

however, it does not succeed in setting the context for US pressures and thus is largely irrelevant to the book. It makes no reference, for example, to US fears of the "Kiwi virus" spreading to Japan, which was one of the major US fears. (The 3 March 1991 hearing of a US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee reconfirmed Defense Department views that neither-confirm-nor-deny policies were essential to the US relationship with some countries and could not therefore be changed for New Zealand.) In contrast to chapter 3, chapter 4 is a textbook account of foreign policy options for influence, insufficiently tied to the New Zealand case. It reads as if the writer's thesis advisor had demanded that he situate his case study within some theoretical literature and he had reluctantly complied. While there are other annoying, minor factual, typographical, and grammatical errors throughout the book, it is overall a competent and welcome addition to the literature.

The conclusion analyzes factors in what the authors see as New Zealand's qualified success in developing and maintaining the antinuclear policy, among them the geographical size, small population, and isolation of New Zealand, together with the extensive experience and decentralization of the New Zealand peace movement. The nuclearization of the Pacific and US pressures themselves combined to turn public opinion even further away from nuclear weapons, at a time when New Zealand was already moving toward a more independent and Pacific orientation. The difficulties for a large country of exerting influence on a small ally are effectively juxtaposed against the

fact that the primary US concern was to warn other countries against similar action.

The creation of New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation has been an interesting exercise in the democratic making and sustaining of foreign policy. The authors, correctly I think, identify the significance of grass-roots organizing in the formulation of public opinion, such that even a National government opposed to the antinuclear policy knows that it cannot repeal it. I wish that the authors had looked at the case in terms of reciprocal influence, asking whether New Zealand's actions had any impact on the United States or the rest of the world as well as whether US pressures had any impact on the sustainability of New Zealand's policy. The latter, however, was their stated purpose, which they accomplished. The book on the impact of New Zealand's antinuclear policies, in the broader context of global security, remains to be written.

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The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: A Critical Assessment, by Michael Hamel-Green. Peace Research Centre Monograph 8. Canberra: Australian National University, 1990. ISBN 0-731508-99-8, vi + 159 pp, tables, notes, bibliography. A\$15.

Events in recent years have tended to overshadow the landmark decision by eight South Pacific Forum countries in August 1985 to limit nuclear access to their region. Nonetheless, the decision

to establish a nuclear-free zone, underwritten by an international treaty, was more than a symbolic act by a few isolated microstates. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), which came into force late in 1986, significantly extended the area of the earth's surface under nuclear-free regimes. SPNFZ also had an effect on the nuclear strategies of great powers, especially on the United States in its strategic ties with Australia and in its troubled security relationship with New Zealand. This impact has not been diminished by the passing years and may have renewed saliency in view of the efforts to construct a new world order following the collapse of the Cold War.

This comprehensive treatment of SPNFZ, its origins and impact, is timely and relevant. The book begins with a review of the concept and goals of a nuclear-free zone. From this theoretical base, Hamel-Green briefly traces the steps leading to the signing of the SPNFZ Treaty on Rarotonga, perhaps with contrived irony, on 6 August 1985—Hiroshima Day. Several chapters are devoted to the policies of individual states toward SPNFZ. These span the Australian Labor Government's 1983 decision to reactivate a 1970s proposal for a SPNFZ through the reaction of the island states—both for and against SPNFZ—to reaction from the extraregional nuclear powers. These chapters form the core of the book and also provide considerable detail on how the nuclear debate has affected the Pacific Islands generally. The concluding chapter assesses the relevance of SPNFZ to regional and global security issues.

This book has many strengths and is

an impressive piece of scholarship. Although it appears to have been written originally as a thesis, the style and presentation are polished, coherent, and very readable. However, the central argument does raise questions. The author seeks to explain why the SPNFZ Treaty does not meet all the objectives of a comprehensive nuclear-free zone. He concludes that it was not in Australia's perceived interests to endanger its strategic relationship with the United States, and therefore Canberra needed to circumscribe the scope of SPNFZ to perimeters acceptable to Washington. Key issues such as the noninclusion of the Micronesian entities north of the equator, the nonexclusion of the transit of nuclear-armed vessels, and the silence on any requirement by the nuclear-weapons powers not to use these weapons from, or across, the SPNFZ are all cited as evidence that the treaty was skewed in favor of United States nuclear interests.

Given the catalytic role of Australia in reviving the lapsed 1970s SPNFZ proposal, Hamel-Green's assertion that Australia sought to protect American security interests in the region seems both plausible and sustainable yet begs the antecedent question of why a newly elected Labor government would put itself in the awkward position of pursuing a foreign policy objective that could endanger its paramount security relationship. The author's interpretation that Australia acted to prevent a more severely restrictive regime is not altogether satisfactory and does not explain why Canberra *initiated* such a potentially risky ploy, especially in the absence of credible evidence that any other South Pacific Forum state was

preparing to force Australia's forestalling strategy. In addition, the logic of this strategy required absolute certainty on Australia's part that it could dictate the outcome of the Forum's deliberations to ensure its view of a SPNFZ would not be captured by those states wanting a more restrictive regime. Not only has Australian dominance of the Forum not been so complete, but also the United States clearly did not endorse a strategy for which it was to be the chief beneficiary. This explanation also understates the domestic factor in the Australian Labor Party's decision to resurrect the regional nuclear-free zone concept so soon after its return to government.

The motivation behind SPNFZ and the details of its ultimate form are open to almost endless interpretation. As Hamel-Green demonstrates with his excellent review of the complexity of island-state attitudes, even the presumed central actors within the region had mixed feelings on SPNFZ. Such ambiguities on a critical and controversial topic predetermine that the debate on SPNFZ will continue. This book makes a major contribution to ensuring the debate on SPNFZ is well informed and that it proceeds with scholarly rigor. Two small technical additions would have enhanced the book—a map of the area covered by SPNFZ and an index. Overall, both academic and lay readers will find this work a useful addition to collections on either contemporary Pacific Island affairs or regional security arrangements.

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Overreaching in Paradise: United States Policy in Palau since 1945, by Sue Rabbitt Roff. Juneau, AK: Denali Press, 1991. ISBN 0-938737-22-8, ix + 244 pp, maps, appendixes, bibliography, index. Paper, US\$27.50.

In 1979, the emerging Republic of Palau created the first constitution that prohibited the use, testing, storage, or disposal of nuclear substances. The constitution can be amended only by a consensual 75 percent, reflecting traditional practices. The nuclear-free restriction directly conflicts with the requirements of the United States under a negotiated Compact of Free Association that, if ratified, would grant economic and developmental aid to Palau for fifty years while the United States provided defense. The United States would then require large portions of land for military purposes, and many analysts think the provisions were intended to protect the US interest. US policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence or passage of nuclear substances, and it has maintained a nonnegotiable stance that Palau must alter its constitution to accord with the compact. Today Palau is the last "trusteeship" of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a strategic trusteeship administered by the United States since 1945 under the auspices of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Seven plebiscites have been held to resolve the dilemma; all failed to obtain the requisite 75 percent or permit resolution by majority vote.

Overreaching in Paradise is a critical review of the plebiscite decade from the perspective of UN decolonization policies and practices and American policy in particular. As a journalist with expe-