear	Row %	68	25	7	100	N=1180
	A lot of fear	Row %	59	31	10	100	Missing=152
Future living	Improve	Row %	69	23	7	100	Cramer's V=0.058
standard	StaySame	Row %	64	27	9	100	Sig.=.136
	GetWorse	Row %	59	31	10	100	N=1032 Miss.=300
Present living	Better	Row %	68	27	4	100	Cramer's V=0.115
standard vs.	SW Better	Row %	66	26	8	100	Sig.=.000
10 yrs ago	Same	Row %	65	26	9	100	N=1172
	SW Worse	Row %	60	29	11	100	Missing=160
	Worse	Row %	32	55	13	100	

Source: Omnibus Survey of Japanese Values March 1999

toward apathy at the low end of this economic indicator. Though we can detect some slight influence of worsening economic perceptions on the "democracy always best" response for the other two economic indicators, neither of these associations is significant at the 5 percent level using the Cramer's V test.

Before concluding as to whether the relationship between economic evaluations and unconditional democratic support found in the above cross-tabulation tests represent a serious threat to Japanese democracy, a causal analysis that compares the influence of the economic items with the political values discussed earlier will be carried out.

5.7 Causal Analysis of Democratic System Support: Economic vs. Political Values

In order to compare the relative impact of economic considerations and political values upon Japanese democratic support during a period of economic crisis a causal analysis using categorical regression was carried out. In this test the diffuse legitimacy item "democracy always best" was recoded to a binary variable separating those with unconditional support for democracy from both authoritarian and apathetic respondents. While noting the sociological distinctions between the authoritarian and apathetic respondents, this test will proceed from the assumption that both groups may be classified as alienated to some degree from the political system. Increases in the standardized beta scores for the independent variables will be interpreted as contributing to the support for democracy as an ideal form of government. Age (youngest to oldest), educational background (lowest to highest) and gender (male 1, female 2) of the respondent were entered as control variables for the analysis. Economic indicators were coded with negative evaluations at the high end. The political values questions were coded as follows: wartime government question (1=good, 2 part good, part bad 3=only bad) and

130

the "democracy works" question (1=soon not work, 2=defects, but works, 3= works well).

The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 5.4 below.

Among the control variables we observe that increasing educational levels have a

positive influence upon support for the dependent variable "democracy always best".

This score appears to cancel out the effect of age, which largely overlaps with education

in the Japanese data. The negative beta score for the independent variable "gender"

indicates that females (coded 2) give less unconditional support for democracy than do

males. Together these two control variables contribute nearly 19 percent of the variance

in this analysis (Importance scores of .093 + .094).

Table 5.4 Categorical Regression Analysis: Influences on Democratic Ideals

Japan

Variables	Beta	S.E.	F	Importance
Country's economic strength bad	-.122	.033	13.511	.163
Fear about personal economic situation	.075	.034	4.735	.069
Future living standard worse	-.038	.033	1.338	.021
Present living standard worse than 10 yrs ago	-.098	.034	8.120	.130
War govt bad	.164	.033	25.077	.216
Democracy works	.134	.033	16.353	.193
Age categories	.080	.034	5.569	.019
Gender	-.094	.033	8.144	.094
Educational Background	.099	.034	8.311	.093

Adj. R Square .117

The economic variables perform much as the cross-tabulation analysis above would

have predicted, with the sociotropic economic evaluation "country's economic strength"

gaining the highest importance score (.163), followed by the retrospective personal

economic evaluation "present living standard worse than 10 years ago" (.130). The beta

131

scores for both of these independent variables are negative, indicating that negative

evaluations of the country's current economic strength and a perceived decline in

personal living standards have undermined unconditional support for democracy to some

extent.

Fortunately the positive contributions of the two political variables more than offset

the influence of the economic variables. A negative perception of the wartime

government contributes the largest percentage of variance in this analysis (.216),

followed by the importance of the perceived efficacy of democracy as a political system

(.193). Together these values contribute over 40 percent of the variance in the analysis,

while neutralizing the negative impact of the economic variables.

5.8 Summary

In this chapter we have investigated the impact of respondents' perceptions of

economic activity upon support for democracy during one of the worst economic declines

in postwar Japanese history. Our findings indicate that negative perceptions of the

economy at both the collective system and personal retrospective levels contributed to a

small decline in unconditional support for democracy in Japan in 1999. However, it is

important to point out that while negative economic perceptions appear to have caused an

increase in apathy toward the political system, there was no substantial increase in

support for an authoritarian system in Japan.

The possible threat to democratic stability posed by the economic decline was

examined in the regression analysis of section 5.7. This analysis has shown that the

negative impact of the economic crisis of the late 1990s has been neutralized at least in

part by the resilience of negative views toward the wartime government by a broad

132

stratum of Japanese citizens. These findings tend to support the idea that the rejection of the wartime past generated by the pacifist movement of the early postwar period continues to play a substantial role in the maintenance of democratic values and the stability of the democratic system in postwar Japan.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

6.1 Exploring Political Legitimacy in Postwar Japan

The discussion in the above chapters has examined two different hypotheses regarding the reasons why Japanese citizens have supported their democratic political system during the postwar period. The first hypothesis tested springs from assumptions popularized in the developmental state model of Japan. The developmental state model has emphasized that Japanese support for the political system is not based upon the Japanese people's support of the democratic process. Instead, this model of political legitimacy in Japan emphasizes a hegemonic project, akin to those established in the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China under Mao, where legitimacy was based upon support for the ideals professed by the regime and not related to how those regimes came into power. In Japan high-speed economic growth is said to be the hegemonic project that binds citizens to the political system. Economic achievements attained under the postwar political system are argued to lie at the base of Japanese political system support.

Thus it has often been argued that economic, rather than intrinsically political values underpin postwar Japanese support for democracy. This dissertation has attempted to explore this hypothesis empirically, while offering an alternative model of Japanese democratic system support based upon the strong antimilitarist sentiments cultivated during the early postwar era.

The alternative hypothesis was grounded in the historical narrative of chapter two. The historical narrative highlighted the linkage between the development of the postwar

134

pacifist movement and support for democracy in the early postwar period. Emphasis was placed upon the development of an indigenous philosophical perspective that locates citizens' control over decisions related to national defense as the bedrock of legitimacy in a democratic state. A national consensus on pacifism as a national ideal was described as a contingent outcome of this historical process.

The remarkable resiliency of postwar pacifist attitudes was described in chapter three. There the legacy of early postwar peace movement was described in terms of: 1) its contribution to social capital formation (i.e. the creation of new anti-hierarchical organizational norms by protestors during and after the Security Crisis of 1960) and 2) the role of antimilitarism in the maintenance of the "1955 system" of parliamentary politics. Longitudinal survey data presented in chapter three documents both the changes and continuities in postwar public opinion trends related to the Constitution and Self Defense Forces, indicating that even after the end of the Cold War and the pressure to make an "international contribution" following the Gulf War, there remains little appetite among the public for "normalizing" the Japanese military by overturning Article 9 of the Constitution.

In order to ascertain the relative importance of contemporary antimilitarism for democracy in Japan the dissertation then moved to an empirical analysis of democratic support using data from the World Values survey of 1995-1997. The empirical analysis proceeded in a two-step fashion. In chapter three the first step taken was to confirm an empirical separation between support for the incumbent regime and support for democratic ideals. A causal analysis of support for democratic ideals was then carried out in chapter four using measures of economic satisfaction and support for alternatives to

135

democracy as independent variables. The findings for the Japanese data were compared with three other industrial democracies in order to highlight the particular characteristics of Japanese political system support. Finally, a comparison of the influence of economic and political values upon democratic system support was carried out using data collected from a nationwide survey during a recent period of economic crisis in Japan. The results of the empirical analyses will be discussed in the following section.

6.2 Empirical Findings and their Implications

The economic model of Japanese political legitimacy presented in the developmental state literature (and which is often adopted in a less principled manner in other writing on Japan) assumes no distinction between the support given to incumbent politicians and the support that Japanese citizens have for democracy as a particular system of government. The analysis presented in chapters three and four has shown that from an empirical standpoint this assumption cannot be supported. The dissertation has shown that these two dimensions can be distinguished through factor analysis and that economic factors play a larger role in incumbent support than support for democratic ideals, much as they do in the other industrialized countries studied. Thus the hypothesized conceptual distinction between these different objects of political support in mainstream American political science literature appears to hold firm in the Japanese case as well.

Making this analytical distinction in Japanese political system support attitudes is important because it allows us to focus investigation upon why the Japanese people support the principle of democratic rule. The results of the causal analysis in chapter four indicate that the rejection of military rule in contemporary Japan plays a much more

substantial role in Japanese support for democratic ideals than do economic considerations.

Japan was also observed to fit a pattern in the other countries studied with recent histories of authoritarian government (West Germany and Spain), in that support for democracy appears to be based substantively upon the rejection of the particular form of regime that preceded it. Ironically, given the perspective of the developmental state model, economic issues contributed more greatly to the variation in democratic support of the United States, which is most likely due to its lack of a history of authoritarian government.

In chapter five survey data collected by the author in a nationwide survey during the economic crisis of the late 1990s was utilized in attempting to discern whether the prolonged economic downturn in Japan had, as the developmental state model implies, caused an erosion of support for democracy in Japan. The influences of a variety of economic measurements, including a sociotropic economic evaluation, were compared with the influence of negative perceptions of the wartime government upon support for democracy as a preferred form of government. The results of the analysis demonstrated that despite a severe downturn in economic performance, negative perceptions of the wartime government continue to be of more importance in determining the extent of support for democratic values in contemporary Japan.

In summarizing the implications of our empirical findings it is best to return to the theoretical presentation in chapter one. In that discussion (see section 1.7) a substantial body of empirical study that has emphasized the critical role that diffuse support for democratic principles plays in the long-term stability of democratic political systems was

introduced. Diffuse support for democratic values is thought to enhance system stability during periodic crises in system performance, whether they are economic or political in nature.

The results of our causal analysis of democratic system support in Japan demonstrate that diffuse support for democratic values in Japan is firmly based in a postwar political culture that rejects a return to the militaristic form of government that preceded democracy. The antipathy to militarism in postwar Japan provides roots for democratic values that can aid in sustaining the political system during periods of economic and political turmoil. Thus the implications of the empirical results point toward a much more stable political system than popular economic models of Japanese postwar legitimacy would suggest.

Nearly ten years of economic stagnation and a precipitous drop in the prestige with which most Japanese view the national bureaucracy have yet to cause any major decline in support for democracy in Japan. Still, theoretical models that base support for the Japanese democratic system solely upon economic performance continue to garner support in Western political science literature. These models provide no answer as to why most Japanese people sustain their belief in democratic values during periods of economic decline such as the current one in Japan.

It is therefore necessary to go beyond the one-dimensional conception of Japanese democratic system support offered by the developmental state model to create a more complex understanding of political system support in Japan. This thesis has taken a step in this direction by uncovering the empirical importance of antimilitarism in the support for democratic values in postwar Japan.

138

Recently Chalmers Johnson himself has become a champion of Okinawan people fighting to free themselves from the presence of United States military bases. In the unwillingness of the United States to forgo antiquated security policies in the region he finds the potential for serious repercussions to United States interests. Perhaps in this sense he has begun to see a firm link between Japanese security issues and broader Japanese political values. Interest in these linkages continues to grow in the field of security studies, which currently is moving to consider these issues from a broader societal perspective that includes cultural norms and national ideals as parameters within which policymakers must maneuver.

Democratic values in Japan certainly cannot be simply equated with an ethos of antimilitarism in postwar Japan. Future work will need to be done to create a more complex and viable model of system support in Japan. Future models will be required to incorporate both the day-to-day practical concerns of Japanese citizens and their long-term aspirations for a system that provides them with greater influence and accountability from their elected officials.

References

Aruga, Tadashi. "The Security Treaty Revision of 1960," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen eds. *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989.

Barshay, Andrew. "Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-90" in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ed. *Modern Japanese Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Benedict , Ruth. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946.

Berger, Thomas U. *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Bix, Herbert P. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. New York: Harper Collins, 2000.

Bōei Nenkan Kankō. *Bōei Nenkan 2001* (Defense Yearbook 2001), Tokyo: Bōei Nenkan Kankō, 2001.

Broadbent, Jeffrey. *Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998.

Citrin, Jack. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government," *American Political Science Review*, 68-3 (September 1974), pp.973-988.

Curtis, Gerald L. ed. *Japan's Foreign Policy: After the Cold War Coping with Change*. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Inc., 1993.

Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999.

Dower, John W. *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1979.

Dower, John W. "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict." In *Postwar Japan as History*. Andrew Gordon ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

140

Drifte, Reinhard. *Japan's Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 1990.

Finn, Richard B. *Winners in Peace: MacArthur. Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992.

Flanagan, S.C., and Richardson, B.M. "Political Disaffection and Political Stability: A Comparison of Japanese and Western Findings," *Comparative Social Research*, 1980, Vol. 3, 3-44.

Fouse, David. *Japan's Democratic System Support: A Multidimentional Analysis*. Unpublished dissertation for The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, Japan, 2001.

Fouse, David. " Exploring the Default Dimension in Japanese Democratic System Support During Hard Times," *Behaviormetrika*, Vol.28, No.1, 2001, pp.1-22. See pages 8-11 for a comparison of the apathetic and authoritarian respondents.

Friedman Edward. *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Fujihara Hirotatsu. *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Ishiki*. (Political Consciousness of Modern Japan). Tokyo: Soubunsha, 1958.

Gluck, Carol. "The Past in the Present," in Andrew Gordon ed., *Postwar Japan as History*. Berkeley and Loa Angeles: University of California Press, 1993: pp.64-95.

Hook, Glenn D. *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*. London: Routledge, 1996.

Igarashi, Yoshikuni. *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Iriye, Akira and Warren I. Cohen eds. The United States and Japan in the Postwar World. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989.

Ishida, Takeshi. "Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 11:2, 323-356, 1985.

Ishida, Takeshi. *Nihon no Seiji to Kotoba: Heiwa to Kokka*. (Japan's Politics and Language: Peace and Nation). Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1989.

Jansen, Marius B. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Johnson, Chalmers. *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Johnson, Chalmers. "Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role." *Daedalus,* 121.4, 1992 pp.1-33.

Johnson, Chalmers. Japan *Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State.* New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995.

Johnson, Chalmers. "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed. *The Developmental State.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.32-60.

Masumi, Junnosuke. *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955.* Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985.

Kabashima Ikuo and Takenaka Yoshihiko. *Gendai Nihonjin no Ideology.* (Political Ideology in Japan). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996.

Kataoka, Tetsuya. *The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics.* New York: Crane Russak, 1991.

Katzenstein, Peter J. *Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Keddell, Joseph P. *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures.* Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1993.

Kersten, Rikki. *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the search for autonomy.* London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Kisala, Robert. *Prophets of Peace: Pacifism and Cultural Identity in Japan's New Religions.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.

Masataka, Kosaka. *100 Million Japanese: The Postwar Experience.* Tokyo: Kodansha International LTD, 1972.

Shinsaku, Kouhei. *Tenkanki no Seiji Ishiki: Kawaru Nihonjin no Touhyo Koudo.* (Turning Point in Political Consciousness: Changes in Japan Voting Behaviour). Tokyo: Keo Tsuushin, 1979.

Krauss, Ellis. *Japanese Radicals Revisited.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.

Kume, Ikuo. *Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Lafeber, Walter. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History*. New York London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Large, Stephen S. *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Livingston, Jon, Joe Moore and Felicia Oldfather eds. *Postwar Japan 1945 to the Present*, New York: Random House, 1973

Maruyama, Masao. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*. Expanded edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Masumi, Junnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*. Translated by Lonny E. Carlile. Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985.

Matsumura Michio, Itou, M. and Tsujinaka, Y. *Nihon no Seiji*. (Japanese Politics). Tokyo:Yuhikaku, 1992.

Mendel, Douglas H. *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy: A study of Public Opinion in Post-treaty Japan*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961.

Miller, Arthur H. "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," *American Political Science Review*, 68-3 (September 1974), pp.951-972.

Morlino, Leonardo and Jose R. Montero. "Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," In R. Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and H. Puhle eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 231-260.

Morris, Dr. I. I. *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japanese: A study of post-war trends*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Muller, Edward N. and Thomas O. Jukam, "On the Meaning of Political Support," *American Political Science Review*, 71-4 (December 1977), pp.1561-1595.

Nakamura, Masanori. "Democratization, Peace, and Economic Development in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952." In *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences*. Friedman Edward ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

Nakane, Chie. *Japanese Society*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1970.

NHK Hōsō Yoron Chousajo. *Zusetsu Sengo Yoronshi.* (Postwar History of Public Opinion). Second edition. Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shubban Kyoukai, 1983.

NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyujo. *Gendai Nihonjin no Ishiki Kouzou (Dai Go Ban).* (The Structure of Modern Japanese Consciousness (Dai Go Ban)). Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shubban Kyoukai, 2000.

Ōtake, Hideo. *Nihon no Bōei to Kokunai Seiji* (Japanese Defense and Domestic Politics). Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1983.

Otake, Hideo. "Defense Controversies and One-Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany," in T.J. Pempel ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University press, 1990.

Ozawa, Ichirō. *Blueprint For a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Translated by Louisa Rubinfien.* Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994.

Packard, George R. Protest in Tokyo: *The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Pempel, T.J. ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University press, 1990.

Pempel, T.J. "The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy," in Meredith Woo-Cummings, ed. *The Developmental State.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp.137-181.

Pyle, Kenneth B. *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era.* Second edition. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1996.

Richardson, Bradley M. *The Political Culture of Japan.* Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer. *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies.* Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Sakamoto, Y., Tsuchiya, T., Nakamura, T. and Maeda, T. *Japanese National Character Study, 10th Report.* (1999) (In Japanese). Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Research Report No.83, March 1999.

Sakamoto, Y., Tsuchiya, T., Nakamura, T., Maeda, T., and Fouse, D. *A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Tenth Nationwide Survey* (1998) (English Edition). Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Research Report No. 85, November, 2000.

Sasaki-Uemura, Wesley . *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.

Scalapino, Robert A. and Masumi Junnosuke. *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Scalapino, Robert A. ed. The *Foreign Policy of Modern Japan.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Schaller, Michael. *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Schonberger, Howard B. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952.* Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989.

Shinobu, Seizaburō. *Sengo Nihon Seijishi: Volume 1, Senryou to Minshushugi 1945-1952.* (Postwar Japanese Political History, The Occupation and Democracy 1945-1952). Tokyo: Keisou Shobou.

Shōichi, Koseki. *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution.* Translated by Ray A. Moore. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Stockwin, J. A. A. *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Tanaka, Aiji. "Kokumin no Seiji Ishiki ni okeru 55 nen Taisei no Keisei," (The Establishment of Citizen Political Consciousness in the 1955 System) in Takafusa Nakamura and Masayasu Miyazaki eds., *Katoki toshiteno 1950 nendai.* Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1997.

Toshiro, Saeki. "Amendment is Just a Grand Illusion," *Japan Quarterly.* October-December 2001: pp.72-79.

Ward, Robert E. and Sakamoto Yoshikazu ed. *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.

Wada, Susumu. *Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki: Kurashi no nakano Kempo. (Postwar Japan's Peace Consciousness: the Constitution in daily life).* Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997.

Watanuki, Joji. *Politics in Postwar Japanese Society.* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977.

Watanuki, Joji, Miyake Ichiro, Inoguchi Takashi and Kabashima Ikuo. *Electoral Behavior in the 1983 Japanese Elections.* Tokyo: Institute of International Relations, Sophia University,1986.

145

Weinstein, Martin E. *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Welfield, John. *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System.* London: The Athlone Press, 1988.

White, James. "Civic Attitudes, Political Participation, and System Stability in Japan," *Comparative Political Studies* 14-3 (October, 1981), 371-400.

Woo-Cummings, Meredith ed. *The Developmental State.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Yamakawa, Hitoshi. *Nihon no Saigunbi.* (Japan's Rearmament.) Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1952.

Yoshitsu, Michael M. *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.