

Local Politics and Local Identity:
Resistance to “Liberal Democracy” in Yogyakarta Special Regions Of Indonesia

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DEDICATION

For my beloved son: Iqra Garda Nusantara

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“There is no time to rest before grassroots politics becomes a well-established field of study in Indonesian political discourse. It is my dream to see this happen soon after my graduation from the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, USA.”

I have been blessed with a great opportunity, and I deeply owe a debt of gratitude to the people of Yogyakarta who have inspired me to study local and grassroots politics. Yogyakarta, as the center of Javanese culture, was an ideal location to study everyday politics, and the creativity of the people of Yogyakarta impressed me during my field research. The movement against the Dutch in Yogyakarta is a manifestation of Javanese ideology called “*Manunggaling Kawulo lan Gusti*,” meaning the people and the King are united. It was inspiring for me to learn more about the recent movement in Yogyakarta under the banner of defending the special status of this region as part of the decentralization and democratization project led by the central government. The *Pisowanan Agung* (The Great Mass Gathering), which was attended by millions of Yogyakartaans in 1998, clearly showed the solidarity of the people and the King. Suharto was born in Yogyakarta, but people of this region were demanding for him to step down. People power grew out of grassroots politics and was transformed into a social movement and collective protests.

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to researchers and enthusiasts of local politics and contemporary studies, as well as to politicians and public policy makers everywhere.

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ABSTRACT

In a struggle to preserve traditional values and elite interests in Yogyakarta following the 1998 reforms, voluntary indigenous organizations (*paguyuban*) have used local ethnic identity and cultural resources to build legitimacy for their political positions and to mobilize participation in protests that support the privileged status of Yogyakarta Special Region. Cultural resources are themselves constructed, invented, contested, and politicized by communities to defend the “public interest” as they interpret it.

In so doing, the Yogyanese engage in active, public resistance through *paguyuban*. Such groups reproduce existing cultural resources as part of a broader movement to oppose proposals for “democratization” or “liberal democracy” that have been raised by the central government. At the same time, however, a far larger portion of the population are not members of the any social movement organizations, this silent majority engages in everyday politics in their private lives in response to national, regional and local political dynamics.

Based on data gathered through interviews, fieldwork and newspaper reports, this study finds that: (1) collective identity is produced and reproduced on the basis of local traditions, myths and values, leading to an active protest movement in the case of debates over the special political status of Yogyakarta; (2) the existence of indigenous groups contributes to shaping and reshaping such protest events; and (3) open politics and everyday politics, the latter of which has been neglected in previous research on Yogyakarta, are simultaneously active with regard to such political issues. This study shows that people react to local and national political dynamics in different ways, depending on whether their activities are in the public sphere or in their private lives. The reasons for such disconnections are diverse and include the impact of external mobilization, economic interests, social obligations, and reluctance to participate publicly, driven by the view that organized movements are meaningless due to the hegemony of the elite and due to attitudes of disillusionment with regard to democracy.

Keywords: political transition, social movements, collective identity, voluntary organizations, everyday politics, liberal democracy, decentralization

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List of Abbreviations

APDESI	:	The Association of Village Headman (Asosiasi Pemerintah Desa se-Indonesia)
APPSI	:	The Association of Local Government of Indonesia (<i>Asosiasi Pemerintahan Propinsi se-Indonesia</i>)
DIY/DIJ	:	<i>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta</i> , The Special Region of Yogyakarta
DPRD	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> , Local People Representative Assembly
DPR RI	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia</i> , National Assembly
DPD	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Daerah</i> , District Representative
GENTARAJA	:	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Semesta Jogjakarta</i> , The People Movement of Yogyakarta
GOLKAR	:	<i>Golongan Karya</i> , Functional Group/party
GRM/GERAM	:	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Mataram</i> , The Mataramese Movement
GRY	:	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Yogyakarta</i> , The People of Yogyakarta Movement
GRMB	:	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Mataram Binangun</i> , The Binangun Mataramese Movement
GKR	:	Gusti Kanjeng Ratu, The Prince
HB	:	<i>Hamengku Buwono</i> , The official name of The Sultan
FPI	:	<i>Front Pembela Islam</i> , The Islamic Front Defender
FKUB	:	<i>Forum Kerukunan Ummat Beragama</i> , The Interfaith Forum of Jogja
FJR	:	<i>Forum Jogja Rembug</i> , The Jogjanese People Forum
FORINBA	:	<i>Forum Intelektual Budayawan Yogyakarta</i> , The Intellectual and Artist Forum
ISMAYA	:	<i>Paguyuban Lurah dan Perangkat Desa se-DIY</i> , The Village

	Headman Association of DIY)
IRE	: Institute for research and empowerment (NGO)
KIPER	: <i>Komite Independen Pengawal Referendum</i> , The Independent Committee for Yogyakarta Referendum
KOMPAK	: <i>Koalisi Masyarakat Penyelamat Keistimewaan</i> , The Group Coalition for Yogyakarta Special Regions
KMKY	: <i>Koalisi Masyarakat untuk Keistimewaan Yogyakarta</i> , The People Coalition for Yogyakarta Special Status)
KM	: Koalisi Mataram (Voluntary Association of Mataram)
KPH	: Kanjeng Pangeran Haryo, The official name of the Palace noblemen
KRT	: Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung, The Family of the Pakualam
LSM	: Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
PA	: Paku Alam (The official and traditional name of Pakualaman King)
PKI	: Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesia Communist Party
PDIP	: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, The Indonesia Democratic Party Struggle,
PKS	: <i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> , The Prosperity Justice Party
PKB	: <i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> , The Nation Awekining Party
PMJ	: <i>Paguyuban Masyarakat Jogjakarta</i> , The Association of Jogjanese
PARADE Nusantara	: <i>Persatuan Perangkat Desa se-Indonesia</i> , The National Association of Village headman
PAN	: <i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> , National Mandate Party
ParWI	: Parliament Watch and Insight (NGO)
PPP	: <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> , The Unitary Development Party
PPLP	: <i>Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai</i> , The Association of Coastal Villager

RUUKY	:	<i>Rancangan Undang-Undang Keistimewaan Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta Special Status Bill, or “Special-ness” Bill</i>
Sekber Gamawan	:	<i>Sekretariat Bersama Gerakan Keistimewaan dan Penetapan, Pro-Speciall-Ness of Yogyakarta Movement</i>
Semar Sembogo	:	<i>Paguyuban dukuh se Propinsi DIY, Association of Sub-Villages of DIY</i>

Glossary

<i>Abangan</i>	:	Syncretic Muslim
<i>Agama Jawa</i>	:	Javanese Faith/ideology agama mix of Islam and Hindu
<i>Agung Binatara</i>	:	A great leader
<i>Abdi dalem</i>	:	Servant of the King
<i>Alun-alun</i>	:	Yard in front of the Palaces
<i>Bakul</i>	:	Small trader
<i>Bangsawan</i>	:	Nobleman
<i>Bupati</i>	:	Head of Region
<i>Daerah Istimewa</i>	:	Special Privilege/status of the region. e.g. Papua, Aceh, Jakarta, and later Yogyakarta.
<i>Demokrasi</i>	:	Equal meaning with democracy.
<i>Ismaya</i>	:	<i>Paguyuban Lurah se-DI Yogyakarta</i> , The Head of villages association
<i>Ijab Qobul</i>	:	Political contract among “Republic of Indonesian” and “Nation of Yogyakarta” conducted in Sept 5, 1945 between the Sultan and President Sukarno to agree on unitary state.
<i>Juru kunci</i>	:	Gate Keeper
<i>Kampung/desa</i>	:	Village, Javanese Village
<i>Kawulo</i>	:	Orang kecil/wong cilik, little man
<i>Keraton/Kraton</i>	:	The palace as center of cultural and traditional power
<i>Kesultanan</i>	:	Sultanate
<i>Masjid Gede</i>	:	Grand Mosque
<i>Mataram</i>	:	Previous Kingdom of Yogyakarta. its people so-called kawulo Mataram

<i>Muhammadiyah</i>	:	Islamic and modern Islamic Groups that emerges within the Palace Wall founded by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912.
<i>Ngabekten</i>	:	The day for respecting to the Kings/Sultan
<i>Ngrasani</i>	:	Critica discourse in private way/individual manner
<i>Paguyuban</i>	:	Voluntary organization/traditional association in the Javanese term
<i>Pribumi</i>	:	Indigenous people
<i>Pisowanan Ageng</i>	:	The ceremony in which The King meet to the people in direct way
<i>Pararadhya</i>	:	Sultan as symbol of cultural leader
<i>Rukun Tetangga</i>	:	Community self-reliance
<i>Sekber Gamawan</i>	:	The Pro-Special Status of Yogyakarta Movement
<i>Santri</i>	:	Puritan Islamic groups
<i>Slamatan</i>	:	Rite ceremony to Thank God and ask for blessing.
<i>Semar Sembogo</i>	:	The Association of Hamlet in DI Yogyakarta Province founded 2007
<i>Sinkretisme</i>	:	Ideology, mix of ideology
<i>Trah</i>	:	Descendent of the King Family
<i>Taman Siswa</i>	:	The name of student movement in Yogyakarta in 1922
<i>Tanah Lungguh</i>	:	Appanage land
<i>Tingalan Dalem</i>	:	Celebration of the birth day of the Javanese Kings
<i>Yogyakarta</i>	:	The name of city and region/province, it is often written as Jogjakarta, Yogjakarta, Ngayogyokarto, Ngajogjokarta. People og Jogja can be named as Jogjanese or Yogyakartaans.

Chapter I

Introduction: Local Politics, Local Identities, and Democratization

“Yogyakarta became well-known because of its independent soul.
Keep the spirit of independence forevermore...!”
--Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia¹

1. Introduction

After the fall of the new order regime in 1998, a third wave of democracy and "liberalization" spread across almost all regions of Indonesia, including the monarchical province of Yogyakarta. This political reform or *reformasi* led to the current so-called transition period. It remains to be seen whether this transition period will be democratic or not. This situation has been interpreted as a basis for instituting direct general elections under Law 22/1999, the promulgation of which was followed by a variety of political scandals for the local elections involving both national and local actors.

In the liberalized political system, it seems that anyone with money can win positions in the central, provincial, or local government. As Hadiz (2010) and Hidayat (2009) argue, social capital, networks, and money each play important roles in political competition and liberal democracy in Indonesia. Liberal democracy has become a serious problem after 12 years of reform in Indonesia. The big bang of decentralization with the direct elections led to the emergence of a mafia, local strongmen, predatory elites, and

¹ This translation is by the author. In Indonesian the quote is, “menjadi termashur oleh karena jiwa kemerdekaanya. Hidupkanlah terus jiwa kemerdekaan itu...!”. From Heru Wahyukismoyo, in *Specialness of Jogja versus Democractization* [Keistimewaan Jogja vs. demokratisasi.] Yogyakarta: Bigraf, p. i

patron-client behavior as elements of everyday life. As a result, corruption has spread rapidly nationwide, giving rise to the question: has liberal democracy in Indonesia failed after the decade-long reform era? Actually, this has re-emerged as a topic of public discussion since, in 1950, Indonesia experienced its first failure with liberal democracy (Legge 1964, Kahin 1964, Faith 1967, Dwipayana 2011), which led to Sukarno's guided democracy. Global scandals toppled the totalitarian regime and replaced it with economic liberalization and restriction of political space. After 32 years, the economic crisis in Asia ignited political revolution and ended with the fall of the dictatorship on May 20, 1998, initiated by movements of students, union workers, and other elements of civil society.

During the course of this transition period, different political entities have responded in different ways. Politicians, civil society organizations, and grass root communities, of course, they have their own opinions in an atmosphere of political uncertainty. In the case of Yogyakarta, some of them have reacted to the New Order by demanding more democratic states and more decentralized regions, while others want to preserve traditional and charismatic leader of Yogyakarta, and yet others talk about better prosperity, more peaceful conditions, and increased job opportunities instead of democracy and participation. It means that there some political dynamic in this region concerning locality, respect to charismatic leader (The Sultan) by employing social movement model and interestingly most of population still continue their everyday politics in this democratic feature. Also, they come together in the some sites of social, economy, and political interaction so we may say that either formal politic/"conventional politic", "advocacy" politics and "everyday politics" intersect one another.

The diversity of these responses has led me to conduct research elucidating the

processes by which local people in Yogyakarta have resisted the central government's proposals for gubernatorial elections.

The reason why people do participate in social movement against democracy and why they don't are diverse. Participants may think that their local leader is quite better and promote peacefulness, accountable, and well respected. Other maybe think both democracy and monarchical model do not really help them to take any opportunity so they remain in insisting privately reject them instead of public way.

2. Previous Studies on Local Politics

We should take into account what has happened in local contexts during political transitions in Indonesia. Local politics can be understood in terms of local political cultures, which have their own identities, historical backgrounds, social cultures, customs, value, religions, and so forth. Moreover, local politics are different from national politics since, as Giddens (1991) points out, globalization influences local transformations in the everyday politics of the people and *vice versa* as a consequence of modernity and the introduction of western democratic values under the banner of periodic elections in order to create a legitimate government (Imawan 1996). But, sometimes, general elections are only a festival of democracy ("pesta demokrasi") as was the case in Indonesia especially during the New Order (Heryanto 1996, Budiman 1996, Antlove 1995). Since that time, general elections have become a new tradition worldwide.

There are several questions that remain unanswered by previous research such as Hadiz (2010), Choi (2009), Klinken (2007) and so forth relating to local political issues

in Indonesia. For instance, Hadiz (2010) does not distinguish clearly between local politics and other levels of politics as arenas of contestation, preferring Thomas P. O'Neill's view that "all politics is local." This simply means that local interests play a vital role in national and even global politics. To understand Indonesian politics, then, we must understand the political realities of local regions. Moreover, national politics can lead to contestations between different interest groups, creating both violent and nonviolent conflicts at the local level. In general, prior studies lack an understanding of the political dynamics in Javanese regions, especially in Yogyakarta and central Java. The continuity of everyday politics and symbolic behavior in facing political issues is obvious in Javanese society, yet it is barely acknowledged by many scholars and researchers.

Therefore, the contributions to the existing literature of my studies include (1) discussion of how local politics can be seen in light of their historical background, cultural issues, and of course the rule of the aristocracy in shaping and reshaping both local and national politics, including power relation in government offices, political parties, NGOs, and grassroots politics; (2) the elaboration of patterns of political dynamics, including examinations of how people individually or collectively construct and produce discourse and meaning regarding issues relating to local politics, with attention to social movement and everyday political theories in building a new understanding of local-national political tensions; and (3) formulation of an argument that local elites dominate the local politics, including mass mobilization to support the Sultan's privilege, but that such actions overlook cultural values, historical values, ethnic consciousness, social connectedness, and other elements that could potentially make such collective

movements more effective.

This project is important for several reasons. The first is that this research builds on previous research by showing that, even in Javanese society, there is a variety of local political dynamics in response to the domination of a central state. Local politics, popular resistance and identity politics are relatively unexamined in Indonesia and particularly in Java. Most international research in Indonesia has considered areas outside of Java, focusing on ethnic and political conflict in places such as Aceh, Papua, Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. Two key differences between Java and these other locations are the degree and forms of political conflict. Outside of Java, such conflict is readily apparent, whilst inside Java it tends to be subtle, contradictory and symbolic, perhaps better described as disagreement instead of conflict. Therefore, researchers who have considered Java have sometimes failed to find meaning in modern symbols of resistance. Yet, in Javanese culture, symbols can be powerful channels of popular resistance, and if we do not understand their meanings, we will fail to understand Javanese people properly, resulting in serious misconceptions when it comes to religious and political aspects. The second reason is that this topic is a timely and relevant issue for culturally situated social movement theory, and at the same time it is quite rare to talk about grassroots politics. In this connection, existing material from previous research will be helpful to confirm or to criticize them in order to create intellectual discourse.

3. Theoretical Frameworks

At least there are four central concepts here to be acknowledged to build an

understanding on this research topic, namely: democracy, everyday politics, resistance, and social movements. I explain each of these in detail as follows.

3.1. Democracy

First is democracy. Democracy has attracted many scholarly discussions. For Aristotle, the reason why there are many forms of government in the world is because every state contains many elements. Indonesia itself is one of the most diverse societies worldwide, which has tremendous consequences in terms of conflict and civil war, latent and manifest unrest, open confrontations and symbolic resistance. Liberal democracy and constitutional democracy are common forms of Western representative democracy. According to the principles of liberal democracy, elections should be free and fair, and the political process should be competitive (Schmitter & Karl 1991, Dahl 2006, Diamond 2008). Dahl (1998) argues that certain conditions of non-democratic states can help to create the conditions for democracy. He also provides a clear definition of democracy and its requirements as a workable system of representative government based on democratic elections.

For Dahl, besides participation, equality, and checks and balances, democracy can also provide opportunities to avoid tyranny while offering freedom, equal rights, development, peace, moral autonomy, and prosperity (1998:38, 45). Liberal democracy may take various constitutional forms, such as a federal republic, a constitutional monarchy, a presidential system, a parliamentary system, and a semi-presidential system. Among these, Aristotle declared that monarchy, aristocracy and constitutional government were better forms of government than democracy. The definition of liberal democracy in this study is limited to refer to an electoral democracy, which relies on

elections to choose political leaders rather than appointment. Dahl (2006) defines modern democracy as a process of control over leaders, and he proposes a formulation of an ideal democracy, which is generally recognized as “procedural democracy.” In a procedural democracy, the government emphasizes the constitutional electoral process. Meanwhile, ordinary people consider how democracy will improve their well-being, job opportunities, prosperity, equality, and justice. Such an ideal, of course, exists in few countries.

The definition of local monarchy as used in the presidential speech concerning Yogyakarta’s place in a democratic state is not obvious for most people. Indeed, Yogyakartaans do not see their government as a monarchy, or even a constitutional monarchy. Even though the governor of Yogyakarta is appointed from a noble family, such local values and local government were recognized under Dutch law and continued in Indonesia’s history. In addition, people used to elect village heads both directly and by appointment and, since 2004, Yogyakartaans have elected their regents and mayor. The gubernatorial elections in Yogyakarta are one exception to this generally democratic system. In this case, Yogyakarta people want a *Penetapan* (an appointed governor, chosen from the Sultan’s family), which is the reason why Yogyakarta is considered as a monarchical province within the republic.

However, popular Indonesian views of democracy have been influenced by the experience of democracy within the country, as divided into three waves of democratization. The first wave of liberal democracy in Indonesia began in 1950 following independence. Unlike Fukuyama (1992), who believes that the history of government will end with a system of liberal democracy, Feith (2006) in his book

Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia states that liberal democracy has failed to implement itself in Indonesia. Other studies might find similar cases around the globe, where liberal democracy has failed or succeeded. In the general elections, hundreds of political parties emerged. This fragmentation of power and interest groups caused parliamentary politics to become unstable, which dramatically ended with the “guided democracy” of the authoritarian regime of Sukarno in 1957. This first failure of liberal democracy was followed in 1966 by a second wave of democracy, with regular elections and a multiparty system, which led to the totalitarian regime of Suharto, a non-democratic regime that was strongly supported by the dictatorship of the party and military (Brooker 2000, see also Arendt 1951, Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956, Schapiro 1972). Ironically, although Indonesia declared itself a democratic state with congressional and presidential elections, the system was thoroughly corrupt. The regime ended with mass mobilization and violence and a new era of political reforms began nationwide.

3.2. Everyday Politics

The second key term to be defined is everyday politics. My definition of “everyday politics” here follows Kerkvliet (2009) as including the actions of embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources through quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct. According to Kerkvliet, the consideration of everyday politics can help us as researchers to be aware of, and realize the importance of, our own everyday political behavior (Kerkvliet 2009:232). The key points of his definition are indirect and unorganized behavior in everyday life of people. Boyte, in comparison, has his own understanding of everyday politics in the case of democracy in

the United States. To Boyte, everyday politics is about how to reconnect citizens to public life and get people involved in doing public work for the good of their communities and the nation (Boyte 2004). Both of these definitions will be employed in understanding the case of Yogyakarta in this study.

The concept of everyday politics is necessary to answer the question posed in chapter 3 of this study: what are the motivations for certain people to resist liberal democracy directly, while others do not? According to Aristotle, the universal reason why people rebel, at least in a revolutionary form, is the desire for equality when one or more groups of people is dissatisfied with the distribution of wealth in society or with feelings of inequality and superiority (McKeon 1941). There are many forms of social resistance, since culture can enable certain forms of resistance to be embedded within society. One form is open resistance, which may also be called civil rebellion, revolution or social movements. In this form, leadership and organizational skills are necessary, which may lead to situations in which corruption and abuse of authority are inherent risks. Another form of resistance is symbolic resistance or, as Scott names it, “everyday resistance,” which “aims to at an immediate and personal gain in a fashion that minimizes the risks of open confrontation” (Scott 1986). In the case of Yogyakarta, people have resisted both in open movements through collective action and through symbolic forms of resistance. Although some activists may have the capacity to mobilize resources, they may decide that open confrontation is not called for. This type of nonviolent movement in the open space of democratic discourse can alternatively be understood as a type of legal advocacy.

Third is resistance. The United States Department of Defense defines a resistance

movement as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability” (JP1-02 2010:313). Meanwhile, the Webster dictionary defines resistance as “an opposing or retarding force.” A resistance movements should be understood as groups or collections of individual groups that oppose those in power through the use of physical force or through nonviolent actions, which may be active or passive, open or symbolic. Other words that relate to this term are “rebellion” and “revolution,” but the two are not the same.² According to Kartodirjo (1972), forms of rebellion, resistance or conflict typically accompany a process of socio-cultural change. He describes an example of this in how the Dutch imposed Westernization and secularization in the seventeenth century, which generated a great deal of resistance in Dutch colonies.

The basic idea of resistance is often close to the meaning of rebellion, revolution, radical movement, and social movement in the Hobsbawmian sense (Kartodirjo 1972; see also Kerkvliet 2009). Thus, “resistance movement” and “social movement” here are interchangeable terms. Scott (1986) prefers to understand resistance as having a working definition, implying that there should be no fixed definition. Instead of imposing a dominant definition, that of rebellion or revolution, which each require collective action or mass defiance, he argues for another approach focusing on “small revolutions” by ordinary people in everyday life. Scott and Kerkvleit (1986) discuss this same idea in more detail by introducing new term, “everyday forms of peasant resistance.” According to Scott, there is no requirement that resistance must take the form of collective

² Rebellion, as Webster defines it, is “organized, armed, open resistance to the authority or government in power,” while revolution is a “movement that brings about a drastic change in society.”

movement; individuals can engage in resistance alone, which can lead to another form of social movement, namely, a symbolic or ideological movement. While few scholars have investigated the effects of everyday forms of resistance in relation to organized and open confrontation (Kerkvliet 2009), Scott gives clear examples of indirect resistance and peasant resistance in his discussions of reactions to the *Zakat* in Malaysia and to the tithe in France.

Indonesia's history, as a country that was colonialized for centuries, contains many forms of civil disobedience, revolution, and resistance against the dominant power. Each such movement had varying motivations, such as resistance to the Dutch government, resistance against the authoritarian state, resistance in favor of democracy, and finally resistance against 'democracy' in the name of identity. Several related studies have examined such resistance movements. To mention a few, for instance, Kartodirjo (1966) published his research under the title *The Peasant's Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel*, which discusses the farmers rebellion in Banten against Dutch colonial rule. In this case, farmers were led by the Ulama (Moslem religious leaders) and the Tubagus, or nobles, of Banten. Before and after the rebellion of 1888, there were many civilian resistance movements in Indonesia. Kartodirjo argues that each of these revolts was a continuation of the others. Historical records also show that Yogyakarta experienced two popular rebellion movements against the Dutch, the first of which was in 1825-1830 led by Dipenogoro Prince, and the second in 1949 led by General Sudirman.

During the Suharto New Order period, protest movements were openly and secretly suppressed by the military. Scholarly works covering this period include

Kuntowijoyo (2002) in his book *Radikalisasi Petani*, Kahin (1999) in his *Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity*, and Basrowi (2004) in *The Resistance of Santri and Peasants in Java (Pembelotan Kaun Pesantren dan Petani Jawa)*. These and other scholars have discussed resistance movements among Islamic groups under the banner of *Komando Jihad* ('holy war') as a struggle against the ideology of Pancasila in the New Order period. Basrowi (2004), for example, describes a local case in which an Islamic leader influenced peasants in the 1990s in East Java to resist green revolution projects in a nonviolent and indirect way.

For the period when General Suharto was in power, we find very few cases of open resistance, because the military regime was strongest at that time. Therefore, it is more fruitful to consider hidden protests as discussed in studies adopting the theoretical framework of "everyday politics" as a possible element of resistance (Scott 1990:85; Kerkvliet 1985, 2009). The term everyday politics should be understood as distinct from other types of politics such as official, conventional, and advocacy politics (Kerkvliet 2009). Shortly after the reform era, overt protest movements were overwhelmingly active nationwide, and in some villages there was general resistance against modernism and capitalism. Such movements included resistance against industrialization in Southern Yogyakarta and movements against modern supermarkets in Yogyakarta. In the past decade, protest movements have served to channel and manifest collective action that could lead to positive social change, implying that the activities of SMOs are no longer considered as a social pathology. Democracy in Indonesia today thus entails a variety of political disagreements that are expressed in overt and organized ways.

Beyond Indonesia, related studies include those conducted by Scott such as his

Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990), *The Art of Not Being Governed* (2009), *Weapon of the Weak* (1985), as well as Kerkvleits's *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South-East Asia* (1986) and other studies on the popular revolutionary Zapatista Movement in Mexico in 1911 and 1994. The case of Mexico is similar to that of Yogyakarta, since the argument there likewise advocates the use of traditional governing systems at the local level, as opposed to standard elections along a centralized model. The Zapatista activists argued that, for federal elections, the votes of people in Chiapas were controlled and influenced in favor of the ruling party for decades, a situation that was able to continue due to the area's geographic isolation (Snyder & Harrington, 1998). Considering the Zapatista movement through a comparative approach can shed additional light on how Yogyakarta's situation presents a different case.

3.3. Social Movement

The last key theoretical term requiring definition in this study is social movement. Social movement theory can be seen as body of literature produced and reproduced among social scientists in the West as an attempt to systematically explain social phenomena such as protests, boycotts, and other forms of collective action. Thus, social movements are simply collective action, where people act together (Phongpaicit 2005), though not every mass action can be called a social movement. To some extent, the term "resistance movement" can be used interchangeably with "social movement," though some scholars distinguish between the two depending on whether collective action is taken in a direct way (social movement) or indirect way (symbolic resistance).

Social movement theories can help build an understanding of the protest movements in Yogyakarta that arose immediately after the collapse of Suharto. The

protest movements at that time were widely understood as ‘resistance to change,’ meaning that Jogjanese wanted to maintain their tradition and culture, such as the special status of the Sultan as *ex officio* governor, as well as local laws for land use and local government structures. In this case, I would like to employ some of social movement theories such as (1) political opportunity (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow 1996; Eisinger 1973), (2) the mobilization of resources (McCharty & Zald 1977, Snow 1980, Diani 1997), and (3) framing Process which include collective identity and collective action (Hunt, Scott, Benford & Snow 1994; Melluci 1995; Whittier & Taylor 1994). The rise of social movements can be seen as beginning with public discourse, persuasive communication and public awareness (Klendermans 1992) as well as mass movements in relation to boundaries, consciousness and negotiation (Taylor and Whittier 1992). The dynamics of social movements (Tilly 1978) can then be followed by the strategies and tactics of social movements, such as discourse in media, ideology and framing movements in order to gain wider internal and external influence.

There are at least two groups in social movement theory that go beyond the context of Europe and America. The emergence of uprisings, revolutions, and resistance in Europe is motivated primarily by class-consciousness derived from Marxist theories, as well as the notion of widespread collective consciousness or representation (Durkheim 2004), which received extensive study by social scientists such as Skockpol (1979), Moore (1993) and Tilly (1978). Meanwhile, in the American context, both violent and nonviolent social movements are generally analyzed and understood on the basis of colonization, human rights issues, and civil rights issues. In the colonial era, tribes of Native Americans were conquered by the whites, and in later eras social movements

stood up to discrimination and segregation by the whites over blacks or colored people. Race-based politics is quite visible in American politics.

By looking at these contexts for the origins of social movement theory, we can objectively consider how they might reflect universal values that can be used to understand social movements in other regions and in other hemispheres. Social movements in Indonesia have been highly diverse, if we include all of those seen in the Dutch colonial era, the Japanese occupation era, after the revolution, and in the post-1998 reform period. The forms of collective action have been marred by physical violence and rebellion, but new social movements based on identity have adopted various models of resistance, both non-violence pioneered by Gandhi in India and widespread violence.

The theories described above are employed in this study to facilitate understanding of popular movements in favor of Yogyakarta's privileged status, and opposing the reform agenda in favor of Westernized procedural democracy, which could entail the abandonment of local identities, culture and history.

4. Yogyakarta: Before and After the Suharto New Order

4.1. Yogyakarta in Indonesia's Post-Suharto Era 1998

Some political scientists call the current era (2001 to now) as the Indonesian political transition, and others have labeled Indonesia optimistically as undergoing a "big bang of decentralization" in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Hofman and Kaiser 2001, Crouch 2010), characterized by wide regional autonomy, local elections, direct election for all levels of government, and what Kimura (2006) calls "massif proliferation."

Political reforms under the banner of decentralization did not dramatically change the political structure in the Yogyakarta Special Region, but some politicians and academics have started questioning the privileges of the Sultan. This has, consequently, invited many people to participate in such debates in the media, in universities, among communities, and in individual conversations.

The Sultan, as the traditional and charismatic leader in Yogyakarta, has survived several political transformations over the course of the revolutionary period, the 1998 reformation, and in the post-Suharto era of so-called liberal democracy. The existence and influential role model played by the Sultan is quite constant even though, to some extent, the current Sultan has less power compared to his father, Hamengkubuwono IX. Generally speaking, the Sultan's centralized power remains intact, given his capacity as both the cultural and political leader in Yogyakarta province. Political parties and social organizations generally must build good relationships with the Palace. Moreover, candidates for mayor or regional head (*bupati*) ask for support from the Sultan and use symbols relating to the Sultan and the Palace in order to sway voters.

According to the loyalist group, which supports the Sultan, the existence of traditional power in Yogyakarta should be respected by the government, because the constitution and autonomy law guarantee the diversity of culture in Indonesian society. Democracy, they argue, is not the only option and is less desirable than monarchy. In line with this point of view, Hadiz (2010) proposes that democratization has paradoxically involved a decentralization of political power while at the same time economic power is becoming centralized through globalization, a situation that leads to problems in transforming the values of democracy for different societies, cultures and interest groups.

Similar to the experience of the Philippines, described by Sidel (2004), in Indonesia, the emergence of new democracy has highlighted the disadvantages of democracy, as elites from the old regime still dominate political and economic resources through a mechanism called *pilkada*.³ This has led people to start questioning the effectiveness of democracy as a way to gain equality and prosperity.

As a result, some have rediscovered the meaning of democracy to solve local political problems in Yogyakarta, arguing that true democracy must entail an appreciation of regional diversity and local autonomy. They point to political scientists who have argued that Taiwan and South Korea are the best examples of successful democratic states in the third wave democratization since 1980-1990 (Chu, Diamond and Sin 2001). At the same time, the Asian Barometer and Afrobarometer (2005) have published surveys showing that public confidence in democracy as the best form of government has declined significantly (Diamond 2008, Dahl 1998). Likewise, consider De Tocqueville's beliefs on local self-governance and voluntary association: democratization through a planned, political development can undermine the value of local democracy for local, indigenous people. Planned political and economic development programs have created many resistance movements in third-world countries including Mexico, Kenya, and in this case Yogyakarta and Indonesia. Despite these facts, however, liberalist thinkers like Huntington and Fukuyama recommend that democracy should be installed in developing countries regardless of its heavy political and social cost, even writing apologies for a clash of civilizations as a logical consequence of such a process.

³ Pilkada (pemilihan Kepala Daerah) literally means local-general elections.

In Yogyakarta, popular resistance to “liberal democracy” does not mean that people disagree completely with every Western idea of democracy *per se*. I would argue, to the contrary, that such popular resistance is directed against institutional changes promoted by the central state. People feel that their local government, governed by the King, is fixed and final instead of electing a governor via an electoral procedure. In this thesis, I employ local evidence, similar to Schaffer (2000)’s work on Kenya, to explore whether democracy is universally possible in an unfamiliar culture. This study examines by what manner people support and oppose liberal democracy installed by the central government regarding gubernatorial election of Yogyakarta, given people’s resistance to democratic elections, while at the same time accepting and practicing models of democratic institutions in other levels of government. The “consensus democracy” model offered by Lijphart (1999) is helpful in understanding the ongoing debate between local and national interests concerning the compatibility of a local monarchy within a democratic state. People might view local democracy through the lens of local identities and values, would be a better way to secure the future prosperity of local people rather than forcing a foreign definition of democracy upon them. This simple assumption, however, needs more detailed arguments and stronger evidence.

4.2. Pre-1998 Reforms

For about 400 years, Yogyakarta was an independent kingdom (*Mataram*) called *Swapraja*.⁴ It became known as the kingdom of Yogyakarta, founded by Prince Mangkubumi, under the name of the Sultanate of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat after the Gianti Treaty of February 13, 1755, signed between Mataram and the Dutch. This treaty

⁴ Literally meaning a autonomy region, or independent state/nation.

divided Mataram into Surakarta and Yogyakarta and, later, eventually into Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran. In 1945, Yogyakarta merged into the Republic of Indonesia (Lubis, 1982: xi), and to this day it is designated as a special region of Indonesia with political status equivalent to a province (Soemardjan 1962).

Like England in 1603, Yogyakarta was a monarchy in fact as well as in name during the period of 1775-1945. Its political system could be labeled as royal absolutism under the traditional power of divine rights of the king. Since Yogyakarta's monarchy supported the Republic of Indonesia and its revolution for independence from Dutch rule, it gained recognition as a special region within the country based on written political agreements. Its governor and vice governor are appointed automatically from the Sultanate family and Pura Pakualaman. This special privilege still continues today, with minor changes.

The privileges of Yogyakarta Special Region (DIY) are rooted in the fact that it has traditionally been governed by the Sultan since 1775, and the Sultan retains both legal and traditional cultural powers. His political roles in supporting Indonesia to gain its independence and during the reforms of 1998 cemented this power. Yogyakarta has become well-known nationally as the "Mother of the Republic of Indonesia," "The Struggle City," "The Revolutionary City," "The Education City," and also as "The Tourist City." Such labels contributed to a local popular identity in the modern era, which is easily politicized by local elites to demand special privileges by mobilizing and engaging citizens and groups in Yogyakarta.

5. Rising Debate on Yogyakarta's Politics

Yogyakarta after 1998 can be labeled as a partially provincial monarchy within the Republic of Indonesia. Unlike the former governor of Yogyakarta, which served in the position of governor for life (non-elected governor) and only on the basis of political consensus between Sukarno and the Sultan, the current governor is also the Sultan but must be regularly 'appointed' administratively by the central government and the DPRD (local parliament). In order to maintain this legal privilege, some of the local elites have tried to force the central government and parliament into approving a bill recognizing the special status of Yogyakarta as soon as possible. So far, more than six such bills concerning the political status of Yogyakarta have been drafted and sent to the national parliament.

Unlike other special regions, however, Yogyakarta does not have a specific legal basis for such privilege. In contrast, Aceh has an explicit special right to implement Islamic Shari'a law as regulated by Law No. 44/1999 Concerning the Privileges of the Province of Aceh and Law No. 11/2006 Regarding the Government of Aceh. Likewise, the authority of the local parliament in Papua is guaranteed by Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Jakarta, meanwhile, enjoys privileges under Law No. 29/2007 regarding the Government of the Special Province of Jakarta as the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia. This lack of laws to regulate the privilege of Yogyakarta as a Sultanate and Pakualaman has led many to question whether the citizens of Yogyakarta still wish to maintain their local traditions and system of governance.

This issue emerged repeatedly in 2003, 2008 and 2011 at the end of the Governor's term of office, as reflected in various decrees of the Minister of Home

Affairs. Popular aspirations for appointment of the Governor as an alternative to elections have been ignored by the central government. As a result, protest movements are often seen as anti-Jakarta, anti-politics, and/or anti-SBY. Moreover, the rejection of the Western democratic concept of “one man, one vote” is a way of negotiating the meanings of democracy and cultural identity.

When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated that the monarchy does not fit with the concept of democracy (Kompas, 10/18/2010), political tensions between the local people and the central government became more intense and gained national attention. In response to the President’s statement, a third wave of protests among various groups in Yogyakarta and Jakarta filled the streets with voices that rejected the idea of direct elections for governor. Some media channels reported that the protesters regarded liberal democracy and direct gubernatorial elections as insufficient to guarantee prosperity and tranquility, since liberal democracy in other areas has led to corruption and strengthened the positions of local political strong men.

The central government's efforts to install a "liberal democracy" has actually awakened the power of tradition in Yogyakarta and re-strengthened the identity of Yogyakartaans as a historically autonomous state. In response to the central government, hundreds of community organizations have mobilized their resources to argue that Western democracy (“One man, one vote”) is not the best system, and that direct elections do not always reflect the best interests of society since, in an era of economic and political liberalization, money can determine everything (Palast 2004). Yogyakarta is not rich in natural resources, which may be a reason why the central government has attempted to dominate local politics, and this may be another reason why Yogyakartaans

oppose democratization that undermines local culture and beliefs (Kuntowijoyo 2002).

In 2011, the issue of special status for Yogyakarta arose due to the central government's attempts to force local elections for governor. Loyalist cultural groups argued that liberal democracy entails disadvantages, and this movement led to the option of holding a referendum. They demanded to the president that they were ready to hold a referendum to decide whether Yogyakarta would either retain its right to install the Sultan automatically as governor or become an independent state. Another option for the referendum would be for Yogyakarta to decide on mechanisms for appointment or elections in choosing its governor. In response to this movement, the central government tried to offer options that involved keeping the Sultan as the main governor, but having a separate governor who would be elected democratically.

The reason why people protested is that the central government failed to appreciate Yogyakarta's history, as the capital city of Indonesia during the revolutionary era, and as an independent state, which contributes to aspirations to place the Sultan as governor for life. Yogyakartaans appreciate the palace and respect the Sultan's sacrifices for Indonesia and its people. Such reasons also justify the collective movement to boycott the elections when the central government forced the issue. According to these people, democracy is people power: *vox populi vox dei*.

Nonetheless, such radical movements in Yogyakarta did not attract the central government's attention to resolve this long-term political problem, as can be seen by the fact that the Bill of Yogyakarta has not yet been approved. At the end of 2011, the central government extended the governor's term until the end of 2012. (Domestic Minister

Letter No.55/2011 in KR 10/8/2011). Some speculated that the suspension of the Bill for Special Status was due to there being too many political interests in the national parliament and the government especially concerning the mechanism for choosing Yogyakarta's governor as well as issues of land ownership (Hadiwijoyo 2009).

6. Research Methodology

To address this topic, I conducted a qualitative study that involved participant observation, employing ethnographic methods to explore the meaning of symbols of resistance in Yogyakarta and related to the liberal democracy in Indonesia from 1998 to the present day. It aims to elucidate the cultural phenomena that reflect the knowledge and system of meanings guiding the life of a cultural group (Geertz 1973 pp.3-30).⁵ As such, this method allows us to capture the “social meaning and ordinary activities” of the informants in this study by interpreting selected data (Becker 1996). James Scott's work has, at the very least, reminded political scientists of the continued relevance and importance of interpretive methods and ethnographic research for analyzing modes of power in human dynamics that are impossible to measure in through surveys of attitudes and public opinions. Interpretive, ethnographic approaches to power are more than a complementary methodology to survey research and aggregate data.

In formulating the method for this study, I was strongly influenced by researchers who have engaged in research in the same area of studies, namely, Javanese anthropology and sociological approach, including Geertz, Woodward, Anderson, Mulder and Magnis-

⁵ Geertz, C. (1973). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 3-30.

Suseno. Unlike them, however, my approach is a type of anthropological politics, from which I examine local phenomena to show how people are experiencing and reacting to political transition and economic uncertainty. In other words, my point here is about how to understand the everyday politics of a popular struggle to preserve local ideology, basic needs, relations between the unseen world and the real world, as well as how the local people understand democracy versus local values and the contestation between them. In doing so, this research tries to escape from the conventional political mainstream and build a new understanding about local “micro politics,” or “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990), described by others as “everyday politics” (Kerkvliet 1984, 2011), which will help us answer what happens in the surface of political practice and what exist inside the society.

My fieldwork of study was carried out during the summer of 2011 and the winter of 2011-2012. While visiting Yogyakarta, popular resistance to the national government’s policies was ongoing. Therefore, I was also able to attend numerous discussions held by communities and universities, and also documented the local movement such as demonstrations, expressions of opinion by ordinary people, and numerous art performances. Such opportunities drove me to collect data not only from media and leaflets but also from private documents.

The first, and primary, source of data for this study is in the form of semi-structured interviews, informal talks, and my field notes from participant observation. The purpose of these interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of why people resist and support local collective identities in favor of being ruled by the Sultan, and why others prefer the process of electoral democracy. These interviews thus allowed me to

consider not only the voices of the elites, but also subaltern voices. A secondary aim was to understand the distinction between conventional politics (formal, official, and institutional) and everyday politics, including everyday forms of resistance concerning an ongoing conflict between the central government and local people and government.

To support this ethnographic research, I collected a secondary source of data comprising news and report related to the issue from local and national newspaper databases (*Kedaulatan Rakyat* and *Kompas* from May 1998-2011). Additional data was collected from unpublished documents, reports, resolutions, speeches, and from local and national government documents. As a graduate student in an American university, I was able to access literature related to the topic in Hamilton library, including literature in English as well as books in Indonesian, which facilitated the comparison of different scholarly perspectives. I selected and categorized the literature I reviewed into several topics, including democracy, social movement, decentralization and local autonomy, state-society relation, the concept of power, local identity, and the political transition of Indonesia.

Both observational methods and informal interview were conducted with more than 35 interviewees, including ordinary people, community leaders, and elite politicians and bureaucrat in Indonesia. Their ages ranged from 30 to 40 years old. Because I explored both the elite and ordinary people's motives for resisting or accepting the gubernatorial elections proposed by the central government, I also attempted to balance the groups of respondents by gender and socio-economic class. The interviews were both formal and informal, and they focused on local issues related to the special status of Yogyakarta province. The interviews involved asking participants, opponents, and

audiences not only about the facts as they understood them, but also the symbols they viewed as relevant to such discourse and their interpretations of such political issues.

Through this method, I have attempted to elucidate the processes of symbolic and manifest resistance in Javanese culture relating to the gubernatorial elections proposed by the central government. By examining this specific case and exploring why some people resist and others do not, and why some resist openly while others do not, we can better understand what the “special status” of Yogyakarta means to its people, and we can raise the question of whether liberal democracy is compatible with Javanese culture, or whether some innovation or modification of liberal democracy is required to maintain local culture and integrate it with Western democratic values.

7. Thesis Organization

Continuing the review introduced in this chapter, chapter 2 aims to describe the political context of Indonesia for the transitional period that followed the long authoritarian regime of Suharto. Once this regime declined in 1998, power relations began changing dramatically, and social movements and political protests emerged nationwide, including the Free Aceh Movement, the Freedom Papua Movement and other ethnic and religious conflicts. Traditionally, the relationship between the Sultanate and Suharto during the New Order period was friendly, and King Hamengkubuwono IX of Yogyakarta even served as a vice president of Suharto. Thus, the collapse of Suharto’s regime brought direct political and cultural consequences and impacted the stability of Yogyakarta. Projects of democratization and decentralization initiated by the reformist

cabinet led to increased tensions between local and national interests, and may have even precipitated “undemocratic consolidation” as an unintended result (Choi 2009, Hadiz 2010, Klinken 2007). Change and continuity in this political transition can likewise be seen in the social movements that have flourished in Yogyakarta since 1998, as discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 explains the social basis and the genealogy of social movements that oppose the ‘liberal democracy’ project sponsored by the central government and its allies. Generally speaking, these form a cultural protest movement opposed to the undesirable consequences of democratization and decentralization as they have played out in contemporary Indonesia. Public discourse regarding electoral democracy and its consequences can be seen as one motivation and channel for this movement. Electoral or procedural democracy has been widely implemented after the Suharto regime. Elements of social movement theory will be selectively used to support this argument. Continuing the discussion started in chapter 2, chapter 3 also considers the political and historical context at both the local and national levels as factors in this analysis. For example, the politicization of tradition and the deep cultural roots of this movement should be analyzed with reference to theories of collective identity and resource mobilization. By doing so, we can then understand the roles of indigenous groups, traditions, political beliefs, and identity in shaping and reshaping these collective movements.

To complement previous discussion, chapter 4 it aims to analyze such protest movements from a different angle by examining the political behavior of people in everyday life. Unlike social movement theories, everyday politics considers the behavior of ordinary people in response to political dynamics and power relations, whether in the

context of Suharto's authoritarian state or that of the current democratic one. This point of view is important for two reasons. First, the majority of people experience politics as part of their everyday lives and rarely engage in organized and direct action, a fact that is far too often overlooked by many scholars who study issues involving social conflict. Second, even though the regime has been changed to become more democratic, the politics of everyday people are still informal, as discussed in *Weapon of the Weak* (Scott 1987), or as Vaclav Havel (1985) calls it, the politics of the powerless. The possible impact and the role of everyday politics is therefore examined in this chapter.

Chapter 5 presents a summary and conclusion, discussing the relationship between formal and informal politics, as well as examining the creation of boundaries for different types of politics, such as conventional, advocacy and everyday politics. SMOs and their activities are advocacy politics, while the interests of the state and actions of political parties are official or formal politics, and unorganized political behavior and indirect expressions of the public concerning resources and political issues are everyday politics. Relationships delineated within each of these three arenas can be mutual, contested, or a mixture of the two. There may or may not be cooperation across political spheres, and factionalism may exist to some extent at any or all of the three levels. There are many arenas to justify the reasons for cooperating or competing, and local and national elections often serve as explicit arenas of contestation and negotiation among each type of political actors.

The final chapter also restates the findings and main points of the previous chapters while mentioning several weaknesses and directions for future research. I conclude by arguing that, instead of producing a theoretical legacy, this study is intended

to present a critical point of view toward existing proposals in the literature relating to democracy, identity, locality, and social movements. Through this research, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of how social and political phenomena are not universal, uniform, and fixed, but rather are shaped in dynamic and changing patterns that people express in their daily lives.

Chapter 2

Change and Continuity: Political Constraint in Post-Suharto Indonesia

We the President of the Republic of Indonesia confirm Ingkang Sinuwan Kanjeng Sultan Hamengkubuwana Senopati Ing Nagala Abdurrakhman Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatullah ingkang Kaping IX of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat in his position in the belief that he will devote all of his thoughts, energy, spirit and deeds to the establishment of tranquility (keselamatan) to the region of Yogyakarta as a territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Jakarta, August 19,
1945

President of the Republic
of Indonesia,
Soekarno.

We Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of the nation of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat proclaim:

1. That the nation of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat is a special region of the nation of the Republic of Indonesia with the attributes of a kingdom.
2. That We, as head of the region, hold all powers internal to the nation of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and therefore, in light of current conditions, all matters of government, from this time forward, are in Our hands and we retain all other powers.
3. That relationships between Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and the central government of the Republic of Indonesia are direct and that we are responsible for our nation directly to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. We command all inhabitants of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat act in accordance with our proclamation.⁶

Ngayogyakarta
Hadiningrat
28 Pasa, Ehe,
1878
(5 September
1945)

⁶ These translations are by Marx Woodward in his book *Java, Indonesia, and Islam* (London & New York: Springer, 2011), p.1

1. Introduction

The two political statements above establish a written political agreement between two leaders of two independent states: Sukarno's Indonesia and Hamengkubuwono's Yogyakarta. This form of agreement is widely cited by the proponent movement for Yogyakarta's special status as "Ijab Qabul," saying that Yogyakarta integrated to Indonesian republic (NKRI). By this political understanding September 5, 1945, was viewed as marking the end of political negotiations between Indonesia and Yogyakarta. However, this agreement does not mean the King or Sultan relinquished all of his powers in this specific region, due to the wording of the proclamation (1) to the effect that Yogyakarta would become a special region within the Indonesian unitary state, implying (2) that the governor and deputy are automatically appointed from two traditional Kings in this region, namely, the Sultan and Pakualam, and (3) that the control of this region would remain under the the authority of the King, who would be responsible directly to president of Indonesia.

Yogyakarta's status as special region was never questioned during the Sukrano Old Order, and even Sukarno feared that other regions would demand the same special privileges as Yogyakarta. Several distinctions given to Yogyakarta were its right to control the land, cultural symbols, and also the direct relationship between the governor and the president. Moreover, in the beginning of the New Order period, Yogyakarta held a central position in national politics when Hamengkubono became vice president. At the time, Yogyakarta became a symbol of the Java-centric trend in national politics (Mulder 2005).

Pancasila was then easily viewed by non-Javanese as a hegemonic symbol of the Javanese over the multicultural nation.

Transitional politics in Indonesia brought a number of problems, nationally and regionally. Political conflicts of interest between local and national government, as well as religious and ethnic conflicts, became strongly evident. Additionally, the change of political party from a three-party system to one involving 24 to 48 parties nationwide, according to David Held (1987), decreased political stability. It is reasonable to assume that more political parties would provoke more conflicts of interest. Once economic development faltered, such conflicts escalated in electoral competitions. Nordholt (2007) identifies some problems faced by Indonesia shortly after the collapse of the Suharto regime, including (1) the emergence of regional movements for local autonomy, special status, or *pemekaran wilayah*; (2) local movements, based on identity, that worked against national government; (3) ethnic conflict (SARA); and (4) the emergence of a “shadow state” and “black economy” that continued the new order model (Nordholt 2007:18-28, see also Hadiz 2010, Hidayat 2008, Choi 2009). Thus these issues are related to religious and ethnic conflicts during and after Indonesia’s transitional political era. From 1999 to 2003, such conflicts increased dramatically, primarily outside of Java (Klinken 2007), as a counterreaction to the injustices practiced under Suharto’s rule, as democratization gave citizens the opportunity to demand better.

The 1998 reforms also created a political dilemma in Yogyakarta due to the existence of traditional power, which seems to follow an undemocratic model. The involvement of the Sultan, according to some loyalist groups, would endanger the special status of Yogyakarta. Although the Sultan decided to support the anti-Suharto Movement

with other civil society elements and finally succeeded in toppling the regime in a peaceful way, the loyalist group's fears were indeed realized shortly after the 1998 reforms. Social and political discourses emerged, leading to discussions concerning the transformation of power in Yogyakarta from monarchy to more democratic model. This discourse is still ongoing. But, due to the existence of special privileges not given by the central government but instead based on a separate written political agreement, according to some people, Yogyakarta status must be guaranteed by the Indonesian constitution (Verse 18 UUD 1945), while some local groups demand to continue the traditional system instead of following what is called 'liberal democracy' (Fukuyama 2006), electoral democracy (Freedom House 2005)⁷ or procedural democracy (Dahl 1989).

In this chapter, I discuss the national and local foundations for political positions in the post-Suharto regime in order to form a basis for understanding local and grassroots politics in Yogyakarta. The emergence of regional movements, like what happened in other regions, was likewise in Yogyakarta an ethnic and historical based movement to continue the special status of the region after more than 60 years. The existence of a traditional leader in this region, the Sultan as governor for life, was threatened by the democratization project under banner of reform after Suharto. According to some liberalist groups, no one should retain the privilege to serving as a political leader based merely on their having been born into an aristocratic family. In response to this situation, loyalist groups in Yogyakarta think just the opposite, while indigenous organizations use

⁷ A country cannot be an electoral democracy if a significant authority for national decisions resides in the hands of an unelected power, whether a monarch or a foreign or international authority (definition by Freedom House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%20FIW%201989-2012--Draft_0.pdf).

existing symbols, history, and culture to oppose democratization. Sentiments of ethnic and local identity have accordingly become polarized. In line with that Huntington once said, identity-based movements and anti-state protest can be understood as signs of both the emergence of democracy and the roll back of democracy. As such, social movements in Yogyakarta firmly oppose liberal democracy by adopting democratic principles in theory and in practice.

2. Local Versus National Politics

2.1. Local Politics, Economy and Identity

When considering the dynamics of local politics in Yogyakarta before and after Suharto, we cannot separate four main elements: (1) the role of the palace; (2) the existence of traditional associations and non-governmental organizations; (3) political parties; and lastly (4) grassroots politics. These four elements are discussed in brief in this section.

First, the Yogyakarta Special Region is generally regarded as “the Center of Javanese Culture” (Woodward 2011), given its former status as capital of the ancient kingdoms of Mataram and Islamic Mataram. To this day, the Sultan and the Puro Pakualaman continue to hold *ex officio* positions as governor and deputy governor as rewards for their participation in the struggle for independence of Indonesia. Yogyakarta is unique as a cultural city and a university town, as well as a place of interaction between modernity and tradition (Nakamura 1984), between Javanese and Hindu religions, and between these older religions and more recent, modernist Islamic groups that have given rise to a syncretic ‘Javanese’ religion as described by Geertz (1964) and Woodward

(1989). Moreover, Liddle (2011) concludes his study of Yogyakarta by saying that the Sultans have maintained a strong and powerful leadership position within the region, which contributes to the community development project (Kompas, 7/21/2011). His argument is quite convincing. Given the fact that the Sultan remains as both cultural and political leader in this region, we would probably have better understanding of his position in a time of crisis, such as a natural disaster.

Yogyakarta has a unique status both in Java and nationwide as a symbol of cultural diversity, not only in artifacts but also in its inherited political history, with a modern King who retains power and respect. This is one of the substantial distinctions of its special status compared to other provinces. The province is also known as a meeting place of modernity and traditional, where Western and Eastern civilizations mix in a friendly way. Yogyakarta's identities are not confined to small groups of people, but rather transcend identity barriers to create a large community marked by its diversity. This label has been intensely contested and constructed between groups in favor of and opposing the special status of Yogyakarta for more than a decade.

Additionally, over more than 60 years, the role of the *Keraton*, or palace, as the center of power in this region remains intact, and it is not easy to be challenged politically. The loyalist groups supporting the Sultan go beyond boundaries of class and religion, including members of the lower class, middle class and local elite, and including not only syncretism religious groups but also modern-Islamic groups like Muhammadiyah. This situation, according to the liberal groups, leads to the centralization of power with the Sultan as governor, serving as both cultural-symbolic leader and political leader. This kind of power does not make any sense to liberal group due to their

belief, following Lord Acton, that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. Another consequence is that political parties in this region inevitably must build good relationships with the palace in order to get more grassroots supporters (Pratikno, *Kompas* 4/6/2007).

Second, outsiders who visit Yogyakarta often remark on how calm and peaceful society seems under a single monarch for more than six decades, but it is true that such sentiments are socially and perhaps politically constructed in order to build an argument for the special status of the region and attract more grassroots supporters. In fact, there are many community groups that are dissatisfied with the local government policies of this region, as can be seen in the cases of Bugel, Parangtritis, the Super Market Project, JEC Gate, and the murder of news reporters. Bambang Purwanto (2008) mentions that there has been violence and crime in the post-revolutionary period in Yogyakarta and to some degree after the 1998 reforms. This fact contradicts with what local elites have stated in the media about the absence of violence in Yogyakarta.

The political dynamics in Yogyakarta actually can be seen as involving both change and continuity of political actors shortly after the integration of this region into the Indonesian republic. Some political parties were founded from this region. Politically, the involvement of the palace into national politics can be traced back to the Golkar party. Sultan HB IX was one of the founders of Golkar, which is why the Sultan and family has kept a relationship with this party to date. The political accommodations of the palace afford opportunities for the Sultan to keep his role in contemporary local and national politics due to the uncertainty and changing of ruling elites in national level from one party to another. As a result, regional political parties must maintain good

relationships with the Sultan to the extent possible. In the 2009 elections, several families related to the Sultan supported the ruling Democratic Party for the presidential election. Gusti Prabu, the Sultan's brother, was the leader of the Democratic Party in this province, but in 2010 he withdrew from the party because he would have had to support the movement for Yogyakarta's special status, but the Democratic Party was reluctant to approve this position; in fact, the Democratic Party has now taken a position formally opposing the movement for special status.

Historically, the first nationwide general elections were in 1955, and the dominant political parties in Yogyakarta adhered to nationalist and communist ideologies, such as the PNI and PKI. This situation continued in New Order, dominated by Golkar and the PDI, while the PPP remained in the third position. Then in the post-1998 reform era similar political party held sway, such as Golkar, PDIP, and PD. Besides these, the PAN, PKS and the PKB which represent Islamic groups are considered as moderate parties that still have many supporters. The royal family of Yogyakarta, historically, is part of Golkar and cannot be separated from that party to this day. The closeness of the palace to the Golkar party often makes other political parties like the PDIP uncomfortable, as they must spend additional resources in building public opinion while proposing that the Sultan should withdraw formally from the Golkar party. In 1982, for example, it was rumored that Sultan HB IX joined the Democratic Party, and this news became a local political issue which attracted widespread public attention.

The dominance of nationalist political parties in this area can be explained by the fact that the majority of the people of Yogyakarta believe in the *abangan* (syncretic ideology) or the *pengikut kejawen* (religion of Java) (see Woodward 1984, Mulder 1978,

Magnis-Suseno 1999). The remaining political power of significant influence in Yogyakarta comes from civil society organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Taman Siswa, Nahdlatul Ulama, and NGOs (non governmental organizations). Grassroots politics also involves other political activist groups, as can be seen from the existence of diverse traditional associations (*Paguyuban*) based on family, job, village, and hamlet associations. Their political power has dominated political discourse on the special status of Yogyakarta for a decade, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. Related to the movement for special status, the general pattern is that political parties close to the palace tend to regard it as a key problem, and they employ a variety of tactics to build public opinion to the effect that their parties are the most loyal to the palace and that the palace should be a symbol of leadership.

Third, one of the advantages of Yogyakarta is that its social and economic situation allows for the growth of voluntary associations, including traditional and modern NGO groups. Though it has a small geographic footprint, Yogyakarta has a high density of traditional associations and NGOs; indeed the region has one of the highest such densities in Indonesia. The local networks of community group (*paguyuban*) organizers are not only a form of Javanese culture that prefers to maintain harmony between members but are also fueled by the recognition of the limitations of the region's finite natural resources in light of natural disasters. Some theories suggest that Yogyakarta's lack of natural resources has made it a more harmonious community, in which members help each other to survive. Likewise, many material and intangible benefits are provided by associations for their members. Moreover, the emergence of modern NGOs having a variety of domestic and foreign funding streams is a reflection of

the progress of the people of Yogyakarta and the success of individual graduates from local and non-local universities. The community openness of Yogyanese to immigrants is a distinct advantage for the development of various NGOs and modern organizations, including groups who are strongly critical of the ruling elite in this region, as exemplified in the palace.

In modern Yogyakarta society, there is a kind of socio-cultural construction that creates a sense of pride and superiority as “kawulo Mataram” (Yogyanese) or as “wong jogja” (Yogyanese), so that from the outside it appears that Yogyakarta is an exclusive community. But the groups supporting the special status of Yogyakarta claim that they have legitimacy as nationalists, as evidenced by Yogyakarta’s support for Indonesian independence, its role as the capital city of Indonesia, and the establishment of the open national university (UGM) to give people nationwide opportunities to learn in Yogyakarta. In addition, Yogyakarta is also building a new identity as a “city of tolerance,” a “multicultural society,” and a center of “the never-ending Asia.” Together such efforts are meant to shape the public discourse so as to emphasize that Yogyakarta is neither Java-centric nor separatist. A variety of activities thus work to convince people that the privilege of Yogyakarta is not only for the benefit of Yogyakarta but rather for the greater good of Indonesia, because it is an example of national unity under the banner of Pancasila, or unity in diversity (see Sultan HB IX’s statement in his Cultural Speech of 2007, as well as a speech document of the HB X at the ceremony of receiving the honorary doctorates at UGM and ISI in 2011).

Finally, the political situation at the grassroots level is actually not much different from what happens in other areas. The gap between the political orientation of the lower

classes and that of the middle and elite groups is a feature of Indonesian society generally. Like many political analysts have remarked, in general, the lower class in Yogyakarta is still regarded as “the silent majority group” in politics. This situation sometimes creates problems for the ruling elites of the local government, because the popular interests may sometimes be difficult to guess, but its effects can be quite powerful in general elections. If there is a dramatic increase in the number of "Golput" (non-participating) voters in an election, the winning political parties may be seen as having a less legitimate mandate. Arguably, grassroots political channels are driven by informal leaders who advocate whether or not to vote in an upcoming election. Clifford Geertz (1976) has pointed out that the grassroots groups are largely populated by those affiliated with abangan (syncretic) beliefs and those having nationalist, socialist or communist leanings.⁸ Thus, the nationalist parties are generally larger than the parties that are specific to individual religions. The fourth group will be much discussed in more detail in the chapter 3.

2.2. Local and National Constraints: The Discourse on Special-ness Status of Yogyakarta

Since 1999 the central government has imposed reforms focusing on decentralization and regional autonomy. As a consequence local governments now deal with their problems independently, and all leaders at the district and provincial levels are voted for directly in general elections. Yogyakarta is the only exception, since the region enjoys the privilege of having its Sultan rule as governor. Nonetheless, the national

⁸ Clifford Geertz divides Javanese society into three groups: *Santri* (religious), *Priyayi* (Aristocrat), and *Abangan* (syncretic). See Clifford Geertz in the *Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 32-35.

government has attempted to change this traditional system for several years. In general, the central government argues that a system of monarchy should not exist in a democratic state. Moreover, to bolster the legitimacy of this argument, the national government under the Ministry of Domestic Affairs conducted a “secret” survey showing that 71% of the voters of Yogyakarta would agree to choose their governor through democratic elections. The plan for elections promoted by the national government, however, sparked huge protests, both in the city of Yogyakarta and throughout the region, as well as symbolic and individual forms of resistance.

In response to the Domestic Minister’s release of the survey results indicating that 71% of Yogyakartaans would support direct elections for governor, and followed by SBY’s statement about the monarchy system of Yogyakarta, on December 13, 2010, thousands of people took to the streets to support the establishment of the Sultan as governor (“Hasil Survey...” 2011). The people of Yogyakarta expressed their disagreement with the proposed reform through symbolic ceremonies, traditional rituals, the wearing of traditional clothes, the use of *topo pepe* that were gathered in the field, flying the flag at half mast, as well as through the creation of songs, cartoons, murals, stage puppet shows, and *ketoprak*. In addition to these, they also expressed their views through traditional forms of protest, such as by holding banners and signs supporting their right to local autonomy in political choices; by advocating views against the Presidency; by aligning themselves with the “Dare to Die” movement (*cap jempol darah*); and by engaging in plenary sessions, public assemblies, leafleting, ritual ceremonies, online movements, and so forth. Each of these involved local politics, local identities, and symbolic expressions of resistance in the modern era.

Historically, the problem of the special status of Yogyakarta arose just shortly after Indonesian gained its independence, and due to asymmetrical decentralization, other regions came to demand the same status. Sukarno anticipated the problem this posed to the unitary state system of Indonesia and, since he wanted Indonesia to become a strong national state and avoid ethnically driven factionalism, he did not clearly restate the status of Yogyakarta when responding to the letter referred to as “Maklumat Sept 5, 1945,” from Sultan HB IX declaring that Yogyakarta retained a special status. Indonesia under Suharto’s rule was the same, as the regime was reluctant to give opportunities to local regions while violently suppressing ethnic, religious and local identities (Tanasaldy 2007:470).⁹ This led Indonesia to assume a more uniform political makeup under strong state control. As Weber said, the regime employed political mechanisms, such as military power, to defend the authority of the state and pressure regional movements in a process of deregionalization. This issue continued after the fall of Suharto during the reformist era.

In 1998, shortly after the fall of Suharto, the central government required that the governor of Yogyakarta must be elected through elections to the Regional House of Representatives, but on the other hand still required the determination of the people of Yogyakarta directly (Hadiwijoyo 2009) as Sukarno appointed Sultan HB IX as governor automatically without direct or representative elections. The conflict between forces in support of democracy and the traditional Sultanate, and the practice of “democracy,” led to divisive positions in the community and academic groups to this day. Groups both for and

⁹ Taufiq Tanasaldy, in *Local Politics in Indonesia*, 2007 edited by HS Nordholt and GV Klinken. See also “The problems of decentralization system and identity” in Jaap Timmer (pp. 595-625), as well as Franz and Keebet van Benda-Beckmann (pp. 543-576).

against the privileged status criticized the government's handling of the issue. Several groups argue for the concept of "asymmetric democracy" or "asymmetric decentralization" insofar as the law allows (Masudi in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* 2/1/2011), and another group argues for a position closer to the concept of Western-style democracy in which they believe that elections should be the operational standard for every country, just as is the case for Western democracies.

Yogyakarta has made major contributions in each of the historical processes of Indonesia. To mention a few, Yogyakarta became the capital of Indonesia (1946-1949), participated in the Old Order regime, the New Order and the 1998 reformation movement. Yet, the legitimacy of the legal position of privilege DIY is often questioned. Some of the earlier statutes are considered by some to no longer establish a legal basis to sustain the privileged status of this area. New areas outside of Java, such as Papua and Aceh, which saw separatist movements for independence, responded quickly to the opening for reforms in 1998 and were given special status by the central government. Since 2001, Aceh and Papua gained special treatment called Special Autonomy status.¹⁰ From 2005 to 2007, the funds disbursed to Papua, West Papua, and 29 counties and cities in Papua reached more than Rp. 41 trillion. The unclear legal status of the DIY has

¹⁰ The central government has designated four provinces as having 'special' status, including Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, because its people want to implement Islamic law; Papua province, because its people want to separate from Indonesia; DKI Jakarta, because it is the capital of Indonesia; and Yogyakarta, due to its role in supporting Indonesia as a free state. Yogyakarta province was also the historical capital of Indonesia. Of these four specially designated areas, only three are supported on a statutory basis by means of Law No. 44/1999 Concerning Privileges of the Special Province of Aceh, Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province (which designates special members of parliament for Papua), and Law No. 29/2007 on the Capital Region of Jakarta as the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia. Actually, the Special Region of Yogyakarta has legitimacy under the declaration of two kingdoms of Yogyakarta on 5 September 1945 and it is also mentioned in Article 18 UUD 1945 of Indonesia's Constitution which names the Sultan as regional ruler holding all power in Yogyakarta province, including both traditional and legal authority (Weber 1947).

contributed to this unequal treatment. Some observers attribute this to the issue of natural resources, since the area of Yogyakarta has no natural resources can be used as a national or international political commodity.

Yogyakarta itself experienced a disadvantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis the central government after Article 18 of the 1945 constitution was amended in 2003. The amendment meant that the special privileges of regions no longer clearly emphasize recognition and respect for “origins” and “original arrangements” as basic features. Actually, before the amendment, the 1945 Constitution emphasized the principle that any law concerning a special area should not ignore local characteristics. This was also supported by several laws that suppressed the position of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta to continue the leadership of the monarchy from generation to generation. The result of the last amendment also encouraged the practice of electoral democracy in the regional *Pilkada langsung* (direct elections of the local government). This situation led to resistance among groups in favor of special status for Yogyakarta, and they thus became entrenched in their position.

The reason for democratization and modernization of governance is, according to the liberalist groups, to shake up the status and substance of the special privileges of Yogyakarta. The euphoric atmosphere that led to direct elections for the regional government after the enactment of Law no. 32 of 2004, according to the liberal groups, was the reason for discarding the resultingly irrelevant monarchy system of DIY. However, moderate groups have tried to reposition the palace (Sultan) as a symbolic institution of the region higher than the governor. The Sultan as cultural leader holds a position called “Pararadya” (Team of JIP UGM 2008), “Gubernur Utama” or main

governor (Ministry of Domestic Affairs) and “Hamengkoni Agung” or supreme power (DPD’s version). Those title of positions are equal to ministry who has a veto power over local government policy.

Actually, the debate boils down to a decision as to whether the Sultan or the palace should be separated from public office. In the sense of the democratic state represented by liberal-moderate groups, public officers should be directly elected as democratically, but some accommodations may be made for local culture such as adopting a model of constitutional monarchy similar to those of Malaysia, Norway, and England. Arguably, Law no. 32/2004 and Law no. 3/1950, to the liberal groups, are insufficient to provide rules for succession to the position of governor (Mas’udi, opinion piece in *Kompas* 21/05/2007). The second group suggests that the governor should be elected directly as other areas except for the Sultan, and that citizens should also allowed to compete for the position. This group advocates a procedural approach to democracy, which is taken for granted is based on Law 32 of 2004. Some groups standing for this position are the Commission, the IRE, YTB, and several others. Yogyanese traditional communities, meanwhile, think that it is entirely appropriate for the Sultan to be a center of political and cultural power, and to serve as governor for life. This last group places more emphasis on the historical reasons that have established a written agreement concerning Yogyakarta’s politics, that is, an “Ijab-qabul” with the government of Indonesia. Some of the elite of this group reason that Law no. 3/1950 (*lex specialist*) and section 18B of the 1945 Constitution are still viable to some extent and are the legal basis for the privileged position of the Sultan. Meanwhile, the aristocratic intellectual Heru Kismoyo (2008) has argued that the constitutional monarchy system might not be

applicable in Yogyakarta, and that cultural-based democracy (Demokrasi Budaya) should be preferred since the constitutional monarchy has no roots in this community.

3. Yogyakarta under the Post-Suharto Regime

3.1. Democracy and Democratization

The reform era of 1997-1998 marked the first waves of direct democratic elections after more than four decades of democratic elections in 1955. The 1999 election reform agenda has delivered substantial progress in national legislation (under the DPR and MPR) by the revocation of the dual function of the ABRI, the Suharto corruption investigation, and the success of the 1945 amendment prohibiting the President to serve more than two periods, and also opening of democracy elections for the president, regional heads (governors, regents, and mayors) in direct elections without due process of representation in the House or the Parliament. With the implementation of the 1945 Constitution (amended 2003) and the enactment of Law 22/1999, new horizons opened for democracy in Indonesia, namely the practice of direct presidential elections in 2004 and elections for board members and regional heads in 2005 in hundreds of areas. This implementation of democracy in Indonesia post-Suharto came to be known as "Big Bang Democracy" (Hoffman & Keiser 2002). In this political era, now all politics is local.

In the context of local democracy and politics in Yogyakarta, at least, there are two models for "charismatic-traditional" leadership in local and national politics. The first is the period of Sultan HB IX who contributed to ideas of Indonesian-ness, diversity, and democracy in tangible forms. This can be seen from the period of revolution that expressed support for the independence of Indonesia (see announcement of 5 Sept 1945).

In addition, HB IX initiated village-level democracy via direct elections of village heads and delegations. In addition, Sultan HB IX also conducted internal court reforms that decided the gap between the royal family with the most ordinary people (Soemardjan 1962; Suryo 2003), namely by removing the position of "Pepatih Dalem." One thing that was most meaningful to the foundation of democracy was the pioneering level of democratic institutions in this areas that later became the forerunner of models for local parliaments throughout Indonesia (Yuniyanto 2002, Hadiwijoyo 2009, Team of JIP 2008).

Second, national history records Sultan HB X as the traditional leader of Yogyakarta region, continuing the work of his father to demand the resignation of Suharto from his power as presidency of Indonesia in mid-1998 by holding a "Pisowanan Agung" (Mass Gathering) held in the north square of Yogyakarta Palace. This protest event was attended by approximately one million people (Denny 2008), who shouted anti-Suharto slogans and advocated for political reform. Sultan HB X gave a speech stating that he supported peaceful reforms. Everyone knew that Suharto was a friend and partner of his father, so those hearing the speech appreciated the courage of Sultan HB X to oppose Suharto and took it as clear evidence that the Sultan supported the people of Indonesia and was partial to democratic values, thus building an image for HB X in favor of nationalism and statehood.

Politically, the continuation of the political role of the king of Yogyakarta was to determine the continuity of the palace and the temple, or Pakualaman, institutions to retain good standing as part of the Indonesian Republic or in the community where they still maintain and preserve the noble values of the Javanese community. This holds true

not only in Yogyakarta province, but also in other communities in the former kingdom of Mataram, in Central Java and East Java. Yogyakarta performed a strategic role in the serving the national interests, and was named a “special” region for its broad public support. This is different from other areas, including areas that never gained status as special regions, such as the Mangkunegaran and Kasunanan of Solo and Surakarta in the Dutch period, and which were sued by the people in the anti-Swapraja movement to reject its special status. A popular movement that occurred in Surakarta in the 18th century was caused by the King who reluctantly supported Indonesia's independence movement. In addition, this movement could be due to an ideology sentiment, class consciousness, and the Islamic movements that forcibly rejected the traditional authority.

On the other hand, the reform movement was followed by the democratization project, which also threatened the establishment of political and cultural institutions named by the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. The position of the Yogyakarta special region has applied since the Old Order era, and the king has automatically held the office of governor. Democracy is unlikely to tolerate a palace held by privilege. Several large demonstrations took place to demand the enactment of HB X as governor for life without due process of elections as was the case in other provinces. At the end of 1998, it appeared that the demands of the masses would be granted by the central government. One party claimed that the central government would make a decision concerning the mechanism for determination of the governor, while other groups claimed that the election of the Emperor as governor in 1998 was actually through an electoral process in the provincial parliament (Interviews with Takdir, Sulistyono, Bancono, Sukiman, and Putut).

With the expiry of the office of governor of Yogyakarta, in 2003 debates concerning the topic re-emerged with a variety of political factions and conflicts of interest in both the public and in the court. The same thing happened again in 2008, late 2010 and throughout 2011. Year 2011 was the culmination of political struggles for democratic discourse and individual identity that had made headlines for the causes of decentralization and democracy in Indonesia for a decade. The emergence of this debate was triggered by the expiry of the power of the governor, and the debate was repeated concerning the mechanism for filling the office of governor in a special region of Yogyakarta. In 2011, based on my analysis, the factions in favor of the special status of Yogyakarta were using the tools of democracy to counter the dominance of democracy itself. For instance, they argued that democracy should be based on popular demand and not national political interests. Additionally, in the era of democracy, local and regional autonomy are guaranteed by law, so it is reasonable that Yogyakarta would ask to keep its own traditional identity.

3.2. Decentralization: Between Hegemony of Western Democracy and the Palace

Regarding decentralization, there are at least three groups arguing for political development projects in countries adopting democracy in the past several decades. First is an optimistic group of liberal-normative, who see decentralization as part of democratization. Decentralization, in this view, addresses many regional and national problems in the very beginning of the transitional regime. Ideally, as PBB notions which categorize the decentralization into two forms: (1) deconcentration, or administrative decentralization, and (2) devolution, or political decentralization. The second of these is quite problematic and oftent politicized by interest groups. Devolution means that the

central government gives some authority to local governments. Thus, political decentralization is defined as reforms under which the central government gives local authorities the power to decide or not decide political issues through local parliament (DPRD), while also allowing locally elected political like local parliaments (DPRD) the authority to manage the local government. Decentralization is, therefore, not entirely equivalent to a reduction of power for the central government.

Moreover, the concept of decentralization has actually been tested since the era of Dutch rule in Indonesia. In the days of the Old Order regime, this concept was used to dampen regional insurgencies. J. D. Legge (1961) argues that decentralization was, however, only an artificial reality for many regions. The process of decentralization continues to this day only because local autonomy was not fully realized. According to Bhenyamin Hoessein (1993), decentralization is the establishment of autonomous regions and/or delivery of certain powers by the central government. This understanding is based on the empirical case of Indonesia, where the birth of autonomous regions in Indonesia occurred during the creation of government through a process of decentralization. B. C. Smith (1985) has argued that decentralization requires the delegation of authority to subordinates and power-sharing to regional governments, such that the central government is required to hand over power. Achieved without any real regional autonomous authority, however, decentralization can remain only artificial.

The second group, unlike the optimists, are the pessimist or so-called historic-empiricists who doubt to the authenticity of decentralization projects led by the central government. Shortly after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, a wave of "democracy" and "liberalization" spread across almost all regions of Indonesia. Reform

was then interpreted as a mechanism for direct general elections that followed a variety of political scandals between national and local actors. Not only did the poor become victims of the mechanisms of democracy, the concept of democracy was itself destroyed due to the system of liberal politics. In the end, anyone who had money could win a position in the central, provincial, or local government. As Hadiz (2010) and Hidayat (2009) point out, social capital, networks, and money are crucially important role in political competitions and liberal democracy in Indonesia. Liberal democracy has therefore become a serious problem after 12 years of reform. In two waves of national and local elections, the mafia, local strongmen, bossism, and corruption made large political gains.

This group believes that decentralization is not exactly the same as democratization (Rondinelli 1990, Nordholt & Klinken 2007), as evidenced by political paradoxes in Indonesia that continue to this day such as SARA-based conflict, widespread land conflicts and a variety of local identity-based demands that continue to undermine the state. Such scholars call for a more equitable situation and the appreciation of local communities. After more than a decade of implementing democratization and decentralization in Indonesia, stagnation could hamper further prosperity and corruption among national and local politicians could become entrenched. In such a situation, the people of Yogyakarta have responded to the ideas of uniformity in projects for democratization and decentralization and in direct elections.

The idea of decentralization defined by the granting of autonomy to political entities at the local level is not new. This kind model of autonomous rule was well known in the area now called Indonesia since the Kingdom of Majapahit, circa 1400 AD, under

which the ruler guaranteed the existence of local entities to preserve natural resources and community service. In general, certain areas received different treatment such as tax holidays (*tileman*) or exemption from conscription as rewards from the King. The political practice of the West, which was then introduced in Indonesia, was a "asymmetrical democracy" or "asymmetrical decentralization" (Wehner 2000, Pratikno et al. 2008)¹¹ or a special region with special authority in the modern sense.

Lastly, the critical-transformative group has proposed an alternative way both to implement the Western legacy of decentralization and to maintain local values. This group has given attention to specific cases such as problems in the relationship between the central government and local governments, which are not always the same from one area to another. Privileged status itself is often contentious, considering the concept of national unity that could be threatened by the existence of local entities. Uniformity is nearly always advocated by an authoritarian regime, and even a centralized governance model could easily emasculate the law, as happened during the Suharto era (1965-1997) and continued in the post-reform era with create a lot of issues related to various interpretations of article 18 of the 1945 constitution. Both before and after its amendment in 2003, this article clearly stated that local communities and diverse forms of local political entities would be recognized and guaranteed by the state.

The SBY administration in KIB I and II intended to change the local political landscape of Yogyakarta to make it more democratic. But the meaning of democracy here was ambivalent, because Indonesia's constitution guaranteed diversity and autonomy to regions through Law no. 22/1999 and Law no. 32/2004. Pragmatic political interests

¹¹ Academic Paper on the Special Status of Yogyakarta and Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta in a Monograph on Politics and Government, Team of JIP UGM, p. 24.

between the political parties complicated the situation. The central government believed that only with good governance, democratization and transparency to people can be realized. But the activist movement in demanding special privilege for Yogyakarta argue that democracy is not a universal system that can simply be copied and pasted from the Western liberal states to the state-within-a-state cases such as Yogyakarta, Aceh and Papua. Elections held according to democratic standards, in many cases, have major consequences for the emergence of conflict in a community and can lead to practices that are contrary to democratic values. This view is expressed in Barak Obama's statement that, "Elections alone do not make a democracy" (Pedrosa 2009, al Shaadawii 2012).¹²

Related to such discourses on democracy and decentralization, Yogyakarta has seen responses from local communities seeking to preserve the uniqueness of 'democracy' based on their local cultures, which are believed to bring calmness and peace to its citizens. This might be called a "third way," taking the old system and transforming it into a new one that serves the common good. Various forms of opposition to democratization in Yogyakarta have been arisen, including demonstrations, legislative activism, leafleting, symbolic resistance, and others. Culturally based social movements have likewise taken place in Yogyakarta from 1998 to date. Hence, the following two chapters will consider the grassroots political dynamics as represented by organized groups (political advocacy) and unorganized groups (everyday politics).

As is clearly visible in the case of Yogyakarta, negotiations between the locality and cultural uniqueness in power relations and governance practices with the new values are strongly Western-biased concepts of deliberative democracy. They assume the

¹² Sources available at <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=475228> and <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/17/188874.html>

existence of modern political parties, and they contribute to the flow of liberal democratic politics. A society that upholds the values of local culture, and that respects people who hold traditional beliefs, can easily lead to friction with a modern state if it is characterized by a secular and anti-cultural identity. In this case, the local and central factions clearly have different perspectives on how and in what ways people should choose a leader and meet material and non-material needs. Performance indicators that impose democracy will only give birth to a growing mass opposition from the spirit of social cohesion and solidarity, as seen in the protests rejecting the gubernatorial elections of the DIY. Democracy as a system of government can fail when its implementation is coercive, as has been the case in Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, Senegal, and other countries.

Although the Indonesian central government is nominally democratic, this does not automatically remove barriers in Yogyakarta for individuals to engage politically. In the case concerning the privileged status of Yogyakarta, groups supporting and rejecting the election of the governor both practice advocacy politics through collective movement and everyday politics among individuals who have not joined organizations taking an explicit stance for a certain movement. At the very least, the group supporting the non-elected governor is divided into four major camps: the GRY, the Gentararaja supported by elements of the Ismoyo and the Semarsembogo, the Joint Secretariat of the Gamawan, and the KIPER. While this group is mostly seen in the selection of political parties, NGOs, democratic institutions, and groups of academics, everyday politics also plays a role, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

One way to understand the political dynamics in Indonesia is by analyzing the aspects of what has changed and what is a continuation of periods of previous political

leadership. In fact, the linkage between the political practices of the past with the politics of today is not integral (Kuntowijoyo 1999, Abdullah 2000) and the study of governance of contemporary Indonesia cannot neglect the experience and past political practices of the Dutch and Japanese colonial eras, the first transition period (the revolutionary era of 1945) and the second transition (the 1998 reforms). Opportunities and challenges coexist and influence each other, such as the issues of fighting corruption, the politicization of the bureaucracy, and other forms of shadow state and informal government, which are not new phenomena in Indonesia. This is a historical continuity. Nonetheless, some aspects have certainly changed after a decade of reform, such as the expansion of freedom of the press, the presence of the Constitutional Court, the spreading of electoral democratic practices, and regional autonomy. Additionally, at the grassroots level, widespread social movement politics focusing on economic problems have extended to questions of identity, religion, and ethnicity. This second phenomenon is a sign of progress in the political dynamics of Indonesia.

Political study by scientists at home and abroad must take into account the political dynamics in Indonesia and internationally before and after the fall of Suharto's New Order. The strengthening of globalization and capitalism over the last twenty years has fueled fear and anxiety among many communities in developing countries. Anxiety is sustained by a variety of factors, with various promises that democracy will strengthen the capacity of communities to fight for their wellbeing, which promises may signal at least a beginning of political reform and economic restructuring after the collapse of Suharto in mid-May 1998 (Denny 2006) or the role of the intellectual movement that was driven by the middle-class and educated elite. Ironically, the reform movement was from

its inception fragmented in two groups: a mass-based movement and an intellectual movement led by the elites.

The importance of the role of the masses in such movements is justified, since when economic conditions severely deteriorated, the crisis provoked widespread uprisings. Therefore, I basically agree with Denny (2006)'s dissertation *Democratization from Below*, which argues that the elite simply followed and responded to the dynamics of the mass movement in 1997-98. In this case, the elite were "political entrepreneurs," and the movement was different from the idea of nationalism prior to independence considering the dominant role of the educated elite and because at that time the political awareness of ordinary people was still very low. What has happened in Yogyakarta is a social movement or a cultural movement that has occurred in response to changes in global and national political order, just as ideas of reform and democratization had begun to consolidate. It is a case of social movements arising in a moment of political transition.

The phenomena of change and continuity are modeled after the fallen Suharto regime, and thus dominated by the consolidation of the old elite (Mashad et al 2005), which has continued to win local elections and political battles. This tendency thus shows the ugly face of liberal democracy, including undemocratic practices such as money politics, voter buying, candidate bribery, and other undemocratic symptoms that are collectively described by political scientists as a continuation of the political style of the past. In addition, political decentralization has also been a trigger for the emergence of a black economy and shadow state, where local politics are conducted in a manner precisely the opposite of the principles of democracy (Sidel 2004, Hadiz 2010, Chuo

2010, Hidayat 2007). In the case of Yogyakarta, the potential removal of privileges by continued Old Order elite, the remnants of the Suharto regime, is now part of the post-reform order. It could be that modifications are being made to the political process through informal tactics, and under-the-table deal-making, to attempt constitutional reforms under the banner of law enforcement.

Regarding the decentralization of Indonesian politics, Marco Bunte and Andreas Efen (2009:ii) have stated a powerful thesis, as follows:

“...the fall of Suharto marked the beginning of a difficult and multilayered transition process. It was accompanied by intensified conflict in the political arena, a dramatic increase of ethnic and religious violence and the danger of national disintegration. Ten years after the collapse of the New Order, Indonesia has made significant progress; however, the quality of democracy is still low.”

This is consistent with several studies that focus on three major problems following the first five years of implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, which problems continue to this day. These problems include (1) the relationship between central and local governments, which has not been clearly stated in regulations, the implementation of which becomes unnecessarily complicated; (2) the spread of corruption from a central base to regional outposts; and (3) the practice of money politics during and after local elections (Bunet 2003, Alfonso & Hauter 2006, USAID 2006, World Bank 2003, Turrer & Podger 2003). In addition, Kimura (2008) has noted other forms of corruption in the process of regional expansion in the era of political decentralization. In short, the policy of regional expansion involves political interests among national and local elites that are more subtle and concealed than the interests of public welfare.

Despite these issues, there are also some changes that we can see more in the practice of politics in Indonesia as a consequence of the opening of the valves of

democracy in 1998. Local identity issues that were silenced for about 32 years have been renewed. Merely artificial symbols of unity in diversity have been strengthened into a healthy political trend in the post-Suharto period. Identity and locality are the new characteristics of the political struggle in the face of the central government in particular and in the face of changing global economic system in general. In Yogyakarta, the spirit of regionalism and ethnicity are built internally as communities in favor of the region's privileged status leverage internal, deep cultural resources (Smith 1983) and other external resources to gain wider support while creating a hybrid identity. Yogyakarta is, then, socially and politically constructed as a multicultural society, inhabited by the various religions and races, as a city of the republic, the city of the Indonesian revolution, and so forth. Public memory has been building and imagining this construction of identity with historical legitimacy. Like many regimes worldwide, hegemonic power over the public's memory of the special status of Yogyakarta is symbolized by a variety of museums and monuments.

Chapter 3

Rawe-Rawe Rantas, Malang-Malang Putung: The Post-Suharto “Paguyuban” Movement of Yogyakarta

*Holopis kuntul baris holopis kuntul
baris*

*Jogja.. Jogja.. tetap istimewa...
Istimewa negerinya... istimewa
orangnya...*

*Jogja.. Jogja.. tetap istimewa..
Jogja istimewa untuk Indonesia...
-- Jogja Speciality, an “Official Song
of the Resistance” by Kill DJ Java Hih
Hop¹³*

“Monarchy is the best kind of government because the King is then owner of the country. Like the owner of a house, when the wiring is wrong, he fixes it.”

-- A villager monarchist in Southern Italy¹⁴

1. Introduction

As I mention before, in this thesis I will discuss about either grassroots politics that are individual, indirect, and unorganized or the organized one. Both political level are exist within society regarding Yogyakarta’s political issues for years. This chapter aims to talk about type of politics so-called advocacy politics, which occurs under the banners of social movements, or what I will refer to here as ‘paguyuban’ movements (indigenous organization movements). This kind of political dynamic cannot be separated from the post-Suharto political transition period. The emergence of civil society

¹³ Meaning: ‘Lets unite together, all in one/ Jogja remains special/ Special of its state, special of its people/ The Specialness of Jogja dedicated to Indonesia’ (translation is by the author). This song was the most popular of those sung during the protest movement. The lyrics are based on proverbs spoken by Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno, Sultan HB IX, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, and RM Sosrokartono, and the rest were created by Marzuki.

¹⁴ Edward Banfield (1958), *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, p.62.

organizations, pro-civil rights movements, and democracy are quite obvious in the post-New-Order era.

Social movements in Yogyakarta opposing the democratization project led by the central government are clear examples of how civil society has responded to the dramatic political changes that shortly followed the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime. This also can be explained from the point of view of the protest movements as (1) grassroots responses to uncertainty in politics during the transitional regime together with new opportunities for civil freedoms; (2) the absence of regulation to guarantee better relationships between national and local politics and ambiguity in the interpretation of law in the new era of decentralization, for example as seen in the central government's offer of local autonomy that was followed by other regulations that centralized the authority of the state; and (3) the existence of cultural and social capital that significantly contributes to such collective movements. Social connectedness and egalitarian status among citizens makes it possible to create social and political consensus such that a traditional-charismatic leader like the Sultan could be seen as fitting within a modern system of governance.

Every social movement has its own supporters and attempts to attract new audiences. In Yogyakarta, there are different motives and orientations for such movements due to the freedom of speech they gained under the new democratic system. Each civil society organization has its own points of attraction, whether it supports or opposes a local charismatic leader, and whether it supports the monarchy or liberal democracy. The tension between groups holding these opposing views has contributed to tension between local and national government relationship from 1998 to date.

Social movements can be defined as instances of collective action,¹⁵ whether they are led and motivated by economic or class-consciousness or other causes like identity and civil rights. The first case is an example of early social movements that arose mostly in Europe, while the latter are exemplified by more recent social movements. A common assumption underlying this definition is that, “shared grievance and generalized belief (loose ideologies) about the cause and possible means of reducing grievance are important precondition for the emergence of a social movement” (McCharty and Zald 1977:1214). Nonetheless, participants have their own objectivity, subjectivity and rationality to participate or not in movement activities. Additionally, social movements or collective action involve components such as constituents, adherents, and beneficiaries;¹⁶ proponent and opponent (McCharty and Zald 1977); protagonist and antagonist groups (counter movements),¹⁷ and audiences (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994); resources; social movement organizations (SMOs)¹⁸ (McCharty and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982); leadership (Tarrow, 1994) tactic and strategy (Tilly 2008; McAdam, 2001; Levitsky 2010). Protesters typically need a so-called ‘common enemy.’ Additionally, in the framing process, collective action has three functions which are “diagnostic,” “prognostic,” “and motivational” (Snow and Benford 1998). Meanwhile Gamson suggests other ideas related to a causes of social movement by focusing on “injustice,”

¹⁵ McCharty and Zald (1977) define a social movement as a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or distribution of rewards in a society. The definitions of social movements are quite varied, and this definition is general. In my case, the social movement aims to protect and defend a cultural legacy rather than change old elements.

¹⁶ The constituents of a SMO are those providing resources for social movement activities. Adherents are those individual and organizations that believe in the goals of the movement. Potential beneficiaries are those who would benefit directly from SMO goal accomplishment (McCharty and Zald 1977: 1221).

¹⁷ A counter movement is a set of opinions and belief in a population opposed to a social movement (McCharty and Zald 1977: 1218).

¹⁸ A social movement organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goal with the preference of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals (McCharty and Zald 1977: 1218).

“agency,” and “identity.” Together these terms form a basis for my working definition of social movements.

I strongly agree that in post-colonial society, identity has a powerful meaning and it is kept well by many people collectively and individually. It causes then the closed relationship between collective identity and collective action. Collective identity is form of “collective representation” (Durkheim 2004) and the concept can be traced to classical theorists in Europe and the United states. There are a lot of social movement theory we have, but I will employ some of them following McAdam and McCharty related to the political opportunity, resource mobilization and framing process.

My further concern with this definition is to build on it by showing how collective identity can be transformed into collective action and vice versa. However, Taylor and Whittier (1992) examine the processes by which collective identity is constructed and contested in order to win control of discourse and reach the goals of a protest movement.¹⁹ Movements may broaden or tighten aspects of identity, which may be unavoidable by design or may involve the invention of new traditions, such as the creation of hip-hop using Javanese language, or the use of ritual ceremonies during the course of protest events. The construction of collective or shared identity itself can be done by using multilevel and diverse activities such as public discourse through talk, framing process, narrative, interaction among others, media, storytelling and legitimate

¹⁹ According to Taylor and Whittier, the three processes contribute to the construction of collective identity, (1) boundaries, referring to the social, psychological, and physical structures that establish differences between a challenging and dominant group; (2) consciousness, consisting of interpretive frameworks that emerge out of challenging group’s struggle to define and realize its interest; and (3) negotiation, encompassing the symbols and everyday actions subordinate groups use to resist and restructure existing systems of domination (1992:111). For this study, I noted that dominant-subordinate groups can have either state-society or central-local intragovernmental relationships, and resistance may be against change instead of in support of change.

cultural activities (Hunt and Benford 2004: 445). Additionally, collective identity itself is a requisite component for collective action, and they may grow from each other (Hunt and Benford 2004: 450-1) due to the importance of solidarity, commitment and emotional ties among protest participants.

Hunt and Benford (2004) have defined collective identity as the conceptions by which individuals identify themselves collectively in cognitive, emotional, and moral terms. Rooted in and shaped by particular socio-cultural contexts, collective identities are produced and reproduced in ongoing interaction between allies, oppositional forces, and audiences, who can be real or imagined. While providing a sense of “We-ness” and collective agency, collective identity likewise creates a sense of “Other” via boundary identification, construction and maintenance. Collective identity is, thus, shared meaning, providing cultural context for planning, enabling, carrying out, and evaluating individual participation and collective actions. In addition, collective identity is the main characteristic of new social movements worldwide, including collective action that may be led by class consciousness or economic concerns.

2. Profiles of SMOs

Following McCharty and Zald (1977), in this study I define a Social Movement Organization (SMO) as a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement such goals. The SMOs of Yogyakarta are constantly varying vis-à-vis their orientations, tactics, and membership. They include both proponent and opponent groups (countermovement organizations). Moreover, some groups serve only as networking organizations. Proponent groups are those that support the special status of Yogyakarta or

that oppose electoral democracy for the election of the governor. Meanwhile, opponent groups argue for the opposite and support ‘liberal democracy’ while opposing special privileges for the Sultan, such as being named governor for life. Based on the genealogy of SMOs in Yogyakarta, it is problematic to judge such movements as either pragmatic or spontaneous protest movements.

2.1. Ismaya

Ismaya, which stands for Ing Sedyo Memetri Asrining Yogyakarta, literally means “The Readiness to defend Yogyakarta’s Specialty.” It is a loyalist group in favor of the Sultan. Before 2003, it was a number of village and hamlet head associations.²⁰ This provincial level organization, founded in 1965, has around 9,132 members who are village heads in four districts.²¹ The organization focuses on a number of political issues, such as village issues and political issues at the provincial level. According to them, the substance of the special status of Yogyakarta is the position of the Sultan as governor and the Pakualam as vice governor.

2.2. GRY (Yogyakarta People’s Movement)

GRY was the first SMO, founded by several groups in 2003, to support the privileges of Sultan as governor for life. The main actors of this group are village head associations, Ismaya and the educated middle class. The role of this organization is to consolidate several communities (*paguyuban*) and to articulate its goal to pressure the central government. This networking group declined drastically before and during the

²⁰ The village staffs include village heads, village secretaries, staff, heads of hamlets, and staff assistants in village offices or *kelurahan* (Cokro Pamungkas 2010).

²¹ The names of the village head associations are Suryadhadari (Sleman), Tunggul Jati (Bantul), Semar (Gunung Kidul), and Bodronoyo (Kulonprogo).

2009 elections due to fragmentation of the elite when dealing with the political gains. This led to the emergence of a new networking organization called Genta Raja in 2008. =

2.3. Genta Raja

The Universal Jogjakarta Movement (Genta Raja) is a networking organization that was founded after the collapse of GRY in 2008. This organization is supported by 66 organizations from village- and urban-based communities in Yogyakarta and outside the region.²² This SMO is relatively well organized in comparison to GRY. It functions as a networking organization in local and national politics to support the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta. The current tactics of this movement are primary legislative activism. The potential groups comprising this SMO include Forinba Jogja of Jabodetabek, The United Wredatama of the Republic of Indonesia (PWRI), Association of Police Retirement, FKUB, Hudyana, Abdi Dalem Budaya, and national level of associations such as the forum of Nusantara Palaces, Parade Nusantara, the association of regional governments. The membership of this movement is overtly ethnic Yogyanese, radical, and focuses on cultural and historical issues in its propaganda. The radical nature of Genta Raja can be seen from its slogan: *Rawe-rawe rantas malang-malang putus*,²³ “dare to fight to end the constraint.”

2.4 Sekber Gamawan (Joint Secretariat of the Special-Ness Movement)

This SMO was founded at the end of 2010 to focus on the single issue of Yogyakarta’s special status. Supported by more than 32 community groups, this organization contributes significantly to local discourse regarding the substance of the

²² Adapted from Genta Raja (2011).

²³ Meaning that we will overcome all of obstacle and problem and we will not dare to die.

special status of Yogyakarta and the legitimate rule of Sultan as governor. Members of Sekber Gamawan are generally younger and urban. Some of them have backgrounds in the 1998 activist movement. The organization is well known for its slogan *Greget sawiji sengguh ora mingkuh*, “where there is will, there is a way.” Due to its close ties with the family of the Sultanate, some have labeled it as pragmatical movement for individual interests.

2.5. KIPER

The Independent Committee for the Referendum (KIPER) was founded in 2010 under the banner of Post Commander (Posko referendum) and Combatant of *Ijab Qabul*.²⁴ This group claims itself as a cultural movement to support the Sultan as governor, and pressures the central government to allow for Yogyakarta to hold a referendum to decide whether it will support appointment or elections, and whether to remain part of Indonesia or become independent. It is primarily supported by community groups near the Palace, but has other supporters from village communities. This single-issue movement has less trust in local and national political institutions, and does not use demonstrations to deliver its message, since it sees demonstrations as a type of activity that belongs to a non-Javanese foreign culture.

2.6. Opponent Organizations

The opponent groups come from various backgrounds and include Non-Governmental Organizations representing non-Yogyanese such as IRE, PaRWI, the Ronggowarsito Foundation, the Gilang Siti Foundation, KMKY, the urban poor linkage

²⁴ *Ijab Qabul* is another name for the written political agreement between Sukarno and Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in 1945. This agreement explicitly mentions Yogyakarta as special region within the Republic of Indonesia.

(Savirani 2004), Kompak, Forum LSM, and Yayasan Tunas Bangsa. These groups are stereotyped by the proponent groups. Not all NGOs, however, oppose the Sultan's privileges or pro-liberal democracy. Opponent groups also include supporters of Angling Kusumo (son of Pakualam VIII, who wants to run for vice governor in the event of a general election), political parties and governmental institutions (Democratic Party and KPUD), and university professors such as Ikhlasul Amal, Heru Nugroho, Amien Rais, Alfian Dharmawan,²⁵ Muchsan, Warsito Utomo, and Tim JIP UGM.

3. The Implementization of Social Movement Theories

To build more comprehensive understanding, I will employ three social movement theories to analyze these movements in Yogyakarta during the period of 1998-2011. Such theories can help to answer the questions associated with the social basis of the movements, how they contest meaning and what kinds of conditions enable the emergence of such movements in the broader context of Indonesia's political topography.

3.1. Resource Mobilization

According to Oberschall, resource mobilization is defined as "anything from material resources—to non material resources—authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skill, habits of industry, and so on" (1973:28). McCharty and Zald add that resource mobilization "can include legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor" (1977:1220). In more detail, Oberschall refers to resource mobilization as involving an external "sponsor" in cases where an oppressed group has less resources and faces difficulties in

²⁵ Alfian Darmawan merupakan mantan Calon Gubernur DIY pada 1998 yang menjadi perdebatan bahwa DIY pernah menyelenggarakan pemilihan di DPRD sementara KPH Angklingsusumo adalah Calon Wakil Gubernur DIY 2001 ketika persoalan pengisian jabatan wakil gubernur diperebutkan oleh anak keturunan Pakualam VIII pasca meninggal ayahnya.

opposing a more powerful group. In line with Obeschall, Jenkins and Parrow make point out that, “collective action is rarely a viable option because lack of resources and the threat of repression...When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of external resources” (1977:251). Those theories seem fit with what has happened for movements concerning the special status of Yogyakarta.

When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) delivered his statement about the impossibility of monarchy in a democratic government, the Yogyanese, at first, reacted peacefully and shortly thereafter social movement organizations consolidated to protest the central government intensively. The original statement was that, “There can be no monarchy which conflicts with constitutional and democratic values,” which was delivered in a limited cabinet meeting on October 27, 2010 (Reuters October 27, 2010). The president's speech triggered various forms of protest, such as demonstrations, shadow puppet satires, and flying the flag at half mast, each of which expressed a sense of grievance that the Pancasila state's respect for ethnicity, local communities, and self-government had been ignored by the President himself. Since then, such movements have consolidated intensively, with stronger community organizations and more intense meetings and deliberations. Those seeking a formal approach requested a presidential statement addressing the plenary session and enactment of the RUUKY that had been under debate for nearly 10 years. Those who joined the protest movement included the village *paguyuban*, traditional artists, community groups, village heads, interfaith forums, representatives of the tourist industry, and retired civil servants, who together prepared an alternative draft for the RUUKY bill. Currently, there are at least five different drafts of this bill prepared by community groups.

However, the central government of Indonesia has tried to force democratization throughout Indonesia, including taking a survey to influence the direction of the discourse, although Yogyakartaans believe that the divine power is represented in their King. In this sense, the central government used the media as a tool for power in line with Foucault (1980)'s theory of power and knowledge. In response, the traditional faction conducted ritual activities such as *Mubeng Benteng* (silent circling of the Palace) and *Rapat Akbar* (mass gatherings) as non-violent displays of their own power to shape the content of the media. According to my findings, there are at least four reasons for the emergence of such resistance movements. First is the privilege they confer to identity, second concerns political reasons and opportunity, third is the crisis or decline of traditional legitimacy, and last is that they enable members to imagine their own identities and futures.

In my view, there are some overlapping problems between such theoretical frameworks on social movements and other theories when understanding the dynamics of social movements in Yogyakarta. First, resource mobilization intersects with collective identity, and they can inherently complement one another to create a strong collective identity and collective action. Cultural resources can be mobilized, including both material and non-material aspects. Social capital is a significant type of internal resource that includes traditions, customs, beliefs, ideology, art, and other cultural aspects, and there is strong evidence that Yogyanese are bounded by their culture, tradition, and other forms of social connectedness. These aspects of cultural and non-material capital contribute to a shared identity that can be mobilized to create and modify social movements.

McAdam points out several resources that can be useful for collective movements: members, solidarity incentives, communication networks, and leaders. I will modify these tenets since, based on the social movements that are the focus of this study, there at least there are five important resources in shaping and reshaping such protest movement.

First is members. As McAdam mentioned, members can include individuals with informal networks and civic engagement that establish the potential to create a movement and also from traditional organization as 'bloc recruiters' (Oberschall 1973:125).

Second are indigenous organizations. Structural and material resources can be used to mobilize communities, village heads, and indigenous groups that are culturally and structurally tied to one another. Social movements in Yogyakarta include SMOs that are driven by community groups as well as local organizations, ranging from temporary and comparatively less organized structures to the most established. Most voluntary organizations that join in the the work of SMOs are highly flexible, except for the Association of Village Heads (Ismaya) and the Association of Hamlets (Semar Sembogo), which have formal means of administration and binding constitutions. Such SMOs emphasize the use of cultural resources, which tends to restrict their agendas. Some SMOs that are well established, like Genta Raja, have a strong commitment to the movement's goals, while others have more flexibility and less commitment. Such differences are due to their different structure and history. For example, the Association of Village Heads and the Association of Hamlets have existed for generations as part of established society. The stronger and more well established SMOs tend to be more militant and to have less direct political interests, but this does not necessarily mean that

people easily become involved in their protest movements. Indeed, the discourse and the contestation between main actors are constantly under examination by the public, who may defer their allegiance to one side or another, or may remain undecided.

Third are cultural resources. The existence of cultural groups in Yogyakarta confirms the goal of movements with cultural reasons to support traditional power in this region. Each social movement organization emphasizes culture instead of politics. Their internal resources complement external resources from organizations outside Yogyakarta.

Fourth is the role of leaders. In Javanese communities, the role of informal leaders is somewhat bigger than that of formal leaders. Therefore, informal leaders can easily mobilize ordinary citizens to participate in a movement. This can be seen in protest events in Yogyakarta that are supported by informal leaders who recruit their supporters.

Fifth are networking organizations, which refers to social movement organizations like Genta Raja which have a role in channeling sponsors and opponent organizations. This point will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

3.2. Political Opportunity and Process

The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 was followed by democratization projects nationwide, including Yogyakarta as a partial monarchy. This situation offered both political opportunities and problems for Yogyakarta communities. On the one hand, democracy opened access for civil freedoms in the media and organizationally. On the other hand, the special privileges of Yogyakarta could be threatened by democracy itself. Elites in Yogyakarta recognized such potential benefits and troubles when the local Palace supported the reformation movement to topple Suharto. Groups benefiting from

maintaining the privileges of the Palace and Sultan include village head associations and political parties. Thus, local elites at different levels of Yogyakarta society display loyalty to the Sultan by supporting the movement and appointed mechanism under Yogyakarta's special status. The political opportunity, for them, is merely about economy and political resources. Meanwhile, grassroots participants consider non-material opportunities such as social harmony, cultural benefits, spiritual relationships, and peace.

Democratization is still ongoing. Local elites of Yogyakarta see there are other opportunities possible to preserve the special status of the region. For example, a democratic system would allow them to demand for special privileges under the banner of democratic reasons such as popular aspirations or a social consensus related to the privileges of the Sultan. Democracy is defined as people power, which makes such an approach reasonable. In addition, decentralization and regional autonomy justify such movements, with regulations like Law 22/1999 and Law 32/2004, which further the national discourse on the special status of the province. However, local elites demand both the maintenance of their current political position and to dismantle the power of the old elites. Unsurprisingly, then, we see the emergence of both opponent and proponent movements under control of the powerful elites in order to bargain for a better position vis-à-vis both the Sultan and the central government. Therefore, people often view this movement cynically by saying that it is merely a movement of the local elites instead of a *wong cilik* (people's movement). That is the reason why some people are reluctant or unwilling to join such movements; they consider both the costs and benefits, as Olson mentioned on his book, *The Logic of Collective Action*.

Related to the emergence of social movement, there are at least three points to

explain why such a movement arose shortly after the collapse of Suharto. First, this movement has a strong relationship to the existing social capital and social connectedness among the people of Yogyakarta. The existence of traditional associations and voluntary organizations based on religion, occupation, ethnicity, and the like is readily apparent in Yogyakarta, which may well have one of the highest densities of voluntary and civil organizations in Indonesia. This, according to Tacquivile, Putnam, and Fukuyama is the foundation of a democratic state. Social capital makes it possible to connect people in civic engagement activities in daily life and in government projects. This also enables the emergence of collective movements whatever the reason they have as long as it guarantees for good relationship with one another.

Second, movements for the special status of Yogyakarta can be understood as causes of and effects from political change in Indonesia. People and local community have reacted to programs of political and economic liberalization sponsored by the central government after the 1998 reforms. As a result, Yogyakarta's movements are bottom-up movement in order to preserve their culture and tradition especially their relationship to the Sultan as traditional and charismatic leader for hundreds years. People have felt empowered under the rule of the Sultan as governor for more than 65, ever since this region became part of Indonesia. As an effect, this movement is reacting to the central government's coercive tactics for political change in Yogyakarta by installing Law no. 22/1999 and Law no. 32/2004. Meanwhile, based on traditional and cultural heritage, people still do believe in the Sultan as protector, as father, and as leader for the people. Even if Yogyakarta is a type of monarchy, that does not necessarily mean that people suffering under such a system. Moreover, such movements are related to local-

global changes. The gap between global and local is inevitably a problem, so local people have responded by trying to protect their own culture while taking for granted the ideas of liberal democracy, globalization, and capitalism. People also worry about the future transformation from subsistence communities to industrial society, in which they think they lose out in a free competition for economic resources.

Lastly, the emergence of groups that reject mechanisms for procedural democracy in determining the governor of Yogyakarta area was precipitated by the many events of past history, politics and the state of contemporary Indonesia. The failure of liberal democracy due to money politics, vote buying and corruption among politician in daily politics significantly contributed to discourse about the disadvantages of democracy. Thus, a series of disastrous social and political regimes have caused people to oppose democracy and participate to create another meaning of democracy, which may coexist with monarchy.

3.3. Framing Process

Threads of discourse mark the collective movements in Yogyakarta, as organizations create a common enemy in the national government's discrimination against Yogyakarta as a special region of Indonesia. Some argue that Yogyakarta has been marginalized in the post-Suharto political system, for several reasons: (1) because of its privileged status as a Sultanate "monarchy;" (2) because its people believe in historical traditions that have been discarded in other regions; (3) because of its traditional bureaucracy and hierarchical system; and finally, (4) because the central government does not want to exclude it from the democratization that followed the collapse of the Suharto regime. Like in Thailand, the combination of democratization,

economic growth, and globalization has produced contradictory results. Democracy is contaminated by money politics, and there are demands for more direct participation and solutions to the problem of inequality (Shiraishi 2005:12; Hadiz 2010). This has produced political opportunities and legitimacy for contemporary cultural-based social movements. The purpose of these social movements is to protect their social environment, their identities, traditions, and their livelihoods.

In general, elites, activists, and the rank and file of the protest movements each have different positions and understandings about whose interests they stand for, and for what purposes they advocate. Quite different views and perspectives may be held on major issues, a circumstance that is reinforced by multiple discourses that play out in the media among those who organize social movements, political parties, government or society. As a researcher or an outsider, it is thus important to know how terms are understood differently by various members of society, and therefore to grasp the exact meaning of a word. On the other hand, such meanings can contribute to impulses toward militancy and reluctance to join in the movement to protect Yogyakarta's privileged status.

Klendersman (1992) explains how a common identity is built through three key stages, namely: public discourse, persuasive communication, and public consciousness. In this case I have focused on the role of discourse for social movements in Yogyakarta. The political and identity discourses are also understood as a framing process in local politics from 1998 to 2011 with some issue still being debated and others resolved. There are at least two major discourses for contestation of meanings related to identity, democracy, and the special rights of the Palace and Pakualaman Temple, which are

reflected in the Bill on the Social Status of Yogyakarta (RUUK Yogyakarta).

(a) Democracy as Public Discourse

Democracy is generally advocated by supporters around the world as the best political system and government, although there are many who are discontent with democracy (Diamond, 2008). The “clash of civilizations” thesis proposed by Huntington (1992) has been criticized by many other scholars, who point out Huntington’s lack of sensitivity in assuming that one can speak of “Asian values” without grossly oversimplifying the contexts of local traditions and local cultures as part of the argument that Eastern culture is generally incompatible with Western democracy (Mahbubani 1996, Langguth 2003). Even more provocatively, Fukuyama (2006) has suggested that liberal democracy has definitively won out after the collapse of Communism in Europe. This is in conflict with current criticisms, however, that point to democracy in America as tending toward “corporatocracy” and the existence of predatory states and cleptocracies in Asia in the guise of democracy. This occurs when a government is no longer controlled by the will of the people, but instead by a small group of people or big businesses that represent no more than 1% of the population. In Indonesia, questions continue to be raised as to whether liberal democracy will bring prosperity or new problems. Both in the Eastern and Western hemispheres, nation states seem to lose their democratic populist orientations (Schaffer 2000, Chomsky 2007, Kohli 1991, Sandel 1998).

The opponent groups, viz. liberal groups, claim that democracy is a universal system with universal values to guarantee individual rights and good governance. One of the indicators of democracy is the elite selection process via regular local and national elections to choose political leaders, allowing everyone to participate. Though this system

is widely believed as the best, it also has its disadvantages due to the political practices discussed by many scholars like Vedi Hadiz (2010), Syarif Hidayat (2008), Antlov & Cederroth (2004), Marijan (2006) and Choi (2009). Most of them have drawn the same conclusion about Indonesia after more than 10 years democratization, agreeing on the existence of “undemocratic consolidation” and a “shadow state” under democracy. This situation has led to Nordholt’s conclusion that decentralization does not mean democratization.

Meanwhile, the proponents, or loyalist groups, think that democracy in Indonesia should be based on local culture and not forced Western democracy (Anshory & Toha 2005:179). According to them, democracy can be understood as a social system, a tool to reach social goals within society in order to maintain social order. Therefore, democracy should be an operational and functional system that is based on local culture, tradition, and values. In other words, democracy must have a rational and cultural character to make it work in an unfamiliar culture.

In its proposal, in 2010, the central government made a plan regarding the status of the privileges of Yogyakarta. One of the discourses that emerged was the statement of the president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, that monarchy is incompatible with democracy. Because Yogyakarta did not have free elections for provincial governor, some circles concluded that Yogyakarta was a form of monarchy in the republic. In the same time, a wave of protests among various groups in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, went into the street to express the rejection of direct elections and support the establishment of the governor of Yogyakarta. Some media carried reports claiming that society regarded liberal democracy in direct gubernatorial elections as failing to guarantee prosperity and

tranquility, since liberal democracy, as applied in other areas, only created corruption, while strengthening the positions of local bosses and political strongmen.

Thus, it would be incorrect to say that movement activists and pro-establishment factions hold views on the basis of nostalgia. There is, of course, a certain element of the movement that cannot be separated from the shadows of the past, the charismatic kings of Java, and the authority figure of Sultan HB IX, but acceptance of the Western tradition is also apparent inasmuch as it does not threaten the dignity of ancestral culture and traditions. Most Yogyakartaans still consider the words of Sultan HB IX to be sacred. They see their own culture as distinct from other cultures. This can be traced to the use of phrases coined by the Sultan such as, *Ik ben een in de allereerste plaats blijf javaan* (“As much as I learn Western knowledge, I am somehow nevertheless still Javanese”). This statement is, to borrow a phrase from Whittier Taylor (1992), a delimiter of identity and a force that builds collective identity in support of a patron-client culture.

(b) The Meaning of “Special Privilege”

There is no doubt that Yogyakarta contributed to both local and national political dynamics during the revolutionary period, the anti-new order movement, and in post-Suharto Indonesia. The recent political issue in Yogyakarta concerns regional autonomy in the era of decentralization. Thus, there is a great deal of local and national media discourse on this topic. I would like to show the frequency of local news reports on this issue from 1998 to 2011.

In a democratic system of government, doubtless, local politics shapes national politics, and we should pay attention to what is going on at the local level rather than the national. Politics is not always seen as representing state hegemony as Weber has

stressed, but it appears in a deep-rooted cultural base such as traditional associations, day-to-day social interactions, and so on. Nonetheless, people often see this in the opposite way, and that is why many problems have arisen relating to democratization, institutional reforms, and identity conflict. Since the 1970s, Indonesia has been governed by a regime of planned development with ambitions to create a uniform society regardless of what people want in each locality. For example, the imposition of the green revolution, of state ideology, and of decentralization, including the proposal for gubernatorial elections in Yogyakarta, are each extensions of this mindset of central planning that local people resist.

The government has difficulty using the logic of democracy as a way to force people to leave their traditional roots that have been maintained for hundreds of years and replace such traditions with a modern constitution. Even local people try to understand their own cultures by making analogies to what exists within society, like what villager quoted at the beginning of this chapter said regarding the feelings of being subject of monarchical system being equivalent to a king owning the country like people own their houses. Such understanding is part of the contested meaning and definition during the transition period, whether for a democracy or another modern system of government. Another analogy raised in interviews was that the King is a father, so he will protect citizens as he protects his children or family. This kind of understanding is quite common in Yogyakarta even from ordinary people's point of view.

Table 3.1: Frequency of Media Reports on Speciality issue, Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2011

Media	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	Total
Kompas Daily	17	4	-	19	50	39	27	39	24	235	337	144	286	85	

Kedaulatan Rakyat	119												120	225	

The existence of several local media in Yogyakarta contributes significantly to the mobilization of public opinion among interest groups and society. People can express their opinions through the local media by mailing letters or contacting local councils to support or oppose the special privileges of the local aristocracy. For instance, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, the biggest local newspaper, is a daily that reaches even remote areas. Many respondents said that mass mobilizations on protest events were ignited by this local media instead of by local elites. From the above data, we can see the increase in the numbers of reports on the issue at hand followed by local elite consolidation and the increasing support from villagers.

Yogyakarta is a well-informed community in a small province, and its region is recognized as one of the most highly literate places in Indonesia concerning legislative issues (*KR* 4/26/2011). Unsurprisingly, people generally believe in the power of language. From 1998 to 2003 many letters were sent to the local government concerning the support and opposition for the special status of Yogyakarta and the privileges of the King. Based on local government documents, more than 1,000 pieces of mail were received from 1998 to 2003. As stated by Taeku Lee (2002) in *Mobilizing Public Opinion*, letter-writing campaigns are part of the mobilization of public opinion and may involve different types of mail, such as pressure mail, supporting mail, and terror mail. Political parties that supported the privilege of the local aristocracy built political aspirations on such letter-writing campaigns.

Based upon the data I analyzed, there are at least three groups in Yogyakarta:

conservative, or culturalist, moderate and liberal groups. Conservative or loyalist groups are fully confident that granting Yogyakarta status as a special region (not a province) is plausible given its history. Of course, the meaning of 'special' itself is contestable. This is due to the involvement of the people of Yogyakarta and the Palace in guarding the independence of Indonesia by contributing money, legitimacy, and a location for the Republic of Indonesia when it was threatened by foreign powers. In recorded history, Yogyakarta was the capital of the "temporary" Unitary Republic of Indonesia from January 4, 1946, to December 27, 1949 (Suhartono WP et al. 2002), and it was well known as the center of resistance to the Dutch domination (Woodward 2010). Second, the king has been traditionally *jumeneng* (enthroned) as governor and deputy governor, beginning with the appointment of Sultan HB IX for life by President Sukarno in 1949. This fact, for such groups, is non-negotiable. Last, the Sultanate and Pakualaman own land for what is called the *Magersari*, or Pakualaman Grounds and Sultanate Grounds, which cover thousands of hectares or about 37.7 million square meters (Lutfi 2009:174, Aditcondro 2011).

History is cited when justifying the loyalist group's position and to counter discourse that they are not democratic. In doing so, there are several legacies from HB IX used to highlight how Yogyakarta is also democratic. They make the argument that democratization in Yogyakarta started with HB IX, and that such political reforms were used as a model for democracy at the national level. There are two achievements of HB IX relating to the democratization of the monarchy and the elimination of the Papatih Dalem to accelerate communication between people and the king/governor. The first direct elections were conducted in Yogyakarta in 1951 (Soemardjan 1962). In order to

build the pillars of democracy, such as village councils and KNID delegation, such bodies were elected directly by the people. The second major change was the transformation of local self-government (*swapraja*) to be a special province of the Republic of Indonesia (Roem 2011, Yuniyanto 2010, Darmawan 2010, Baskoro & Sunaryo 2011). The significance of this event is the delivery of certain elements of the sovereignty of the autonomous region to the national state while it still retained special privileges.

In contrast, according to the opponent groups, the special privileges have no meaning when the local government fails to provide its people with access to economic resources, health services, and political careers. For the liberal groups, the issue of special status should be redefined in modern terms so that the common people can gain more benefits for being part of the special region. Democracy or constitutional monarchy should be understood as an alternative to force local elites and people participate in regional developments. Bambang Purwanto (2003) points out that society is divided into different groups, who may support the local elites or may express anti-democracy and anti-reform perspectives on one side but take an opposing stance within their communities. They may have their own reasons not articulated on the table above for why they did not join the protests on either side. Certainly there are those who support RUUKY as long as their society remains peaceful, and they do not get involved in demonstrations, marching, or leafleting due to their preoccupation with their daily work as farmers, small traders, and laborers. Additionally, some scholars also offer a moderate way, following the United Kingdom's constitutional monarchy (Asia Pulse [Rhodes] December 22, 2010). Yet this choice is also problematic because that concept is

ambiguous in the unitary state and democratic system adopted by Indonesia.

(c) RUUK Yogyakarta (Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta)

The birth of the idea for RUUK Yogyakarta posed complex problems, since both the Palace and the central government are trying to establish a legal basis for their governance. The King, with support from the community, wants to maintain traditional power, while the central government wants to change it to a mechanism of democratic gubernatorial elections based on Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 32/2004. The proposal of RUUKY is a political necessity as a response to political unrest that, many interviewees claim, was proposed by Sultan HB X himself to protect the positions of governor and deputy governor. Although RUUKY seems pragmatic and based on sound political reason, this has not made people reluctant to fight for the privileges of the Sultan, because this issue is not about the mere position of governor. Each year, social movement organizations called *paguyuban*²⁶ call more strongly for the privileged status of Yogyakarta.

There are three different groups that contest the meaning of the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta: conservative or radical groups, transformative or moderate groups, and liberal groups. The former two are considered as the proponent groups and the last one is an opponent group. They have their own standpoints for understanding the special privileges of Yogyakarta and at times they compete to define the issue in their own ways.

²⁶ *Paguyuban* means a traditional community group or voluntary association in which individuals are oriented to the large association as much, if not more than, to their own self interest. Furthermore, individuals in such communities are regulated by commonmores, and by beliefs about the appropriate behavior and responsibility of members of the association, to each other and to the association at large. They are marked by "unity of will" (Tönnies 22).

Conservative groups think that RUUKY only serves to empower previous laws or political contracts such as Ijab Qabul or maklumat penetapan and some laws such as Law no. 22/1948, Law no. 3/1957, and so on. The proponent groups have benefited from a national political context that highlights the corruption and failure of the national government to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts, while in contrast Yogyakarta has been named one of the cleanest areas with the least corruption (Transparency Indonesia Institute 2009, VIVAnews 2009) and one of ten cities with the least corruption in all of Asia in 2011 (Reuters, October 3, 2011). This reassures such groups and their intended audiences that the existence of traditional power in the Palace of Yogyakarta can be a force for reducing corruption, corporate greed, and the detrimental effects of liberal capitalism. Restrictions on market liberalizations in Yogyakarta have also caused marginalized groups to support the Palace, which has led to widespread support for the establishment of the Sultan as governor and rejection of elections that can be tainted by the influence of money. They believe that true democracy means *Vox Populi, Vox Dei*, so that, in the minds of the Javanese people, the voice of the King is the voice of God. Therefore, the King of Java has strong charismatic power.

There are two possibilities for how local ideas of power in Java can encounter Western ideas of power. First, the modernization of traditional society can lead to a loss of original values and identities. The second possibility is precisely the challenge of modernization and secularization of society, where cultural legacies are conserved by adopting local-traditional values in a community. Democracy will be something new if it is interpreted as merely a mechanism for selecting a leader, but old values can be incorporated if it is understood as also including respect for human rights, the freedom to

form civic organizations, and participation in governmental systems. Thus, historical change and continuity could be understood on the basis of adaptive change, where local cultural values that are accepted and used to enrich the new system, or confrontational change where some are rejected on the basis that they threaten the existence of cultural core values.

According to this group, the central government's efforts to install a "liberal democracy" has awakened the power of tradition in Yogyakarta and re-strengthened the identity of Yogyakartaans as an autonomous and united polity. In response to the central government, hundreds of community organizations have mobilized their resources to argue that Western democracy ("One man, one vote") is not the best system, and that direct elections do not always reflect the best interests of society since, in an era of economic and political liberalization, money can determine everything (Palast 2004). Yogyakarta is not rich in natural resources, which may be a reason why the central government has attempted to dominate local politics, and this may be another reason why Yogyakartaans oppose democratization that undermines local culture and beliefs (Kuntowijoyo 2002). Emotional responses in favor of local identities can be seen in slogans such as: "We are proud to be citizens of Indonesia, but we are more proud to be people of Yogyakarta," "We love peace, but we love the appointed governor even more," "Privileges for Yogyakarta now, appointment is the only choice," "The people of Jogja Resist," "The people of Yogyakarta are ready for a referendum," "The living and the dead both follow the King," "Privilege or independence," and so on.

The transformative group argues that democracy needs many requirements to be implemented in harmony with local culture. They think that RUUKY is one way to

compromise in negotiations on the next step for reforms. Yogyakarta might be called as partly democratic, but the opportunity to become fully democratic remains. Thus, they try to stand between the two groups on either side of the issue, contending that Western democracy and Eastern tradition can be united while accommodating both values in different ways. Meanwhile, the opponent group has taken democracy as the best system of government since the collapse of socialism shortly after World War Two. This group said that the highest authority is the constitution, and the local government must follow the law no matter what, necessitating general elections to accommodate all citizens' interests.

4. Strategies, and Tactics, and Motivation of the Movements

4.1. Recruitment Models

Each social movement organization has its own character in recruiting members. There three type of recruitment model seen in the movements of Yogyakarta. First is the structural model used by GRY, Genta Raja, Ismaya, and political parties in order to select the right people and groups to be part of their movement. Ismaya has the strictest membership requirements since they are a village head association, so those who are not village heads can be participants but not decision makers. Second is semi-structural, where recruitment is based on similar goals and personal connections, though mass mobilizations are still open to the public. This group includes Sekber Gamawan and KMKY (the opponent organization). Lastly is informal relations, where a group has open membership and it is equal to a voluntary organization. KIPER has adopted this model, offering the public opportunities to participate regardless of background, so long as they

have social commitments to support the special status of Yogyakarta. Most participants are invited personally in informal ways both in the countryside and in urban communities.

4.2. Strategies and Tactics

Generally speaking, social movements and protest movements take different forms and employ different tactics, depending on the context. While the state has certain powers to shape and reshape the activities of social movements, we may argue to the contrary that social movements also influence the type of state regime and that they can transform their strategies such that the state acts in ways that are less oppressive. The strategies and tactics adopted by these groups are dynamic, based on the context and the orientation of such movements, ranging from non-violence to violent protest, from anti-state to civil rights issues, from global to local-identity based movement. The diversity of issues influences the types of tactics they adopt.

For instance, based on the supplementary data I collected from news reports, the chart below summarizes the activities and characteristics of social movements over the course of Indonesian history, focusing on Yogyakarta regions.

Figure 3.1: Characteristics of Local Movements In Pre- and Post-Reform Era Yogyakarta

Components	Revolutionary Era (1928-1945)	Old Order Era (1945-1965)	New Order Era (1965-1997)	Post-Reform Era (1998-present)
Actors	Ethnic and religious leaders	Educated people	Students, labor leaders, community leaders	Increased diversity: students, educated people, ordinary

				people
Motivation	Anti-colonial, pro-independence	Anti-state domination; anti-ethnic domination, religious/ethnic-based movement	Economic distribution, political injustice	Identity, culture, moral values, local tradition, anti-capitalism, environmental issues
Tactics/Strategies	Indirect, symbolic, boycotts, violence, cooperative	Direct demonstrations, legislative proposals, cooperative	Indirect, symbolic, ending in violent protests	Direct, open, cooperative, non-violence
Scale	Regional	Regional	National (1997-8)	Local-National
Example	Revolution against the Dutch	Anti-communist movement	Solidarity movement for Udin	Movement for the special status of Yogyakarta

Source: Adapted from newspaper reports in *Kompas* and *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

To understand the changes in tactics and strategies of protest movements in Yogyakarta, I analyze four SMOs below and, to some degree, I will also discuss their corresponding counter-movements. SMOs are those organizations in a movement that explicitly organize their members. The four SMOs I focus on here are the GRY (The People's Movement of Yogyakarta); Genta Raja (United Yogya Movement); Sekber Gamawan (Association for the Special Status of Yogyakarta); and lastly the Post Command of Referendum. I then consider several characteristics among these SMOs, including their main supporters, identities, goals, and relationship to the palace, tactics, and strategies. Based upon my interview data, newspaper reports, and my own interpretation I opinion I present these data in the following table:

Table 3.2: Charactersitics of Groups Favoring the Privileges of Yogyakarta 1998-2011

Components	GRY (2008)	Genta Raja (2007-present)	Sekber Gamawan (2010-present)	Posko Referendum (2010-present)
Constituents and Supporters	Rural and village leaders; Ismaya	Rural and village leaders, intellectuals, 67 organizations	Urban workers and communities, 32 organizations and community groups	Rural and traditionalist communities
Identity	People of Yogyakarta	People of Yogyanese and <i>Kawulo mataram</i> (The Real Yogyanese)	<i>Kawulo mataram</i> , multiethnic identity	Culture-based movement
Goals	Appointed governor, Special privilege	Special privilege, RUUKY (Privilege bill of Yogyakarta)	Special privilege and Appointed Governor/duput y	Appointed Governor/duput y
Tactics/strategies	Civil disobedience	Civil disobedience, cooperative, spiritual	Cooperative with local parliament, extra-parliament, and spiritual	Radical but in non-violence
Protest activities	Demonstrations, mass assemblies, confrontation, terror	Demonstrations, ritual movements, boycotts, leafleting, media framing, symbolic movement	Demonstrations, ritual movements, boycotts, leafleting, media framing, symbolic movement	Ritual and symbolic movement, leafleting
Relationship to the Palace and Sultan	Neutral	Traditionally and politically is closed to but they create a distance from	Relatively close	Close, patron-client relations

Source: Adapted from interviews and newspaper reports from *Kompas* and *Kedaulatan Rakyat*.

The differences among the SMOs outlined above can be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand, the diversity and variations in the movements can be seen as strengthening their primary purpose of supporting each other, because together they can reach a broader audience of towns and villages, as well as religious and ethnic groups. Another advantage is that the government cannot easily co-opt such an array of groups having collective, collegial leadership (though there are exceptions where IGs have a centralized leadership that joins with others in the same SMO). On the other hand, the diversity of these SMOs can alternatively lead to fragmentation and conflict. Gentaraja, for example, is a new SMO that grew from disillusionment with GRY, while the Joint Secretariat of Gamawan was originally part of Gentaraja (Interview with Adji Bancono, 8/13/11) and became its own SMO. This can result in detrimental public relations, as discord can be interpreted as pointing to ulterior political and personal interests among SMO leaders. If so, the public may be reluctant to join in protest activities.

One radical group that does not use street demonstrations or political negotiation is called Command Post Referendum. They prefer a cultural approach, because such activities cannot be easily contaminated by political interests. Proponents of this group are militant and have strong social relationships and traditional values. The largest protest activities include the *mubeng benteng* (a traditional ceremony of silently circling the palace), an event I witnessed once out of the three times it was held. In the event I saw, thousands of people participated in the activity, which lasted from noon until 5:00 pm. For more detail about the protest events we will discuss on the protest event session (pp. 20-23).

From the above data, we can see differences in the characteristics of these SMOs. Every choice has consequences for supporters and groups of antagonists, including the central government. If certain groups are found to be too pragmatic and political, they may elicit a response in the streets, which would affect the internal dynamics of the SMO itself. The image of the movement is important for the maintenance of continuity and integrity. Demonstrations are framed in terms of new concepts of democracy rather than forms of mass action that display symptoms of a “social disease” or expressions of people who have lost in the struggle for economic resources. Good public images can win the hearts and minds of people, and negative images can drive them away. GRY is a good example of how the political interests of certain elites have led to the collapse of an organization that existed for nearly 10 years and was known to be very influential.

4.3. Protest Events

The goals of protest events can be diverse, but in general they try to reach new potential supporters, enlarge group interests and/or to defend the status quo. Protest events are generally held collectively and openly, but in some cases may be held indirectly as cultural events. Following Tarrow, protest events can be divided into three groups, namely, confrontation, violence, and conventional (1995: 98). Confrontation includes collective action involving large masses of people but which lacks violence, such as the occupation, obstruction and forced entry of spaces, as well as radical strikes. Like confrontation, conventional protests are also non-violent, and this category includes petitions, legal action, demonstrations, leafleting, mass gatherings, and public assemblies. Meanwhile, violent protests include looting, riots, shootings, and so on. In the case of

Yogyakarta, violent events were rare and occurred only in 1998 and 2008, when GRY employed terror against groups that opposed its movement. Kompak was reported as a countermovement²⁷ organization in 2008 and was threatened by many actors at that time both directly and indirectly (Interviews with Budi Setiawan 7/7/2011, Pambudi 7/16/2011, Wahyu 8/12/2011). An additional type of protest event that does not fit nicely within this framework are so-called cultural events, which serve as a way of delivering the message of protests through rites, festival, shadow puppet shows, traditional village cleansing, art performances, and so forth.

Groups representing the pro-establishment movement in Yogyakarta have clearly been influenced by the dynamics and models of social movements that exist in other places around the world. They are well-informed with the presence of various technologies. Creativity within the community gives its own color for protest participants to introduce innovations in protest events. Protests are not monolithic. We can adopt the categories of Tarrow in viewing forms of resistance as direct or indirect. Direct protests include demands voiced in demonstrations, marches, public gatherings and boycotts. Both of these types involve a diversity of performing arts, traditional routine events, leafleting, billboards, discussions and seminars.

Based on selected data from the local and national newspapers *Kedaulatan Rakyat* and *Kompas* from January 1998 to October 2011, the types of protest events and activities are summarized below:

Table 3.3: Frequency of Protest Activities by Type, Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2011

²⁷ A countermovement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population that is opposed to a social movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218).

Protest events	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11
Demonstrations	2			2		7			1	1	2		2	15
Leafleting						1	2							>
Mailing	>			>	>	52 ²⁸								12
Public Assemblies	3			2	2	59			1		2			3
Public Gatherings	2			2	1	2				2	2			1
Occupations	1				1									2
Cultural Events ²⁹	(45) +2	(45) +2	(45) +2	(45) +2	(45) +1	(45) +3	(45) +2	(45) +1	(45) +	(45) +8	(45)+8	(45)	(45) +3	(45) +7
Confrontations	1									1				1
Marches	1													7
Legislative drafts					1				2		2		1	3
Terror Activities						1								
Boycotts										3				
Total														

Sources: *Kompas*, *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, other data.

From Table 4 above, we can see how the intensity of protest activities increased at the end of gubernatorial term. In 1998, the major nationwide transition of government had an impact on traditional community responses to save the region from the ambitions of “democracy and freedom without limits.” In 2003, the official end of the office of governor arrived, but this was extended once to 2008 and again until 2011. Although there have been no elections, the central government has thus extended the status quo of the local aristocracy. Each of these extensions was preceded by protests supporting the establishment of the Sultan as governor and expressly rejecting either the extension of the

²⁸ Mailing campaigns vary according to individual and organization, and they expressed different opinions, including that the governor and vice governor must be appointed by the King (23 pieces of mail), that the governor could be a member of the family from the Palace (19 pieces), and that the governor as a public officer should be chosen via democratic mechanisms (10 pieces). Sources: Documents of the Regional People’s Representative Council of DIY People 2003.

²⁹ Cultural events can be defined as activities based on tradition and local culture. They are not as direct as protest events, but are clearly a part of social movements and the consolidation process. This activity includes art performances, street art, rituals, and collective-spiritual activities. The 45 events listed for each year is the number of cultural events included on the fixed calendar of the two palaces.

term of office or the implementation of an electoral system. Loyalist groups rejected the election mechanism for many reasons, and their activity can be seen from the diverse protest events that have occurred since 1998, with increasing intensity and the number of groups involved each year.

The existence of cultural events in Yogyakarta brings together many actors in the movement, and they are able to meet opposing groups, since cultural events are generally celebrated and attended by all people regardless of their personal religious, occupational or ethnic background. Sekaten, for example, is an annual event held in Yogyakarta for 40 days in front of palace. Traditional markets, traditional games and performances are provided as part of this festival. In January 2012, there *pengajian* were held during this event, and Cak Nun performed and gave a speech as a guest. Many people attended the event including local elites from the palace, bureaucrats, and politicians, all of whom were talking about the special status of Yogyakarta and its historical value.

For a better understanding of protest dynamics in Yogyakarta, below I provide an additional chart summarizing several notable protest events of Yogyakartaans held from 1998 to 2011, as reported by national and local newspapers, from my fieldnotes, and from my observational interviews:

Table 3.4: Large Protest Events in Yogyakarta 1998-2011

Date	Protest event		Number of Participants	Organizers and SMOs involved
	Name	Type of tactics		
08/26/1998	Support The Sultan	Mass assembly	500,000 people	Popular masses ³⁰
03/25/2008	The Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta	Demonstration	About 10,000	GRY

³⁰ This was not a well-organized protest, as the SMOs did not yet exist (c.f. Selo Soemardjan 1999: iv)

4/2/2008	Tingalan Dalem	Public assembly	About 300,000	Open to the public
10/28/2008	Pisowanan Ageng 2	Public assembly	About 300,000	Open to the public
12/13/2010	For the Appointed Governor	Public assembly	About 14,000	Gentaraja, Sekber Gamawan, and others
12/13/2010	Flag at Half Mast	Symbolic resistance	Individual and communities base	N/A
03/1/2011	Symbolic Resistance to Political Parties	Satirical ceremony	70 people	Sekber Gamawan
03/26/2011	FKY (3 days)	Festival, street art	More than 1,000 each day	Local community groups
05/29/2011	Mubeng Benteng	Marching, rites, silent, flaging	more than 2,000 people in three events	Posko Referendum, KIPER
05/2011	RUUKY bill	Demonstration	70-100	Sekber Gamawan
05/2011	Permanent Tatoo for supporting the privilege of Yogyakarta	Symbolic resistance	800	Sekber Gamawan
05/2011	Ritual movement of Topo pepe ³¹	Traditional ceremony	300	Genta Raja
05/4/2011	Declaration of the Special Status of Yogyakarta	Mass assembly	200	Hamlet Association of Yogyakarta Region
05/12/2011	Appointed Governor	Mass assembly and free public speech		Sekber Gamawan
05/13/2011	RUUKY and Appointed governor	Demonstration, marching	500	Gentaraja, Sekber Gamawan
05/27/2011	Yogyakarta special privilege/RUUKY	Rites, cultural movement ³²	600	Gentaraja, Forinba, Semar Sembogo, and Ismoyo

Sources: *Kompas*, *Kadaulatan Rakyat*, personal field notes.

³¹ *Topo pepe* is kind of ritual movement in Javanese tradition used to express objections or grievances in front of the Palace. It is usually used to request the King for assistance.

³² This protest event was held in front of the King's Palace to support the appointed governor and was hosted by Gentaraja, Forinba, Semar Sembogo and Ismoyo and their constituent organizations.

The motivations of participants involved in this movement, based on my interviews and the data gathered from the media, can be grouped into three categories: motivation founded on past agreements and historical awareness, motivation stemming from feelings of social solidarity, and motivation from emotional ties with the figure of the Sultan as symbolic and ritual leader as well as political leader (Astuti & Palupi 2010).³³ If we trace the reasons for each of these, there are a variety of emotional and psychological roots that lead to strong beliefs in tradition, which are in line with Javanese beliefs in supernatural powers, as Geertz (1964), Anderson (1972), and Woodward (2010) have each found, namely, that power is symbolized by the charismatic figure of the Sultan and inheritance as the real power base.³⁴

Such traditional beliefs are powerful in Yogyanese communities, and they are taken for granted as undeniable “truth,” which can give rise to militants and radical protesters. As Goodwin et al. (2004) argue, the emotional dimension is part of social action but, unfortunately, many scholars underestimate this point. Antagonist groups argue that emotional and irrational movements will quickly dissipate because they lack strategy and political calculation while having only a minor political effect. They further criticize spontaneous protests driven by emotional groups as not worth worrying about, since they are only short-term events (interviews with Budi Setiawan July 17, 2011, and with Putut August 12, 2011). Nevertheless, such protest movements have sporadically been held for a decade thus far. Despite the existence of an apparently “irrational” or

³³ Opinion piece, *Kompas* December 6, 2010.

³⁴ Bambang Sigap Sumantri, “Penetapan sebagai harga diri” [Appointed as the local people’s dignity] in *Kompas*, Dec 10, 2010. See also Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. *The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture* (pp.1-69). In Claire Holt (ed), Benedict R. O’G. Anderson & James Siegel, *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1972.

“emotional” dimension, participants have built their common beliefs into a movement of collective action, which can be effective precisely because of the emotional content, the sense of belonging and the primordial sentiments embedded within public beliefs and expressed in everyday life. Thus, cultural or emotional collective action might emerge and reemerge as responses to dominant groups, turning resistance to change into a part of everyday life and vice versa.

4.4. The Motivational Factors

According to Darmawan (2010), factors contributing to the conduct of proponent groups and their mass mobilization activities demanding respect for the special privileges of Yogyakarta include (1) the sovereignty of the region; and (2) social, economic, and political stability in light of a historical legacy and failure of democracy nationwide after the implementation of local elections.

In contrast, for opponent groups, the reasons why they are resisting an appointed mechanism are (1) unpopularity of policies in local government; (2) the problem that democratic institutions may create difficulties for the articulation of popular interests; (3) the problem of law enforcement, and (4) concerns regarding a culture of self-service bureaucracy. Actually, the main point for the opposition group is that the appointment mechanism is totally anti-democratic. But, as with other social movement activists in Yogyakarta, the Sultan himself has stated that Yogyakarta is neither an absolute monarchy nor a constitutional monarchy but rather a democracy given that the governor is approved by the DPRD every five years.³⁵

³⁵ Sri Sultan HB X, in *Kedaulatan Rakyat* 9/26/2008.

5. Conclusion

If we refer to three types of social movement theory that have been discussed in this section, we will find some important factors that could help elucidate the dynamics and the emergence of social movements in Yogyakarta. At least three major factors have driven the emergence and sustainability of this movement for the past decade: (1) the structure of opportunities and threats, (2) local resources and the organization of traditional and cultural values, (3) organizational connections, and (4) the availability of media and public spaces as a loci of contestation and struggle for making-meaning.

Firstly, political opportunities and threats can be understood as responses to political change. The movement for the special status of Yogyakarta can be called a recent type of movement in post-Suharto Indonesia. Theoretically, new social movements that have arisen following collapses of authoritarian regimes worldwide tend to follow “identity-oriented paradigms” (Cohen 1985) under the banner of postmodernism or social constructionist (Epstein 1990). In line with such theoretical frameworks, Williams (2004) examines shifts among collective movements from bases for economic distribution to new identities, moral concerns, and civil rights issues. For this study, I have defined new social movements as those that are based in culture and that produce and reproduce new collective identities throughout a framing process that unfolds via public discourse.

Secondly, what we mean by traditional organization is indigenous groups (IGs), which are defined for the purpose of this study as including well-established and organized community groups within society, such as the Ismaya and Semar Sembogo groups, and which have existed for centuries. Other communities that become involved in a movement are not necessarily IGs, and the different genealogy of IG groups can

shape and reshape SMOs with different characteristic and tactics, depending on whether the IGs choose to become highly politicized or to remain independent with strong commitments to the goals of SMOs.

Thirdly, the existence of networking organizations like GRY and Genta Raja at the local and national level, or the Sekber Gamawan at the local level, provide an additional level of dynamics in the articulation of public demands related to the special status of Yogyakarta in determining local leaders. Genta Raja is dominated by intellectual and cultural experts, especially in Jakarta. This group, as representatives of the middle-class, have good relationships with the local aristocracy, both culturally and through kinship. This networking organization is therefore highly flexible and plays two important roles, being able simultaneously to nationalize local issues and to localize national issues. In social movement theory, this role is understood as the “boomerang effect” (Snow, Soule & Kriesi 2009:327), where the ability to connect issues to outside groups brings more individuals and factions into the discourse, including the government, so it can communicate the goals of the movement.

Genta Raja, for instance, has politicized the existence of international recognition of Yogyakarta as an indigenous community guaranteed by the United Nations to build legitimacy. Another role of Genta Raja is to communicate with parliament and government to take an alternative direction when street demonstrations are no longer effective to negotiate among stakeholders.

Finally, the presence of media and public spaces that can be used both groups become part of the discourse by producing the historical memory of the past. According to Habermas (1989), public spaces can be divided into three types: public representative

space, public literature space, and the political sphere. The first public space frees the royal family from public interests but it may act on the wishes of the people, while literature may be used as a living space that brings members of different classes and communities to interact with one another. The political sphere, meanwhile, is an arena of contestation of meaning used by both the ruling faction and the opposition. Political spaces can be expressed through discourse, mass media, and memories of the past to shape public opinion. Like the old order and new order eras, even the reform era involves the further development of loyalty and hegemonic power through various media such as museums, landscapes, monuments, and commemorative ceremonies (Anderson 1984, Shackel 2001). Social movement organizations in Yogyakarta likewise reproduce memorial events of past history wrapped with trappings of heroism, the role of local elites and solidity of shared ancestors.

Some activities utilized by the SMOs include ‘grebek’, Serangan Omoem 1 Maret, Jogja Kota Republik, Jogja Kembali, Jumenengan Raja, Peringatan 17 Agustus, and so on. Each of these cultural events is attended by thousands of people annually, and they are not merely ceremonial but also used as media of consolidation, bringing many groups of people together to win public support by showing the size of the movement. Since this activity requires financial and material resources, the movement must mobilize the support of outside sponsors as well. Voluntary groups have been recruited through a variety of ways to raise financial support and, by organizing various activities, they preserve the traditions of the ancestors under the banner of the special status of Yogyakarta.

Public spaces in buildings such as the opera house are dominated by the pro establishment of the opposition. The opposition only emerged in media channels and university seminar rooms, while the public spaces in the city such as large intersections are packed with a variety of symbols and banners in support of the privileged status, urging people to join and remember the history of the triumph of Yogyakarta. Public memory is also constructed through various cultural events and traditions organized by the two kingdoms, local government, community groups, and villages. In the traditional calendar of activities organized by the Palace, there are 23 annual cultural events, and the Pakualaman has 22 major cultural events (Calendar of Pakualaman and Palace 2012). These are not merely royal rituals; they also commemorate the beginning of the revolutionary struggle for independence and have included social movement organizations since 2003.

In short, similar to what happened in the United States after the American Civil War, as the federal and local governments created events for political commemoration, the same type of process is unfolding through the activities of SMOs in Yogyakarta to develop a public memory of a past associated with the role of the Sultan and Yogyakarta's support for Indonesian independence during the revolutionary era and in the 1998 reform movements. In the the context of the United States, Shackel (2001:655) argues that public memory can be constructed in three ways: "(1) forgetting about or excluding an alternative past, (2) creating and reinforcing patriotism, and/or (3) developing a sense of nostalgia to legitimize a particular heritage." In the case of Yogyakarta, the first of these points is less relevant since Yogyakarta was not marginalized by the central government prior to 1998.

Chapter 4

Everyday Politics and Resistance: Understanding the ‘Hidden Transcript’ of Jogjanese Communities

"For us, the grassroots, the important thing is not special status, or who is governor or who becomes Sultan, but peaceful, harmonious lives, whether can work in peace and have a decent living."

-- Wignyo (65), a parking attendant at KH Dahlan Street, Yogyakarta City³⁶

"For us, as ordinary people (kawulo), the Sinuwun (King, Sultan) are currently the leaders of the land of Indonesia, more than just political leaders, more than just governor or vice president or even president, because the Sinuwun (King, Sultan) is Ngarsadalem Sampeyandalem Ingkang Sinuhun Kanjeng *Sultan* Senapati Hing Ngalaga Ngabdurrahman Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatulah ‘Supreme Militray Commander, Sevant of the Merciful (God), Descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, Regulator of Religion, Caliph (Representative) of God.’

-- Herman (50), from a letter dedicated to The Sultan of Yogyakarta³⁷

1. Introduction

As far as I am aware, few scholars have conducted research on grassroots politics, their dynamics and their influence on the people Yogyakarta since its merger with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. Generally, scholars have been interested in the politics of Yogyakarta as a network of power relations among state institutions. This chapter discusses grassroots politics, and the motive for why people are reluctant either to participate directly for the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta and

³⁶ Similar opinions were expressed by more than 10 respondents when asked about the issue of special status and the position of Sultan as governor. Such sentiments are generally held by those in the grassroots who have to work hard to earn a living.

³⁷ From a collection of letters published under the title *The Pisowanan Alit*, written by Herman Sinung Janutama, published in Yogyakarta by Mitra Media Pustaka, 2009, p. v.

its proposal for an appointed governor, or to take part in electoral politics for the position of governor.

Laswell's definition of politics is quite close to what people understand as what matters politically: "who gets what and how" in Javanese society is the crux of political activity. Nonetheless, in this thesis I highlight that power can be held and owned by everyone regardless their formal or informal position. Power can exist at all levels of social and individual experience, and this position sets my research apart from that of previous social theorists who believe that the Javanese idea of power is inherently constant and centralized.

Javanese culture most generally refers to the people of Yogyakarta, and includes various complex symbols that often escape the notice of the central government and even political scientists. In the case of protestors in favor of special status for Yogyakarta, their demand is to retain the king as governor within the scope of the current project of democratization, as they consider general elections as unable to deliver a society that could fulfill the promises of a functioning social welfare system. Therefore, this form of resistance is worth examining as a critique of democracy in a wider political context while focusing on the role of local culture. Perspectives contributing to this analysis include everyday politics and symbolic resistance, as well as locally organized movements called *paguyuban*, or voluntary indigenous organizations.

Several key terms should be introduced, including a definition of everyday politics and how it is practiced in the everyday lives of ordinary people. The main goals are to build a better understanding of political issues in the transitional era and to delineate the relationship between everyday and conventional politics, that which is

happening both on and below the surface of public discourse. A fixed definition is necessary but must be contextualized within different cultures. It is problematic to attempt to identify each type of politics explicitly, since everyday politics are rarely expressed openly or collectively; they can of course only be traced through everyday activities and their symbolism. For instance, as can be seen, various forms of popular expressions of dissatisfaction with government policies may include everyday gossip, rumors, or simply disengagement and noncompliance. In Javanese culture, such types of behavior are legitimated by their cultural value in maintaining social harmony.

Everyday politics, I would say, is a relatively new approach in analyzing political matters in Indonesia, and is far from a mainstream approach to politics in Indonesia. Thus, building toward a definition of this term will help future scholars to become involved in studying this type of politics in the near future. Everyday politics itself is often seen as daily politics, but it is just not true. In my understanding, daily politics is “politics as business as usual,” which is widely practiced by elites and politicians. Everyday politics is about ordinary people and their ordinary lives. The participants in everyday politics are the vast majority, a group that transcends class or religious boundaries. Unfortunately, the government and many political scientists think that politics is about power relations among state institutions and social groups, between the rulers and the ruled.

There are two definitions, each quite but not entirely different, of everyday politics. First is that of Boyte (2005), who defines everyday politics as interconnectedness between ordinary people in everyday life to react to and resolve social and political problem instead of forming groups in opposition to the state. This definition includes

voluntary associations, which engage in social work, as well as activities relating to elections. Civil involvement in the public sector is also an element of everyday politics, which the government should support. This notion is similar to those of Tacquiveil, Putnam and Fukuyama concerning civic virtue, social capital and voluntary organizations in shaping and reshaping government policies. In the context of America and Europe, such values are vital components of a healthy democracy. Other scholars who stress civic connectedness include Paul Ginsborg and Jeffrey Goldfarb.

The second definition for everyday politics is that of Benedic Kirkvleit (2005:232), as follows:

“Everyday politics involves people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct. Key to everyday politics’ differences from official and advocacy politics is it involves little or no organization, is usually low profile and private behavior, and is done by people who probably do not regard their actions as political. It can occur in organizations, but everyday politics itself is not organized.”³⁸

This definition is quite important in view of the widespread nature of agrarian society in Southeast Asia and in Yogyakarta. Kirkvleit makes a clear distinction between conventional politics and everyday politics. Conventional politics is divided into two types: official politics and advocacy politics. Official politics are authorities and organizations, while advocacy politics are "direct and concerted." Meanwhile, everyday politics is a new term that recognizes the role of a third group of actors who are indirect and unorganized.

³⁸ Ben Kerkvleit has published several books related to rebellion, resistance, and everyday politics since 1986. The fact that he focuses on Southeast Asia distinguishes his work from that of Boyte.

Scholars who divide political affairs into strata, such as Weber (1919), typically justify doing so due to the existence of social structures, such as in Yogyakarta where society is divided into levels that can be described in pyramidal form. The top layer is the political elite who are the smallest minority, the second layer is the educated middle class and lowest layer is the majority of ordinary people. In general, the middle class work as entrepreneurs, researchers, academics, and activists in the NGO movement, which is connected with the outside world as well as government policy makers. Meanwhile, residents at the bottom of the pyramid are ordinary people, often referred to as the proletariat (by Marxists), the underprivileged (*kawulo*), the grassroots (*wong cilik*), and/or marginalized groups. In Southeast Asia, this group includes farmers who live in rural or mountainous areas separated from the city and 'civilization.' For this reason, they often become victims of development and modernization.

Conventional politics, as defined by Kirkvleit with regards to Indonesia, refers to formal politics, the political state and its relation to actors at the middle level, such as civil society organizations. Meanwhile, everyday politics itself is what is called the informal or extra-political parliament: individual expressions at the grassroots level which are in fact vague, especially in a dictatorial regime or under colonial domination. In the case of Vietnam, to give one example described by Kerkvliet, individuals acted in response to policies adopted by the authoritarian communist government. In this study, I ask whether everyday politics in a transitional democracy would disappear or transform into conventional politics.

In short, everyday politics are part of the everyday political reality by which individuals react to social, economic and political factors in indirect, unorganized, and

symbolic manners, often without expectations of the impact of the changes it may cause. This behavior can be a symptom of class struggle or non-class struggle. In Indonesia, records of such behavior exist in the stories of the ancient kingdom, and have continued during the colonial era, the old order, Suharto's New Order, and even at times when the system of government reform has been experiencing transition to a new system of democracy. The practice of everyday politics as described by Kerkvliet existed in Javanese communities at least as early as the 8th century, as marked by the Javanese adage, '*nglurug tanpa bala, Menang tanpa ngasurake*' which means that forms of resistance not based on organizing may simply be done individually (Herusatoto 2003).

Thus, I will argue that the everyday politics of ordinary people may contribute to both local politics and national features of politics, and that scholars should pay closer attention to local trends rather than national, though in fact the tendency is to do the opposite. Various national problems remain unresolved concerning democratization, institutional change and design, and identity conflict among society and in state-society relations. I argue that this is because we have never seriously tried to understand the everyday politics of ordinary people. Moreover, conventional politics typically fails to understand that power exists in everywhere and that the definition of "politics" cannot be monopolized by certain groups within society either literally or substantially.

Since the 1970s, Indonesia has been governed by a planned development regime with an ambition to establish a uniform society, regardless of what people want, which has created plenty of social, economy and political problems at the grassroots level. For example, the imposition of the green revolution, of state ideologies, and of decentralization including the proposal for gubernatorial elections in Yogyakarta are

types of centrally planned initiatives that led to popular resistance. The government faces difficulty using the logic of democracy in a way that forces people to leave the roots of democracy that have been maintained for hundreds of years to be replaced with a modern constitution that the government has planned. In addition, Indonesia has declared itself as the “Pancasila State”—the multiculturalism state. Of course, noble values will not be easily shifted to constitutional democracy.

2. The Concept of Power and Democracy in Everyday Lives in Yogyakarta

2.1. The Concept of Power

Aside from the standard meaning of "political might," power is defined differently in different cultural communities. People think that power in Asian communities is always the same number (i.e., a zero sum game), concrete, absolute, and undivided. In the West, however, power is distributed and abstract (Anderson 1984) and associated with the concepts of "influence" and "authority." Sources for legitimacy of power vary, as Weber has said, and may be obtained through inheritance (traditional), through ability (charismatic), or through constitutional processes (legal-formal). One of the differences between traditional and modern power lies in the locus of power. Power in the modern era is located outside of the ruler in the form of a constitutional mandate of the people and thus is more prone to be moved or transferred. While the Old Javanese literature mentions that power is in itself a ruler as "revelation" (*pulung*) or obtained from the magic power and forged intensively studied, the concept of power in Javanese society is of course growing and changing according from the dynamics of the absolute into a pluralist model.

The more modern a society, the more power is divided. Traditional, inherent power is a symbol of the ruler, but the substance is abstract because it is basically the power of everyone around the 'center' of the power. Then, how can power be monopolized? According to Weber, power is divided into two types, namely coercive power and hegemonic power. Two properties of this rule also has an antidote that is the power inherent in the controlled group. Power that is spread over many people can be violent or soft, manifest or latent. A king or ruler is actually very vulnerable. People nearby may be a threat to the individual monarch. Due to the weak nature of this power, the king is presumed to have supernatural powers to anticipate resistance. Presidents and prime ministers, for example, now must have spies, military strength, and various tools of modern technology.

The above explanation can also apply to Yogyakarta. Efforts to eliminate the 'centralized' power of Sri Sultan HB X as a cultural leader (king) and as a political authority (governor) have been unsuccessful because the power of the King is centralized only when seen from the outside. In reality, it is actually not so centralized. The formation of power in Yogyakarta is actually spread, as other regions are distinguished only by the existence of the two kingdoms. As a consequence, the cultural dynamics of Yogyakarta are more prominent than is the case in other areas. Cultural groups who are loyal to the palace can be a separate political force in certain situations. Since loci of real power in Yogyakarta are interdependent and mutually balancing, they are not easily toppled by outside forces. Thus, for example, rebellions are unlikely in the community without exploitation that results in a crisis situation.

Research on the concept of power of Javanese society has been conducted by many scholars including Geertz (1976), Anderson (1972), Mulder (1999), Magnis-Suseno (1997), and Moedjanto (1990). One difference from this existing literature and the present study is that I have rejected the thesis that power in Java, even in the pre-modern period, was centralized and unitary. The spread of power in Javanese tradition clearly shows a confluence of forces that were recruited by the king or Sultan at the time. Even now, in the monarchy of the kingdom of Yogyakarta there is a hierarchy of power. In contemporary Javanese society, all individuals have the potential to use political power as an individual or group at any time and under any circumstances (see Havel 1985).

In many ways, the concept of the power in Java is often misunderstood due to the domination of the national Old Order and New Order regimes by the Javanese. The leadership style of *Daulat Tuanku*³⁹ adopted after the downfall of Suharto was the key element of criticism by the Javanese monarch, strongly de-legitimizing the dominance of Suharto who had hidden behind Javanese culture when attempting to implement New Order authoritarianism. On May 20, 1998, in front of millions of people, Sultan HB X gave a speech which included the following quote (cited in by Mark Woodward 2011:229):

"Hamengku means to give more than you receive. Hamengku means to act as a loving parent, giving peace, protection and security to the heart. Regardless of how much state power it is given, Kraton Yogyakarta has a strong desire to be a lamp in the center of society with the values, vision and history of leadership. Suharto ruled the nation with a concept of political leadership rooted in Javanese culture, that of Yogyakarta. However, in many cases he acted on the basis of his personal interpretation."

³⁹ *Daulat Tuanku* is a concept of the Javanese Kingdom which means that the King's statement strongly influence people to do or not to do something, but Suharto adopted it as '*Asal Bapak Senang*' (ABS, literally meaning doing something in order to make one's boss happy), and used it to oppress the people.

The idea of power in Javanese society as something passed down from generation to generation is a form of legitimacy for power that comes from tradition. Because the kingdom of Yogyakarta has existed within the modern State (as a state within a state) since 1945, the king's power was handed over to the republic. Nonetheless, the king retained certain powers such as land tenure, culture, and regional leadership. The Javanese tend to accept the symbolic leadership of such a formal leadership model, and the community respects the king as the sovereign rather than as a governor. Some, however, have reached a new understanding of the governor as king, and king as governor. This expression is strongly held by the 'culturalists', or cultural fundamentalists, and it is a clear sign that ideal concepts of leadership and experience in Java are developing and adjusting to concepts of modern power. Basic elements of *bebarap* cannot be changed easily, though. According to Sasmino (1998) and Mudjanto (1996), the Javanese ideal of leader is the leader of 'the Great Binatara.' Sasmino interpreted this as a model of leadership that does not concentrate on how to act, and that does not involve an opposition winning majority support to gain power, but instead realizes the possible configurations of representative leadership that could accommodate various interests groups. This is symbolized by the phrases "the throne to the people" (Sultan HB IX), and "uphold the throne for the People" (Sultan HB X), so that the Javanese king is seen as guarding a life of harmony and wisdom for the welfare of the people. If a political system runs well, people will not care whether it is a monarchy, democracy, or a socialist state.

One of the most striking differences that is often raised concerns the existence of a mystical form of power in Java that cannot be accepted by liberal Western thought.

Belief in the existence of other dimensions of life in the universe often leaves a question mark for contemporary political analysts. On the other hand, occult practices in the struggle for positions of power in the democratic era are still highly visible across Indonesia. For example, before presidential and legislative elections, local election candidates and supporters generally engage in rituals to ask the blessings of deceased ancestors by providing offerings in places considered sacred. In addition, on the day of voting one must take care concerning things that are not propitious, for example, how one walks outside the house, the color of one's clothing, and so on, to avoid certain things which could result in losing confidence. Not surprisingly, such beliefs influence attitudes and outlooks in Java concerning local developments to address political and economic uncertainty. Javanese ethics (Magnis-Suseno 1997), in my opinion, require special attention in the study of everyday politics to ascertain the character of symbolic behavior. It is disorganized and inherent in the everyday lives of Javanese individuals, and this is reflected in many individual behaviors when reacting to a new order, as the Javanese attempt to maintain a local culture protected from foreign hegemony. Democracy is in this view potentially a tool for Western-style dictatorship.

In 2002, Inpedham (the Institute for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights) conducted the study using a combination of surveys, field studies and research documents about the "power of the Sultan Palace Resonance In The Era of Democratic Society" (Kompas, 6/25/2002) and found evidence that the radius of the royal power was still strong. For example, citizens of the South Mountain districts and in rural areas had high loyalty rates toward the palace (i.e., meaning that they indicated they were willing to be led by the Sultan). Another measurement of loyalty is the existence of good manners,

language, and ways of communicating (Faruk 2002) as well as participation in customs and culture (Pratikno et al. 2008).

In line with these findings, previous survey results conducted by PJ Suwarno in the 1990s showed a similar pattern.⁴⁰ The latest survey, conducted by Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) in 2011, concluded that the Kingdom still has a strong support base within village community. This demonstrated that the highest loyalty of people was among Gunungkidul residents (99%),⁴¹ who live far away from the Palaces. The strength of the Sultan's influence may lie in his ability to combines traditional power with rational legitimacy. Accumulation of power can bolster legitimacy, as also described by Weber in *Politics as Vocation* (1919), which divides types of legitimacy into traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. In short, by combining the three types of legitimate power, the Sultan is not easily removed, though slogans signal popular commitments to the contrary, such as "Pejah Gesang Nderek Sultan" (Loyalty is only in the removal of the Sultan), "golong gilig, seiweg proyo Saiko," (The unity of all people), "manunggaling kawulo lan gusti" (Unity between the people and the Leader). This model has been followed by both Sultan HB IX (1945-1988) and Sultan HB X (1998-present) in their positions as governor of Yogyakarta.

Bayu (2002) further describes the influence of the palace based on surveys and interviews with a total of 2,100 respondents, the results of which collectively indicate the strong resonance of the palace of Yogyakarta with mystical energy, in the sense that people still trust in the spiritual power of shrines such as the South Sea, Mount Merapi,

⁴⁰ Survey tersebut menghasilkan temuan bahwa sekitar 80-90% rakyat Yogyakarta masih setia kepada kepemimpinan Keraton Yogyakarta.

⁴¹ Sumber: makalah presentasi Hasil survey yang dilakukan Ilmu Pemerintahan UMY tahun 2011 juga dalam Kedaulatan Rakyat, 2011.

Flower Lampir, Turgo, monument, etc., all of which are typically believed by respondents to have a mystical relationship with the palace (Kompas, 6/25/2002). In fact, such beliefs are also justified by residents outside the province of Yogyakarta, including Pacitan, East Java and certain part of Central Java (regions previously part of the kingdom of Mataram). Mythical popular legitimacy thus plays an important role for the leadership of the king in the tradition of Javanese power, and the palace's power resonates in rational and pragmatic dimensions, including through managerial skills, attitudes, democratic and populist values, and tolerance. The palace is seen, in the popular mind, as open and accommodating to the various demands of the times.

This is apparently the opposite of Anderson's thesis on the concept of power in Javanese palaces, where it says that power is like a light bulb, with a power source (the palace), with greater influence and degree of loyalty in direct relation to proximity. Indeed, one of the most critical groups of the palace complex is right near the palace itself, a community of students in Kauman Muhammadiyah who are also part of the power of the Sultan Palace. A community leader of Budi Setiawan, named Kauman, expressed disapproval in my interviews with him that the Sultan could automatically become governor for life. Setiawan is a modern Islamic activist organization, but he did not use the organization's opposition to form an organization to fight the domination of the Palace. He only expressed a personal opinion and did not express a wish to mobilize the masses. This type of behavior is common among many people in Yogyakarta. In a study of Javanese culture, such behavior gives proper attention to traditional ethical behavior in Java, where priority is given to peace (harmony) and avoiding chaos (social disorder), thereby mitigating direct confrontation with the institutions concerned.

2.2. Democracy, “Demokrasi”, and “Democracy”

In general, people do not understand the true origins of the word democracy (in the Indonesian language it is written as 'demokrasi'). Most members of the grassroots know that the idea of democracy was introduced from the outside and is not rooted in the original culture. This is often considered to be negative, due to the oppressive ways in which democratic ideals have been manipulated by politicians, such that in everyday life people often say that democracy is equivalent to "democracy." This cynical phrase is deeply ingrained in the minds of ordinary people, small traders, and local community organizations, especially in light of media saturation of the concept of democracy since Suharto stepped down. In the New Order era, democracy was spoken of only once every five years, as the legitimacy of the corrupt and authoritarian government of Indonesia was touched up for international eyes to highlight supposed progress in democracy. Given the rampant corruption, money politics, black campaign tactics, and intense violence associated with democracy, the word now carries a negative connotation, as does the word liberal in the ears of the lower class. Members of the grassroots are jaded by "politics," a term used to refer to people who are always looking for advantage in a bad situation.

Regardless of the origins of the literal definition of 'democracy,' people in Yogyakarta are skeptical when they are apparently forced to understand that democracy means that all people have equal rights to directly elect their leaders. For ordinary people, such a right is not something that needs to be changed, but rather it is the implementation of obligations among leaders that concerns them. They also intuitively hold positions that it is impossible for all people have equal rights. Community members are bound by rules,

ethics, norms, and customary laws that restrict the rights of each individual. The values of liberal democracy are thus rejected by most people in the region. In line with Najib (2011), the understanding of democracy in Yogyakarta is seen as a freedom to choose limits. The meaning of democracy is freedom, but this freedom is limited by the freedoms of others. Democracy is not something that ordinary people debate when considering the meaning of everyday community life; instead they focus on a situation called *adem-ayem* (peace and harmony) as the hopes and desires of the community take priority over the issues of privilege and democracy itself. When conventional political actors argue about freedom of speech, the lower social classes enjoy the freedom to join or not join associations in their neighborhoods, a clear sign to them of *ipso facto* freedom, and thus they do not care about the specific form of governance. Such activities of meaning-making are collectively considered by Goldfarb (2006) as the power of definition in everyday life, where people derive value from their individual understanding, though conflict with the values of the regime in power may apply. Civil liberties, in such a situation, have an impact under a regime of "dictatorship" because the rulers must adjust to a common definition in the community they govern.

Growing discourse on the meaning of democracy in Yogyakarta, especially by the educated middle class, defines democracy as the people's power (*vox populi vox dei*) where people have to determine all forms of governance and policy. Ordinary people privately agree with this concept but hold a slightly different interpretation. For the ordinary people of the Javanese (*kawulo*), the concepts of democracy, socialism or capitalism are not as important as the need for leaders who can nurture and provide spiritual and physical tranquility through a figure who holds a position of supreme leader

as *Agung Binatara* (Sasminto 1998). This expectation is congruent with the traditional leadership in the palace of Yogyakarta. As a consequence, they prefer the traditional monarchy system, which they see as a part of their lives rather than Western democracy which they do not necessarily see as providing for the common good. Democracy is regarded as equivalent to free market capitalism, which is regarded as a serious threat to the continuity of culture, identity, and proper allocation of economic resources in the local community.

2.3. Politics and the Identity of Special Status under RUUKY

In general, lower-class people view politics as something remote from them. Politics are often conceived as a struggle for power at the top level in the center of the State. This understanding of the circumstances is based on recognition, first and foremost, of defeat in the struggle for economic resources. This is in line with Lasswell who defines politics as the process of ‘who gets what and how’ in the power struggle for economic and political resources. Common people in Yogyakarta tend to identify themselves as objects rather than subjects in politics. As a consequence, they are often passive and indifferent to political discourse in the mass media on national and local issues. Some people have started to realize that the prevailing system of government today is a complex relationship between central and local governments, and there is often tension in identity-based and religious politics, but ordinary people are neither organized nor vocal, so their views are often not taken into account.

Yogyanese citizens realize that they have a clear identity based on a shared history as subjects of the Javanese Kraton traditional rulers. Their limited economic resources are seen as collectively owned by the kingdom. Culturally, they participate in

the wider Javanese society, with its inherent symbolism that regulates the relations of power (Woodward 1989, 2011; Mulder 2005). However, political problems can not be separated from trusted sources of power. With the belief that the community has kept an atmosphere of deep calm and harmony both socially and politically under traditional governance, the RUUKY (Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta) is seen as being at the center of a debate on the importance of local identity and the foundations of the constitutional privileges of DIY at the conventional political level. The local elite do not actively invite the general public to get involved in this legislative issue. For the underprivileged, it is a matter of law and is seen as too complicated and far removed from daily activities. This is likewise reflected by the behavior of people in everyday life who choose the traditional processes, such as family-based mediation, to solve social or criminal problems rather than formal legal proceedings.

The substance of local identity mentioned above is often displaced by the discourse of political elites in national and local media and public spaces. Some interpretations of new identity value Yogyakarta's political potential rather than its cultural values. This is shown in discourses arguing, for example, that Yogyakarta should be guaranteed its special status under law; that the land controlled by the kingdom is reserved for use by the people under the slogan "Throne For the People;" that the heroism of the revolutionary struggle of the people of Yogyakarta and the king of HB IX confers legitimacy; and that forms of multiculturalism and loyalty to the nation unique to Yogyakarta should be seen as expressing cultural nationalism in ways that should be appreciated by the government and people of Indonesia. This construction of identity is not well understood by most members of the grassroots. Construction of identity and

substantive knowledge of these political debates are used by community groups and political advocates in negotiating with the central government or the opposition parties in order to lobby for RUUKY. The same topics of discourse concerning local identity are meanwhile opposed by NGO groups that advocate for liberal democracy and wish for a change in governance in Yogyakarta.

3. Understanding Everyday Politics in Yogyakarta's Communities

Of a population in Indonesia of approximately 237.6 million people, the Javanese account for one third of this total (BPS 2010). The island of Java alone accounts for approximately 116 million, while the population of Yogyakarta is about 3.46 million. However, Java itself is not homogeneous. People often narrowly suggest that Java is culturally a combination of Mataram, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta, and foreign scholars generally agree that these areas are the "heart of Javanese culture." (Mulder 2005, Anderson 1983, Geertz 1964). On the other hand, there is a stereotyped idea of an attempt to "Javanize Indonesia" (Mulder 2005:45) due to the domination of the national government by the Javanese, as well as the predominance of Javanese in the national elite. Moreover, Javanese cosmology links the real and invisible nature symbolized of through an imaginary straight line between the mountain-pillar trim Krapyak-palace-stage and the southern ocean. This is where the sacred island of Java, it is believed, had its glorious history (Woodward 1989, Beek 1990, Smithies 1986, Janutama 2009). Such an understanding makes individuals reluctant to move toward modernization or secularization, and even tend to have a situation of involution. Secretly they therefore reject the mechanism of democracy in local elections, because democracy is not for those

who can change their lives, but of the unseen, the blessings of the ancestors to achieve spiritual and physical peace.

In Yogyakarta, everyday politics in the periods before and after the 1998 reforms saw change, continuation and locally-driven dynamics. From 1945 to 1997, no single organization raised the issue of privilege, since the central government had never intervened with the local leadership until the fall of Suharto. The existence of cultural practices demonstrating loyalty to the traditions of society legitimated local power, which may explain why the central government did not dare to challenge the monarchy in Jogjakarta when the country adopted guided democracy, constitutional democracy (under Sukarno), or Pancasila democracy (under Suharto). Political and economic developmental projects sponsored by the state during the Old Order and New Order regimes did not have significant impacts on the Yogyakarta Special Region. Cultural expressions that were part of the everyday politics of people ensured a calm and peaceful society, reducing the central government's ambitions to impose liberal democracy in Yogyakarta.

Expansion of mass media, technology, and literacy in Java, and especially in Yogyakarta, is a separate thread of discontinuity that has shaped ideas and opinions on government policy. In terms of communication, according to Soemardjan (1977), political communications were no longer monopolized by the village administrative agencies with the government as a super ordinate hierarchy, while the rural people exchanged information by word of mouth. After the reform period commenced, we have seen an explosion of two-way communications (top-down and bottom-up) in the policy making process at the local level. Both types of communication (word-of-mouth versus

public discourse) coexist in rural areas in Indonesia, although Yogyakarta has undergone significant changes in the last decade. In a period of limited means of communication, everyday politics can be found in the myriad informal opportunities among citizens. Local authorities have been dominant in advocating via administrative channels effectively as to what should or should not be done. Another effective channel for guiding the activities of ordinary people is informal leaders. Now, ordinary people also have a chance to ask the leaders of political parties and local candidates about their views on everyday issues.

In the context of Indonesia, everyday politics can be observed in both rural and urban social groups, among farmers, artists and modern believers in mystical faiths. It is a misconception that everyday politics in Indonesia belong only to farming communities, or that such politics require limited economic resources or weak political power. Scott has argued that the poor can resist or advocate only in ways that are covert, indirect, symbolic, no collective, and mostly unorganized. The reality is that people with higher education have a mature knowledge of democracy yet still choose this path as an expression of everyday politics when responding to broader political issues.

Forms of expression in everyday politics are strongly influenced by an individual's background, including location (rural, subsistence peasant village, or suburban), educational level (low or high educational degree) socioeconomic status (upper class, middle, or lower class), and an understanding of ideology and culture (modern or traditional; rationalist, 'culturalist' or conservative). Therefore, I divide my analysis of everyday politics here broadly into four groups, namely: (1) traditional agrarian societies, represented by some communities or individuals that in fact they are

farming communities, (2) cultural groups in urban communities, (3) spiritual groups of artists and mystics in urban communities, and (4) middle class society (modern Islam) as represented by Muhammadiyah members.

3.1. Everyday Politics in Agrarian Communities

I chose one of the agrarian areas in the Western part of Yogyakarta province named Bugel Coastal Area in the region of Southern Kulon Progo. During my visit I conducted several informal talks with local people in the street, including peddlers, fishermen, and peasants. This rural area, about nine kilometers long, faces many issues relating to land use, industrialization, environment, and of course the local elections which were being held during my visit. The day I visited was the day of local elections for Bupati in Kulon Progo. I knew that this area had faced conflicts between local people and the government regarding plans for industrialization in this area. The provincial governor had already approved this plan, and the local government had begun to implement it. Actually, this plan has been established by the government quite long time ago under Hamengkubuwono IX in the 1980s in order to forge a better future for the area, which had seen less economic development compared to other regions in Yogyakarta (Roem et al. 2011:134). This planned development was based on research conducted by a university to measure the local concentration of iron in the local sand, found to be equal to that of the Cilacap coast. At that time, PT Aneka Tambang had offered to take up the industrialization project. "If this project can be implemented soon, with a 50-year deposit, say, it will change the people's lives for the better in Yogyakarta and in general," said Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, former governor of DIY. Nonetheless, the local people objected to the project for both economic and environmental reasons.

In 2010 and 2011, protest events relating to this issue were conducted against the local and provincial governments. Local citizens struggled to keep their land and reject the displacement of more than one hundred peasant families. Violent tactics were practiced by the government and its local gangsters as well as by the local people. After one protester was sent to jail, the common people went back to the field to continue planting vegetables, and it seemed like they would have nothing to do with political issues. Basically, they are peasants and subsistence farmers who use their income to pay for their children's educations and barter for other daily needs. Although they had seen bumper harvests during the last two years, their happiness was muted by the threat of the provincial development project. PT Jogja Magasa Minang led the mining project through a family business related to the Sultanate, which claimed land ownership through historical legitimacy. There are several types of landowner in Yogyakarta: the Sultanate grounds and Pakualam's grounds owned by the two Kingdoms, private ownership, and the state ownership. Local people also claim the land as their own as traditionally handed down from their ancestors.

At the time of elections, I visited together with a friend to monitor the process and gauge how enthusiastic the affected people were regarding the industrialization plan and the local elections. Based on my direct monitoring, it was clear that the farmers were not enthusiastic about the elections, and some of them were in the fields before the voting had started. During the day, many farmers continued to work as usual, which made sense given that their plants require irrigation more than three times per day. Several times I asked to speak to farmers, but there was reluctance to talk to an outsider. Their suspicions may be due to the fact that in the months prior, groups had visited the

area to spy on the activities of farmers who had refused to support the mining project. Most of them were members of the farmer's community under the name PPLP (The association of coastal peasant society, Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pasir), while some preferred other forms of individual expression. Some farmers stated that they felt more secure by combining their resources in an organization, but others thought the opposite. At least two cars had been burnt and one of the protesters had been sent to jail on charges of terror. I interviewed six different people around the farm area before and after I observed to the polls.

I first encountered and spoke with food vendors in the agricultural area. They turned out to be supporters of one party's nationalist wing, the PDI-P. I noticed that they had just cast their ballots for the local election. Their tone was clear that they supported the iron sand mining plan, and even stated that local farmers should take their share of the profits, especially considering that the land was ultimately owned by the Kingdom. Since I could converse in the local language, one respondent shared his views quite freely, expansively remarking on the positive impacts of the industry if mining were to be developed in the area. To be honest, not everyone was willing to talk about the evictions relating to the industrial project. When I read and took pictures of the protest writings along the street advocating against the iron sand mining plan, people looked at me with suspicious faces. Most of them would say they knew nothing about the matter, if I tried to chat. I concluded from this that it was a highly sensitive issue, as my friend had advised before I went into the field. The tones expressing resistance were in writing on the street; people used different media for expression, especially younger and literate farm boys, while older people generally do not express their opinions in public.

Shortly after that, I went to the voting booth in the village, which contained about seven polling stations. It seemed that quite a few people had not voted, and my guess is that families who would be affected by the sand mining boycotted the election, possibly also as an expression of solidarity with one of their friends who had been sent to prison. However, the local elections committee, when asked about who did not vote, said those not participating were not farmers but rather citizens who had migrated away from the area. There was some form of protest or boycott; I observed from the writings and rumors in the community that such a boycott might indeed have happened, and one young man approached me to admit that the group of farmers most likely did not vote. The number of people participating in the regent elections in Kulon Progo district especially in the polling station of Bugel village can be seen as follows:

Table 4.1: Voting Behavior in Local Election, Kulon Progo

No.	Polls Station	Number of voters	Present	Absent	Broken Ballot	Total	The highest vote/candidate
1	I	532	265	267	79		no. 2
2	II	508	369	139	147		no. 2
3	III	532	409	123	151		no. 2
4	IV	478	380	98	167		no. 2
5	V	502	332	170	118		no. 2
6	VI	498	359	139	119		no. 2
7	VII	386	308	78	105		no.2

The number two candidate actually the weaker one politically and economically but they seems pro-people those who will be replaced by the provincial and local government. I tried to clarify this data directly with the farmers I met in the fields. Most of them claimed to have voted, but even when I observed them at the polls means, they may very well have come to vote or might have not. Of the five candidates approved, almost all would make the iron sands mining project more difficult, so it would make sense that they should go to vote, but based on the percentages of votes, the ruling party

(incumbent) supported by the Kraton family received fewer votes in the seven polling locations than the new candidates did.

Relating to public opinions regarding the status of land and the iron mining plan, I quote directly from one interview with a farmer as follows:

D: Excuse me, I heard that in this area a big company will be established to exploit the sand, called pasir Besi?

P: (not responding for a while), ...local people reject it, so what can they do. If you want to know, see the company over there, but people reject it.

D: Pardon me, according to them, including the government and political party here, all of this land is owned by the Sultanate and Pakualaman family. Is that true?

P: (Their face changed suddenly and I just tried to give them time...they continued watering their vegetables and seemed to ignore me) ...the genealogy of this land has also come from our own ancestors for hundreds of years. We used it as usual and we will keep it as long as we can...

Due to this is a sensitive issue, they were not friendly to me, and I shifted to another topic. They also refused to talk about the actual issue on the special status of Yogyakarta and they were saying did not care at all: "...We are ordinary people (wong kecil), doing our activities as subsistence peasants, which is already difficult...as wong cilik we do jobs like this and nothing else." Regarding local elections in Kulon Progo, they were also reluctant to talk to me, and I heard from the people at the polling stations that the peasants might be not participate in the voting because there were no political parties or head of district candidates that represent them directly. Some of them said that

they did go to cast a ballot, but really there is no other alternative way, so perhaps they were thinking to decide which course of action would have the least detrimental impact. For them, to go voting or not would lead to the same thing in different ways, and they expected no impact from their votes.

What do we can learn from this story to understand everyday politics? As I mentioned before, language and symbols are two important things to consider regarding the everyday politics of the Javanese, especially in traditional farming communities. An indirect character, which is dominant in daily behavior, makes the phenomenon of class struggle quite subtle. The number of political expressions and the cultural diversity within the community of Jogjanese raises special concerns regarding language and symbolic behavior in Javanese culture, which have been studied in the disciplines of history and anthropology. Ordinary people in rural areas have not realized their power and authority to make changes. Even if they are reluctant to be known by others, obviously they are often the deciding factor when it comes to political stability and sustainability of local authority, both traditional and modern (as shown in the case with the planned development). Stories of social rejection unfolded indirectly in projects relating to the green revolution in Indonesia as well as in connection with the implementation of family planning programs. Due to the indirect nature of these activities, however, researchers are often not interested in looking at this phenomenon.

Everyday politics in Yogyakarta can be interpreted via two roots: language and symbolic behavior. First is the language of "enggeh ora kepanggeh," which is a form of expressing that what is said and what was done are not the same. In front of someone with authority it may be necessary to say "yes" that one will do or not do something, as a

response to a command, but in practice no action may be the ultimate result. The second is the idea of *bumbung kosong*⁴² in reference to a sign of "local democracy." This has become a commonplace phenomenon in Java when electing or selecting local leaders for the past several decades. If there is only a single candidate in an election, then there must be a candidate who can fill the option of *bumbung kosong*, thus providing an opportunity for individuals who do not like the candidate to check an empty box, which practice is categorized in Indonesia as a "non-vote" (Yusron 2009). The phenomena of resistance, confrontation and disagreement in the absence of organized opposition have existed at least since the Dutch and Japanese colonial eras (Sartono Kartodirjo 1984, Houben 2002, Yusron 2009).

Inevitably, mass media has played a major role in shaping the opinions of ordinary people's responses to the transition of political systems that has been ongoing since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. The presence of such media can help us understand the voices of the majority of ordinary people at the grassroots level, but it could also mask the true reality. Therefore, we cannot try to see the dynamics of everyday life based simply on media reports alone; we must be mindful of the limitations and shallowness of news coverage. In Yogyakarta itself, partial acceptance of the idea of democracy started with the merger of the two kingdoms of Yogyakarta and Pakualaman into the community of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) on 5 September 1945, an event that has been popularized as the "Ijab-qabul" ('Political Contract').

At first, ordinary people received information related to local politics indirectly, namely through the channels of daily social interaction and also from various cultural

⁴² Literally this means an empty box as an alternative choice on the ballot.

activities. Now, however, symbols of grassroots political expression can be broadcast in local or national news in coverage of elections, presidential candidates, and local policies relating to aspects of everyday life such as agriculture, plantations, the UMR, and family planning issues. With the growth of the media, ordinary people like farmers, fishermen and others are interviewed in the news, and some local media even have specific pages for the delivery of grassroots aspirations. For example, the local newspaper *Kedaulatan Rakyat*⁴³ in Yogyakarta has the motto "The voice of the grassroots," and other newspapers are almost certain to include at least some pieces expressing such a perspective in their letters to the editor sections. Information disseminated to the lower classes in Yogyakarta is largely determined by the print and video mass media. The issue of the privileged status of Yogyakarta has been daily news in the local newspaper *Kedaulatan Rakyat* from 1998 to 2011, with about 1,300 pieces of news related to the issue published in the national daily, *Kompas*.⁴⁴

3.2. Everyday Politics in Urban and Suburban Areas

The city is an arena of class struggle between the haves and the have nots, among the upper, middle and lower classes. Nonetheless, the business class (middle class both Islam and Chinese group) dominates economic resources in the post-Suharto era of liberalization. In Yogyakarta, the poor may occupy the land of Sultan and Pakualam as long as they want, because there is enough land for them, but they cannot sell it or own it.

⁴³ *Kedaulatan Rakyat* (KR), which literally means 'The People's Sovereignty,' is a daily newspaper in Yogyakarta established by H. Samawi and H. Soemadi Martono Wonohito. The first edition of the newspaper was published on September 27, 1945. KR is a daily newspaper with 16 pages in its early editions. Recently, KR has become one of the largest newspapers in Yogyakarta and Southern Central Java, with a circulation of 125,000 copies per day.

⁴⁴ *Kompas* began publication on June 28, 1965, from an office in central Jakarta, with an initial circulation of 4,800 copies. Since 1969, it has been the largest national newspaper in Indonesia. In 2004, its daily circulation reached 530,000 copies, and its Sunday edition, 610,000 copies. Readership totals some 2.25 million (*Kompas* Data Base 2011).

As a result, economic competition is remarkably challenging for many in Yogyakarta. The lower class may be loyal to the Sultanate, and they may be strong supporters to the movement for special status, but they may remain covert in showing their support or opposition. In contrast, the upper class and middle class are less loyal to the Sultanate and the Palace but for some political goals they may try to show their support publicly and privately.

Although the typology of the urban and rural communities has a noticeable difference regarding the intensity and diversity of information received in terms of everyday politics, there is certain regularity, as described by Kerkvleit (2011), in that attitudes and expressions are generally not delivered directly. Interviewees are reluctant to speak in public, because they think their opinions will offend other people who have different opinions. The option to *memilih diam* (prefer to keep silent) is quite noticeable, especially in rural communities when interviewees are faced with a stranger or someone who clearly has an opposite opinion. This choice is understandable, because Javanese culture strongly emphasizes the maintenance of harmony and social order in the community.

My findings indicate that urban individuals, in contrast to those in rural areas, have more diverse sources of information from friends, organizations, associations, and various mass media. As a result, they tend to dare to express their opinions. Such opinions may be tempered through subtle statements, however, or by using a variety of imagery. These forms of expressing disagreement are largely due to bitter experiences related to the practice of local government policies that favors them less. For example, the construction of modern supermarkets was not considered a policy that favored the

lower-class society. Moreover, in line with the findings of Selo Soemarjan (1977), Javanese communities are generally not ambitious to make revolutionary changes. In considering the patterns of thought still further, aspects of the past may affect what is happening in the present, while in Javanese culture there is only little concern about the future. The virtues of a democratic system that are promoted many groups are, thus, sometimes regarded as flights of the imagination that make little sense, because such experiences were not shared by the ancestors.

One late night, around midnight, I was running out of gasoline on my motorcycle in the palace complex and I stopped to buy some gas from the street vendors. Filling stations are one place in Yogyakarta where ordinary people gather to watch life or simply to discuss various matters relating to day-to-day affairs, including national political issues. I took the opportunity to chat informally. A man named Doel, a tire retailers and gasoline vendor, lived in Yogyakarta palace complex, because he has no fixed abode. Without prompting, he said that there had been mubeng action to support the determination of the governor's castle in Yogyakarta. He looks sinister with local political practices that have been less than impartial and says the supporters of the Sultan are people who have an interest to gain economic resources. He argues that times have changed, and that the interests of the aristocratic relatives and those of the royal family are no longer concerned with the people's interests (Interview with Doel, 06/07/2011). The same sentiments were also shared by a peddler who for 30 years had been selling drinks for international and domestic tourists at the Taman Sari complex. He said that the charisma and glory had come to an end since the death of HB IX in 1989. According to him, whoever serves as governor would not change the fates of the common people

(Interview with Gino, 05/07/2010). The two men mentioned above, however, did not express that they actively opposed the direct appointment of the governor. Similarly, Wigyo, a parking attendant at Jl. KH Dahlan, believed that the king did not need to be involved in politics, because the king is no less honorable position in the office of governor, and that political appointments are often contested in ways that are not truthful, for example, with money politics or black campaign tactics. According to him, the king as a figure of a charismatic leader should be careful to stay above political behavior. When asked regarding whether he supported the establishment, he was reluctant to comment and choose not argue at all. Such behavior makes it difficult to understand whether the palace still holds power, as groups may only quietly support, or even secretly no longer support, its hegemony.

Nonetheless, skepticism of the hegemony of the Palace does not mean that respondents would demand liberal democracy as such. Society is in transition, and whether the populace will ultimately choose liberal democracy or monarchy remains undecided. Respondents seem to know that Western democracy may have its disadvantages in a community-based society like Java. Official and civil society organizations claim that democracy will lead to better prosperity, but this is questioned by people privately and has led to discourse in local contexts in the everyday, informal lives of people. Muhammadiyah, for instance, has a diverse membership of mostly middle and educated class people, but these members have different opinions regarding the special privilege of the Sultan. Politically, they are not in the same affiliation or political party. Some are loyal to the Sultanate due to family connections and government association, and some are strongly critical of the Palace on cultural and political issues.

They are reluctant to organize and mobilize to express their opinions publicly in opposition to the local elites. Therefore, they individually and silently oppose the monarchical status of Yogyakarta. Based on my own notes, though they seemed to be organized, they are politically independent and do not organize themselves to achieve certain political objectives in their everyday politics.

In short, these four types of individuals in everyday political groups have a common ground with other groups. The typology of political advocacy groups and political officials in particular events, such festivals, elections, and movement activities regarding the privileged status of Yogyakarta, media, and also because of the day-to-day activities may also bring them in line.

For most people in Yogyakarta, the so-called silent majority, there is a cultural and historical consciousness of being Javanese and/or Jogjanese for decades or even generations. Although there may be groups of people who identify themselves as absolute loyalist, they are not interested in openly supporting the Sultanate as a political leader, as governor. They see themselves as servants of The King, because the King has divine right from Divine Power. As long as the King does not threaten their economic resources, they will think positively of the Sultan given their belief in the slogan *Manunggaling Kawulo Gusti* ('Unity between the People and the King'). For instance, an interviewee named Suprpto (60), who had been working as a street parking attendant for more than 20 years, felt that what he had gained as a Yogyanese was due to the willingness of the previous Sultan. The Sultan was believed to be a good and chosen leader, who would respond to his prayers and dreams. He also supports the movement for special status, yet he did not intend to participate in any demonstrations. My discussion with him showed

that one who has strong individual loyalist leanings may express their support but choose to identify only in an indirect way. When I was asked about democracy, he said he had no clear position but that he had a bad impression of democracy. Other respondents said simply that democracy “is not our culture” or that they were not the right person to talk about it. This may imply that local knowledge of democracy and its practices might be scant, but according to the interviews I conducted, democracy as a political ideology was understood as a modern and liberal slogan, which contrasted with what people actually wanted: political guarantees of social harmony and social order, safe communities, jobs, social connectedness, basic civil freedoms, and the like.

3.3. Everyday Politics in Javanese Mysticism

Yogyakarta is well-known as a syncretism community. I hypothesized that aspects of spirituality may be a common tool used by members of the lower class in the face of economic and political uncertainty during a period of globalization (Santoso 1999), modernization, and liberalization, where local institutions integrate with a global system. Public awareness is understood well by the King/governor of Yogyakarta as expressed many times, including in a speech in 2011 delivered when he received honorary doctorates at ISI Yogyakarta and UGM. However, the Sultan did not state that globalization was entirely bad. Instead he expressed that there is a necessity to develop a strategy to compete while staying true to traditions and local cultural identity. Some academics have made similar arguments, claiming that Javanese culture is not diametrically opposed to Western culture, and that it could be adapted without losing the characteristic ethos of Java. For example, in Javanese tradition, there is a saying, *Trimopam ing, ono sathithik dipangan sathithik* which teaches how one should accept

business risk and save money, a sentiment that is precisely in tune with the spirit of free trade in the West.

According to Rahmat (2004), aspects of ritual are actually just one person's religious attitudes. Traditions of spirituality also have other dimensions, including ideological, intellectual, and social consequences (Atmadja 2010:453). This is why cultural movements, such as anti-colonialism and the dominance of developmentalism as practiced in Indonesia, are often met with resistance and spiritual protests in the name of religious beliefs and ideology. When the Javanese rose against Suharto, one of the reasons for their solidarity was that they saw themselves as backed by the spiritual conviction that despotism had demeaned the power of Java and that the oppression of human culture must be confronted (see Woodward 2011, Maula 1999, Nusantara 1999), and that resistance was justified with the support of unseen powers. Javanese spiritual beliefs attached power to the divine workings of the Jagat Gede (the greater universe), which is always controlling the jagat cilik, or little universe (earth). One way to help authorities is to perform spiritual behaviors such as fasting, prayer, and offerings, so it is no wonder that the people of Yogyakarta secretly and independently perform rituals asking for help in order to be spared the adverse effects of liberal democracy.

The practice of mysticism is not only limited to those who are poorer and less powerful, but is also very popular among the middle class, including intellectuals and the military, as well as the aristocracy. This shows that mysticism can be organized or not organized, and it cuts across all social lines from the elite to the lowest classes. Ritual practices are not dominated by certain elite groups but can be done by anyone, regardless of social class and religion, showing that the revival of mysticism in the post-

independence era is a quest for cultural expression and day-to-day transition and changes of identity (Mulder 2001). For many, a spiritual interpretation of life is more important than the pursuit of what is to be held not far beyond himself. Search for meaning, it is believed, can come from within yourself through for example the process of psychotherapy. Mystical resurrection is also described as a reaction to uncertainty, abnormality and cultural disembodiedness (Kartodirjo 1973:5). In other words, the rise of post-liberalization spiritual, political and economic development in Indonesia is also part of a reaction to modernity and its adverse effects. Other scholars have stated that the rise of mystical thought in protest is a criticism of what is happening in the present (Subagyo 1973:126).

The emergence of political behaviors that are vague and do not directly refer to 'everyday politics' within the everyday lives of people may have a close relationship with the spiritual effects of repressive colonial political pressure, the new order regime, or even the post-new-order reforms that extend hegemony of power economically, in the production of knowledge, and in the cultural realm. In the colonial era and the repressive New Order era, the central authorities arguably had the power to oppress civil society and marginalized groups (farmers), so that they channeled residual strength for spiritual needs by joining communities that were apolitical. However, the political expressions of human beings cannot be denied; if government policies harm the viability of day-to-day life, people will fight for their own livelihoods. This is substantiated in the interviews I conducted, in which many individuals said they had never gone to the streets over national versus local political issues related to the privileged status of Yogyakarta, but in the end of 2010 they did so because they saw an threat to their spiritual connections.

They considered issues of privilege and the establishment of the Sultan as the non-elected governor as a relatively respected by people for decades. Many individuals have the same interests and want to keep the current system of traditional power and beliefs, but recently such kind of free markets, globalization, secularization, and economic pressures have been threatening such spiritual beliefs.

4. Conclusion: The Power of Everyday Politics

In Javanese communities, objection, disapproval, or complaints concerning the policies implemented by the state or by individual authorizes are typically not overtly rejected, nor is it common to take to the streets for demonstrations collectively. In Java, the technical terms "inggih ra kepanggeh" and "nglurug tanpa bala" are widely understood among the people. Unsurprisingly, in the case of support and challenges to the question of whether the Sultan should be named as the governor for life, or whether the governor should be elected periodically, this leads to many problems of interpretation. There is a Javanese tradition of "diam tanda setuju" (silence means agreement), but not all silence signals agreement. Moreover, survey research will not fully answer this question, because respondents to political surveys often just want to please the researcher by saying things that fit with what is expected as an appropriate response. Historically, in the practice of social interaction between the lower and upper classes in Java, such an environment is quite noticeable. The term "inggih ra kepanggeh" refers to a situation where an individual who faces a potentially conflicting relationship of any kind will provide answers which fit what the questioner or interviewer is perceived to expect, though it may in fact be just untrue. This behavior has cultural legitimacy on the basis of

the Javanese ethics of 'maintaining harmony and social order' rather than open and frontal opposition.

The reality of the 'silent majority' that exists in the Java community, led to political difficulties during the history of Indonesia, such as when the Dutch occupied the island of Java, because Javanese silence has diverse meanings including "yes/agree," "do not agree at all," or even "in between yes and no." The silent majority does not even deign to explain the meaning of their silence; as such behavior would be considered a disturbance of the tranquility of the heart and its environment. This expression can be seen from several cases that have occurred, such as for example the Samin community in Central Java, discussed by Benda and Castles (1969), and as another example Sultan HB IX's silence when the Dutch attacked the Republic of Indonesia which had declared its de facto independence. Again, in the case of the movement for the special status of Yogyakarta from 1998 to 2011, many people are not involved in the streets, but that does not entail they lack an opinion about this local issue, or that they agree or disagree about the appointment of the King as governor for life.

In the beliefs of the Yogyanese, the King has his own character of command ('titah') called 'seprapat tamat'— if a king's speech is not exhaustive, people can freely and individually interpret it. If they do not understand they may conduct a "tapa pepe" or "dede" in front of the palace to receive an explanation from their King (Janutama 2009:x), and such an action is equivalent to submitting an objection. This tradition is still practiced, but not because there is a dictatorial or oppressive form of government; instead it is to gain legitimacy from the local culture in which indirect demands are believed to be a noble value of the people. For example, in the largest popular movement in Yogyakarta

on 20 May, 1998, calling for the overthrow of Suharto, only about one million people participated (out of 3.4 million people). The mass activity known as the "Great Pisowanan Agung" (the Great Mass Gathering) was the largest crowd in the history of Yogyakarta. The lesson to be drawn is that the Java also has an indigenous concept of representation in conveying aspirations. To face a problem, if an opponent can be dealt with by one person, then it is not necessary to face the opponent with a thousand people (Interview with Gondo, spiritual activist, 1/8/2012). In ancient Javanese literature, this sentiment is expressed in the term 'nglurug tanpa bala,' to strike without collective force.⁴⁵

The political practices of the majority, who do not organize their claims, could counter the elite's claims on either side, to appointed governor for life or to hold elections. Often, quantity of support is the only valid measure for the potential of national or local policies, but the real quantity of the majority belongs to grassroots politics. The government itself has put faith in taking surveys to legitimate its policies. Various surveys have been conducted to determine the behavior and community support for the special privileges of Yogyakarta and for determining the appropriate setting for Yogyakarta's leadership. Unfortunately, it did not solve the problem because "the silent majority" has full control. Grassroots politics also has a dangerous character, as it is able to fight when there is massive pressure that endangers the interests of the common people and their culture but they remain silent if the government does not directly threaten the existence of the individual. Individuals who respond to political issues in relaxed and

⁴⁵ The term "*nglurug tanpa Bala*" itself has been popularized by a local singer, Marzuki, in a song titled "Jogja Istimewa". This is a hip-hop-like Song of Jogjakarta and its could be named as an official song of the Yogyakarta People's Movement in opposition to the central government. This song is quite popular due to its use by social movement organizations in protest events since 2010.

informal ways can be interpreted as granting legitimacy to the central government to apply a Western democratic system, simply because the ordinary people's voices have never expressed in public spaces such as meetings with the politicians or the government. Nonetheless, it is just true that they discuss political issues in their everyday lives, even if they do not expect fundamental changes to occur dramatically.

Meanwhile, the emergence of organized groups that can mobilize the masses are viewed as (1) maneuvers of local elites to survive the political transition, (2) as public expressions by civil society groups who want to build links to local authorities, and (3) as a transformation of grassroots politics as part of its response to the threat of local identity that had been harmed by the projects of capitalism and economic liberalization under the banner of democracy. Within certain limits, everyday political and symbolic resistance can converge with advocacy groups that focus on community associations (local indigenous organizations) such as Ismaya, Bodronoyo, semar sambogo, Gentaraja, and the Joint Secretariat Gamawan. These linkages are caused by social relations in rural areas, kinship, emotional connections, mobilization, and intensive interaction among individuals or between groups, so that the everyday politics within an organization make it possible to meet more easily as an organized movement. Only few individuals, however, want to join in such social movement organizations. Of the 3 million residents of Yogyakarta, about 10,000 to 40,000 participated in the movement directly between 1998 and 2011.

These are indicators of the impact of everyday political and symbolic resistance in the Javanese community, which have yielded results in an effort to maintain the privileged status of Yogyakarta. This movement cannot simply be summarized by saying

that strong loyalist groups are organized; it also must take into account the majority, the unorganized, who could potentially delegitimize the existence of a majority position claimed in the central government survey stating that 71% of the people of Yogyakarta wanted direct elections (Interview with Putut, a local politician of the Democratic Party; c.f. the LSI 2010 survey funded by the ruling party),⁴⁶ since grassroots politics is not easily measured by surveys or by other Western styles of public discourse.

In short, my findings indicate that the politicization of the upper level (conventional politics) and civil society groups are not the sole or even the main determinant factor of local political dynamics in Yogyakarta, because the will of the people exists outside the political interest groups. Practices of individual behavior at the grassroots level have its own logic and rationality. This character is obviously different from that of the interest groups that publicly favor appointment or elections. The King or governor of Yogyakarta himself challenged the central government by asking the Jogjanes people what they want. The position of the King would be weakened if huge numbers of people refused to support him as governor, and vice-versa. This is why the phrase "Throne for the People" has become a political commodity to win the support of the grassroots for the local elites. Political proponents and opponents in conventional politics are clearly in a difficult position to claim absolute legitimacy for their positions. Both groups hold polls, but this has little impact on government policy. They seem to be afraid to hold a referendum on the issue because of the historical trauma of East Timor case. My point is, however, is that government clearly should consider the silent majority

⁴⁶ Tentang survey yang menyimpulkan bahwa 70% rakyat Yogyakarta ingin diadakan pemilu langsung gubernur ini tidak banyak yang tahu jika survey ini didanai oleh partai democrat. Hal ini saya temukan ketika melakukan crosscheck dengan Dodi Ambardi yang merupakan pimpinan survey dari Lingkaran Survey Indonesia.

of Jogjanese. The evidence so far is that the people have their own special status, not relating directly to the king's privilege as governor, but what ordinary people understand as their relationship with their ancestors and the divine power that is reflected in the relationship between the kawulo (people) and the Gusti (king).

Thus, for the underprivileged people, the creation of a harmonious world of life, of social life in a society that has an atmosphere of "*adem ayem tata tentrem kertarahadjo*"⁴⁷ is the primary need that goes far beyond the discourse of the importance of an area and the special nature of democracy itself. Democracy and privilege become meaningless without the presence of a social situation that is constructed by individuals in the community and marked by safety, prosperity, calmness and friendly circumstances that allow them to meet their spiritual and material needs. This is the Javanese belief; this is the ideology that has influence over the latent and symbolic behavior of everyday politics and everyday forms of resistance. This construction of meaning, then, serves as an important force in the debate over the conventional political discourse. When political actors deliver conventional welfare indicators assessed from statistical figures, the people may at the same time not interpret it as relevant. Ideals of democratic development may be resisted by a community that wishes to practice the culture of the past when it is viewed in a positive light. For Jogjanese, happiness, freedom of expression, and assembly are part of their culture and do not need to be contrasted with modern culture and ideology. They feel they already have what they are supposed to have and, for this reason, they do not express a strong desire one way or another as to whether the system should be a monarchy or democracy.

⁴⁷ The Javanese proverb "*adem ayem tata tentrem kertarahadjo*" means that life is in peace, there is better prosperity, friendly relationships, familyhood, and social bonds with one another.

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Directions for Further Study

This study began with questions concerning how and by what manners people in Yogyakarta resist proposals for democratization raised by the central government. These questions are intertwined with societal reactions to local political phenomena and nationwide trends toward decentralization post-Suharto Indonesia.

1. Transitional Politics

Citizens in Yogyakarta have responded in a variety of ways to the political situation that has followed the collapse of the New Order regime. For example, debates regarding the meaning and substance of democracy started in 1998 and have not to date led to a new consensus as to divisions of authority among levels of government (“official politics”), participation by civil society organizations (“advocacy politics”), and the role of grassroots politics (“everyday politics”). This has resulted in a situation where meaning is regularly contested in a binary opposition between liberalist groups and traditionalist groups. This opposition has been characterized by scholars conducting research on Yogyakarta in terms of various dimensions, such as democratic versus conservative groups, liberal versus culturalist/fundamentalists, transformative versus conservative, traditional versus modern, primitive versus modern, democracy versus monarchy, and so forth. The two opposing factions have different views on the issue of gubernatorial elections in Yogyakarta. Several groups have proposed the implementation of "Democracy Budaya," or cultural democracy, as a model for culturally-based democracy, while other groups offer a model of "constitutional monarchy" for

Yogyakarta that would respect the ideals of liberal democracy. However, the tensions underlying such debates are not resolved; the special status of Yogyakarta and the nature of democracy are arenas of contested meaning.

From these points of view, I have considered several perspectives by which to understand the situation of Yogyakarta's politics, first as a network of well-organized social movements, second as passive and indirect responses during the course of everyday politics and resistance, and last how these types intersect with one another.

2. Social movements

Opposition to the gubernatorial elections can to some degree be read as a phenomenon of undemocratic consolidation, by which those representing the interests of local elites take advantage of local cultural traditions to legitimize and maintain political interests in the region. Such actions are contrary to the spirit of the 1998 reforms, which opened the tap of democracy for all people regardless of status and family background. As Eisinger has argued, it is precisely the openness of political access that has spurred local actors and civil society to consolidate support for liberal democracy together with voices for the conservation of local identity. Similar movements can be seen on a case-by-case basis in areas such as Aceh, Papua, and Riau where movements advocate independence as well as Bali and Surakarta which have requested privileged political status.

The symptoms of such undemocratic consolidation that have hit in Indonesia in the era of democracy are characterized by a strong role of capital in the local and national political dynamics. In practice, national political actors seek victories in regional

elections and vice versa. Money politics, the role of local strongmen, and the shadow state have become integral players in regional elections. These events are considered by traditional/'culturalists' and conservatives alike as a paradox of liberal democracy and a failure of proper democratic practice, which has been caused by the importation of Western democracy without regard to values based on traditions and local culture. Clearly, the culture of Indonesia is different from that of Western democracies.

Arguments to the contrary, rejecting the election of governors, rely on a position in which current institutions of democracy in society are recognized as having already been incorporated within local traditions, thus ensuring confidence in Yogyakarta's longstanding practice of democracy. They claim that the aspirations of the community require support for a uniquely local type of democracy in Yogyakarta. These aspirations are likewise democratic, because democracy is supposed to be based on the will of the majority and not necessarily based on electoral mechanisms, at whatever cost, regardless of whether they could result in damage to social and cultural ties. For those advocating the special status of the region, democracy should be built from the bottom-up, and not top-down as was the case during the New Order regime. They further argue that the lack of progress on RUUKY since the New Order era, from 2003 to 2011, is a strategy of delaying tactics used by the government of the SBY. This type of political strategy, called 'floating masses,' works to establish a society in which the government creates uncertainty regarding political information. Nonetheless, proposals, strategies and discourses stemming from organizations supporting the special status have built community support on an annual basis, through repetition and innovation in propagating

their messages. For example, even the groups opposing the central government now work through villages directly, represented by Ismaya.

Thus, the issue of the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta (RUUKY) can be seen from many perspectives. Of these, at least one of two points are worthy of mention. First, the popular movements in Yogyakarta are part of a widespread phenomenon to respond to undemocratic consolidation by demanding the conservation of local culture and special autonomy, or asymmetrical decentralization. Second, this consolidation of civil society has been characterized by the convergence of three types of politics. Consolidation at the level of culture cannot be said to have followed a pattern of binary opposition, but rather it is open to the possibility of an alternative type of democracy in which Western ideals are adopted without leaving behind local cultural identities. This possibility is realistic, given the practice of district and city elections in Yogyakarta since 2005, as well as direct elections of village heads, hamlet heads, and informal organizations since 1949.

As discussed on chapter 3, social movements in Yogyakarta on both sides of the issue reflect trends relating to three elements: (1) resource mobilization, (2) political opportunities and processes, and (3) framing processes. The first and third of these relate to each other, since SMOs rely on community support and cultural resources as tools to create legitimacy. The framing process is characterized by efforts to build popular memories of past glory through cultural ceremonies, rites, myths, and museum, while the struggle for public space involves art activities that frame the maintenance of Yogyakarta's privileged status as a form of social responsibility. The substance of Yogyakarta's privileges are thus identified with the appointed governor (the Sultan) as

the only appropriate political composition of Yogyakarta, taken for granted as an established tradition.

Political opportunities and processes, however, are interpreted differently by the elites, middle class citizens, and the underprivileged. For the local elites, the ability to withstand the current trend toward liberal democracy and maintain a privileged position as ruler is key to furthering the status quo. For the educated middle class and businessmen, the movement against liberal democracy in Yogyakarta may offer an atmosphere that would be conducive to developing their businesses, because Yogyakarta is known as a safe area, a tourist area, and the center of quality education. Meanwhile, the majority of people do not recognize political benefits in such a movement and instead consider non-material benefits—what I call 'cultural opportunities'—such that they can maintain good relations with the ancestors and relationships with others that following the regularity of Javanese ideology, maintaining balance with the existence of a cosmological symbolized by the king as the representative of god on earth. Raja is believed to be a connection between the real world and unseen world. This works to maintain the inner peace of individuals in society amid the crush of economic problems that arose after the integration of the local economy into a global economy in a climate of 'neo-liberalist' ideology.

Framing ideology theory can be employed to ascertain the character and dynamics of movements for and against privileged status, despite the fact that some of the issues have continued while others have changed in 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2011.⁴⁸ The fourth

⁴⁸ These years—1998, 2003, 2008, 2011—are the periods of escalation for the movements relating to privileged status for Yogyakarta. Political discourse, protest events, and counter-movements happened

period has been a phase during which the movements consolidated and escalated to more massive action. In 1998, movements emerged in response to a perceived need to rescue the identity and the traditional power of the Sultan in the face of a wave of reform and democratization. At the same time, the governor of Yogyakarta was in a vacuum of power. The Sultan's involvement in the reform movement became a tool of legitimacy for the continuation of privileges under the written political agreement, the "Ijab-Qabul," reached between Sukarno and the two regional rulers of Yogyakarta. While we can see that discourse was used to build public opinion and mass mobilization during these peak years, continuation and escalation of issues and changes to the strategy also occurred. In 2003, the privileges were claimed to have been secured under Law no. 22/1948, Law No. 3/1950 and Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution. This turn in the discourse was caused by fear of the emergence of opponent groups, since democratic support was still quite strong in this region after the 1998 reforms. The issue of ethnicity increased in 2008 to counter the opponent group as people were divided into Jogjanese and non-Jogjanese, loyalist and anti-tradition groups, and so on. Additionally, the Sultan's influence remained strong, even in academic debates, in local discourse for decades, which is one reason why UGM created a draft piece of legislation that could accommodate the traditional and charismatic leader as the future leader of this region (c.f. the draft RUUKY made by Affan Gaffar, UGM).

2008 saw a repeat of the debates concerning proposals for the privileged status that occurred in late 2002 and 2003. In the most recent debates, the substance of the discourse crystallized the DIY RUUKY proposed by several institutions by bringing

primarily during these periods, and even physical conflicts were sparked between supporters of liberal democracy (gubernatorial elections) and the local monarchy.

together a compromise of different versions. Fewer symptoms of violence were experienced by the opponent groups in protest events. The issue of native and non-indigenous people was still used as a tool to build legitimacy for the claims of Yogyakarta's privileged status. Nearly all political parties in the local parliament supported the RUUKY, which at that time allowed for the determination of the governor and deputy governor in Yogyakarta as Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X and Sri Paduka Pakualam IX.

By the end of 2010, and during 2011, the movement reached its highest level of participation since 1998. The largest protest event, held in December 2010, involved thousands of people in demonstrations and cultural events advocating to keep the status of Yogyakarta as a special region. The social movement organizations had, by this time, developed into more than four umbrella organizations ranging from rural to urban, and from traditional associations to modern organizations. The issue had also transformed into an ethnic concern for the discourse on multicultural society under the banner of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika*, "from monarchy to the local democracy" (*demokrasi budaya*). Related to this radicalism, some groups demanded for a referendum demanding the special status of the region as the only option and calling for boycotts of any direct elections, popularized in the radical slogan: *Rawe-rawe Rantas malang-malang Putus*. The opponent groups included organizations from KPUD as well as more than 10 NGOs (IRE, INTERFAITH, INTERFIDEA, IDEA, Forum LSM, etc.). Universities tended not to take a stance that opposed the special status directly but rather preferred to use other forms of political discourse such as newspapers, seminars, discussions and so on to voice their opposition.

Popular movements in Yogyakarta, moreover, were not free from the influence of the opposition in the national government, expressed locally. At the center, this 'opposition' was the PDI-P, and the ruling party was the Democrat Party. Historically, the PDIP was led by Megawati and had gained experience as the opposition party under Suharto's New Order (1990-1998). Politically, the PD wants to force the implementation of a comprehensive and consistent democracy, while Yogyakarta is known as one of the cages in which the PDIP has the opposite idea. Therefore, this struggle at the center of politics has been expressed at the local level and vice versa. The PDIP is one of the larger parties in Yogyakarta, with many supporters in the lower class, ideologically identified as "abangan." Traditionally it is closer to the ideology of most Jogyanese citizens. In addition to the PDIP, Golkar has similar supporters, but also a more diverse constituency ranging from the lower class to the upper middle class as a result of the politicization of the bureaucracy and the military by Suharto for 30 years. The spirit of opposition has been connected hand-in-hand with the movement for the special status of Yogyakarta, for a subtle but vital agenda: to defend and seize increased political power.

Unsurprisingly, the issue of the special status of Yogyakarta has become a political commodity for local politicians in the midst of political upheaval in a local multi-party system. One example of this can be seen in electoral contests, in which each provincial candidate for mayor or regent relied on this issue to attract the support of voters in local elections. Some SMOs fought for the determination of Yogyakarta, but in local elections they were easily fragmented, and SMOs have now built connections to different political parties. Semar Sembogo and Ismaya, for example, are identified with Golkar. These groups were founded by people with connections to the Suharto family,

and they have links to the Sultan and Palace affiliates through Golkar. Other SMOs, such as Sekber Gamawan, have vague connections to the PDI-P yet remain close to the Sultan's family and the Pakualaman. Within certain limits, even having the same agenda cannot guarantee the emergence of a monolithic movement.

Based on the discussion above, we can summarize the results of this study in several points: (1) a new social movement based upon cultural identity emerged in contemporary Indonesia in response to regime change and democratic transition nationwide; (2) in the case of Yogyakarta, this took the form of collective action in which indigenous groups and local culture played important roles in shaping and reshaping both the creation of SMOs and the continuity of movements from 1998 to 2011; (3) conflicting political interests and class struggle were negotiated in such a way that local values led to the emergence and reemergence of protest movements; (4) collective identities were produced and reproduced in social movements in a continual process, without clear boundaries, to mobilize and influence audiences to participate in such movements; and (5) such collective actions have been successful in maintaining the privileged status of Yogyakarta from 1998 to 2011, even though they failed to gain legal recognition through approval of the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta.

A question remaining to be answered is whether the movement will ultimately reject liberal democracy, the path it has taken for the past decade. And what conditions and factors could be said to make this movement a success? Clearly, from the perspective of social movement mobilization, either via resources or political opportunities, one could say the movement has been a success because the mass mobilization and use of cultural identity in 1998 succeeded in pressuring the local parliament and central

government to establish the Sultan as governor, whilst in 2003 the movement succeeded in naming the sultan HB X as non-elected governor (*Penetapan*) and, since 2008, the central government has postponed decisions to the contrary. This success could be measured by the success of efforts to press the central government to at least maintain the Sultan's position as governor by extension of his term.

The movement in Yogyakarta can also be read as opposition by traditional-revival groups against democratization and against political schemes that are considered as remnants of a feudalistic system in Yogyakarta that have experienced failure and chaos since the 1998 reforms. Those reforms were followed by democratization, which threatened aspects of local identity. Models of aristocratic governance in Yogyakarta are entrenching in the popular mind to such an extent that they may prove resilient to the introduction of further democratic reforms, as the power of the king and the aristocracy are only symbols of local government, while the people have accepted democracy as part of everyday life. This is demonstrated by direct election for village heads, heads the choice RT/RW, and growth of various voluntary organizations, each of which are evidence of a health tradition of civil society and democracy. Because Yogyakarta itself is a relatively egalitarian society, what is called feudalism in Yogyakarta is quite different with that of previous centuries that involved oppressive governance. Yogyakarta's movements for special privileges are not merely ethnic, as members of each side consist of multiple ethnicities and religions. Nonetheless, the discourse has been contested, produced, and negotiated to mobilize support and build public memory for each side.

Certain conditions have allowed for the movement to be effective. Conducive to the movement and enabling convergence between actors and individuals in the realms of

official politics, grassroots politics, and advocacy politics is the power of a shared imagined past and social connectedness. For example, an individual consciousness as part of the silent majority was triggered by a variety of activities undertaken by the SMOs as they built a discourse for privileging local identity under the banner of special privileges. This common imagination for social order, and the resulting social harmony, are strengthened by diverse cultural events and public commemorations such as Grebek Maulud, Sekaten, Nyadran, Mubeng Beteng, Jumenengan, Ketoprak, Shadow Puppet performances, art museums and exhibitions, stories of national heroes, Palace symbols, and both formal and informal education.

3. Everyday politics and resistance

The reluctance of the majority of people, particularly the lower classes, to take part in local political processes is easily overlooked by researchers and political actors, both nationally and locally. Disengagement among ordinary people may introduce difficulties in gauging their interests regarding public policy, and may lay behind the proposal for a referendum raised by groups such as Golkar, the KIPER, and Ismaya. There are two types of referendum that have been proposed; the first concerns the option to select or appoint the governor, and the second more radical one concerns whether Yogyakarta's governor should be appointed or whether the province should be independent. The movement groups face the risk that popular support for the issue may wane in light of a radical referendum. Another problem is that public opinion can be difficult to predict, and it could in the end work against the movement. Grassroots politics, which have their own characteristics, could be politicized to lead to referendum

results that would be contrary to the survey results showing a public preference for the gubernatorial election. Although the specific influence of this silent majority is unknown, it is clear how ordinary people could influence election results.

4. Intersection between Conventional and Everyday Politics

One interesting point in my findings is how conventional politics (organized and planned) can intersect with everyday politics (unorganized and spontaneous). Three factors can bring together political actors, namely elections, cultural ceremonies, and discourses regarding the RUUKY. Elections are clearly a reciprocal relationship between political institutions and the people, even if such reciprocity is not ideal. However, where people believe that an election is a farce, they may refuse to vote with no hope of change. However, in response to potential boycotts of the elections, politicians have adopted a strategy to prevent the behavior of "Golput." Meanwhile, the ceremony and ritual traditions of the traditional ruling ideology likewise connects with the everyday activities of the people. Finally, the emergence of civil discourses concerning the issue of the gubernatorial election has provided an opportunity for the consolidation of civil society. Public responses can be individual, tacit and/or indirect. This process of consolidation has been triggered by the opening of the valves of democracy. Although the democratic regime applies, we can still witness political behavior among the majority in an unorganized manner.

The possible relationship between everyday politics and social movements has likewise been regrettably overlooked. There are at least four phases of the social movements that occurred in Indonesia, especially after the 1998 reform. The first phase

was discourse, second was legislative demands, third was policy advocacy, and last were mass-based movements (Arisudjito 2004). The discourse phase of the movements was undertaken by individuals, while the second and third phases required well-organized strategies and actors. Indonesia has experienced each of these phases of movements at various points during the course of its history. Movements grew like mushrooms after a rain shortly after the collapse of the Suharto regime. Openness toward democratic ideals also provided ample opportunity for the emergence of radical movements in civil society (Eishinger 1973), with a variety of motivations, strategies, and orientations in response to the uncertain situation in transitional politics. However, as suggested by theories such as resource mobilization by McCharty, McAdam, and Zald which states the existence of informal networks as the basis of cultural, social capital and of formal and informal institutions to drive change. Symbols and public memory about the past have shown to be powerful weapons for mobilizing people, while external support can spread the effects of a broader movement. Thus, public memory, ideology, and worldviews play inherent roles in organizing individuals.

In short, one of the main arguments of this study is that both open social movements and hidden everyday politics co-exist in public responses to the political issue at hand. Most other scholarly discussions of social movements and everyday politics interprets them as driven by either one or the other. If open social movements are not possible, then hidden resistance is used. If open politics are possible, then there is no need for hidden resistance or everyday politics. What I am trying to say in this study is that both play a role.

5. Directions for Future Research

One contribution of this research is, I hope, to show as Kartodirjo did, how ordinary people, especially those of lower classes and uneducated masses, deserve credit for participating in social and cultural movements. Kartodirjo's work was the first to take into account the role of people rather than just the elites in Indonesia. As can be seen in the past several years, the revolutions in the Middle East are often recognized as middle-class movements. I argue that the power of ordinary people should be considered as significant. Finally, this study also attempts to determine whether or not such local forms of nonviolent resistance are effective. Politically, the process is still ongoing since the Bill on the Special Status of Yogyakarta has not yet been approved by the central congress.

As a final note, I would like to invite political researchers to give more attention to political activity that is otherwise overlooked in studies of Indonesian politics. We may need to think more about unconventional ways of understanding politics. As a political science lecturer at a university in Yogyakarta, I see there has been a subtle shift of interest in the study of political science among students and teachers, which may be a result of a saturation of resistance to the political mainstream that is stuck in a "Trias Politica" or official politics and its institutions. Studies of the dynamics of bureaucracies and government organizations are very limited, and the methodologies for such analysis are undeveloped. One major breakthrough, for example, is ethnographic work done by Karen Ho (2009), who wrote the book *Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street* to highlight the complex relationships that lie at the heart of the global financial system and resulting politicization. Aspects of daily life, background, and 'habitués' of the players in

the global money markets were analyzed in Ho's study. Through records of personal experience, we can paint an image of reality either as an insider researcher or as an outsider with no loss of objectivity. When we are embedded in people's daily reality, we can contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of a grassroots perspective with a method that can be categorized as scientific.

Therefore, this work has aimed to build toward a shift of paradigm in research interests among political scientists on the issue of power relations between the state and the social domain (grassroots). Although it was impossible to discuss everyday politics without reference to conventional politics, my ultimate intent is to conduct research worthy of follow-up work that is able to read the political situation in a different light. Everyday politics is its own genre, which can be connected with the kind of practical political maneuvering that is done in an organized manner. It can be seen in each political character through descriptions of the complexity of relationships between the three actors in different political realms. Power, given the culture of the people of Java, is spread among all people and in different places. Decentralization and diversification of the concept of power leads us to understand everyday politics and how it is connected with other types of politics.

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Appendices A: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interview Guide for the Ordinary People:

Initial Open-Ended Questions

1. Tell me about what happened recently in Yogyakarta related to political and economical issues?
2. What did you think then?
3. Do you belong to any kind of social organization? If so, could you tell me a little bit about your role and its activities?
4. What do you think about the King of Yogyakarta? How the king play important role in your life?

Intermediate Questions

1. What, if anything, did you know about the central government proposal to change the ways to elect Yogyakarta governor?
2. Tell me about your thought and feeling when you heard that?
3. Thousand people went to street and protested against that plan, so what will happen?
4. What positive thing if the governor is elected directly by the people?
5. What negative things do you think?
6. Why is not elected? Or any reasons?
7. Did you follow the social movement to resist the electoral system proposed by central government?
8. Or, why don't you follow the protester?
9. If so, who invited you to do so? And what is your motivation?
10. How they persuade you become part of the protesters?
11. Did you know what democracy is? And what do you think about that in social life around you? Where does democracy come from?
12. If you feel disagree with your leader, sultan, even president, what do they want to do? How to express it? Symbolic or manifest actions?

Ending Questions

1. What do you think are the most important ways to solve this problem?
2. After having experience how people express their disagreement to the national government plan, what advice would you give to politician or even president if you have chance to meet them?
3. Is there anything else you think I should know to understand?
4. Is there anything you would like to ask me?

Interview Guide for Elites:

A. Initial Open-Ended Questions

1. Tell me about what happened recently in Yogyakarta related to political and economical issues?
2. What did you think then?
3. Could you tell me a little bit about your role in your organization or association?
4. What kind of social activity it has? How about political activities?
5. What do you think about the King of Yogyakarta? How the king play important role in your life?

B. Intermediate Questions

1. the central government propos to change the ways to elect Yogyakarta governor Thousand and people went to street and protested against that plan, so what will happen? Tell me about your thought and feeling when you heard that?
2. What do you think about president's statement related to the monarchy system in Yogyakarta that it doesn't make sense in democratic state?
3. What positive thing if the governor is elected directly by the people?
4. What negative things do you think?
5. Why is not elected? Or any reasons?
6. Did you follow the social movement to resist the electoral system proposed by central government?
7. What do you think about Jogjakarta whether it is monarchy or democracy system? Or both?
8. If you feel disagree with your leader, sultan, even president, what did you want to do? How to express it? Symbolic or manifest actions?

C. Ending Questions

1. What do you think are the most important ways to solve this controversial problem?
2. What does Sultan have to do?
3. After having experience how people express their disagreement to the national government plan, what advice would you give to politician or even president if you have chance to meet them?
4. Is there anything you would say?

Appendix B: Yogyakarta's Map



**Appendix C: The Proponent
Organizations of Yogyakarta
Specialty Movement (1998-2011)**

No	Name
	Paguyuban /Asosiasi
1	Ismaya (4 branches)
2	Semar Sembogo (4 branches)
3	Asosiasi pedagang pasar
4	Persatuan Warga Pendatang
5	Karangtaruna DIY
6	Persatuan Wanita Yogyakarta
7	Kosgoro DIY
8	Persatuan Penarik Becak dan Andong
9	Persatuan Warga Bantul
10	Persatuan Warga Gunung Kidul
11	Persatuan Warga Kulonprogo
12	Pencinta Otomotif Yogyakarta
13	Majelis Silaturahmi Yogyakarta
14	Penggemar Sepeda Ontel Yogyakarta
15	Koperasi Pasar Gemah Ripah
16	Forinba Jogja Jabodetabek

17	Hudyana
18	Forum Patuk Negara
19	Forum Wredhatama Senior
20	FPUB
21	Muhammadiyah
22	NU
23	GRMB
24	KNH
25	FJR
26	Persatuan Purnawirawan POLRI
27	KNPI
28	Kanisius Book Publisher
29	Paguyuban Budaya Abdi Dalem
30	Paguyuban Kawulo Mataram (PKM)
31	PBHD
32	APPSI (Asosiasi pedagang pasar seluruh Indonesia)
33	K5 Malioboro
34	GEMAH RIPAH (asosiasi pedagang buah dan sayur Gamping)
35	PPBS Giwangan
36	Paguyuban Waekreis III
37	PBWJ
38	IJO

39	Majelis Silaturahmi
40	KKSS
41	PEPADI DIY
42	Majelis Dzikir
43	KMBM
44	IMI
45	PPBKY
46	PKAS
47	Perwaci
48	ISWI
49	ASEPHI
50	Baramus
51	Dewan Kebudayaan DIY
52	IPPHTI
53	PERSAJAK
54	PATERTER
55	PPTS
56	HMA DIY
57	GEMARI
58	Koperasi NGANDEL
59	APP TRANS DIY
60	Jasa OJEK
61	KTN Yogyakarta
62	Koperasi Pasok Kranggan

63	Asosiasi Peternak Kelinci
64	Himpunan Masyarakat Mataram DIY
65	Persatuan Pemandu Taman Sari Wisata
66	Rumah Guide Wirobrajan
67	Himpunan Pemandu Wisata Indonesia
68	Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Indonesia (FKMI)
69	PAPTA
70	PPM
71	LKKPM
72	P2WKS Kraton Yogyakarta
73	PERPU
74	PERTI Bantul
75	Paguyuban Budaya Jawa
76	Bimo Budaya Bantul
77	Parade Nusantara
78	Sepur NKA (Serikat Penghuni Rumah Negara exs KA)
79	GRMB
80	GERAM
81	Java Tato Club
82	Sepeda Religi Banguntapan
83	Yayasan PSM

84	Yayasan Handodento
85	Exsponen 96
86	Kerabat Rakyat Mataram
87	Paguyuban tri Tunggal
88	Rembuk Rukun Tangga Se Kota Yogyakarta
89	Wiridan Sarikraman
90	Sarduloseo
91	Abdi Dalem Tankenowola-wali
92	Paguyuban Warga Mertolulutan (PWM),
93	Masyarakat Adat Kaliurang ⁴⁹
94	Gerakan Moral Rekonsiliasi Pancasila
95	Kopi Jawa,
96	Lembaga Studi Dayak
97	Pasinaon Sekar Macapat Karaton Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat
98	Paguyuban Kawulo Mataram Kotagede
99	Sami'in Setia Semaan,
100	Tjap Orang Jadzah

⁴⁹ Turi, Jetis, Gamping, Jowangan, Sayegan, Minongetal, Sembungan, Sumber Arum, Banguntapan, , Pamong.

111	Saharu Layali
112	Ashabul Café
113	Komunitas Matahati
114	Paguyuban Songsong Buwono
115	Forum Masyarakat Nusantara
116	Paguyuban Kawula Mataram.
117	Paguyuban Pengusaha Malioboro
118	Paksi Katon
119	Pareanom
120	Parenaom community
121	FPUB
122	Pelangi
123	KNH
124	Srikandi Mataram
125	paguyuban Panca Mahardhika
126	Masyarakat Advokasi Warisan Budaya (Madya)
127	Forum Seniman Yogya
128	PW Pemuda Muhammadiyah (2011)
129	Forum Komunikasi Badan Perwakilan Desa (FK-BPD) Kabupaten Bantul
130	Paguyuban Carik se-DIY
131	Paguyuban Mitra Rakyat
132	Paguyuban Becak Malioboro-

	Mangkubumi
133	Senkom Mitra Polisi
134	Persatuan Keluarga Yogyakarta Mataram-Jakarta
	SMO's (Social Movement Organization)
1	GRY
2	Gentaraja
3	Sekber Gamawan
4	KIPER (Posko Referendum)
	Political Parties
1	GOLKAR
2	PDIP
3	PAN
4	PKB
5	PKS
6	Gerindra
7	Hanura
8	Fraksi Bintang Demokrat
9	Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan

(Sources: field notes, Document of Sidang Rakyat II 2008, KR, Kompas, Document of Sekber Gamawan; Darmawan 2010)

**Appendix D: The Opponent Organizations of Yogyakarta Specialty Movement
(1998-2011)**

No	Name	Members/	Character/focus of issues
NGO/Civil Society/Paguyuban			
1	IRE	faculty of local Universities	rural development, democracy
2	Tim JIP	Political Department of UGM	legal drafting of RUUKY
3	PaRWI	NGOs activists	local policies, advocacy, community empowerment
4	Yayasan Tunas Bangsa (YTB)	public	democracy, culture, religion
5	Kompak	NGOs activists	specialness of Yogyakarta
6	Forum LSM	NGOs activists	local policies, advocacy
8	Lapera Indonesia		
9	PW Muhammadiyah (98-2003)	Islamic group, santri	-Moderat, modernis, non-political aviliation
10	PUSHAM UII	NGOs activists	law
11	Institute DIAN		village and rural development
12	INTERFIDEI		religion
13	IDEA		participatory budget
14	LBKHI		law enforcement, advocacy
15	YLBHI		law enforcement, advocacy

16	Masyarakat Yogyakarta peduli Demokrasi	the supporter of Angling Kusumo	
17	Forum Masyarakat Demokrasi	the supporter of Angling Kusumo	
18	Paguyuban Tukang Becak Pabringan		
19	Yayasan Komunitas Politik		
20	Yayasan Ronggowarsito		
21	Yayasan Gilang Siti Kencana		
22	Urban Poor Linkage.		
23	LBH Yogyakarta		
SMOs (Social Movement Organization)			
23	FKMKY (Koalisi Masyarakat untuk Keistimewaan Yogyakarta)	Parwi Foundation, Forum LSM, IRE, Pusham UII, ICM, LBh Yogya, Persada Yogyakarta, INAI, Lappera Indonesia, KPI, HMI MPO, Rumpun Tjut Nyak Dhien, AJI Yogyakarta, Jaringan Radio Komunitas, YCW, LKBH UII, Gilang Siti Kencono, YABM, LBH SKHAPI, KIP Parlemen, GMNI APMD, LPM Himmah UII, dan LBHaM.	specialness of Yogyakarta
Political Parties		periode/years	
24	PAN	99-2003	

25	PKB		
26	Fraksi Gabungan	2003	
27	PD	2009	
28	Fraksi ABRI		

Appendix E: Frequency of Yogyakarta Specialty issue on two newspapers (1998-2011)

No	Year (s)	Media	
		<i>Kedaulatan Rakyat</i>	<i>Kompas</i>
1	1998	37	17
2	1999	4	4
3	2000	23	-
4	2001	49	19
5	2002	70	50
6	2003	59	39
7	2004	65	27
8	2005	69	39
9	2006	54	24
10	2007	335	235
11	2008	317	337
12	2009	256	144
13	2010	302	286
14	2011	150	85
	Total		