

Polynesia in Review: Issues and Events,
1 July 1989 to 30 June 1990

Reviews of Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna are not included in this issue because of unforeseen circumstances.

AMERICAN SAMOA

The devastation wrought by Cyclone Ofa was the most dramatic event of 1989–90. This was the first hurricane to affect the entire Samoan archipelago since 1966. It followed only three years after Cyclone Tusi, which caused extensive damage in the Manu'a Islands. Ofa swept through the Samoas during the first week of February 1990 leaving millions of dollars in damage to property, businesses, and government services. The Territorial Emergency Management Coordinating Office immediately began to survey the extent of damage, and within days President Bush declared the territory a disaster area. Fortunately, no lives were lost during the hurricane.

Relief from off-island was immediate and well coordinated. The Federal Emergency Management Agency began accepting claims on 16 February, and grants were made available to families that did not qualify for loans. The US Navy sent thirty Seabees to assist the American Samoa Power Authority to restore electricity to outlying villages.

Prior to the hurricane, the territory's financial crisis had dominated local political affairs, and there was a continuing executive-legislative stalemate over the governor's proposed 3 percent

excise tax. In October 1989 Governor Coleman introduced a Financial Recovery Plan, which included a list of various causes of the \$18-million-dollar deficit, a projected deficit summary, and proposed solutions to the problem. He continued to claim that the previous Lutali administration was responsible for the financial dilemma, and emphasized the importance of cooperation from the legislature (*fono*) in order to avert a reduction in government employees' working hours and layoffs. Annual step increments for fiscal year 1990 had already been frozen, and it soon became apparent that the administration was prepared to squeeze the workforce further. On 6 December 1989 the governor announced that, unless the *fono* repealed the 2 percent sales tax and passed the proposed 3 percent excise tax, government employees' working hours would be reduced to thirty-five per week.

The *fono* had already acted on several of the administration's proposed revenue-raising measures during the November special session called by Governor Coleman. Taxes on tobacco, alcohol, poker machines, and firearms products were raised, but there was no movement on the excise tax issue. While the governor's criticism of the *fono* was quite open, he remained silent when it became known that the director of human resources had ignored a general directive and authorized more than thirty thousand dollars

worth of salary increases for several employees in his department.

There was strong opposition to the thirty-five-hour work week when it went into effect on 15 January, especially among the public school teachers. The teachers were upset that the governor's order did not affect employees who were considered to be providing "essential services." The American Samoa Education Association and the Concerned Parents of American Samoa organized a series of meetings at which various courses of action, including a teachers' walkout, were discussed. A petition was drawn up and circulated publicly while representatives tried to get legislators to support *fono* action to restore normal working hours. There was widespread agreement among the public that workers were being penalized for a financial crisis caused by corruption in government.

On 23 February 1990, in the wake of Cyclone Ofa, Governor Coleman announced that the forty-hour work week would be restored, and other pronouncements concerning the financial crisis mysteriously went with the wind. The 3 percent excise tax had finally died in the Senate in the week prior to the hurricane. At the end of the period under review, American Samoans were waiting for further revelations regarding the effectiveness of the Financial Recovery Plan and the status of the government deficit.

The present Coleman administration, like all its locally elected predecessors since 1977, has not demonstrated prudent financial management. For example, the 1989 inspector general's audit attributed annual losses of \$2 million to mismanagement in the tax

and customs offices. Nor has the administration taken appropriate action to reduce government expenditures, especially by cutting back on unnecessary hirings and promotions. Although more than 80 percent of the annual budget is spent on wages and salaries, leaders have failed to recognize that increasing taxes and reducing working hours delay rather than solve deficit problems.

The race for the territory's seat in the US House of Representatives was beginning to take shape at the end of the period under review. Two new candidates, Moaali'itele Tu'ufuli, former commissioner of public safety, and Afoa Moega Lutu, former assistant attorney general, issued the challenge to incumbent Faleomavaega Eni Hunkin. Congressman Hunkin maintained a sound measure of popularity both within the territory and with constituents in Hawai'i and on the US mainland, and will be counting on this support for reelection in November 1990.

BILL LEGALLEY

COOK ISLANDS

Editors' note: The 1988–89 review of the Cook Islands published in Volume 2(1) of the journal stated on page 165 that the Cook Islands Party "won 13 of the 24 seats" in parliament. In fact, it won 12 seats. We would like to apologize to the authors of the review for this error, and for any embarrassment it may have caused them.

It was generally a good year for the government, but not for the opposi-

tion, which fell further into disarray. The Cook Islands party came into office in 1989 with only 12 seats in the 24-member parliament. They were enabled to govern by a deal with the 2-member Demo Tumu splinter group, who were understandably well looked after. But in August 1989 an opposition member from Mangaia crossed the floor in return for an assistant minister post, and in May 1990 the member for Manihiki crossed after a similar deal.

Internationally, Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry, an impressive speaker, was elected spokesman of the South Pacific Forum's annual meeting in Kiribati in July 1989. Then in April 1990 he was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the Honolulu-based Pacific Islands Development Program by delegates to the Third Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders.

The prime minister met with many heads of government during the year. In addition to leaders of South Pacific Forum nations, he had extensive discussions with French Prime Minister Rocard in Tahiti and in France. France has an obvious interest in the Cook Islands, which is the nearest neighbor of French Polynesia, the location of the nuclear testing facility. Official French pronouncements promised lots of aid, though very little has yet materialized. In April 1990, during a world tour seeking aid, Henry met briefly with US President George Bush. The US interest is no doubt in Mr Henry's rise to high profile in the South Pacific and in the fact that the Cook Islands has been less critical of US strategic interests in the Pacific than most other island nations.

Despite his intense criticism of the extent of foreign travel by the previous

government, Mr Henry has traveled much more than any of his predecessors. It is too early to evaluate the results.

In December 1989, the Cook Islands joined UNESCO as a full member, widening the range of international organizations in which it participates.

Economically the year was constrained. Tourism is the nation's largest income earner. Tourist numbers dropped by 3 percent in 1989, but grew a little in the first half of 1990. Employment remained high, with, for example, only 60 applicants for 165 posts advertised in May 1990 for a new government hotel project. Quality control on fresh fruit exports was not maintained, causing exports to be suspended several times while quarantine procedures were tightened. There was almost certainly a decline in per capita real income, and the government (much the largest employer) was unable to pay the six-monthly cost of living adjustments that have been standard for about a decade.

The government pins its economic hopes in the short term on tourist growth (with the government building a luxury hotel to be managed by Sheraton), black pearls (with USAID and other aid to extend the industry in Manihiki and develop it in Suvarrow), and the international finance center. When Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and some European countries enacted tougher legislation to preclude their companies using tax havens, the Cook Islands government gave the industry more protection, and an extensive clientele was located in Asia. For the longer term, economic hopes focus on seabed minerals on the

Manihiki Plateau. These exist in vast quantities, but at great depth. Their value could range from nothing to vast amounts, depending on a host of variables.

The government was in the process of negotiating loans from Italy (for the new hotel), France (to upgrade the power and water supply), Asian Development Bank (for housing and other developments), and other sources. The loans amount to the equivalent of nearly one year's gross domestic product—an extremely high level, and very dependent on as yet uncertain repayment sources.

Cook Islands Television (a government corporation) began broadcasting to Rarotonga on 25 December 1989. It is losing money heavily, as advertising revenues are insufficient to finance as much local programming as is understandably desired. Another communications development was the NZ\$12-million agreement signed in July to provide telecommunications to all islands over the next three years. Taxes were increased to finance this and the television deficit.

The government's daily newspaper *The Cook Islands News* was sold to private owners after making heavy losses for many years. The result is a better and more independent paper, but at double the price.

There were no significant changes in aviation, and shipping services remained very poor. For example, there was no ship to Pukapuka from October 1989 to April 1990. In shipping in particular, but also in other fields, the connection between the Cook Islands and Fiji was strengthened. The proportion of

imports from Fiji increased, and the Cook Islands government chartered vessels from Fiji and ordered a NZ\$4.5-million ship to be built by the Fiji Government Shipyard for the interisland trade. That price is far above the capital cost needed for a suitable vessel, and the ship can run only at a heavy loss to the taxpayer. At least two private operators offered to supply ships and run the service at no cost to the taxpayer and at no greater cost to the users. The government's decision may have been influenced by the knowledge that a monopoly on shipping is a powerful political tool for whichever political party is in power.

Promised reviews of education and health were undertaken during the period under review. The education review, published under the title *The Polynesian Way*, advocated major changes in school management and the establishment of a Cook Islands Institute of Higher Education. Implementation of the report is proceeding slowly. The health review, undertaken by former Minister of Health Dr Joseph Williams, advocated changes that Dr Williams has been hired to implement.

A review of the Department of Outer Islands Affairs revealed that many staff (appointees of the other political party when it was in power) had insufficient work to do, and led to its closure. This was consistent with the government's promise to reduce the size of the public service, which absorbed 42 percent of the national budget in the period 1987 to 1989. By 1990 it was absorbing 52 percent.

A major policy shift was intended to enhance the importance of culture and was reinforced by the plan for the

Cook Islands to host the next Festival of Pacific Arts, to be held in October 1992. A Ministry of Arts and Culture has been created, and a NZ\$20-million arts and culture center with seating for 2,300 is to be built.

A serious split arose over the question of leasing the uninhabited island of Manuae, which is jointly owned by about sixteen hundred Cook Islanders of Aitutaki origin. The company that has been pressing for the lease for some time, with the backing of the government, is Manuae Leisure, a Sydney-based firm whose alleged connections and motives concern many landowners. A government minister assured opponents that Manuae Leisure is not the Mafia. In April 1990, following long and acrimonious debate, a majority of the landowners decided against leasing.

A consignment of heroin with a street value of between NZ\$21 and \$31 million (or about half the national budget), arrived in Rarotonga in January 1990 from Thailand. It was not claimed, probably because the intended recipients had learned that police in various countries had been tracking it. It was seized by the Cook Islands police in April, but no arrests were made. For a nation of 17,000 people that is a lot of heroin, and questions were raised about the volume that has been or will be distributed from Rarotonga. On conviction, the offender would probably have been given the maximum fine allowed by law (NZ\$200—about US\$114) which allows some change from NZ\$21 million! Proposals for higher fines are being considered.

Overall, it was a year of very suc-

cessful international activity, significant national developments in several areas of policy, a sluggish economy, and economic projects with as yet unknown outcomes.

RON CROCOMBE

MARJORIE CROCOMBE

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Pacific countries have been quite articulate about French political and military activities in French Polynesia, but rather less is known about internal developments in the territory. In part, this is because the Léontieff government—a coalition of parties of quite diverse political orientations—has been preoccupied with its own survival since it came to power in December 1987. Consequently the major topics in territorial assembly sessions and the local media were economic and social. With the exception of Oscar Temaru's *Tavini Huiraatira* party, and to a lesser extent, Jacqui Drollet's *Ia Mana te Nunaa*, there was little discussion of either the independence or the nuclear issues.

Having established itself, however, the Léontieff government gradually began to adopt a more assertive stance. A first initiative was taken in June 1989 by a citizens' group that called for a government debate on the impacts of nuclear testing. Following this, the *Ia Mana* party, a member of the majority coalition, introduced a motion calling for the assembly to establish a commission on Moruroa to investigate the socioeconomic, ecological, and health consequences of nuclear testing. It also called for a public poll on testing (rather than a referendum, in which

metropolitan citizens would have overwhelmed the Polynesian vote). The result was a showdown within the coalition government during which Drollet was forced to withdraw his motion and resign as secretary general of *Ia Mana*, a post he had held since the party was established in 1975.

Oscar Temaru was in opposition and faced no such constraints. In early July, more than twenty members of the youth wing of *Tavini Huiraatira* began a week-long hunger strike at the Catholic cathedral in the heart of Pape'ete to protest nuclear testing. A delegation marched on the Territorial Assembly and the offices of Jean Montpezat, the French high commissioner, leaving letters of protest for Montpezat and President Mitterrand. They made almost daily headlines in the local press and threatened to disrupt the bicentennial celebration of the French Revolution. The strike ended five days later, but only after Léontieff promised to debate the issue publicly.

This debate, initially scheduled for 17 August 1989, was foiled by a series of adroit political maneuvers and never occurred. Louis Le Pensec, Minister of the French Overseas Departments and Territories (DOM-TOM), arrived in Pape'ete on 24 July, and announced that the debate would be replaced by a roundtable discussion chaired by Montpezat, and that this would be delayed because of the forthcoming visit of French Prime Minister Rocard. Local politicians were aware that the nature of the forum had been altered significantly by these maneuvers and that the issue would now be discussed by a carefully selected group.

In protest, *Ia Mana* called for

Rocard to stop acting paternalistically and allow the Tahitian people to claim their dignity, their identity, and their own destiny. Jean-Marius Raapoto, a member of the Territorial Assembly, called for decolonization of the consciousness, criticizing local officials trained in dependence-oriented colonial traditions. A more active stance was taken by Oscar Temaru, who demanded a public poll on the nuclear issue and initiated a further hunger strike on the main coastal road opposite the Tahiti-Faaa international airport. Rocard denied the request, arguing that French defense policy fell outside the jurisdiction of the territorial government.

In October 1989, four months after the first hunger strike was held, a roundtable discussion was held in Pape'ete. As a gesture to local politicians, Léontieff was named co-chairman, together with the high commissioner. Except for designated sessions, the doors were closed to the public and the press, although spokespersons met with journalists on a daily basis. The roundtable was to include three phases: preliminary discussions in October, a period of reflection, and final discussions in December. Oscar Temaru declined to participate, charging that the roundtable was designed to divert the open debate that had been promised earlier.

The October sessions included an expedition to Moruroa by visiting French military officials, territorial government ministers, majority coalition and opposition members of the Territorial Assembly, members of the territory's Economic and Social Committee, labor union and business repre-

sentatives, the Peace and Development Committee, the Human Rights League, the Catholic Church, and members of the local news media. François Seners, technical adviser with the French government's DOM-TOM, described the work of the roundtable as a complete checkup.

Toward the end of the discussions, the results of an unofficial public opinion poll were announced by Napoleon Spitz, minister of tourism, sports, employment, and job training. The poll was conducted in the Tuamotu and Gambier islands, the groups closest to the nuclear testing site, and indicated that the majority supported the presence of the CEP (*Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique*). Spitz explained that he, as well as the population, supported the presence for practical reasons, but opposed the actual testing "philosophically." The implication was that despite concern over the ecological and social impact of the tests, opposition was muted because of the financial payoffs.

The final phase of the roundtable, which had been scheduled for December, was not held. Instead, metropolitan spokespersons announced that a written report would be distributed at an unspecified future date. In the following months, the normally militant parties of *Tavini Huiraatira* and *Ia Mana* were unusually quiet. The initial momentum that had been mustered by the hunger strikers and the citizens' group had been successfully dissipated through a series of French official visits, strategic delays, financial aid, and reinterpretations of earlier political concessions.

By early 1990, news coverage was

back to the usual fare of beauty queens, canoe races, local festivals, natural hazards, and Japanese investors. Oscar Temaru, who is also mayor of Faaa—Tahiti's nuclear-free city—invited Montpezat on an official visit. The occasion was the inauguration of the new Faaa Municipal Hall, financed by a US\$2-million grant from France. *Ia Mana*, which had introduced the motion for debate the previous July, also appeared to have been placated, and Drollet was granted the new position of party president.

President Mitterrand arrived from France in May to attend the centennial celebrations of the city of Pape'ete and the inauguration of a \$14.5-million city hall. Instead of the hoped-for additional subsidies, Tahitian residents received a blunt economic diagnosis that noted the large trade deficit, mounting unemployment, lavish expenditures, and inequitable tax system. On Moruroa, Mitterrand promised that France would not be the last to disarm.

In local politics, Napoleon Spitz was required to take a leave of absence from his ministerial duties because of allegations of electoral fraud. Emil Vernaudeau, formerly minister of postal services, telecommunications, and regionalization, was fired by Léontieff because of suspected collusion with Gaston Flosse. In reprisal, Vernaudeau and Flosse introduced motions in the Territorial Assembly calling for the dissolution of the government a year in advance of the scheduled elections. The motions were easily defeated.

By the end of the period under review, political parties had already begun campaigning for the March 1991

territorial assembly elections. The Léontieff coalition faces the formidable opposition of Vernaudon, Flosse, and Temaru, mayors of the most populous communes outside Pape'ete. Considering the territory's history, it would be no surprise if radically different political alignments were to emerge.

MOSHE RAPAPORT

NATIVE HAWAIIAN ISSUES

Theft, theft everywhere.

While the record sell-off of Hawaiian real estate continued in the year 1989-90 (over \$1 billion in land alone went to greedy Japanese corporations), a sleight of hand in the governor's office dispossessed Native Hawaiians of their largest land trust. This was the biggest story, or tragedy, for Hawaiians during the year under review.

A secret deal negotiated between the executive branch and the government-created Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) was announced on 8 February 1990 and went for first hearing in the state legislature just five days later. Hawaiian communities had barely heard of the agreement when they were asked to comment on it. Hawaiian legislators like Senator Mike Crozier hurried the bill through the political process, essentially rubber-stamping what amounts to the single largest land swindle since the Hawaiian government lost both domain and dominion when it was overthrown by the American military in 1893. In detail, the agreement is superficially complex; but in total effect, it is both simple and devastating.

A little background. Native Hawaiians are beneficiaries of two land trusts: the Hawaiian Homes trust (nearly 200,000 acres), created by the US Congress in 1921; and the "ceded lands" trust (1.4 million acres of public lands), created in the Hawai'i State Admission Act of 1959. Set up as a covenant between the State of Hawai'i and the federal government, the "ceded lands" trust has two beneficiaries: Native Hawaiians, defined as those of 50 percent or more Hawaiian ancestry, and the general public. Since 1959, neither the lands nor the revenues from the "ceded lands" trust have been segregated into Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian categories. As a result, Hawaiians have been dispossessed of the native portion of the trust.

In 1979, a State Constitutional Convention created an Office of Hawaiian Affairs in the form of a State agency to represent Hawaiians and to receive 20 percent of all revenues from ceded lands. The architects of OHA never intended it to receive lands from the trust, only a fifth of the trust revenues. At its birth, OHA was, like the Hawaiian nation itself, a landless entity.

By the mid-1980s, OHA was not receiving its share from the airport and other revenue-producing uses of ceded lands. Arguing that they were owed millions, OHA sued the state. The courts threw the issue back into the political arena, that is, the governor's lap. After two years of negotiations, a deal was struck that gave OHA about \$8.5 million a year, plus nearly \$100 million in back rentals. Exulting in the press and at the legislature, OHA and the governor hailed the agreement as

“historic” and “equitable.” One Democratic party sycophant even called the deal an act of “self-determination.”

But for tens of thousands of Hawaiians who are landless, the “ceded lands” agreement is just another act of villainy in a long line of villainous acts by our alleged “trustees.” In the first place, the Admission Act clearly identifies two beneficiaries of 1.4 million acres of *land*. Arguably, this makes Native Hawaiians eligible for *half* of these lands. While both the public and the native portions of the lands have been commingled for the last thirty-plus years, real estate values have soared astronomically. The state, meanwhile, has gone into the business of attracting foreign investment, giving land-use approvals for such “native” uses as Japanese-owned golf courses and high-rise hotels. All this means, of course, that land is worth more than anyone ever dreamed possible. Given the market, as they say, why should Natives get land when they can be bought off with money?

This sort of reasoning animated both the OHA trustees and the governor. Created as a kind of state Bureau of Indian Affairs for Hawaiians, OHA is actually a state agency, not a representative body created by Hawaiians to serve Hawaiians. The difference is crucial because what OHA gets does not go directly to Hawaiians, but rather to trustees for their pet programs. In this manner, millions will be spent, or mis-spent, in the name of justice for Hawaiians.

Justice, however, is blind. What Hawaiians need desperately at this stage of their history is land. And that

land is now being used by the US military, private investors, the state, sugar companies, and nearly anyone and everyone else.

OHA, meanwhile, has joined forces with the governor and the Democratic party to continue to dispossess Hawaiians of their lands and waters. For Hawaiians, this deal is painful indeed, because all agents involved are Hawaiian: the OHA trustees, the governor, and the key legislators. As with other indigenous people the world over, money is not the answer. Hawaiian problems will not be resolved by throwing money at them, even if those tossing it are Hawaiian.

While OHA was devised to circumvent the trust first set forth in the Admission Act, the *legal* question of whether Hawaiians are eligible for half of the ceded lands is still potentially alive. However, since Hawaiians do not have standing in either state or federal courts to bring actions for breach of trust, they must depend on the federal government to sue the State of Hawai‘i for any mismanagement of lands and revenues. Given the Republican administrations in Washington, DC, such federal action is highly unlikely.

Amid all the land struggles today—the efforts to stop geothermal development on the island of Hawai‘i; to ban hotels and other resorts in rural Hawaiian communities; to protect fragile ecosystems like wetlands, forests, and bays—the ceded lands settlement seems to many Hawaiians a bit of good news. But in the guise of giving revenues, the deal has actually moved a step closer toward total dispossession

of the trust lands. The longer the problem is framed in terms of money, the harder it becomes to frame it in terms of land. In typically American fashion, money has come more and more to replace the Hawaiian birthright. Meanwhile, Hawaiians continue to leave Hawai'i, the intended result of dispossession.

The only hopeful sign is public disapproval of the agreement by a host of sovereignty groups. One in particular, *Ka Lāhui Hawai'i*, dogged OHA at each of its community presentations, forcing the question of land dispossession into open debate. Apart from critical education, however, these forums did not succeed in overturning the settlement.

In the year ahead, Hawaiians will need to consider strategies aimed at the US Congress, the Justice and Interior departments, and the broader international human rights community. This will demand even more effort from self-determination groups, but, given the closed nature of politics in Hawai'i, no other course seems available.

HAUNANI-KAY TRASK

MAORI ISSUES

To New Zealanders, 1990 is significant as the sesquicentennial year of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. On 6 February 1840 the nation came into being when thirty-five chiefs of the northern confederation of tribes signed the treaty with Captain William Hobson, the representative of the British crown.

The government established a commission with a budget of NZ\$20 million

to promote a series of events that would make the sesquicentennial "our year." The commission promoted the theme of unity and racial harmony extensively on television and made grants to community projects that would enhance the sense of national unity.

This was not an easy task in view of the history of colonial despoliation of the Maori. For twenty years Maori activists had targeted the government-sponsored treaty celebrations at Waitangi, revealing the contradictions between Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand society. In 1971 *Nga Tamatoa*, the young warriors, protested at Waitangi, proclaiming Waitangi Day a day of mourning for the loss of 63 million acres of Maori land and calling on the government to ratify the treaty. The government responded in 1976 by establishing the Waitangi Tribunal to inquire into Maori grievances. The tribunal was not retrospective to 1840 and had no power to make awards, so Maori activism continued.

In the next decade, the Waitangi Action Committee took over the burden of protest action and denounced the treaty as a fraud. As the demonstrations escalated in size and vehemence, so did the police presence. In 1983, two hundred demonstrators were arrested at Waitangi in a preemptive strike by the police and detained without charge for several hours before being released. When the Labour government came to power the following year, it stepped back from a ceremony that required massive policing. Waitangi was deemphasized as smaller ceremonies were held in different parts of the country

(Walker, forthcoming). Five years on, the government felt obliged to do something significant to mark the sesquicentennial year and delegated the task to the 1990 commission.

Dr Bruce Gregory, both a commissioner and a member of parliament for Northern Maori, promoted the idea of a flotilla of tribal *waka* converging on the Bay of Islands to welcome Queen Elizabeth II on Waitangi Day. The commission supported the idea with cash grants of NZ\$50,000 to any tribe wanting to participate in the project. Maori activists saw this as an attempt to buy off the Maori people, but they refrained from public comment as more than twenty tribes built *waka* in preparation for the celebrations.

Maori motives for engaging in the *waka* project were complex. The northern tribes, who have a proprietary attitude to the treaty, genuinely supported the government-promoted celebrations. For others, it was a statement of mana. The *waka* is a potent symbol of tribal identity and the seafaring traditions of the Maori. The cultural renaissance over the last twenty years had been given tangible expression in the building of carved ancestral meetinghouses in urban as well as rural areas. But few tribes had enough resources to build *waka*. Interest in revival of the *waka* had been kindled by the visits of two ocean-going vessels in 1985, *Hokule'a* from Hawai'i and *Hawaiki-nui* from Tahiti. The commission's financial inducement was enough to trigger *waka* projects all around the country. For many tribes the scheme provided temporary respite in areas of high unemployment. For

young men with no educational qualifications, the projects gave training in traditional skills under government work schemes.

Although demonstrations were expected from the activists, tribal engagement in the *waka* project gave assurance that the Waitangi celebrations would be successful. This assurance proved short-lived as Maori criticism was leveled at the government from unexpected quarters. Television New Zealand ushered in the new year with a special dawn ceremony on the east coast, where the first rays of the sun rising out of the sea strike Mount Hikurangi. During the event, Ngaati Porou tribal elder Petuera Raroa referred to the Treaty of Waitangi as a covenant dishonored by the Pakeha. Elders, particularly from small towns and rural communities, are not usually so frank on public occasions, let alone on national television. But the most stunning critique of all came from a pillar of the establishment, Anglican Bishop of Aotearoa Whakahuihui Vercoe (Walker 1990).

When Bishop Vercoe addressed the Queen at Waitangi he charged the Crown with not honoring the treaty and with marginalizing its Maori partner instead. "The language of this land is yours, the custom is yours, and the media by which we tell the world who we are are yours," he said before concluding that "we come to the waters of Waitangi to cry for the promises that you made and for the expectations our *tupunas* made 150 years ago" (NZH, 7 Feb 1990).

The bishop's forthright address did not please Prime Minister Geoffrey

Palmer, who spoke after him and claimed that no government had done as much as the present one to resolve Maori grievances. The editor of the *New Zealand Herald* supported the prime minister and criticized Bishop Vercoe for being "sadly astray" on the immediate past, claiming Maori advances in the 1980s were directly linked to the government and its policies (NZH, 12 Feb 1990). Neither the prime minister nor the editor recognized that the concessions made toward some Maori grievances had been wrung from the government by Maori appeals to the Waitangi Tribunal and the High Court. These included successful injunctions against the transfer of Crown lands to State Owned Enterprises in 1987 and the Maori fisheries claim against the government's quota management system. In both instances, the court ruled that the government had an obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi to protect Maori interests.

Maori claims were a hindrance to the government's plans for corporatization of government bureaucracies and maximum use of fisheries resources. Publicly the government made a virtue out of necessity, while taking internal initiatives to turn back the Maori challenge to its hegemony. Its damage-control strategy included the establishment in 1988 of a treaty unit in the justice department. The government distanced itself from the rhetoric of "partnership" under the treaty, and reoriented its policy to observance of "the principles of the treaty" instead of the treaty itself. It then proceeded to define the principles of the treaty unilaterally (Department of Justice 1989). The first principle, that the government had the

right to govern and make laws, was a clear signal to the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal to back off. The government would simply legislate its way around embarrassing decisions that favored the Maori, as it did with the Maori Fisheries Bill and the Treaty of Waitangi State Enterprises Bill.

The Labour government's assertion of hegemony over the Maori signaled a return to the colonizing ethos of its forebears. That agenda was made explicit in the Australian current affairs television program "Four Corners" on the Waitangi Day celebrations. In 1989, the Tainui tribes won an injunction in the High Court against the sale of Coalcorp lands, pending settlement of their claim before the Waitangi Tribunal concerning a million acres of land confiscated in the nineteenth century. Justice Sir Robin Cooke rebuked the government for its handling of the case and ordered it to negotiate with Tainui. When asked what he thought of that judgment, Palmer was explicit: "The government has made it clear that that approach is totally unacceptable. When it comes to a question of allocating resources that is a political question for the government. It is not a legal question for the courts, and it will not be decided by the courts in any authoritative way." For the colonizer this statement means business as usual. For the colonized it means their struggle for justice will continue long into the foreseeable future.

RANGINUI J. WALKER

NIUE

The major event of 1989–90 for Niue was Cyclone Ofa, which caused severe damage during 3–4 February 1990. Despite protection from its reef and hundred-foot-high cliffs, enormous waves crashed boulders and tons of water onto the island, wrecking buildings and equipment. For Niue's fragile economy, already disturbed by the loss in 1988 of its international air service, this cyclone may prove to be one storm too many.

Hardest hit was the capital, Alofi, where most government offices, public services, and expatriate housing are situated. Structures on the seaward side of the main road suffered the most. The desirable cliff-top home of then cabinet minister Robert Rex, Jr—the son of Premier Sir Robert Rex—was swept into the sea in a matter of minutes. The residence of the Speaker of the Niue Assembly, Sam Tagelagi, was virtually destroyed. The government-owned Niue Hotel, the principal such amenity on the island, was devastated, while the island's hospital was extensively damaged and initially had to be evacuated. Total storm damage was assessed at more than US\$2.5 million, but further costs must include the impact of the cyclone on the island's diminishing attractiveness to its own people.

Niue's population has declined in twenty years by more than half, to approximately 2200 in 1990. With more than 12,000 people of Niuean descent now living in New Zealand, this dramatic population decline has become a source of concern not only on Niue but to New Zealand, which

has a constitutional commitment to provide financial support for the island.

The Niue Concerted Action Plan 1988–90, which was designed to stabilize population numbers, is being reassessed in the wake of Cyclone Ofa. Damage to infrastructure disrupted fishing activities in several villages, but the storm's effects on agriculture were more serious. Breadfruit, banana, papaya, and taro crops were devastated, leaving a relatively small quantity of local food on an island once entirely self-sufficient in this respect. Royal New Zealand Air Force flights brought in emergency medical supplies, generators, water and fuel pumps, and food. A New Zealand navy vessel, *Endeavour*, delivered additional foodstuffs, as well as building and plumbing materials, two weeks after the storm.

Cyclone Ofa also had an impact on the political environment. The general election was held as scheduled on 7 April, only two months after the cyclone. Sir Robert Rex, aged 81 and premier since self-government in 1974, had begun to face increasing opposition during 1989, surviving a no-confidence motion moved by opposition leader (and former South Pacific Commission secretary-general) Young Vivian in June. The vote arose after a New Zealand Audit Department statement expressed concern about Niue's spending of NZ\$10 million in aid monies from New Zealand. Despite speculation about his possible retirement, the premier linked his decision to run for office to the cyclone: "I'll have to stand again now, despite pressure from my family to stand down. It would be like a captain deserting a sinking ship"

(*PIM*, March 1990, 15). Nevertheless, the election results suggested a mixed response amongst Niueans to their premier's sense of commitment and tenacity.

Sir Robert stood against two challengers for reelection as the representative for Alofi South. He gained 71, or less than half, of the 152 valid votes cast, but this was enough to win reelection by 9 votes over the runner-up. He owed his victory to a divided opposition and was the only candidate returned with less than a majority. On 12 April, the Niue Assembly reelected Sir Robert to his sixth successive term as premier by a vote of 12 to 8. Sam Tegelagi was reelected speaker by the same margin, a reflection of the party alignments that have developed recently among the diminishing population of Niue.

Given Sir Robert's longevity in politics, his "faction" may be described as the Niuean political "establishment." Also contesting the 1990 elections were Young Vivian's Action Party, and Sani Lakatani's Niue People's Action Party (NPAP). Shortly before the elections, these two opposition groups joined forces with the sole aim of changing the government.

The most notable aspect of NPAP's manifesto was a pledge to reduce Niue's public service from its present level (around 600) to "a maximum of 100–150 personnel," an ambitious restructuring favored by New Zealand. The program was vague in other respects, giving no details of how the proposed "repatriation plan" for Niueans might be effected, for example.

Young Vivian's plans included im-

plementing major constitutional changes intended to upgrade Niue's political status. The Niue Constitution Amendment Bill, which reflected the recommendations of a constitutional review committee, had been withdrawn in November 1989 ostensibly "for procedural reasons," and the referendum proposed for January 1990 did not eventuate. Vivian's faction mounted an "It's time to change" campaign, and seemed set to capitalize on a variety of favorable circumstances, including Sir Robert's age and Niue's economic difficulties. But the election results were disappointing, with opposition groups commanding eight votes in the assembly, just one more than they had managed at the time of the vote of no-confidence in June 1989.

Some 94 percent of the 1157 people eligible to vote did so. Each of fourteen villages is represented by one member, with a further six elected on an at-large basis using an island-wide electoral roll. However, the different villages have been affected unequally by emigration, so that now Alofi South's 156 voters and Toi's 22 each send one member to the assembly. In April 1990 it was possible to be one of the highest polling candidates overall but still lose, as did Tukala Makamau Hekau in Alofi South. On the other hand, one candidate was elected with a mere 14 votes. In three villages, no elections were held; as only one candidate had been nominated, their three members (among them Young Vivian) were declared elected prior to the election.

By contrast, nineteen candidates stood for the six common roll seats, including Lady Tagaloa Rex (Sir Robert's wife) and Robert Rex, Jr (his

son), both of them incumbents. Lady Rex gained 483 votes, sufficient to retain her seat and finish third in the balloting, but a decline of 10 percent from her top-polling victory of 1987. Robert Rex, Jr received 396 votes to take fourth position, 13 votes more than the NPAP's Sani Lakatani. Leading the field was O'love Tauveve Jacobsen, a nurse first elected at a November 1988 by-election, and regarded as politically independent of the various factions.

Initially Sir Robert Rex's survival as premier seemed in doubt, but he broadened his support by including one of the opposition factions in his four-member cabinet. Only one cabinet member, Frank Lui, was reappointed—Robert Rex, Jr lost his ministerial position as well as his house—while NPAP leader and first-time member Sani Lakatani became minister of finance. Following the political reshuffling, however, the principal challenges to the Niue government remain substantially unchanged.

Prospects continue to depend on constructive collaboration with New Zealand—whose aid package now represents roughly NZ\$5000 per Niuean resident—and mobilizing what remains of the island's economy. Efforts to reintroduce a sophisticated air service have led to plans to upgrade the island's airport. Air New Zealand has concluded that a Niue stopover would be uneconomic, and prospects for renewed air links appear to rest with one of the smaller regional carriers.

In mid-1989 the New Zealand minister of external relations and trade suggested not only that the public service might be reduced by two-thirds, but

that Niueans begin to pay for government services. However, this raises the possibility that Niueans removed from the public service (the island's largest employer) or adversely affected by market-led policies might simply emigrate. On the other hand, the April 1990 decision to pay 50 percent of New Zealand superannuation benefits to persons living outside New Zealand for six months or longer may encourage eligible Niueans to return to Niue. Other developments foreshadowed by the Niue Concerted Action Plan, such as a land-title review, were being expedited where possible.

STEPHEN LEVINE

TOKELAU

Cyclone Ofa of February 1990 was the most important event for Tokelau during the period under review. Following Cyclone Tusi (and a tsunami a fortnight later) in 1987, the vulnerability of the low-lying atoll environment has been demonstrated in the strongest possible manner. Without substantial external assistance it may be years before the villages can recover to their pre-cyclone state, while outer islets will probably never return to their former condition.

No feature of organized life on the islands was unaffected. Twenty-two houses were completely destroyed, and a further ninety-one were severely damaged. Vital seawalls, protecting the fragile Tokelauan land base from erosion, were washed away. Fishing equipment, water tanks, sea latrines, and cooking houses were lost, and food supplies decimated. About 80 per-

cent of the breadfruit and coconut trees were destroyed or damaged.

The Apia-based Office for Tokelau Affairs (OTA) issued a preliminary assessment of the costs for recovery at NZ\$3.95 million. But OTA's figure did not include all forms of damage, and other estimates ranged much higher. For example, the damage to the physical character of one atoll, Nukunonu, was assessed at NZ\$22 million.

In the wake of the storm, the Royal New Zealand Air Force delivered urgently needed supplies via airdrop (there are no airstrips on any of the atolls), and further assistance arrived later by sea. Even so, delays in assisting the atolls—a week passed before the airdrop took place—are likely to lead to new disaster preparedness and relief procedures.

While acknowledging New Zealand's support, each island's council of elders (*taupulega*) was adamant about the need for more substantial measures. Because of its political status, Tokelau cannot expect to receive significant support from other donors, and the recovery program is essentially an internal New Zealand management problem. Tokelau's requests envisaged a substantial and sustained New Zealand Army engineer presence. One proposal involves teams equipped with bulldozers and trucks spending approximately four weeks on each atoll. Agreed priorities include reconstruction of housing and seawalls, channel clearance, repairs to stores and other government buildings, and replanting of damaged trees and crops. Additional medical supplies were delivered in anticipation of the increased number of diarrheal, respiratory, and nutritional

diseases expected as a result of water, hygiene, and food-supply problems. Tokelauans in New Zealand were requested to return to assist with recovery operations.

In March 1990 former New Zealand public servant Geoff Parkinson carried out an assessment of the Tokelau Public Service and reported on the steps necessary to promote cyclone recovery. A month later, the General Fono met on Fakaofu in the presence of the Wellington-based administrator, Neil D. Walter. As well as the cyclone damage, the forty-five delegates (fifteen from each atoll) discussed shipping needs. There are plans to replace the vessel used between Tokelau and Apia and to build a new interatoll vessel, expected to be in service by June 1991. The delegates also discussed moves to improve coordination between the Tokelau Public Service and the Tokelauan community. Administrative authority has increasingly been delegated by Wellington to Apia-based officers, and basing the public service in Tokelau itself is likely to be the next step.

New Zealand allocated some NZ\$1.2 million for cyclone recovery in addition to its existing development grants and budgetary assistance of approximately NZ\$4 million annually. In February 1990 a proposal to introduce a new funding arrangement, modeled on Tuvalu's trust-fund concept, was politely criticized by OTA, which later recommended that current arrangements continue. These recommendations were predicated on a view of Tokelau as an entity "not seeking to be independent" and feeling no "stigma from the international community" as a result of its present political status.

OTA was concerned that "limited economic independence could encourage Tokelau to entertain illusions of political independence," illusions happily dispelled by "living under the economic and political umbrella of New Zealand."

These observations notwithstanding, New Zealand remains committed to assisting Tokelau move toward a greater degree of self-government and economic self-sufficiency, not least because of the remote supervisory scrutiny of the United Nations. On 26–27 April 1990, a Tokelauan member of New Zealand's ministry of external relations and trade, Falani Aukuso, reported to the UN Committee on Decolonization "on behalf of the Faipule and the people of Tokelau." This was only the second time that the committee had been addressed by a "special representative" of Tokelau, the first having been in June 1987.

Reiterating what Tokelau's elected leadership had said at ceremonies in New Zealand commemorating the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Aukuso's statement indicated that Tokelau's "partnership" with New Zealand "feels right and we wish [it] to continue." He reported that the *faipule*, Tokelau's three elected island leaders, had taken the opportunity "to renew and reaffirm the wishes of the people of Tokelau to remain and keep on the 'special relationship' that currently exists." While not challenging New Zealand's responsibilities to the United Nations, the testimony nonetheless noted that "unlike other countries, Tokelau has not been 'colonised'," that "New Zealand cannot be accused of

violating human rights," and that the New Zealand government could not be accused of "hindering our path towards self-determination." In developing its own approach to the dilemmas of development and self-rule, Tokelau looked to the committee for "understanding and patience." Nevertheless, constructive moves toward the assumption of greater political authority by Tokelauans were identified for the committee's benefit.

The Tokelauan representative also seized a rare opportunity to speak out on international issues. He spoke of threats to the Pacific environment such as driftnet fishing, the dumping of toxic and nuclear waste, climate change, and nuclear testing, and alluded to a sense of powerlessness when confronting depredations brought about by the actions of "more 'advanced' countries." Tokelau's vulnerability was poignantly expressed: "We are a tiny dot. . . . Nevertheless we do exist, and we do have a voice. . . . If we are to believe our knowledgeable scientists our 'voice' will disappear forever in 50 years time. We have no one else to turn to but the Government of New Zealand and the United Nations."

Triennial elections were held in February 1990 for the three *faipule* and three *pulenuku* 'village mayor' positions, and a new group of Tokelauan community leaders emerged. On Fakaofu (whose island council gives somewhat greater authority to the elders) both the *faipule* (Peni Semisi) and the *pulenuku* (Lui Kelekolio) were reelected, but new representatives were elected on the other two atolls. Atafu reelected its *faipule* (Kuresa Nasau) but

chose a new *pulenuku*, Paulo Kitona, very popular with the *aumaga* (village workforce) and a young graduate of the University of the South Pacific. On Nukunonu (the more lightly populated of the three atolls), new leaders, Mika Koloi (*pulenuku*) and Salesio Lui (*faipule*), were selected.

The choice of Lui, a man in his mid-thirties, as *faipule* represented a particularly notable departure for a community that has always lodged authority and decision-making power with elders and older heads of families. A graduate in political science from the University of the South Pacific and a school-teacher, Lui's perceived strengths include an understanding of the public service and an ability to articulate alternative policies and perspectives at both island council meetings and the General Fono. It seems clear that some Tokelauans wish not only to enhance traditional authority but also to advance individuals with the skills and confidence to represent them in exchanges with New Zealanders, their own public servants, and the international community.

STEPHEN LEVINE

WESTERN SAMOA

In January 1990, the academic world was shocked when a principal informant of Margaret Mead, Fa'apu'a Fa'amua, admitted that she and other teenage girls had fabricated stories about lovers in 1926 to tease and humor the young American anthropologist (SO, 3 Jan 1990). Meanwhile, an academic controversy of a different kind continued to rage at the National

University of Samoa. Matters came to a head on 14 August 1989, when the professor of Samoan language and culture, Dr Aiono Fanaafi Le Tagaloa, was summarily dismissed by vice chancellor Tauiliili Uili (ST, 25 Aug 1990). Critics charged that she was ousted because of her association with the opposition party, and that the minister for education and chairman of the university council, Patu Afaese, was behind the sacking.

Although Dr Aiono sought a supreme court injunction and was reinstated a week later, the University Lecturers' Association and some members of the university senate charged the vice chancellor with mismanagement when the university council met in October 1989. The council responded by setting up a subcommittee, including Professor Colin Aikman of New Zealand, to investigate (ST, 6 Oct 1989). The vice chancellor himself responded by suing both the lecturers' association and the senate petitioners on the grounds of character defamation (ST, 17 Nov 1989).

The subcommittee submitted its report in November 1989. However, the university's executive council went into a long recess, and was not convened again until early in August 1990. When the report eventually came up for discussion, chair Patu Afaese insisted that things were back to normal on campus and that everyone should now forget about the past.

Over the hill from the university, the long-standing and bitter confrontation between the nurses association and Director-General of Health Dr Walter Vermeullen continued. In early August 1989, a commission of inquiry recom-

mended sweeping changes in the health department, including the removal of Dr Vermeullen. However, the government appeared reluctant to carry out the commission's recommendations. Although the Public Service Commission had written to Dr Vermeullen on 20 September asking him to step down (SO, 3 Jan 1990), he was still living in a government house and driving a government vehicle at the end of the period under review.

One of the more controversial issues that preoccupied parliamentarians in 1989 was the accusation by Minister of Lands and Survey Sifuiva Sione that the Nauru government had given money to help the opposition's election campaign in 1988. The Nauru government denied the charges and asked for an apology. The leader of the opposition challenged Sifuiva to provide evidence or withdraw his remarks. Seemingly unruffled by the stir he was causing, the minister did nothing to either confirm or retract his accusation. As a result of the ensuing political uproar, Nauru abandoned its plans to build a huge five-star hotel in Apia and pulled all of its investments out of Western Samoa (SO, 15 & 20 Dec 1989).

Parliament also got into some mud throwing when it was revealed that the newly appointed ambassador to the United States, Canada, and the United Nations, Dr Felix Wendt, a sitting MP, would be based in New York (SO, 10 Nov 1989, 1 Dec 1989). Critics argued that the costs of a permanent post in New York were not justified and accused the government of trying to avoid intraparty rivalry by distancing one of the more ambitious government MPs from the center of power.

Early in 1990, the Special Posts Bill was passed into law. Under it, all top posts in government departments are no longer appointed by the Public Service Commission, but by the government. Justified as an attempt to make the public service more responsive to government policies and priorities, critics argued that the bill would make political affiliations rather than professional qualifications the number one criterion for selecting top executives (SO, 15 Sept, 24 Nov 1989).

Economic performance during 1989, like the year before, was mixed. The balance of payments surplus for 1989 was ws\$0.9 million higher than for 1988, and gross international reserves increased from ws\$98.5 million in 1988 to ws\$126.5 million in 1989. Yet production trends for the same period were negative. In the manufacturing sector, for example, production decreased by 10.9 percent. Agricultural production improved slightly, but the volume of exports dropped 7 percent below the 1988 level. Despite improvements in prices during the year, total export earnings dropped from ws\$31.4 million in 1988 to ws\$28.85 million in 1989. The import bill on the other hand was a staggering ws\$171.65 million, offset only by heavy inflows of funds from overseas. Remittances—currently the biggest source of finance for Western Samoa—were worth ws\$86.61 million in 1989 (Central Bank, March 1990).

According to the chairman of the Western Samoa Manufacturers Association, Tuigamala A. Lam Sam, the economy was in trouble partly because the government was interfering in the private sector, "running businesses

which it knows nothing about" (so, 9 Mar 1990). As if to prove Tuigamala right, the government in June 1990 revealed it was writing off ws\$26.7 million in bad debts, mostly owed by unprofitable public corporations (so, 22 June 1990).

Suggestions were made during the year that overseas donors were trying to use aid to influence government policy. For example, a multimillion-dollar loan from the Asian Development Bank was approved only after the government committed itself to privatizing public corporations, particularly the financially troubled Western Samoa Trust Estate Corporation (so, 22 June 1990). The importance of overseas development assistance was underscored by the proposal to change the fiscal year from January to December to July to June, as used by major donors such as Australia and New Zealand (so, 22 June 1990).

Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana made headlines by becoming the first Commonwealth leader to visit the Peoples Republic of China after the massacre at Tiananmen Square. The visit was generally seen as the price paid for the ws\$18.2-million interest-free loan to build a government office complex in Apia (so, 27 Sept 1989). Earlier in 1989, Western Samoa's high commissioner to New Zealand denied allegations by Greenpeace that Japan had bought Samoa's silence on the issue of driftnet fishing with a WS\$20-million aid package (so, 26 July 1989). Ironically, a senior government minister, Jack Netzler, gave credence to Greenpeace's claim by suggesting in parliament the same week that his government's position on issues pertaining to

Japan in the region was being compromised by Japanese aid (so, 28 Sept 1989).

The year 1990 began with a lavish birthday party for Head of State Malietoa Tanumafili, to mark his fifty years of service to the nation. Some taxpayers were unhappy with the half-million-dollar bill for the party, and Malietoa seemed uneasy about the whole thing (so, 3 Jan 1990). The legal system was also rocking early in the year, but not to birthday music. The controversy involved Acting Chief Justice Tiavaasue Falefatu Sapolu, who charged the editor of the *Samoa Times* with contempt of court (so, 30 June 1990). In an article published the week before, the *Samoa Times* had suggested that the acting chief justice should disqualify himself from hearing a murder case because of conflict of interest. The article pointed out that the counsel for the defense was the sister of the acting chief justice and an unofficial partner in the Sapolu law firm. It also noted that the case was being prosecuted by the office of the attorney general, and that Tiavaasue still held the post of attorney general. The editor was fined ws\$1500.

The Village Fono Bill, which would give extensive powers to the village *fono* and *matai*, was introduced at parliament's first sitting of 1990. Widely criticized as a potential threat to human rights, the bill was passed into law by parliament after some modification. Support for the government's proposal to hold a referendum on the issue of universal suffrage appeared to be gathering momentum at the end of the period under review. However, the government has made it clear that the

referendum is only meant to gauge the feelings of the nation, and a majority vote for universal suffrage will not necessarily lead to its introduction.

If 1990 will not be known as the year of universal suffrage, it will certainly be known as the year of Cyclone Ofa. For three days in February, the cyclone, believed to be the worst in history, brought things to a standstill in Samoa. It left behind twelve dead, a shattered economy, and damage estimated at more than US\$200 million. Damage to infrastructure was extensive, with some villages and roads completely wiped out. Forests were badly hit, as was the agricultural sector, which contributes more than 50 percent of the GDP and employs 60 percent of the labor force. Banana and breadfruit crops were totally destroyed, and taro crops, except for the very young ones, were leveled and had to be used almost immediately.

Since the cyclone, life in Western Samoa has revolved around relief and rehabilitation. The government quickly implemented a number of measures to help the recovery. Budgetary funds were diverted to agriculture and infrastructure rehabilitation; interest rates were reduced; lending policies were altered to favor loans for cyclone relief and rehabilitation; and an export finance facility was introduced to enable commercial banks to lend to exporters at concessional rates. However, national efforts were completely overshadowed by the international

assistance that poured into the country after February. Multimillion-dollar loan packages were approved by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Great Britain, West Germany, the United States, France, the European Economic Community, and various international organizations gave substantial assistance in the form of grants or relief supplies, or in kind.

The emphasis on cyclone relief and rehabilitation in the first half of 1990 has created new problems and exacerbated existing ones. The economy is far more dependent as a result of the cyclone, and the handout mentality has been further entrenched. In terms of self-sufficiency, the cyclone has put Samoa back many years.

IOSEFA MAIAVA

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