

COMMUNICATION POLICY AND PLANNING  
FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION: CASE STUDIES  
SINGAPORE AND GUAM

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The present study focuses on how two multicultural, developing societies--Singapore and Guam--use communication to build strong and cohesive societies out of their essentially diversified populations. Specifically, the researcher sought answers to the following questions:

1. What are the natures of the historical, political, cultural and economic environments in Singapore and Guam?
2. What is the approach to development in the two areas?
3. What are the communication policies which either promote or militate against national integration in both societies?
4. What is the nature of the planning and decision-making process undertaken for implementing communication policies relative to national integration in Singapore and Guam?
5. What are the existing mass media structures in the two places?

This study has certain limitations. The first is that it involved only the island-societies of Singapore and Guam. These two places were chosen for varied reasons: both areas have marked problems relating to national integration; their small size (in relation to other countries facing similar problems) definitely facilitates study; English is widely used in both areas, thus obviating any serious language problems in analyzing documents and interviewing people; Singapore typifies the strictly-controlled Asian state as against Guam's free-wheeling society under U. S. domination--but both struggling to establish their political and economic survival.



A second limitation is the time frame of the study. The research on Singapore was made from September to November, 1975, while that on Guam was conducted from May to July, 1976. The third limitation is the study's focus on mass media structures, specifically radio, television and the press. Although this is not meant to negate the importance of the other communication channels existing in both societies, the emphasis on the mass media is, nevertheless, a deliberate choice based on the greater influence these exert on the societies as compared with the other channels.

Fourth, this study was meant to be primarily exploratory. It was not intended to give any answers, but rather identify questions and problem areas which later researchers interested in allied fields may want to look into.

## CHAPTER II

### METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES OF DATA

#### Methodology

Data for this study were gathered through field research undertaken in Singapore and Guam. The researcher relied heavily on documentary analysis and both semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Media content analysis was culled from secondary sources whenever available and valid.

#### Sources of Data

The primary documentation centers used by the researcher were:

- Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
- Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, Singapore
- Malaysia-Singapore Collection, University of Singapore Library
- Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam
- Flores Public Library, Guam
- Bureau of Planning Collection, Guam
- Guam Legislature Library
- Hawaii-Pacific Collection, University of Hawaii Library
- Asia Collection, University of Hawaii Library
- Documentation Collection, Communication Institute, East-West Center, Hawaii

Documents analyzed included the following:

- General state planning documents

- Laws issued by government or other lesser regulatory bodies relating to the mass media
- Speeches and policy statements related to communication development and regulation made by government officials
- Records of parliamentary debate and legislative discussion relative to general cultural policy and sub-policies on language, censorship, control of media, media programming and content
- Public records and documents of the central planning bodies relative to a breakdown of organizational structures and programs
- Public records, annual reports and other documents of mass media organizations showing a breakdown of ownership, organization, funding, mode of operation and development plans
- Surveys of mass media content and audience analysis made in the past
- Published and unpublished masters and doctoral theses dealing with Singapore and Guam: history, society, politics, economics, communication
- Survey of other literature (books, journals, newspapers) concerning the socio-economic-political environments of Singapore and Guam

Types of persons interviewed included:

- Legislators involved in communication policy formulation
- Other government officials and civil servants whose work relates to communication development and regulation

- Officials of planning organizations
- Officials of government and private mass media organizations
- Local mass media practitioners
- Local communication researchers
- Local opinion leaders
- Ordinary citizens

In analyzing the documents and interviewing people, the researcher was guided by a list of concerns which formed the base of the study:

1. What are the dominant factors in the historical/political/economic and cultural environments in Singapore and Guam?
  - How do these promote or militate against national integration?
  - How do these influence the role the mass media play?
  - How do these relate to the government's overall approach to development of the area?
2. What kind of a collective identity exists for the people in the society?
  - How was this "identity" formed?
3. What formal or informal policies does the government operate under in its relationship with the media?
4. What are the mass media structures in the society?
  - How are these organized?
  - What type of programming/editorial content do the media have?
  - Is mass media ownership centralized or diffused?
  - Which plays a more dominant role in the operation of the mass media: public or private interests?
  - For what purposes are the mass media used in the society?

5. What is the nature of the government's interaction with the mass media?

- How strict is government control and censorship?
- What is the process of news flow between government to the people and vice versa?

6. What is the nature of the process of planning?

- How are the needs of the population identified as they progress?
- Who decides how the needs are met?
- How is this decided?

### CHAPTER III

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

##### Communication Policy and Planning

Prior to a review of literature in the field of communication policy and planning, it is important to define the basic terms, planning and policy.

Planning. Although some may consider planning as "not much more than applied common sense (Morrison, 1947)," the process is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon which has found application in many fields. Albert Waterston (1965) states that planning is an "organized, intelligent attempt to select the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals." Latin American social scientist Andreas Faludi (1973) further delineates, "Planning is the application of scientific method--however crude--to policy-making. What this means is that conscious efforts are made to increase the validity of policies in terms of the present and anticipated future of the environment." Aaron Wildavsky (1973) emphasizes the deterministic aspect of planning saying, "It is the ability to control the future by current acts. Instead of discovering his fate in the future, man plans to make it in his own image."

These definitions, though varied, contain three underlying themes. The first concerns the process itself which proceeds through three basic levels: formulation of goals, identification of alternatives, and determination of behavior toward some specified end. The second is the assumption that man is rational and that, in making decisions,

he will use his reason, planning the efficient utilization of alternative means to achieve his ends (Waterston, 1965). The third theme is that the planner plans from a position of power. Since disagreement over social goals is inevitable, it is clear that there can be no planning unless one can assume that people can be made to behave in a particular way whether or not they would have naturally chosen to do so.

Other social scientists have posed serious challenges to planning theories and their assumptions. A substantial number of studies have indicated that shaping the development of cities and nations according to a preconceived design based on a rational framework is not a successful approach (Friedman, 1971). The belief that man primarily uses his reason in making decisions and choosing his actions is questioned by Davidoff (1963) who thrusts planning into the area of subjective values arguing that, in fact, "values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process, and that any planning action cannot be prescribed from a position of value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on desired objectives." Richard Bolan (1974) supports the crucial importance of values to planning stating that these permeate all aspects of the process whether it is viewed from a scientific or humanistic point of view. Just as important as rational analysis would be the cultural norms and values, the impact of social and political institutional arrangements and the modes of securing behavior changes essential to the implementation of the plan.

Because planning is based on the assumption of power, the question of who plans is pivotal. The argument for efficiency



(central to the theme of rationality in planning) dictates that core decisions be made by people who are trained and qualified to make such decisions. This, of course, is an elitist perception and studies conducted in the recent past have come up with evidence showing the failure of planning decisions arrived at through such processes. Because the elitist plan expresses only one perspective and uses a single hierarchy of values, it does not command the commitment of other parties whose interests may be involved. Therefore, it suffers in implementation (Friedman, 1971).

The argument for democratic planning is strong and it is defined by Goulet (1975) as that which "is controlled by, and responsive to all persons affected by its decisions." Popular participation in planning, expressed either through consultation or self-management (Dinell, 1974), has been gaining ground in the recent past, as it is increasingly being recognized that the people who are to be affected by the decisions should be a part of the decision-making.

A final issue in the study of planning is the recognition of "planning without plans." Wildavsky (1973) states that since the process of planning may occur outside formal planning organizations, there may or may not be an actual document:

Planning must not be confused with the existence of a formal plan, people called planners, or an institution with the word planning in its official title. Formal plans are only one possible manifestation of planning.

What is given greater importance than the existence of a formal plan is the question of whether the planning process is firmly established as a matter of government policy (Waterston, 1965).



For the purposes of this study, then, planning is an organized process by which man selects, from among many alternatives, his choice of means to achieve a specific desired end. It is a process which is subjective and based on the assumption of a position of power by him who makes the plan. The plan, in turn, may either be written or unwritten.

Policy. Some political philosophers would define policy simply as any action taken by the "state." Eulau and Eyestone (1968) state that policy "is a response of government to challenges or pressures from the physical or social environment." It may be manifested in terms of general programs, specific decisions, legislative enactments, executive orders, administrative regulations, or in terms of the amount of money spent (Easton, 1953).

The public character of policy is emphasized by Eulau and Eyestone (1968) who state that the "public component" of policy may be signified in two ways: first, that it is action taken by "public authorities" (i.e. government officials) or, second, that it is action done to or for the public, regardless of who is performing it. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that policies are influenced by public, societal forces found in the overall socioeconomic environment: "Social structure, political culture, political institutions, and elite perceptions intervene between a given environment . . . and the articulation of demand (Jacob and Lipsky, 1968)."

Various models for policy analysis have been drawn showing the dynamic interplay among (a) the environment which both contains the demands that stimulate the response and the resources with which the

response is implemented, (b) the political structures and processes which convert the demands and resources into policies and (c) the actual policies, symbols and services which are the outputs of the whole process that are themselves subsequently converted into feedback in the form of other demands and resources injected into the process at a later point in time (Hofferbert, 1974; Sharkansky and van Meter, 1975). The models clearly show that policies never operate in vacuums.

There are multiple power sources that interplay in the process of policy-formulation. The influence exerted by decision-makers in the various branches of government and the civil service is self-explanatory. Governmental decision-makers aside, the more central question, among the "democratic" nations, is how and to what extent private citizens and interest groups influence policies through one or a combination of various means: organizational strength, the ballot box, money, show of expertise, mass demonstrations, extra-parliamentary methods (i.e. civil disobedience), or use of violence. Yehezkel Dror (1968) lists eleven categories of participants in the policy process: private individuals, intellectuals, political leaders, legislative bodies, political executives, civil servants, courts, parties, universities, interest groups and special thinking units (e.g. RAND) and planning bodies.

Another interesting concern is the human factor involved in policy-formulation. Policy-makers are people and people's actions are motivated by a variety of causes: their perceptions of the society's needs or personal political gain. History is witness to innumerable instances where innovations in policies were the result

of the impact of leadership and individual initiative. Sometimes, these play the decisive role in a country's politics.

A final point to be made in the discussion on policy is that, like plans, it need not be written down or declared in order to be. A public official's inattention to a situation that can be changed is also construed as policy action in the form of "non-decisions" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). This covers both a government's deliberate tolerance of an existing situation and non-deliberate non-action of some decision-makers. Social scientists are beginning to look into the validity of considering as policies in themselves the absence of manifest statements and actions. The process of non-decision-making in the study of policy is in itself a valid point of inquiry (Vidich and Bensman, 1958).

For the purposes of this study, then, policy is any action taken by public authorities either directed at or declared for the public in response to needs and demands expressed in the socio-economic-political environment of a society. Policy formulation may be influenced by governmental decision-makers as well as private citizens and interest groups. Policy may either be expressed through a formal declaration of objectives or through the deliberate absence of such.

Communication Policy and Planning. Interest in policy and planning research is new in the field of communication. It has only been in the last decade or so that the study focus has shifted from research on the journalism profession and media content and audience analyses to a more basic consideration of alternative ways of structuring communication systems (Pool, 1974).

Attempting to conduct a systematic search for literature on this new field, Rahim (A-1976) compiled an annotated bibliography covering four hundred entries on mass communication, telecommunication, extension and interpersonal communication, new technology and developmental applications. A review of the works revealed that policy and planning questions were mostly raised either contextually in the adoption of new technological forms or in reference to the use of communication for specific sectoral development programs (i.e. agriculture, education, family planning, etc.). There were very few works dealing with concepts, models, theories and methods (Rahim, B-1976).

The same author (Rahim, B-1976) noted down the different emphases and concerns around which the new research evolves. The first is premised on the belief that technology plays the decisive role in modern communication. Pool (1974) singles out the "exponential growth in the rate of technological change" as the prime element influencing communication policy research. Pool states, "The important issues for scholars looking at the next decade are not only how people behave in the existing communication system, but what the communication system itself will be." He argues that the primary concern should be the use of technology to build more efficient communication systems dedicated to pluralism of expression.

In direct contradiction to Pool's thesis, Schiller (1975) views technology as value-laden and communication as a tool of influence being used by the dominant classes, both on the national and international levels, to keep the struggling peoples of the world

subjugated and exploited. The reality of neo-colonial domination ("cultural and communication imperialism") is stressed and, in Schiller's view, policy and planning research should generate knowledge that will precisely bring about liberation from the structures of domination. He disagrees very strongly with the belief that technological innovations in communication systems will bring about new societies and new social conditions:

Technological innovation does not arise out of thin air. It is encouraged (or discouraged) by the prevailing social system . . . it is integrated into that system ordinarily to achieve the objectives of the dominating elements already commanding the scene.

A third approach to communication policy and planning is taken by UNESCO which calls for the coordinated functioning of the various elements of the communication system, " . . . in furtherance of a policy which is in itself an integral part of comprehensive planning for national development (Naesselund, 1974)." UNESCO's concern is the establishment of mechanisms of coordination in order to avoid wastage of time and effort expended in diverse communication plans usually drawn up for various sectoral programs (i.e. agriculture, education, health, etc.). It, however, urges that communication be viewed both in terms of the country's specific sociopolitical framework as well as within the structures of the interdependent relations of nations. UNESCO (1972) defines communication policies as "sets of norms established to guide the behavior of communication systems" and sees communications planning as a cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary endeavor.

Another UN organization, the UNDP's Development Support Communication Services (DSCS), views communication planning from a



diametrically opposite point. DSCS emphasizes the supportive function of communication within specific development programs. It stresses the importance of diffusing information among people to be affected by the development projects and maintains that this can best be done through project and group level communication planning.

Other various groups and institutions have expressed interest in policy and planning research in communication. Among these are the World Bank, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Broadcast Institute, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and several U. S. federal agencies foremost among which are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Office of Telecommunications (Department of Commerce) and the Office of Telecommunications Policy of the White House. Other private and educational institutions involved in research on communication policy and related problems are Rand Corporation, the Annenberg School of Communication (University of Southern California), the Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society, the Research Program on Communication Policy (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), the Institute for Communication Research (Stanford University), and the Program on Information Technologies and Public Policy (Harvard University).

Likewise, national governments have also been concerned with the formulation of long-term communication policies. The countries most involved have been Canada with its "Proposals for a Communications Policy for Canada (1973)" and Finland with its broadcasting thrust aimed at the innovational "information program policy (Nordenstreng, 1974)." Others which have undertaken related studies are Japan,

Australia, India, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Holland and Peru (Rahim, B-1976; Pool, 1974).

### Development

The question of development is central to most nations' workings and processes. Does development mean simply growth? Or are there moral issues to be considered? Would development involve the uprooting of social values and institutions? Or is it simply synonymous with aggregate economic advancement?

For many years, development was thought of as synonymous with economic growth. Hence, the success of "developmental plans" were measured in terms of increased production, higher investment or GNP and low rate of unemployment. Later on, however, it gained an added dimension. During the UN's First Development Decade, U Thant went a step further and defined the process as "Development = Economic Growth and Social Change." But exactly what quality of growth or what kind of change were not really clarified.

In recent years, a third stage of development thinking has emerged which has shifted the focus to the left quite radically. This third school stresses qualitative improvement instead of quantity, emphasizing that the basic question in development is moral in nature. It re-poses the classical questions of

What is the good life? What is the good society?  
Is fullness of good compatible with abundance of goods?  
Is human development something more than a systematic  
combination of modern bureaucracy, efficient technology  
and productive economy? (Goulet, 1975)

The previous emphasis on economic growth was severely criticized for supporting elitist decision-making insofar as this orientation

perceived the masses simply as onlookers in the process of development and as passive recipients of its benefits. Goulet (1975) stated,

The decisive test of success is that in obtaining [the benefits], a society will have fostered greater popular autonomy, in a non-elitist mode, social creativity instead of imitation, and control over forces of change instead of mere adjustment to them.

Following this school of thinking, then, the experience of development is viewed as strongly value-laden; a process transforming apathetic people into change agents within their society. Change must occur only with the people in control and in their own way. And a frame of reference is established: economic development only if or within the premise of human development.

It is easy to see the validity of Goulet's thesis on "anti-development." A system which promotes domination and dependence in place of sovereignty and independence promotes the phenomenon. He explained:

A society has 'anti-development' if its development breeds new oppressions and structural servitudes . . . 'anti-development' can co-exist alongside excellent nutrition, high income, general literacy, bureaucratic efficiency and expanding investment capacities. Since these are all relative goods, much depends on what is sacrificed to obtain or preserve them.

The experience of development is thus seen as a diverse, value-laden historical process which involves economic advancement but within the context of general human upliftment. Those who wish to achieve genuine development should recognize the high cost of such an undertaking for, necessarily, the process is conflict-ridden since it involves the greater masses of the people taking control of their destiny from elites who have been accustomed to playing the dominant role in society.



### National Integration

The problem of national integration is most often crucial in plural societies.

The Plural Society. Cultural pluralism is a dominant feature of many new nations. It is defined as "the existence within a state of different solidarity patterns based upon shared religion, language, ethnic identity, race, caste, or region which commands a loyalty rivaling . . . that which the state itself is able to generate (Anderson, 1967)." The people in a plural society are definitively described as a medley "for they mix but do not combine (Furnivall, 1956)," with their interaction limited to the economic sphere. Plural societies may be compared to the annual bazaars in medieval Europe when merchants converged to trade with each other, but otherwise lived very different lives within their own communities after the close of the fair (Furnivall, 1956).

Kuper and Smith (1969) describe the political system in plural societies as one of colonial domination imposing "a western super-structure of business and administration on the native world, and a forced union on the different sections of the population . . . The system is maintained by domination, regulation and force."

The Integration Process. The major task confronting plural societies is the promotion of integration most often expressed in terms of a national identity. When a society is divided into separate and self-sustaining communities, the national government will find it difficult to progress. The presence of diverse loyalties divide the nation and threaten its unity. In such a situation, there is a need for two-fold integration:

Vertical integration is the process of creating among all groups the sense of overriding loyalties to the claims of the nation-state. Horizontal integration is the process of creating consensus about national values as well as the capability of all groups to cooperate with each other. (Kassim, 1974)

Two basic strategies are open as alternatives in the promotion of integration. First is the strategy of accommodation where the end objective is national unity without the loss by component groups of their language and culture. Second is assimilation where each racial community loses its individual identity in pursuit of an overall identity representative of all (UNESCO, 1969).

## CHAPTER IV

### CASE STUDIES

#### Singapore

##### Country Profile

Basic Information. Strategically situated on the southern tip off the Johore coast of Malaysia is Singapore--an island, a city, and a state rolled into one. It sits on a land area measuring 224 square miles (presently being stretched another five square miles by seashore fillings) and is physically joined to the Malay peninsula by a causeway three-quarters of a mile long.

Singapore is located one and a half degrees north of the equator. The core of the island is mainly granitic, occasionally rising to high points of over 300 feet, but extensively surrounded by lower marshy areas. The city itself has developed on much firmer ground adjacent to the Mount Faber ridge. In the more recent periods, suburban growth has been extensive in the north and along the eastern coasts while a large reclamation project west of the docks has provided land area on which was built the Jurong industrial complex.

The island population is one of a complex multicomunal nature. The 1970 census showed that Singapore is 76.2 percent Chinese, 15 percent Malay, 7 percent Indian and 1.8 percent others. There are four official languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English. Of the four, Malay was chosen as the national language, although this is more a ceremonial than a functional policy. In actuality, English has become the dominant language in society where it is used as the

language of government bureaucracy (legislation and court judgments are recorded in English), of international trade and a venue for furthering one's career development and social mobility (Kuo, A-1976).

The increase in the usage of English is no accident. Although the government has a policy of multilingualism which, by definition, classifies all four official languages as theoretically equal in importance, it is no secret in Singapore that in actual practice, "some are more equal than others (Kuo, A-1976)." In the country's bilingual educational program, children must learn English plus a second language (usually their mother tongue). Furthermore, in both English and non-English schools, English is used as the medium of instruction in mathematics, science and technology.

Apart from its heavily heterogeneous composition which has proven to be a source of problems, both in the past and in the present, another aspect of Singapore's population which has given rise to some concern is its high rate of growth. The island is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Housing and family planning are two of its major concerns and it is in these fields that Singapore has scored some of its major achievements.

The government's Housing and Development Board (HDB) has built public flats at a rate of one every twenty-five minutes, housing 30 percent of the city's population in high-rises. Building skyward, Singapore has literally constructed "vertical blocks"--huge apartment buildings with built-in shopping centers, clinics and open-air restaurants. These public housing complexes contain apartments (ranging from one to four bedrooms plus bath, kitchen and balcony)

renting out for US\$16-50 per month and selling at slightly higher payments on ten- to twenty-year purchase plans.

Likewise, a high-powered family planning program is also presently being enforced by the government. Singapore's Sterilization and Abortion Acts are more progressive than any comparable legislation in other Asian countries. A system of social disincentives is also in effect. In the state maternity hospital where most Singaporean children are born, the fees escalate if mothers return after delivery of a first child. Maternity benefits such as leave with pay are correspondingly diminished with more pregnancies. Larger families are given lower priority in public housing and no more than two children will be registered in the preferred schools unless at least one parent has been sterilized.

The more important public facilities and services in Singapore are generally subsidized by the government. Medical attention is available in fifty government hospitals and clinics for US\$1.00 per visit, such fee usually being waived if the patient declares himself unable to pay. Education is also heavily subsidized. Children of all Singapore citizens are entitled to six years of free primary education.

History. George Thomson (1975) reports that SINHAPURA (meaning "lion city" in Sanskrit) was originally founded as a seaport in 1297 as part of the Srivijaya trading empire based in south Sumatra. It was destroyed in the year 1376 by the rival Madjapahit empire and, for centuries thereafter, remained little more than a bivouac for fishermen.

On January 29, 1819, a squadron led by Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East India Company, arrived in Singapore. Raffles had

been commissioned to find a suitable island where the British could establish a port to protect its eastern trade interests. Upon reconnoitering the area, Raffles concluded:

You may take my word for it. This is by far the most important station in the East and as far as naval superiority and commercial interests are concerned, of much higher value than whole continents of territory. (Wise, 1976)

On February 23, 1819, Sir Stamford founded the city of Singapore. Leased that same year from the Sultan of Rhio-Johore, the island was fully taken over by the British five years later.

Raffles did not err in his judgment of Singapore's commercial value. Both trade volume and population increased at tremendous rates and, in 1832, Singapore became the center of government for the Straits Settlements which it formed with Penang and Malacca. Later on, the Straits Settlements came directly under the control of the Colonial Office in London, but Singapore's importance as seaport and trading post increased with the years, especially with the opening of the Suez Canal and the consequent strengthening of the London-China route. More and more, Singapore became the center for British operations in the area until on February 12, 1942, the Japanese invaded the island and remained there, forcibly occupying the territory. The Allied Forces, led by Lord Louis Mountbatten, regained the island on September 5, 1945, and reinstituted British rule.

From the end of the Japanese Occupation to the 31st of March, 1946, Singapore was administered by the British Military Administration, but the British faced a different Singapore during these post-war years. Having been left to survive by itself during the harsh Japanese-ruled period, Singapore had matured both politically and



socially. A new consciousness marked the people's thinking as the island set out to reconstruct from the rubble of war. British prestige suffered from its original defeat at the Battle of Malaya and the heroic role that war guerillas, mainly Chinese and Communist, played in gaining back freedom raised the issue of the growing power wielded by the Chinese in the new Malaya. Economically, however, Singapore still depended on British rehabilitation grants with which it restored its position as a leading entrepot center in Southeast Asia.

On April 1, 1946, Civil Government was established in Singapore. The Straits Settlements was dissolved as a unit with Penang and Malacca joining the Malay Union (later the Federation of Malaya) in 1948. From then on, Singapore went through a series of constitutional developments, ranging from the establishment of colonial legislative and executive councils in 1948 to a partially elected legislature in 1955, onward to full internal self-government in 1959 and, finally, ending its colonial status on September 16, 1963, by joining the Federation of Malaysia. This political union, though, was short-lived. Two years later, prompted by Malay communal reaction to possible domination of Malaysia by the Singapore Chinese, the Kuala Lumpur government unilaterally announced the separation of Singapore from the Federation. Thus, on August 9, 1965, Singapore proclaimed itself "forever a sovereign, democratic and independent nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of her people in a more just and equal society."

In September of the same year, Singapore gained membership into the United Nations and, a month later, into the Commonwealth and the

Afro-Asian group. On December 22, 1965, it became a republic with a President as head of state and shortly thereafter teamed up with the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Economy. Unlike many other developing countries, Singapore is characterized by the absence of a rural agricultural base. Less than one-sixth of the country's land area is under crop cultivation. The tiny island-republic lacks any significant natural resources and has to obtain most of its basic requirements, including food, water and raw materials, from the outside. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect to create a domestic market since its population is small and income levels too low.

Singapore's major asset is its sophisticated, highly literate and increasingly well-educated population. The ruling People's Action Party's development strategy hinges on an industrialization program with simultaneous development of labor and capital resources. Among the country's economic goals were the establishment of a viable manufacturing sector directed towards export, the creation of infrastructure to attract foreign and local capital and the training of technical and managerial experts from among its labor force (Lim, 1975).

In essence, Singapore's economy is primarily dependent on trade, manufacturing and service industries. It owes its early growth and prosperity to its role as Southeast Asia's main trading post. Due to its favored geographical position on the crossroads of many a sea route traversing the Pacific, the island has maintained its position as prime entrepot port in the region. Singapore's major commercial partners are



Malaysia, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, although the four may occasionally interchange in ranking positions. The major import items are crude oil, crude rubber, textile fabrics, industrial machinery and electrical equipment. With regards the export sector, the industries heavily dependent on export sales for its growth were textiles, shirts and wearing apparel, plywood and veneer, natural gums, non-ferrous metal industries and transport equipment.

Singapore is one of the largest oil refining centers of the world. Its petroleum refineries make for over thirty percent of the nation's industrial output. The country also builds, sells and services the giant oil rigs which ply the southeast Asia route.


The island operates the world's fourth busiest harbor. The seaport itself has a berth length of 610 meters where advanced docking and warehousing facilities have been built. Its capacities for shipbuilding and repair have also greatly expanded. A measure of the port's sophistication is that it now builds 90,000 ton tankers. Singapore presently ranks twenty-first in the world in shipbuilding and provides an efficient base for industry support of the offshore oil explorations in the west Pacific.

Another service industry which Singapore has effectively harnessed to its advantage is banking. The island has become the base for the Asia dollar, the offshore German mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and other major currencies. Total deposits as well as the number of banks operating in Singapore have increased tremendously in recent years. Likewise, the country's banks now rank as underwriters of major international loans and bond issues. What has helped

Singapore tremendously in its bid for being the region's financial center has been its reputation as the one Southeast Asian nation where money transactions are both easy and safe. Banking regulations have eliminated many obstructions in the flow of funds, at the same time imposing strict accounting procedures (Hanna, 1976). All of which have attracted huge capital investment in the country making for the sound, solid Singapore dollar.

A more recent addition to the list of Singapore's major industries has been tourism. The largest proportion of visitors, according to an industry study, has been the Australians (making up 17 percent of the market) with the Indonesians ranking second (15.8 percent), the Malaysians third (10.5 percent), the Japanese fourth (10 percent) and Americans fifth with 9.5 percent (Lim, 1975). The government has also been active in promoting intra-regional travel through the efforts of the ASEAN which has established a permanent committee to ease travel restrictions and increase travel flow between and among the ASEAN nations.

Politics. Peter S. J. Chen (1975), a Singaporean sociologist, illustrates the power structure in the island-republic as:



Chen describes the power elite to be a "strong, cohesive and homogeneous" group whose members follow the same line of political thinking and maintain the same interests and objectives. The political elite and the civil bureaucrats operate in a tight and efficient partnership.

The politicians set up the goals and objectives of the development plan, and the bureaucrats implement it. A sub-group, the "select professional elite," are also seen to be instrumental in running Singapore. However, their influence in the process of decision-making is limited by whether or not they are viewed in a favorable light by the political elite (i.e. whether they, the professionals, also share the same ideology, interests and objectives as the first two groups). The service functions of the professional group are therefore retained, but the direction of their services are largely co-opted by the government. In terms of actual power wielded, the political elite emerges as the most important and, in this arena, one tightly-knit group dominates: the People's Action Party (P.A.P.).

To understand the workings of the P.A.P. is to understand, to a large degree, the premises on which the political system in Singapore works. Pang (1971) uses two classifications of political parties according to their concept of membership: mass or cadre. The former places emphasis on quantity and the latter on quality of members. Pang points out that the People's Action Party has had to combine both systems because of its own peculiar needs. As an avowed socialist party, it needs members for both financial and electoral support but because of its fight against communists, it has had to pay close watch over the quality of its followers.

As a mass party, the process of applying for membership into the P.A.P. is easily definable. To join the Party, one has to be above seventeen years old and a Singaporean citizen. An applicant fills in a form for enrollment and, if accepted (theoretically, the Party need

not accept all applicants but, in practice, most applications are approved), pledges to "accept and conform to the constitution programme, principles and policy of the Party (P.A.P. Constitution)."

On the other hand, the P.A.P. also has cadre members although, as Pang reports, the actual nature of such membership is held in secrecy. Cadres are not issued any distinguishing cards, badges or special insignia, but they are distinguishable from the mass members in that they are privileged to vote for the Central Executive Council (CEC), the P.A.P.'s main policy-making body, and they are invited to the Party's monthly meetings regularly. A majority of the cadres are members of the executive committees of the Party's branches. They constitute the P.A.P.'s activists and loyalists and are estimated to number from four hundred to five hundred persons. The main characteristic which qualifies a regular Party member to become a cadre member is illustrated in the P.A.P.'s own journal:

Party membership should be open to all those who are of good character and wish to belong to the Party, whereas the Party cadreship should be restrictive. Party cadres should be carefully chosen among Party members who have been tested in struggle and through doing Party work. (Chua, 1966)

The cadre system was originally adopted in order to counteract any communist infiltration of the Party. However, although this is still being used as an excuse for keeping the system, most concede that the cadre structure is kept operational in order to limit discussion or autonomy in the Party to a select few. It is commonly thought that most new members have joined the party as political opportunists who would willingly leave once the Party loses power. The combined

mass-cadre nature of the P.A.P. thus ensures that membership be open to all yet authority be limited to a few (Pang, 1971).

It is the nature of the leadership of the Party though which is a clear indication of how power is actually wielded in the P.A.P. and by the P.A.P. Within the Party, the Central Executive Council (CEC) reigns supreme. It is the only policy-making body of the Party. Although there are repeated protestations towards collective leadership, it is no secret that even within the CEC, there is an "inner circle" which actually makes the decisions that matter. This inner circle includes the Party's Secretary-General, Lee Kuan Yew; its chairman, Dr. Toh Chin Chye; the Deputy Chairman, Dr. Goh Keng Swee; and the Director of the Political Bureau, S. Rajaratnam. Discussions and disputes that take place within the CEC are seldom publicized and Party members are generally not informed of any policy debates (Pang, 1971).

This intra-Party elitism is reflected in the way the P.A.P. runs Singapore. Confident in their mandate, the P.A.P. leaders have arrogated upon themselves the responsibility of deciding the direction of Singapore's development. With the civil bureaucracy and most of the professionals behind them, the P.A.P. has assumed a position of entrenched power, controlling all aspects of political and social life and directing all activities toward pre-determined developmental goals set by the Party itself:

The PAP's top echelon of elite theoreticians and administrators operates rather like an academy of development specialists, conceiving, planning, encouraging, implementing and constantly monitoring and revising a full range of constructive programs. . . . The PAP's leaders head a tight little meritocracy . . . It is



converting itself into an advanced technocracy, ritualistically professing fidelity to vague principles of state socialism and democratic self-rule, practicing meanwhile a truly inspired expediency. . . . They hold elections and assemble Parliament rather like a kindergarten exercise in political education, rarely letting the obscurantism of any more political process interfere with professional quality administration or development. . . . It is all very logical, coherent and admirable and it might well be exemplary save that not all Singaporeans and not many of their neighbors regard it as such. (Hanna, 1976)

Tight control over criticism is exercised. The existence of the Special Branch in the Singapore police is no secret and it has been used to suppress dissent whether privately or publicly expressed (Buchanan, 1972). Citizens complain of living under "fascist" rule in a "police state" which actively promotes a "culture of silence." Tan Wah Piow, former president of the University of Singapore Students Union and political fugitive, stated upon going underground:

I was conditioned to have my eyes blinded so that I see no social evils; my ears plugged so that I heard no cries of the people; and in case I did see or hear some evil, my mouth was to be gagged so that I speak no protest. I broke the rules altogether. I ripped the blindfold and saw the pathetic living conditions of neglected old pioneers of Chinatown and the exploited workers of Jurong; I dug out the earplugs and heard the voice of Said Zahari [a journalist under detention without trial for thirteen years] coming from behind the prison walls. Finally, I took the decisive step to liberate myself--I spoke up. (Senkuttuvan, 1975)

Others, too, have challenged Lee's "culture of silence" unsuccessfully.

Newspapers, for example, have been closed down because of their undisguised criticism of P.A.P. policies. Other suppressive measures have been the abolition of trial by jury, the detention without trial of political prisoners and former opposition party officials, and the requirement of a "suitability certificate" for entering the university.

The latter are issued to applicants only after they have been cleared by the Special Branch and only those with certificates are allowed to enroll.

The National Integration Issue. (1) The Problem. Several factors contribute to the problem of integration in Singapore. These are racial heterogeneity, linguistic diversity, multiple education streams and socioeconomic differences. Singapore's population is racially complex in nature. Thomson (1972) reports that in 1819 there were recorded 150 residents on the island: 120 Malays and 30 Chinese. After Singapore was established as a port, the island attracted migrants from all over the area, each one bringing his own particular skills and goods to be bartered. The flow of migrants increased such that five years later there was a reported population of 10,683: 74 Europeans, 4,580 Malays, 3,317 Chinese, 756 Indians, 16 Americans, 15 Arabs and 1,925 Bugis from Celebes.

Today the population of Singapore remains as heterogeneous as when it was first founded: there are 76.2 percent Chinese, 15 percent Malay, 7 percent Indian and 1.8 percent others. But the racial mix is far more complicated than the official statistics suggest. In addition to the ethnic groupings, each racial community also has its sub-groups. Within the Chinese community, there are five sub-groups: Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka and Hainanese. The three largest are each more numerous than the Malay population. The latter can also be subdivided into the Bugis, the Boyanese, the Javanese and coastal Malays. The Indian population is composed primarily of Tamils, Pakistanis and Ceylonese.

Linguistic diversity is a second element that contributes to the problem of integration in Singapore. There co-exist in the republic five major languages (Malay, English, Mandarin, Tamil and Hokkien) and three minor ones (Teochew, Cantonese and Hainanese). In cognizance of the major cultural streams in the country, the leadership chose to declare Mandarin, Malay and Tamil as official languages, adding a fourth--English--because of the island's British colonial background. Kuo (B-1976) points out the level of competence of each of the ethnic groups in the different languages (see Table 1).

The Kuo study likewise measured the different languages' "communicability index" and came up with the following conclusions:

1. Malay is the lingua franca of Singapore. It is the most important language in intergroup communication and also is prevalent among the Malays and Indians.

2. English comes a close second. English competency is evenly distributed among the Chinese, Malays and Indians.

3. Mandarin and Tamil are used only within the Chinese and Indian communities respectively.

An overall observation made by Kuo was that in all intergroup situations, except in the case of Malay-Indian interaction, the index scores were low, showing a low level of communication integration.

Kuo deduced the existence of a dual linguistic system in Singapore. Pidgin Malay ("Bazaar Malay") is used by the different ethnic groups in the market place and other traditional meeting places. On the other hand, English is used for more official and formal occasions. This situation is duplicated within the Chinese



TABLE 1. -- Percentage of Population in Singapore Aged 15 and Over Competent in Various Languages, By Ethnicity, 1957 and 1972

Ethnicity	Major Languages				
	Malay	English	Mandarin	Tamil	Hokkien
<u>Malay:</u> 1957, % who can speak	99.4	23.5	b	b	b
1972, % who can understand	100.0	60.1	1.7	1.7	6.2
<u>Chinese:</u> 1957, % who can speak	32.5	18.0	26.7	b	b
1972, % who can understand	45.8	41.2	69.5	0.1	91.1
<u>Indian:</u> 1957, % who can speak <sup>c</sup>	88.3	35.5	b	76.7	b
1972, % who can understand	95.9	66.3	d	86.7	5.1
Total <sup>a</sup>					
1957, % who can speak	48.0	22.2	19.9	8.2	b
1972, % who can understand	57.1	46.6	54.4	6.7	72.7

<sup>a</sup> Including 'other ethnicities'

<sup>b</sup> Data not available

<sup>c</sup> Not including Ceylonese, most of whom were Tamil speakers

Sources: 1957 data based on State of Singapore: Report on the Census of Population, 1957, by S. C. Chua (Department of Statistics, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1964), Tables 44-47, pp. 162-5.

1972 data based on SRM Media Index, 1972 General Report for Singapore, Vols. 1 and 2, by Survey Research Singapore, 1972, Table 6B.

community where Hokkien is used in inter-dialect communication while reserving Mandarin for the more formal, official functions. Malay and Hokkien then surface as languages used in the more traditional and informal settings, while English and Mandarin are used in the more modern context of universities, government offices, the courts and in public speeches and forums.

Another factor which serves to divide Singapore's population is the medium of instruction by which they are educated. In Singapore there are four streams: Malay, Mandarin, English and Tamil. A wide range of differences may be observed between the English-educated and the mother tongue-educated, regardless of their racial origin. There exist greater homogeneity of values and attitudes among the English-educated groups, irrespective of their ethnic background. An English education has apparently been effective in breeding new values and mores, causing a cross-cultural alignment to form (Chan, 1972). However, while similar attitudes and values are prevalent among the English-educated Malays, Chinese and Indians, a "great cultural divide" exists between the English-educated and the mother tongue-educated groups of people within the same ethnic community.

Socioeconomic differences coinciding with ethnic divisions is a fourth factor, and its importance is underscored by the University of Singapore Seminar on Malay Participation in National Development. Using employment and education as indicators, the relative socioeconomic standing of the different ethnic communities can be deduced. Two indices point toward the low status of Malays in Singapore (Ahmat and Wong, 1971). The 1957 Census of Population (the 1970

Census does not give as detailed statistics) shows that two-thirds of low skilled workers were Malay while the 1967 Civil Service Statistics Report indicates that the majority of the Malays who were in government service were employed in the lower divisions.

In education, the 1966 Singapore Household Survey disclosed that the Malays accounted for only 4.5 percent of those who completed the secondary level (compared with the Chinese 72.5 percent and the Indians with 8.0 percent) and only 2.3 percent of university graduates belonged to this ethnic block. Historically, however, it must be noted that the Malay education stream operated by the British during the colonial era was lax and inferior to the other streams. It did not train the Malays to compete with the other racial groups and fitted them primarily for peasant agriculture (Roff, 1967).

John MacDougall is cited by Chan (1972) to delineate the class stratification within the various racial communities as:

Racial Distribution Within Each Class  
in Singapore

	<u>Upper Class</u>	<u>Middle Class</u>	<u>Lower Class</u>
Malays	3.1	9.6	12.5
Chinese	59.5	67.8	73.6
Indians	12.4	14.0	13.0
Others	24.9	8.5	1.0
TOTAL	99.9	99.9	99.9

Very clearly, the Malays are a minority not only numerically but also socioeconomically. This factor has been a major influence in

strengthening their group identity since cultural, language and social differences coincided with their professional or occupational differences. The Indian community, on the other hand, although also few in number, enjoys economic and social influence exceeding its size. They have been particularly well-placed in commerce and in the civil service (Chan, 1972).

The Malays of Singapore, hence, find themselves in the peculiar position of being a relatively poor and unprogressive minority in a region dominated by people of their race, culture and religion. Allowed the luxury of a culture-based, non-competitive education and having lived in the Kampongs without any significant contact with the other communities, the Malays have adhered closely to their time-honored traditions and values. It is no small wonder then that they, among all the ethnic communities represented in Singapore, find it hardest to modernize, re-orient their attitudes and cultivate new values.

(2) Ethnic Group Perceptions. The prevailing attitudes among Singapore's ethnic communities, especially between the Chinese and Malays, are illustrated by Bell (1972) who interviewed two sets of opinion leaders: principals and teachers in "integrated" Chinese-Malay schools and officials of the government's Housing and Development Board (HDB). Bell concluded, "There is very little, if any, linguistic and cultural assimilation at any level." He stresses his point with two examples:

. . . In the first instance, I was interviewing the principal of an integrated Chinese-Malay secondary school, and in the course of the conversation I asked about the problem of linguistic and cultural assimilation.

He answered my inquiry by informing me that they do not integrate in the classrooms and by showing me the lunch counter-recreation room. On one side there was a Malay counter, staffed by Malays and serving Malay food. On the other side was a Chinese stall, staffed by Chinese and dispensing Chinese food. Congregated around each was a group of Malays and Chinese respectively. But this was not the complete picture. I was assured that even the teachers segregated, despite a government order to intermingle so as to present an example for the pupils.

The second illustration came from an official with the Housing and Development Board and concerned his experience with the community centers . . . Under the PAP, the community centers have become agents for manifest political socialization. Governmental policy has stipulated that, in the television room, if a Malay program is being televised, it has priority. Second priority is given to the Indian (Tamil) programs. When in fact, these programs are on, the Malays and Indians show up respectively. However, if a Chinese or English program is being broadcast, they stay home.

One final example, again given freely by the HDB official. After a disastrous fire swept through a slum area, a new housing estate was constructed. Small one-room flats with common restrooms and common kitchens were built so that the people could intermingle. Actually, very little intermingling ever took place. The Malays refused to use the kitchens because the Chinese cooked pork. The two groups would pass each other in the halls, but there would be no exchanges between them.

Other studies have been conducted in the past to gauge each ethnic group's attitudes towards the others. A recent one was made in 1974 among students of Nanyang University (formerly Singapore's Chinese University converted in 1975 to the English medium). Its author, Andrew Lind, reported a very deep opposition among the students to intermarriage with Malays. More than 76 percent expressed adverse sentiment towards the Malays with a very high 32.1 percent recording the extreme choice "strongly oppose" and only 8.1 percent indicating any acceptance. Fifteen percent of the respondents refrained from registering an opinion. When asked to explain their



negative responses, the students cited longstanding and fundamental cultural distinctions and often repeated ethnic stereotypes of " . . . the Malays and Indonesians appeared to be 'lazy,' 'pleasure-loving' and 'lacking in initiative and ambition'." Lind reported that sometimes the respondents could not even rationalize their negative feelings except by saying, "Their ways upset me very much" or "I have an inbred abomination of them." Lind's findings are substantiated by data on actual inter-ethnic marriages in Singapore. Hassan and Benjamin (1976) cite the rate at a low average of 5 percent, a concrete indication of low social integration in Singapore society.

Peter Busch (1972) explained the stereotypic views of the Malays as based on other groups' perceptions of their economic condition. The Chinese presumption, Busch contends, is that every individual strives for economic advancement and he will progress depending on his mental and physical capabilities and how hard he tries. The conclusion then is that for most Malays to remain poor for generations with no hope of advancement is "only possible if the entire race is genetically incapacitated."

Busch's survey of multi-ethnic students enrolled in Singapore's secondary schools also showed that 18.6 percent of the Malay respondents thought they were inferior to the Chinese, 46.2 percent felt both groups were equal, and 36.2 percent said Malays were superior. On the other hand, 80.2 percent of the Chinese held themselves superior to the Malays, 19.8 percent believed both races were equal, and 1.2 percent responded that Malays were superior to Chinese.



The informal body of knowledge generated by the researcher's own interviews, on the other hand, traced the causes of Chinese-Malay ill will to past experiences with racial riots in 1968 and accusations of Malay "collaboration" with the Japanese in World War II. There is also a fear that in the event of conflict between Singapore and its neighbor nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, the Singaporean Malays would side with their blood brothers instead of defending Singapore. There was popular sentiment expressed in favor of the unofficial government policy of raising the standards for joining the armed forces and the police, effectively screening out Malays from membership, and recruiting instead from among the Malaysian Chinese and Malaysian Indians.

### (3) In Search of a Singaporean Identity.

We ask ourselves, what is a Singaporean? In the first place, we did not want to be Singaporeans. We wanted to be Malaysians. Then the idea was extended and we decided to become Malaysians. But 23 months of Malaysia-- a traumatic experience for all parties in Malaysia-- ended rather abruptly with our becoming Singaporeans. (Lee Kuan Yew)

In seeking to understand the process of creating a Singaporean identity, one must keep in mind that the establishment of Singapore was first and foremost a commercial venture. The British were looking for a port to protect its eastern trade interests and found the island suitable for the purpose. Singapore then was "neither a national, strategic nor cultural identity; questions of loyalty or cultural or religious identity were not relevant (Thomson, 1972)."

The majority of its population were immigrants, mainly traders and coolies. They were not profound culture-bearers seriously

motivated to propagate their traditions (Chan, 1972), but were more concerned with economic survival. They did, however, have a sense of sentimental attachment to their respective mother countries while at the same time acknowledging that their economic future lay with Singapore.

Corollary to this is the difference in the various ethnic groups' socializations (Seah, 1973). Each community had a different cultural, linguistic and religious background which were, for the most part, left unhampered and free to co-exist even by the British. The educational system was not used as an instrument for nation-building by the colonial officials. Schools were left to themselves to devise their own programs and syllabi. In the Chinese schools, for example, books and course content did not carry a local Singaporean orientation and most of the teachers came from China.

Another source of identity problem was the island's political insecurity. Singapore had traditionally held close links with the Malayan peninsula both before and during British colonial rule (Seah, 1973). Economically, the two were intertwined, with Malaya serving as a "hinterland" and Singapore as the commercial and trading center. The two also shared common administrative and professional services which enabled officials to serve both territories, eventually culminating in Singapore joining the Federation in 1963. With its establishment as a free and independent nation, Singapore had to reconsider a lot of its alignments including its relationship with Malaysia.

Faced with this socio-historical background of Singapore's identity problem, the ruling People's Action Party chose to promote a

pragmatic, non-ideological solution with economic development as its core value. Discussion involving political philosophy was suppressed and the new Singaporean national identity prided itself in not being connected with any particular cultural tradition. The three main principles on which it was based were multiracialism, multilingualism and meritocracy.

Multiracialism was defined as cultural tolerance--the acceptance of each other's differences in religion, customs and traditions without any discrimination to any one group. Each ethnic community is entitled to equality before the law and equality of economic opportunity based on free enterprise and personal initiative. This policy was necessary to de-emphasize the Chinese dominance of the island in view of its geographic proximity to the Malay nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. It was also one way of promoting loyalty to the country and dissuading the Singaporean Malays from thinking that the key to their advancement was alignment with countries with which they shared racial affinity.

Multilingualism was visibly expressed when Singapore declared all four languages (Mandarin, Malay, Tamil and English) official. Bilingual education was given impetus in the nation's schools on the assumption that such a policy would increase opportunities for contact among the communities. The concept of bilingualism, though, was distinctly defined to mean the learning of the mother tongue and English. It was not simply an advocacy of the study of any combination of two of the four official languages.

A concomitant value of meritocracy was also promoted. Ethnic affiliation was de-emphasized. Merit and performance became the avowed primary criteria for the acquisition of authority and upward economic mobility. This policy was meant to, once again, de-emphasize Chinese dominance in Singapore and also served to negate any different or preferential treatment for the minority Malays who claimed the right as the "indigenous people" of the island.

A University of Singapore study (Chiew, 1971) measured the emergence of national identity consciousness with the following results:

1. 90 percent of respondents called themselves Singaporeans.
2. 74 percent preferred being called Singaporean rather than Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian or European.
3. 67 percent chose Singapore as the country in which they most wanted to live their lives.
4. 48 percent considered separation from Malaysia as good for Singapore.
5. 80 percent had seen or heard three or more symbols of Singapore nationhood.
6. 58 percent had cognition of three or more of the national symbols.
7. 66 percent expressed positive feelings toward three or more of the symbols.
8. 75 percent expressed positive feeling toward two or more of Singapore's symbols of national development.
9. 74 percent said they were fairly or very willing to fight and die for Singapore.

Chan (1971) gives reasons for this apparent success of the promotion of a national identity. First, the immigrant communities of Singapore do not have a firm cultural tradition and were open to change because of the necessity to survive in a new environment. This explains why the values of modernization, central to Singaporean identity as espoused by the P.A.P., met little resistance. Second, the Chinese not only form a numerical majority. They are the economic and political majority as well. Therefore, the P.A.P.'s adoption of an accommodationist policy did not threaten the majority's power and position. Third, the outstanding leadership and dedication displayed by the People's Action Party in governing the republic proved crucial for the success of its development strategy.

Not everybody, though, was happy with the P.A.P. formula for national identity. The emphasis on economic advancement and material progress brought about "consumerism" which was criticized for doing away with the old values of the established cultural streams. The emphasis on English as the language of modernity and progress resulted in graduates of the English stream schools getting preferential treatment in terms of employment opportunities. This, too, was widely resented.

The Malays, used to the security of the slower, more relaxed lifestyle in the kampongs, found it difficult to accept the competitive, achievement-oriented values and attitudes of the new Singapore identity. The Malay community however had very weak political leadership and the expression of their dissatisfaction was further stymied by the fact that any discussion of the underprivileged position they



occupied under the new society was suppressed on the grounds that they incited "communalist" feelings and, thus, ran counter to the P.A.P. principle of multiracialism.

The Chinese-educated Chinese, too, were unhappy. To the Chinese, language (and consequently education) is an expression of their culture and identity. This is the reason for the proliferation of Chinese schools wherever there are overseas Chinese communities. The schools are established to transmit their heritage to their children. With the emphasis on the English language, there occurred a decline in the enrollment in the Chinese schools which resulted in the accumulation of grievances by the Chinese-educated.

Another qualifying statement to the success of the P.A.P. effort to create a national identity is Wilson's (1972) observation that the "sense of national identity is more evident at the higher levels of society than at the lower." Bilingualism and the consciousness of being Singaporean are more prevalent in the universities, in the professions and in the civil service while Singaporeans in the middle and lower income groups are less affected.

#### Mass Media Profile

In Singapore, political leaders feel that the need to promote new values and establish a national identity is so crucial that they will not tolerate challenges to their authority. The government has arrogated upon itself the right to select and impose a new value system for the new nation and demands that this be the base for a "cultural consensus" in the country. Toward this end, all socializing forces in society are unequivocally directed; including the mass media:



We want the mass media to reinforce, not to undermine the cultural values and social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and universities.  
(Lee Kuan Yew, 1971)

Having had to wage a political battle of ideas, especially when Singapore was struggling in the Federation, Lee quickly learned the value of using the media to suit his purposes. The media were to assume a "teaching" role, albeit a persuasive one, as the dynamic Prime Minister "used the mass media and the radio to take the whole nation into a collective tutorial on the problem of politics (Thomson, 1971)." There is no ambiguity about the P.A.P.'s attitude towards the mass media. They are to be used as instruments of propaganda. They will explain to the people the policies and programs of government--this is the core value. All other functions are secondary, if at all important:

The PAP inaugurated a policy of information saturation to educate, convert, give shape to and guide public opinion. The emphasis on political communication, which has accelerated over the years, evinces an abiding belief in the efficacy of information, argumentation and reason to establish and confirm popular support for the government. (Bellows, 1970)

The Print Media. There are approximately 300 periodicals published in the various different languages used in Singapore. The major newspapers (the dailies), however, number twelve. These are:

Berita Harian, Malay	Straits Times, English
Malaysia Malayali, Malayalam	Min Pao, Chinese
Tamil Malar, Tamil	Nanyang Siang Pau, Chinese
Tamil Murasu, Tamil	Shin Min, Chinese
Tamil Nesan, Tamil	Sin Chew Jit Poh, Chinese
New Nation, English	Shin Min Rhy Baw, Chinese

In addition to those listed above, Singapore is also serviced by Sunday newspapers in the four official languages and by specialized

bulletins and professional journals. Newspapers and journals published in Malaysia are available on a daily basis. The government likewise sponsors mimeographed semi-tabloids. "The Mirror of Opinion," started in 1968 and published by the Ministry of Culture, features highlights of news culled from the Malay, Chinese and Tamil press. Its circulation is limited to government employees and agencies. The "Monitoring Digest," on the other hand, prepared by the Department of Broadcasting, is the "Radio Singapore Special News Service." Singapore is serviced by ten major news agencies including the American UPI, AP and Reuters, the Japanese Kyodo and Jiji Press, the Czech CETEKA, the Russian Tass, the Agence France-Presse and the Central News Agency of Taiwan.

There exist three press people's associations in the country. First is the Singapore Press Club composed mainly of writers from the English papers, foreign news correspondents, advertising executives and PR men from Singapore business companies. The club primarily performs a social function with the members meeting regularly over lunch with scheduled speakers on current issues. A second organization is the Singapore National Union of Journalists. The SNUJ functions as a trade union looking after labor conditions in the industry. Finally, there is the Chinese Press Club of more than two hundred members mostly from the RTS Chinese News Division and pressmen from the country's Chinese newspapers.

The newspapers published in the different languages have differing journalistic traditions. The first English newspaper, started in 1824, was the Singapore Chronicle published by Francis James Bernand,

the British Chief of Police in the colony: "It was a sheet of paper folded into four parts, popping at irregular intervals--a week or a month--depending on shipping movements and commercial activities (Soh, 1971)." Eleven years later, Edwin Boustead, merchant and scholar, opened the Singapore Free Press which from then on continued to dominate English journalism in the country. In 1845 R. C. Woods, a well-known lawyer, established the Straits Times which rivalled the Free Press for a century. In 1932 the Straits Times installed the first rotary press in Southeast Asia and, a year later, bought the Free Press.

The other major sector of the Singapore press is made up of the Chinese newspapers whose circulation exceeds the English. The two major dailies are the Sin Chew Jit Poh and the Nanyang Siang Pau. Chinese newspapers, on the whole, carry very different content from the English and the Malay papers. The Chinese, as a rule, publish a lot of articles (both news and features) about local community activities, clan association meetings and social club functions. They print poetry and serial novelettes which are not regular features in the other language papers. The Chinese papers also usually publish speeches by members of Parliament and other government pronouncements verbatim.

In 1975 the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre (AMIC) conducted a content analysis of news appearing in the Straits Times and the Nanyang Siang Pau. The study was particularly interested in the newspapers' content, source and theme. It came up with the following conclusions:

1. Local news rank highest in both papers with an average of 58.2 percent, followed by news from Asia with 31.7 percent, and news from outside Asia 15.1 percent.

2. Political and economic news from Asia and outside Asia rank fairly high in both papers. This probably reflects the city-state's heavy dependence on international and regional activities and hence the need to be well-informed.

3. At the local level, Singapore papers give higher priority to "social and community" news than to "political" news. The Chinese paper gives more space to "social and community" news, both at the local and Asian levels. (This is because the Chinese paper usually has a few pages dealing with articles on education, arts and serial stories which have been classified under the "social and community" category.)

4. "Political" news at the local level stands fourth in the Straits Times and fifth in the Nanyang, perhaps partly because Singapore is a one-party government and in the absence of an elected opposition, there is virtually no political debate. (In Singapore, party and government are synonymous. Much of the government news is information and educational.)

5. Neither of the papers is "sensational" in nature. The category on "crime, accidents, sex, etc." has less percentage and therefore stands lower in priority. However, the emphasis on "sports" is higher.

6. It is perhaps possible to conclude that the English paper performs more of an informational function and the Chinese gives

almost equal emphasis to education and information (Lim, et al., 1975). The data culled from the AMIC Report is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

Government Relationship With The Print Media. Singapore's English newspapers, The Eastern Sun and the Singapore Herald, both gained international attention when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew closed down their presses in 1971. The Eastern Sun was accused of being a fifth column newspaper run by Hongkong communists. The government accused its managing editor of securing the initial loan with which the Sun was established from a communist intelligence network. The PAP alleged that the newspaper's strategy was first to gain respectability, which would then be used by the communists to subvert Singapore.

The case of the Herald was even more celebrated. Established in 1969, the newspaper appealed to Singapore's growing well-educated middle class. It distinguished itself by publishing incisive, analytical editorials and well thought out features on government policies. It also had an outspoken "letters to the editor" page which published complaints sent in about government inefficiency and maladministration. As a reader wrote to the Herald:

The Herald is the only English paper that has the guts to criticize the government without fear. I give three cheers to the management and the staff.  
(The Herald, May 26, 1971)

During its fight to remain open, the Herald editors mounted a major defense published under the heading "Our Right to Live with Dignity" saying,



Table 2. -- Percentage Distribution of News Appearing in the Straits Times (Feb. 21 to Feb. 27, 1975) and the Nanyang Siang Pau (Feb. 28 to Mar. 6, 1975) According to Source and Content.<sup>a</sup>

Source and Content	Straits Times	Nanyang Siang Pau	Average
LOCAL (Singapore)	55.6 (18,489.5)	60.8 (37,192)	58.2 (27,840.7)
Political	12.1	5.6	8.8
Economic	30.1	24.7	27.4
Social & Community	29.1	51.3	40.2
Crime, accidents, etc.	10.0	2.4	6.2
Sports	12.2	5.9	9.1
Miscellaneous	6.5	10.1	8.3
ASIAN	23.9 (7,941.5)	29.6 (18,050)	31.7 (12,995.8)
Political	30.0	17.1	23.6
Economic	18.3	18.8	18.5
Social & Community	11.7	36.3	24.0
Crime, accidents, etc.	14.5	6.3	10.4
Sports	18.2	20.2	19.2
Miscellaneous	7.3	1.3	4.3
OUTSIDE ASIA	20.5 (6,823.5)	9.6 (5,852)	15.1 (6,337.8)
Political	26.1	27.5	26.8
Economic	34.0	42.1	38.1
Social & Community	13.7	13.0	13.3
Crime, accidents, etc.	9.0	5.9	7.5
Sports	9.4	8.4	8.9
Miscellaneous	7.8	3.1	5.4
TOTAL	100.0 (33,254.5 col/cms )	100.0 (61,094 col/cms)	100.0 (47,174.3 col/cms )

<sup>a</sup> Source: Lim (1975)



Table 3. -- Percentage Distribution of News Appearing in the Straits Times (Feb. 21 to Feb. 27, 1975) and the Nanyang Siang Pau (Feb. 28 to Mar. 6, 1975) According to Content.<sup>a</sup>

<u>Source and Content</u>	<u>Straits Times</u>	<u>Nanyang Siang Pau</u>	<u>Average</u>
Political	19.4	11.1	15.3
Economic	28.0	24.6	26.3
Social & Community	21.8	43.2	32.5
Crime, accidents, etc.	10.9	3.9	7.4
Sports	13.0	10.6	11.8
Miscellaneous	6.9	6.6	6.7
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(33,254.4 col/cms)	(61,094 col/cms)	(47,174.3 col/cms)

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<sup>a</sup> Source: Lim (1975)

Unless we defend ourselves publicly, we may be forced to disappear from the Singapore scene under a clinging morass of half-truths, innuendoes and downright inanity. (The Herald, May 1971)

The "Save the Herald" campaign gained broad-based mass support from individuals and institutions both in Singapore and abroad. Big display advertisements were bought by sympathizers and thousands of dollars were contributed to the fund. In a matter of ten days, the paper's daily circulation changed from 12,500 daily to 50,000 (Polsky, 1971).

For this, the PAP government revoked its printing license, accusing the newspaper of negatively influencing Singaporeans' attitudes toward basic national issues. Lee Kuan Yew rationalized his action stating:

The Singapore government had the responsibility to neutralize the attempts of foreign agencies and communists to make political gains by shaping opinions and attitudes of Singaporeans.

In such a situation, freedom of the press, freedom of news media must be subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore and to the privacy of purpose of an elected government. (Lee, 1971)

Also a major issue during the Singapore press controversy in 1971 was the arrest and detention of Nanyang Siang Pau's four top executives on charges of "glamourizing the communist way of life" and trying "to stir Chinese racial emotions." It was alleged that the newspaper published too much news about China, to the exclusion of coverage of other parts of the world. The PAP likewise did not appreciate the Nanyang's stand on the controversial language issue then a target of widespread controversy in the country. The newspaper had praised the use of Mandarin in Parliament (as opposed to

the use of English) and also encouraged their readers to send their children to Chinese schools to preserve the Chinese language, culture and way of life. It highlighted the dissatisfaction felt by the Chinese-educated in Singapore over the growing pre-eminence of the English language in the country. Towards the last quarter of 1970, the paper started featuring strongly worded letters-to-the-editor, feature articles and editorials on the matter. The Nanyang Siang Pau was thus viewed as "an opposition to the officially sponsored cultural linguistic identity by advocating a regressive Chinese identity (Chan, 1972)."

Today, smarting from their defeat at the swift detention of their leaders, the present editors of the newspaper declare, "We exist basically for one reason and that is to make money. The Nanyang Siang Pau is basically a commercial enterprise and profit is our goal (Goh interview, 1975)." They state their policies to be (on international news) following the government-sponsored policy of non-alignment such that all countries are treated equally in terms of coverage, and (on domestic news) avoiding controversial issues such as race, language and religion.

The Malay press has not been spared PAP accusations of both communist and communalist journalism. In June 1976, Hussein Jahidin, editor of the Berita Harian Singapore (the Malay newspaper of the Straits Times group), was arrested. A statement later released by the Ministry of Home Affairs said:

The BHS consistently reported news on communism and the Muslim religion in a manner inconsistent with responsible and objective editorship. Articles and news reports had been slanted so as to put communism

in a favorable light whilst others simultaneously attacked Islamic tenets. Hussein's broadcasts showed a consistent pattern in that all the topics chosen by him were based only on the victories and successes of revolutionary struggle of the communists in Indochina. (Senkuttuvan, 1976)

Government leaders said the strategy used was to work up discontent and despair among the Malays and to convince them that communism was an alternative to solve their problems.

Very clearly, then, the crucial issue in the Singapore press is government control. The Singapore legislature has enacted several laws which restrict the free workings of the press in the country. These laws are the Newspaper and Printing Press Act, the Printers and Publishers Act, the Undesirable Publications Act and the Internal Security Act. A more complete discussion of these legislations is contained in a later section of this study.

Apart from direct censorship, the government also exercises indirect controls in the form of phone calls made by government officials to editors for cooperation in the name of "national interest." The PAP government is sensitive to domestic criticism and does not hesitate to act when it feels threatened. However, a ranking editor of the English leading newspaper, the Straits Times, states that one can publish critical articles provided you meet three conditions: (1) your claims are documented by solid evidence, (2) you offer alternatives or solutions to the problems you discuss and (3) the attack is not personal, that is, one may attack ministries and ministry policies, but not ministers (Lim interview, 1975).

The Broadcast Media (1) History. Broadcasting in Singapore is operated and regulated by the government through the Department of Broadcasting in the Ministry of Culture. The industry dates back to 1935 when the British-Malaya Broadcasting Corporation was established as a commercial enterprise. The first regular radio transmissions were started in 1936 under the call-sign ZHL operating on the frequency of 1333Kc/s on the 225 meter band. Four years later the government purchased the company and operated it as the "Broadcasting Station, Posts and Telegraph Department, Singapore and the Federated Malay States." From the years 1941-1945, following major politico-historical developments on the island, the broadcasting system changed administration from a semi-government operation (jointly controlled by the British and local colonial governments) to a Japanese wartime station and, after the war, to a British military controlled publicity unit, finally being reorganized into the "Radio Malaya, Singapore and the Federation of Malaya" in 1946 when civilian government was restored.

In 1959 the operation was split into two entities, "Radio Singapore" on the island and "Radio Malaya" on the peninsula, but eventually joined together once more when Singapore became part of the Federation of Malaysia. When Singapore declared its independence in 1965, responsibility for broadcasting was turned over to the Ministry of Culture under which it operates to this day. "Television Singapura" was first introduced in February 1963 and, together with the radio facilities, forms the government network Radio-Television



Singapore (RTS). Television color transmissions were introduced into the country in 1974.

Apart from RTS, there is a commercial radio broadcasting organization existing known as Rediffusion (Singapore) Private Ltd. It has operated a wired system under government franchise since 1949. Two programs originate from its studios: Gold Network (Chinese) and Silver Network (Chinese and English) reaching more than 80,000 subscribers throughout Singapore.

Likewise, there is an Educational Media Service established in 1967. It is administered by the Ministry of Education with programs planned, produced and recorded by the Teachers' Training College. Transmitted on one of RTS's TV channels, the programs are intended exclusively for school use.

Radio-Television Singapore, however, remains the main broadcasting facility and is, in effect, the Broadcasting Department of the Ministry of Culture entrusted "with the responsibility of interpreting the long-term objectives and policies of the government, and particularly in maintaining a sense of national identity (RTS Publication, 1973)." Funding for RTS operations is derived from an annual subsidy from Treasury Funds (approximately S\$9 million) and revenue from license fees collected. Radio licenses each at S\$12 a year entitle licensees to operate any number of radio sets (except car radios) at any given address. The combined license fee for operating radio and television sets is S\$36 a year. License fees are collected by the Postal Department but enforcement of payment falls under the Inland Revenue Department. According to



the Ministry of Finance, 336,699 radio and 270,163 television licenses were issued in 1975. In addition to the collected revenue, each language service has sponsored programs and commercial advertisements. It must be noted though that no ads are allowed to interfere with news, public service, serious music, documentaries and feature programs (Tan, 1974).

Structure and Operations. Radio-Television Singapore has five main divisions: Engineering, Commercial, News, Central Production Unit and Programming. The Engineering Department provides an integrated service for both radio and television. It is in charge of operational and equipment maintenance and also does hardware planning for the network.

An advertising service in the four official languages is run by RTS through its Commercial Division for both radio and television. All commercials conform to the government's policy and the RTS Programme Code and Advertising Copy Policy.

The News Division is an integrated unit with staff working for both radio and television. International news copy is taken from the wire services and local news is covered by the department's own reporters and camera crews. Most of the local news however consists of government-sponsored functions and activities. Bulletins and press releases from the different ministries are invariably featured and ministers' speeches are widely quoted (the quotes often being personally chosen by the ministers themselves). The news broadcasts are made in the four official languages and, for this purpose, the division operates four different desks, one for each language.

Although the Tamil (Indian) newscast may carry a story on the death of an Indian statesman which copy may be deleted from the Malay or Chinese bulletins, or vice versa, the newscasts, as a rule, are similar in content with the headline stories very seldom, if at all, differing. The work then of the different language desks is primarily translation of the copy submitted to them by the reporter-staffs. It is also interesting to note that news bulletins in one medium (TV, for example) are often repetitions of newscasts in the other medium (radio) with minor changes to adapt to the change in venue.

The organizational set-up of the News Division likewise gives an indication of the relative importance of each language stream in the treatment of news in Singapore. As originally established, the news staff was divided into two parts, one headed by the Controller for English news and a second for the other streams (Chinese, Malay and Tamil). A major policy decision resulted in the recent creation of a major position, that of "II Controller News" who was charged with taking care of all Chinese news programming and Chinese Public Affairs shows. It was apparently felt that the previous working set-up did not genuinely reflect the actual composition of the population, and that Chinese programming should be given more attention. "I Controller News" was given the responsibility for the newscasts in English, Malay and Tamil.

RTS's Central Production Unit (CPU) is basically the propaganda unit of the government. It produces films, filmlets, slides, forums, talk shows and radio/TV documentaries on government programs and

government policies. Political, social and economic developments in and around the republic are analyzed, but the shows invariably follow government thinking. Produced for both radio and television in all four languages, "CPU programmes give the rationale for government action, explain the aims of government policy, and suggest to the audience a particular way or choice (RTS Publication, 1973)."

The RTS Programming Division is in charge of acquiring, for local radio and television airing, shows from abroad including long films to cater to the Chinese, Indian and Malay sectors of the Singapore population. Films are imported from the U.S., U.K. Hong Kong, Taiwan, India and Indonesia. RTS studios also produce programs on many aspects of information, community service and entertainment including talks, drama, music, variety shows, adult education, sports, children and youth and women's programs. With the city-state's multilingual populace, a subtitling service is provided in all four main languages.

Programming. RTS operates two television channels, four AM radio stations and an FM stereo service. The network broadcasts in the four official languages of the country:

No. of TV Channels	:	2 (Channels 5 & 8)
No. of Radio Channels	:	4
		Medium Wave Service
Channel 1 (English)	:	630 kHz      476 m
		790 kHz      380 m
Channel 2 (Malay)	:	990 kHz      303 m
		790 kHz      380 m
Channel 3 (Chinese)	:	680 kHz      441 m
		790 kHz      380 m
Channel 4 (Indian)	:	1370 kHz     219 m
		790 kHz      380 m

An official government policy sets the ratio of different language programming as 20 percent Malay, 35 percent Chinese, 10 percent Tamil and 35 percent English (Jek, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 28). This time apportionment is a policy based on the 1957 Census of Population where respondents indicated the language they "can speak best in." Translated into actual operation, Channel 5 broadcasts basically in Malay and English and Channel 8 in Chinese and Tamil. However since English and Chinese are allotted 35 percent each of broadcast time, programs in the two languages may be viewed on both channels to meet the requirements. An RTS report submitted to Parliament (Notice Paper No. 80 of 1975) stated the actual breakdown of program allocation as:

Radio:	Malay-----	126 hours (25%)
	Chinese----	147 hours (29%)
	Tamil-----	105 hours (21%)
	English----	126 hours (25%)
Television:	Malay-----	11 hours 25 mins. (11%)
	Chinese----	26 hrs. (25%)
	Tamil-----	9 hrs. 20 mins ( 9%)
	English----	57 hrs. 15 mins. (55%)

Vernon Palmer, RTS Controller for Program Administration, in an interview, disclosed that 39 percent of television programs aired on RTS are locally produced. On the other hand, 90 percent of radio shows are locally produced with the remaining slots imported from abroad mainly musical variety and educational shows from Deutsche Welle, Radio New Zealand, French R/TV, Swiss Broadcasting, Australian

Corporation and the BBC. Classical music programs are emphasized but there is a policy of featuring at least one variety show per language stream every week.

Palmer also disclosed RTS figures (1975) showing the percentage of television shows according to program content:

I. Locally Produced Programs	Channel 5	Channel 8
Education/Information	12.9%	21.92%
Entertainment	12.9%	14.23%
II. Foreign Produced Programs		
Education/Information	1.2%	2.31%
Entertainment	65.8%	61.54%

A more detailed breakdown of RTS Television programming was given by V. G. Krishnan, RTS Film Organizer. Based on September 1975 statistics, the breakdown was as follows:

Breakdown of Programming:

	Total %	Local Productions %	Foreign Productions %
Chinese	24.44	37.64	17.02
Malay	11.19	29.62	0.83
Tamil	8.33	16.73	3.63
English	56.04	16.06	78.52

Breakdown by Program Categories:

Education/Information	29.01%	Westerns	4.01%
Feature Films	18.27	Mystery	2.88
Drama	17.15	Sports	2.64
Music & Musical Variety	7.77	Daytime Serials	2.56
Comedy	4.49	Adventures	2.24

## Breakdown by Program Categories (continued):

Children/Youth	4.33%	Quiz and Games	0.40%
Cartoon	4.26		

Breakdown of Imported Programs:

Drama	26%	Sports	6%
Education/Information	15	Daytime Serials	6
Comedy	10	Adventure	5
Cartoon	9	Children/Youth	4
Westerns	9	Music and Musical Variety	3
Mystery	6	Quiz and Games	0.9

Breakdown of Local Productions:

Information/Education	61.45%
Drama	14.7
Music and Musical Variety	11.13
Culture and Arts	6.08
Children and Youth	6.69

Breakdown of Local Productions by Language Stream:

	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Malay</u>	<u>Tamil</u>	<u>English</u>
News and Newsreels (Educ/Info)	6.46%	6.01%	6.01%	8.46%
Magazine Format (Educ/Info)	6.90	4.01	2.45	4.23
Public Affairs (Educ/Info)	8.24	5.79	1.11	1.78
Drama	6.46	6.01	2.23	--
Music and Musical Variety	4.90	4.23	2.00	--
Arts/Cultural	1.56	1.34	1.59	1.59
Youth/Children	3.12	2.23	1.34	--



In terms of RTS radio programming, an analysis was conducted by the Asian Mass Media Research and Information Centre (AMRIC) with the following conclusions:

1. Radio in Singapore is primarily entertainment-oriented. Seventy-five percent of the shows are of popular music, folk/classical music, and radio drama.
2. In terms of flow of information, 43 percent were local productions, 33 percent were Asian programmes, and 23.9 percent from outside Asia.
3. A majority of the imported programmes (85 percent) were classifiable under entertainment mostly popular, classical and folk music. This was explained by the easy access Singapore has to records and tapes from the U.S., U.K., Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and India.
4. "Current affairs" programmes featured are mainly those produced by the Central Production Unit of RTS.

When an analysis of program content is made, one must also consider the process of program planning and feedback mechanisms. In the case of RTS, there is a "Department of Broadcasting Directorate," theoretically the body which makes the major programming decisions. As listed in the official RTS Directory, the group is composed of the Minister of Culture, the Director of Broadcasting, the Deputy-Director of Broadcasting, and the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for Culture. The Directorate, however, rarely meets. What does convene on occasions is the RTS Management Committee which discusses and decides budget allocations, programming changes,

Table 4. -- Percentage Distribution of Radio Programmes Broadcast in Singapore (Channels 1, 2, 3, 4) from February 24 to March 2, 1975, According to Theme<sup>a</sup>

<u>Theme</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Current Affairs	7.2
Children	3.1
Crime and Violence	.1
Entertainment Shows	49.1
Drama	10.5
Folk/Classical	17.4
Documentaries	2.5
Long Films	.5
Miscellaneous	5.4
Educational	4.2
TOTAL	100.0
	(25,755.0 minutes)

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<sup>a</sup> Source: Lim (1975)

program placements and other such issues. The committee is made up of the Director of Broadcasting, the Chief Engineer, the Commercial Manager, the Controller for Program Administration, the Controller for the Central Production Unit, the two Controllers News, the Controller Services, the Head of the Administrative Section, the RTS Chief Accountant and the Senior Executive Engineer of the network.

However, for all practical purposes, program plans are made annually whenever the Department of Broadcasting proposes its budget for the year to Parliament. Most of the program classifications, for example, are set as broadcast time blocks allotted to each language stream for television. There are broadcasting policies which are "side effect" policies, as it were, of major PAP decisions. In the case of the language programming quotas, this is a consequence of the government's strict adherence to multiculturalism and multilingualism. Although, admittedly, the intent of the policy is good, its implementation by the RTS staff leaves much to be desired. Being civil servants, their main preoccupation is the implementation of the word of the law, sometimes to the detriment of its spirit. The researcher found it not uncommon for RTS officials to display concern over the number of shows they had in the Tamil language, for example, to meet the requirement, without an equal interest in the quality of the programs they were importing. Very many of the long films were re-run countless times for the purpose of logging in time for the specific language quota. Media critic Edgar Koh of the New Nation comments:

. . . The mass media are still content with only a spectator--and not a creative and leading--role. RTS only records and telecasts--rarely choreographs and

composes--local music and drama . . . . The valid criticism is that RTS has not garnered together, analyzed and explained all the various cultural heritages, trends and forces in the country . . . . There is no doubt that Singapore has reached a stage when conscious cultural planning is necessary to involve all the cultural representation here. Television, through its visual and audio facilities, has to play a big part in proposing and explaining this integration process to the people. (Koh, 1973)

Added to this is the question of feedback. RTS has publicly acknowledged that it is "not equipped for proper audience research (Notice Paper No. 80 of 1975)." Presently, they mainly rely on (1) letters sent to the Department of Broadcasting from viewers and listeners, (2) letters sent in response to quizzes, competitions featured in programmes and (3) telephone calls made to the Department. Obviously, this type of gauge is limited in coverage and even the letters to the editor which enjoy a wider base of support and readership is not enough:

Up to now Television Singapore has yet to conduct a public survey to find out what are preferences of viewers. Beyond relying empirically on telephone calls and letters, it has made no attempt to find out what viewers want. Indeed, it has all along given viewers, in its opinion, what they ought to want. . . . It is ironical that mass media has to rely on another mass media, the press, to maintain contact with viewers who write letters to the editor. (Koh, 1973)

A few in the RTS hierarchy privately admit that the biggest problem facing them right now is that they are fast losing their young audience. Because they program their broadcast hours from a standpoint of monopoly, the majority of the shows which get aired are either old movies imported from Taiwan and other countries or propaganda talk shows and documentaries produced by CPU, neither of which appeal to the young audience:

I wonder if I could express some of the more common feelings of us youths. It is a feeling born of restrictions and bans. . . . Creativity and a sense of freedom are always shrouded by censure and control . . . There is a lack of a sense of 'doing your own thing.' Instead there is a sense of being manipulated. For example, the TV programs of RTS are getting duller and duller. All we get are shows that are antique-flavored, flat, more suitable for grandparents. Perhaps this is an overprotective attempt at injecting only the 'good' type of culture into our 'young and impressionable minds.' . . . Are the whole mass of us of such poor mentality? Perhaps it actually reflects on the mentality of the persons in charge. . . . Will we always be manipulated? (Letter to the Editor, Straits Times, February 8, 1971)

Government Relationship With The Broadcast Media. S. Rajaratnam, PAP theoretician, stated the function of broadcasting in Singapore as the Party sees it, "Through TV, we were able to project, in a very dramatic way, our point of view and, on the whole, I think we have been fairly successful at that (Koh, 1973)."

With both radio and television controlled and operated by the government's Broadcasting Department, the character of the industry seems unlikely to change. RTS programs its broadcast hours with very little regard for what its audience may want:

All along it [RTS] has been operating under a misconception that information and education--its euphemism for propaganda--were the main reasons for its existence. On the other hand, the majority of viewers have tuned in with an equally unmitigated misconception that RTS exists mainly for an evening of entertainment.

There is not much two-way communication in this communications business. (Koh, 1973)

The propaganda function of broadcasting in Singapore can also be seen within the context of actual news operation in RTS. Based on the researcher's interviews with various people both presently



and previously employed with the network, it was apparent that news copy goes through a system of controls prior to broadcast. The chief editor gives assignments to reporters and camera crews. A copy of the stories they come out with is given to each language editor who is responsible for deciding whether it goes on air or not. If the story is judged to be "politically sensitive," the language desk editor usually defers to the chief editor for a decision. The chief editor also checks film footage coming in from the field. Instructions to editors and sub-editors of each language desk are also recorded in a log book which often contains detailed guidelines from the chief editor and the "Controller News" as to how stories should be treated for either emphasis or de-emphasis. The Controller News also reads the final script and previews film footage prior to actual broadcast. All scripts are submitted for review to the Director of Broadcasting the next day and the copy comes back with her personal comments ranging from corrections of grammatical mistakes to pointers on how the "slant" of any story should have been different.

One line from the RTS tenth anniversary programme sums up the situation, "We leave you [the viewer] no choice."

Other Communication Structures. Aside from the mass media, other socializing forces in the society were used by the government in its campaign to create a national identity, with the PAP even creating some of its own when needed. Among the venues used are the education system, political re-orientation programs, meet-the-people sessions, national drives and community centers.



Education played an essential role in producing a "pyramidal meritocracy with each social class well-trained in, and unquestioning of, its tasks (Ho, 1976)." The Prime Minister was fond of referring to each person as a "digit" and his critics were quick to point out his creating a system where "the children would be raw materials and the schools the factories responsible for manufacturing products for the use of the state (Bell, 1972)." Basic to the education policy was the proposal to use a "streaming" process, a series of academic hurdles designed to maximize the efficient production of personnel and manpower for the economy. Primary school applicants were to be rated according to their family background, pre-school education, language aptitude and home environment. Those with similar backgrounds were slotted together and those who fail to make the grade are streamed into classes teaching basic technical skills in preparation for their admittance to government apprenticeship programmes. On the pre-university level, students were given ten lecture courses on "Singapore and the Modern World" with individual talks on such topics as "Graduates and National Service," "Democratic Socialism in the Singapore Context," "Student Revolt and Responsible Participation in National Development." These lectures were duplicated to other agencies and institutions like civic clubs, the YWCA and the Red Cross.

Another education policy which was used to forge a cohesive Singaporean society was that of bilingualism defined by PAP leaders to mean the learning of the child's mother ethnic tongue plus English, the latter being envisioned to be the common language

cementing Singapore's varied cultures together. The promotion of the English language resulted in a de-emphasis of the traditional cultures as they existed in Singapore and gave greater impetus to modern values concomitant with science and technology.

To reach its own employees and civil servants, the government instituted an intensive re-education program through the establishment of the "Political Study Center." The Center conducted seminars and study courses "explaining Singapore to Singaporeans (George, 1973)." Its work later taken over by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the program nevertheless flourished. It operated specialized courses for the Police Academy, for the armed forces, for civil servants, for schools and for trade unions. Subjects covered included "Dynamics of Nation-Building," "Communism in Singapore," and "Southeast Asia in the 1970s":

The lectures invariably propagated the notion of Singapore as Lee Kuan Yew envisaged it, condemned all other notions as unpatriotic and explained why it was the duty of government servants to identify themselves with the political leadership and help establish its ideology. (George, 1973)

The Government of Singapore also created the Ministry of Culture which was:

. . . charged with the mission of taking the lead in developing our national arts and culture. It is also responsible for creating a national cultural image. It must inculcate in our people a sense of national consciousness and patriotism. It also has the duty of imposing censorship on publications and books in order to remove any material that may poison the minds of our people. (Teong, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 30)

The creation of the new ministry was premised on the principle that a "cultural revolution" was needed to sustain and reinforce the

political and economic revolution that the PAP had already started. The Ministry of Culture has, under its wings, the Department of Broadcasting, the National Museum, Film Censorship and the National Archives and Records Center, among others.

PAP leaders have likewise instituted channels to keep them informed of grassroots demands and needs. In the "Meet the People Sessions," members of Parliament visit their constituencies every week during which time individual citizens personally bring up their own problems to their elected representative without having to go through the usual bureaucratic chain of communications. The M.P.s take these "consultative meetings" seriously and they often find solutions to the matters brought to them,

. . . and this is in fact not too difficult since most of the expressed demands are not grandiose but rather mundane and limited to such as better roads, electricity, better water supply, more compensation on re-settlement, school placement and employment.  
(Chan, 1973)

The sessions are not only used to diffuse local discontent. The M.P.s also spend time during the meetings explaining and justifying government programs and policies.

Another method used by Singapore are the "national drives" which are in actuality mass campaigns designed to promote either attitudinal or behavioral change for specific developmental goals. Usually spearheaded by a government ministry, the drive is administered by a coordinating committee which includes various members of the mass media and officials from other government agencies whose jobs are somehow related to the issue being promoted. Representatives from the print media and officials from RTS are specially

tapped for the purpose of designing the communication strategy to be used in the campaign. They decide the media mix to be used in the promotional advertising: quality and quantity of posters, design of pamphlets and brochures, how the community centers may be utilized, etc. Most often, RTS produces the films, filmlets, forums and drama segments used to highlight the campaign. Some of the more comprehensive campaigns so far launched by the government have been "Keep Singapore Clean," "Use Your Hands," and "Boy or Girl, Two is Enough."

In 1960, the PAP government created one of the more major instruments it uses for its "important social engineering and mobilization tasks (Chan, 1973)." Legislation No. 35 of 1960 created the "People's Association," a statutory board with a Board of Management consisting of the Prime Minister as chairman, a minister as deputy chairman with partly appointed and partly elected members from among seventy-two corporations representing the youth, cultural and sports organizations in Singapore (Tan, 1973). The People's Association Tenth Anniversary Souvenir Programme lists the following as the organization's main functions.

1. To ensure close mingling of the peoples of various races, cultures and religions and thus lead to the creation of a closely-knit multi-racial, multi-cultural, and multi-religious society.
2. To establish a two-way communication system between the government and the people.

3. To provide recreational, cultural, sports and vocational training activities and facilities for the people, particularly those in the lower income group.
4. To provide various types of activities to serve as an outlet for the surplus energy of youths.
5. To provide useful community services for the people in the form of mobile libraries, primary production extension service to farmers, civic tours, changing of addresses on national registration identity cards, family planning clinics, etc.
6. To encourage "gracious living," cultural activities are a common feature in many community centers, which enable people to participate in the cultural activities of other ethnic groups.

Community center buildings were set up in the different constituencies to provide an activity area and a meeting place for those actively involved in the Association. Various government leaders and members of Parliament give speeches at the community centers. It is also a recreational place where people come to enjoy radio and television shows, play games and attend classes. Sewing, cooking, folk dancing and handicraft courses are offered for adults, and kindergarten classes are held for children. Various youth and women's voluntary committees are formed to give citizens "outlets for involvement (Seah, 1975)."

Chan (1973) points out three interesting developments brought about by the People's Association. First, all major youth, cultural



and sports organizations were affiliated to the People's Association, giving this body the right to influence their activities. Second, community centers were put up in the different electoral constituencies to promote popular participation in the Association's activities and facilities. The rationale behind this was the PAP's belief that "involvement in local neighborhood-focused activity would encourage identification with and loyalty to the government and State." Third, a National Youth Training Institute was opened to provide leadership education for local youths who were to assume leadership functions in their respective community centers.

By their very nature of promoting government-sponsored activities and programs, these institutions do actively take on socialization functions of encouraging PAP-sanctioned ideals and policies such as the acceptance of a multilingual, multicultural, non-communist society.

Two organizational channels were instituted by the PAP to strengthen their link with the local communities. These were the Citizens' Consultative Committee (CCC) in every electoral constituency and the Management Committee in each community center. The two bodies perform similar functions and their memberships sometimes overlap. Participants in the two institutions come from the same socioeconomic background with most members being medium and small businessmen, trade guild leaders, teachers and principals. These "local leaders" are nominated by the M.P. of the particular constituency after which their applications are screened by governmental agencies for the



nominees' political reliability and social integrity before they are given final acceptance.

The Citizens' Consultative Committees were put together to act as intermediaries between the PAP government and the local populace. It was a body to which complaints and demands may be brought up and which in turn were to articulate these concerns to the proper agencies and authorities. In a similar vein, the Management Committees of the community centers were "to transmit to the government . . . information on the needs of the neighborhood and to keep them [the people] informed of the government action and policy (People's Association, 1965)." Aside from this, the Management Committees were to manage the community centers as well as organize activities for them.

Foreign Minister Rajaratnam states:

These committees [The Citizens' Consultative Committees and the Management Committees of the community centers] are in fact the local parliament where citizens can discuss, criticize and recommend to government what should be done to improve the welfare of the community in a given area. (Chan, 1973)

Not everything works as in theory, however, as evidenced by complaints from some of the participants. Chan testifies to demoralization among CCC members caused by many bureaucratic rejections of their proposals and a constant disregard for the grassroots suggestions. She cites the specific case of Telok Ayer where the committee expressed this grievance:

The PAP government is too authoritarian in its demands. Their attitude is--we want this done and you do it. We report the people's wishes but the government carries on its policies with little regard for our reports. No explanation is given of its policies. The CCC appears

to be ineffective. The people in the streets are saying--you are supposed to be for the people, but you can do nothing. (Chan, 1973)

Bringing together these local leaders into government-sponsored organizations such as the CCCs and the Management Committees is a major achievement of the PAP, however. Chan points out that by nominating traditional leaders from the different racial communities, the PAP has guaranteed them a place in the formal political structure, thus harnessing the loyalty of wealthy and influential interest groups which could have been used as the bases for organizing opposition against the government. In effect, the government has formed a loose alliance with these well-connected social groups, activating their leaders to the PAP's advantage and, more important, strengthening the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the groups' members.

Malay CCC members thought that the CCC has come to replace the Ketua Kampong as spokesman, intermediary and arbitrator among many Malays although religious matters were still referred to the traditional Malay leadership. Chinese clan associations leaders also confirmed that whereas before 1965 many of the less educated Chinese would approach them for advice concerning any dealings with the bureaucracy, they would now turn to the CCC for assistance. Many citizens who felt inhibited about contacting the party with their problems would seek mediation through the CCC. (Chan, 1973)

Government propagandist R. O. Daniel of the Ministry of Culture cites the educative role of the community centers as its primary "development communication" function saying, "Wherever the people gather, the government is there . . . to spread the right kind of positive ideas in the right direction (Daniel, n.d.)."

Whether the PAP's ideals are the "right ideas" is subject to discussion. However, one cannot deny the comprehensive communication system they have established linking the government with all constituencies. By using the mass media, the interpersonal communicative influence of the local leaders as well as the long-term socializing effect of education, the People's Action Party has demonstrated their understanding and appreciation of the value of information and information systems.

In a positive way, the PAP government has established a system whereby it is constantly informed of the pressures from the ground level. . . . If there is major discontent over any issue, the ruling party leadership is fully aware of it, but the settlement of the issue and the redress of the grievances will take place only according to its own timetable. . . . The PAP government has followed the cardinal political rule. An astute set of authorities often meets just enough demands at least so as to still any critical accumulation of discontent. In the language of practical politics, this involves offering sops or conciliatory outputs at just the right moment to head off any brewing storm of dissatisfaction. (Chan, 1973)

Media Laws. Singapore has legislated specific measures which regulate mass media operations. These are the Internal Security Act, the Broadcasting and Television Act, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, the Undesirable Publications Act, and the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act.

One of the more basic legislations which affect the mass media in Singapore is the Internal Security Act which confers wide-ranging powers in the Executive to fight subversion and to repel security threats. It provides for power of preventive detention and the restriction of an individual's movements. The minister for Home

Affairs is authorized to prohibit the printing, publication, sale, issue, circulation or possession of a document or publication deemed prejudicial to the national interest, public order or society of Singapore.

The Broadcasting and Television Act (Act 16 of 1963) grants the government the exclusive privilege of establishing any broadcasting station and installing and operating broadcast equipment. The government is the only body empowered to grant licenses for establishing such broadcast apparatus inside Singapore or in any ship, aircraft or vehicle registered in the country.

The Emergency (Essential Powers) Act of 1964 prohibits all members of the Singapore armed forces from communicating with newspapers, whether the communication pertains to a military project or one of personal and private nature. Any matter which discredits the Singapore military, or constitutes a grievance against his position as a member, is also prohibited from being discussed. The law specifies that if a member of the Singapore armed forces does communicate with any editor, proprietor, manager, printer or employee of a newspaper and that newspaper publishes the content of the complaint, the newspaper management is required to divulge the identity of the complaining member of the armed forces if the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense so requests.

The Undesirable Publications Act (Acts 3 of 1967 and 14 of 1969) prohibits the importation, sale or circulation of publications "contrary to the public interest." A ban on the publication may be enforced upon the Minister's absolute discretion. The government may

likewise prohibit the printing, sale, publication, issue, circulation or possession of documents and publications which

- (a) contains any incitement to violence; or
- (b) counsels disobedience to the law or any lawful order; or
- (c) is calculated or likely to lead to a breach of the peace, or to promote feeling of hostility between different races or classes of the population; or
- (d) is prejudicial to the national interest, public order or security of Singapore.

Under the law, any newspaper found to contain "seditious matter" may be suspended by any court.

The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Act No. 9 of 1974) reserves for the government the right to grant and withdraw licenses for the operation of printing presses in Singapore. Likewise, all newspapers have to be published by "newspaper companies" in which:

- (a) all the directors are Singapore citizens,
- (b) there are two types of shares: ordinary and management shares, and
- (c) no management shares may be issued or transferred except to Singapore citizens and corporations which have been granted specific approval by the government.

Furthermore, no newspaper may refuse to issue shares to a person who has been granted approval by the government to purchase such shares. Every management share carries two hundred votes in any resolution relating to the appointment or dismissal of any director or member of the staff of the newspaper company. What this Act, in effect,



has done is "give the government the power to decide who will run newspapers, which in the given circumstances, also means the power to decide how they will run (Chopra, 1975)." The law also stipulates that a newspaper or a journalist is prohibited from receiving foreign funds without the approval of the government:

Management will be free to operate the newspapers as commercial enterprises, provided they ensure that there is no manipulation by foreign elements and that no attempt is made by them, or through their proxies, to glorify undesirable viewpoints and philosophies. (Jek, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 33)

Strict media regulation and a one-way communication policy based on the PAP's autocratic rules has resulted in what Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee himself has termed "a depressing climate of intellectual sterility (Ma, 1971)." Singapore watchers echo the same view:

It is showing signs of becoming, under the impact of PAP autocracy, an uncritical conformist society which even believes its own propaganda. It does what it is told. It thinks what it is told. There is little internal criticism, little public questioning, no cleansing debate. . . . The story is familiar. The people are told what the Government thinks is good for them, so that there is little informed awareness of what is going on and no way of disputing government decisions. . . . One phone call by a minister to a newspaper will make sure that an unwanted speech or statement will not be reported. Newspaper proprietors and editors, who publish under license at the government's pleasure, are generally most careful not to print anything or write anything that will incur the government's displeasure. . . . A newspaper which opens its columns or its editorial mouth to criticize the government or reflect on its policies will quickly face extinction if it persists. (McKie, 1972)

Also as a side result, the mass media are being discredited because of the wide disparity between what the public experiences as reality and what the press reports.



### The Planning Process and Bureaucracy

Planning authority in Singapore rests on the Planning Department under the Ministry of Law and National Development. It has two main divisions: the Development Planning Division and the Development Control Division. Among its major functions is the preparation of comprehensive, long-range physical plans which serve as guidelines for the government's physical development decisions. The Department is also charged with the responsibility of updating the Statutory Master Plan.

The principal statute which governs physical planning and development in Singapore is the Planning Act (No. 12 of 1959). The legislation is administered by both the Planning Department and the Building Control Division of the Public Works Department. The Statutory Master Plan, mandated by the Planning Act, was first drawn and approved by the government in 1958. It is prepared and revised by the Chief Planner and before its legal adoption, it goes through a process of public exhibition and inquiry during which time objections may be lodged against its proposals. The Singapore Master Plan has gone through two revisions, the first in 1966 and a second in 1970.

Many public development agencies undertake collaborative planning with the Planning Department in relation with their respective large-scale projects. Among the more prominent ones would be the Housing and Development Board in terms of its public housing plans, the Jurong Town Corporation in the establishment of Jurong Industrial Town and other outside industrial complexes, and the Urban

Redevelopment Authority in terms of urban renewal. Other agencies in the public sector which participate in the implementation of the Master Plan are the Public Works Department concerning road development and the establishment of schools, hospitals and parks; the Ministry of the Environment regarding sewerage and drainage projects; and the Public Utilities Board which deals with water, power and gas supplies. The private sector likewise contributes in the implementation of the Master Plan but its contributions have been limited principally to projects on private housing for middle and upper income groups and commercial development in the form of shopping centers, hotels and high-rise offices (Wong, 1975).

In a critique on the section dealing with Singapore planning in Wong's Cities in Asia, C. T. Wu offered a modified classical model of planning. Although intended to be applied to physical planning, the model as a decision-making theory nevertheless throws light on the importance of politics in the actual planning process or machinery. Wu states, "Political decisions frame the context of the planning process through the formulation of broad goals and objectives which are to be accepted by the planners as given (Wu, 1973)."

George Thomson (1969) echoes the same sentiment in his paper on "Planning and Development of New Urban Centers."

Politics is of particular importance in current planning in Singapore. In simple terms, a nation is a home-land, and Singapore is building its national home for the first time . . . .

Planning cannot be divorced from politics, and . . . the planner must himself react to this situation. The planner has four alternatives:




Figure 1. Modified Classical Model

Source: *Cities in Asia*, James Wong, editor, University of Singapore Press, 1975.

(a) Either, on the ground that planning is a purely technical problem, he can make his own plans on what he considers a matter within his administrative and technical competence, or

(b) on the ground that the political element is subordinate and that he himself is competent to make political judgments, he can make decisions on his own knowledge, on what he believes his political leadership would like, or on his own assessment of what he can persuade the political leadership to accept, or

(c) on the ground that he is only a technical administrator, leave it to the political leadership to like it or lump it, or do his own homework, or

(d) accepting the political element, go as far as his technical and administrative competence will confidently carry him; define that limit: beyond that limit define the issues on which the political leadership must give a decision and if he wishes, suggest to the political leader, alternative political decisions and their advantages and disadvantages.

Apart from physical planning, no other planning provisions exist in Singapore. What do exist are target objectives for social programs and strategies for achieving these, with the latter being specially flexible. Singapore's leadership believes in pragmatism, in freedom for maneuvering to achieve set goals. What is held in primacy is the policy, and civil servants are charged with the duty of interpreting and implementing these as they see fit. The discharge of their duty, needless to say, is always within the context of the official government line.

As such, the planning or policy-making process, as it exists in Singapore, is simple. The major decisions are made on the Cabinet level with the Prime Minister enjoying the privilege of making the final choice. No policy exists in a vacuum, however, as all major decisions are weighed and considered within the PAP political framework. It is the same framework which guides the policies'

implementation by the civil servants at their respective levels. Operational decisions are made in the ministries by administrative functionaries, including "career ministers" who may be placed in control of government agencies to dispose of the regular functions of the office. They, however, refer back to the Prime Minister whenever faced with a major policy decision. This pattern of civil servants implementing set basic policies occurs simultaneously in various fields. For example, based on the policy of multiculturalism of the central government, the Ministry of Culture (through the Department of Broadcasting) operates radio and television programs in all four official languages of the republic. Running parallel and similarly deriving its rationale from the basic policy of multiculturalism, the Housing and Development Board has encouraged families from Singapore's different racial streams to live alongside each other in the HDB's housing complexes instead of assigning members of the same racial communities together.

Communication Policy and Planning for National Integration. In essence, a formal process of communication planning, following the classical model of goal formulation-selection of alternatives-direction action-evaluation, is hard to discern in Singapore because of the secrecy with which the PAP elite guards its decision-making process within the Party. What is clear is that policy changes in communication, along with other major concerns of the country, are deliberated upon in the Cabinet



with the Prime Minister acting as final judge and decision-maker. There are, in effect, high-profile communication policies derived from basic tenets espoused by the People's Action Party: multiculturalism, multilingualism, meritocracy. All radio and television programming consists of government ideas converted into broadcasting shows, while privately-owned newspaper companies are tolerated as long as they remain "profit-seeking business concerns and keep off politics (George, 1973)." The only media concerns which are planned long-range are those which involve infrastructure. The introduction of color broadcasting, for example, was a Cabinet decision which involved planning since it brought with it questions on resource allocation, manpower training, union pay schemes and budgets for the purchase of equipment.

In the promotion of national integration, the same pattern of decision-making described in the previous section on planning process was found evident by the researcher. The communication aspect only followed after the basic social policy was laid out and, in most cases, the government stand was unambiguous. Radio-Television Singapore was established with the primary purpose of carrying on "the responsibility of interpreting the long-term objectives and policies of the government, and particularly in maintaining a sense of national identity [underscoring supplied] (RTS Publication, 1973).



The actual operations of the mass media were based on a communication policy stemming from the PAP's tenet of multiculturalism. Hence, we find strict regulations against "communalist" or racially-partisan journalism and strict broadcast time quotas for the different languages in RTS programming. All of these subregulations and press guidelines, however, are only the practical expression of the more basic cultural and linguistic policies of the ruling party. It should be noted that the multicultural communication policy of Singapore has not changed since it was first enunciated. This is simply because the principles on which the PAP runs Singapore have similarly remained unchanged, all the more underscoring the importance of political decisions in the planning process in the country.

The implementation of such media regulation is handled by civil servants handpicked by the Prime Minister to occupy the major positions in the government offices. In the case of the Department of Broadcasting, its Director Wong Lee Siok Tin enjoys the confidence and trust of the Prime Minister going back to the days when they worked together for the Singapore-Malaya merger and in the ensuing struggle of Singapore to survive within the Federation. The Minister for Culture, Jek Yeun Thong, is likewise known for his

first-hand familiarity with the local media especially with those working with the Chinese papers since he himself was a former journalist with the Chinese press in Singapore. Jek is also noted for his experience in fighting communism and communist propaganda, and it is for this reason that he is given the post he now heads.

The personnel who serve under Minister Jek and Director Wong are lower level civil servants who implement PAP policies as they relate to the regulation of the press, radio, television, cinema and the publication of books. The Ministry of Culture's various branches constitute the major gatekeepers in the flow of information in the island-republic. The Ministry's different offices (especially the Publicity Division, the Broadcasting Department and Film Censorship) are given full authority to decide which values and information to allow and which to ban. They preview and censor all films as well as ensure that all publications and broadcasting programs promote the PAP-sponsored view of the Singapore utopia. Discussion regarding government policies are allowed, but limited to questions on their implementation. The basic principles on which the "new Singapore" is built (meritocracy, multiculturalism, multilingualism) are not to be challenged.

Wong (n.d.) outlines the system of sanctions which may be brought to bear on "erring" pressmen who do dare to challenge. He theorizes that any government

. . . may control the press through the Security Act, Publication Law, Criminal Law and Constitutional Law.  
. . . There is also political suppression: the most popular being ordering the press to close down, arresting of journalists, restricting or forbidding publication of newspapers by the opposition and press

censorship. There is yet another indirect way of suppression, and that is by withholding news and information or not permitting people of the press to teach the sources of information. These devices have become popular recently. Another measure of control is the holding of 'arranged' press conferences and handing out prepared press releases to the newspapers. The government takes the initiative to disseminate news and information to the reading public in a way in accordance to the wishes of the government. Another politically restrictive measure is always to issue instructions or warnings to key men of the press so as to make them toe the line of government.

All of the methods cited by Wong are familiar to Singapore media practitioners. The system of control was highlighted during the Press Crisis of 1971 when the PAP accused specific newspapers and their management of promoting communalism and subverting the government. The sanctions used by the Singapore leadership included the jailing of Nanyang Siang Pau editors, disbarment of select pressmen from press conferences, personal reprimands, withholding of information and the closure of the Singapore Herald and the Eastern Sun.

### Guam

#### Country Profile

Basic Information. Situated in the western Pacific 3700 miles southwest of Hawaii and 1350 miles south of Yokohama is the United States' westernmost territory, Guam Island. It is approximately 217 square miles, the island being 32 miles long and ranging from four to eight miles wide. It lies at the southernmost tip of the Marianas chain, thirteen degrees above the equator. Temperature ranges from 70° to 90° with a mean annual temperature of 81°.

Guam's topography varies from the rough mountainous and hilly lands of the south to the rolling coastal lowlands and plateaus in the north. Deep trenches bordered by long, sinuous ridges exist in the surrounding seas.

Data on the island's population released in September 1975 by the Guam Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a civilian population numbering 80,000 with a median age of 18.9 years. Seventy thousand (88 percent) were U. S. citizens and the remaining were immigrant (permanent resident) aliens. About 56 percent of the people were Chamorro (descendants of the original island inhabitants), 19 percent Filipino, 9 percent Caucasian, 4 percent Chamorro-Filipino mixture, 3 percent Chamorro-Caucasian mixture, 2 percent Japanese, Chinese or Korean and 7 percent others. Most of the population live in the central and northern parts of the island where business establishments are concentrated. In addition to the civilian population, 20,000 American military personnel and dependents also live on Guam.

History. The history of Guam can be divided into three parts: Pre-western contact, the Spanish period, and the American era.

Anthropological evidence points out that Guam and the rest of the Mariana Islands were settled as early as 1500 B.C. and there are reasons to believe that the Chamorros (as the islanders are called) originated from Malaysia and came to Guam via the Philippines (Spoehr, 1957). Ancient Guam was divided into several chieftainships with no overall political authority. Settlements were small and located along the rivers and coasts and the chiefs of these settlements were accorded deep allegiance. The society was highly

stratified into distinct social classes with formal rules governing behavior between persons of low rank and persons of high status. The social position of one's parents determined his own standing and membership in social groups was passed on matrilineally. The household group extended beyond the nuclear family and each household was economically self-sufficient, although a part of the harvest was traditionally set aside as tribute for the chieftains. Rice was the staple food of the people together with bananas, breadfruit, taro and yam. Food from the seas was also abundant and eaten regularly (Wilson, 1975).

The Spanish period began on March 6, 1521, when the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan, sailing under the Spanish flag, landed on the island. This marked Guam's first recorded contact with the western world. From that time on, several voyagers visited Guam and some sailors even settled on the island. Guam then was administered by the Viceroy of Mexico and was a stopping point for the galleons which plied the Manila-Acapulco route. However, it wasn't until 1668 that Spanish missionaries and soldiers began the active Christianization and conquest of the island. At first a peaceful endeavor, the opening of the missions was backed up by Spanish arms when the native upper classes began to resent the foreign presence.

The native population soon decreased in numbers due to casualties suffered from diseases, epidemics and also from armed conflicts with the Spaniards. Many elements of the island's social organization and ancient culture were gradually lost. What occurred was a blending of old beliefs with Spanish influence. The native Chamorro language, originally Malayo-Polynesian, adopted many words



from Spanish. Hispanic culture, often modified by Mexican and Filipino influence, became the model. Rice, as a staple, was supplemented by corn which was ground on metate stones carried from Mexico on the Manila galleons. There was an extensive system of sharing and exchange of food among kinsfolk, including those acquired by marriage and godparental relationships. Various types of feasts brought people together from all parts of the island and these were occasions for households, assisted by related households, to prepare food for visitors. These social events (village fiestas for patron saints, marriages, baptisms and funerals) served to discharge whole systems of obligation between households and individuals, and likewise cemented social ties (Wilson, 1975).

On December 10, 1898, Guam was officially ceded to the United States after a payment of twenty million dollars for Spanish territorial possessions as executed by the Treaty of Paris. Political power on the island then rested with the U. S. Navy which introduced many changes in the society. Spanish priests were augmented by American priests. The U. S. Navy opened public schools. English became the official language. Wage work was introduced in the island through the military establishment. During this entire period, a dual community system existed on Guam: the local Chamorro community and the U. S. military community. Members were separated by language, culture and standard of living with no successful effort to bridge the gap (Wilson, 1975).

The American era was shortly interrupted by the Japanese occupation of the island during World War II. Island residents were



forced by the Japanese to return to farming in order to feed the occupying troops. Many were also drafted into forced labor. People were gathered in concentration camps throughout the island. The Japanese tried to win over the Guamanians by opening schools and teaching Nippon language and culture. The Guamanians, however, remained on the side of the Allies largely because of the political killings conducted by the Japanese.

American forces invaded Guam on July 21, 1944, securing the island after a bloody battle which left the capital at Agana destroyed. The American reoccupation of Guam ushered in a lot of changes. The number of military personnel did not revert back to its pre-war level of a few hundred, but remained high. The old pre-war naval station was augmented by the construction of a post-war air force base, several communications installations and a naval air station on the island. Subsistence agriculture gradually lessened as Guamanians went to work for the U. S. armed forces. Much land was appropriated, with little or no compensation, for military purposes. New residential areas were laid out by military engineers, and populations were relocated. Roadways and utilities were modernized and jeeps and automobiles were increasingly used (Wilson, 1975).

In 1946 a civilian government was instituted, but Guam remained little more than a military outpost. Executive Order 8683 authorized the Navy to control entry to the "Guam Island Naval Defense Sea Area and Airspace Reservation."

In 1950 the Organic Act was passed by the U. S. Congress and signed into law by President Harry Truamn, thereby changing the

status of Guam from a possession to an unincorporated territory of the United States. By definition, most provisions of the U. S. constitution would not of their own force become operative in an unincorporated territory but would require positive congressional action in order to fully apply. Only basic fundamental principles inherent in the constitution would apply automatically in unincorporated territories.

The Guam civilian administration was headed by a governor appointed by the U. S. President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The government consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative and the judicial. All administrative relations between the territory and the federal government are placed under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Department of Interior. The Act also provided that income tax laws in force in the United States be applied in Guam with the collected revenues being deposited in the Treasury of Guam for use by the Guam government. Prior to this Guam had no income tax. In the same year Typhoon Karen swept the island, leaving death and destruction in its wake. This brought Federal rehabilitation funds which were used to modernize facilities. A construction boom ensued to replace the buildings which were damaged. The latter brought many alien contract workers and immigrants into Guam which has changed the island's ethnic composition considerably.

November 1970 proved to be another milestone in Guam history as the populace turned out to elect its first Governor. The elected Governor assumed the responsibility of executing the laws of the Territory as mandated by the Organic Act of 1950.

The island has (since 1950) had a unicameral legislature consisting of twenty-one senators elected at large for two-year terms. The District Court of Guam, with the judge appointed by the President of the United States for a term of eight years, serves as the federal court of Guam. The District Court of Guam, like a U. S. District Court, has jurisdiction over all cases arising under the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, while the Superior Court of Guam handles all other cases arising under the laws of Guam.

Guamanians do not enjoy the right to vote for the President of the United States and only in 1972 were they able to elect even a non-voting delegate to the U. S. House of Representatives.

Politics. Guam's local political scene is characterized by a two-party system made up of Republicans and Democrats, both of which are affiliated with their American mainland counterparts. In addition to the Governor, the Lieutenant-governor and the territorial senators who are elected through the two-party system, each of the nineteen villages also votes for its "commissioner" who performs dual functions. The Commissioner's primary function is to act as liaison between the central government and the village. This is particularly highlighted during crisis situations when information dissemination and grass roots response have to occur within tight time constraints. During such situations the governor convenes the "sub-Cabinet", a council composed of the island's village commissioners and uses the forum to expound on his stand on important issues, asking the commissioners to relay his concerns to the different village communities. The

facilities of the village commissioners' offices have likewise been used, in the past, by the island administration to generate support for its own programs such as green revolution drives and anti-gambling campaigns.

The commissioners also perform internal village functions, including coordination of parish work and intervention in conflicts and feuds between individuals or families in the villages. They are also responsible for convening mass meetings to discuss local problems which the people might want to be brought to the central government's attention. Most often, though, the actual influence exerted by the commissioner on the village depends on his own social status in the community, the family he belongs to, how big the village population is and the relative distance and consequent isolation of the area.

The essence of Guam's politics, however, lies in the strategic role the island plays in U. S. security plans. Very clearly, the United States exercises a huge amount of influence on the island, as reflected in the American military's present operations there to this day. A third of the land mass (46,900 acres) is owned by the U. S. military. The United States Air Force alone owns 15.3 percent, with its command situated at Andersen Air Force Base occupying much of northern Guam. The Navy controls 17.7 percent of the land, with its commands located at scattered points throughout Guam: the Naval Station at Orote Peninsula and Apra Harbor, the Naval Air Station in central Guam, the Naval Communication Station at Finegayan, Polaris Point, the Naval Hospital in Agana Heights and the Naval Magazine in

Apra Heights. In 1973, at the peak of the Vietnam war, the combined military and military-dependent population on Guam was estimated at 31,000. It was from Guam that SAC bombers took off for their twelve-hour round trip runs to targets in Indochina and where Polaris submarines changed their crews and obtained provisions in between patrols.

Although direct hostilities in the Indochinese peninsula have ceased, this does not imply a decline in the strategic worth of Guam and nearby Micronesia. On the contrary, political observers forecast increased militarization for the region.

Economy. At first glance Guam's economy appears to be a thriving free enterprise endeavor. In 1973 gross business receipts amounted to \$499 million and total bank deposits were \$272 million. Construction gross receipts totaled \$112 million. There were roughly fifty thousand cars on a 217 square mileland area. New housing subdivisions were fast rising where there was once only jungle. Homes were priced anywhere from \$35,000 to \$100,000 (Haverlandt, 1975). Indeed, the American influence of profit motive and free enterprise seemed to be a success.

Through prolonged exposure to mass media advertising and to American-style education based on individual reward, increased acquisition of material goods was also promoted and there were statistics to prove that Guamanians were indeed enthusiastic participants in modern technological consumption. A 1974 survey comparing the Guamanian, Filipino and statesider families living on Guam reported that while 40.7 percent of the stateside families said



they owned a black and white TV set, 58 percent of the Guamanian families said they owned a color TV set. There were also 1.9 cars per household, and the vast majority of Guamanian families not only owned a radio and tape recorder but also monaural or stereo equipment. In fact, 67 percent said they owned a stereo set and 47 percent said they had air conditioners (Haverlandt, 1975).

Side by side with rapid modernization on the island, though, is a stark decrease in the utilization of its resources and an over-dependence on imported products. Guam presently imports more than 90 percent of its foodstuffs. The 1974 household survey indicated that among Guamanian Chamorro families less than 41 percent grew only 21 percent of their daily needs, and only 31 percent fished for only 17 percent of their food. Guamanian families purchased, on the average, 89 percent of their food.

The United States government, at the very outset, was not interested in the economic development of Guam nor in promoting agriculture and island self-sufficiency. What the U. S. government did foster was a wage-based economy dependent on outside appropriations for its governmental and military bureaucracies which employed the majority of the people. Historically, this could be traced to the period when the U. S. first took over possession of the island and enforced a security closure throughout Guam. In effect, Guam was closed to outside economic development and the only businesses which were allowed were those which got prior approval from the naval government.



With most other sources of income closed to them, Guamanians naturally turned to the military establishment for employment. By 1911 one-fourth of all able-bodied men on Guam were working as laborers under the Navy. By 1919 the number had increased to one-third of all able-bodied males working for the military government (Haverlandt, 1975). This trend has continued to the present. Figures from the Guam Bureau of Labor Statistics show that as of April 1976 roughly 49 percent of the work force are either employed by the territorial government or by the federal government, mostly on the island's military facilities. Federal funding is the largest single factor in Guam's economy at an annual outlay of \$200 million for military and other expenditures. Second comes the Government of Guam whose expenditures increased from \$65.2 million in 1972 to \$82.6 million in 1974.

There are even more pessimistic figures available. Data obtained through two surveys conducted by the University of Guam in 1974 indicated that 49.7 percent of respondents worked for the Government of Guam, 33 percent worked as Federal Civil Service employees or were enlisted in the military service or had jobs directly related to the U. S. military establishments on the island. Only 0.3 percent were engaged in agriculture as their primary means of support (Haverlandt, 1975). What exists then is, essentially, a colonial dependency--a population dependent on the United States--funded governmental and military bureaucracies to support its wage economy based on consumerism and imported goods. It is an economic dilemma imposed upon Guamanians because of their political status as

wards of a nation which, at the very outset of its trusteeship, had no intentions of developing the area but only wanted it for its own security purposes.

John D. Gilliam, former Director of Planning for the Government of Guam, definitively summarized the development approach in Guam:

The political economy of Guam has been created out of local resources and non-local power. In the process, Guamanians were, by and large, until recently unable to exercise any significant control over their own destinies. (Gilliam, 1975)

The National Integration Issue. According to the U. S. Census held in 1970, native Guamanians constituted 55 percent of the population, statesiders (those born in continental U.S. including military personnel and their dependents) comprised 28 percent, and Filipinos (mostly immigrants born in the Philippines) 12 percent of the population. The remaining 5 percent was made up of other Asians and people from the Trust Territories.

A more recent study conducted in December 1975 indicated very little change in the racial composition on the island. Sponsored by the Community Development Institute of the University of Guam, the survey results covered the local population, excluding those 25,000 residents of the military bases (roughly 22 percent of the population) almost all of whom are statesiders. The racial breakdown of the civilian population reads: Guamanian, 58 percent; Statesiders, 16.2 percent; Filipino, 16.2 percent and others, 7.2 percent.

Causes of Racial Diversity. The complex nature of the Guamanian population is attributed to politico-historical factors which make alien and statesider in-migration to and Guamanian out-migration from

Guam attractive. First of all, when the U. S. naval government was established on the island immediately after World War II, thousands of Americans came to the island as a direct result of the military decision to develop Guam as one of America's major defense outposts. Haverlandt (1975) cites that between 1940 and 1949 there was a 168 percent overall population increase in Guam (representing a 16.8 percent annual growth rate) but the Guamanian population only grew by 34 percent (for an average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent). On the other hand, the population of Caucasians over the same period increased by an astounding 2819 percent--from 785 in 1940 to 22,920 in 1949.

Secondly, since Guam is a territory of the United States and therefore under federal jurisdiction, immigration is recognized as a right of national sovereignty. Thus the decision of who may immigrate to Guam is not under local control and, for the most part, not influenced by local conditions. Persons who want to immigrate to the United States and who fall under one of many categories listed by the U. S. Immigration and Nationality Act may also enter Guam regardless of whether they are specifically needed on the island or not.

A third factor contributing to the complex nature of Guam's population is the provision for hiring non-immigrant alien labor. This contract labor is brought in under the H-2 visa as provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States. Since the 1950s, and especially during the economic boom of the early 1970s, H-2 laborers for construction have been brought to Guam to fill the need for workers.

A fourth factor affecting migration patterns is the practice of the territorial government of hiring professionals, specifically schoolteachers, from the U. S. mainland. Referred to as "contract hire," this labor is paid wages comparable to those in the United States, supplemented by subsidized housing and round trip airfare once every two years to the place of hiring origin for the individual and his family. Such fringe benefits are not available to locally hired people. It is easy to see, then, how the practice of contract hiring depresses wages on Guam.

Viewed from the local population's point of view, the same factors which make in-migration to Guam attractive for statesiders and aliens makes out-migration to the States attractive for Guamanians. Carl Vail (1975) summarizes these factors as:

1. Low wages in Guam's private sector and limited fringe benefits.
2. Use of contract hire which discourages the resident to qualify for such jobs.
3. The lack of jobs for certain skills or the opportunity to become skilled in a particular work or profession.
4. Use of non-immigrant (alien) labor which continues to depress wages.

Because of the great dependence on the military and governmental bureaucracies for employment, there is a lack of variety of job opportunities on Guam. This condition is aggravated by the high cost of living (thirty to thirty-five percent higher than the U. S. mainland) and the depressed wages for locals. Likewise, the contract

hiring practice discourages Guam residents from training for professional jobs and encourages those so trained to leave the island. The U. S. mainland, very simply, offers a wider spectrum of opportunity for education and employment for Guamanians.

The Integration Problem. With the population so ethnically diverse and even further complicated by the heavy U. S. military presence, one would expect the question of ethnic or racial harmony to be of pivotal importance to Guam residents. Not so. Guam, like all places dependent on tourist money and good publicity, is very self-conscious of projecting an image of a happy "melting pot of the Pacific" where everybody--white, black, brown or yellow--is well accepted. In reality, of course, the situation is more tenuous. The exigencies of job scarcity, the pressure of alien labor and the resulting competition all contribute to a potentially dangerous situation.

Undeniably, there have been instances when the "melting pot" came to a boil. During the months of February and March 1975 and May 1976, racial unrest hit two big Guam schools: Dededo Junior High School and John F. Kennedy High School. This resulted in injuries to Chamorro, Filipino and white students. Department of Education and police officials dismissed the violence as "gang brawls" and "minor skirmishes typical of junior and senior high students (McKenna, 1976; Ehrhart, 1975; Hebert, 1975);" but Guam's daily newspaper, The Pacific Daily News, editorialized on the seriousness of the problem:

. . . One Department of Education official lamely stressed that the incident there last Friday was a 'school problem' and that the term 'racial' was used by the Daily News and not by anyone else, including the police.



That may be true, or it just may be that the Daily News, unlike the Department of Education and the police department, doesn't have its head stuck in the sand. Everybody on this island, except apparently for the DOE and the police, is well aware that the problem is, indeed, racial.

. . . Are these island residents blind? We believe that everyone does know that the problems are very real and very serious. And we believe that they aren't going to go away, unless they are met head on. (Pacific Daily News, March 7, 1975)

The newspaper traced the causes of school violence to very basic social conditions existing in Guam, specifically to the following elements in its diverse population (PDN Editorial, 1974):

1. The large number of Asian immigrants and the resultant language, social and economic problems.
2. The military-dependent population stationed on the island for only a short period on their way to and from the mainland bases.
3. A sometimes disgruntled local group who resent newcomers, or are jealous, and thus over-react with violence, or who look down at some of the immigrants because of their customs and language.

Other incidents in the past indicative of racial tension have taken place and, significantly enough, these are also related to developments in the educational system of the island. One is the highly partisan public furor which arose in September 1976 over complaints levelled by parents against some Filipino public school teachers who allegedly spoke English "with an accent." The parents complained that this hampered their children's learning. Once this was brought into print in the Daily News, highly emotional letters to the editor poured in both against and in defense of the hiring of Filipino teachers.



A more serious development related to the island's racial problems was the U. S. Air Force proposal to open its own school inside the base for children of their personnel. Citing the below par academic status of Guam schools and continuous racial violence directed against both children of the military and statesiders in general, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force asked the Commissioner of Education if federal impact funds--monies annually given to the Government of Guam to compensate for the military and other federal dependents in the school system--could be re-routed to build a school inside Andersen Air Force Base. The local community condemned the action as "segregationist" and one that would widen the already existing gap between the military and civilian populations on the island. The Daily News editorialized:

It was like telling the Guamanian people, 'We like your island for our bases and our planes, but we don't want our children to go to school with your children.'

The Air Force must realize that this affront to the pride of the Guamanian people won't be taken lying down. Such a move can only surface in other ways, bringing out latent hostilities, none of which will be good for the island.

Separate schools will cause even more alienation between the people of Guam and the military. Guam is part of the United States almost as much as San Diego, Norfolk and Jacksonville. If we are going to be treated differently by the Air Force, the people of Guam will think it time to re-think our whole relationship with the U.S. (February 25, 1976)

Very clearly, the controversy which arose over the establishment of the military's own school for its dependents is only an indication of a much more basic conflict between the military and civilian populations of the island.

Ethnic Group Perceptions. Several studies have been made on how the different ethnic groups on Guam perceive each other. Brislin and Wilson (1971) administered an attitude survey to University of Guam students representing nine ethnic groups. The study was designed to measure which factor influenced their social choices, asking the respondents to indicate in what way they thought the ethnic groups were similar or different. Results of the survey indicated that "language" and "culture" were given as the main reasons for differences.

The Lynn Study (1975) used as respondents 179 people chosen at random from the files of the commissioners' offices in the island's nineteen villages. Lynn asked, "How do people on Guam perceive the way various ethnic groups feel toward one another and themselves?" Lynn reported a consistency in the responses made by the various groups whether the data was broken down by nationality, age or sex. Significantly, the Filipinos were perceived by all the different groups to be the most rejected by the Guamanians.

A third study was conducted by a University of Guam class under Christopher Ford, Director of the UOG's Community Development Institute. In this study 110 Guamanians were asked their perceptions of the different ethnic groups on the island. Results corroborated many of Lynn's conclusions, including that which showed that Guamanians consider Filipinos to be less friendly, more dishonest and more of a threat than Statesiders or Japanese.

A 1974 research, on the other hand, made by Carl Vail specifically studied how Guamanians, Statesiders and Filipinos feel about

each other. Results showed that the negative feeling existing between Guamanians and Filipinos was mutual in nature. Discussing this mutual dislike, Ford (n.p.) analyzed:

. . . that Guamanians should perceive Filipinos as being more of a threat than the other ethnic groups on the island seems to be the key to these negative feelings. Guamanians generally view statesiders as 'being here for a while' and generally filling positions for which they themselves are usually less qualified.

The students in Ford's class, in discussing the results of their own study, suggested that the high percentage of Guamanians who responded that statesiders "act superior" reflected an attitude that, in many respects, Guamanians actually feel that Statesiders are superior and therefore should have higher paying positions. However, Filipinos are seen as "inferior" and Guamanians resent having to compete with them for jobs. Corollary to this is Ford's observation that this Guamanian resentment for Filipinos is felt most at the level of low-skill employment, an area dominated by Filipinos, where Guamanians now increasingly want positions as a result of the decrease in hiring for government jobs which are preferred by Guamanians. To support this contention, Ford adds that in the field of medicine, which is also dominated by Filipinos, resentment of Filipino doctors is minimal because "Guamanians accept the fact that they are not qualified in this area and therefore do not resent the Filipino presence in that profession (Ford, n.p.)."

Aside from perceiving Filipinos as an economic threat, a second area of concern among Guamanians is the potential political power a united Filipino community can wield on the island. In a pre-election

discussion carried on in the "Voice of the People" column of the Daily News, local citizens focused attention on the formation of the "Movement for the Advancement of a United Guam" (MAUG), whose members are mostly of Filipino ethnic origin. Assailed as a partisan political tool, the organization issued a strong rebuttal and stated the objectives for its formation:

The MAUG has been organized to unify the minority, especially the Filipinos, and give them a voice or influence in the political make-up of the island. . . . We of the MAUG merely want to be considered part and parcel of the community. We do not want to be treated as second-class citizens. . . . Filipinos comprise 25% of the total Guam electorate. This is big, no one can deny it. But may I ask how many senators of Filipino descent do we have in the legislature? I am sure that all . . . know there's only one. (PDN, November 1, 1976)

A united Filipino community voting as an ethnic block is something the Guamanians might have to contend with in the future, and this realization certainly contributes to the racial unease on the island. Perhaps unconsciously, Ching Barro, MAUG president, succinctly summarized it, "MAUG is non-partisan and not a political tool, contrary to what others have criticized of the movement. That's why we don't brag about our big influence in the political make-up of the island, not for the present yet [underscoring supplied]." (PDN, November 1, 1976).

In Search of Guamanian Identity. Guamanians have undergone a diverse aculturation experience characterized by multi-ethnic influences and the imposition of modern technological society's values and desires. Because the changes in the people's way of life have been so swift, many fear for the loss of revered traditional values which, for decades, have provided the stabilizing force in

the island society. A serious concern for the loss of Guamanian identity is expressed by social scientists:

The evidence from the American Indians, the Hawaiians, the Maoris and the Ainus suggests that when a group of people decide, either consciously or unconsciously, to abandon their native culture and language which evolved over many generations, they are destined to become a marginal people. The result will not be the adaptation of a new culture, but rather the emergence of a new culture which does not have its roots any place. Do the Chamorro people think they will somehow escape this destiny? (Topping, 1973)

Who is a Guamanian seems to be a particularly hard question to resolve, as evidenced by the varied alternate qualifiers Souder (n.p.) used to define the term:

- those who speak Chamorro
- those who were born on Guam or whose parents were born on Guam
- those presently residing on Guam
- those who contribute politically, economically or socially
- descendants of the ancient Chamorros

Souder herself noted that any one single classification fails to satisfactorily provide an answer to the query, "Who is a Guamanian?" but that rather a combination of the factors might paint a more complete picture. Whichever way the point may be resolved by sociologists and anthropologists, it remains that the 1970 U. S. census designated 52,400 persons as Guamanians. It is this group of people who have historically gone through the Guamanian aculturation experience of continuing adaptation, assimilation and fusion (Souder, n.p.).



The resulting "hybrid" culture is seen from two points of view by local sociologists. Haverlandt (1975) theorized that instead of losing their culture, the Guamanians have on the contrary been able to develop viable psychological patterns, familial networks and cultural responses by which they cope with and take advantage of the situation on Guam. It is this capacity for adaptability which has given the Guamanians "survival mechanisms" with which to handle the demands of outside influences.

Others are not as kind to the Guamanians as Haverlandt in their analyses, however, and they argue that the Guamanian identity crisis runs deep. Kallingal (as cited by Pray, 1974) argues that unlike the peripheral changes introduced during the Spanish, the U. S. Navy and Japanese periods, the present changes occurring on Guam are penetrating, and the conflicts attendant to these changes are real. The crux of the conflict is pinpointed to be that the young have acquired wants which are contrary to the traditional culture, but in seeking to satisfy these wants, they do not wish to offend their elders.

The new Guamanians do not possess the same cultural security that their elders have, borne by the latter's stronger ties to tradition. Today, the youth are exposed to new and conflicting values. In school they are taught to uphold individualism, independence and self-containment as ideals. The American way and the American think-for-yourself philosophy are drilled into their consciousness through a curriculum taught in English. Because knowledge of island history and culture are not given importance,



the younger generation develop a sense of inferiority. They are taught that to be decisive and assertive is to be modern and progressive and yet, at home, they are expected to obediently follow the traditional way of life. The tenets of free enterprise and competition run diametrically opposed to the older system of sharing, extended family structures and social obligations. Likewise, parents encourage the learning of English in order to ease their children's way into the world of business and modern technology. Some Guamanian children never learn to speak Chamorro and grow up feeling that "local" is inferior. The multitude of elements contributing to the Guamanian identity crisis is summarized by Souder (n.p.):

- the traditional socialization in the family vs. socialization in the schools (a generation gap)
- emphasis on the use of English vs. Chamorro
- the importance of traditional obligations within the family vs. a growing sense of individualism and socioeconomic independence outside the family
- social control derived from religious and moral principles vs. more fluid situational ethics emphasizing secular explanations

The collective result of all these changes is the growing feeling of insecurity which besets the modern Guamanian. Added to this is the fact that he relies very much on outside resources and manpower for his economic growth. A dependence on federal funding and technically-trained alien workers has caused the Guamanians to have a feeling of inadequacy in their own island. The situation "leaves a bitter taste in the mouth of the local person who, on one

hand, enjoys the comforts of progress but, on the other hand, must depend on someone else to make it possible (Souder, n.p.)." Van der Poel (1973) documents the presence of this insecurity. His survey results showed that when asked, "Do we like it that so many people from other countries live on Guam?", 53 percent of the respondents checked the statement, "I often dislike it because they seem not to understand us and seem to look down upon us" as descriptive of how they felt.

The American Contribution to the Guamanian Identity Crisis. Two American policies implemented on Guam contributed to the islanders' losing touch with their indigenous culture. First was the establishment of an American-patterned public school system which enforced a strict English language policy. The schools spent a great amount of time and effort drilling children every day in "proper" grammar and diction, time and effort which only resulted in the decisive erosion of the indigenous language (Topping, 1976). Topping further states that the English language policy has served to loosen social ties such that

. . . the people are learning how to communicate better with their teachers, priests and other members of the colonial forces, but they are losing the ability to converse with their grandparents. . . . Most people familiar with the situation in the Marianas feel that English will displace Chamorro on Guam within the next generation of speakers.

A second American contribution to the Guamanian identity crisis was the introduction of the mass media with its U. S. mainland orientation. The mass media have been very effective purveyors of

American culture and values, the preoccupation with consumerism and material goods:

. . . and along with our advertising columns, we bring the ideas of the affluent society to Guam. Can you image a tropical island with carpeting, for instance? Yet, we've got it, in big batches, and mostly because of advertising. (Murphy, 1974)

Radio and television programming on Guam do not vary much from their stateside counterparts. In fact, the bulk of the shows are syndicated from mainland networks every week.

The campaign to "Americanize" Guamanians has, not surprisingly, resulted in a dilution of the local culture. Sociologists even started referring to the evolution of "Guamericans," an interesting anachronism for the socialization of these Pacific islanders into Americana. However, the transformation of the psychological, cultural, economic and political values of the Guamanians have had negative effects:

Because of the imposition of a foreign language, programmed mass-teaching techniques and the shift from a rural to an urban environment, frustration and violence are becoming the daily menu for many of our youth. Misunderstanding and distrust between intermingling cultures is an added burden on the complexity of our Guamanian society. Furthermore, there is a loss of identity among our people owing to the disregard of a proud and ancient cultural heritage and the inevitable destruction of certain social patterns and mores resulting from a society in the midst of change. (Unpingco, 1975)

Indeed, the problem of integration and loss of identity is one of serious proportion in Guam.

### Mass Media Profile

Print Media. Three newspapers existed on Guam prior to World War II. The first was the Guam Newsletter which lasted from 1909

until 1921. It carried stories on topics such as World War I, Prohibition and the exploits of the Wright Brothers. The papers had a hard time with finances:

The Guam Newsletter is independent, that is, independent of everything except cash. We welcome subscriptions. (Pacific Daily News, July 11, 1976)

By the summer of 1917, the circulation of the Newsletter reached a high of 1,000, but this was deemed insufficient by the editors eventually forcing the paper to close down.

In March 1924, the Guam Recorder was founded. Its owner and editor was W. W. Rowley, and the publication was described as

. . . the island's and the Naval Station's most complete and interesting record and has been closely associated with the official life of both the Naval Station and the Naval Government. (Annual Report, 1936)

On October 2, 1933, the Naval government took over the ownership of the magazine from Rowley and, by January 1936, the Navy was printing it in its own printing shop. The Recorder featured articles on the flora and fauna of the island, current events, vital statistics and government reports. It was a monthly magazine supported by income generated from advertising, commercial job printing and subscriptions (\$1 per year) (Carano, 1964).

The island's only daily newspaper before World War II was the Guam Eagle published in mimeographed form specially for the American community. It was run from the Naval Communications Office and it carried local, national and international news. The Eagle was supported by a naval subsidy and was distributed free of charge.

After World War II the Navy began publishing a daily newspaper called the Guam News. In 1950 the paper was sold to Joseph Flores and renamed the Guam Daily News and this was published side by side with another Flores-owned paper, the Sunday Territorial Sun. During the ensuing postwar years numerous print media were started but all were closed down. These included the Pacific Journal, the Pacific Profile, the Guam Times Weekly, the Pacifican, the Pacific Sun, the American Daily News and even a Guam edition of the Okinawa Morning Star.

In February 1970, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin took over ownership of the two Flores newspapers and renamed them the Pacific Daily News and the Sunday News. It is presently the only daily newspaper existing on Guam. When the Gannett Company of Rochester, New York, took over the Star-Bulletin group in November 1971, the Guam newspapers were included in the package. Gannett owns a total of fifty-four newspapers in eighteen states and on the island of Guam. Its avowed policy is one of complete local autonomy for its newspapers. In an interview, George Blake, managing editor of the Pacific Daily News, stated that all decisions are made by the editorial and managing staff on Guam. He underscored the philosophy behind the PDN and its sister publication, the Sunday News, as one of being local papers, first and foremost. Coverage emphasis, he said, is local news and the primary consideration is serving local needs.

The PDN, ironically, has met with criticism from local residents who accuse it of being a "metropolitan newspaper" with a U. S. mainland orientation and bias rather than a "community newspaper"



featuring the narrower concerns of island residents and their local activities. The PDN is known for its aggressive coverage of political and economic news (local, international, national) but is accused of being remiss in its reportage of the smaller group efforts on the island. Underlying these criticisms against the PDN is a reported Gannett policy of recruiting the PDN's main editorial staff from other papers in its chain, sending them to Guam to gain journalism experience, after which they are promoted to positions with mainland newspapers. An examination of the composition of the PDN editorial staff made by the researcher supports this contention. Among eight senior editorial positions, seven are held by Statesiders (editor, managing editor, city editor, wire editor, lifestyle section editor, sports editor and copy editor) and the position of business editor is held by a local Guamanian. The composition of its news staff reflects the same trend: two assistant city editors, six news reporters, two news photographers and one news intern who are all Statesiders as compared with one news intern and one photographer who are Chamorro. City editor Ed Kelleher, in an interview, attributed the lack of local reporters on the staff to the poor quality of journalistic training on the island.

In addition to a local reporting staff, the PDN also uses the services of several international wire news systems among which are the Associated Press, United Press International, the Gannet News Service, the New York Times abridged news service (by mail) and other syndicated feature services. It likewise makes use of the Gannett Washington correspondent in reporting federal or congressional action



affecting Guam and Micronesia. With regards to its coverage of its neighbors, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the PDN uses the Micronesian News Service and also has a full-time correspondent based on Saipan, the headquarters of the TTPI. Despite these Micronesian news sources which imply interest in developments in Micronesia, PDN reporting stresses news from continental USA:

As a part of the U.S., Guam is interested more in news from the mainland U.S. than from its Pacific neighbors. A content analysis would bear this out . . . Since Guam is a strategic U.S. military location, interest in Pacific or rim country nations is the highest when it involves deployment of military forces from Guam. (Brislin, A-1976)

Although the Pacific Daily News is the main print medium on Guam owing to its circulation of 17,489 copies (as of June 1976) in an estimated 19,500 homes (roughly 90 percent saturation), smaller publications do exist alongside it today. The Catholic diocese of Agana publishes the Pacific Voice weekly and this is distributed free of charge during services every Sunday in all of the island's Catholic churches. It features articles about local church-related activities, editorials by the Bishop of Agana, syndicated articles from the Catholic News Service, and some pieces and commentary written in Chamorro. The latter service is unique to the paper, the PDN having given it up after a short experimental weekly column in 1971. Since the local population is predominantly Catholic, the Pacific Voice is widely read. Some interesting facts about its readership were documented by George M. Cohen who did an independent survey in November 1975 dealing with 375 interviews in eighteen of the nineteen villages on Guam. Cohen states that 60 percent of Guam voter

households read the Pacific Voice. Ethnically, the figures indicate that 63 percent of Chamorro voter households and 52 percent of Filipino voter households read the Catholic paper. Other interesting classifications by which he broke down his respondents were:

- 58 percent of GovGuam voter-employees read the Pacific Voice
- 49.6 percent of Federal government voter-employees read the Pacific Voice
- 65.3 percent of voter-housewives read the Pacific Voice
- 52 percent of privately-employed voters and/or student voters read the Pacific Voice.

The Guam Federation of Teachers publishes The Union, a monthly tabloid-sized newspaper. It mostly contains articles and editorial commentaries on local education issues which are very controversial in Guam.

Attempts have been made at putting up other newspapers on the island but all have met with financial failure and had to close down. Publishers most often opine that the Guam economy is too small to support two newspapers. The latest of these attempts was The Pacific Dateline, an afternoon newspaper which was given birth on July 6, 1970, and laid to rest on November 29, 1975. It was a member of the Gannet group and functioned more as an afternoon edition of the Daily News with most of its articles taken from national and international wire news.

The other recently closed down newspaper was a weekly called The Pacifican which began publication in March 1975 and closed down on its seventh month. It focused on local events, writing in both feature and interpretative news styles. Editor-publisher Antonio Palomo, in an interview, stated:

Sixty percent of the island's population is indigenous, but 80% of PDN reporting is about the States and the world. Editorial policy does not reflect nor portray the local population . . . A paper has to have its heart in the community. How can PDN do it when most of its editorial people are transients here on a Gannett 'tour of duty'? (Palomo interview, 1976)

Broadcast Media. There are a number of broadcast media operating on Guam today. The island is served by one commercial television station, one public broadcasting television station, and one cable TV system. In addition, there are three AM radio stations, two of which are commercial and the other a non-commercial religious station. Two FM stations operating on the island prior to the devastating Super-typhoon Pamela in May 1976 have suspended operations due to destroyed antennae, equipment and buildings.

The Pacific Broadcasting Corporation (with majority stocks owned by H. Scott Killgore) owns and operates KUAM television and radio, the oldest of the broadcasting companies of the island. It features canned shows brought in from the U. S. mainland, mainly situation comedies, variety shows, sports, news and public affairs. KUAM-TV offers the CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite on a one-day tape delay basis, and produces its own thirty-minute nightly newscast. One full-time staff member is assigned to handle local news and public affairs programming. Titled "Manager of Public Affairs," he coordinates news gathering mainly from the Office of the Governor, the legislature, the different executive departments and the police beat. National and international news gathering facilities consist of a direct cable circuit from UPI in New York City backed up by a UPI radioteletype circuit copied from Hong Kong. KUAM also maintains

a fully-equipped mobile broadcast van with two-way radio and video-taping facilities. Both radio and television stations are serviced by the same news and public affairs staff.

During recent months there has been an effort on the part of KUAM to increase the number of public affairs programs and locally produced shows. An outstanding example is the highly popular "Chamorro Hour" started in 1975 featuring music and news in Chamorro. The audience-following of this particular show cuts across age differences in the island's nineteen villages. Aside from this, a Filipino show "Voice of the Philippines" is broadcast five days a week (thirty minutes Monday to Wednesday and sixty minutes on Thursday and Friday). Japanese and Korean programs likewise get air time-- sixty minutes each week on Sundays.

As for public affairs shows, KUAM broadcasts Consumer Counsel programs, a Community Progress Report, and "Operation Crime Watch" among others. Although the development of local program formats and increased local news coverage has been planned, the station's programming remains, on the whole, American entertainment oriented. The official station report to the FCC broke down programming hours as:

News: 13 Hours and 50 Minutes (11.08 percent of total air time)  
Public Affairs: 3 Hours and 3 Minutes (2.44 percent of total air time)  
All Other Programs Exclusive of Entertainment and Sports: 11 Hours and 4 Minutes (8.9 percent of total air time).

The other commercial radio station on Guam is station KATB owned by Magof, Inc. comprised primarily of Don Brown (President and Manager of KATB) and formerly A. T. Bordallo, prominent Guam businessman who

passed away and was succeeded by son Rodolfo in the corporation. KATB is primarily a music station featuring "middle of the road" rock music aimed at the twenty-five to forty year old audience. It also features jazz, soul and Top Forty tunes from the U. S. with five-minute newscasts every hour on the half hour based on AP national and international wire stories. A part-time staffer collects local news which consists basically of press releases from the legislature, the Governor's Office, the police blotter and articles followed up from reports in the Pacific Daily News. According to KATB Manager Brown, the station does not believe in programming to specifically serve "ethnic minority needs" such as Chamorro or Filipino shows but rather "the station recognizes the mixture of people in the radio audience and prepares programs for their diverse music tastes, hence our combination of music from soft to hard rock (Brown interview, 1976)."

Guam's newest radio station is KTWG, opened on August 22, 1975, broadcasting from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. Designed as a "community-oriented station offering morally uplifting programs," KTWG is part of Transworld Radio based in New Jersey which has three hundred and fifty Missionaries around the world. Programs are essentially religious Protestant shows giving presentations on the scriptures and on general Christian faith. Formats vary from radio drama, talk shows and general listening to classical music. KTWG broadcasts some local news and alternately uses AP and UPI for national and international stories. All programs are imported from the United States except for ethnic programs (done in Korean and Japanese),



news and community action shows which are produced locally. The station receives duplicate tapes from syndicated religious networks all over the Mainland. Station KTWG exists for two primary reasons, according to Director Larry Grow in an interview. The first is to minister to Guam, and the second is to minister to the entire Far East with their evangelical religious broadcasts. It is run by an all-missionary staff who had previous training or experience in broadcasting prior to assuming the posts. There are nine members of the staff, four of whom are on the management decision-making level.

On July 1, 1975, the 12th Guam Legislature enacted Bill No. 194 creating the "Guam Educational Telecommunications Corporation." By this action KGTF-TV became a public broadcasting station, an affiliate of the nationwide U. S. Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Unlike the commercial stations which only feature public affairs programs to meet FCC requirements, PBS stations were created precisely to provide informative and educational programs. The feasibility study on which Guam's Public Law 194 was based specifies that the PBS station was created to provide Guamanians with programs on music, art and culture. Audience surveys indicate, however, that KGTF program formats and presentations appeal to the island's Caucasian community and, generally, not to the other groups which they are also supposed to serve. To make up for this, the station produces programs about island events and issues, including weekly news programs in five different languages (Chamorro, Japanese, Filipino, Korean and Japanese), reports from the Guam Political Status Commission and frequent special features covering major island events.



Cable television on Guam was started as early as 1962 when a master antenna system was put up in the village of Asan to help redistribute TV reception to around sixty homes in the village that received poor transmission. In 1965 Guam Rediffusion was established operating with two channels: one to re-broadcast KUAM-TV and the other to serve as a closed circuit system carrying old movies, FM music and live shows to subscribers. In October 1970, Guam Cable TV (formerly known as the Marianas Communications System Cable TV) started operations bringing to the island, for the first time, color programming, shows from all three U. S. mainland networks and all-day transmission. In 1971 the company obtained its own studio in Los Angeles cablecasting seventeen hours each day. The tapes of the networks are airflown to Guam.

Ten of the twelve available channels on the cable system are used by Guam Cable TV. Cable Channel 8 is used to re-broadcast KUAM-TV and Cable Channel 13 for KGTF. Four full-time channels broadcast programming from Los Angeles, California, that is received in video cassettes and replayed on Guam: Cable Channel 2 for L.A. Channel KNXI (CBS channel), Channel 4 for L.A. channel KNBC (NBC channel), Channel 7 for L.A. Channel KABC (ABC channel) and Channel 9 which draws its programming from selected shows from independent Los Angeles stations. All four channels broadcast from 7 a.m. and sign off at one or two the next morning.

Cable Channel 11 broadcasts the following foreign language programs.

1. Chinese programs from Taiwan's Chinese Television Service, the government network. Most of the shows are adventure dramas.

2. Japanese programs recorded from a Los Angeles UHF channel, mostly Japanese old movies and newer contemporary soap operas.

3. Korean programs provided by the Korean consulate consisting mostly of period adventures and soap operas lifted from the national television network in Seoul.

Cable Channels 12 and 5 are special service channels. Channel 12 is a closed circuit loop running to the hotels in the tourist belt area of Tumon Bay providing hotel visitors with special programming, primarily tourist-type travelogues, Japanese movies and Japanese television programs. This is made by special arrangement with the "Hotel Vision of the Pacific," a company which commissioned the service. Channel 5 is reserved for advertising twenty-four hours a day, consisting of typewritten ads shot from slides.

Cable Channel 6 broadcasts local studio productions, including a daytime talk show, a one-hour locally produced newscast, a weekly "Know Your Government" program featuring reports from the Governor, a local dance band discotheque show, conversational Tagalog language instruction and sports programs which provide special coverage of local football and baseball games. All other air time not taken up by the programs listed above are used for "Weather Advisory Reports" from the island's weather bureau and "System Information Programs," mainly notices about program changes or rearrangement of movie schedules within the Cable TV system.

Special note should be made of the public affairs and news programs aired on Guam Cable TV. The system presents the NBC Nightly News and the ABC Evening News on a two-day delay basis.

It also presents the CBS Morning News, Good Morning America (ABC) and the Today Show(NBC) on the same basis. Its nightly local newscast of island news is gathered by a four-member news team and national and international stories are taken from the AP wire service.

The Guam Cable Television System operates from revenue generated from subscriptions (\$14.75 a month by roughly 12,000 subscribers--figure taken from pre-Pamela days). Likewise, additional income is earned from local advertising in its shows (average of \$2,000 per month on a non-election year but much more during campaign periods). Cable TV also produces commercials for candidates in local elections, which provides a further source of funding for the system.

Audience Surveys. Very few audience surveys have been made on Guam and the results of whatever have been conducted often have limited application. The most recent and the most reliable survey was conducted by the Guam Cable TV System in early 1976 among its subscribers (Brislin, B-1976). Guam Cable TV has 12,000 individual subscriber households out of approximately 19,500 existing housing units on the island. The survey sample of 1,529 households presented roughly 13 percent return of questionnaires from among the 12,000 total number sent out to the subscribers. Results showed that the average island household had its television set on for eight hours and forty-two minutes every day. Fifteen point four percent reported that their TV sets are watched all morning; 21 percent said that their sets are on all afternoon and a significant 59 percent stated that they watch TV all evening.

The most popular choice for "favorite programming" was movies, with 33.9 percent of respondents indicating this category as their first choice of programs to watch. Movies were followed by adventure drama programs (17.3 percent) and comedies (12.8 percent). The other categories in descending order of popularity were sports (9.9 percent), soap operas (5.2 percent), documentaries (5.0 percent), news (4.0 percent), variety shows (3.8 percent), game shows (3.8 percent), cartoons (1.2 percent) and talk shows (1.1 percent).

In terms of channel preferences, at the top of the list was ABC Network Channel 7 with 32.6 percent of the respondents voting for it, followed by KUAM-TV Channel 3 with 18.9 percent. Channel 2 (CBS) was listed by 15.8 percent as the network that carried their favorite programs; 12.8 percent said their favorite was Channel 4 (NBC). Channel 9 came next with 10.2 percent of the responses, followed by Channel 6 (locally originated Guam Cable TV channel) at 5.9 percent. Channel 13 (KGTF) was preferred by 2.4 percent and Channel 11 (foreign language programming) at 1.4 percent.

On April 6, 1976, Jones and Guerrero Company, Inc., one of Guam's biggest businesses, conducted its own in-house survey of media preference among its employees. Of the 400 forms sent out, 204 were returned. Of these, 121 respondents indicated a preference for KUAM, 68 for KATB and 62 for KSTO (local stereo FM station presently not operating due to damage suffered from typhoon Pamela). Since the total responses exceeded the 204 questionnaires returned, this indicated a frequent dial switching phenomenon which, in turn, may be interpreted to mean the absence of strong "station loyalty" on the part of island radio listeners.

It is also interesting to note that 130 out of the 204 respondents were television cable subscribers. Out of these, 99 said they switched from channel to channel for their general programming, 63 said they watched the locally-produced newscast on Channel 6, while 81 claimed they watched the KUAM news at night.

Analysis. When one speaks of communication on Guam, one speaks of two different levels. On the one hand, the island is a key center for sophisticated communications. It has RCA Global Communications, the NASA tracking station, the Australian Cable Company and ITT. Likewise, the military communications from the Naval Communications Area Master Station to Andersen Air Force Base constitutes one of the largest concentrations of radio, radar and sonar equipment anywhere.

On the other hand, disaster situations such as Supertyphoon Pamela in May 1976 demonstrate just how inferior internal island communication is. Within hours of the storm all telephone lines were down, power was disconnected throughout the island, rendering television and electric radio useless. Even battery operated radios became useless when station antennae fell. Newspapers likewise stopped publication because of power outage. The population was reduced to depending on citizen band radios to keep information flowing. Such stark contradiction between the conditions existing in external and internal communications on the island have overwhelming implications regarding development priorities. It is almost too repetitious to state that they reflect the overall policy of the United States towards Guam: first and foremost, Guam is a



base for military operations; secondarily, it happens to be the home for the 100,000 "Guamericans" living on the island.

Likewise, an examination of its mass media reaffirms this dominance of American culture and interests. Heavy stateside influence can be felt in all areas, starting with ownership of the media and the professional staff the newspapers and the broadcast stations employ. The Pacific Daily News, by far the largest and most influential newspaper on the island, runs a para-Stateside operation with its wide coverage of national and international news--impressive but perhaps too metropolitan for its island readers whose narrower everyday concerns are treated more often as just not "newsworthy" enough to warrant space. This is not to say that the newspaper does not put out good journalism because in terms of reporting style and lay-out presentation, the PDN is, indisputably, good. However, it is also legitimate to say that the paper, because it has chosen to be more cosmopolitan than its actual readership, is limited in its representation of the attitudes and tastes of island residents, except for those who see themselves as transients.

In the broadcast media, syndicated network programs imported from the U.S. mainland abound. These shows run the gamut of formats from California situation comedies to game shows and network news. Even public affairs programs are imported from CBS, NBC and ABC such that reporting bias and the angle from which people on the island view events is mainland U. S. flavored. More important, the most popular shows are the imported programs, with local productions running a very poor second. What this implies is summarized by Michael Reidy, a social planner with the Guam Bureau of Planning:



The mass media have been used, more than anything else, to co-opt values. By using so much stateside programming and by not giving enough support to local productions, broadcasting has tended to undermine the local values and substitute them with mainland USA attitudes. For me, the fact that Guamanians love those California situation comedies so much indicates that we are promoting a fantasy--the islanders have started identifying with stateside values. (Reidy interview, July 14, 1976)

What does the future hold for the Guam mass media? Local productions are hampered by two problems: low funding and badly trained personnel. Most Guam-produced shows are produced on shoestring budgets with financiers reasoning that "If we can get away with this budget and still have the station operating on a profit, why invest more?" The media on Guam are run primarily as business ventures with service to the local community low in priority. But it is precisely this commercial orientation which may eventually bring improvements to the quality of the shows, according to Dan Smith, former KGTF director. In an interview, Smith pointed out that negotiations are under way for the KUAM network to be purchased by Honolulu broadcast interests. If this happens, the new owners may bring in better trained personnel from Hawaii to supervise local productions. This might spur competition and encourage the other stations to produce higher quality shows themselves.

Media Laws. As a matter of practice in the past, the more significant sections of the law affecting the activities of the press on the island have been those dealing with the issue of libel, as stipulated in the Government Code of Guam. Very similar to standard libel laws found in many states, they were in fact drafted almost verbatim from the California code. In addition, all rules

and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission are applied to the territory particularly in regulating its broadcast media.

More important, however, is a recognition of the fact that the U. S. Constitution is enforced in Guam. This includes the First Amendment which reads:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

This particular amendment forms the basis for all press freedom and press laws in the United States and its territories. Taking its cue from twenty-six states in the Union which have passed similar statutes, Guam recently enacted Public Law 13-181, an act "which provides immunity to newsmen from being adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to disclose their sources of information." More popularly referred to as the "Reporter's Shield Law," the legislation guarantees that newsmen

. . . cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to disclose, in any proceeding, the source of any information procured . . . or for refusing to disclose unpublished . . . or untransmitted information.

The law extends the confidentiality privilege to persons "connected with or employed by" newspapers, magazines or other periodicals, press associations or wire services, radio or television stations. P. L. 13-181 was passed by the Guam Legislature on August 19, 1976, and was signed into law by Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo five days later.

A second major piece of legislation recently enacted affecting the operations of the press on Guam is P. L. 13-35 entitled "The Open Government Law" passed by the Guam Legislature in June 1975. P. L. 13-35 guarantees public access to all meetings of government agencies and to the minutes of such meetings. The intent behind the law is very clear as it stipulates: "It is the policy of this territory that the formation of public policy and decisions is public and shall not be conducted in secret." George Blake, PDN managing editor, in his testimony supporting the bill states, "It's like taking the idea of 'government of the people, by the people and for the people a step further by adding 'government with the people.'"

As can be deduced, all the above-mentioned legislation are general laws pertaining to press freedom and press rights. No specific communication policy (whether in form of laws, rules or regulations) referring to the promotion of national integration exists except, of course, the protection extended by the U. S. Constitution which prohibits discrimination based on race, color or creed.

How to persuade privately-owned commercial media operating within a free enterprise system to become support communication channels for development policies such as the promotion of integration is the essence of the problem. Joel Biggs, BOP social planning chief, offers a solution:

All the broadcast stations are required by the FCC to apportion part of their programming to community service. If the governor officially comes out with a policy encouraging them to use this part of their broadcasting hours for program format designed to help alleviate ethnic tension, this would already

be a step forward. If the stations do not comply, this could certainly be taken against them when they apply for license renewal with the FCC. And, of course, public opinion backing up the policy would also generate pressure for this kind of programming to be pushed through. (Biggs interview, June 18, 1976)

### Planning Process and Bureaucracy

Enacted by the 12th Guam Legislature and signed into law by Governor Ricardo Bordallo in 1975, Public Law 12-200 provides for comprehensive development planning for the Territory of Guam. It calls for "continuous farsighted planning policy" in order to:

- (1) identify territorial goals and objectives,
- (2) propose long-range plans to reach these territorial goals and objectives,
- (3) coordinate the planning of all governmental and non-governmental activities with a dynamic comprehensive development plan, and
- (4) provide factual data, projections and analyses to assist policy-makers in the selection of programs and the establishment of priorities.

P. L. 12-200 mandated that the comprehensive development should focus on the following areas: land use, community design, transportation, public services and facilities, public buildings, housing, conservation, recreation and public safety. The law likewise saw as desirable the formulation of a five-year socioeconomic plan which would deal with problems of health, manpower planning, employment opportunity, education, law enforcement, welfare, consumer protection, public revenue and expenditures and cultural heritage preservation. Policy

statement on the following areas were also sought: social and human resource development, natural resource development, environmental protection and historical preservation.

The law created two planning bodies. One was the Central Planning Council, the members of which are to be appointed by the Governor from among department and agency heads in the territorial government. The Council acts as an advisory, reviewing and coordinating body to harmonize the implementation of planning activities at all government levels. The second body created by law was the Bureau of Planning (BOP), directly under the Office of the Governor, to serve as the Council's staff and to administer central planning functions.

The Bureau's core task is the formulation of policy alternatives and growth guidelines as they relate to key areas of the island's development. These policy recommendations are submitted to the Governor for review and eventual implementation either by executive order or through legislation. Planning Director Paul Souder delineated the Bureau's present major efforts as being focused on producing "program packages" which "outline what we are and what we have right now; where it will lead us if we go on like this; what we must have or prepare for if we continue living like this (Souder interview, July 18, 1976)." The research which went into the preparation of the different packages (i.e. on housing, health, land use) was envisioned to be the base for legislation.

Joel Biggs, head of the BOP's Socio-Economic Planning staff, emphasized what he felt should be a major responsibility of the Bureau:



strengthening the planning capabilities of the different government line agencies. Seeing this as the vital link which will ensure continuity in programs despite changes in political administration, Biggs rationalized his concern as rooted in the legislation itself, as reflected in the BOP's "Overall Program Design: Fiscal Years 1977-1979" which mandates that the Bureau should:

. . . assist each functional government agency in assessing its planning responsibilities and developing its staff requirements, planning program and budget; assist in developing and implementing training programs; and promote inter-governmental coordination and cooperation.

This cooperative planning thrust has been used by the Bureau in two of its major projects: The "Growth Document," which outlines the various alternatives for the island's development, and the "Goals Document," which attempts to define the aspirations and hopes of Guam's people for themselves and their island. In drafting these two papers, the Bureau of Planning actively worked with the relevant departments in the territorial government, sharing resources and information, with the ultimate goal of having the research results and the actual plan used in evaluating and redirecting the programs in the different departments and agencies.

The cooperative planning scheme is one way of encouraging input into the plans from sectors outside the Bureau, counteracting the tendency for "archair planning," which is a common weakness of structured planning bureaucracies like the BOP. Its venues for citizen participation, although stipulated in the planning legislation, are not very much used in actual practice. Public hearings are formally a part of the plan adoption process, but these, unfortunately,

attract very little attention on Guam. An important case in point was the instance when the Bureau utilized a series of island village meetings to solicit response to selected goal statements. It was an attempt to elicit involvement in the goal formulation process for the island's development. As it turned out, only 215 of the 1,000 forms distributed were returned with responses. Public hearings and testimonies, a feature of the American planning process, apparently receive little support from Guamanians.

In summary, it may be stated that innovations in strengthening the planning process and encouraging islanders to participate has received relatively little attention from the BOP. Instead, emphasis is laid on producing a planning document (or "planning packages") to serve as the basis for legislation.

#### Communication Policy and Planning for National Integration

Inherent in the act of planning is the assumption of sovereignty over basic resources or, alternatively, control through the application of policies. Guam does not possess such sovereignty or control (Sanchez, 1975). The island is a territory of the United States, and the Organic Act of 1950 gave only limited powers to the local government. Whatever laws and policies the mass media operate under in Guam are basically extensions of American legislation. (For a more detailed explanation, see the section of "Media Laws, Guam".)

When interviewed, officials of the island's newspaper and broadcasting organizations invariably replied in the negative when asked whether communication planning should be effected on Guam. All respondents cited the American constitution's First Amendment as the

rationale for their answers, implying that they interpreted planning to mean interference. Many feared the government taking an active role in communication, stating that this would inevitably lead to mass media being used for propaganda and other political purposes. It was a general belief that the present system, based on the American pattern of "free media" within a free enterprise system, was best for the island. This prevailing attitude among Guam's media practitioners is reflected in the specific laws previously passed by the island's legislature concerning the workings of the mass media. Instead of being policy guidelines suggesting how communication structures could be channeled for specific developmental purposes, these pieces of legislation are more focused on freedom of inquiry and protection of the rights of media personnel. The spirit of the law emphasizes "freedom" rather than control, a factor implied in planning any endeavor.

Regardless of heavy American influence on Guamanian values and laws, the need remains for the island to re-think its direction if it is to develop its own solutions to its problems. Faced as it is with overwhelming politico-socio-economic problems, Guam must reevaluate how it is presently using its very limited resources, including that of communication. The success of its development programs depends a great deal on information dissemination and attitude change, two phases where effective communication can help tremendously.

With regard to the promotion of integration in Guam society, the communication needs which planning must address itself to are clear. As the researcher has pointed out in previous sections of this case

study, ethnic tension is basically a result of the lack of communication between and among the different racial groups. Perceptions of each other are often based on stereotypes and prejudices and the local government does not help any by refusing to acknowledge racial tension as a major problem, preferring to base its policies on an unrealistic image of Guam as the "happy melting pot of the Pacific" for the purpose of attracting tourists and foreign investment to the island.

Once Guam does decide to address itself to the issue of racial integration, using communication planning and policy to help solve the problem, the primary dilemma would be bridging the gap between the reality of the island being a U. S. territory and the need for it to develop according to its own Guamanian-ness. A duality of systems exists. Indeed, there is a need for the local population to be kept abreast of events in the U. S. mainland as it affects their lives. This is the present orientation of the mass media of the island with the majority of broadcast shows and printed material either imported from or focused on U. S. news and the U. S. way of life. However, Guam is also a distinct Pacific island with its own cultural roots and proud heritage which must be preserved. And this concern is no less important than protecting the basic freedoms contained in the Constitution of the United States and in U. S. federal laws as they apply to Guam.

The researcher wishes to suggest that the two systems need not be contradictory, and that one may be promoted within the context of the other. In place of direct governmental pronouncements and

policies dictating media usage, which are construed as interference in the workings of the press, an advisory body composed of media practitioners and communication researchers could be created on an ad hoc basis. This body may be specifically empowered by the Governor of Guam to study the communication needs of the island and submit recommendations to the Bureau of Planning for inclusion in the Guam Master Plan or in the island's socioeconomic planning document. Although there is a Guam Press Club presently existing, the organization is primarily social in nature, and there is a felt need for a separate body of people either involved in communication research or practice to come together specifically to assess Guam's communication needs and how to meet them. The creation of such a body is, of course, only one alternative and does not in any way exclude input in communication planning and policy formulation from other sectors of the community through other forms.




## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

Based on the research findings described in the two case studies, it is apparent that a distinct communication planning process, along the lines of a classical planning model, does not exist in Singapore and Guam. What comes nearest to communication planning is an adaptation or, very simply, the application of the general planning process in the society as it relates to communication or media control.

What is more pronounced in both societies are the communication policies to be found in various levels of the government's interaction with the local population. Some of these policies are explicitly declared and can be found directly stated in legislation, public pronouncements made by government officials, rules adopted by media-regulatory bodies, and public records and documents of planning bodies and media organizations. And still there are some which are undeclared and implicit and have to be deduced from the experience of government's actual interactions with the media establishments.

In both cases, communication planning and policy, whenever they existed, did not operate in a vacuum. They were products of the interaction of different societal forces, and were direct expressions of the state's approach to the development of the society. The development of communication planning and policy can be stated very simply as:



In Singapore the ruling People's Action Party believed that the key to the country's development lay in putting the premium on economic security. It was faced with the problem of dealing with an ethnically and linguistically diverse population, within a history of minimal social integration, and a country occupying a small land mass with very few natural resources. A predominantly Chinese society in an area dominated by Malays, Singapore was, nevertheless, peopled by immigrants whose primary concern was economic survival. Based on this analysis, the PAP propagated economic advancement as the core value of its development strategy, subsuming all ethnic considerations.

Because the PAP introduced an overriding national goal towards which all citizens must work, cultural issues were relegated to the background. "Culture" was understood to mean "traditional" culture, something "backward," and "retrogressive," certainly not scientific and forward-looking as the PAP wanted the new Singaporean nation to be. Translated into communication policy, this development approach meant the promotion of English as the language of modernity and progress, strict regulation against "communalist" or ethnically-partisan journalism, with a government-run broadcasting system emphasizing news and documentaries focused on the nation's modern

achievements mostly economic in nature: a high standard of living, low unemployment, high per capita income and gross national product.

In Guam, the development approach hinges on the island's status as a territory of the United States and the important role it plays in American security and defense. Politically and economically, Guam is totally dependent on America. Ninety percent of its foodstuffs and resources are imported from the mainland and federal appropriations fund most of the government and military salaries around which the economy of the island revolves. The United States likewise continues to control its political direction, administering the island through the Department of Interior.

The Guamanian people have gone through a complex history of aculturation culminating in their adoption of American citizenship in 1950. With this, the islanders have chosen to follow the free enterprise system as practiced by the United States and to embrace as their own the American constitution and political processes. Translated into communication policy, this development approach has resulted in an emphasis on the protection of individual rights and a reticence to interfere in the workings of the "free press." As such, communication planning is viewed as a source of possible government control and political manipulation, and even the suggestion of planning to use the media for specific developmental goals is frowned upon and held suspect, the thinking being that if the media are given "guidelines" these would eventually lead to their being used for political purposes by those in power--a

consequence anathema to freedom of expression and of the press as embodied in the U. S. constitution.

Likewise, planning as a process is also much more fragile in a U. S.-patterned society like Guam where all plans or proposals have to go through a political process which includes public hearings, public testimonies and lobbying by interest groups. Theoretically at least, a plan, when adopted, may be modified or even radically changed from its original form by input from private citizens and organized groups. This process is very different from the one in existence in Singapore where the government exercises almost complete control over most fields. Hence, whatever it plans or enunciates as policy is as good as implemented, with the people having very little input in the process.

The researcher contends that the differences in the communication policies and planning processes in Singapore and Guam as they pertain to the integration issue are traceable to the differences in the historical, political, economic and cultural environments of the two societies. In the first place, Guam's colonial history and the varied experiences of aculturation which its people have gone through has resulted in a crisis of identity such that the query, "Who is a Guamanian?" is today difficult to resolve. On the other hand, Singapore, by virtue of its immigrant origins and its predominant commercial nature, today has a pluralistic society--one in which three traditional cultural streams co-exist side by side with very little integration to speak of.

Culturally, the emphasis on the ethic of hard work and economic advancement so central to the Chinese in Singapore has, intentionally or unintentionally, been the core value of the meritocracy and multiculturalism tenets of the People's Action Party, with the Indians and Malays being asked to operate within the framework. While in Guam, the integration conflict comes, among other things, as a result of ethnic stereotypes adhered to among the Chamorros, the Statesiders and the Filipinos of each other. The Chamorros look down upon the Filipino immigrants and contract workers as "inferior" and at the same time themselves resent the patronizing attitude which they perceive from the Stateside community, particularly from the military transients and their dependents. The young Guamanians, especially, are culturally insecure, torn as they are between the traditions of their indigenous Chamorro culture which revolves around obedience and respect for elders and the attraction of the American way of life which very much upholds individualism, independence and aggressiveness.

Economically, the importance of keeping good international relations is basic to Singapore's survival (trade and commerce are its chief industries), hence its policy of multiculturalism which is the basis of both print and broadcasting policies in the country. On the other hand, Guam's overwhelming economic dependence on the United States is very much reflected in the heavy mainland American orientation of its mass media editorial and programming content.

It is the political factor, though, which holds primacy in importance in the planning and policy-formulation processes. The



comprehensive ideological strategy implemented by the People's Action Party in Singapore has resulted in a communication system where policy decisions are derivatives of the underlying principles espoused by the ruling Party and where decision-making is centralized at the top. While in Guam, the island's status as a dependent territory of the United States and the overwhelming presence of the U. S. military are the primary causes of the lack of sovereignty and control exercised by the people of the island over their destiny, a condition which is a requirement of any planning endeavor, be it in communication or in other fields.

It would be worth a comparative note, at this point, that although both Singapore and Guam operate within capitalist economic structures, their political systems widely differ. One is a highly authoritarian, one-party dominant state and the other is a loose, free-wheeling society with all the trappings of Jeffersonian democracy. These differences are reflected in both societies' mass media structures. Furthermore, Guam's unique relationship with the military establishment is a factor worth noting. The U. S. military has invested a huge outlay of sophisticated radio, radar and sonar equipment on the island. Although the researcher does not have hard data on the subject, it would certainly not be irrelevant to conclude that, based on the presence of such elaborate communication systems in both Navy and Air Force bases, Guam plays a major role in the U. S. military's communication system in the Pacific. This condition, quite possibly, could be an important factor in determining future communication structures and investments on the island.

Other than the elements already discussed, only the human factor remains to influence and implement variations in policy. To illustrate, the People's Action Party of Singapore acknowledges the problem of national integration more seriously than does the leadership in Guam, and they also have a greater appreciation for the power of the media in helping solve the problem.

In summary, the two case studies are strong arguments for the contention that, indeed, policy and planning do not exist in a vacuum, and that communications systems, at best, should be studied within their historico-cultural-political-economic frameworks. Both Singapore and Guam, like it or not, are looked upon in their particular regions as representations of "development" and what it can do to a society. It would not be surprising if their neighbor states, faced with similar problems, look to them either for example or support. It is in this spirit that these two case studies have been drawn to see where the strengths and weaknesses of the two systems lie for others to perceive. The researcher would most sincerely encourage other comparative studies to be made to see whether the conclusions arrived at in this paper are as valid when faced with other variables in other societies.

Other factors which the researcher did not fully account for are (a) the influence of the societies' interactions with the outside world on the development of internal communication structures and (b) private sector planning. Very definitely, both constitute legitimate areas of investigation for interested researchers in the future.

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