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HONOLULU (July 26) — Asia’s “regional identity was imposed from without. It was Europe that named Asia …” At least that is how Jong Won Lee, a law professor at Japan’s Rikkyo University, sees it. And, he is not alone.
The quest for meaningful identity continues in Asia, even if the definition is still vague.
Janadas Devan, a U.S.-based senior writer and columnist for Singapore’s Straits Times newspaper, says elements of that illusive identity will still come from outside the region.
“The triangular relationship among the United States, China and Japan will determine” the way Asia, especially Northeast Asia, is defined in the coming years.
Devan told a recent seminar at the East-West Center, “the existence of Asia … I mean its literal, not ideological existence … will depend as much on the ability of transnational public spaces (ASEAN, APEC, etc.) to restrain bellicose national policies …” But, he does not foresee a one-size fits all identity. “I don’t think this ability is contingent upon the creation or nurturing of transnational Asian identities, but it does, I think, entail the positing of a pluralized ‘We’ straddling the region.”
Obtaining consensus on just what that ‘We’ might entail may prove to be a lot trickier than it sounds.
Young Whan Kihl, an East-West Center visiting POSCO fellow and professor of political science at Iowa State University, agrees with Devan on at least one point. He argues that true regionalism requires a sense of Asian identity that does not yet exist. That identity will need to coexist with national identities, as is now the case in Europe. In Asia, however, Kihl notes, “there are three major hurdles to overcome,” on the road to that coexistence. “Geography, history and culture are all elements that could stand in the way of regionalism, of a cohesive Asian identity.”
Kihl acknowledges that “there is some evidence of a pan-Asia pop culture or identity emerging,” witnessed by the popularity of Korean television dramas today and the recent popularity of Japanese manga throughout the region. But he sees no similar signs in the other two areas, especially in Northeast Asia.
And, those “other two areas” were among the major issues that came to the fore at the inaugural session of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in December 2005. A gathering that was fraught with birthing pains.
The EAS was first envisaged in 2001 as “the evolution of the annual summit meetings of the ASEAN+3 (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea).” The purpose of the EAS was to promote the establishment of an East Asia Community, a community that would allow the three Northeast Asian countries to share the leadership role with ASEAN and make the new group less ASEAN-centered and more “East Asian” in identity.
The new forum was championed by Malaysia and China. But as Gueng Chan Bae, an EWC visiting scholar and a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul, points out, “several ASEAN members had some reservation about launching EAS formally.” High on that list was Indonesia, who along with other members, “feared that the EAS could dilute the strategic importance of ASEAN.” He adds that Singapore and Vietnam also shared Indonesia’s concerns and were non-committal regarding the establishment of the EAS.
But, Bae notes Malaysia was able to convince the other ASEAN members to commit to the inaugural session in Kuala Lumpur last December, a move aimed at helping to bolster Malaysia’s “wishes to continue to take the lead in the regional integration process of East Asia.”
Beijing was also active in the lobbying efforts for the 2005 inaugural. The attraction to China, in addition to being one of the “+3” countries, is that under the ASEAN+3 makeup the United States would be naturally excluded from membership in the EAS. That would give China a forum to, as Bae puts it, “maximize its influence in the region” and also “play a central role, if not dominant one, in the process of East Asia community building.”
The results of the first EAS drew mixed reviews. Some skeptical analysts say the forum was another example of, as Bae puts it, “a talk shop, another regional process heading nowhere.” Others, however, see the EAS as a constructive venture that could rival APEC or even the ASEAN+3 in the future.
Bae, solidly in the former camp, points out, “There was no consensus about its purpose, its relationship to the existing regional institutions, such as APEC and particularly ASEAN+3 or its role in community building in East Asia.”
In fact, it was the question of membership that was the primary issue running up to the Kuala Lumpur meeting — a question that shadowed the conference and called into question the concept or identity of East Asia itself.
China and the majority of ASEAN members seemed to advocate limiting membership to the existing ASEAN+3 countries. Others had other ideas. Japan joined several ASEAN members arguing for membership expansion. Indonesia called for India, Australia and New Zealand to join the EAS. Singapore suggested that India be included. Japan went further, calling for invitations to be extended to leaders of the United States, Russia, the European Union and even the United Nations.
The so-called expansionists had a motive. According to Bae, “they were concerned about the possibility of a China-led EAS, and shared a sense of urgency to add new members in order to counterbalance China.”
It was finally agreed upon that the inaugural EAS would include the ASEAN nations, and the +3s, China, Japan and Korea, in addition to Australia, India and New Zealand. But, not much more was agreed upon.
Bae argues the results of the inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur, in which ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and the EAS all came away with something, were “so muddled that everyone can live with them for now.” He adds the confusion and “face saving” that came out of the first summit override “the original concept of EAS that was to replace the ASEAN+3, eventually integrating into a community.”
Bae concludes, “It is still an open question whether or not the EAS will play a significant role in building a community in the region.”
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Young Whan Kihl is professor of political science, Iowa State University and a visiting POSCO fellow at the East-West Center. He can be reached at 808-944-7244 or via email at kihly@eastwestcenter.org
Gueng Chan Bae, an EWC visiting scholar and a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul can be reached via email at gcbae@mofat.go.kr.
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