

general to draft remedial legislation to address this "racial discrimination."

In practical terms, this move by Bush endangers all federal funding for Native Hawaiian projects, which at present amounts to millions of dollars in aid. Although the congressional delegation from Hawai'i is opposed to such reclassification, the fight ahead will be strenuous. It is also possible that the question of federal recognition of Hawaiian nationhood will be raised as an alternative to continued federal funding. But such a movement toward justice for the native people of Hawai'i would be out of keeping with the Bush administration's policy of dismantling liberal restorative programs like affirmative action, family leave, and child-care funding.

In sum, the year was a bad one for Native Hawaiians. While the state of Hawai'i continues to abrogate its trust responsibility to Hawaiians, a sinister force moves toward funneling native trust assets into developments unrelated to Hawaiian needs. As we move closer to the one-hundredth anniversary of the American military overthrow of the Hawaiian government in 1893, the Native Hawaiian demand for justice is resisted in ever more devious ways.

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK

MAORI ISSUES

The 1990 sesquicentennial celebration of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi began in spectacular fashion with the remarkable display of tribal mana in the form of twenty *waka taua* 'carved war canoes' escorting Queen Elizabeth

II to the landing at Waitangi. There the pageantry ended when Anglican Bishop of Aotearoa Whakahuihui Vercoe told the Queen that promises entered into under the treaty had been dishonored. The Maori had been marginalized in their own land (*NZH*, 7 Feb 1990).

The marginalization alluded to by Vercoe was contemporaneous as much as historic. The Labour government had sensed that the path it had taken in giving retrospective power to the Waitangi Tribunal to settle Maori land and fisheries claims was an election loser in 1990. It distanced itself from its earlier policy by turning away from the treaty itself, and focusing on the "principles" of the treaty, which it proceeded to define unilaterally. In the document *Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi*, primacy was given to the principle of *kawanatanga* 'government' and its right to govern and make laws (Dept Justice 1989, 7).

This interpretation of the first clause of the treaty was in effect an assertion of sovereignty. It promulgated unequivocally the hegemony of the state over the second principle of *tino rangatiratanga*, the sovereignty of chiefs guaranteed under Article 2 of the treaty. This assertion of principles indicated that the government would not be fettered by the treaty in its allocation of resources and pursuit of economic goals.

While the Maori Council and individual tribes had resisted corporatization of Crown lands and the Individual Transferable Quotas fisheries management regime in the preceding three years, there was a felt need by tribes not party to these events for a more

concerted opposition to the hegemony of the state. On 7–8 July 1990, at the behest of Sir Hepi Te Heuheu, the paramount chief of Tuwharetoa, the tribes assembled at Ngaruawahia Marae for a *hui whakakotahi* 'assembly of unification'. There the National Congress of Tribes was formally constituted.

The thirty-seven member tribes asserted the independence of the congress from government funding and manipulation by agreeing to an annual levy of NZ\$5000 (*Proceedings of the Hui Whakakotahi* 1990). The test for the congress as a new political force will be the willingness of the tribes to fund its operations in the national rather than the parochial arena of politics.

The advent of the tribal congress to supplement the political efforts of other long-standing national organizations, such as the Maori Women's Welfare League, the Maori Council, and Te Roopu Whakawhanaunga i nga Haahi (Maori Ecumenical Council of Churches) is timely. In November the conservative National party swept back into power with 67 seats to Labour's 29 in the 97-seat house, the other seat going to the splinter New Labour party.

The National Government's Maori policy is one law for all New Zealanders and mainstreaming of Maori social and economic development. The colonial dream of resolving the Maori problem by assimilation would be achieved by abolition of the ministry of Maori policy, which replaced the department of Maori affairs under the previous administration, and eliminating the Iwi (tribal) Transition Agency before it ran its five-year course. In

anticipation of these changes, incoming Minister of Maori Affairs Winston Peters appointed a Maori planning group of three members in January 1990 to produce a report as a basis for Maori policy.

On 5 March 1991, Mr Peters convened a national assembly of Maori leaders in parliament for the official launch of his planning committee's report, *Ka Awatea* 'it is dawn'. The report found that both past and present government policies have failed to deliver equity to Maori. In education for example, it revealed that 36.8 percent of Maori students leave high school with no formal qualifications compared with 12.5 percent of non-Maori. Adverse Maori health statistics were also cited. Three times as many Maori women die of lung cancer as non-Maori. In 1990, Maori, who constitute 10 percent of the population, made up 20 percent of the unemployed.

To address the identified problems, *Ka Awatea* proposed the establishment of a new ministry of Maori development to replace the existing ministry of Maori policy and the Iwi Transition Agency. There would be four units within the ministry responsible for Maori health, education, training, and economic development. Although *Ka Awatea* signaled the jettisoning of Maori policy from the previous administration, Maori leaders endorsed *Ka Awatea*. Despite that endorsement, Prime Minister Jim Bolger was said to be lukewarm to the report, saying it was not government policy.

The day *Ka Awatea* went before cabinet for approval, it was described in the press as being "controversial"

and causing "tensions" within cabinet (NZH, 13 May 1991). There were rumblings that it was a "separatist" policy contradicting mainstreaming, and opposed by Minister of Finance Ruth Richardson (NZH, 14 May 1991). At the heart of the matter was the NZ\$239 million budget needed to proceed with the Maori development plan laid out by *Ka Awatea*. Mainstreaming would mean the dispersal of the Maori Affairs vote to other departments. Although Mr Peters kept the Maori Affairs vote from previous years intact, a belated attempt was made to undermine his position by a leaked report of a government write-off of NZ\$90 million of bad loans on Maori land development schemes. "Anger in caucus" over the write-off was reported in the press, but it was ill conceived (NZH, 18 May 1991). Before the loans were written off, the minister sought advice from the Crown Law Office. It turned out that the government itself was liable, because the loans had been incurred over a thirty-year period by government officials within the old department of Maori affairs, and in more recent times by the outgoing Iwi Transition Agency. Many of the loans had been made without reference to the landowners. But the constructed reality in the media of *Ka Awatea* as being controversial was epitomized by the editorial headlines "Ka Awatea Kerfuffle" (NZH, 14 May 1991), and "Not another Maori Loans Row" (NZH, 16 May 1991). The views of the client minority of the government's Maori policy, and the media construction of it in the press and on television, hardly figured at all. They were merely the victims.

Mr Peters, who has staked his politi-

cal future on *Ka Awatea*, now has only two years to implement it and resolve issues whose etiology is steeped in one hundred fifty years of colonial history. Although the obstacle of Pakeha hegemonic domination is formidable for a Maori of Mr Peters' political skills, the challenge is worth meeting.

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NIUE

The year 1990-91 was one of limited recovery. In the aftermath of Cyclone Ofa the New Zealand and Niue governments decided to extend the Niue Concerted Action Plan (providing funding through March 1991) to June 1992. The two governments also committed themselves to reviewing priorities for future planning and expenditure.

New Zealand financial assistance remained critical. Funding levels in 1990-91 were around NZ\$10 million, of which 70 percent went for budgetary support (principally public service salaries). Pressures for greater efficiency and reductions in expenditure expressed during the New Zealand Labour party's term of office continued following the election of a National party government in October. In Janu-