Memories, Continuities, and Constructions

Social Process in Hawai‘i
Volume 42

Joyce N. Chinen
Guest Editor
Uchinaanchu Diaspora
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Foreword

This volume on *Uchinaanchu Diaspora: Memories, Continuities, Constructions* in Social Process in Hawai‘i presents updated voices and analyses on the Okinawan experiences in and around Hawai‘i. Exchanges and ties with Okinawa and within the Pacific Basin are linked in significant ways to the experience in Hawai‘i. The Guest Editor, Professor Joyce Chinen, and the contributors are to be congratulated for the work in this volume in exploring how large structural forces dominating Okinawa, Hawai‘i and other local settings also foster agency, transforming these influences over time. Comparing the Hawai‘i experience with survival and adaptations in Okinawa and other settings provide guides for further research and development.

Kiyoshi Ikeda
Executive Editor
Preface

Studies of Okinawa and Ryukyu were once considered marginal or, at best, esoteric topics to pursue within Asian Studies. However, with the rise of post-modern and post-colonial studies in the late-twentieth century, and new patterns of globalization, consumerism, and imperialism in the twenty-first century, Okinawan Studies has become quite in vogue. The so-called “Okinawa boom,” the interest in Okinawa’s exotic music, tourism, lifestyles, etc., has spilled over to Okinawa’s diasporic communities, as well. The increasing dekasegi (immigrant worker) population in Japan has also generated interest in Latin American Uchinaanchu communities, who part of the larger Nikkei (people of Japanese ancestry outside Japan) experience (Hirabayashi, Kikumura-Yano, and Hirabayashi 2002). Uchinaanchu in Hawai’i, one of the larger Okinawan diasporic communities, also have become subjects of study by increasing numbers of researchers—from Okinawa and hondo (mainland) Japan, the continental U. S., and Oceania. Too often the results of those studies do not to make it back to Hawai’i, so there has been little opportunity for local Uchinaanchu to assess or learn about how researchers conceive of the Uchinaanchu in Hawai’i.

This volume represents an effort in community reflection. It looks at various aspects of the Uchinaanchu Diaspora, but mainly as it relates to Hawai’i. It considers the social and cultural elements that Okinawan emigrants carried with them from their homeland of Uchinaa, the traditions and customs they maintained or continued to perpetuate, and the new patterns, practices and organizations they constructed. It builds on the realization that the Uchinaanchu diasporic community in Hawai’i is intimately connected to events, conditions, and communities in Okinawa itself, as well as to other Okinawan diasporic communities.

Seven years have passed since the “Uchinaanchu Diaspora” International Scholars Forum was held at the Hawaii Okinawa Center in Hawai’i in 2000. Some of those conference papers were published by Ronald Nakasone in Okinawan Diaspora (2002) and are included in this volume with his permission. Additionally, the “First Worldwide Uchinaanchu Conference” was held in Honolulu in 2003. Although there had been three “Worldwide Okinawan Festival” gatherings (or Taikai) in Okinawa, this was the first international conference of Uchinaanchu held outside of Okinawa, and a number of interest-
ing presentations emerged in the panel on “Uchinaanchu Worldwide Identity.” Consequently, this volume is composed of some of the conference papers from those two conferences and various scholarly and creative works which have emerged since. They reflect different voices, perspectives, and products of Uchinaanchu or those interested in them.

Modernization, recent events, and contemporary conditions both in Okinawa and Hawai‘i have influenced the social trajectories of the Okinawan diaspora. The pieces in this volume address selective aspects of these, and collectively provide a comparative sense of the Okinawan diasporic experience. Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu, therefore, are investigated vis-à-vis their linkages to other sites and spaces—Latin America, the U.S continent—and of course, Okinawa.

Summary of Articles

We begin (and end) with “Tinsagu nu Hana,” a traditional Uchinaanchu “warabi-uta” (children’s folk song) about the flower of the tinsagu plant. It evokes memories of old Uchinaa and, more important, of generational bonds. “Tinsagu nu Hana,” especially its continuity through time and space, suggest the depth and strength of Okinawan identity, as well as its modification under diverse social conditions.

We follow “Tinsagu nu Hana” with Robert Arakaki’s examination of the literature on diaspora, diasporic flows, and identities. Maehara Shinichi’s keynote speech at the First Worldwide Uchinaanchu Conference complements the theoretical discussion on diaspora and poses questions about Uchinaanchu cultural continuity, values, and identities.

George Oshiro’s exploration of Ifa Fuyi’s visit to Hawai‘i and the continental U.S provides an important glimpse into how this trip influenced the thinking of Ifa (widely regarded as the father of Ryukyuan studies) and reminds us of Hawai‘i’s influence on the development of subsequent intellectual leaders such as Ota Masahide, Seiyei Wakukawa, and others in Hawai‘i.

Ishihara Masahide’s piece follows, examining language policy and linguistic domination in Okinawa, exploring the social structural and cultural conditions from which Uchinaanchu emigrated, and how those and inequalities affected the speaking of Uchinaaguchi by Okinawans outside of Okinawa. It is followed by an article by Kyoko Hijirida and Keiko Ikeda which examines the various efforts to promote Uchinaaguchi instruction in Hawai‘i.

Kinuko Maehara Yamazato’s study of Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i suggests how the experiences of Hawai‘i-born Uchinaanchu Nisei who were sent to live in Okinawa and Japan in their childhood differed from both the Yamatunchu (mainland Japanese) Nisei and other Uchinaanchu in Hawai‘i. She shows how the Kibei Nissei used their experiences to contribute to the evolution of the Uchinaanchu community in Hawai‘i.

So much of the modern history of Okinawa is tied to the Battle of Okinawa. A number of pieces in this volume underscore this tragic event which, in a mere eighty-two days, took the lives of almost a quarter million people, nearly one out of every three Okinawans. Shinji Kojima’s article examines how the Battle of Okinawa has been differently “remembered” in the various post-war historical periods and why peace and anti-militarism continues to be such a defining feature of contemporary Okinawan politics.

Irei no Hi (day for consoling the souls), Okinawa’s memorial day, which commemorates the tacit end of the Battle of Okinawa is a Prefectural holiday (but not a national holiday). Memorial services are held in various locations throughout the island, the largest of which is in the Heiwa no Ishi-ji (Cornerstone of Peace Park) in the southernmost part of Okinawa Island. In many diasporic communities, only Shin Issei, those who migrated after the Pacific War, are familiar with Irei no Hi. In 1974, a Buddhist memorial service was held in Honolulu, but there had been no other formal memorial gatherings until 2005. Irei no Hi commemorations were held in Honolulu, and again in 2006 and 2007, and is documented in a photo essay.

Post-war emigration often receives less attention. Kozy Amemiya’s article sheds light on the impact of the U.S Occupation and militarization of Okinawa and its impact on the post-war diasporic settlement of Bolivia.

Shirota Chika explores the way in which post-war or Shin Issei (new immigrant) Uchinaanchu women created a space for themselves in Hawai‘i and have enriched the Uchinaanchu community through the practice of Eisa.

Noiri Naomi explores mixed-racialized identities and experiences in Okinawa by examining at the Amerasian School, the life history of an adult Amerasian, politician Denny Tamaki, and the Okinawan Prefectural Government’s discourse of ignoring prejudice and discrimination against Amerasians.

Ronald Nakasone recounts his family’s religious pilgrimage in Okinawa. It is a useful companion piece for Christopher Reichl’s exploration of how
elements of Okinawan religion have been incorporated into a New Religion in Hawai‘i, Okinawa, and Japan.

With all of these diasporic flows and communities, the question of who and how to define Uchinaanchu is raised in the humorous interchange by Arakaki Makoto and Wesley Ueunten. Peter Shimazaki Doktor’s “Thought Bytes” reflective essay explores a similar theme, but from a critical standpoint.

We end with two complementary pieces. Alison Yanagi reflects on her Sansei-Yonsei, Okinawan-Japanese identity in the form of a song. And Wesley Ueunten’s reflective essay reminds us of the spiritual power and timeless lessons imbedded in the Warabi-uta (children’s song) “Tinsagu nu Hana.” Ueuten suggests that Uchinaanchu learn from First Nations people who act in anticipation of the consequences for the seventh generation, and work to create a more just world for both Uchinaanchu and other children.

Editorial Conventions

Certain editorial conventions are worth noting here. First, the names of individuals are listed according to their predominant context: Surnames followed by given names for the Okinawans or Japanese in Japan; given names followed by surnames for those in the American context (e.g., Ifa Fuyū, but Seiyei Wakukawa). Second, Japanese and other foreign terms are italicized with appropriate diacritical marks, and translations are provided in parentheses; for example, dojo (a place for learning or practice). However, Ryukyuan or Okinawan terms are not italicized and double letters instead of macrons are used, as in Uchinaaguchi (language of Uchinaa). This is to highlight the issues of differences in language and to normalize Uchinaaguchi, as several pieces in this volume address this issue. The Okinawan-English Wordbook (Sakihara 2006) was frequently consulted. The exception to this are found in titles of published works, names of entities, or foreign rendered terms (e.g., Ryukyuan or University of the Ryukyus). The generational referents (e.g., Issei) follow the conventions of the Japanese American National Museum publications; they are Romanized and capitalized when referring to a whole generation, and lower-cased when describing a single individual. Since Hawaiian is one of the two official languages of the State of Hawai‘i, every effort has been made to properly incorporate diacritical markings and Hawaiian words are normalized (i.e., not italicized).
Acknowledgments

In 1999, planning began for the centennial celebration of Okinawan immigration to Hawai‘i, an ambitious year-long commemoration in 2000, with at least one event to be held each month throughout the year. The Centennial Celebration Committee envisioned holding an International Scholars Forum, much like the one in 1990, offering a credit course on “Okinawan History and Culture in Hawai‘i” at the University of Hawai‘i and with it, a complementary study tour to Okinawa. I was asked to coordinate the educational programs because the Uchinaanchu community’s scholarly resource persons, Professor Mitsugu Sakihara and Professor Ruth Adaniya, were both ill (sadly, both have passed on). Since I am neither an Okinawan/Ryukyuan specialist, nor an Asian Studies specialist, I initially resisted. However, as frequently occurs in the local Uchinaanchu community, I gave in and took on two of these projects—the course and the Scholars Forum and learned much in the process.

This volume would not have been possible without the involvement and support of several individuals and the Hawaii United Okinawa Association (HUOA). First and foremost, has been the commitment of Social Process in Hawai‘i Executive Editor, Professor Emeritus Kiyoshi Ikeda, whose deep interest in Uchinaanchu in Hawai‘i and Okinawan issues spans over a half-century from his early scholarly work and his continuing encouragement of younger scholars. Social Process in Hawai‘i continues to provide a venue for many of these scholars. Second, graphics specialist with the Center for Instructional Support at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, only begins to describe the work that Mark Nakamura does. He not only designed the cover, laid-out the text, but also served as a virtual editor spending countless hours catching things I had missed. The HUOA and many individual members supported the publication of this volume, and individuals such as Laverne Higa Nance, David Arakawa, and Dexter Teruya patiently prodded the project along as did Lucille Aono of the University of Hawai‘i Press.

I also want to acknowledge the assistance of others who read and reviewed the manuscripts in their various stages: Suzanne Falgout, Charlene Gima, Philip Ige, Jonathan Okamura, Kathy Phillips, James Turner, and Teresa Bill and Louise Kubo. A special ippee nifee deebiru (gratitude) goes to Kyoko Hijirida,
who helped me clarify the subtleties of meanings of Okinawan words. In the end, however, the responsibility for the mistakes is mine.

While I juggled editing with teaching, my husband and family patiently put up with my multiple stacks of various versions of manuscripts, and lack to attention to real world activities, and colleagues and students were ever supportive.

Ultimately, I thank and dedicate this volume to Professor Mitsugu Sakihara and Professor Ruth Adaniya. Their interests in Ryukyu and Okinawan studies preceded the “Okinawan boom,” and the significance of their respective works will continue well after the “boom” fades. It is also in remembrance of my parents, Wallace Seiko Chinen and Kiyoko Uchima Chinen, and my extended kin who, through their daily behaviors, taught my siblings and me the value of Yuimaaru, pitching in and working collectively. This volume is a tribute to the Uchinaanchu and Uchinaanchu-at-Heart in Hawai’i, especially those within the Hawaii United Okinawa Association, but globally as well, without whose support and assistance this volume could not have been accomplished—Ukaji Sama De (Okage Sama De—we are indebted to you).

I dye on my fingernails
The flowers of the touch-me-not
I dye in my heart
The words of my parents.

The myriad stars in the sky
Can be counted if you try
But the lessons learnt from parents
Are too many to be counted.

Ships traveling through the night
Rely on the Pole Star
The parents who gave me birth
Place their trust in me.
“Tinsagu nu Hana,” means the flower of the tinsagu plant, taxonomically known as *Impatiens Balsamina*, which is native to Africa. This song is one of many warabi-uta or children's folk songs which have been passed down from generation to generation for longer than anyone knows. As Etsuko Higa points out:

Traditional children's songs (warabe-uta) are spontaneous products of children's daily life and play; the creators of their music and texts are unknown. With their long history, Okinawan children's songs have been passed down to us from generation to generation. (1998:37)

Most Okinawans are familiar with “Tinsagu nu Hana”—if not with the lyrics, then with its nostalgic melody. Sometimes, in addition to the three stanzas provided above, a fourth stanza (and even a fifth one) will also be sung. Whether “Tinsagu nu Hana” is sung with three or with four stanzas appears to be a matter of preference. Gisho Funakoshi notes:

There is no copyright on children's songs, with their wide distribution and long history. Although the texts may differ, it would be wrong to consider a particular version as erroneous or as a parody. Any song sung by children qualifies as a warabe-uta, and there is no need to distinguish between different versions on the basis of their supposed authenticity (1998:35).

What is most important about “Tinsagu nu Hana” is that it was a treasured cultural artifact carried by Okinawan immigrants and it was (and continues to be) passed on from one generation of Uchinaanchu to the other. It is reprinted here with permission from The Okinawa Times.

**References**


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**Sekai no Uchinaanchu Okinawans Around the World**

Maehara Shinichi

It is a distinct honor to have an opportunity to deliver this keynote address. I have worked for Okinawa Television (OTV) as a journalist and producer of television programs for many years. For some fifteen years, I have traveled with my crew to listen to the stories of Okinawan people. Initially, from 1987 to 1996, we broadcast a program called *Ware-ware Chikyuujin* (Stories of Uchinaanchu Around the World). We went to North America, Asia, Hawaii, Europe, Southeast Asia, and Canada, meeting Okinawan people in those areas, and made one hundred forty-five episodes of thirty minutes each. From 1997, we created the program called *Uchinaanchu Kikou* (Uchinaanchu Travel Journals). We have now produced sixty-two episodes which have been televised all around the world. The program has been a sensation! However, it is expensive for Okinawan media to go overseas to do these reports and interviews for the program. We could not have continued this without the understanding and support of OTV.

Last year, the program began broadcasting in Hawai'i and I was pleasantly surprised to learn that many people have followed and enjoyed the program. In Okinawa, this program airs on Wednesdays at 7:00 p.m., a very busy time for people. But here in Hawai'i, it airs on Saturdays at 8:00 p.m. I'm so glad that people in Hawai'i can watch it, enjoy it, and I hope to continue to produce even more.

Today, I wish to speak about Uchinaanchu around the world—about how Okinawan people live in other countries, how they keep their culture and customs of their homeland of Okinawa, how the younger generations follow it, how Uchinaanchu identity is created, and what it means to be Okinawan in a multicultural, globalized world. As many of you know, Okinawa is considered the "emigrant prefecture." It is said that about three-hundred thousand Okinawans live abroad. The number of Japanese emigrants is about two and a half million so we may say that about twelve percent of Japanese who live abroad are Okinawan. This is remarkable, since Okinawa comprises only one percent of Japan's population.
This high percentage is due to Okinawa's history of sending emigrants overseas throughout the twentieth century. As many of you know, Hawai'i was one of the first destinations of emigrant Okinawans—twenty-six men arrived in Hawai'i in January of 1900 to work on the sugar plantations. Since emigration from mainland Japan had begun in 1885, the Japanese had already established their communities in Hawai'i. Many of these Naichi Japanese rejected the Okinawans who had difficulty speaking the Japanese language, wore humble clothing, and ate pork. Consequently, Okinawans here faced discrimination and prejudice, and extremely hard times.

Surveying the history of Okinawan emigration after this, Uchinaanchu moved to Mexico and the Philippines in 1904. In Mexico, Okinawans worked in coal mining, and in the Philippines, three hundred and sixty people, most of them from Kin-cho (a district in central Okinawa), migrated to work in road construction. At that time, the Philippine Islands were under the administration of the United States and a road was being constructed from Manila to the summer resort area of Baguio. Because of the high heat and humidity, Okinawans were perceived to be an ideal workforce since Okinawa has similar climatic conditions. However, even after the road was completed, Uchinaanchu had not been able to accumulate enough money. Since hemp was in demand for the production of rope used in shipping, Uchinaanchu subsequently migrated to Davao in the southern Philippines to work in the hemp industry. Prior to World War II, roughly nineteen thousand Okinawans had migrated to Davao, and their remittances substantially enriched Okinawa. However, when the war broke out, Okinawans became associated with the Japanese soldiers who were taking over the Philippines. These Okinawan migrants, henceforth, lost everything and were forced to return to Okinawa in poverty.

Let me now speak of Canada. In 1907, one hundred and fifty Okinawans went to Canada to work in railroad construction. They worked in the Canadian Rockies and after that, they moved to the city of Lethbridge in Alberta and worked for a coal mine. These were the first Okinawans to move to Canada; there are about a thousand Uchinaanchu living in Canada today.

Let me now speak of South America. The first emigrant settlement in South America was in Peru. Some thirty-six individuals migrated to the Trujillo area, where a monument stands in their honor. Much of Peru's western coastal area is desert, but a few oases in the desert with greenery and farms can be found. In the early 1900s, it was Europeans who controlled the plantations of Peru. Okinawans who worked there faced severe working conditions and frequent beatings. Those who couldn't bear such harsh labor conditions left the plantation and moved to cities such as Lima and Callao. They began earning a living by operating tiny stores. Still others crossed the towering Andes Mountains either by mule or on foot, leaving Peru and moving to Bolivia.

Okinawans worked as laborers on the rubber plantations in the interior of Bolivia, and settled in places such as Trinidad. A community of some two hundred Okinawans was created in Riberalta in 1920. Because Riberalta is located in the interior of Bolivia, few Okinawans moved in subsequent years. As a result, Okinawan men married local women and assimilated into the community. Presently, there are many Okinawans who do not speak Japanese, and I was able to meet one of the Issei there.

In South America, the largest emigrant population is to be found in Brazil. In 1908, a ship named the Sasado-Maru was completed. At that time, three hundred twenty-five Okinawans migrated to Brazil to work for the "golden tree"—coffee—because stories had circulated that it was possible to make a living growing coffee in Brazil. However, as in Hawai'i, Uchinaanchu were met by Japanese emigrants who preceded their arrival and who considered Okinawans not only different, but also inferior. Okinawans, therefore, had a difficult time on the coffee plantations. Furthermore, there were differences in perceptions about how to cope with the harsh working conditions. While mainland Japanese thinking leaned toward: "We came all the way here, we have to do our best in this place," Okinawans were more likely to think: "If we can't do well here, we should go elsewhere," and they often ran away. Consequently, Japanese often perceived Okinawans as being insincere about hard work. There were other cultural differences between the Japanese and Okinawan cultures as well. For example, Okinawan women were uninhibited about breastfeeding their babies in public, and Uchinaanchu celebrated births with much drinking and loud singing and sanshin playing late into the night. The Japanese disdained such behavior, so it was difficult for Okinawans to co-exist with Japanese in Brazil.

Before the Second World War, Okinawans also went to Nanyō (the South Sea Islands)—especially the islands of Saipan and Tinian as part of Japan's economic expansionist efforts. From 1914, Japan governed these islands, and in order to economically develop those lands, Japan required labor who were accustomed to the heat and humidity. Again, Okinawans were recruited and approximately 35,000 moved there. But just as in the Philippines, Okinawans were associated with the Japanese military. There are stories told of much cru-
Within this text, we can identify a section discussing the immigration patterns of the Okinawan people. The text highlights several key points:

- **Pre-war Immigration**: The text mentions the considerable flow of Okinawan residents to various destinations, such as Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, driven by economic struggles and political repression. It notes that many Okinawan men migrated to South America, purchasing land and engaging in farming in places like Bolivia.

- **Post-war Immigration**: Post-war immigration to these regions is also discussed, with particular emphasis on the emigration to Cuba, which was notably terminated after the Cuban Revolution. The text underscores the significant role of Okinawan women in these migrations, who often married and settled in the United States and Argentina.

- **Challenges and Reactions**: The text elaborates on the challenges faced by Okinawan immigrants, such as the scarcity of farmland due to the concentration of military bases, and the socio-economic hardships they experienced. It also touches on the cultural impact of these migrations, noting the formation of Kenjinkai (Okinawan associations) and the efforts of Okinawan women to maintain cultural ties with Okinawa.

- **Motivations for Migration**: The motivations for Okinawan migration are multifaceted, including economic necessity, political repression, and the desire to escape the concentration of military bases.

- **Historical Context**: The text provides a historical context for these migrations, mentioning key events such as the Battle of Okinawa and the establishment of the United States occupation in Okinawa. It also references the involvement of Okinawans in various movements, such as the Reimei Kyokai (Dawn Association) and the Komintern (Communist International).

Overall, the text offers a comprehensive overview of Okinawan migration patterns, emphasizing both the scale and the complex motivations behind these movements. It underscores the enduring cultural and social legacies of these migrations, particularly the role of Okinawan women in the diaspora.
War and the post-war "newcomers" entering the immigrant lands have spread, enhanced, and strengthened the Chimagukuru (Okinawan spirit) within their respective communities.

Through my interviews and reporting around the world, I have been able to meet about five hundred people of Okinawan descent. At this point, I would like to tell you about some of the people I have interviewed and their interesting life stories. One of those, who recently passed away at the age of one hundred and one years, and who became quite successful, was Shōkan Shima. Originally from Haneji, he came to Hawai‘i at the age of fifteen. However, because he was physically weak, he decided to go on to Washington to study. While there, he met the Henderson family, well-known in upper-class social circles, for whom he worked as a "houseboy." He was highly trusted by Mrs. Henderson, and when she passed away, two hundred thousand dollars and two large houses were given to him as an inheritance. A newspaper in Washington which covered the story, referred to him as a "Cinderella Boy." After the war, he looked after students who studied abroad on the GARIOA (Government and Relief in the Occupied Area) scholarship program. I visited him twice at his home in Washington, and he always told me, "You young people, please create a happy and prosperous future for Okinawans."

In Hawai‘i, I met a lot of people also: Dwight Takamine, Yoshito Takamine, Goro Hokama. The late Albert Teruya who, with his brother Wallace, founded the Times Supermarket, to name only a few.

Among Okinawans who have achieved success outside of Okinawa, I think of Yonamine Seishō. He emigrated to Brazil at the age of fifteen but lost his parents at an early age. As the eldest child, he had to take care of his siblings and began working as an apprentice at a local bakery. Since the oven in the bakery was used only during the day to bake bread, Yonamine asked and received the owner's permission to use the oven at night. Yonamine baked bread at night and rode his bicycle to sell the bread he had baked during the day. I wondered when he had time to sleep, but Yonamine said "three to four hours of sleep is enough," and he has continued the schedule until today. Yonamine owns the second largest bakery company in Brazil, employing four thousand employees. Morning meetings at the company start at 5:00a.m., and he stays at the company until 7:00 or 8:00p.m. When I visited him in Brazil, I was amazed by the statue of his parents in his yard. Every morning before he goes to work, Yonamine bows to the statue of his parents and says, "Itsumairimasu" (I am leaving home now, will return later), and when he returns, he says "Tadaima Kaerimashita" (I have returned home). He said his parents entered Brazil from the port of Santos and worked as farmers. Going through hardships, both of parents fell ill and could not achieve their goals. This memory remains in his heart. "I have no means of repaying them now—at least, this way I can pay respect to them every morning and evening."

In the post-war years, many Uchinaanchu also went to Europe attracted by its diverse cultures and skills. For example, people who wanted to study music went to Germany or Italy. In France and Spain, there are quite a few prominent Karate teachers from Okinawa and they have established Karate dojō with expanding numbers of students. Recently, many gathered at an international Karate competition held in Okinawa, and many European teachers and their students attended. It was most interesting to see the European students refer to their teachers as "sensei."

Another Uchinaanchu, Nakasone Masanori, lives in the northern Italian town of Brescia near Milan, a town which has thrived from the Medieval period manufacturing arms and armor. The Bettoni family, aristocratic descendants of a feudal lord, has lived in this area for twenty generations. Nakasone is married to the daughter of the Bettoni family, having overcome his father-in-law's initial objections. I interviewed him at his "Summer Palace" by Lake Garda, a place of great scenic beauty. Nakasone is originally from the very small island of Taramajima in the Miyako group, and his words are unforgettable. "I am from the small island of Tarama, and I went to Miyako to attend elementary school. People from Miyako teased me a lot because I was from Tarama. Then I went to the main island of Okinawa for high school, and there I was teased because I was from Miyako." For college, he went to Keio University in mainland Japan, and was teased for being from Okinawa. From Keio University he went to Great Britain to study abroad and was teased because he was from Asia. As such, he faced prejudice wherever he met "a larger world." But he used those adverse experiences to persevere and overcome all of his difficulties. Each year, he and his wife return home to Tarama, the island rich in art and music.

As I have previously noted, many Uchinaanchu are in South America, like Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia. But there are also Uchinaanchu at all ends of the world, even in the southernmost tip of South America. In a town called Ushuaia in the Tierra Del Fuego (Land of Fires), lives a man called Tamaki who had ventured south on a motorcycle and decide to stay. In Venezuela, near Rio Orinoco in a town called Puerto Ordaz, is Ishikawa...
Shinsuke, the owner of two department stores. He migrated without papers, and expanded his small shop into two department stores. Altogether, I have been to about thirty-five countries, to nearly the ends of the earth, and each time I find at least one Uchinaanchu.

After meeting all of these people of Okinawan descent in all these places, I found a common disposition or nature, an orientation which may be called “Chimugukuru” (Okinawan mind and heart). It is something passed from the Issei down through successive generations, and I will try to describe it through examples. One of those is “Ichariba Chodee” (once we meet we are brothers). This is the disposition of being open, frank, and conveying ease. The is based on the idea of “Inu Uchinaanchu” (recognizing commonality in being Uchinaanchu), but at the same time, being inclusive and with “our hearts open toward others.” Going outside of Okinawa to other places, Uchinaanchu pretty much convey their heart of Ichariba Chodee to the local people wherever they went.

Let me give an example. There were a lot of Okinawans residing in Palau before the war. In the town of Koror, we found many local people who had been subjected to Japanese language education before the war. When they discovered we had come from Okinawa, they greeted us with a huge welcome. When Japan occupied the islands, there was an official hierarchy: government officials in charge of the Nanyo at the top, then the posted people from other prefectures, then Uchinaanchu who were second-class nationals, and finally, the people of Palau. So the Uchinaanchu and the Palauans had greater opportunities to interact, and Palauans remember Uchinaanchu as being warm-hearted. This may be an example of our predecessors’ feeling of Ichariba Chodee permeating into the local community.

“Tee-gee” means approximately, or not precise, and perhaps, it can be extended to mean not really particular about time. The concept of tee-gee still seems to remain in Hawai‘i. Brazil, Argentine, Bolivia, and other places to which many Okinawans have migrated have a Latin culture which seems calm and relaxed. In Latin culture, they say hasta mañana (see you tomorrow). I think Uchinaanchu notions of time, tee-gee, fit in that environment quite well, and were better accepted than those of Japanese.

And we often say “Nankuru Naisa” (it will all work out) when we encounter hardships or difficulties. When we face hardship, we approach it optimistically, and figure that “things will work out.” I think Nankuru Naisa is an expression of the optimistic nature of Uchinaanchu. When our ancestors first migrated, they did not know the spoken language of their destination, and they were very poor. I think they succeeded in ventures because they thought positively, Nankuru Naisa, and just hoped for the best.

Moreover, I think another common way of thinking our ancestors shared is seen in two expressions: “Chui Dashiki Dashiki” (helping one by one) and “Inu Uchinaanchu nu deemun” (since you are Uchinaanchu). Together these notions create conditions for mutual assistance. Keeping these expressions in mind, they helped each other get settled and do better. Many Uchinaanchu can be found clustered in the same kinds of businesses and this may be a result of the communal practices of assisting people from the same villages or homeland. For example, restaurant and hog raising were the common businesses in Hawai‘i. In Brazil, Issei were in the ferante (street vendor), or cultura (tailor or dress-making) businesses. Many Uchinaanchu have pasta (deep-fried pastry stuffed with meat and other ingredients) businesses because the earlier immigrants shared information with the later immigrants about the kinds of entrepreneurial activities which might succeed, how to operate them, and in this way practiced mutual assistance or Chui Dashiki Dashiki with one another. Similar patterns exist in Argentina, where there are many family-owned and -operated dry cleaning or laundry shops (tenturieria), owned by both Uchinaanchu and Japanese, and in Peru where barber shops, bakeries and markets are common.

I have suggested four common ideas that Uchinaanchu worldwide seem to have in common: Ichariba Chodee, Tee-gee, Nankuru Naisa, and Chui Dashiki Dashiki. These four ideas probably emerged out of pre-war village communities that sustained those who lived in that environment. These concepts, and that of Chimugukuru (Okinawan heart or spirit), supported those immigrant Okinawan communities. Finally, in addition to those intangible values, Okinawans brought with them cultural arts like uta-sanshin (singing with sanshin) and their language. Many immigrants who came as sugar plantation workers brought their sanshin with them, and so did those who migrated to South America. The earliest Okinawans to South America learned Spanish before they learned Japanese, so they mainly communicated in Uchinaaguchi or Spanish. After the war, the immigrants of Peru, Brazil and Argentina also spoke Uchinaaguchi which continued to perpetuate the language.

Here’s an example. In the area around San Paulo, there is a town called Kanpo Grande. It is said that Okinawans established that town and there are about ten thousand Okinawans living there. We heard that many Okinawans
operate stalls in the marketplace, so we went to interview them and found a woman in her sixties or seventies. Assuming she spoke Japanese, I began to interview her saying, “I'm from Okinawa, which generation Uchinaanchu are you?” She looked puzzled, and I panicked because I couldn't speak Portuguese. So I said: “Watta-ya Uchinaa kara cha...” (we are from Okinawa), and since I can't speak much Uchinaaguchi, “Uchinaa kara choondo,” a more informal expression. The lady's face brightened and she said in very fluent Uchinaaguchi, “Ya-ya Uchinaa-kara ru yanna?” (you are from Okinawa?). She went on to say in Uchinaaguchi, “my father is from Gushikawa,” with a Gushikawa intonation. Speaking Uchinaaguchi in this regional manner is a characteristic of Uchinaanchu in Brazil and Argentina, one which is disappearing in Okinawa.

I also noticed there were people who steadfastly only speak Uchinaaguchi. I recall a tough interview with Moromizato Anken who owns a bakery in Peru. I would ask a question in Japanese and, although he could communicate in Japanese, he would reply only in Uchinaaguchi. He was insistent about speaking Uchinaaguchi. It is ironic that my generation of Okinawans in Okinawa cannot speak Uchinaaguchi any longer. Contrast this with individuals from Brazil, or Peru, or other South American countries who have come to Okinawa to work, happy to be able to visit their ancestor's homeland. As young adults who can speak Uchinaaguchi, they often expect their Okinawan peers to be able to do the same, but young people in Okinawa do not speak Uchinaaguchi, nor do they understand it. So, unlike their counterparts from South America, young people in Okinawa cannot communicate in their heritage language! After traveling to South America to do those interviews, I have been inspired to study Uchinaaguchi.

I think these value orientations and cultural traits which help define who and what we are, construct our identity as we live in a multicultural society. I think Okinawans in Hawai’i who have a strong Uchinaanchu consciousness are a good example. For me, meeting many Okinawans worldwide has made me think more about Okinawans in Okinawa. We, Okinawans, have inherited rich cultural orientations from our ancestors, but these are disappearing from the consciousness and personalities of Okinawans in Okinawa. As I reflect on this, I recall that in the earlier days, when a person went to the countryside, the obaachan (elderly women) would often ask “munoo kadi?” (have you eaten? please eat if you're hungry), or “cha-gwa nodi ike” (have some tea). This was common when visiting villages in Okinawa. Such generosity of attitude seems to be disappearing in Okinawa as concepts of tee gee get replaced by an emphasis on competition and efficiency. And Uchinaaguchi is hardly spoken any more, while it is very much alive in South America.

Recently a person from overseas told me something very shocking. This person said, “Okinawans often talk about Ichariba Choodee,” but for Okinawans today, it is becoming more like Ichariba Choodee only for that moment; people are hospitable initially, but it doesn’t continue.” I often hear that Uchinaanchu have become cold-hearted, and I think we need to seriously reflect on this. Does the Okinawan spirit no longer exist in Okinawa, but only in Hawai’i and South America? Whenever I have visited South America to do my work, the Uchinaanchu would pick us up from the airport, even if we got there in the middle of the night; when we interview, they prepare so much food, more than we could possibly finish—they are so generous. While Okinawa may be the motherland for Uchinaanchu, how much kindness and simplicity truly remains by comparison? Perhaps in twenty years, the gentleness of Uchinaanchu may no longer be witnessed in Okinawa; instead, we may have to plan tours entitled “Seek the Real Uchinaanchu Spirit in South America.” I am truly afraid that if you want to be a real Uchinaanchu, you will need to go abroad.

To summarize, the Uchinaanchu mentality which was constructed over the past century in the various immigrant communities was characterized by the following orientations: “ichariba choodee,” “tee-gee,” “nankuru naisa,” and “chui dashiki dashiki.” I think here we can see a common set of ideas which helped people live together in understanding and acceptance of different cultures. I believe they are also ideal elements for adapting to a globalized society. It is often said that we Uchinaanchu, especially those in Okinawa, don't have an identity. I don't think identity can be sustained without being conscious of it, and I don't think identity is something we automatically possess because we are born in Okinawa.

We need to consider Uchinaanchu's ways of thinking—of conceptualizing the world and of being in it—and the Uchinaanchu spirit that we inherited from our ancestors, and try to pass them down to succeeding generations. This is the way to sustain Uchinaanchu identity, and this First Worldwide Uchinaanchu Conference may be a means of passing down that Uchinaanchu spirit and identity. Yesterday, at the festival, I heard many people say: “I am so proud of being Uchinaanchu.” I especially heard it from many of the elders. It warmed my heart. I hope this conference will be a great success.
Notes

Maehara Shinichi delivered this keynote speech on 1 September 2003 at the "First Worldwide Uchinanchu Conference" held at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawai'i. Although Okinawa had hosted several Worldwide Uchinanchu Taikai (gatherings), this was the first international conference hosted by one of the diasporic Uchinaanchu communities and held outside Okinawa Prefecture. Maehara's speech was delivered in Japanese and was videotaped. The transcript was then translated from Japanese into English by Rinda Yamashiro, Shinji Kojima, and Shinako Oyakawa and edited by Joyce Chinen.

1. The 1885 date represents the start of the “Kanyaku Imin” (Government sponsored immigration). An earlier private contract labor immigration, the "Gannen Mono" (First year of Meiji people), proved to be largely unsuccessful and only one of the original group remained in Hawai'i after the contract expired.

2. The Philippines and other former Spanish territories (e.g., Puerto Rico, Cuba, etc.) were annexed by the United States in 1898 as a result of its victory in the Spanish-American War. With the Treaty of Paris in 1899, Filipinos became American Nationals until the passage of the Tydings McDuffie Act of 1934 in which the Philippines were promised their independence.

3. The following is a quote from the afterword by Mitsugu Sakihara.

Another bright spot was in the field of higher education. Before WWII, Okinawa was the only Japanese prefecture without any institution of higher education. The situation was remedied in October 1949, when the University of the Ryukyus was established by USCAR. In addition, many Okinawans were sent under the GARIOA (Government and Relief in the Occupied Area) Fund, to the U.S. for higher education. As of 1972, a total of 1,045 Okinawans availed themselves of the opportunity. Of this number, 28 students received doctorates, 262 received master's degrees, and 155 received bachelor's degrees. There were also those who went to Japan to study, including contract students, national scholarship students, and private students. As of 1980, approximately 3,924 students had graduated from institutions of higher education in Japan. Never before had so many Okinawans received higher education—either at home or overseas (Okinawa: The History of an Island People, by George H. Kerr. Rev. ed., Boston, MA: Tuttle Publishing, 2000, p. 554).

Theorizing on the Okinawan Diaspora

ROBERT K. ARAKAKI

Centennials are milestones marking progress on a journey. The year 2000 has been designated as the centennial of the arrival of the Okinawan immigrants in Hawai'i. This book marks some of the complex journeys undertaken by Okinawans who left their homeland to sojourn in other parts of the globe and by their descendants who seek to recover their Okinawan identity.

This process of large numbers of people emigrating and settling abroad is referred to as diasporic flows. Diaspora is derived from the Greek noun diaspora, "dispersion." The verb form is diaspeiro, "to scatter abroad, throw about." The original expression described a farmer sowing seeds. The word later acquired its present meaning when it was used to describe the history of the Jewish people in exile. More recently, diaspora has been used to describe the experiences of other peoples. In this essay, I will discuss the recent theoretical debate surrounding the concepts of diaspora, diasporic flows, and diasporic identity and the ways in which these concepts are used to frame our understanding of the Okinawan diaspora as presented in this book.

The discovery of the Okinawan diaspora was a surprise for this Sansei Okinawan born and raised in Hawai'i. I knew that there were Okinawan communities in Hawai'i, the mainland United States, and Brazil. But I was surprised to learn that the Okinawan presence extended to the Philippines, Micronesia, and Fukien, China, and Manchuria. I was fascinated to learn of Okinawans living as far away as Singapore, Java, Cuba, and New Guinea. These discoveries raised a host of questions: What were the political and economic forces that gave rise to the Okinawan diaspora? How was Okinawan identity constructed outside Okinawa? How was the diasporic Okinawan experience shaped by the social processes of modernity, nationalism, and globalization?

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Centennials, occasions for celebrations, are also times for critical reflection. Both are needed. Celebrations without critical reflection can easily degenerate into self-indulgent narcissism. Approached constructively, centennials serve as means for appreciating the past, understanding the present, and preparing for the future. This book is intended to be a critical and reflective work of scholarship. It is intended to be read by the descendants of Okinawan immigrants and by descendants of other immigrant groups. It is hoped that this book will be of interest to the scholarly community, especially members of that community studying modernity, identity politics, ethnicity, nationalism, and Asia-Pacific history.

**A New Field of Study**


The subject of diaspora is also receiving serious attention in academic journals. William Safran (1991:83) notes that very little attention has been given to diasporas. James Clifford’s “Diasporas” (1994) surveys the field. And Adam McKeown (1999) gives the subject a theoretically sophisticated treatment. The emergence of this new field has also been marked by the launching of the journals *Diaspora and Public Cultures* and *Diaspora* in addition to such established journals as the *Journal of Transnational Studies and Cultural Anthropology*. Another indication of the serious attention being given to the topic of diaspora is the University of Washington Press series on global diasporas under the editorial leadership of Robin Cohen.

Research on diasporic flows has been stimulated by the emergence of postmodern theory and cultural studies, disciplines that cover a wide range of diverse topics such as globalization, identity politics, nationalism, transnationalism, orientalism, postcolonial theory, and subaltern studies. Some notable works are Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* ([1983] 1991), Arjun Appadurai’s *Modernity at Large* (1996), Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s collection *Identities* (1995), Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson’s collection *Global Modernities* (1995), Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan’s *Diasporic Mediations* (1996), and Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978). Although much of the discussion in these works focuses on the postmodern context of the late twentieth century, the questions that they raise, their employment of an alternative lexicon, and their challenging of conventional categories make this book possible. Without this current of scholarly debate, our understanding of Okinawan identity could not be framed in such terms as the response to relations of power or to the transnational forces of capitalism, nationalism, and modernity.

**What Are Diasporic Flows?**

Diasporic flows are ancient phenomena. The history of humanity is filled with individuals and groups moving from one place to another. The Jewish diaspora is well-known. The close association between the expression *diaspora* and the history of the Jewish people evokes strong moral overtones. It is only recently that appropriations of *diaspora* have moved beyond the constrictive connotations of loss, exile, and the tenacious preservation of identity. The more recent appropriations have sought to highlight transformations and dislocations of groups by transnational forces, as well as the fluidity of identity, as a way of challenging bounded and static understandings of society.

With diasporic flows, we are speaking about movements of significant numbers of people and the relocation of cultural systems. A lone merchant or even a small guild doing business in a port far away has a negligible effect on the local culture and society. It is when large numbers of migrants begin to settle and replicate the cultural system of the homeland in a new context that we can begin to speak of a diasporic presence.

Diasporic analysis is still being contested by competing approaches. These approaches range from the postmodern hermeneutics found in Barkan and Shelton’s *Borders, Exiles, Diasporas* (1998) to Robin Cohen’s more historical *Global Diasporas* (1997). Tensions exist between the centrifugal
“diaspora as exile,” which is based on the understanding of concrete entities whose identities are indissoluble over time and space, and the centrifugal “diaspora as diversity,” which shifts the emphasis away from bounded groups to dispersed connections, institutions, and discourses (McKeown 1999:311). Before undertaking diasporic analysis, we must clarify whether our interest lies in the social structures of the diaspora or in the subjective orientations of individual emigrants.

For the purpose of this essay, I will be defining diaspora broadly, as the dispersal of significant numbers of people that results in the formation of a minority culture in a different social context. My understanding of diasporas ranges from a group’s merging or assimilating into the host society, to a large-scale return to the country of origin, to a group becoming the dominant power, to a group assuming a creolized or hybrid identity. In this essay, diasporic flow refers to the social and institutional factors that facilitate the movement of people, diasporic experience to the formation of social identity within the dialectics of the ancestral homeland and the current host society. Where the former is more structural and political in focus, that is, objective, the second is more subjective and reflective.

**Diasporic Flows and the Making of the Modern World**

Diasporic flows have powerfully shaped the modern world; they are the chief source of the multicultural diversity of many contemporary societies. Examples in Europe include the Algerians in France, the Turks in Germany, and the Pakistanis and Indians in England. The Cubans in Florida, the Irish in the United States, and the French in Louisiana and Quebec, respectively, are North American examples. Asia-Pacific examples include the Indian diaspora in Fiji and the Indian and Chinese diasporas in Malaysia and Singapore.

The United States is the result of a multiplicity of diasporic flows. The English Puritans emigrated in search of religious freedom; the Africans were transported across the Atlantic against their will as slaves; the Irish fled the Potato Famine; and the Chicanos crisscrossed the border between the United States and Mexico in search of work. More recent diasporic flows originated from Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The long-dominant ethnic group in the United States, the Anglo-Saxons, was the result of the English diaspora that began in the seventeenth century. The English diaspora is one of the most significant diasporic flows with respect to volume, duration, and effect (Cohen 1997:67). Between 1846 and 1932, about 18 million people emigrated from Great Britain and Ireland. This diaspora resulted in the formation of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Diasporic flows can give rise to diverse and tolerant societies like Hawai’i’s (see below). Unfortunately, they can also give rise to intolerance, xenophobic racism, and apartheid. The American Exclusion Act of 1924, the neofascist attacks against the Turks in Germany, the antagonisms between African Americans and Korean immigrants in the Los Angeles riots, all point to the darker side of diasporic flows. The problem of ethnic pluralism and having an open and tolerant civil society is one of the major challenges of our time.

A number of books have been written on this topic, for example, Crawford Young’s *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (1976), Donald Horowitz’s *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), and Joseph V. Montville’s collection *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multietnic Societies* (1990).

The study of diasporic flows is important for constructing an understanding of global history. Diasporic analysis links national history to the study of transregional and global history. For example, although the African diaspora and the Indian diaspora are distinct, there is a significant relation between the two. Both are examples of a labor diaspora. The slave trade was crucial for the emergence of the modern world economy. When slavery was outlawed, the labor needs of capitalists simply shifted from coerced African labor to indentured labor from India (Cohen 1997:59). In a similar way, the demise of the African slave diaspora gave rise to the Chinese labor diaspora. Thus, although the African, Indian, and Chinese diasporas were quite different from each other, they are linked by global capitalism’s evolving need for cheap labor. Just as the globalization of capitalism created an international economy, it also resulted in the ever-widening circulation of capital and, with that, a corresponding expanding dispersal of human labor, giving rise to a multiplicity of diasporic flows.

Diasporic analysis can be useful for bringing to light a hidden side of modern history. Until recently, much of modern history has been presented with reference to “national narratives” (McKeown 1999:307). Constricted by the trope of nationalism, scholars have largely understood recent history as events within a nation’s borders, ignoring transnational phenomena. For example, at the turn of the twentieth century, 62,000 Chinese laborers were recruited to work in the South African gold mines. A few years later, 140,000 Chinese were enlisted to build roads and dig graves and trenches in France during World
Although the laborers established no permanent presence, surely their contributions should be included in our consideration of history. Diasporic analysis can also prove helpful in understanding contemporary developments. In *Ungrounded Empires* (1997), Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini discuss how the Chinese diaspora is giving rise to a transnational Chinese identity. Barbara Metcalf’s collection *Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe* (1996) shows that diasporic identity need not be based solely on ethnicity.

**Types of Diasporic Flows**

Diasporas can take a number of forms. There are labor diasporas, in which people emigrate looking for jobs that promise economic improvement. There are political or victim diasporas, in which groups of people are forcibly ejected by a hostile regime or are fleeing civil war. There are slavery diasporas, in which groups of people are seized and transported against their will to meet labor needs elsewhere. There are imperial diasporas, in which the immigrants become the majority, dominating the original inhabitants. A number of different typologies have been constructed to describe and differentiate the various diasporas. Milton Esman (1994:6ff.) has formulated a threefold typology: hegemonic diasporas; bourgeoisie diasporas; and labor diasporas. Gung Wu Wang (1991:4ff.) has created a fourfold typology to describe the Chinese diaspora: *huashang* (trader); *huagong* (coolie); *huaqiao* (sojourner); and *huayi* (reemigration or tertiary migration). Robin Cohen (1997:x) differentiated five types of diasporas: victim diasporas (the African and Armenian), imperial diasporas (the British), labor diasporas (the South Asian Indian), trading diasporas (the Chinese and Lebanese), and cultural diasporas (the Caribbean).

Differences in diasporic flows shape the diasporic community’s interaction with the host culture. In the case of hegemonic diasporas, the immigrant community arrives in such numbers and with such a technological advantage that it dominates the indigenous peoples and in time claims for itself the status of homeland people. In bourgeois diasporas, immigrant communities enter host societies with commercial or educational advantages over the indigenous peoples. This often gives rise to a middleman minority group, both feared and envied by the host community, which can in turn give rise to xenophobic violence. In labor diasporas, a large-scale migration of workers and their families seeking a better way of life occurs. These emigrants often seek economic advancement and assimilation into the host country. Often, they engage in political mobilization to gain access to economic and political centers of power in the host country. On the other hand, in victim diasporas, communities forced from their homelands will often seek to return home and thus impede assimilation into the host culture.

**Effect of Nationalism**

Diasporic flows have been significantly affected by the nationalisms of the twentieth century. Nationalism has imposed on the majority of the world population the modern category of citizenship in which one’s political identity, not to mention one’s social existence, is determined by membership in a recognized state. In many ways, nationalism constitutes the height of the modernity project. It fuses the modern state with a precisely defined geography and a uniform populace with a uniform national culture. The essentializing of identity, a process that has come under rigorous scrutiny and critique from postmodern theorists, is crucial to the formation of the national identity. Under nationalism, political identity becomes linked with a particular “essence”: race, language, religion, or culture.

Because nationalism assumes a fixed and stable identity, it is uneasy with communities with multiple or ambiguous loyalties. Hybridity and creolized identity are viewed as having the potential to undermine the nationalist project. In its quest for a uniform populace, nationalism gives rise to either assimilation or exclusion and has little tolerance for a transnational identity.

The host society’s attitude toward diasporic communities is heavily shaped by its political culture. In countries such as the United States that define citizenship in civic terms (*jus soli*), the government will usually seek to assimilate the diasporic community into the national culture. In countries such as Japan that define citizenship in ethnic or racial terms (*jus sanguinis*), full citizenship is often denied to members of diasporic communities, even though they may be three or four generations removed from the original immigrants and may have no memory of their families’ country of origin. In countries such as Malaysia that define citizenship in terms of consociation (i.e., democracy structured along the lines of institutionalized pluralism), ethnic diasporas are recognized as distinct communities and are guaranteed proportional representation; however, assimilation into the dominant culture is not encouraged.
Identity Politics

The construction of social identity is critical for understanding the diasporic experience. The question of identity, long taken for granted, has recently become the subject of vigorous academic debate. Primordialism—the understanding of identity as something stable and fixed—has long exercised a powerful influence on the way people understood social identity. However, in recent years, social scientists have come to understand identity as something that is flexible and context dependent. Fredrik Barth's collection *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) represents an early attempt critically to understand the nature of ethnic identity. In his introduction to the collection, Barth contends that it is the group boundary, not the cultural context, that plays a critical role in the construction of ethnic identity. Dru Gladney (1996) argues that identity is constructed through a series of binaries (us/them) that are dependent on the context in which the question of ethnic identity is raised. Norman Buchignani (1980) makes an argument for the interactionist model of ethnic identity.

Diasporic identity is not necessarily unidirectional. Robin Cohen (1997:24) points out that the mere arrival of immigrants does not automatically signify the formation of a diasporic community. The migrants may seek to merge, shedding their prior cultural identity. Furthermore, assimilation can involve the forgetting or suppressing of one's ethnic identity, which the immigrant then later attempts to recover. My "Politics of Okinawan Identity" represents an attempt to describe this process (see Arakaki 1996). Ethnic identity can also result from outside pressure on a self-defined group. John Sorensen (1991) describes the attempts of the Eritreans, Oromos, and Tigrayans in Canada to resist being identified as "Ethiopians" by the Amhara elites from Ethiopia and the general Canadian population. Thus, identity is not static but dynamic. I suggest that we think, not only in terms of identity (a noun that implies something stable and static), but also in terms of identification (a process that implies historicity and change).

Although largely discredited in academic circles, primordialism is far from dead. It is still very much alive in the 1990s. The horrific ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by the Serbs represents an attempt to create an ethnically pure state through systematic violence. The white supremacist groups in the United States represent an attempt to preserve white identity in the face of population pressures that threaten to transform the white majority into a white minority. Primordialism is also very much alive in Japan, where the notion of *nihonjin-ron* (theorizing on the Japanese)—which assumes an unidentifiable "essence" that defines Japanese uniqueness—is still widely accepted (see van Wolferen 1990:263ff.; and Reischauer 1977:401ff.).

The ability to negotiate identity depends on the accessibility of the identity marker that a group uses to differentiate itself. An attribute or a practice that no longer distinguishes a group from its rivals or that has fallen into widespread disuse cannot easily be used to assert a group's identity or interests. One widely used identity marker has been religion. Catholicism has been a powerful unifying marker for the Irish and the Poles. An Islamic identity has been used in a similar way by the Algerians in France, the Turks in Germany, and the Palestinians in Israel. Another powerful identity marker has been language. The defense of the French language in Quebec is one example of boundary maintenance. Similar instances can be found in the case of the resurgence of Alsatian, Breton, and Flemish in France. In Great Britain, Gaelic and Welsh have enjoyed a comeback after years of domination by English. An identity marker can also take the form of a decisive historical memory. For the Jews, the traumatic event is the deportation to Babylon; for the Irish, it is the Potato Famine of the 1800s; for the Armenians, it is the Turkish pogrom; and, for the Africans, it is the transatlantic slave trade.

The signifiers of ethnic identity are often dynamic and shifting. In the construction of a diasporic identity, manipulation of identity markers usually reflects power structures. Identity markers can be highlighted in such a way as to exclude others or to establish hegemonic relations over others. Or identity markers can be suppressed in order to gain access to the centers of power and obtain material and social benefits. This latter phenomenon is known as passing.

One of the fundamental assumptions of this book is that there is such a thing as an Okinawan identity. But this leads to such questions as: What are the signifiers of an Okinawan identity? What are the practices, values, rituals, and institutions that are uniquely Okinawan? Do these signifiers hold across the various diasporic Okinawan communities? To what extent are the signifiers of modern Okinawan identity shaped by the Japanese nationalist project? Which theoretical approach best describes the way the diasporic Okinawan identity has been constructed?

Creole Identities

The nature of diasporic identity can shift significantly over time. Where a sojourner community regards the country of origin as its homeland, two or
three generations later the diasporic community will have evolved into a settled community loyal to the adopted country. This is manifested by the creolization of diasporic identity. Creolization retains some cultural practices of the original ethnic community while fully participating in the social, political, and economic institutions of the host society, especially through intermarriage with the native population.

Hawai'i's diverse and tolerant multicultural society is the product of the creolization that resulted from the various labor diasporas that converged onto Hawai'i's plantations (see Okamura 1998). In the late 1800s and early 1900s, laborers were brought in large numbers from south China, Japan, Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Azores to meet the need for cheap labor to work on Hawai'i's plantations. The Haole (i.e., European American) hegemonic diaspora from the mainland United States also had an effect. It was under the Haole oligarchy that the various labor diasporic communities learned to live, work, and play together, giving rise to Hawai'i's unique local culture and pidgin English. Modern Hawai'i is the result of the complex dialectic of Americanization (assimilation) and resistance to Haole cultural and political dominance. The roots of this dialectic stem from tensions between various nonwhite labor diasporas and the white Haole hegemonic diaspora.

Hawai'i's open society has made it possible for the Okinawans to make their own contribution to Hawai'i's unique blending of cultures. At first, the Okinawans were closely allied with the Japanese. Later, as they gradually became increasingly conscious and confident of their political ability, they began to field political candidates who won major political offices. In Hawaiian political circles, the Okinawan community has come to be widely respected for its ability to mobilize significant numbers of voters and resources.

However, creolization and assimilation are not necessarily inevitable. Several factors can impede creolization. If an immigrant community locates itself in a rural instead of an urban area—as Japanese communities in South America early in this century tended to do—it becomes isolated from the influence of the host culture. This isolation creates linguistic enclaves—for example, among South American Japanese communities, Japanese was used in public conversation and in signage, and libraries stocked only Japanese materials (Normano and Gerbi 1943:52). Another impeding factor is loyalty to the home country. In Peru, for example, Japanese immigrants remained unflaggingly loyal to Japan and willing to follow the instructions of Japanese officials. That the native population resented the economic success of the immigrants further isolated the Japanese community, and tension grew to the point that anti-Japanese riots broke out in 1940 (see Gardiner 1975:156, 61–65).

Diasporas and the Homeland

One of the variables shaping diasporic identity is how home is identified. Is home where one hopes one day to return, or is it where one's family has resided for the past two or three generations? I would argue that the return is not an essential part of diasporic identity. At the same time, the nostalgia of literally returning home can exercise a powerful influence on an individual's and a community's construction of a diasporic identity. Many settled diasporic communities regard the host country as home and have no desire to return to the country of origin. They are already home. However, it is possible that the desire to help out one's "homeland" can be used to mobilize the resources of diasporic communities.

Armenian immigrants to America who fled the 1915 massacres became withdrawn and sought to forget the past. In the 1970s, the American Armenian community made a journey to the past that resulted in a political identity that unleashed a burst of energy within the community. The end of the cold war resulted in the founding of the Republic of Armenia in 1990 and revived dreams of Greater Armenia. Armenia proceeded to lay claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan. The American Armenian community raised $1.5 million through telethons and fundraising drives to pay for food, clothing, and arms and ammunition. Other examples include the Irish American community's support of the Irish Republican Army and the American Jewish community's support of the nation of Israel.

In contrast, the diasporic Okinawan identity has, for the most part, been that of an apolitical labor diaspora. That, however, could change. Edith Kaneshiro (1999) describes how the Okinawan diaspora was rooted in the economic decline brought about by Japanese rule. Emigration emerged as an alternative when protests against Japanese rule were crushed by government authorities. Unable to improve their lot through political reform, and pressed by unemployment, Okinawans began emigrating in large numbers.

For me, the study of Okinawa's recent history has brought to light the forcible annexation by Japan and the attempts by the Japanese government to suppress Okinawan culture and stamp out the Okinawan language. For this diasporic Okinawan, these discoveries have given rise to a sense of moral
outrage. As I became aware of Okinawa's past, I also became painfully aware of Okinawa's present status as a U.S. military outpost.

As one whose primary loyalty is to Hawai'i and the United States, my feelings about the oppressive presence of the U.S. military on Okinawa are ambivalent. My perception of Okinawan identity underwent another shift when I visited Shuri Palace, the site of Okinawan political sovereignty and of the theft of the Ryukyuan royal crown in 1945 (see Nakasone 1992). Previously, I understood Okinawan identity with reference to cultural practices: Okinawan dance; the sataa andagi (a deep-fried ball-shaped sugar cake); and the sanshin (a three-stringed plucked lute). I now see Okinawan identity grounded in a historic tragedy and political sovereignty lost. My diasporic identity is now caught between the apolitical labor diaspora and the more political victim diaspora.

**Double Minority within a Double Diaspora**

One of the unique features of the Okinawan diaspora has been the Okinawans' position as a double minority. The Okinawans were often seen as "the other Japanese." They have been referred to as "the other Japanese" in Mindanao, "otro Japonés" in Peru, "Japan-Pâke" in Hawai'i (by mainland Japanese), and "Japonese-Kanaka" in Micronesia. In many instances, the diasporic Okinawans were forced to construct their identity against three axes of identity: the host culture, the Japanese diaspora, and the Okinawan diaspora. They were often both Japanese and non-Japanese.

The Okinawan diaspora is also significant because there were two Okinawan diasporas: one within the Japanese colonial empire and one beyond. Okinawans who moved within the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were forced to negotiate their identity against the Japanese imperial center and Japan's other colonial subjects. Okinawans who moved beyond Japan's colonial empire were forced to negotiate their identity against the host culture and in relation to mainland Japanese immigrants.

The contradictions embedded in modern Okinawan identity reflect the fact that, although officially a prefecture of Japan (which presupposes equality with mainland Japan), Okinawa was, in fact, an exploited colony (which presupposes a subordinate identity to mainland Japan; see Nomura 1992). With its annexation by Japan in 1879, Okinawa became subject to Japan's ambitions to become a modern nation-state. And with those ambitions came myriad Japanese normalizing practices: administrative laws, military conscription, language, education, and emperor worship. The nation-building project involved a series of measures to make the Okinawans into "good" Japanese. The attempts to emulate the Japanese reached ridiculous extremes, such as a newspaper editorial exhorting Okinawans to sneeze in a manner identical to that in which the inhabitants of other prefectures sneezed (Christy 1997:155).

However, because Okinawans remained different, they came to be regarded as inferior to the Japanese. This categorization of Japanese superiority/non-Japanese inferiority is an outgrowth of the Japanese construction of national identity.

Alan Christy (1997) notes that, unlike most other subject peoples, who by and large resisted the Japanese colonial project of cultural assimilation, many Okinawans accepted it. Within the context of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese polity was understood as a "family state." The Okinawans were the eldest son, the Koreans the second, and the Taiwanese the youngest. It was in the interest of many Okinawan elites to suppress their Okinawan identity in order to access the benefits derived from the Japanese. Christy notes, "The examples from both Taiwan and Osaka remind us that Okinawan struggles to deal with discrimination from Japanese and improve their economic lot must be understood within the context of the Japanese Empire, in which being Japanese was the only way to access power" (152). Many Okinawans immigrated to Taiwan, a Japanese colony at the time, seeking economic opportunity. Systematic discrimination forced the Okinawans to occupy the bottom rung of the labor market. Many changed their names in an attempt to pass as someone from Kagoshima Prefecture in southern Japan (Christy 1997:150).

Discrimination in Taiwan forced many Okinawans to immigrate to the Osaka-Kobe area in search of work, where they also abandoned their Okinawan identity. The Seikatsu kaizen undō, or Lifestyle Reform Movement, founded in the Osaka-Kobe area, encouraged Okinawans to reject their traditional dress, speech, and recreational activities (Christy 1997:146). Tomiyama Ichirō (1992) notes that a similar movement was also founded in Micronesia.

The Okinawan response to Japanese colonialism was not one of unmitigated complicity. Many resisted assimilation and discrimination. In the 1920s, the various mutual-support groups in Osaka-Kobe came under the leadership of the leftist Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association, which attempted to instill class consciousness in Okinawan workers. (The association collapsed with the Japanese government's antileftist crackdown in the late 1920s.) Another sign of
resistance was the founding of the discipline of Okinawa gaku, or Okinawan studies, in the early 1900s in reaction to the Japanese exclusion of Okinawa's history in favor of the imperial version of Japanese history.

Castell's *Power of Identity* (1997) is useful for differentiating the different responses that Okinawans have made to the Japanese colonial project and the construction of diasporic Okinawan identity abroad. Castell argues that there are three types of identity: legitimating identity, which rationalizes the structures of domination; resistance identity, which attempts to resist domination; and project identity, which seeks the transformation of society. To these categories, I would add another, colluding identity, the response of a subordinate group that accepts the hegemonic project and subordinates its identity to that of the oppressors, even to the point of actively colluding with them. Using Castell's categories, I would say that the Japanese administrators utilized a legitimating identity to justify Japanese rule in Okinawa. The Okinawans responded by taking on either a resistance identity or a colluding identity. One sought to become Japanese, the other to maintain the uniqueness of Okinawan culture. It seems that the project identity has been largely absent in the history of the Okinawan diaspora. It is possible that the recent Okinawan protests against the U.S. military bases and the attempt to reaffirm Okinawans' identity as a peaceful people could form the basis for project identity.

**Engaging the Japanese Identity Project**

Further research on Japanese nationalism and the Japanese diaspora may shed additional light on how Japanese identity was constructed within and outside Japan. Such research is needed because the Okinawan diaspora, it seems, cannot be adequately understood apart from the Japanese diaspora and the Japanese colonial project. Okinawan identity has been constructed in four contexts: in Okinawa under Japanese colonial rule; in mainland Japan under the Japanese majority population; in diaspora alongside the Japanese diaspora and the native population under Japanese colonial rule; and in diaspora alongside the Japanese diaspora and the native population outside the Japanese polity.

One of the distinctive features of the Japanese construction of identity is the unusual stress on Japanese uniqueness (Reischauer 1977:401ff.) and the invention of "one Japan" (Hashimoto 1998:140–143). More important, the official ideology of modern Japan prior to 1946 stated that the emperor is the living embodiment of the *kokutai* (national essence), a position that can be traced to the *Kojiki* (Records of ancient matters), which was completed in 712, and the *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan; also called the *Nihon shoki*), compiled a few years later, in 720. This national essence consisted in the alleged unbroken imperial succession from the first emperor, Jimmu (660–585 B.C.E.), to the present, and these ancient documents trace the origins of the imperial line and the Japanese people to the divine. The myth of Japanese uniqueness was further reinforced by the isolationist policies of the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1867), which shielded the country from the outside—especially the Western world—for several centuries. (The Bakufu government did maintain diplomatic relations with China, Korea, and Ryukyu.) The cultural stress on group conformity and the centuries-long harsh authoritarian rule also perpetuated the belief in the singularity of Japan. These historical and sociological features gave rise to *nihonjinron* (theorizing on the Japanese), which permeates Japan's popular and official culture (see van Wolferen 1990:263ff.).

It is important to note that, beginning in the Meiji era (1868–1912), the Japanese identity was also constructed against the gaijin (outsider, i.e., foreigner) West, an attempt to survive the onslaught of modernizing practices that threatened to undermine the Japanese way of life (Wagatsuma 1975:314ff.). What is of interest is how the Japanese constructed a Japanese identity when Japan incorporated non-Japanese peoples into the Japanese polity in the course of colonial expansion. Also of interest is how the construction of a Japanese identity defined, protected, and supported Japan's military designs and economic interests throughout the twentieth century. Weiner's (1995) bibliography lists a body of literature that critiques the Japanese construction of identity and the hegemonic relations so engendered. I am not aware of any major study of the Japanese diaspora. James Clifford's (1994) survey article "Diasporas" does not discuss it. Neither does Robin Cohen's *Global Diasporas* (1997). There are a few works on the Japanese diaspora in Latin America. Gardiner's *The Japanese and Peru* (1975) and Normano and Garbi's *The Japanese in South America* (1943) were written before the recent emergence of diaspora studies and postmodern theory. John Schultz and Kimitada Miwa's collection *Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (1991) represents a good start. Further research is needed.

To conclude, the study of the Okinawan diaspora is more than an academic exercise. It is an attempt to recover the Okinawan voice, resist the violence of Japanese nationalism and the more recent American global imperialism, and raise questions about modernity and the nation-building project.
Unfinished Agenda

It is hoped that this volume will inspire additional research on the Okinawan experience. Further research is needed on early Okinawan incursions into Southeast Asia, especially before the Satsuma invasion. Researchers proficient in Thai, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, Latin, Portuguese, and Javanese should be able to tell us more of the early Okinawa diaspora. Between 1430 and 1432, Ryukyuu sent at least seventeen trade missions to Ayutthaya, eight to Palembang, and six to Java. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ayutthayan fleets called on Ryukyuan ports. We can also assume that Okinawans were in contact with Indian and Arab traders when they disembarked in Melaka, Champa, and other Southeast Asian ports. The modern Okinawan diaspora in Central and South America merits further study. Whatever happened to the more than three thousand Okinawans who went to Manchuria? There is a critical need for American Okinawans to enter into dialogue with Okinawans from other diaspora communities as well as with Okinawans who live in Okinawa.

Also needed is a better understanding of the political and economic forces that drove the Okinawan diaspora. To what extent was it shaped by the initiatives of the Japanese government, by the local Okinawan community, and by entrepreneurs? How did Japan's annexation of Okinawa restructure Okinawa's place in the regional and global economy? To what extent did Japanese colonial rule result in the deterioration of the Okinawan economy?

More specifically, research is needed on the social institutions that structured the Okinawan diaspora in a manner, perhaps, outlined by McKeown (1999), who notes the development of well-integrated transnational business networks among the Chinese that facilitated the movement of people on a vast scale. Research is also needed on the institution of the imingaisha (emigration company) and the role of such Okinawan entrepreneurs as Tôyama Kyûzô and Ôshiro Kôzô in the shaping of the Okinawan diaspora.

A further area for future research is the search for literary voices articulating the recent Okinawan experience. Short stories, novels, poetry, songs, lays, and dance pieces can give voice to the Okinawan diaspora and identity in ways that formal prose essays cannot. The writings of Ôshiro Tatsutu, Higashi Mineo, Shun Medoruma, and others need to be introduced to a wider audience. We need translations that make traditional Okinawan literature accessible to diasporic Okinawans. And we need to hear the voices of Okinawan cohorts in other diasporic communities.

Another area for future research is ethnographic accounts of the diasporic Okinawan experience across time, space, and national cultures. As I mentioned in an earlier article (see Arakaki 1996), the remembering, forgetting, and recovery of identity is closely linked to relations of power. What is needed are interviews with first-, second-, third-, and fourth-generation Okinawans that ask them to describe how they grew up, how they understood their national and cultural identity and the significance of being Okinawan.

Finally, there is a need for comparative analyses, the benefits of which would be twofold. First, the situation of the Okinawans is unique in that they are a double minority within a double diaspora. A better understanding of the Okinawan diaspora therefore has the potential for enriching our understanding of other diasporic flows. Second, a comparative analysis of diasporic communities can be used to test theories of how diasporic identities are constructed, how diasporic communities are affected by power relations, and how diasporic flows are shaped by such social forces as capitalism, nationalism, and globalism.

Notes

1. For an insightful discussion of this topic, see Geertz (1973).
2. Technically, this language is referred to as Hawai'i Creole English.

References


Introduction

In his essay on “Okinawa in the Matrix of Pacific Ocean Culture,” Hokama Shūzen, the “dean” of Okinawan studies today, states that “Ifa Fuyū pursued the answers to two broad questions: where did the Okinawan people come from, and what is their destiny?” (2002:53) In his life of seventy-one years, Ifa Fuyū (1876–1947), devoted himself to resolving the above questions in their myriad complexities and manifestations. He wrote many books and articles that spanned a broad range of subjects including history, linguistics, folklore, and anthropology, and pioneered research in Okinawan studies. Unfortunately, Ifa’s work is still not widely-known outside of Okinawa, except to a small group of academic specialists. He does not, for example, appear in any articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica nor the Encyclopedia Americana. The Encyclopedia of the World Cultures too, does not even mention him!

However, this dismal state of affairs appears to be changing. The impressive eleven-volume The Complete Writings of Ifa Fuyū, published by the Heibonsha Publishing Company (1974–1976)—which magnificently collected previously scattered writings of Ifa—is helping to revive interest in his life and his work. In the past thirty years in Japan, and perhaps twenty-odd years in Hawai‘i, Okinawan scholarship, which Ifa pioneered, has emerged conspicuously in its own right. Prominent Okinawan scholars, such as Ōta Masahide and Hokama Shūzen, who have led the way in the postwar rediscovery of Okinawan Studies, have both come to Honolulu in pursuit of research on Ifa—at the East-West Center and the University of Hawai‘i, respectively—and have helped to make Ifa’s name more widely known. In Japan, several biographies on Ifa have appeared, providing stimulating analyses of his still controversial interpretation of Okinawan origin and its inextricable linkage to mainland Japan.
The landmark publication of *Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii*, a joint project by the University of Hawai'i Ethnic Studies Oral History Project and the United Okinawan Association of Hawaii (1981), provided Hawai'i-based researchers, most notably, Seiyei Wakukawa and Mitsugu Sakihara, the opportunity to contribute their unique bicultural backgrounds to the field of Okinawan studies. Also in this volume, Kiyoshi Ikeda sounded the call for more sustained and systematic research to explore various areas of Okinawan contributions to Hawai'i, including to "collect reports of critical events and experiences" (1981:144).

This paper is one such report. We focus attention on one remarkable individual, Ifa Fuyū—perhaps the most important historical figure in the field of Okinawan scholarship—and explore in depth an aspect of his life experiences which intimately connect him to Hawai'i. In the four-month period between October 1928 and February 1929, Ifa made his one and only trip outside of Japan: to lecture to Okinawan and Japanese communities in Hawai'i and in California. Using newly-discovered archival sources, along with the published primary and secondary materials on Ifa, we will attempt to describe, in greater detail, various aspects of the trip previously unknown or overlooked. The specific individuals who played a part in supporting this trip, the historical context and environment in Hawai'i when Ifa came to deliver his talks, the subsequent writings that he left pertaining to Hawai'i, and the intellectual evolution of his opinions and viewpoints, which he expressed before and after his trip, will be analyzed in the light of his total view of Okinawan history and culture.

I. Ifa’s Lectures in Hawai'i: A Retrospective Analysis

Newspaper Gleanings

Ifa’s arrival in Hawai'i was announced inconspicuously in the *Hawai'i Hochi* on the sixth of October in 1928. Reporting the arrival that morning of the passenger line *Shunyō Maru* with its 280 passengers, one short line near the end of the announcement is devoted to Ifa: "Passenger in First Class, Ifa Fuyū, writer, linguist, researcher of ethnology." It is not the eye-catching article, which today, we who are consciously aware of Ifa’s stature in Okinawan scholarship, would have expected. What is also striking about the piece is that there is neither any reference of Ifa to Okinawa, nor of his pioneering Ryukyuan studies. This omission may be explained by the fact that area studies—such as Japan Studies, and indeed Okinawan studies—were not yet specialized academic disciplines; thus calling Ifa a writer, a linguist, and an ethnographer may have been the commonplace way of referring to him. However, our curiosity is further aroused by the first public announcement of his lectures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Lecture by Ifa Fuyū, B.A.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friday, 12th and Saturday, 13th, 7:30 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Nuuanu International YMCA Gymnasium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecture Fee: $1.00 (two lectures inclusive)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Topics:**

First Lecture: “The Spirit of Japanese Nation-Building as Expessed in Mythology”

Second Lecture: “The Three Phases of the Conception of the Japanese Nation”


**Sponsors:** Itsugyō no Hawaii, the Kanna Promoters, and the Nippu Jiji Company (Hawai'i Hochi, 6 October 1928).

Again the newspaper piece fails to identify Ifa as an Okinawan, and makes no mention of his academic specialty that centered on Okinawa and the Ryukyus. Moreover, the lecture topics advertised—with their $1.00 admission fee for hearing both lectures—deal with Japan, and not Okinawa. The Japanese “spirit,” its underlying “mythology and ideology,” and its connection to “nation-building,” is the main theme. This discovery surprises us since we have been told by Ifa’s biographers that he lectured in Hawai’i from his text *Okinawa wa doko e* (Where is Okinawa Headed?) But as the above advertisement clearly shows, the projected audience in his first appearance in Hawai’i encompassed not just Okinawans, but the entire Japanese community. How does one explain the discrepancy?

The advertisement printed above was probably not a careless error. Rather, it appears to have been a rational decision made in full consideration of the status of Okinawans vis-à-vis the dominant Naichi population. The Okinawan population in the whole of Hawai’i at this time was estimated to be about 15% of the total Japanese population, and numbered roughly 16,000 and, of this number, perhaps 4,000 lived in Honolulu (Ethnic Studies Oral History Project and United Okinawan Association of Hawaii [hereinafter ESOHP])
1981: 108). This latter number, the organizers probably felt, was too few to cover the financial costs of bringing Ifa from Japan; they had to publicize the lecture by targeting the wider Japanese community too. To emphasize Okinawa as Ifa’s lecture topics would have been too narrow to attract widespread attention. Consequently, appealing to the Japanese national identity of all Issei—the Naichi as well as Okinawans—by offering eye-catching topics—was seen as the wisest approach to public relations. This strategy apparently worked: over 500 people turned up for the first night’s lecture.

A Hawai‘i Hochi reporter attended both lectures, and reported on them in the 13th and the 15th October issues of the paper. We see from these newspaper articles that Ifa’s talks were a huge success. The reporter commented that, ‘the ‘Treasure’ of Ryukyu, Ifa, had been able to rivet—from beginning to end—the attention of the audience.” Ifa refrained from watering down and popularizing the contents of his talk and kept “the lecture a purely academic one.” But it was “interesting and clearly delivered” (Hawai‘i Hochi, 13 October 1928). Obviously, the several hundred lectures that Ifa had given all over Okinawa in his younger days had developed him into a trained and polished speaker, who knew how to inform and entertain his listeners. The Hochi article also described the contents of the lecture, which it reported as follows:

From the perspective of Linguistics, Ethnology, and Archeology, the mythologies written in the Kajiki and Nihon shoki and other ancient texts were explained from a scientific standpoint… the talk was concluded by pointing to the equality of social welfare which was transmitted through the royal lineage; it also under gird the foundations of the nation; but with the advance of mechanical civilization, accompanied by the capitalism of the West, the Japanese State too, after the Russo-Japanese War, has become encapsulated as a part of the Financial Clique, thus preventing the realization of the Imperial household’s inherent idealism (Hawai‘i Hochi, 13 October 1928).

This loose translation of the Hochi’s stilted original captures Ifa’s main theme for the evening and suggests his concern with economic exploitation in Japan’s modern history. Seiyei Wakukawa, who later confessed that Ifa’s ideas profoundly influenced his own, was present at that talk and referred to it as a socialistic interpretation of history. Kano Masanao (1993: 203), in his intellectual portrait of Ifa, has commented that “Ifa was closest to Marxism” during his composing of essays on Hawai‘i, than at any other period of his life. Ōta Masahide, too, points to Ifa’s attraction to socialism while in Hawai‘i (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 5:17). Because this theme of Ifa’s relationship to Marxism is so intermingled with his visit to Hawai‘i, we will discuss this subject in more depth later in this paper. Here, it suffices to call attention to this crucial component in Ifa’s thought.

The materials at our disposal seem to indicate that after the above general lectures to a mixed audience of Okinawans and Naichi, Ifa may have had other opportunities to lecture on Okinawan topics as well. Hokama Shūzen (2002), in an 1980 interview with Seikan Higa and Seiyei Wakukawa, related that “Ifa’s lecture contents included his maiden work Concerning the Ancestors of Okinawans (1906), Theory of Okinawan Ethnicity (11), and Ancient Ryukyu (11).” He seems to have anticipated being in many smaller group meetings attended mainly by Okinawans. At some of these meetings, he talked in local Okinawan dialect (hoogen). Hokama has recorded the following story from Kibei in Los Angeles: In one of his talks, Ifa, perceiving that Okinawan Issei in the audience were unable to understand standard Japanese, delivered his lecture in hoogen. Some listeners from different prefectures began to ask whether Ifa himself could speak standard Japanese. The gossip reached Ifa’s ears, and he ended all doubts by giving his next lecture in perfect Japanese. The significance of this anecdote lies in the fact that it elucidates, concretely, the delicate balancing act that Ifa faced in his lectures on whether to speak hoogen (Okinawan language) or hyōjun go (standard Japanese).

After about two-and-a-half months in Hawai‘i, Ifa headed, in December, for Los Angeles to lecture in California. We do not have any information of his lecture-circuit in southern California, but we pick up his movements again in newspaper clippings from the San Francisco-based Nichibei shimbun (Japanese American). These little miscellanies are revealing in that they give little bits and pieces of information unavailable elsewhere about Ifa’s visit to the Okinawan community in Fresno.

The first is a short announcement on 9 January 1929 of his arrival in Fresno:

Mr. Ifa’s (BA) Lecture Meeting
Announcement for Okinawa kenjin (people of Okinawa prefecture)

The author of Whither Okinawa and other historical works on Okinawan history, the famous Ifa Fuyū (BA) will arrive in Fresno from Los Angeles on the evening of the 10th. On Friday, the 11th at 1:00 pm a reception and lecture will be held by the Okinawan kenjin kai at the F Hall of the Asahi Inn. All Okinawa kenjin welcomed (Nichibei shimbun, 9 January 1929).
Three days later, on the 12th of January, another short announcement appears in the same Japanese American paper:

Mr. Ifa (BA)
Lecture: Tomorrow Evening
Sunday, 13th at 8 p.m.
Home of Mr. Taichi Yasusato, 1782 Satter St.
Lecture by Mr. Ifa, BA.

This appears to be an interesting lecture, and we would like to see many faces in the audience (Nichibei shimbun, 12 January 1929).

On the 13th of January, the following newspaper article described Ifa’s above talk.

Mr. Ifa’s Second Lecture
Including also: Okinawan Kenjin Reception

A reception of the Okinawan kenjin was held at the Asahi Inn for the linguist, Mr. Ifa Fuyu. (About 50 persons attended). Mr. Ifa lectured in the Okinawan dialect. The lecture topic was entitled “The Spirit of Japanese Nation-Building as in Mythology.” Newspaper reporters were also there, but the talk was completely unintelligible to them—it sounded like it could have been German. But the lecture appears to have been highly entertaining for the listeners; all throughout, laughter and chuckles were heard. A heartfelt thank you speech, made by Mr. Yoshinobu Takagi, closed the session (Nichibei shimbun, 13 January 1929).

On 18 January, the Nichibei shimbun printed the longest article we have found relating to Ifa; it appeared two days after Ifa left for Japan, and unlike the others above, was printed in larger type. It began with the heading:

Famous Ryukyuan Linguist
Mr. Ifa Fuyu leaves on Morning of 16th
He lectured in Hawaii and the West Coast (Nichibei shimbun, 18 January 1929).

This article consisted of a short interview Ifa gave to a reporter in which he discussed his three-and-a-half month lecture trip in Hawai‘i and California. He said he was happy to have had the opportunity to discuss his Okinawan and the Ryukyuu research, to which he had devoted over twenty years, with fellow countrymen in Hawai‘i and the continental U.S. In Hawai‘i, where some 16,000 Okinawans lived, and in California too, this was the first time audiences had heard lectures on Okinawa, so they were enthusiastic over them. Ifa also mentioned that interest in the “southern islands” has increased in Japan in recent years, and that an important advocate of these studies was Kunio Yanagida. Also, in the previous year, an association to study “southern islands” had started which reported on research pertaining to Okinawa; he thought these would add to the accumulating materials on ancient Japan.

As the above newspaper articles in the Nichibei shimbun show, Ifa’s trip to California was relatively brief. He probably spent two weeks in southern California, and a week in northern California. This contrasts with the more than two months he spent in Hawai‘i. It is not known who arranged his California talks; most likely, they were done through an informal network of Okinawan immigrants. He may have given some general lectures to mixed audiences in Los Angeles, but he did not do that after going north to Fresno. And though he left for Japan on the ship Siberia from San Francisco, he did not speak in that city. The geographical distribution of Okinawans in northern California appears to have been concentrated in and around Fresno, without many in the city limits.

Ifa returned to Tokyo in early February, 1929. He had been away for a full four months. This trip to both Hawai‘i and California—which was the only trip Ifa made abroad in his entire life—was a significant experience for him. As we shall see, it had major influence on his subsequent life and thought.

**Backdrop of Ifa’s Visit to Hawai‘i**

Ifa visited Hawai‘i at a particularly auspicious moment for the Issei in the islands. Though separated by 4,000 miles of ocean, a great many of them felt a strong personal and social identification with their mother country. Dispersed geographically, they still retained their national identity, which was symbolized in the personage of the Emperor and the royal family. In a few weeks hence, the enthronement ceremonies for the Crown Prince Hirohito were to be held, and a powerful nationalistic sentiment—promoted wholeheartedly by the two vernaculars, the Hawai‘i Hochi and the Nippu Jiji—prevailed the atmosphere of Hawai‘i’s Japanese communities. For example, the Hochi displayed a large photo of the Emperor and Empress on the front page of its 11 November 1928 issue. This “Yamato-spirit mentality” explains the patriotic-sounding titles attached to Ifa’s lectures, and helped to promote their popularity.

Inclusion of the topic “The Fukunaga Incident and the Theory of Japanese Expansion” in the lecture advertisement reflected the obsession the public had
Tetsuo Tōyama (1876–1970) was one of three key players responsible for Ifa's visit to the islands. Tōyama was a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War who had immigrated to Hawai'i in 1909, and started his journal in 1913. He headed two of the three groups that contributed financial support for Ifa's Lectures; the first was his journal, the Jitsugyō no Hawai'i (Industrial Hawai'i); and the second was the political fund-raising group, the Kanna Keiwa Promotion Group, which was formed to help elect Kanna, a retired Japanese navy Rear-Admiral from Okinawa, to the National Diet in the general election held that year (Wakukawa 1981:238–39; Sakihara 1981:106–07). The third group backing Ifa's lectures—probably in an effort to raise the visibility of the talks and thus increase revenues—asked him to comment on the case as part of his lecture. The Fukunaga case is mentioned in many books and articles that deal with the Japanese in Hawai'i (Kimura 1988:149).

Higa Shuncho was the third person in the triumvirate who cooperated with the Myles Fukunaga murder case. Ifa had arrived in Honolulu when the death sentence was passed on Fukunaga. The Japanese language newspapers were filled with news regarding the verdict; the Hochi claimed that Fukunaga was insane, and thus not responsible for his act; this differed from the opinion of the Nippu Jiji which felt that Fukunaga deserved his punishment. Another acrimonious public debate resulted—reminiscent of the Hawai'i Japanese language school controversy with its mud-slinging journalism—and it dominated the editorial pages of both papers for the duration of Ifa's visit. On a daily basis, the Hochi focused on some aspect of the Fukunaga case and advocated its views on the editorial page. On 11 November, the Nippu Jiji offered an olive branch to the Hochi to end the feuding—to show a united Japanese community in light of the impending coronation ceremonies—but this was rejected by the Hochi. Against this contemporary setting of Hirohito's coronation and the debate revolving around the Myles Fukunaga death sentence, the sponsors of Ifa's visits—probably in an effort to raise the visibility of the talks and thus increase revenues—asked him to comment on the case as part of his lecture. The Fukunaga case is mentioned in many books and articles that deal with the Japanese in Hawai'i (Kimura 1988:149).

Higa Shuncho was the third person in the triumvirate who cooperated with Ifa's visit to the islands. Tōyama was a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War who had immigrated to Hawai'i in 1909, and started his journal in 1913. He headed two of the three groups that contributed financial support for Ifa's Lectures; the first was his journal, the Jitsugyō no Hawai'i (Industrial Hawai'i); and the second was the political fund-raising group, the Kanna Keiwa Promotion Group, which was formed to help elect Kanna, a retired Japanese navy Rear-Admiral from Okinawa, to the National Diet in the general election held that year (Wakukawa 1981:238–39; Sakihara 1981:106–07). The third group backing Ifa's lectures was the Nippu Jiji. It is not known when or how Tōyama linked with the Nippu Jiji, then the largest circulation vernacular Japanese language newspaper in the islands, to support the lectures. Several Nippu Jiji reporters were of Okinawan background, and it may have been through them that arrangements were made. The Nippu Jiji's publisher and chief editor, Yasutarō Sōga, like Tōyama, was of the conservative bent in his social and political philosophies; moreover, he shared a similar position of being a journalistic leader and opinion-maker in the Japanese community. Tōyama himself later claimed that a prime motivation for his initiation of Ifa's visit to the islands was to improve the self-image of Okinawans in Hawai'i by demonstrating to them—as well as to the Naichi majority—that Okinawa too could produce important men. Bringing Ifa before them to speak would thus help break the stereotype that Okinawans were crude and uneducated. Introducing prominent Japanese to Hawai'i was not something new to Tōyama. He had earlier arranged visits of such celebrities as the Meiji industrialist, Shibabusa Eichi, the famous Christian evangelist, Kagawa Toyohiko, and the religious thinker, Nishida Tenkō. Seiyei Wakukawa, a pioneer Okinawan intellectual in Hawai'i, whose fascinating biography was published several years ago, had known Tōyama for over fifty years and did not like him. Tōyama, he claimed, was an "ayoku" (ultra-rightest), as well as an opportunistic and unprincipled man. But even Wakukawa was willing to concede that Tōyama, was rich with promotional ideas.7

The second man whose role was indispensable in inviting Ifa Fuyū to Hawai'i was Seikan Higa. Unlike the majority of Issei immigrants who only had elementary-level schooling, Higa had an impressive educational background. Born and raised in Naha, he had imbied Christian teachings in his youth. He graduated from the Aoyama Gakuin University and the Tokyo Baptist Theological School, and was ordained a Methodist Minister. After returning to Okinawa, he engaged in Christian-welfare ministry in Naha. He immigrated with his family to Hawai'i in 1921. Higa was motivated by an unwavering belief in the importance of social justice, which inclined him toward Marxism, which was then at its intellectual high point in Japan. Higa's idealism prompted him to promote progressive Christian activities at Reimei church in Palama after his arrival in Honolulu; however, after a few years, because of conflicts with the church's stance on labor issues, he quit the ministry and became a Japanese language instructor on the island of Hawai'i (Wakukawa 1981:238–39). Tokusuke Oshiro, in his interview in Uchinanchu (ESOHP 1981), recollected that he and his wife were married by the Reverend Seikan Higa in 1923. Apparently, Higa was still performing Christian religious rites on the island of Hawai'i; he returned many years later to Honolulu and resumed his ministry work. He may have lived in the interval on Kaua'i too. The historical timeline in Uchinanchu records that Higa purchased the Kaua'i-based weekly newspaper Yoten Jihō on 5 May 1926. He was probably on the island of Kaua'i when Ifa arrived in Hawai'i in 1928, and accompanied him on the neighbor island lectures (ESOHP 1981:383, 564).

Higa Shunchō was the third person in the triumvirate who cooperated to bring Ifa to Hawai'i in 1928. Higa, like Ifa, was from Naha, and was his
disciple. Ten years younger than Ifa, he had left Okinawa for Tokyo in 1923. He got a reporter's post with the left-wing journal Kaitō and worked there for most of his life. While pursuing his career in journalism he dabbled in Okinawan studies as an amateur scholar. In 1927, he served as Tetsuo Tōyama's guide when the latter visited Japan, and introduced him to many prominent persons. (Wakukawa 1981:238) Through this connection, Higa became the contact person through whom Tōyama made travel and financial arrangements for Ifa's visit to Hawai'i. Higa remained Ifa's closest friend and colleague until the end of Ifa's life; when Ifa's home was destroyed by firebombs in air attacks by American B-29 bombers in March 1945, he and his wife moved to live with the Higas. Higa supported Ifa spiritually as well. He tells a touching story of how he, to boost Ifa's flagging spirit after they heard news of Okinawa's devastation in the summer of 1945, encouraged Ifa to read with him the Ōmuro Sōbi (the Japanese rendering of "Umufu Usooshi," the "Book of Sentiments," which is the earliest poetic anthology of the Ryukyus, compiled 1531-1623). Ifa died at Higa's home on 13 August 1947. Today, Higa's reminiscences of Ifa remain a valuable source of information about Ifa's private life as well as his intellectual thought (Ifa 1974-1976, vol. 7).

Ifa's Past Link to Hawai'i

Ishikawa Tomonori, the leading contemporary scholar on Okinawan immigration, found and published an important letter—dated 1909—in his essay on "Historical Geography of Early Immigrants" (Ishikawa 1981:103). This letter addressed to Ifa, from Kame Oshiro, an employee of the Hilo Shimposha, a newspaper published on island of Hawai'i, pushes back nearly twenty-years, we notice, Ifa's connection to Hawai'i. The letter is reprinted in full here:

Because our language, as well as customs and manners are different from those of the people from other prefectures, we are regarded as being a different race. Especially on the island of Hawai'i, there are many from the Chugoku area, who are ignorant of the situation in Okinawa unlike the people of Kyushu. Even when there are some who know about Okinawa, they only fantasize the old Okinawa and know nothing about the recent Okinawa that has made progress. I am afraid that these are the reasons for the fact that we are regarded with contempt by others. When we are addressed disrespectfully, "Hey, Okinawa," which is a common practice here especially on plantation, at times I feel full of an emotion [sic] that I cannot explain. If this practice is done only by our countrymen it would be less painful, but when even white people initiate this and treat us differently, it is unbearable even for those who have patience. If this situation continues, I am afraid that Okinawan immigrants' future will be a distressing one (Ishikawa 1981:103).

Ishikawa added the following: "Then he appealed to Iha [sic] to introduce a history of Okinawa to their countrymen in Hawai'i to enlighten them." This letter is remarkable for two reasons. First, it shows that Ifa, at age 33 and still at the beginning of his career—he had only graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University three years before—was already recognized by some immigrants in Hawai'i as an intellectual leader in Okinawa. The second reason is that we know through hindsight that Ifa indeed carried out Oshiro's request. Sumiya Kazuhiko (2004) has pointed to this character trait in Ifa's personality: of remembering obligations. One finds remarkable continuities in his consciousness which, seemingly lost for a while, reveal themselves at later points in time. We will see another example of this when we discuss Ifa's relationship to the Japanese Marxist, Kawakami Hajime. Thus, when the invitation to lecture in Hawai'i came to him in 1928, through the efforts of Tōyama and the two Higas mentioned above, Ifa probably felt that the time to fulfill a past obligation had come. He drafted a paper, "Okinawa yo izuko e" (Whither Okinawa?), and used it as his main text for the lectures. This text was expanded later, and published posthumously in Honolulu and Tokyo as Okinawa rekishi monogatari (The Historical Story of Okinawa); we will discuss this book later in this paper.

II. Ifa's View of History

Okinawa's Past and Its Present Realities

One must understand Ifa Fuyū's sense of history to appreciate the lectures that he delivered in Hawai'i. As pointed out earlier, Seiyei Wakukawa had interpreted Ifa's lecture as reflective of "dialectical materialism." However, scholars such as Kinjō Seitoku, and even Ifa's closest friend, Higa Shunchō, deny that Ifa embraced Marxism in his interpretation of history. A more suitable concept to explain Ifa's views, says Kinjō, would be that of "evolution," and, even, Social Darwinism (Kinjō 1972:143-48). Though influenced by socialist ideas, particularly in the period from late Taishō through early Shōwa—roughly 1924-1933, Ifa remained a traditional, nineteenth-century liberal (jiyushugisha) in his thinking. Ifa's writings suggest a view of history that conceives of changes as occurring gradually, an evolutionary process passing through consecutive lines of development, without discontinuous leaps and bounds.
The takeover of the Ryukyuan Kingdom by the Satsuma Clan in 1609, and its three-hundred-year rule over the kingdom, was seen by Ifa as the root cause of modern-day Okinawa's problems. His anger at this historical crime is captured vividly in the anecdote left to us by Higashionna Kanshun, Ifa's younger colleague. Higashionna, reminiscing on their Teidai college days, tells of the usually gentle Ifa, apparently intoxicated, pounding his fists on a table, and angrily shouting that "all of Okinawa's miseries are Satsuma's doings!" Such was Ifa's view of Satsuma's historical legacy in its long domination over Okinawa. Ifa felt it has laid over the island a "slave system" and had created a "slave mentality" in the Okinawans by stripping away their freedom and self-dignity, and by mercilessly exploiting them economically (Kinjō 1972: 101–6, 143–8).

Ifa felt that the freeing of Okinawa from Satsuma's control, which came with the Meiji Restoration, was the golden opportunity for Okinawans to regain their freedom; but he did not desire to revert back to the days when Okinawa was an independent kingdom. Rather, he put his faith in the "Okinawan Solution" (Ryūkyū Shobun). This "solution" refers to the events that led to the setting up of Okinawa as a prefecture within the newly-created nation-state of Japan, which occurred when Ifa was a child of three. Ifa wholeheartedly approved of this merger with Japan, and saw within it the "liberation of the Okinawan people from slavery." Moreover, such a merger with mainland Japan, was neither something strange nor alien, in his eyes. The Okinawan people, he believed, were descended from the same ancestor as the people of mainland Japan. In the prehistoric period, people from Kyushu had migrated southward to inhabit the islands of the Ryukyus. And over historic time, although the two geographical areas had evolved separately, they had retained many common features in language and culture. This nichiryū dōka ron (theory of Japan-Ryukyuu assimilation) lay at the center of Ifa's thought, and formed the core of his beliefs and conviction. It was based on this assumption of Okinawans' origins, that Ifa carried out his research studies as well as his social activism (Kinjō 1972:1973–82).

The flurry of social causes that we see in Ifa involved with between 1912–1919—his late thirties and early forties—seems to have been based in large part upon his subscribing to a view of history that embraced the significance of the roles great men played in the life of a society. Embracing the concept of "Great Men's Role in History," not unlike Thomas Carlyle in the nineteenth century, Ifa too, looked for heroes in Okinawan history. He found three; the first was Shō Joken (1617–1675); the second was Sai On (1682–1761), and the third was Giwan Chōchō (1823–1873). All had their own unique individuality, and demonstrated insight and courage. Even under harsh Satsuma rule, they guided their societies with foresight and wisdom. It is to such men, Ifa wrote, that Okinawans should turn for guidance and emulate.

Ifa was an impassioned man who devoted himself to issues of social justice and working for the betterment of society. In the period from 1916 through 1919, Ifa made it his personal mission to help raise the self-awareness of individual Okinawans to live morally clean and decent lives. He became a strong advocate of prohibition, condemning the use of alcohol and tobacco; he also campaigned to abolish prostitution and to this end, he published History of Okinawan Women in 1919, and stressed the importance of human rights for women. Ifa saw in education—especially in the lower grades—the key to the transformation of the individual, which, by extension, would lead to a more-highly developed social consciousness in the people as a whole. Ifa's idealistic goals seem to have incorporated the concepts and practices of the Christian Social Gospel, as it had manifested itself in late nineteenth-century Great Britain and America. Also about this time, Ifa gave his famous public hygiene lectures, which numbered over 360, on "culture and blood relations" in neighborhoods in all areas of Okinawa. Speaking in the local dialect to ensure that he would be understood, Ifa based his talks on the emerging scientific findings, particularly in the biological sciences, and stressed the genetic dangers that arose from close kinship marriage (Kinjō 1972:42–52).

Ifa saw his social welfare activities as providing a means by which Okinawans could regain their self-dignity and pride. These public enlightenment forays, he believed, would help strengthen the moral backbone of Okinawans and give them the courage "to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." Ifa felt that this potential lurked in the heritage of the people. The Omoro Sōshi—the classic poems composed in the period of the Ryukyu Kingdom from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries—attested to the Okinawan people's sense of independence. The Okinawans who composed the poems of the Omoro Sōshi were free, individualistic, and expansive, in their spiritual lives. Their poems capture those attitudes, and Ifa felt it was of crucial importance that Okinawans rediscover for themselves, and pass along to their children, this cultural treasure from their own past. Ifa's fascination with the Omoro Sōshi—with its unique language and vocabulary that reflected a philosophy of
art, nature, and metaphysics—absorbed the greater part of his attention in the last two decades of his life, especially in the 1930s (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 6).

Ifa’s enthusiasm for social activism, however, gradually diminished. By 1924, four years before his lecture trip to Hawai‘i, he had come to realize the futility of social salvation through strenuous moral effort and pure will-power. Facing hard economic realities he began to sense that coping with them directly was the only path open to the Okinawans to save themselves. But economic development too, initiated and advanced by themselves, seemed at this time like a hopeless cause. The economic depression and famine—the so-called sotetsu jigoku (sotetsu hell)—that hit Okinawa in the aftermath of the First World War had dampened his outlook (Kinjō 1972:165–72). Poverty and unemployment, added to decades of neglect and exploitation by a Japanese central government too busy with its problems elsewhere, had left their mark on Okinawa. Moreover, the social discrimination—both real as well as imagined—that Okinawans suffered vis-à-vis their mainland compatriots, further disappointed Ifa’s hopes for social progress. With these gloomy thoughts, he composed his Kotojunoryakushishi (Lamentations on Ryukyuan History) a few years prior to his visit to Hawai‘i. In this work, Ifa came close to treading, both in reasoning and sentiment, a Marxist world view of class conflict, competition, and economic exploitation.

Some of the youth whom Ifa had taught in Okinawa had come under the influence of left-wing ideas in the mid-Taishō period (1911–1925), and had criticized him for his liberal opinions which had advocated gradualism and ameliorative measures to solve social and political problems. Though Ifa never became an outright advocate of Marxism, we can surmise from his experiences above that he would have been highly receptive to its ideas. Seiyei Wakukawa’s testimony of his meeting with Ifa on the evening of his arrival in Honolulu is especially illuminating. Wakukawa relates that one of the things that attracted him to Ifa was his sympathy for socialism. Wakukawa’s recollection of their conversation is as follows: after telling Ifa that his major at the University of Hawai‘i was in Political Science and History, Ifa replied: “You young people are indeed fortunate...you are now able to study history in the light of historical dialectics, thus avoiding the circuitous difficulties that we [Ifa’s generation] had undergone.” Ifa then encouraged him to “do his very best” in such studies (Wakukawa 2000:38–39). These words of advice from a man he admired, Wakukawa reminisced, served as a powerful stimulus for him. Young Hawai‘i Okinawan intellectuals such as Wakukawa, then a part-time reporter for the Nippu Jiji, and Hokuzan Arashiro, who like Wakukawa, was from the same village of Nakaji in Okinawa, must have found in Ifa a model to emulate. The respect seems to have been mutual. Ifa, in his article on the “Backside of the History of Hawai‘i’s Industry,” identifies Kinjō as the “reporter for the Maui Recorder” who told him the pitiful story of exploitation (aishi) that the native Hawaiian people, as well as the immigrants who came to Hawai‘i to work on the sugar plantations, suffered at the hands of the white capitalists (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:357). This interpretative line—of racial exploitation and class struggle—underlies and darkly colors Ifa’s two historical narratives of Hawai‘i.

As he traveled around Hawai‘i with his friend Seikan Higa, Ifa was probably influenced greatly too by Higa’s disappointment with Christian piety and evangelism in solving societal ills and especially the plight of oppressed laborers. We quote here from Mitsugu Sakihara:

Higa despaired over what religion had offer to the workers. In his open letter to the Hawaii Hochi in 1928, he confessed his disappointment with established religion and its passive message of salvation, which he called “philosophy of resignation” and proclaimed that he found an alternative in the social sciences....[H]e seemed to be inclining towards Marxism and even formed a monthly study group which spread leftist ideas within the Japanese community on all the islands” (1981:182).

Ifa also had undergone a similar kind of disappointment with the limitations to social rejuvenation that can be derived by preaching Christian principles. While still in his thirties and early forties, Ifa had toyed with Christianity and helped to start social movements, particularly for young people, based upon the teachings of Christ; he even helped in the establishment of a church in 1916. He had contacts with Christian missionaries on Okinawa, such as Earl Bull, with whom he cooperated to carry out Christian social-welfare activities. However, there is no record of Ifa being baptized as a Christian, nor did he maintain a long-standing membership in any church. We suspect that Ifa was probably attracted to Christianity more for its uplifting ethical teachings, which emphasized good works and actions, than for its religious theology. His ardent lectures on public health seem to have sprung from such altruistic ideas too. By enlightening the Okinawan populace to the teachings of mutual cooperation and self-help, which were grounded in ideas of brotherhood and love of neighbor, Ifa hoped for the moral betterment of Okinawan society. When Ifa moved permanently to Tokyo from Naha in
1925, he seems to have left his Christian ideas behind. And by the time of his lecture trip to Hawai‘i in 1928, Ifa's ideas seemed to have undergone some dramatic shifts. Like his friend, Seikan Higa, he had moved from a position of idealistic Christianity to secular socialism that was grounded in political and economic realities (Kinjō 1972:42–52).

When we study Ifa’s life from his earlier years, we detect that he had already become acquainted with socialist thinkers such as Kawakami Hajime (1877–1946) many years before coming to Hawai‘i (Bernstein 1990). While serving as director for the Naha Prefectural Library in 1911, he had met Kawakami who had come to Okinawa to carry out research. The two got along well, and when Ifa published his book Koryūkyū (Ancient Ryukyū) in 1911, Kawakami wrote the preface (Kinjō 1972:149–56). But apparently busy with other matters, they did not meet again until nearly thirty years later. In 1928, the year that Ifa made his Hawai‘i lectures, Kawakami had run afoul with university authorities because of his support for the Rōnō tō (Laborer-Farmer Party) in the general elections, and was forced to resign his prestigious professorial post at Kyoto Imperial University. But he continued to actively pursue his leftist activities and joined the Communist Party in 1932. Between 1934 and 1937, Kawakami was imprisoned for his political activities. Ifa visited Kawakami in Kyoto in 1943 to explain to him that Koryūkyū was being reprinted, but that the publisher wished to delete Kawakami’s preface. The latter was a marked man who was hounded by the police. Kawakami was impressed with Ifa’s sincerity, and the two resumed their correspondence until Kawakami’s death three years later. Kinjo Seitoku (1972:149-56). But apparently busy with other matters, they did not meet again until nearly thirty years later. In 1928, the year that Ifa made his Hawai‘i lectures, Kawakami had run afoul with university authorities because of his support for the Rōnō tō (Laborer-Farmer Party) in the general elections, and was forced to resign his prestigious professorial post at Kyoto Imperial University. But he continued to actively pursue his leftist activities and joined the Communist Party in 1932. Between 1934 and 1937, Kawakami was imprisoned for his political activities. Ifa visited Kawakami in Kyoto in 1943 to explain to him that Koryūkyū was being reprinted, but that the publisher wished to delete Kawakami’s preface. The latter was a marked man who was hounded by the police. Kawakami was impressed with Ifa’s sincerity, and the two resumed their correspondence until Kawakami’s death three years later. Kinjo Seitoku (1972:149–56) has made the interesting observation that, though Ifa did not share the same degree of passion for social justice that impelled Kawakami to make such huge sacrifices, Ifa was nonetheless attracted to this battling Marxist, and respected him for doing things which Ifa himself was incapable of doing.

Publications on Hawai‘i

Two of Ifa’s articles that resulted from his visit to the Hawaiian Islands, “Story of Hawai‘i” and the “Backside of the History of Hawaii Industry,” are unique, for amongst all of Ifa’s works, only they exhibit a Marxist dialectical materialism in perspective and tone, says Hokama Shūzen (Wakukawa 2000:34). Ota Masahide too, has made a similar point in his short article entitled “Professor Ifa Fuyūi’s Visit to Hawaii and Its Influence.” Ota explored Ifa’s connections to Hawai‘i in a year spent at the East-West Center in 1973.

At this time, he managed to interview survivors who had first-hand memories of Ifa’s visit, such as the leftist Reverend Seikan Higa mentioned above, who stood among the vanguard in social reform and justice movements in the islands in the 1920s. Ota’s startling conclusions is the suggestion that Ifa’s political and social philosophy underwent a profound change in Hawai‘i (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 5). Ifa was, as he traveled to Los Angeles after completing his stay in Hawai‘i, “slanting towards Socialism.”

Ifa’s publications on Hawai‘i number some six pieces, and all are included in his Complete Writings: (1) “Hawai‘i’s Lei” (1928); (2) “Discourses on Hawai‘i’s Local Customs” (1929); (3) “Story of Hawai‘i” (1931); (4) “Back Side of Hawaii’s Industrial History” (1932); (5) “Home of the Polynesians” (1932); (6) “Captain Cook’s Explorations of Hawaii and His Death” (1933). When and where the article “Hawai‘i’s Lei” appeared is unknown, but most likely it was soon after Ifa return from his trip. The article “Discourses on Hawai‘i’s Local Customs” originated as a lecture that Ifa had given at the Gakushikaikan in downtown Tokyo in May 1929. The last two articles listed above, apparently, were free-style translations based on W. D. Westervelt’s popular Hawaiian Historical Legends (1923). Westervelt was an American missionary who had lived in Hawai‘i for over forty years and had published many books on native Hawaiian folklore. Ifa had probably purchased some of these books during his Hawai‘i visit and thought some parts worthy to introduce to Japanese readers.

The first of the two articles, “Hawaii Story,” is wide-reaching in its scope, and deals not only with Hawai‘i’s history, but its politics, society, and its economics as well. It appeared in a special issue of the journal, Hanzai Kagaku (Criminology) in the summer of 1931 (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:371–85, 355). Why Ifa chose this particular journal to publish this work is not known; however, toward the end of the essay, he included a short paragraph on the Myles Fukunaga case as an instance of how racial exploitation lay at the base of this sensational crime. In a letter to Kawakami, Ifa explains that “this article did not reach many readers because it was proscribed by the authorities” and circulation was banned shortly after its publication (Ifa, 1974–1976, vol. 10:481) This work of thirty-seven pages includes many photographs and statistical tables and is one of the longest of Ifa’s writings on Hawai‘i. It is divided into six sections: (1) First Impressions of Hawaii; (2) Historical Outline of Hawaii; (3) Museum of Ethnography and Social Science Laboratory; (4) Nikkei’s Japanese Language Problem; (5) Hawai‘i’s Mission; and (6) Nikkei’s Transformation.
Stepping off the Shunyō Maru in Honolulu Harbor on the morning of the 6th of October, Ifa was given a flower lei which he fondly remembered in later years. He was then driven to the Kyrakukan Inn in downtown Honolulu where he stayed during his visit. Passing though the streets of the “green city,” the sight that attracted Ifa most was the people: “bronze, yellow, white, black, a diversity of types. Indeed [he had] entered an ethnological museum.” He had read A. W. Palmer’s Human Side of Hawai’i (1924) which explained that “in the meeting and merging of the Orient and the Occident, the vanguard stood at two places in the world: one was Constantinople on the Bosporus, and the other was the Pacific gateway, Honolulu.”

Hawai’i was an excellent “sociological laboratory that included, in addition to the natives, Japanese, Okinawans, Koreans, Chinese, Americans, Englishmen, Germans, Russians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Norwegians, Galicians, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Micronesians, East Indians, and Blacks.” Ifa claims that he even saw a gypsy in the street! Thus, much like the early organizers of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which had held its first two meetings in Honolulu in 1925 and 1927 on the theme of “amicable race relations,” Ifa too, was attracted to this idealized conception of Hawai’i as a place where a “harmonization of races” and a “melting pot” was taking place (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:322). Ifa also seems to have been familiar with the idealistic activities of Alexander Hume Ford, who, around the turn of the century had organized the “Hands Around the Pacific Club, which stressed the importance of Hawai’i as a center in a network hub that ringed the Pacific. As shown in Paul Hooper’s book Elusive Destiny (1980), Ford later organized the Pan-Pacific Club; this club reached the zenith of its influence around the time that Ifa arrived in Hawai’i.11

But Ifa’s opening theme of harmonization of races soon faded after he began his narrative of the history of the native peoples. In the “Americanization” of Hawai’i, it was they who had suffered the most. Ifa recounts the drastic population decline of the native people since contact with Europeans, and notes the disruption of their traditional ways of life. This was accelerated with the absorption of the islands of Hawai’i into the United States as the Territory of Hawai’i. The development of the profitable sugar industry and its need for laborers served as the motive for the importation of huge numbers of immigrant peoples, which resulted in the racial diversity listed earlier. Ifa does not delve in this essay with the mechanism of capitalistic domination by white planters, and the economic exploitation this entailed, but he does make this his central theme in his sequel essay on “Backside of Hawai’i’s Industrial History.” This latter, as mentioned above, has attracted the attention of Ifa scholars, and is offered as evidence for Ifa’s turn towards Marxism (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:357–70).

A large part of Ifa’s essay in the “Story of Hawaii” is devoted to the problem and plight of the Nikkei in Hawai’i; particularly concerning issues involving citizenship and language. The Nisei, Ifa equivocally states, are through birth and acculturation in American schools, American citizens. To try to force upon them a Japanese identity—as many nationalistic Issei are attempting to do—is foolish, as well as unproductive. It is bound to fail. The Nikkei will grow up to be Americans, and will lose their Japanese language abilities too (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:336–41).

These remarks by Ifa on the Nikkei (descendents of Japanese immigrants), it should be remembered, were made at a time when Japanese in the islands were pressed with difficult issues of race, ethnicity, and citizenship. The great sugar strike of 1920 was still fresh in the minds of many people; so too was the “Japanese language schools controversy,” which had split the Japanese community into two. The fight had left a bitter taste in the mouths of all concerned, and the animosity generated between the two vernacular newspapers, the Hawai’i Hochi and the Nippu Jiji, lingered until the latter half of the twentieth century. Another movement happening at the time of Ifa’s visit was the Reverend Takie Okumura’s “Americanization movement,” which is described in the third and fourth chapters of Eileen Tamura’s book, Americanization, Acculturation, and Ethnic Identity (1994). Ifa’s position resembles that of Okumura’s in its fundamentals.

It should be underlined here that Ifa, in his long discussion of Nikkei, does not mention Okinawans in Hawai’i. In fact, in this entire essay, he mentioned Okinawans only once—namely, in the list of Hawai’i’s peoples given at the opening (Ifa 1974–1976, vol. 11:322). He does not distinguish Okinawans from Japanese and assumes that they are an integral part of Japanese. This reflects the dominant view of racial classification at that time. In the work of Romanzo Adams, which was later carried on by Andrew Lind (1967), and published as Hawai’i’s People, a long-selling book that has run into several editions, Okinawans are not listed separately, but included within the category of Japanese. This explains why editors of the Uchinanchu volume in 1981 had difficulties in ascertaining the exact Okinawan population figures of the islands historically (Sakihara 1981:108).
Okinawa Rekishi Monogatari (Historical Story of Okinawa) and Hawai'i

The text from which Ifa gave his lectures on Okinawa in Hawai'i was published soon after their delivery of "Okinawa yo izuko e" (Whither Okinawa?) as Okinawa Rekishi Monogatari. This book is structured into three main sections: (1) Ancient History, (2) Medieval History, and (3) Early Modern History. Within it are eight chapters totaling 245 pages. Content-wise, the book appears to be a synthesis of all the general survey histories that Ifa had written earlier. These included the essays "The Ancestors of the Okinawans," "Historical Reflections on the Southern Island," "Tribulations of Ryukyuan History," and "Ancient and Modern Records of Ryukyu." The influence of the "Tribulations on Ryukyuan History" is especially great in the perspective it gives to the historical story of Okinawa.

After carefully analyzing the text, Hokama Shūzen points out a number of discrepancies in the table of contents from the actual contents in the main narrative in the book. Ifa, in his haste to complete the book, Hokama concludes, apparently failed to give it the careful checking it needed. Thus, though Ifa conceived of the Okinawa rekishi monogatari as being his definitive work on Okinawan history, it remains an "incomplete work." Because this book was Ifa's last statement, and contains his testimony to posterity on the meaning of his entire work, it has received considerable attention from Ifa scholars. Especially noteworthy is the final line in this book which Ifa had written a month before his death. Only with imperialism's demise, he foresaw, could the "bitter world" of the Okinawans be transformed into a "sweet world;" only then could the people finally realize their unique individualities, thus contributing to world culture, and finding true happiness.

Our purposes here, however, are concerned with the book's connections to Hawai'i. Hokama (1976) notes: "this book was originally written not for publication in Tokyo, but with the aim of being published in Hawai'i." The afterword to the book, under the Reverend Hōun Tamayose's name, reads as follows:

1. This work was written with the aim from the very first to be published in Hawaii. Especially the contemporary history section is dated 9 July 1947; a little more than a month later, the author died suddenly, on 13 August. This book, thus, is Ifa Fuyū's swan song; his final testimony to the world.

2. The manuscript for this book was sent by Higa Shuncho in Tokyo to Seikan Higa in Honolulu, and arrived on 22 August; news of Ifa's death reached Hawaii on the 26th. On the 31st, a memorial service was held for Ifa at the McCully Higashi Hongwanji. At that time, a decision was reached to publish this manuscript. Higa and I were entrusted with this project.

3. But because Mr. Higa was pressed with other business and lacked the time to work on this matter, I consented to take on the entire job of seeing this manuscript to publication. I made arrangements with the Hawaii Times Publishing Company to print the book; I also took on the task of adding furigana (small kana or alphabet placed on the side of kanji or Chinese characters to indicate correct pronunciation) for all of the Kanji in the text, as well to proof-read the entire text. Because of the special nature of reading old Ryukyuan words, I had to pay special attention in assigning the furigana to them.

4. Because this work is the final statement of the eminent Okinawan Historian Ifa Fuyū, it is urged that Hawaii's Okinawans pay particularly loving attention to this book, and to leave it close by their side (1948).

The afterword by Reverend Tamayose to Ifa's last book, translated above, explains much as to why the book appeared in Hawai'i. But many other questions still remain unanswered as to why Hawai'i was chosen as the place for publication. We can only speculate on the possible reasons. One obvious answer was that it was impossible at that time to publish the work in Okinawa because of the war devastations. Tokyo too, had suffered physical destruction in the war, and Ifa probably thought that postwar Japan would not be the best place for his final project. He probably felt that Hawai'i was the only feasible place to print his work. Again, as was the case in his lecture arrangements of nearly twenty years before, the key persons would be the two Higas—Seikan in Hawai'i, and Shuncho in Tokyo.

To these two were joined the Reverend Hōun Tamayose, who ultimately was responsible for this Hawai'i edition. Probably the fact that Tamayose, like Ifa and Seikan Higa, were all natives of Naha contributed to the close bonding between them. When Ifa was in Hawai'i in 1928, as noted earlier, he spent much time with Higa; he probably became acquainted with Tamayose at that time. Tamayose arrived in Hawai'i in 1919 as a Buddhist missionary; apparently, he possessed credentials as a Jōdo-shinshū priest, and in 1922, he started a Hongwanji temple on Smith Street which he moved later to Fern Street in McCully (Sakihara 1981:184–5). Under the auspices of this temple,
the McCully Higashi Hongwanji, Tamayose edited Ifa's last book, and saw to its publication. Another edition of the Okinawa rekishi monogatari was published in Tokyo (the Tokyo edition) on 25 November 1947 from the Central Headquarters of the Okinawa Youth Association (Ifa 1947). In content, it is almost exactly the same as the Hawai'i edition, but without furigana and Tamayose's afterword. What kind of cooperation and/or coordination there was with the people who prepared the Japanese version of the same book is not known, though the latter appeared in print the year before the Hawai'i edition, according to Hokama.

Conclusion

In closing here, I would like to make some final comments on the following four points regarding this paper: first, suggest a few areas for further research on this topic; second, make some remarks on the place of socialist thought in Ifa's final years; third, reexamine his Nichiryū dōka ron (Theory of Japanese-Ryukyuan Assimilation) to see how it expressed itself in the lectures in Hawai'i; and lastly, make some parting comments on Ifa's self-image as an Okinawan and what its significance might mean for our own identities today.

First, our research on Ifa's trip to Hawai'i and California is far from exhaustive; there are many other archival sources that we did not have a chance to explore. If other researchers were to pursue this topic further, the following newspapers and journals would probably prove to be extremely fruitful: Nippon Jiji, Hawai'i Hochi, Rafu Shimpo, Jitsugyō no Hawai'i and Kaizō. By combing through back issues dating back from October 1928 through February 1929, articles and other bits of information that might throw light upon Ifa's lectures can probably be found.

Second, where did Ifa ultimately stand regarding social activism and justice, especially in his views on socialism and dialectical materialism? He probably continued to the end of his life to be concerned with humanistic values and goals. Thus, though he clearly sympathized with men such as Kawakami Hajime in their fight against authoritarianism and imperialism, Ifa himself did not play an active role in political issues and movements. In his last twenty years of life, after he returned from his lecture trip abroad, he concentrated the greater part of his remaining energies to the furthering of his research on Okinawan and Ryukyuan culture. Indeed his most lasting work on the Omoro Sōshi came in this final period. His studies were further stimulated to meet the challenge by the famed ethnographer, Yanagida Kunio, who proposed an alternative "southern route" thesis to explain Okinawan origins.

Third, a more careful and detailed analysis needs to be done on Ifa's Nichiryū dōka ron (Theory of Japanese-Ryukyuan assimilation). As we have seen, this idea was the fundamental assumption upon which Ifa's other works were based. The lectures in Hawai'i and California too, can be subsumed under this general viewpoint. Furthermore, this theory explains Ifa's self-image as a representative Japanese intellectual. He was fully cognizant of the powerful nationalism that was expressing itself both at home and in immigrant communities overseas. While he was aware of its undesirable features, he did not oppose or challenge nationalism. Living today, we know through hindsight where this nationalism led Japan. Thus, we are able, like Kinjō Sei'oku, to point out the "contradiction and limitations" in the historical environment in which Ifa lived.

Lastly, does "assimilation" necessarily involve obliteration of one's identity? Must one lose one's individuality in accommodating to the whole? Ifa did not think so. He felt that it was indeed possible for individuals to be Okinawan, as well as Japanese—at the same time. In his lectures, as we have seen, he openly demonstrated his personal identity as an Okinawan by using hoogen (Okinawan dialect) publicly. Needless to say, the assimilation concept, both in Ifa's day as well as today, entails serious political manifestations, and it remains a controversial idea. To retain one's unique and individualized values and lifestyle, and yet be an integral part of a larger mainstream culture, remains a challenge for all of us today.

As we close this paper, we are reminded, again, through this study of Ifa Fuyū, of the remarkable growth of self-consciousness in people of Okinawan backgrounds, both in Hawai'i and elsewhere, in affirming their personal and social identities. This emphasis on respecting and valuing things Okinawan—clearly separate and distinct from the Naichi—if it does not foster or lead to divisiveness and separation, is certainly one that Ifa himself would have wholeheartedly approved.

Notes

1. Index to Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed. (Chicago: 1994); Encyclopedia Americana International ed. (Danbury, CT: Scholastic Library Pub., 2006), and Encyclopedia of World Cultures (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1993), have been checked. A standard reference
work in English on Japan, Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan (Tokyo and New York 1983), does contain a biographical entry on "Ifa Fuyu" in volume 3 on page 262.

2. For an exhaustive list of writings by and on Ifa, see Hokama Shūzen (1976), pp. 301-36. For a recent intellectual biography on Ifa see Kano (1993).

3. As far as this writer is aware, only Hokama Shūzen and Ōta Masahide have explored Ifa's lectures in Hawai'i. Articles written by Mitsugu Sakihara and Seiyei Wukakawa in Uchinanchu (ESOHPI 1981) make references to Ifa. Another invaluable primary source on Ifa's visit to Hawai'i is Wukakawa (2000).

4. Japanese studies at universities is a post-World War II phenomenon. For a history of its academic development, see Marius B. Jansen (1988).

5. Ōta Masahide (1974-1976); see also “Taidan” (Conversations) between Hokama Shūzen and Seiyei Wukakawa, in Wukakawa (2000) which gives an interesting description of Ifa's visit.

6. Yasutaro Soga (1953) writes about the Fukunaga case in his memoirs.

7. Seiyei Wukakawa (1981:238-39), mentions that he and Toyama stood on opposite sides of the political spectrum. In 1928, however, when Ifa visited, they appeared to be on good terms. Wukakawa even says that "they had left [Ifa's room] together." The split between these two men probably occurred in 1930 with the Nakaima incident.

8. More investigation is needed to check the origin of the letter. Professor Ishikawa's footnote records that the letter appeared in the Okinawa Mainichi Shinbun, 9 March 1909.


10. For Ifa's relationship with the missionary Earl Bull, see http://www.lib.u-ryukyu.ac.jp/academic/bull/man/1f.html.

11. For an interesting account of the colorful Ford, see Paul Hooper, Elusive Destiny: The Internationalist Movement in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1980).

References


Before the outbreak of World War II, immigrants from Okinawa established communities in regions as distant and diverse as the Americas, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Despite a history of struggle against economic hardship and racial prejudice, communities, most notably those in Hawai‘i, Peru, and Brazil, have flourished. World War II fundamentally transformed all these communities, but those that survived now boast of a third and even a fourth generation of Americans, Peruvians, and Brazilians of Okinawan descent. Okinawan ethnicity and culture have been transformed in the process. The pre-World War II Okinawan immigrant community in Davao, Mindanao, in the southern Philippines, did not share this same historical experience. Established early in the twentieth century, by 1945 the Okinawan community in Davao ceased to exist. Numerous members died during the war, and survivors were repatriated to war-torn Japan. Like other Japanese immigrants in other areas of the Pacific and the Americas before the outbreak of war, Okinawan immigrants in Davao were suspected of being possible agents of the Japanese Empire. Residing in a region long troubled by a history of imperialism and colonialism, Okinawan immigrants in the Philippines could not escape the consequences of modern warfare as Japan began expanding into continental Asia and Southeast Asia during the 1930s and the 1940s.

Background to Okinawan Immigration to the Philippines

The history of Okinawan immigration to the Philippines is intimately linked to the history of American and Japanese expansion in the Pacific region. After the end of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars,
the Philippines officially became a dependency of the United States. Former American military personnel became governors, administrators, and planters. Although local Filipino nationalists resisted the American occupation of the islands by forming small groups of resistance fighters known as insurrectos, the American military and civilian occupation of the islands was effectively secured by 1903 (Linn 1997:23-49).

One of the first goals of the American administrators of the Philippines was to improve the economic infrastructure of the islands. According to the U.S. War Department, roads, bridges, and ports in the Philippines were in desperate need of repair, where they existed at all: "The conditions of all forms of public works, was such as to retard public service. Unimproved harbors, primitive roads, unbridged streams, and a crying need for schoolhouses was everywhere evident" (U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs 1913:39-40). One of the department's most famous public-works projects was the Benguet Road or the "Zig Zag Road" to Baguio, a city situated in the highlands of the northern Philippines. This road enabled American administrators and their families to travel to and enjoy the cooler climates of the tropical Philippines. Baguio became known as a mountain resort for the American and Filipino elite (Office of the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines 1942:50-51).

Several thousand immigrant workers constructed the road, one of the most difficult civil-works projects in the Philippines. According to Hayase Shinzō, between 1903 and 1904, more than two hundred workers died, and more than nineteen thousand contracted illnesses and suffered injuries (Hayase 1984a:116-132). Toward the end of the project, workers from Okinawa were brought to the Philippines to complete the road (Goodman 1965:170; Quiason 1958:217). Recalling the early contributions of Japanese construction workers in the Philippines, Willard Price wrote,

> The Americans had recently taken over the Philippines and were building the famous Benguet Road up the mountainside to Baguio. They tried Filipino laborers, Chinese, Russian—all failed. Then they brought down two thousand Japanese from Okinawa. They were equal to the very difficult and dangerous work and the road was completed, but not without great loss of life due to accidents and epidemics (Price 1936:15).

Toyama Kyūzo (1868–1910) and one of his most capable employees, Ōshiro Kōzō, arranged for the Okinawan immigrant workers (see photo). Both men were from the village of Kin. While Toyama oversaw the immigration to Hawai‘i, Ōshiro was charged with managing and coordinating the immigration to the Philippines. Dispatched to the Philippines in 1903 to oversee working conditions there, Ōshiro met the Japanese entrepreneur Ōta Kyōsaburo. The two men realized that the Philippines provided numerous economic opportunities for underemployed agricultural laborers in Japan. Consequently, after the Benguet Road was completed in 1904, Ōta and Ōshiro led a group of construction workers to Davao, Mindanao, to work as laborers on American- and Filipino-owned abaca plantations (Hayase 1984b:90-109; Ishikawa 1976; Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 November 1917).

Unlike the northern islands of the Philippines, Mindanao was not densely populated, nor was it Christian. Americans in the Philippines likened Mindanao to the American frontier, equating its local inhabitants with North American Indians and viewing its open lands as a vast resource. Soon after the
end of the Philippine-American War, Americans separated Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines, called it the Moro Province, and instituted a military government (Hayase 1984b:90–109; Hayase 1984a). The United States set out to pacify the indigenous peoples and to develop the agricultural and natural resources of the island. Abaca, one of the most important products of the island throughout the first half of the century, was used to produce heavy rope and cable for American industry. It was consistently one of the Philippines most important agricultural commodities (Hayase 1985a, 1984a).

Envisioning themselves as the principal producers and distributors of abaca, American soldiers turned planters formed the Davao Planters’ Association in 1905 to promote the interests of American and Western planters in Mindanao (Hayase 1984b:70–83). The shortage of labor was a pressing problem. On different occasions, the Davao planters entertained the possibility of using Italian, Chinese, Filipino, and even Russian laborers on their plantations (Mindanao Herald, 16 September 1905, 10 February, 14 April, 26 November 1906). While the planters were considering various options, Japanese laborers, particularly Okinawans, began arriving in Davao as a result of Ōshiro Kōzō’s recruiting efforts.

Recognizing that they too could profit from producing abaca, Ōta and Ōshiro formed the Ōta Development Company in 1907. Ōshiro was named vice president. With Japanese investment and Japanese labor, the Ōta Development Company quickly became one of Davao’s leading producers of abaca (Hayase 1984:155–62; Quiason 1958:218–9). By 1917, the Ōta Development Company employed more than five hundred people and controlled between ten and twenty thousand acres of land in Davao (Ryukyu Shimpo, 5 November 1917). Filipino and American reports on the abaca industry often cited the productivity and efficiency of the Ōta Development Company. The company experimented with new varieties of abaca and new methods of cultivation, it constructed roads and piers, and it established stores for local people and immigrant families (Duckworth 1926; Quiason 1958:218–9). Thanks to Ōshiro’s influence, numerous Okinawans found employment as managers, shopkeepers, and laborers on plantations and farms owned by the company (Nakama Nabe, OH-KTHC).1 At the beginning of the century, hopeful Okinawan immigrants looked, not only to Hawai‘i, Brazil, and Peru, but also to the Philippines as a possible destination.

From 1904 up to the 1910s, Okinawan immigration to the Philippines was sporadic. Initially, a large organized group traveled to Manila to work on the Benguet project. Thereafter, Okinawan immigrants tended to immigrate as individuals or as sponsored relatives. Learning about the opportunities in Davao from friends and relatives who had settled there after working on the Benguet Road, single men migrated as yobiyose (summoned) or dekasegi (sojourn) laborers. These strategies for seeking employment were similar to those used by the early immigrants to Hawai‘i. World War I, however, marked a significant turning point in Okinawan attitudes toward the Philippines. No longer able to immigrate to Hawai‘i as laborers after the enactment of the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1908, Okinawan laborers increasingly looked to the Philippines as a destination. Although the Philippines was a U.S. possession, Okinawans were attracted to Davao because of its proximity to Okinawa and high wages. As the price of abaca rose during the war, so did wages for workers and profits for farmers (Goodman 1965:172; Hayase 1985a:513; Kobashigawa Kō, OH-KTHC).

Tales about the Philippines and economic opportunities in Davao piqued the interest of young Okinawan men seeking adventure and wealth. Many young men applied for permits to travel to Davao during the later 1910s and the 1920s. Impatient with the time-consuming application and selection process, and unwilling to risk rejection, many young men illegally stowed away on ships bound for the Philippines and Southeast Asia (Afu Seian, OH-KTHC; Yonashiro Shigeru, OH-KTHC). Alarmed that the number of illegal immigrants arriving in Davao would have a negative effect on the Japanese community, in 1918 Ōshiro corresponded with the prefectural governor of Okinawa, urging him to take a strong stand against illegal immigration (Ryukyu Shimpo, 10, 17 May 1918). Despite these warnings, young Okinawans continued to travel to the Philippines without proper documentation.

Once in Davao, and after working for a few years, documented and undocumented Okinawan immigrants had numerous opportunities to become small farmers. With the savings from his earnings, a young man could lease land from an American or a Filipino landowner and cultivate and harvest abaca on his own (Hayase 1984a:85–188). Some men also formed compa (small companies) with friends and leased land (Ryukyu Shimpo, 28 April 1917; Igei Goze, OH-KTHC; Igei Yasutarō, OH-KTHC). As in California, many Okinawan immigrants in Davao gradually climbed out of the laboring class and began their own farms. By the 1920s, Okinawans in Davao were widely regarded as hardworking and successful farmers. In fact, many informants recalled that it was more desirable to marry Okinawan men in the Philippines
than Okinawan men in Hawai‘i (Nakama Goze, OH-KTHC; Higa Todo, OH-KTHC).

For many farm families, migrating to Davao became an attractive alternative to a life of underemployment in their homeland. After the 1924 passage of the U.S. Immigration Restriction Act, which prohibited further emigration from Europe and Asia, Okinawan farmers increasingly looked to the Philippines. Although American immigration laws, most notably the Chinese Exclusion Acts, were enforced in American Pacific dependencies, selective immigration of Japanese was permitted in the Philippines (Goodman 1965:172). Noting this contradiction in American immigration policy, in 1937 the Japanese economist Ishii Ryoichi wrote, "In contrast to the situation that prevails in other Pacific possessions of the United States, there are no restrictions against Japanese emigration to the Philippines" (Ishii 1937:201).

Despite restrictive immigration laws that were directed toward Asians in other parts of the American Pacific, Japanese immigrants were welcomed to work in the Philippines, where they were recognized as skilled agriculturalists. As early as 22 April 1905, the Mindanao Herald reported that "the Japanese make capable hemp strippers; the fiber cleaned by them being of finer quality than that cleaned by native laborers." Because the abaca industry was important to the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, selected immigrants from Japan were permitted to enter the Philippines to work. By the 1930s, in addition to Japanese laborers and farmers, Japanese businessmen who invested in and managed the cultivation and harvesting of abaca for the Japanese market immigrated to the Philippines (Goodman 1965:172–93; Quiason 1958:244–227; Yu-Jose 1996:72). By 1928, Davao, which had once been referred to as "the most thoroughly American community in the Philippines," had become a predominantly Japanese colony (Mindanao Herald, 22 April, 5 May 1928). In addition to American and Filipino businesses, there were also Japanese stores, restaurants, and services in Davao (Quiason 1958:224–5).

The Japanese presence in Davao was strong and influential. Contemporary observers praised the work ethic and business efficiency of the Japanese. "Davao would not have achieved its present state of progress had it not been for the pioneering spirit of the Japanese," wrote Pablo F. Sulit. "They were the ones who blazed the trail to the interior, defying the wilderness and the hostility of the natives." He added, "The Japanese...have converted virgin forests into seas of waving, green abaca fields from which is derived enormous wealth" (Sulit 1929:3–4).

By 1940, approximately ten thousand Okinawans were living in Davao; many were immigrant farmers (Taeuber 1958:200). Acquiring land was essential to the economic strategies of these farmers. The earliest immigrants to the Philippines usually leased uncultivated land from American and Filipino landowners, and, after negotiating an agreement with a landowner, they cleared the land by cutting trees and burning the remaining stumps. Once the land was cleared, they dug holes and planted abaca plants in well-measured rows (Hayase 1984a:185–8; Higa Todo, OH-KTHC). Writing for the Philippine Journal of Commerce and Industry, David Alvarez described the neatness of these rows: "In hemp plantations of Davao abaca plants grow to a great height, in orderly groups arranged in straight rows, so that even in stretches [sic] hundreds of meters long, workers at one end can easily be observed from the other." Having observed the methods of the Japanese abaca grower, Alvarez attributed the success of the Japanese to their meticulous attention to every aspect of the planting and harvesting of abaca: "Selection of the land for planting, the variety of hemp to be raised, the manner of planting in seedlings, and the cutting of the plants for stripping, all undergo careful scrutiny" (Alvarez 1934:6).

When the abaca plant grew to a height of four or more meters and produced blossoms "like that of a banana plant," it was ready to be harvested. During the abaca harvest, the busiest time of the year, Okinawan farmers hired up to five additional workers to assist them with the cutting, stripping, drying, and bundling of hemp. Workers were required to clear the farm of leaves that had dropped from the abaca plant, and then they cut the stalks using machete-like instruments called tonba and boro. After the plant was cut, the fibers were separated—sometimes by hand, but more often by machine. This stripping process—to which Okinawan farmers referred as "peeling" or "sawing"—required the labor of at least five men. More often than not, the process of stripping hemp on Japanese farms was mechanized.

According to Hayase Shinzō, the hagotan, a portable stripping machine, revolutionized the way in which hemp was stripped on Japanese abaca farms. As early as 1908, planters in Davao had experimented with new hemp-stripping machines, but few proved to be successful. Heavy and expensive, many of these machines produced fibers of mediocre quality. Although the time that it took for abaca to be stripped was reduced, the product was poor in quality. Japanese immigrant farmers reportedly managed to produce high-quality fibers with the smaller and portable hagotan (Hayase 1984a:189–90;
The mechanization of hemp stripping resulted in clear divisions of labor based on gender. Although women did not strip hemp, they played crucial roles as gardeners and animal keepers on abaca farms. While immigrant men cultivated and stripped hemp, Okinawan women reported that they kept vegetable gardens and raised chickens and pigs. Okinawan women also reported that they supplemented their food supply by searching the forests for "delicious mushrooms." And, in addition to preparing dishes that called for eggs, chicken, and pork, Okinawan women learned to prepare meals with corn, coconuts, and durian. As in Okinawa, immigrant families in Davao produced their own food and ate what grew around them naturally. Yet, unlike in Okinawa, in Davao they could purchase rice, bread, sweets, and canned goods at trading posts run by the Òta Development Company. In addition to food products, immigrants could purchase manufactured goods such as sewing machines.

The mechanization of agriculture and the availability of new technologies and store-bought goods in Davao led to new gender roles and new work responsibilities for Okinawan immigrant men and women (Ginoza Masa, OH-KTHC; Nakama Emi, OH-KTHC; Nakama Nabe, OH-KTHC). Many immigrants recalled that they were required to demonstrate at least a year's work in cutting and cleaning before they were entrusted with the responsibility of stripping hemp (Kobashigawa Kô, OH-KTHC; Yoshida Masuzô, OH-KTHC; Igei Yasutarô, OH-KTHC). Although Japanese and indigenous workers were both hired to strip hemp, Japanese workers were paid a higher wage. Native workers were paid thirty cents for cutting abaca, while Japanese workers were paid fifty cents. And native workers were paid eighty cents for stripping abaca, while Japanese workers were paid one peso. One Okinawan worker said that such a differential resulted because there were some local workers who were "lazy" (namake) and, as the boss, he could not trust them and had to check their work often (Nakama Masanori, OH-KTHC).

Once the hemp dried and was prepared in large bundles, Okinawan farmers turned to a vast network of brokers, primarily Japanese and Chinese, for assistance in selling their product. In order to get the best price, Okinawan farmers read the newspaper and checked the market price of hemp on a regular basis (Kobashigawa Kô, OH-KTHC). They also positioned their bundles so that the finest fibers were visible from the top, but, as one immigrant recalled, brokers were wise and flipped the product to one side to view the quality of fiber from beneath. Like the laborer who wished to receive a higher wage, the Okinawan farmer tried but failed to outwit the local merchant. Although
worker, farmer, and merchant continually tried to outwit one another, in the end each benefited from the rapid growth of the abaca industry in Davao (Ginoza, OH-KTHC).

The Social Status of Okinawan Immigrants in Davao

Okinawan immigrants in Davao developed a reputation for being hard-working and shrewd. Although they were admired for their strong work ethic, they were continually reminded by Filipinos and Japanese immigrants from the mainland that they were not "truly" Japanese, as were the educated Japanese business elite of Davao. Filipino observers often referred to the Okinawans as "the other Japanese" (Hayase 1984b:216). The historian Cecil Cody wrote, "One feature of the Japanese community stood out clearly to their Filipino neighbors: there were two kinds of Japanese in Davao—the non-Okinawans and the Okinawans. They dressed and spoke differently and discrimination existed between them" (Cody 1959:174). Because of perceived differences, Okinawan immigrants were especially self-conscious of their social status.

Abaca growing was labor-intensive. Days spent under the hot tropical sun darkened the skin of the immigrant farmers, and the work was dirty, the sap from the abaca plant staining their hands and bodies. Nakama Masanori explained that working with abaca often made his hands swell and that sometimes they would become "completely black." The sap was "as sticky as rice paste," he recalled, making it so difficult to clean stained work clothes that he often had to prepare extra sets. Okinawan farmers tended to be darker than their urban counterparts, and Okinawan farmers often appeared dirt) and unkempt to the business elite of Davao, who wore neckties and white suits, the formal attire of the Philippines (Nakama Masanori, OH-KTHC; Murayama 1929:16-17).

Okinawan immigrants were also criticized for keeping untidy homes. The Okinawans' living spaces were closely situated to their work spaces; outside observers often found it difficult to differentiate between the two. One observer stated that Okinawan homes resembled "pig styes." The sight of hemp drying in front of homes, the difficulty distinguishing storage areas from living quarters, and the sight of immigrant farm families and workers clustered in makeshift homes provoked condescension (Murayama 1929:16-17).

Okinawan immigrant women were also criticized for being untidy and unrefined (Murayama 1929:16-17). Although relatively less demanding and more comfortable than rural life in Okinawa, rural life in Davao still required significant contributions from the women. Raising children, keeping house, tending to the vegetable garden, and cooking meals for workers filled the daily schedule. Although the availability of sewing machines enabled women to produce more clothes, the demands of farm life ensured that the clothes that they produced remained simple and functional (Ajifu Kayû, OH-KTHC).

Outside observers noted that Okinawan immigrants were clannish and that they rarely participated in civic activities. Participation in urban-centered activities was often difficult for farmers who lived between two and three hours (measured in terms of travel on horseback) away from urban centers such as Davao and Mintal. A few farmers had cars, and some reportedly kept horses, but most had to walk to get anywhere (Murayama 1929:16-17; Ajifu Nae, OH-KTHC; Ginoza Tosiko, OH-KTHC). The lack of access to convenient forms of transportation prevented Okinawans from traveling to urban centers. Rather than traveling to the city of Davao, where the American and Japanese elite socialized in country clubs and on golf courses, Okinawan immigrant farmers socialized among themselves in their rural communities, conversing in their native dialects and reminiscing about Okinawa. They formed prefectural associations (kenjinkai), village associations (sonjinkai), and small clubs. Elected representatives and supporting a vast membership, these organizations printed newsletters that informed members of weddings, births, and deaths, and they coordinated various activities. One such activity was the annual sumo match between village associations, and another was the effort to raise funds to erect a statue in Okinawa to honor the memory of Ōshiro Kōzō. Okinawan immigrants led active and socially rich lives. For example, after the birth of a child, it was not uncommon for several families to gather and celebrate the occasion for three days, often in drunken exhilaration. Because of these activities and frequent social interaction, many Okinawans reported that they did not feel lonely or homesick for Okinawa. In many ways, Okinawan immigrants had successfully transplanted and adapted Okinawan village life to Davao (Nakama Chiyô, OH-KTHC; Ginoza Masa, OH-KTHC; Ajifu Tatsu, OH-KTHC; Nakama Kamado, OH-KTHC; Ajifu Kayû, OH-KTHC).

Change, however, was also evident. Interactions with non-Okinawans, particularly the native peoples of Davao, altered Okinawan views of themselves and of peoples of other racial and ethnic backgrounds. "It was the Okinawans who tended to live most intimately with their neighbors, especially in the areas of Bagobo settlement" (Cody 1959:184). "The early Japanese and the Okinawans," wrote the historian Hayase Shinţō, "had far more opportunity
to establish harmonious social relations with tribal people and they proceeded
to befriend the Bagobo under the leadership of Ōta” (Hayase 1984b:224).

According to Hayase Shinzō and Fay Cooper Cole, the peoples of Davao
were organized into six tribal groups, distinguished by clothing, tools, and
social organization. And, as in so many Southeast Asian countries, a large
Muslim population existed in Davao. Islam had spread to Mindanao from
Southeast Asia, primarily through Malay and Arabic texts, and found many
devoted converts among the tribal peoples of Mindanao. Owing to the strength
of Islam in Mindanao, Spanish and Catholic influences were not particularly
strong among the peoples of Davao (Cole 1913; Hayase 1984b:13–56; Saleeby
1905).

Like other newcomers to Davao, some Okinawans also believed and
perpetuated stereotypes of their tribal and Muslim neighbors. Ironically, Oki­

nawan descriptions of the native peoples were similar to Western and Japanese
descriptions of Okinawan peasants. Many Okinawans believed that, had the
“native peoples” been “a little more clever,” the Philippines would have been
a “great country.” Some Okinawans assumed that the local people were poor
because of their perceived “backward” cultures.

Describing the cultures of the various peoples of Davao, Okinawans stated
that the “natives” with whom they had the most contact were the Bagobo and
that, if possible, they avoided Muslims, to whom they referred as “the Moro.”
The Bagobo adorned themselves in elaborate red costumes and wore jewelry
around their ankles that sounded when they walked. One Okinawan remarked
that the Bagobo tended to gather in groups of twenty or more, and this made
them appear threatening. In general, Okinawans perceived the Bagobo to be
fierce and courageous, but they also stated that they were poor and hungry
and that they lied and stole (Nakama Emi, OH-KTHC; Yonashiro Shigeru,
OH-KTHC; Ginoza Toshiko, OH-KTHC).

Some Okinawans, able to see beyond the constructed and misleading
stereotypes, referred to the native workers as dekasegi laborers and understood
that cash was essential in Davao’s rapidly growing economy. The native peoples,
like the Okinawans, left their homes to work as wage laborers (Hayase 1984a).
As recent immigrants, sympathetic Okinawans apparently understood that
the tribal peoples’ poverty was not a function of their culture but a result of
their new and weakened status in a cash-based economy. Some Okinawan
employers became friends with their workers. A former overseer recalled,

“Because I learned the local dialects quickly, friendly relations between me
and the natives developed, and I received invitations to the births of their
children” (Tōyama Kamasei, OH-KTHC). Although cultural and linguistic
barriers prevented most from becoming true friends, warm relations did develop
between individual farmers and their workers. Realizing that their hired help
were no different from them, one farmer’s wife tried to help her workers and
their families by feeding them and buying them clothes. Another Okinawan
woman acknowledged that her family’s success was directly related to the
contributions of their workers and felt indebted to them. After the war, she
returned to Davao for a visit and learned that a former employee died soon
after the war had started and that another and his family lived in poverty in
the Davao hills. She was saddened to see their condition (Kōhatsu Uto, OH­
KTHC; Higa Todo, OH-KTHC).

Nonetheless, distrust ran high. Japanese farmers regularly armed them­
selves and cautioned their families of the dangers of living among “native
peoples.” One Okinawan woman remembered that a bell was rung to warn
of possible attacks from the indigenous peoples (Yabiku Shuko, OH-KTHC).
One Philippine-born Okinawan remembered that his mother had told him
that there were “bad people” in the Philippines and that the family kept a
Japanese sword for protection (Ajifu Kayū, OH-KTHC). Such fears were
reinforced when Filipino workers threatened a newly hired Okinawan laborer
with a knife. Another recalled that a native broke into an Okinawan home,
bound the couple living there, and stole a jewelry box from Hong Kong (Ike­
haru Hiroshi, OH-KTHC). While it was not uncommon for an immigrant
farmer and his family to be ambushed and killed, there were also outbursts of
These outbreaks of violence and crime led many Okinawans to believe that
the indigenous peoples were uncivilized and lawless: “The Japanese were very
frightened of the Moro” (Ginoza Masa, OH-KTHC).

Some Okinawans, however, attempted to find similarities between
themselves and the peoples of Davao. For example, when Kobashigawa
Sakukichi supervised indigenous laborers, he recalled that the peoples of the
Philippines trusted Okinawans more than the Japanese from the mainland.
“Yamatunchu [Japanese from the mainland] are proud,” he said, “and because
they treat natives and Uchinanchu [Okinawans] like fools, the natives trust
Uchinanchu.” Kobashigawa believed that the Japanese treated Okinawan
immigrants and indigenous workers alike and thus naively believed that his

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workers felt a sense of solidarity with him. However, his position as overseer, his superior earnings, and the sword that he carried while at work did not win him many admirers (Kobashigawa Sakukichi, OH-KTHC). Kurota Zenpachi also felt that he could develop friendships with his workers by sharing liquor with them. To Okinawans, drinking with friends is and was perhaps the most obvious sign of friendship. After one attempt, he never tried again. "When the natives drink, they become violent, so I never drank with them" (Kurota Zenpachi, OH-KTHC). Social relationships between Okinawans and non-Okinawans in the rural districts of Davao were, therefore, awkward and fragile. Language barriers, cultural differences, misunderstandings, and mistrust prevented Okinawan immigrants and their workers from developing strong and lasting relationships.

"Education Fever" and Japanese Nationalism

Life on the so-called frontier proved to be especially challenging for immigrant parents who valued education. Extremely sensitive about their perceived lower-class status, Okinawan immigrant parents were especially active in their children's education. As one Philippine-born Okinawan recalled, immigrant parents had "education fever" (Ikehara Hiroshi, OH-KTHC). This strong desire to see their children educated is not surprising. According to the demographer Irene Taeuber, of all the Japanese overseas, the immigrants in the Philippines had the least amount of formal education. Less than 60 percent of the male immigrants in the Philippines had attended middle school. In contrast, more than 14.7 percent of the male immigrants to Hawai‘i and 25.9 percent of the male immigrants who settled in the continental United States graduated from middle school. Moreover, Japanese immigrant women in the Philippines received less education than their Japanese cohorts who migrated to Hawai‘i and the continental United States; only 2.5 percent of the female immigrants to the Philippines had attended middle school, while 16 percent of the female immigrants to Hawai‘i and 34.4 percent of the female immigrants who migrated to the continental United States graduated from middle school (Taeuber 1958:2000). A contemporary observer of the Okinawan community in Davao noted that the level of literacy was "dreadfully low" (Murayama 1929:16–17).

In Davao, there were two types of schools: Filipino and Japanese. In 1937, there were twenty-one schools in the city of Davao: seventeen were primary schools with a total enrollment of 3,165; three were intermediate schools with 800 students; and one was a high school with 437 students (Estuar 1937:17). Although Japanese children were eligible to attend these schools, Japanese immigrant parents chose to send them to Japanese schools that were administered by the Japanese Ministry of Education. In 1940, there were approximately 2,000 Japanese schoolchildren and twelve Japanese schools in Davao, and the curriculum in these schools was similar to the curriculum in schools in Japan (Ayala 1940:35; Ajifu Kayū, OH-KTHC). In an economy that depended highly on Japanese investment and trade, a Japanese education and Japanese credentials were required in order to advance beyond the status of farmer. The ability to conduct business in Japanese was essential. Thus, Okinawan farmers eagerly sent their children to Japanese schools if they could. Rather than experiencing a decline in status, many Okinawan immigrants viewed their immigration to Davao as an opportunity for economic and social mobility. Educating the second generation thus became an extremely important priority (Ajifu Kayū, OH-KTHC; Yonashiro Shigeru, OH-KTHC).

If they lived in the city, or if they could afford to board their children near the schools, Okinawan immigrants sent their children to Japanese schools in either Davao and Mintal. Whereas they themselves dressed in work clothes, parents dressed their children in formal attire. The boys wore white shirts, short pants, and shoes and some even neckties. These children were educated to become part of the Japanese middle class. Philippine-born Yonashiro Shigeru recalled that his teachers were "strict." He had lessons in Japanese ethics, Japanese calligraphy, and arithmetic. He also recalled that schoolchildren attended an English class "because the Philippines was an American territory." In addition to these academic requirements, children also participated in sports festivals with other Japanese youths rather than with teams from Filipino schools (Ginoza Toshiko, OH-KTHC; Yonashiro Shigeru, OH-KTHC).

Many immigrant parents supported the activities of the Japanese schools, but, because so many families lived in remote areas, many found it difficult to send their children to these schools. The children within commuting distance came on horseback or bicycle or simply walked. Ajifu Nae stated that she rose before dawn in order to walk her children to school. Children who lived further away crossed rivers and passed through hilly terrain in order to reach the schools. Ajifu Kayū, a Philippine-born Okinawan, remembered that most of his Okinawan friends at school returned to their rural homes in the summer, leaving him with few companions in the city. Nakama Nabe recalled that some parents rented rooms for their children in homes near the
schools. Boarding children in the city was costly; thus, many chose to send their children to Okinawa to live with their grandparents or close relatives in order to receive a Japanese education (Ajit Nae, OH-KTHC; Ginoza Toshiko, OH-KTHC; Higa Todo, OH-KTHC; Kohatsu Uto, OH-KTHC; Nakama Chiyo, OH-KTHC; Nakama Goze, OH-KTHC).

Children sent to Okinawa were accompanied by either a trusted adult or their mothers. This "education migration" was often filled with anxiety. Philippine-born children who were sent to Okinawa often excelled in school but regularly complained that life in Okinawa was "boring" and that the food was "miserable." Grandparents in Okinawa informed parents that their children often threatened to "run away" and return to the Philippines. Okinawan children born overseas, it seems, found it difficult adapting to life in rural Okinawa. Ikehara Hiroshi, a Philippine-born Okinawan, expressed his deepest sympathies for the immigrant women who chose to return to "miserable" Okinawa so that their children could receive an education. "The Philippines was like heaven," he recalled. "The warm climate, the fertile land, no typhoons.... Women's lives were not difficult.... How did the women who escorted their children back to Okinawa feel [about leaving Davao]" (Ikehara Hiroshi, OH-KTHC). Although the sending of their children back to Okinawa evoked emotions of sadness, anxiety, and guilt, these immigrant parents, particularly immigrants from Kin Village, felt assured that their children would at least receive a Japanese education.

Outside observers viewed this return migration of women and children as an indication that Japan was preparing to invade Davao. Antonio Gabila wrote, "You must have read about it in the papers—the silent, 'unofficial evacuation' of Japanese from the South." A week before this was written, eighty-seven Japanese (mostly women and children) left Cebu and Davao for Japan. The evacuation, argued Gabila, was clear evidence that Japan was preparing to invade the Philippines. When he inquired about the "evacuations," he was told by Japanese representatives that "the women and children, they go home because the children they enter school in Japan." Unwilling to believe that this was indeed true, Gabila argued that the Japanese method of control and domination was "gradual and quiet." Warning Filipinos of an impending invasion, he wrote, "You may shove the little Japanese about in the beginning, but some day you'll wake up to find him grown so big and strong you can't budge him. And that's what happened in Davao" (Gabila 1941).

The "education migration" of Philippine-born Japanese schoolchildren coincided with the rise of Japanese militarism in Asia. The Japanese presence in the Philippines had become both a national and an international problem. The Philippines would be a site where geopolitics and diplomacy had failed and war prevailed. The Philippines had sought independence from the United States by the 1940s. During the 1930s, and especially after the Philippines achieved commonwealth status in 1934, Philippine nationalists sought to restrict Japanese immigration and attempted to confiscate Japanese lands that were allegedly acquired through "extralegal" means. Japanese immigration and the "land problem" became two hotly debated issues among Philippine nationalists (Yu-Jose 1996:74-78).

In the fall of 1935, Teodoro V. Nano warned readers of the Commonwealth Advocate that the Japanese community in Davao, Mindanao, would be a major obstacle to Philippine independence. "Japan's agricultural development of Davao," he wrote, "may be disguised penetration that will someday result in the annexation of the Philippines to the [Japanese] Island Empire" (Nano 1935:44). Comparing the Japanese with the Chinese, the Commonwealth Advocate argued that Chinese immigrants were colonists, not colonizers. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese have "ambition[s] of conquest and expansion" (Commonwealth Advocate 1, no. 1 [January 1935]:15-16). Another Philippine nationalist wrote, "The continuous influx of a foreign population, strongly bound to their old country and unwilling to be absorbed by us, soon will usher in a social and racial problem that will rival that of California's" (Paguio 1930:40). Like their cohorts in California, Japanese farmers in the Philippines were perceived to be unfair competitors and undesirable immigrants. However, by the late 1930s, the people and the government of the Philippines had cause for concern. Japanese militarism had increased, and Japan's invasion of China in 1937 provoked criticism from the international community. Although Japan's militaristic activities alarmed several Asian nations, the Philippines continued to welcome Japanese investment until the bombing of Pearl Harbor (Yu-Jose 1996:74-78).

After Pearl Harbor, several Okinawan immigrants in Davao gathered at the Ota Development Company offices and cheered after hearing of the successful attack. Other immigrants recalled that their neighbors regularly prayed for the emperor of Japan. With the outbreak of war, ethnic nationalism among Okinawan immigrants was pronounced. Within a few days, several
Japanese immigrants were interned. In one camp, a Filipino soldier randomly fired a gun and killed five Okinawan immigrants. A few weeks later, the Japanese military landed in Davao and transformed it into a military outpost. Japanese civilians were drafted into the military; many Okinawans served as low-level soldiers, mainly cooks and attendants to Japanese officers. By 1942, the Philippines was under the control of the Japanese military.

During this time, the Filipinos formed several resistance groups. When American troops landed in Davao in 1945, they relied on these guerrilla fighters to fight the poorly trained and ill-equipped Japanese army. Warfare in Davao was particularly ferocious. While Okinawan men served in the army, their wives and children fled to the mountains to avoid conflict and battle. Guerrilla warfare, however, affected soldier and civilian alike. Attempting to flee from American and Filipino troops, civilians drowned crossing rivers. Without adequate food and supplies, many of the elderly and the young died of starvation. Nakama Kamado and Yabiku Shuko recalled seeing many abandoned children along riverbeds. In one instance, one survivor recalled seeing crying babies still strapped to the backs of mothers' whose heads had been cut off.

Despite numerous casualties, many Okinawan immigrants fled further and further into the interior of Davao. The American military enlisted the help of the local tribes to reach them. Igei Genichi recalled that members of the Bagobo tribe were sent to find and retrieve Japanese soldiers and civilians. They were rewarded with "canned goods" and "prizes." But, rather than surrendering to the Americans, many Okinawans continued to retreat deeper into the mountains. At war's end, American aircraft scattered flyers indicating that the war had ended and that Japanese civilians should surrender to American troops. Ajifu Tatsu recalled that the local peoples attacked Okinawans with knives as American troops transported them to internment camps, where survivors—who considered themselves "prisoners"—were processed for repatriation to Japan. By war's end, approximately seventeen thousand Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed, about twelve thousand surrendered, and approximately eighty-two hundred were declared missing.

Okinawan repatriates were sent to Kagoshima, Oita, and Fukuoka prefectures. Many suffered from poor health and malnutrition. Because of their poor physical condition, many, particularly children, died. Those old enough and strong enough to work pieced together odd jobs on a daily basis. Beginning in 1946, many were able to return to Okinawa, but, on their return, they discovered that the island had been transformed into an American military outpost. Okinawan immigrants openly expressed their devotion to the Japanese emperor and assisted with the Japanese military occupation, imperialism, and war.

Conclusion

Unlike Japanese expansion to Manchuria, which began with a military invasion, Japanese expansion to the Philippines began with immigration, followed by investment, and then invasion. The Japanese colony in Davao, Mindanao, was, as numerous scholars have argued, a creation of American and Japanese economic interests in the Philippines. The migration of Okinawans occurred within this international context. Excluded from the continental United States and Hawai'i, Okinawan laborers and farmers contributed to the expansion and economic development of the American Pacific empire in the Philippines.

Although the Philippines was an unincorporated U.S. possession, America's colonial presence failed to win the allegiance of Okinawan immigrants in the Philippines. As Davao's economy and trade became more and more dependent on Japanese investment, Okinawan immigrants began to identify with an expanding Japanese Empire. Japanese schools in Davao were under close scrutiny. Within this colonial context, it appeared impossible for immigrants from Okinawa to be incorporated into
the national life of the Philippines. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, and with the defeat of Japan, it was decided that the Japanese in Davao should not remain in the Philippines (Cody 1959:186; Yu-Jose 1996:80). The Okinawan immigrant community therefore was short-lived. Careful planning and cautious behavior failed to shield this community from the consequences of failed diplomacy and modern warfare. War would ultimately restrict the areas in which Okinawan immigrants could make their homes.

Notes

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1. Much of my work is indebted to the oral histories (OH) conducted and collected by the Kin Township History Committee (KTHC), Okinawa. To indicate that information reported in the text has been obtained from one of these oral histories, I give in parentheses the informant’s name followed by the acronym OH-KTHC. None of the oral histories that I used is dated.

References


Estuar, V. 1937. Davao is a Bustling City of the South. Philippine Journal of Commerce and Industry 13, no. 3 (March):17.
"Kibei" refers to Japanese individuals returning to America; it often refers to a subset of “Nisei,” or second generation Japanese, who were born in the United States but educated in Japan. This paper provides a deeper understanding of a sub-group within the Okinawan diasporic community in Hawai’i—the Okinawan Kibei Nisei. Today, Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai’i are in their seventies, eighties and nineties; they were born in Hawai’i before World War II; they are of Okinawan ancestry; they were schooled in either Okinawa or mainland Japan, and returned to Hawai’i as adults either before or after the war. Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai’i have been able to utilize their experiences of living in Okinawa or mainland Japan during the period of their youth and have actively contributed to strengthening the Okinawan ethnic community in Hawai’i. The life experiences of Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai’i should be recognized as distinctive ones which cannot be simply referred to as either “Okinawan experiences” or “Japanese Kibei Nisei experiences.” Their little-known life stories are more complex and marginalized not only because of being Kibei, a sub-group of Nisei, but also because of being Okinawans in Hawai’i, “[a] minority group within the Japanese community” (Kimura 1998:74). By using the life story method, this paper examines how the Okinawan Kibei Nisei interpret their past, construct their collective identities and define for themselves the meanings of being an Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai’i today.

Most references to the Kibei Nisei experience in general are found in studies on their experiences during World War II. The common image of them suggest that they had a fixed identity: unable to assimilate, pro-Japanese, and disloyal to the United States because of their presumed indoctrination in
militaristic education in the later 1920s and 1930s in Japan. In my study of Kibei Nisei, I use a social constructionist approach on identity formation: which I view identity not as a result of a one-time event that they had while living in Japan, but as a continuing result of experiences and socio-historical circumstances that they faced. The life story method is also important since it allows us to understand how a particular group, in this case Okinawan Kibei Nisei, expresses their sense of identity and their perceptions of the world. Isabelle Beraux-Wiame (1981) points out that examining life stories allows the researcher to see the process by which the storytellers reconstruct the meaning of the past from the present point of view. When a person tells her life story, she is required to select the most important events in her life. Additionally, at a collective level, “telling stories is, therefore, a process of constructing collective identities, revealing both internally-oriented emotional manifestations and externally-based shared understanding of who they are” (Kinoshita 2002:9). By using the life story method, this paper also examines how the Okinawan Kibei Nisei elders employ retrospective narrative as a tool to interpret their past, construct their collective identities and define for themselves the meanings of being an Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i.

Introducing the term “sociological imagination,” C. Wright Mills explains that it is important to “understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals” (1959:5). He believes that an important value of sociology is its potential to explore the process of societal change and how individual actions impact the whole society. Examining Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s life stories also allows us to explore the process of societal change and dynamics within the Okinawan diasporic community in Hawai‘i and how the Kibei Nisei’s existence has contributed to a whole community and society. My study treats Okinawan Kibei Nisei as active agents in the society, exploring not only how they have been able to overcome their marginality but also how they have created positive social changes in the Okinawan community in Hawai‘i.

**Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i**

The first group of immigrants from Okinawa arrived in Hawai‘i in 1900. Like many Issei mainland Japanese, early immigrants from Okinawa sent their Hawai‘i-born children to Okinawa for several reasons. While the practice of sending at least one child to Japan was prevalent within the larger Japanese community in Hawai‘i between the 1920s and 1940s, Okinawan Issei were more likely to send their children to Okinawa for economic reasons. Since the Okinawan immigration to Hawai‘i took place almost two decades later than the Japanese immigration, Okinawan wages were much lower than those of other Japanese immigrants. Second, members of extended families raising their family members’ children was a common practice in Okinawan society. By sending their children to Okinawa, where the children could live with grandparents inexpensively, parents could remain in Hawai‘i to save up money for their own return to Okinawa.

There were critics of this practice. Yamamoto discouraged the trend from an ethnic perspective. In *Hawaii no Okinawakenjin* [Okinawans in Hawai‘i], Yamamoto criticized the practice of sending Hawai‘i-born children to Okinawa. He states that the practice of sending their children to Okinawa would have a negative impact on the ethnic heritage of Okinawan Nisei in Hawai‘i; going back to Okinawa for them would mean coming to terms with difficult social, political and economical situations of Okinawa. Paradoxically, if Nisei were sent to Okinawa, they would be disappointed about their ethnic roots. Yamamoto suggested that it would be better that they spend their energy in learning to accommodate personality and habits to life overseas (1919:308–9).

It was not until the early 1930s that many Okinawan Kibei Nisei were sent to Okinawa or mainland Japan for educational purposes. In the 1920s, Okinawan immigrants began to think of themselves no longer as sojourners and they tried to build a basis for their living in Hawai‘i. Okinawan immigrant parents were especially active in their children’s education and seeing their children received a Japanese education was the parents’ desire. Many Issei sent their children to Japanese schools in Hawai‘i. For higher education, Nisei chose to go to school in mainland Japan, because there were no colleges and universities in Okinawa until after World War II. During the 1920s and 1930s, approximately 3,000 Okinawan Nisei who had grown up in Okinawa returned to Hawai‘i (*Hawaii Pacific Press*, 1 January 1992). The first post-war Okinawan Kibei Nisei—a group of twenty-seven—returned to Hawai‘i in 1947, setting a precedent for future returning Kibei Nisei (*Hawai‘i Hochi*, 28 June 1947).

The only work focusing on Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i available in Japanese is Hiroyuki Kinjō’s article (2004). His work focuses on Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s cultural and linguistic experiences in Okinawa during the period of their youth and offers an important insight that Okinawan Kibei Nisei have played an important role in strengthening the Okinawan ethnic community in Hawai‘i. Kinjō’s attempt to recognize the Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s
contribution to their ethnic community in Hawai‘i should not be overlooked. However, my study provides a deeper understanding of the unexamined social psychological aspect of complex identity formation of Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i.

To better understand Okinawan Kibei Nisei experiences, I interviewed eighteen Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i between July 2004 and February 2005. In this paper, I focus on fourteen of my interviewees who stated that they were sent to Okinawa for economic reasons. Ranging between sixty-nine and ninety-two years old, they were born between 1912 and 1935. Two were female and twelve of them were male. They were sent to Okinawa between the years of 1914 and 1935 as young as six months and as old as ten years old. The length of time that they spent in Okinawa ranged from seven to eighteen years. They returned to Hawai‘i between the years of 1928 and 1947. The interviews were conducted in a flexible, open-ended, and conversational style. To provide for a full range of communication, the interviewees were invited to speak in whatever language they preferred—Japanese, English, Okinawan, or a mix of all three. I asked questions about their lives prior to, during, and after World War II. These three periods encompass their childhoods in Okinawa, their time in Hawai‘i prior to World War II, their wartime experiences when Japan was the enemy, their post-war adjustment when Okinawa remained under direct American authority, and finally their experiences since the revitalization of the Okinawan ethnic community in Hawai‘i in the 1980s.

Life Stories of Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i

The life stories of Okinawan Kibei Nisei varied considerably. While I provide a general picture of Okinawan Kibei Nisei as a group, my goal is also to examine common threads and unique aspects of their stories. In telling this story, in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality, the participants’ names have been changed.

Childhood and Adolescence in Okinawa

Economical Gaps

When Okinawan Kibei Nisei elderly reminisce and talk about their memories of their childhood and adolescence, they plot stories relating to the poor socio-economic environment in Okinawa. When they lived in Okinawa, Okinawans experienced scarcity of food and a growing population. Its economic conditions contrasted sharply with mainland Japan because it had been only a few decades after Okinawa's annexation by Imperial Japan in 1879. The Kibei's memories of life in Okinawa are often told in contrast to memories of a more developed life in Hawai‘i. Ryuji Nakamura had spent ten years in Hawai‘i before he left for Okinawa and he could notice the huge differences between life in Okinawa and one in Hawai‘i. He states,

The one thing that I could not stand was toilets in Okinawa. You know in these days, people in Okinawa kept pigs at home and they used the bathroom in the next room in which the pigs were kept so that pigs can eat our excrement. I could not use the bathroom in Okinawa. I just couldn’t. So I had to go to the public restroom in the newly built train station. That was the only flush toilet restroom that I could find. So every morning I woke up early in order to use the flush toilet.

Those who went to Okinawa after living in more developed places in Hawai‘i took more time to adjust to the way of life in Okinawa.

Yasuko Arakaki was sent to Okinawa in 1921 after spending her first six years in Hawai‘i. She recalls that she told her friends in Okinawa about how good it was to live in Hawai‘i. Since she was in Hawai‘i until she was six, she understood the huge economic gap between Okinawa and Hawai‘i. She recalls,

I remember when I was in Hawai‘i before I went to Okinawa, our family had a dog. Because our dog house was located far away from our house, we had to bring food for our dog. I remember we rode a horse to go there to feed our dog. When I went to Okinawa, I explained to people in Okinawa that in Hawai‘i there is even food for dog, and they were so envious about living in Hawai‘i.

Yasuko also explains that when she came back to Hawai‘i in 1928 at the age of thirteen, everyone was so worried about her because she was much smaller than the other girls of the same age in Hawai‘i, and they believed that it was because she grew up in Okinawa without enough food to eat.

Okinawan Kibei Nisei frequently highlighted Okinawans' hard work and wisdom in dealing with poverty. Toru Adaniya talked about how he felt when he returned to Hawai‘i in 1947 after spending twelve years in Okinawa.

Economical differences, even at my age, I recognized that. You want to know what the first thing that I enjoyed when I came here was when they gave me ice cream. That was the first time I tasted it. We did not have ice cream in Okinawa. No such thing. Another thing is that we did not even have a refrigerator those days in Okinawa. Do you know how we preserved the meat?...They used to use salt. We put meat in kame [vase], what they called...we put meat in Kame with lots of salt...that’s how they used to
preserved it. Us guys were poor family. For special occasions like New Year, my mother picked up the meat and cooked them for us but not that often. Even the rice, when we don't have enough to go around for everyday, they used to chop potato mixed with rice and cook so that everyone got chance to eat. Eating pure rice was luxury. When I came to America, you get everything you want to, rice, meat, and all the meat were found in fridges. But the first thing that I enjoyed was ice cream because I had never tasted it. I recall that now.

In their references to the dire poverty, they often evaluated their unique experience of living there as something that continues to give them strength to manage and overcome difficulties in life. Yasuko Arakaki believes that the hardship of adjusting to a new life in Hawai‘i and building relationships with family from whom she had been separated from a long time, was not as hard as what she experienced in Okinawa. She says that “because I had the most difficult time in my life in Okinawa,” she felt that she could do anything afterward. The following words from Toru Adaniya also send the same message.

See, in a way, I feel I am very fortunate to have lived in both countries in different situations. Because in Okinawa, when I really think about it today, you know, as a child who grew up over there. Compared to over here life, it is really “third-world-country” life. You know, sanitation was so bad...you guys still young, you never understand it. All the third world life styles that I lived in, compared to life in Hawai‘i. I feel that we all have taken it for granted so much. I tend to tell my kids, “hey, you guys, in those days, we did not have this and that.” You know my kids’ comments, huh? They say, “those are your days, dad.” In certain way, I feel that I am really conservative because of the experiences I had in Okinawa.

Despite the comfort and plenty they experienced in Hawai‘i, almost all of the Okinawan Kibei Nisei I interviewed talked about missing Okinawan culture. One person said, “I kinda missed Okinawan things. Like New Year time, we go from relatives to relatives. We did Sumo with all the kids in my village.” They looked back on the difficulties that they had in Okinawa and contrasted it with the life in Hawai‘i. For the elderly Okinawan Kibei Nisei, the representation of “those days in Okinawa” are not just a description of what they experienced back then, but also of what they lost. Stories of their memories of their childhood in Okinawa often brought out what Kinoshita calls “emotional spurts of nostalgia and sentimentalism” (2002:18).

**School Life: becoming “Japanese”**

Okinawan Kibei Nisei were educated in Okinawa in the 1920s and 1930s, when the goal of cultural assimilation policies was to transform Okinawans into Japanese subjects. The experience of linguistic assimilation policies greatly influenced their speech, which became an important trait distinguishing them from Hawai‘i-raised Nisei. When the Okinawan Kibei Nisei I interviewed recall school life in Okinawa, most mention the hoogen fuda (dialect disgrace tag) policy to describe their experiences at school in Okinawa. Hoogen fuda were made for every classroom and students caught speaking Okinawan dialect had to wear it around their necks. Teachers handed over the tag to a first student and he/she would pass it on to other students who were caught speaking in Okinawan dialect. This method of language enforcement suppressed Okinawan culture and dialects and made Okinawans ashamed of their roots. The notorious hoogen fuda continued to be used in Okinawan schools even after the war until the mid 1960s (Arasaki 2000:71).

Okinawan Kibei Nisei explain that they had to follow the hoogen fuda policy as one of the strict school rules without question. During the interviews, when reflecting on their educational experiences, they emphasize the institutional discrimination against Okinawans. In telling stories of the linguistic assimilation policy, they emphasize the importance of maintaining the Okinawan dialect. The following comment by Toru Adaniya is a typical one.

They (teachers) asked us to speak “Japanese.” No hoogen [dialect]. They must have come from Japanese government. They made sure that Okinawans were more Japanese-oriented. That’s why when I visited Okinawa a couple years ago, I found out that younger generation does not speak hoogen. I was kinda sad because you are losing Okinawan culture. So I encouraged the government to revive it. You just cannot lose Okinawan culture. It’s just like Hawaiian. It is something that you should not just forget about.

Upon returning to Hawai‘i, however, Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s Japanese education in Okinawa was seen as something valued Issei. In Hawai‘i, having their children receive a Japanese education was the desire of many Issei parents. Okinawan immigrant parents were especially active in their children’s education; in fact, they sent their children to Japanese schools in Hawai‘i, which were available even around plantations. Attending Japanese language school for a few hours after regular public school was not enough for Nisei to become fluent in the standard Japanese. Thus, they became more familiar with pidgin-style Japanese and English.

Interestingly, some Okinawan Kibei Nisei interpret their experiences of linguistic assimilation in Okinawa as something that later influenced their attitudes toward the discrimination perpetuated against Okinawans. The story of Tomic Kaneshiro, who spent fifteen years in Okinawa, exemplifies this.
Ironically, Okinawan Kibei Nisei were more fluent in Japanese than most other Nisei in Hawai‘i. The experience of linguistic assimilation policies greatly influenced their speech, which became an important way to distinguish themselves from Hawai‘i-raised Nisei. With the ability to speak standard Japanese, they were more immune to discrimination perpetuated against other Okinawans in Hawai‘i. While the language enforcement policy in Japan was discriminatory, Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s proficiency in Japanese ended up protecting them in Hawai‘i.

At the tuna company in Hawai‘i where I used to work, there were many people from Hiroshima and Kagoshima. These issei looked down on workers from Okinawa looking at the tattoos on their hands. They purposely teased Okinawans by giving extra work. And they often said to the Okinawan workers, “Why don’t they understand Japanese?” Then, I could come up to them and said to them that “You know because you are not speaking the standard Japanese. Even though you are younger than them, why can’t you speak the standard Japanese?” And I continued to explain that Okinawans can read better than Naichi do. For example, while Naichi can only read it as Miyashiro, Okinawans can read it as Miyashiro, Miyagusuku and Miyagi. After I told them, they looked at me with their eyes wide open. Then they asked me, “You do not sound like Okinawan. You are not Okinawan, where are you from?” Then I said proudly to them, I am Okinawan! That’s how I interact with Naichi people after I came back to Hawai‘i.

Even though the Okinawan dialect was prohibited in schools, Okinawan Kibei Nisei were able to learn it from families and friends at home. Tomie Kaneshiro explained that institutional assimilation did not control the full use of Okinawan dialect on the island.

As I recall now, we spoke Okinawan dialect all the time. Only at school, we could not. I had a very difficult time speaking only standard Japanese at school. Sometimes I could not express hundred percent what I wanted to say. Our school textbooks were written in the standard Japanese, so we had to learn and spoke the standard Japanese. But when I came back to my house, I spoke Okinawan dialect with my family. At school, if I spoke a single word of Okinawan dialect, and if somebody caught me, I had to do all the clean up the classroom…I always wondered why the people of Okinawa could not speak their own language.

For the Okinawan Kibei Nisei who spent their youth in Okinawa, Uchinaaguchi, or the Okinawan dialect, was their first language. When they returned to Hawai‘i, they had very few peers with whom to speak their first language. As Ishihara (2004:152) points out that because Okinawans faced discrimination from other Japanese in Hawai‘i, they wanted their children to speak Japanese in order to live successfully in the large Japanese community. The first generation of Okinawa, therefore, did not talk to their children in the Okinawan dialect. They did not feel obligated to teach the Okinawan dialect. As a result, many Nisei lost their native tongue.

Whenever Okinawan Kibei Nisei met someone who spoke Uchinaaguchi, they became fast friends. Akio Maeshiro, who was sent to Okinawa in 1916 for eighteen years, states that “speaking Uchinaaguchi is still the language that I feel comfortable the most speaking with, and Japanese second, and English last.” Clearly, being able to speak the Okinawan dialect is one of the distinctive traits of the Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i’s Okinawan community. Today, because of the gradual increase in interest in Okinawan cultural and linguistic practices, the Okinawan Kibei Nisei have become recognized a source of culture of Okinawa. Okinawan dialect also worked to build a bridge between the Kibei Nisei and new immigrants who came after the war, such as war brides, because they were also fluently speaking Okinawan dialects. In relation to today’s need to preserve their Okinawan language, they highly value their experiences of having acquired the Okinawan language during their stay in Okinawa.

**Dual Forms of Prejudice and Discrimination Upon Returning to Hawai‘i**

What Okinawan Kibei Nisei also shared was their marginalization from Nisei peers and even from their own families. Most of the interviewees returned and reunited with their family in Hawai‘i. However, not everybody got along with family members and Nisei peers whom they had not seen for years—some as long as two decades. Shinsuke Teruya, who was sent to Okinawa at his age of two and stayed there for twelve years until 1939, recalled that “We did not have any common interests and hobbies as Nisei had. My social life was mainly in a small circle of other Kibei men or other new immigrants from Okinawa.” Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i were often called “Japan bobora” One interviewee explained that since the color of the Hawaiian pumpkin is yellowish, the Hawai‘i-raised Nisei called Kibei Nisei “bobora,” a pejorative term used for someone who is “yellow on the outside and yellow on the inside as well.” Nisei, on the other hand, were often described as bananas, “yellow on the outside, white on the inside” implying they had assimilated to mainstream American (white) culture.
Most of the stories about discrimination that Okinawan Kibei Nisei emphasized were of Naichi discriminating against Okinawans in Hawai‘i. Mamoru Takamine, who was sent to Okinawa at the age of two, recalls, "[m]y cousin used to sing and call me a name like Japan bobora, Japan bobora. But I felt better than being teased because of being an Okinawan." Even though Okinawan Kibei Nisei were treated like foreigners because of their Kibei characteristics, they were more hurt when they faced discrimination because of their Okinawan identity.

Upon returning to Hawai‘i, Okinawan Kibei Nisei became aware of discrimination toward Okinawans in Hawai‘i by Naichi. Okinawans in Hawai‘i faced prejudice and discrimination as a "minority group within the Japanese community" because the mainland Japanese considered Okinawans as "non-pure" Japanese (Toyama and Ikeda 1981). Exposed to racism in Hawai‘i, Okinawans denied their identities as Okinawan and felt that "becoming Japanese" was the only way to move ahead (Kaneshiro 2002:81). Many suppressed their native language and cultural practices; sometimes they even "Japanese" their last names in Hawai‘i (Kaneshiro 2002:81).

Uruma Seinenkai: Pre-War Okinawan Kibei Nisei organization in Hawai‘i

Okinawan Kibei Nisei had various places to meet others like themselves. Uruma Seinenkai (Uruma Junior Club), which started in 1933 with approximately thirty Okinawan Kibei Nisei, became a place where Okinawan Kibei Nisei could see themselves as belonging to a group. They discovered other Okinawan Kibei Nisei who had similar experiences of being sent to Okinawa at an early age, growing up in Okinawa, and then returning to Hawai‘i. Upon returning, they became conscious of being displaced. Their marginality became the impetus for the rise of their distinct identity. Shinichi Nagamine, a former club member writes, "we were drawn together like magnets and enjoyed singing, reciting poems, and sharing our dreams and future goals" (2002:16).

Reverend Hōn‘i Tamayose, one of the most influential figures of the first generation of Okinawans, helped the members by letting them use his temple for their club activities. He expressed his expectations about the Kibei Nisei and believed in their potential to build bridges between the first and second generations as well as to change the prevailing status of Okinawans in Hawai‘i. He writes,

Uruma means "sunashima" (sand island). As you know, sand is made of many pieces scattered around and is also very ordinary. It does not taste. That is why when something is valueless, we say that it tastes like sand. However, if we add cement to sand and knead with water, it becomes a hard stone. As you know, nowadays cement and sand are often used in architecture with various purposes. I hope that the members of the Uruma Seinenkai unite together and be strong enough to be like cement and be an essential element in construction of the big building that is society (Uruma Seinenkai 1935:3).

When the club was organized, Okinawans were discriminated against by descendants of mainland Japanese. Okinawan Kibei Nisei club members understood the feelings of shame and embarrassment but recognized their need to change their own and their larger society’s impressions of Okinawans in Hawai‘i. Interacting with the first generation, especially, as well-educated people who had potential to change the lower status of Okinawans in Hawai‘i created new images of Okinawan Kibei Nisei. Shigeru Higa refers to Uruma Seinenkai as "a junior club based on the appreciation of one's ethnic roots" (Uruma Seinenkai 1935:91).

In an attempt to present a new image of Okinawans, the Uruma Seinenkai club members participated in various community activities to devote themselves to introducing Okinawan culture to the people of Hawai‘i. The club activities helped "to keep up the cultural aspect of the club" (Nagamine 2002:17). With their knowledge of both languages and a distinctively Okinawan ethnic cultural awareness, the club members introduced and celebrated Okinawan culture with the intent of fostering appreciation of it. One of the events that the Uruma Seinenkai sponsored was an annual Ryuukyuu sumo tournament, which drew participants from O‘ahu as well as the other islands. The sumo tournament was significant because the process of the Okinawan community working as a whole strengthened the unity among Okinawans beyond their own locality clubs. Uruma Seinenkai laid the groundwork for the future founding of the United Okinawan Association of Hawaii (UOA), which was formed twenty years later in 1951.

The club also sponsored a speech contest in both English and Japanese twice a year. Speakers spoke on topics about the United States-Japan relations, the current status of Hawai‘i, and the development of Okinawa. The speech contest also became significant for the Okinawan community because it showcased the higher education achievements of the second generation Okinawans. For the first time, the Okinawan Kibei Nisei members took a major role in establishing pride among Okinawans in Hawai‘i. They also had lectures on current affairs and cultural topics and invited well-known Okinawan celebri-
ties who visited Honolulu to speak. One of my interviewees, an Okinawan Nisei, who participated in the Uruma Seinenkai, recalls that,

We were happy about the Uruma Seinenkai. In those days, Okinawans were still looked down on by other Japanese. I was so proud of their activities. In those days, few Okinawans were well-educated like them.

Members of Uruma Seinenkai felt responsible for changing society's impressions of Okinawans in Hawai‘i. They were able to develop a “positive marginality,” contributing to change public impressions of Okinawans in Hawai‘i and to producing a distinct but equal identity in the Japanese community. Their education in Okinawa provided them with a better perception of themselves. Okinawan Kibei Nisei’s marginality and distinct identity shifted and developed as their Japanese education in Japan were valued by the Issei.

Conclusion

By presenting life stories of Okinawan Kibei Nisei, this paper has demonstrated how they reframed their status from being politically, economically and historically marginalized to establish a positive foundation for their lives. They used their unique position to bridge the cultural, social, linguistic, and geographical divide within the Japanese, American and Okinawan communities. Their life stories reveal that they experienced cultural consciousness, dissonance, and a sense of responsibility about changing public images of Okinawan in Hawai‘i. I hope this examination of ethnic identity construction of Okinawan Kibei Nisei in Hawai‘i will contribute to studies of other ethnic minority groups, not only in the United States but also in Japan as well. Although this study’s focus is on the Okinawan Kibei Nisei, the process by which they become Kibei Nisei and the influences in their lives that shapes their ethnic identity can be generalized to other ethnic groups as well. The notion of being a minority within a minority and the notion of being bilingual and bicultural do not constitute an exclusively Okinawan Kibei Nisei phenomenon. Korean, Filipinos, Chinese, Vietnamese and other immigrants who were educated in very different cultures and those who were historically marginalized within their community will experience similar identity processes as the Okinawan Kibei Nisei. Their life stories also encourage others to tell their own stories and participate in society.

Note

1. According to the Encyclopedia of Japanese American History (Niiya 2001:133), this expression was taken from the Portuguese word for pumpkin and supposedly came into use after Japanese contract laborers sprinkled pumpkin seeds onto their thatched roofs, causing pumpkins to grow. Portuguese immigrants, who settled in the Kumamoo prefecture, arrived in Japan as early as 1567.

References


Japanese Latin American Internment from an Okinawan Perspective

Wesley Iwao Ueunten

I tell this painful story in remembrance of my family so others will know how devastating this event was for us. Although I was just a young girl at the time, I knew that what happened to us was a grave injustice, and it should never occur again in a civilized world. I hope with all my heart that no group will ever have to undergo such an experience.

—Carmen Higa Mochizuki et al. v. United States of America

Japan had lost the war and so we decided to stay in the U.S. until we could go back to Peru. Peru did not readily let us go back there and when the camps closed and we had to go out and work, my husband and I were already in our 50s and could not speak a word of English. To make matters worse, we had with us a granddaughter who was still a small child. I felt that it would be regrettable to leave this earth without telling the real story of our experiences in struggling with a life that was just better than death. Although I am nearly uneducated and ashamed of my writing, I decided to write things down.

—Kamisato Kami, Ijū uchi de iginuita

People...really lucky people travel smoothly through life, but life is really full of rough waves. My life was really full of rough waves.

—OH-1

As a sansei Okinawan growing up on Kaua‘i, I had few places to turn when I became interested in my Okinawan heritage. At home, we had George Kerr’s History of an Island People (1958), which I read cover to cover. Of course, we had my baban (grandmother). When she was temporarily bedridden after a fall, we would play Okinawan music tapes, and she would move her hands in the unique Okinawan clicking motions. I would try to
mimic her hand movements. Observing my clumsy attempts, my mother suggested that I learn Okinawan dance from the Yamasatos in Kapa'a.

I spent many weekends with Toshio Yamasato (see photo below) learning the dances that he had learned as a young man in Okinawa. Although I did not speak Japanese at the time, I eventually learned that the Yamasatos had come to Hawai'i from Peru via U.S. internment camps. At the time, I thought that it was a strange tale and wondered how it could have happened. Only years later, after I entered the doctoral program in the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of California, Berkeley, did I begin to piece together Yamasato's bizarre story and become involved with the Japanese Peruvian Oral History Project.

The U.S. government illegally uprooted more than 120,000 U.S. citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry in the Pacific Coast states, moving them into internment camps for the duration of World War II, even though there was no military necessity to do so since they did not pose a threat to national security. Very few know, however, that the U.S. government also rounded up 2,264 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry from Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and other Latin American countries and placed them in Department of Justice internment camps. In contrast, the War Relocation Authority (WRA) was responsible for the Japanese American internees. Of the 2,264 interned, approximately 1,800 were from Peru, and an estimated half were Okinawans.

The U.S. government exchanged more than 500 Japanese Latin Americans (JLAs) for its citizens stranded in Japanese territories between 1942 and 1943. The ordeal of the remaining 1,400 JLA internees continued long after the war's end. At the end of the war, the JLAs were told that they were "illegal aliens" and thus had to leave the United States. Between November 1945 and June 1946, the United States deported more than 900 JLAs to war-devastated Japan and Okinawa. With very few exceptions, Peru refused to allow any Japanese back. Three hundred Japanese Peruvians remained in the United States and fought deportation through the courts. It was not until June 1952 that the U.S. government allowed the Japanese Peruvians to begin the process of becoming permanent residents. Many became American citizens.

In 1988, Congress passed the historic Civil Liberties Act (CLA), which acknowledged the wrongs that the United States had committed against the Japanese Americans and provided former internees with $20,000 in redress and an apology letter. However, every JLA who applied for redress under the CLA was turned down, except for those who remained in the United States and obtained retroactive citizenship and those who were born in the camps. The JLA internees were denied redress because they were not citizens or permanent residents at the time of their incarceration.

"Akisamiyo!" Was it not the United States that sponsored their forced relocation across international borders and incarcerated them in Department of Justice camps? The United States even forcibly transported JLAs to Panama to labor in the jungles—a gross violation of human rights. Did the United States not call the JLAs "illegal aliens" and deport most of them to war-devastated Japan and Okinawa?

Deeply disappointed, the JLAs sued the U.S. government to be included in the CLA. Two years later, after a determined effort, a settlement was reached.
The JLA were eligible to receive $5,000 and an apology letter. However, the figure was far short of the $20,000 provided to Japanese Americans, and the apology letter was just a curt memo written on half a sheet of paper and stamped with the president's signature. Although it expressed regret "to those who endured such grave injustice," the apology shifted the responsibility to the past, and therefore excusable irrational behavior, by saying: "We understand that our nation's actions were rooted in racial prejudice and war time hysteria, and we must learn from the past and dedicate ourselves to renewing and strengthening equality, justice and freedom." The letter failed to mention the calculated actions of the U.S. government in kidnapping JLAs from their countries to be used in a hostage exchange.

Japanese and Okinawans in Latin America? Hostage exchange? Illegal JLA aliens? This little-known episode in the American wartime experience is shocking and complex. It took place in Okinawa, Japan, Latin America, North America, and Hawai'i. While engaged in this oral history project, I traveled from Berkeley to Los Angeles, Hawai'i, Peru, Japan, and Okinawa and interviewed people who spoke Okinawan, Hawai'i Creole English, Japanese, Spanish, and English. This essay is an attempt to make sense of this story. I have divided my account into two parts. This first section relates Okinawan immigration to Latin America and immigrant life. In the second, I chronicle the internment and later resettlement. I begin each section with the voices of former Okinawan Latin American internees who give testimony to this strange tale.

Sweet Sugar, Bitter Experiences

The women would sing about how the life of a boshikumaa [hat weaver] who worked day and night was hard... They only got twenty-five sen for a hat. [In the 1920s, fifty sen equaled one week's wages (ESOHP 1981:23-24)]. What can you eat with only that much? Twenty-five sen! Sometimes there were "smart" hat inspectors who would not pay anything if there was even a small dirty spot. That was one week's work. We [children] used to go there to make hats instead of going somewhere to play. It would take us a month to do the same work... Boshikumaa awarinamun, Yuru hiru hatarachi [The life of a hat weaver is one of suffering, working night and day]... It's been eighty years, how can I remember?

—OH-1

In the early 1900s Okinawa was very poor. At that time, my mother already had two children. It must have been at that time that they had a dream to go overseas. I guess it was because their lives weren't too easy. So they left the two children with my grandmother, they were around twenty at the time, and they went to a place called Caiete in Peru as kaitaku imin [Immigrants who open up new lands to farm or ranch].

—OH-2

Japan forcibly annexed Okinawa in 1879 and made it a prefecture. In actuality, Okinawa became a virtual colony of Japan. Top officials in the prefectural government were predominantly from Kagoshima Prefecture (formally known as Satsuma) in Kyushu, the southernmost of the four main islands of Japan. People from Kagoshima and Osaka controlled the economic interests in Okinawa. Further, the Japanese government heavily taxed the new prefecture. In 1882, for example, while the Meiji government collected ¥655,279 from Okinawa, it expended only ¥455,136 on the prefecture (ESOHP 1981:14). Data from 1919 to 1928 show that Okinawa paid ¥68,000,000 in taxes while the Meiji government appropriated only ¥23,000,000 for Okinawa. In other words, the Japanese government pocketed ¥45,000,000. Much of this taxation was done without representation. It was not until 1920, thirty years after the rest of Japan, that Okinawa held its first full-fledged election for representatives to the Japanese Diet (Aniya 1974:423-55).

To make matters worse, sugar became the main cash crop. Okinawans raised sugarcane to obtain cash to buy food from the mainland. In other words, Okinawans produced what they did not consume and consumed what they did not produce. When sugar prices in Japan fell in the 1920s, Okinawans suffered greatly. As a last resort, Okinawans were forced to consume sotetsu (the poisonous sago palm), and many died of eating improperly prepared palm.

Okinawans refer to this time of food shortages as "sotetsu jikoku" (sotetsu hell). By 1897, Japan had become a food-importing nation. Earnings from industrial exports paid for food imports. Although the Japanese government adopted a policy of sanyo rikokoku (founding the nation on industry) as the population increased, it did not relieve overpopulation in rural areas of mainland Japan. Industrialization had a negligible effect on Okinawa, which was far from the economic center of Japan (Tigner 1954:11-12).

In 1881, the population of the island of Okinawa was 150,000, or 114 persons per square kilometer. By 1914, the population rose to 396,000. In 1940, the population stood at 475,766, or 339 persons per square kilometer. In the same year, the population density of Japan proper was 204 persons per square kilometer (Tigner 1954:12).
I often wondered about the irony of the link between sweet sugar and bitter immigrant experiences. Many of the friends with whom I grew up in Hawai’i were from countries that raised sugarcane or had parents or grandparents from such countries. It seems strange that the production of white sugar involves the labor of so many brown-skinned people in and from such far-flung places as Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, Hawai’i, Peru, Japan, Okinawa, China, Korea, and Portugal. The Cuban writer Fernando Ortiz wrote in 1947:

> The sugar industry...because of its exotic origin, its European antecedents, and the foreign capital invested in it, is economically centrifugal. It came to the country from abroad; it is the trader in it for foreign consumption who attempts to establish himself in Cuba and encourages its cheap production here; but those in control are not Cubans and the profits are reaped far from here (Ortiz [1947] 1995:69).

The international sugar industry was just one aspect of the world economy that had already begun developing when Okinawan immigration began. Cheap sources of labor have always been a prerequisite for the expansion of this global economy, and the excess population in Japan and Okinawa was one such source. But, even before Japanese and Okinawan immigration commenced, large numbers of Chinese immigrated to Hawai’i, the mainland United States, and Latin America. James L. Tigner writes in *The Okinawans in Latin America*:

> From the time of their independence, early in the nineteenth century, up to the 1920s the general policy of Latin American countries was to foster immigration. The demand for workers in agriculture was unceasing and special efforts were made to attract Asiatic immigrants. The abolition of the African slave trade gave rise to the Chinese coolie traffic and its attendant evils... Between 1849 and 1874 some 87,343 coolies entered Peru to work on coastal sugar plantations, in the guano deposits, and on railroad construction projects (Tigner 1954:5).

Japanese immigration to Latin America started in 1899. By then, Chinese immigration to Latin America had declined steeply because of rising immigration restrictions. After the Sino-Japanese War ended in 1895, Latin Americans became aware of differences between Asians and began encouraging Japanese to immigrate, believing that they might be better workers than the Chinese (Tigner 1954:5).

Okinawan immigration to Latin America began in 1903 with laborers entering Mexico. Okinawan immigrants first went to Peru in 1906 to work in the sugar industry. Between 1906 and 1941, approximately ten thousand Okinawans entered Peru, where they constituted at least one-third of the Japanese population (Tigner 1954:5).

**Racism and Immigration**

Grandfather had an uncle in Hawai’i. He wanted to go to Hawai’i, but because of anti-immigration laws, he had to come to Peru with his uncle and someone from his hometown.

—OH-3

Mother wasn’t able to get into the United States because of the 1924 Exclusion Law, and that’s why they lived in Mexico.

—OH-5

I always wondered why there were so many Japanese in Latin America and why, among JLA communities, Okinawans were numerically prominent. Why are there so many more Okinawans in Latin America than in the United States? Why does it seem that many Okinawans in Hawai’i also seem to have many more relatives in Latin America?

Okinawan overseas immigration began in 1900, and anti-Japanese immigration restrictions in the United States were launched with the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1908. Actually, the Gentlemen’s Agreement was part of a series of measures that restricted Japanese immigration to other white countries: the Immigration Limitation Law of 1901 in Australia, the Lemieux Agreement of 1907 in Canada, and prohibitions on the entry and permanent settlement of Japanese in South Africa from 1913. Complete exclusion of Asians from the United States took place in 1924 with the Exclusion Act.

Soon after Okinawan immigration started, it became more and more difficult for Japanese to enter the United States and other mostly English-speaking countries. Latin American countries still welcomed Japanese immigrants, however, and thus became a destination for Okinawans who left in great numbers to relieve the overpopulated prefecture (Tigner 1954). Between 1899 and 1940, approximately thirty-one thousand immigrants left Okinawa.

**Latin American Dream**

In the beginning they were at a sugarcane plantation in the country under contract, but even in Okinawa sugarcane work—no like eh! At night, they went along the coast and ran away to Lima, where they heard that there was someone from Haneji. They had instructions about where to go in Lima. They were greenhorn immigrants and only had one month’s—or was it one
year's—pay, and they ran away. About five or six of them. They went along the coast and slept where they could at night. I wonder if there weren't any habu [poisonous snakes]? [Laughs.] In Okinawa, everyone asks about habu when you talk about sleeping outdoors. Once at night a seabird flapped its wings, and they all shook from fear that someone was coming. I heard all kinds of stories.

—OH-I

Father had never done farmwork in Okinawa. He first went to do farm labor but ran away since he wasn’t used to it. He and some others crossed the desert and escaped to Lima. In Lima he worked for others and later met mother. He also eventually started his own coffee shop.

—OH-6

When I visited Peru in March 1999, I attended a memorial service for the Japanese immigrants who died in Cafiete. With a few hundred other people, I got aboard one of the four or five buses that left the Japanese Cultural Center in Lima. The bus passed through congested streets and horrible slums and along the dry and dusty coastal region. The bus driver drove at breakneck speed trying to catch up with the other buses, which had left ahead of us. He drove up and down the countless rolling hills that towered between Lima and Cafiete. We reached Cafiete, a small agricultural town near the ocean, more than two hours later.

The long drive to Cafiete exhausted me, but I could not even begin to imagine what it would be to walk the distance or what the conditions were that forced people to walk that distance. What would drive people even to attempt such a trek? Less than ten months after the first group of 790 emigrants from Japan reached Callao on 3 April 1900, 124 workers had perished from disease, principally beri-beri and malaria. They were also victims of physical attacks from the native Peruvians and were not given the wages that they had expected. As Tigner points out, “The root of the problem then was that the Peruvian plantation owners sustained their enterprises by using natives as virtual slaves. Having had long experience with slave labor, they were not prepared to deal with workers in a civilized manner” (Tigner 1954:584). Within a few years of their arrival, many Japanese and Okinawans had made their way to the urban centers of Lima and Callao, where they became small business owners. By 1910, there were about 800 Japanese in Lima and 150 in Callao. The Japanese consul-general reported that there were 67 barbers, 77 small traders, 68 restaurant operators, 45 grocers, 74 carpenters, 19 coal and charcoal vendors, and 40 factory workers. Others were employed as domestics, restaurant waiters, masons, road repairmen, gardeners, fishermen, dairymen, and laundrymen (Tigner 1954:591). By 1940, about 80 percent of the Japanese in Peru were living in the Lima-Callao area. In the same year, there were 17,598 Japanese in Peru, and they represented 28.08 percent of the foreign-born population (Gardiner 1981:5).

A review of the membership of Japanese business associations in Lima in 1938 shows that Okinawans operated a majority of the small businesses (see Table 1).

Lima was a *subarashii* [wonderful] place. I was happy to be there. My brother, who was already there and called us over, was a regular wage worker. He did a lot of jobs. He had three children and later returned to Okinawa after the war.

—OH-7

Table 1
Japanese and Okinawan Merchants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merchants Association</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nachiijin</th>
<th>Okinawans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Merchants Assn.</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Bazaar Owners Assn.</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Barbers Assn.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Café Owners Assn.</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Charcoal Dealers Assn.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Build. Contract. Assn.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Hotel Owners Assn.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Restaurant Owners Assn.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Importers Assn.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Bakery Owners Assn.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Jewelers Assn.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Chauffeurs Assn.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Peddlers Assn.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Tigner (1954:592).*
My father was one who liked to stand out. That's why he became the president of the Okinawan kenjinkai [prefectural organization]. He also rode horses—not to compete in horse races, but to be in shows. He once rode in front of the president. He used to take his hat off and do all kinds of things. That's why his name was well-known. He had a horse saddle and a poncho with four corners. He rode the horses in a figure 8 and did all kinds of performances before the president. So that's why he was well-known in the community.

After initial years of considerable hardship, the Japanese and Okinawans in Peru began to fill a niche in Peruvian society as small business owners. They enjoyed a relatively high socioeconomic status and employed local Peruvians, many of whom were from the indigenous population. The lives of many, if not most, were far better than those of their counterparts in Japan, especially in Okinawa. Many had maids, attended good schools, enjoyed sports, and hobnobbed with influential Peruvians. It was a dream come true for many Okinawans.

Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Just at that time, in March of 1940, there suddenly was a riot. Three such incidents happened when I was in Peru. The first two were only domestic political incidents, and no foreigners suffered damages. The third riot was a riot directed only at Japanese, and almost all the Japanese shops were all destroyed. The victims stayed in the Japanese school, and many went back to Japan. When the riot was starting, the neighbors came out and said, "If you destroy this shop, where are you going to get your bread tomorrow?" Because of that our shop escaped damage, but our home was badly damaged.

I remember that very well. We had the big store, and people were throwing stones. We had to shut the store. We ran away because they were breaking the door. We had to go up on the roof. My sister-in-law was pregnant, and we had to push her up. They looted everything we had.

Rioters were mainly students at the beginning and later everybody else—rioting lasted for more than one day. I had brought a futon from Okinawa. I was scolded for bringing the futon since I could have bought one there. There was an incident when houses were destroyed. The futon that I brought, and our radio, was taken away. We had a steel door. We thought we had locked it, but they took everything away.

The dream would not continue undisturbed. In March 1940, an anti-Japanese riot in Lima and Callao resulted in the destruction of almost all Japanese businesses and many homes. The riot forced many to seek refuge in the main Japanese school in Lima. After the experience, many returned to Okinawa and Japan. The riot started after a Peruvian woman who worked as a maid for the leader of the Japanese Barbers Union died after sustaining injuries during a scuffle between her employer and men from a rival faction in the Japanese community. Tabloid sensationalism fanned anti-foreign and anti-Japanese sentiment that had developed as the Japanese became more and more successful as small businessmen and as Japan became a military threat in the Far East.

After the riot... the people in Peru have their own religious beliefs. In Okinawa we would call them "yuta" [shaman]. Someone wearing white clothes said that it was wrong to attack the Japanese. If that person hadn't said that, things would have been worse.... That person was like a yuta.

A few weeks after the riot, a strong earthquake rocked Peru. Many Peruvians believed that the earthquake was punishment from God for attacking the Japanese. It is interesting that the religious beliefs of the Peruvians came in conflict with their anti-Japanese sentiments and actions, whereas, in many other ethnic and racial conflicts, religion is often used to justify grievous thoughts and deeds against fellow human beings.

The fact that religious beliefs clashed with anti-Japanese sentiments likely reflects complex social relations in Peru. While there was a white elite that controlled the economy and politics, whites were greatly outnumbered by mestizos (people of mixed parentage: white and indigenous) and indigenous people. Peru was also home to many Europeans. Further, as mentioned earlier, there was a large population of Chinese who had immigrated before the Japanese as well as a sizable population of African descent. Each of these groups probably had different attitudes toward and relations with the Japanese, and anti-Japanese sentiment was by no means uniform.
Nonetheless, the riot did cause widespread physical damage and psychological stress within the Japanese community in Peru. At the same time, it raised many questions. Did it happen mainly because the Japanese were economically successful and Japan was becoming a military threat? Or was it also tied to racist ideologies such as white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and “Yellow Peril” fear that were prevalent in the United States at the time?

This last question is especially serious because it brings into focus the relationship between the United States and Latin America. The United States has long had a strong presence in Latin America. It has taken much natural wealth from Latin America, but did it also export its racial ideologies?

Describing how American anti-Japanese racism found inspiration in Peruvian anti-Japanese racism, Harvey Gardiner relates how J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, readily believed Raul Haya de la Torre from the out-of-favor Alianza Popular Revolucionariá Americana. De la Torre asserted that all Japanese had served in the Japanese army, many as officers, and that there were few Japanese women in Peru. Hoover was gullible enough to believe de la Torre’s claim that Peru’s Japanese population was mainly male and could take up arms against Peru and the United States at a moment’s notice (Gardiner 1981:10).

James Tigner writes that the eminent Peruvian historian and sociologist Francisco García Calderón viewed Japanese immigrants as an “emissary of imperialism,” the advanced guard of Japanese military aggression. Calderón was responding to Marquis Okuma Shigenobu’s remark that “South America was comprised in a sphere of influence to which the Japanese Empire might legitimately pretend, and that persevering emigrants there might build up a new Japan” (Tigner 1954:23). Okuma founded Waseda University.

Calderón’s view of Japanese immigrants as the vanguard of Japan’s military seems to echo a 1921 FBI report about Japanese in Hawai’i following the 1920 sugar strike by Japanese and Filipino workers (in which many Okinawans were involved). The bureau surmised that “Japan’s program for world supremacy” began with the “peaceful invasion” of Japanese migrants into California (Okhiro 1994:136).

The 1920 sugar strike had great repercussions, not only in Hawai’i, but also in the rest of the United States. The strike spurred sugar plantation owners in Hawai’i to make a trip to Washington, D.C., to try to convince a congressional committee to revise the Chinese Exclusion Act to allow the importation of Chinese to Hawai’i. The Hawaiian planters believed that the influx of Chinese would curb the threat posed by the large Japanese presence in Hawai’i. At the congressional hearings, members of the Hawaiian delegation tried to play on American fears of the Japanese threat to make their case. In the end, their bid to revise the Chinese Exclusion Act failed. However, they did succeed in heightening white fears of a Japanese conspiracy. Senator James Phelan, a strongly anti-Japanese senator from California who was present at the hearings, came away with a new campaign slogan to replace “Keep California White”—“Keep California from Going the Way of Hawai.” The Hearst newspaper chain ran a six-part series in 1921 in the Los Angeles Examiner with the headlines “Jap Menace Lies Black on Pacific!” The article declared that “Hawaii is a menacing outpost of Japan ruled invisibly by a carefully organized government that functions noiselessly and whose mainspring is in Tokio” (Duus 1999:238). In 1925, Genaro Arbaiza, a Peruvian journalist, declared in the Current History Magazine that “Japanese immigration in Peru has grown and prospered much faster. It is well organized, systematical and has the Tokio Government behind it” (Arbaiza 1925:738). Arbaiza’s words are uncannily similar to the Examiner’s.

The Other Japanese

When I went to Peru in 1937, Okinawan immigrants were still being ridiculed. There was the term “otro japones.” “Japones” means Japanese in Spanish, and “otro” means “other.” “Otro japones” meant that Okinawans were not “pure Japanese.”... The Japanese mainlanders were saying [to the Peruvians] that “those Okinawans are ‘other Japanese.’” They meant that Okinawans were not real Japanese.

—Nomura Kōya, “Uchinanchu no seikatsu.”

The notion of Okinawa as part of the Japanese “nation” is so natural that we rarely question it. However, to incorporate Okinawans into Japan, the Meiji leaders had to abolish symbols of Okinawa’s past and replace them with Japanese symbols. George Kerr describes the events that took place on 30 March 1879 when Japan physically, officially, and forcibly deposed the last king of the Ryukyuan kingdom: “This was a most poignant and dramatic moment. Great crowds waited, tense and silent, as Sho Tai and his household passed from the castle grounds through the Kokugaku-mon (Gate of National Learning) into exile. This was the symbolic break with the past. For the first time in five hundred years the palace ceased to be the seat of authority and the symbol of nationhood. It was immediately occupied by Japanese troops from the Kumamoto Garrison” (Kerr 1958:382).
The Japanese emperor became the new symbol to which Okinawans were expected to give their allegiance. Japanese government efforts to incorporate Okinawa into the Japanese Empire was backed by brute force and by legions of government officials and merchants. Japan’s efficient education system indoctrinated Okinawan schoolchildren in the ways of emperor worship. Although it was slow in implementing other reforms in Okinawa, the Japanese government put great effort into the education system. As a result, by the turn of the century, the vast majority of school-age children attended public schools. The Japanese government may have intended to improve the lot of Okinawans, but the education system was also a means by which to create loyal subjects. Okinawan children learned that their native tongue and culture were barbaric and backward, not fitting for subjects of the emperor. Thus began the stigmatization of the Okinawan identity.

The tragic consequences of this stigmatization would be realized over and over again in the lives of Okinawans both in Okinawa and in the Okinawan diaspora. The development of global capitalism led to the movement of large numbers of Japanese and Okinawans throughout the world. Racism against Asians in the United States diverted the flow of Japanese and Okinawan immigrants to Latin America. Racism with ties to U.S. capitalism also adversely affected the lives of Japanese and Okinawans, especially those in Peru. In the background of the Okinawan immigrant experience was Japan’s annexation of Okinawa. Within the framework of imperialism and nationalism, the Japanese government carried out a policy of suppressing the Okinawan language, culture, and identity. Capitalism, racism, imperialism, and nationalism affected not only the lives of the Okinawan Latin American internees, but also how the Okinawan Latin American internees negotiated with and resisted these “isms.”

**Hostages: Lista Negra**

Grandfather wondered why he was on the *lista negra* [black list]. He thought maybe because he had traveled back to Okinawa.... Grandfather did not know he was on the *lista negra*. He had gone fishing with his friends, and when he came back, he was caught by police who were waiting for him at the entrance of the home. They took him to the police station.... After they took grandfather, no one sold flour to us. We had to close the bakery.

Father was detained in 1943. He did not know he was on the black list. I was asked by detectives if my father was the president of the Japanese Association. I remember answering yes. They were men with guns. It was around lunch, and there were many customers. My father was in the kitchen. Without saying a word they put him in a car. My oldest sister prepared my father’s clothes and some food, but he said later that he never received anything. He probably thought his family was cold.

>*—OH-3*

It must have been from 1943 that detectives were trying to arrest him. He was on the run for one year. [He fled] because he felt he hadn’t done anything wrong. We went to Crystal City in 1944, so that means he was on the run for a year. But during that time he was told by the government that if he didn’t come out of hiding, he would be put in jail for the rest of his life and wouldn’t be allowed to meet his family. That’s why he came out of hiding. He was forcibly deported as soon as he came out.

>*—OH-2*

The United States needed hostages to trade for Americans trapped in Japanese territories. Michi Weglyn wrote that the government perceived a need to create a hostage reserve to counter the Japanese threat of “rampaging hordes of yellow ‘barbarians’ overrunning and making ‘free fire zones’ of American villages and hamlets—looting, raping, murdering, slaughtering.” The government later changed its policy toward building up a “barter reserve” that was “sizable enough to allow for the earliest possible repatriation of American detainees, even at the price of a disproportionate number of Japanese nationals in exchange” (Weglyn 1976:54–56).

The U.S. plan fit well with the Peruvian government’s desire to rid the country of the economically successful Japanese. Henry Norweb, the U.S. ambassador to Peru, informed the State Department of Peruvian president Manuel Prado’s desire to cleanse his country of Japanese: “The second matter in which the President [Prado] is very much interested is the possibility of getting rid of the Japanese in Peru. We would like to settle this problem permanently, which means that he is thinking in terms of repatriating thousands of Japanese” (Weglyn 1976:60). The forcible detention of men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry from Peru was a convenience for both governments. The United States saw the Japanese in Peru as hostages and bodies to be bartered, while Peru saw them as stains on its national fabric. Further, both governments had together spun a web of racial hatred toward Japanese to justify their actions.

**Coming to America**

[The immigration workers] came around and sprayed us, “Shu-shu, shushu.” It was some kind of medicine. They thought we had lice or something....
We were completely naked, you! Okinawan women never ever completely undress. We were so surprised. When you're a child, you may be completely naked even without thinking about it, but as you get older, you naturally try to hide yourself with a towel.

—OH-1

The JLA internees traveled to the United States via different routes. The men who were arrested early were first sent to Panama and put to work in labor camps. Working conditions were especially terrible. Most of the men had been in business for many years and were not used to manual labor. There are even reports of men going insane. Most of the women and children who arrived later to join the men traveled through the Panama Canal and entered the United States through New Orleans.

The first welcome was shocking and humiliating. Women and children were herded into one large shower room, where they were made to shower and then sprayed with insecticide (which many say was DDT).

Camp Life

While the internment-camp experience was psychologically stressful for JLA, many of the interviewees remember camp life as physically comfortable. The JLA, along with German and Italian Latin Americans, stayed in Department of Justice camps, not the WRA camps in which most Japanese Americans internees were confined. Because the U.S. government considered the JLA and German and Italian Latin Americans as potential hostages to be used in exchange for Americans in enemy territory, they were treated relatively well. The camp administrators provided private dwellings, adequate food, recreation, and entertainment. The residents of the Crystal City Camp in Texas prepared their own meals in their own living quarters and were able to set up a Japanese school for their children, a situation unheard of in the WRA camps. The camp also allowed residents to put on Japanese plays and musical performances.

Nakasone Katsujirō, a well-known sanshin master from Peru, gave instruction while in Crystal City. What is interesting is that there seemed to have been many sanshins in the camps. One interviewee said that they had a very "nice" sanshin and speculated that the instruments were brought over from Peru. But, given that the internees were allowed to bring only a limited amount of luggage, it is more likely that many of the instruments were made in the camps. One interviewee spoke of her husband carving a sanshin with a knife in the single men's camp before joining his family in Crystal City. He made the strings out of the heavy thread used for sewing on buttons. Men often fashioned a sound box from a discarded tin can, much like the kankara sanshin that was constructed from cast-off tin cans in Okinawa in the aftermath of the war. The existence of sanshin and the fact that Okinawan music was played is indicative of the Okinawans' love of their music. One interviewee recalls, "They got together. It was their kinagusame [recreation]. Some people would dance and the others would play." On the other hand, I learned from other interviewees that Okinawan music was not performed in public at the Crystal City Camp, that it was usually just done in private at home.

The private performance of Okinawan music relates to the ambiguous position of Okinawa and Okinawans within the Japanese nation. Okinawans carried the stigma of being different, where different meant "inferior." Officially, Okinawans were equal to other Japanese, but this official status did not protect them from discrimination. To escape discrimination, many Okinawans changed their names to make them sound more Japanese. For example, names such as Kanagusuku, Naagusuku, Nakandakari, and Jitchaku were changed to Kaneshiro (or Kinjo), Miyashiro (or Miyagi), Nakamura, and Serikaku, respectively. Okinawans also refrained from speaking to their children in their mother tongue. Some of the Okinawan Peruvian interviewees mentioned that their parents spoke Spanish at home. They could not speak Japanese well and did not want their children to learn Okinawan.

The sad truth, however, was that Okinawans were under pressure to escape discrimination and display their loyalty to Japan. During the Battle of Okinawa, countless Okinawans killed themselves or let themselves be killed in the name of the emperor rather than surrender to the Americans. After the war's end, katta gumi (we won faction) or kachi gumi (winning faction), factions of Japanese who refused to believe that Japan had lost, sprang up in overseas Japanese communities. In Peru, one such group, the Shindo Renmei, was predominantly Okinawan.

Coming Home?

In the camp, there were many people who believed that Japan had won. There were some who knew Japan had lost. We didn't know which side to believe, so we decided to go back and find out.

—OH-10

Most of the people believed that Japan was shinkoku [the land of gods], and so they didn't believe Japan could lose. Until they got off the ship at Uraga,
no one could understand why there were American MPs aboard since they didn’t believe Japan had lost. The kachi gumi was the majority.

We were going to get off the ship in our Boy Scout uniforms. We were going to march off the ship and walk through the city. But that was canceled when we found out Japan had lost.

For the issei it was nostalgic. But for us who were born in Peru and never saw Mt. Fuji before—we had only seen it in pictures—it wasn’t really nostalgic.

At the end of the war, the Justice Department informed the JLA internees that they had to leave the United States because they were illegal aliens. Aside from a very few exceptions, most of the Japanese Peruvians could not return to Peru. Peru refused them reentry. About three hundred JLAs remained in the United States and fought deportation. The large majority, however, returned to Japan and Okinawa, refusing to believe that they were returning to a defeated nation. Probably many more would have stayed in the United States had they not so adamantly believed that Japan had won the war and realized that there was little to go back to.

Another group of JLAs, including many Okinawans, was repatriated to Japan in exchange for Americans in Japanese territories. These Okinawans suffered through the Battle of Okinawa, and many who were lucky enough to survive subsequently died from malaria or malnutrition during the months immediately after the war’s end. Serei Kyoko, one of the many Okinawans who was exchanged during the war, expressed her losses in her 1995 autobiography Watashi no ayunda hansei (Reflections of my journey): “I lost my husband in the war and my child died of sickness. Why did I have to suffer such a fate? How much did the gods hate me?” (Serei 1995:24).

Facing Deportation and Discrimination

[Seabrook, New Jersey] was very cold. We had nothing. It was miserable. Everything was given to us in the camp.... It was a rude awakening actually. It was cold. We had a potbellied stove, and the housing was like bungalows, so they didn’t keep the warmth, and we didn’t have a bathroom inside.... And my parents worked in two shifts. My father worked the day shift and my mother the night shift. They alternated.

When I was in high school [in Los Angeles], I had a Spanish accent. And being Okinawan [the discrimination] was double. So most of my friends were Latinos because they were much closer to us than the nisei. The nisei people never got close to us at all.

I remember grandma talking about the garment industry.... The people who helped her were Hispanics.... Not the nihonjin [Japanese] from here. They in fact didn’t want to have anything to do with us.

Some may believe that camp life was physically more comfortable for the JLAs than for the Japanese American internees in the WRA camps and that the JLAs therefore had an easier time. I would refrain from such comparisons. Additionally, the internment experience did not end when the gates to the camps were opened and the internees were allowed to leave. It continued as internees tried to pick up the pieces of lives shattered by forcible incarceration and make a new start in a new country.

Many of the JLAs who remained in the United States found employment in New Jersey at the Seabrook Farms food-processing plant. The former internees worked long hours for low wages. Seabrook Farms probably benefited from the JLAs’ insecure status as illegal aliens. Eventually, most of the Okinawans found their way to Los Angeles, where the Peruvian Okinawans ran hotels, apartment buildings, and grocery stores and worked as farmers and gardeners: “Everything they turned their hand to has been successful” (Okinawa Club of America 1988:299-334). Many of the interned Okinawan Peruvians who settled in Los Angeles were also involved in Okinawan music. In 1964, Nakasone Katsujirō held the first postwar Okinawan music recital in Los Angeles.

In the beginning they felt very bitter. I remember once this Italian person who got my father’s bakery store [in Peru] came to the United States to also get our [other] property. My father just wouldn’t do it.... Here we were on skid row in a one-room apartment, and this man was all dressed up and trying to buy my father’s property. That time, yes, I saw how bitter my father was.

The price of whatever success the JLAs were able to achieve came at great cost. Parents in their forties and fifties had to start over, doing menial jobs, and their children, who spoke only Spanish, had to learn English and a new culture. Often, the internees left behind property, other assets, and family.
Some families were scattered across Okinawa, Japan, the United States, and South America.

**Back to Sotetsu Hell**

Even the rice gruel [at the camp in Uraga where the JLAs disembarked] was only a little rice at the bottom, and the rest was just soup. That's why everybody suffered from malnutrition. We even had to eat crayfish. It was the worst. There was nothing. We ate anything.

—OH-11

Meanwhile, JLAs who returned to Okinawa had to start all over again in a country that had been essentially reduced to ashes. Most of the returning JLAs from mainland Japan were able to return to their homes soon after arriving in Japan. For many, however, there was not much to go back to. Many JLAs were from Hiroshima, which had been destroyed by the atomic bomb. The Okinawan Latin Americans were not able to return immediately. Okinawa was occupied by the U.S. military. Many were forced to live in camps near Tokyo, and some remained on the mainland. The U.S. military eventually allowed others to return.

The Okinawans from Latin America who returned experienced the Battle of Okinawa, which raged from April to June 1945 and caused the death of about 170,000 Okinawans, or one-third of the population of Okinawa (Ota 1987:301). Nearly all Okinawa’s cultural treasures, including Shuri Palace, the seat of the former kingdom, were destroyed. Thousands of displaced Okinawans languished in such places as Yaka Camp in central Okinawa. “Yaka bushi,” a song composed after the Battle of Okinawa, expresses the lament of the Okinawan people:

*Nachikashi ya uchinaa*

Ikusha ni nayai

*Unanchu tu tumuni*

Nagasu namida

How sad my Okinawa

a battleground you became

The flowing tears of

the multitudes

Do you know what *sotetsu* is? We ate that. It’s poisonous, so it has to be fermented before you eat it. It tastes terrible.

—OH-11

All we had to eat were sweet potatoes, and the root of the *sotetsu*. It tasted bad. We really had *kuro* [hardships] concerning food.

—OH-2

Okinawa was destroyed by the war. There was nothing. There were only tents. That’s how we started.

—OH-12

We even cooked and ate rats in Okinawa... Yes, [we would even use motor oil to fry food]. The motor oil would not be absorbed by the body and would just come out the way it went in.

—OH-11

With dreams of a modern day Nirai-Kanai, the promised land over the horizon, Okinawans had left the *sotetsu* hell of Okinawa for Latin America. Okinawan Latin Americans, who were placed in U.S. internment camps and then sent back to Okinawa, found themselves back in *sotetsu* hell once again.

**Okinawan Diaspora?**

**Question:** You were taken from Peru by the United States and placed in U.S. internment camps. Then you were deported by the United States to U.S.-occupied Okinawa...

**Reply:** Akirame ga tsuyoidoo ni mo naranaiteikoo shite modoo ni mo naranai [A feeling of wanting to give up was so strong nothing could be done about it even if we resisted, nothing could be done]. In Okinawa after the war we couldn’t relax. At night, American military personnel would come to the villages and rape women. Shimashi was near Ojana, which was near a U.S. base. They would come in the middle of the night. Now one could go to court, but at that time the only thing possible was *nakineiri* [weeping into silence]. There were many such incidents. Many women who are now in their seventies and eighties suffered much.

—OH-13

The Okinawan Latin American story presents another irony. Most of the Okinawan Latin American internees were either sent back to Okinawa on exchange ships during the war or deported after the war. The U.S. government arranged for them to be seized from their homes and transported to the United States, where they were placed in internment camps surrounded by barbed-wire fences. These internees returned to an Okinawa that is to this day occupied by U.S. military bases that are surrounded by barbed-wire fences now meant, not to keep them in, but to keep them from their lands. The U.S. military authorities often expropriated the land for the bases by forcing Okinawans off it at bayonet point. Some displaced landowners were never compensated, and bulldozers leveled houses and cultural treasures (Ota 1987:293).
This irony reflects the Okinawan diaspora. This diaspora is intertwined with the projection of U.S. influence across the Pacific into Asia and across the Rio Grande into Latin America. The diaspora reflects the determination of the Okinawans in the face of the immense power discrepancy between the United States and Okinawa. How can Okinawa, a tiny island in a poor archipelago, and the Okinawan people possibly challenge the United States? Perhaps Okinawans fit into the minority paradigm that Gary Y. Okihiro, an Asian American historian, writes of in *Margins and Mainstreams*:

What I would like to suggest is that the deeper significance of Asians, and indeed of all minorities in America rests in their opposition to the dominant paradigm, their fight against the power, their efforts to transform, and not simply reform, American society and its structures (Okihiro 1994:155).

Okinawans have been part of this challenge to America’s society and history. Okinawans have enlarged the range and deepened the meaning of American democracy (Okihiro 1994:156). A large number of Okinawans participated in the labor struggles in Hawai’i during the first half of the twentieth century. In the homeland, Okinawans have held mass demonstrations, rioted, and struck against the U.S. military bases and unjust U.S. policies during the American occupation (1945–1972). They continue to challenge the continued military presence. Okinawan Latin Americans interned during World War II have been part of this challenge. Carmen Higa Mochizuki, a Latin American nisei, is the named plaintiff in *Carmen Mochizuki v. the United States of America*, a class-action lawsuit that sought redress and an apology for the internment of JLA. Other lawsuits have been initiated by people who opted out of the settlement. Among those is George Shima, who is also an Okinawan Latin American.

In a January 1999 declaration, Mochizuki accepted the terms of the settlement but expressed reservations:

Although my family and others suffered the loss of liberty, freedom and assets as a direct result of the action of the United States of America, we can never be adequately repaid. The United States Government has seen fit to compound the travesty by offering to settle this case for far less than was deemed necessary for others interned under the same conditions. Why would the people, although not citizens of the United States, be entitled to any less? (Mochizuki 1999).

She questions America’s claim to be a leading advocate of freedom, democracy, liberty, and equality in the world.
Population Pressure as a Euphemism
The Rhetoric to Push Okinawan Emigration
Kozy Amemiya

In the 1950s, population pressure and emigration were uttered in one breath in Okinawa under U.S. military occupation as if both would always go hand in hand—i.e., overpopulation would inevitably lead to emigration and emigration always would provide a solution to population problems. It certainly was true that post-war Okinawa faced enormous population pressure and hundreds began emigrating overseas. Additionally, while it was true that Okinawa's population density had been high before the Pacific War, and that Okinawa was the poorest of Japan's prefectures and had the highest rate of emigration overseas from the early 1950s simply an outcome of population pressure?

Okinawa's population pressure and poverty were exacerbated by the military occupation of the United States following Japan's defeat in war. It was not, however, until 1950 when the occupation forces started expropriating cultivated land for military use, that the American occupation forces began to voice concerns Okinawa's population pressure. An internal memorandum of the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyu (USCAR), for example, acknowledged in 1950 that land expropriation caused serious political tension between the Okinawan people and the American occupation forces and suggested emigration as a solution (National Archives 13 February 1950). Such an argument was a prelude to a government-sponsored emigration project advocated as a way to ease Okinawa's population pressure. Bolivia was chosen as the destination for such Okinawans. In this article, I explore whether the emigration to Bolivia was designed to solve the population problems and whether it in fact provided the intended solution.
Emergence of Population Problems in Post-war Okinawa

Post-war Okinawa was faced with the same population problems as Japan—i.e., a big surge in population size, due to repatriation from former colonies, territories and occupied lands and also to the post-war baby boom. However, the U.S. occupation forces, or Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), dealt with them differently. SCAP sent first-rate demographers and population specialists to Japan to tackle the population issues. These specialists concluded that overseas emigration would not be effective to ease Japan’s population pressure and recommended lowering birthrates as a long-term solution. Their recommendations encouraged Japanese birth control activists, who had been active in the pre-war era, to push the liberalization of abortion and launch a birth control movement. The Japanese government did indeed implement several emigration programs, and yet emigration was never considered a major means to ease Japan’s population pressure.

In Okinawa, occupied by the U.S. military forces and geographically separated from mainland Japan, the situation was more serious and more pressing. Okinawa’s population problem was exacerbated by the large-scale expropriation of cultivated land by the United States military, which literally drove a large number of Okinawans out of their own homes and farmlands, took away their livelihood, and caused intense discontent. According to the Bureau of Culture and Education of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (1988) the U.S. military bases were concentrated in the central part of Okinawa Island. By 1950, the U.S. Military expropriated “21,500 acres of arable land for the military installations of the occupation, or a loss of 10 percent of the farm lands formerly under cultivation” (National Archives 13 February 1950, 28 February 1950). By 1955 the amount of land expropriated reached 42,000 acres, or 12.34 percent of all the cultivated land in Okinawa. As a result, 230,000 individuals of 50,000 households were displaced. Furthermore, there were plans to construct additional permanent military bases in Okinawa, as testified by General Stevens of the U.S. Army at a Senate subcommittee on 17 May 1955, and the Army was requesting funds to lease another 52,000 acres of land. These developments certainly signaled that more people would be displaced (Bureau of Culture and Education 1988:304–5).

The topic of displacement of individuals from the farmland was discussed as if it were part of Okinawa’s population problems. And yet, American population experts were never called to study Okinawa’s situation and explore solutions. The interim government of Okinawa under the U.S. authority, the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI), made reference to family planning as a long-term solution to the population problems, but unlike mainland Japan, no measure was taken to put the idea into practice, nor was a birth control movement launched. The discussions among Okinawans on population pressure almost always pointed to emigration as a solution.

Some American officials seized upon the notion, and the pressing problems concerning land and population were addressed in terms of need for emigration programs. One 1950 memorandum noted: “serious problems have been created in the Ryukyu Islands by the extensive pre-war increase in population and the simultaneous decrease in the area of land cultivated on the islands,” and concluded that emigration of Okinawans “to other areas of the world” would be “advantageous” and the “most practical means” to solve such serious problems (National Archives 13 February 1950). Another memorandum argued that such out emigration to involve “as many Ryukyuans as possible...in order to alleviate the great pressure of population in the Ryukyu” (National Archives 28 February 1950). How many Okinawans were never discussed and never studied. The question instead focused on where to send a vaguely conceived large number of people. If the American occupiers were indeed serious about solving Okinawa’s “population problems” by emigration, the United States should have accepted entry of some Okinawans into its own land. In fact, there were a few who suggested it. In 1950, “Major Cullen raised the question whether the U.S. should not itself make a contribution to the solution by accepting Ryukyuans into the U.S., especially Hawai’i” (National Archives 28 February 1950). The United States government, however, did not want Okinawans immigrants, and sought to send Okinawans to South America. The leadership of USCAR was even reluctant to push overseas emigration because it would be costly. It undertook, instead, internal migration to the southernmost islands of Yaeyama, with disappointing results because it was not a popular destination for Okinawans.

Choosing Bolivia as a Destination of Okinawan Emigrants

To facilitate the occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. government commissioned the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council to do numerous studies, which included “a survey of Ryukyu migration to South American countries” (National Archives n.d.[a]). The Pacific Science Board assigned to this mission James L. Tigner, a doctoral student in Latin American history at Stanford University. To prepare for the mission, Tigner first went to Tokyo, Okinawa and Honolulu in 1951, to make connections with
emigration advocates, and in 1952 toured Latin American to visit Okinawan communities in various countries and to assess the feasibility of each community as the destination of Okinawan emigrants. It was in Bolivia, Tigner claimed, that he found conditions he deemed ideal. There, a group of pre-war Okinawan immigrants from Riberalta, La Pas and Santa Cruz had organized themselves as the Uruma Agricultural and Industrial Society in order to help their war-ravaged compatriots by bringing immigrants in and setting up an Okinawan village called Uruma Colony in Bolivia. They had applied for a land grant from the government and already acquired 2,500 hectares east of The Rio Grande, adjacent to the vast lands owned by the central government. The idea of the Uruma Society was to bring fifty families from Okinawa to the Uruma Colony at first and start a pilot program under the leadership and guidance of pre-war immigrants, who moved to the Uruma Colony in 1951. Meanwhile, the Uruma Society kept in contact with the GRI and the Okinawa Overseas Association, asking for their organizational and financial assistance.

It was into this situation in Bolivia that James Tigner arrived on 12 May 1952. He had been well informed of the Uruma Society and its activities. For the members of the Uruma Society, Tigner's visit was tantamount to a visit by an American official, symbolizing the American government's recognition of their plan. The Okinawan immigrants found Tigner a quintessential good-intentioned American—tall, eager, sympathetic, and likable—and revered him as Professor Tigner. Tigner in turn liked what he saw—their enthusiasm for accepting new Okinawan immigrants and the land already purchased for that specific purpose. Actually, he had liked Bolivia even before he arrived there, as the destination for the new Okinawan immigrants. According to the journal of the president of the Uruma Society, upon arriving in Bolivia, and even before visiting the proposed colony site, Tigner talked passionately to the Uruma Society members that he was already convinced that there was no other place more suitable than Bolivia for sending Okinawan emigrants (Gushi 1948–1954 vol. 3:71).

As to the Uruma Society's plan of bringing fifty Okinawan families, Tigner told them that was not ambitious enough. He exhorted that they should plan to bring 2,500, not 50, families or 12,000 persons to Bolivia in ten years. The old immigrants were stunned. Tigner had not even surveyed the site, and yet insisted on a large-scale program. However, as the Uruma Society needed funding to carry out their plan, it was not difficult for Tigner to persuade them to reshape their plan according to his design with a promise of financial aid from the U.S. government. If both the U.S. and Ryukyu governments were to provide the financial and technical support, it could be done, reasoned the old immigrants and they conditionally agreed to Tigner's proposal. Thus, Tigner prevailed over the skeptical immigrants and promised that he would do all he could to make the large-scale immigration plan come true (Gushi 1948–1954 vol. 3:71–76). He then duly went to the settlement site as the Uruma Society requested.

It is implausible that Tigner, a mere field researcher, devised and delivered such a grand-scale plan without the approval of his supervisors. The ambitious plan must have been made somewhere higher up before Tigner set out on a tour of Latin America. Tigner's role was to confirm their assessment of Bolivia, take the plan with him to Bolivia, and persuade the Okinawan immigrants to cooperate with it. He was so delighted with what he had seen in Bolivia he could not wait until he returned home; he publicly announced in Peru, his next stop after Bolivia, that Bolivia was his choice. This process was hardly a selection of the emigration site by thorough investigation and careful survey as Tigner's work was touted at the time of launching the immigration program.

The Political Situation in Okinawa

Upon returning from the Latin American tour, Tigner forcefully advocated emigration as the solution to Okinawa's problem of population pressure and made a case for Bolivia as the ideal site for Okinawan emigration. It was as if he had discovered Okinawa's population problems after he had chosen Bolivia. There is no evidence that he had studied population theories or had done any previous empirical research of Okinawa's or any other society's population. In other words, he was as much an amateur as anyone else in the field of population. However, Tigner spoke with such a tone of authority about Okinawa's population pressures on numerous occasions that his arguments about Okinawa's population issues and his proposal for emigration as a solution were accepted at face value without close examination.

Tigner kept up the mantra of Okinawa's population pressure and emigration in memos and reports that were circulated among the officers in USCAR, many of whom freely quoted him. Tigner became a guru on Okinawa's population problems, not because he was an expert, but because he spoke the language that addressed the deepest concerns of the U.S. occupation. Refe-
ring to numerous problems in Okinawa as imposing an “economic burden” on the United States, he maintained the U.S. government had “no means of effectively resolving these problems other than by assisting the Ryukyuan people to emigrate to other areas of the world which offered them a respectable livelihood and a future for their children (National Archives 15 November 1952). That would lighten the “burden” on the U.S. occupation, he argued, with the remittances that would be sent home by Okinawan emigrants. To Tigner, Okinawa’s overpopulation was a euphemism for the growing political tension threatening the U.S. occupation. His argument for emigration was more ideological than scholarly. In spite of that, or rather because of it, his recommendations for shipping out the excess population of Okinawa to far away Bolivia met with little challenge. By the latter part of 1953, they routinely accepted and were embraced by American and Okinawan emigration supporters, who were concerned that Okinawans’ discontent about the expropriation of the land for military installations might lead to the spread of Communism in the islands.

Indeed, the political and social tension was mounting rapidly, as an American Christian missionary observed in June 1954. He noted, “in 1947 everywhere the Okinawans told me that they were not Japanese, but wished to join with American [sic]. When there again in February 1953, practically everyone told me that they now preferred to belong to Japan.” He put the finger on American military occupation in Okinawa:

Perhaps the main difficulty is that America is spending so much money there on military operations and housing, etc. for personnel and, at the same time doing so little for the Okinawans—not even paying a proper price for the land they take—that they have disrupted the local economy and caused much suffering (National Archives 1954).

Such concerns were largely ignored by the occupiers. Instead, they turned to the idea of emigration as a safety valve, as Tigner advocated. Tigner clearly argued than an emigration proposal would function as a safety valve. He cited two main “advantages of developing and implementing an emigration program to Santa Cruz, Bolivia.” One was the usual, widespread rhetoric of relieving population pressure and reducing the economic burden to the U.S. of supporting the Okinawan population. The other was more explicit and more telling of the underlying motive of promoting an emigration project—i.e., defusing the social discontent. In the passage of his memorandum co-signed with a USCAR officer Paul Skuse, which is worth quoting here, Tigner claimed:

Okinawa, with its rising population and decreasing areas of available land, will offer progressively less [sic] future for the farming population. Restiveness and dissatisfaction will inevitably accompany the waning prospects of land ownership and fading hopes for an adequate livelihood, particularly among the youth of Okinawa. Since Communists appeal to the youth of a nation, and with apparent success in many areas of the Communists dominated world, the youth of Okinawa represent a potentially vulnerable element of the population. The prospects of obtaining large tracts of free land in a distant community as afforded by an emigration program will give fresh hope to the youth and in this way serve to cope with their discontent and susceptibility to the Communist’s false promises of reward (Tigner 1954:522).

In his report to his superior Frank Collidge, he expanded his argument regarding the psychological effects of the emigration plan on the Okinawans:

Aside from reducing the economic burden on our Government, [emigration] will have great value in raising morale among Ryukyuan population and help to prevent their defection to communism. The prospects of obtaining large tracts of free land in a distant South American community, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, for example, will give the Ryukyuans renewed hope for a provident future than can never be theirs in the homeland. Preservation of a healthful political climate in the Ryukyus is mandatory from the security standpoint, and emigration offers the most practical and efficient means by which it can be achieved (National Archives 15 November 1952).

To mark this point, Tigner took note of “the outcome of recent elections in the Ryukyus in which the one communist member of the Legislature received more of the popular vote than any other single candidate” (National Archives 15 November 1952). It was this fear of Communism that prompted the United States to seek a means to pacify the growing discontent among Okinawans. Emigration to Bolivia offered “the most practical and efficient means” by which to achieve “[p]reservation of a healthful political climate in the Ryukyus” that was “mandatory from the security standpoint.” It should be, Tigner argued, “a long range program of organized emigration” (National Archives 15 November 1952).

Launching the Project

The new leadership of Okinawa embraced the emigration project to Bolivia. GRI and Okinawa Overseas Association lobbied and pleaded with the United States for financial and technical assistance for this project. In order to ensure its implementation, the GRI sent two delegates—Inamine Ichiro from
the Okinawa Overseas Association and Senaga Hiroshi, of the Department of Economic Planning, GRI—to Bolivia in February 1954 as an Okinawan Emigration Mission.\textsuperscript{14} Inamine was part of the post-war Okinawan elite who had a vested interest in a trouble-free occupation by the U.S. military and he established the Ryukyu Overseas Association in 1953.\textsuperscript{15} He contacted Walter Judd, Congressman from Minnesota and Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, House Committee on Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{16} Judd took an interest in Okinawa out of his concern about the spread of Communism in Asia and worked to secure funds to support Okinawan emigration.

Once Tigner took over the Uruma Society’s idea of bring Okinawans to Bolivia and transformed it into a grand-scale emigration project, the pre-war immigrants of the Uruma Society quickly lost control of the plan or any portion of it. The visit of the Emigration Mission from Okinawa to Bolivia accelerated and completed this process. During their survey of the settlement site, they spent a little more time than Tigner had, and discussed with the pre-war immigrants details of the settlement plan. Senaga showed a great deal of concern about the site and the anticipated hardships the immigrants would face. Inamine, on the other hand, powerful and aggressive, cast an intimidating shadow over the prior immigrants in every aspect and intervened in the selection of the members of the Receiving Committee, virtually putting an end to Uruma Society’s control of the immigration project.\textsuperscript{17}

When the Okinawan Emigration Mission returned to Okinawa, the emigration program was launched as transformed by Tigner and Inamine. The GRI announced the project, to which 4000 applications poured in. The procedure moved with amazing speed. Within a month, 397 individuals were selected; however not all were farmers and their offspring, as the Uruma Society had insisted. In Bolivia everything was also rushed but lagged behind schedule.\textsuperscript{18} Despite of the incomplete preparations for receiving emigrants, new Okinawan emigrants departed in two groups from Naha Port to Bolivia with great fanfare, on 19 June and 19 July, 1954, respectively (Uruma 1995:67–72, 182).

Two months after departing, both group arrived, a month apart from each other, at their destination, Uruma Colony, in the Bolivian jungle. Not only was their housing still incomplete and wells not dug, but the entire situation was far from what the emigrants had been led to believe. The site was deep in the jungle, far away from the main road to the nearest urban center, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and cut off by a major river, the Rio Grande. Although they had expected hardship, they had also expected some semblance of civilization. Yet, even the most basic of necessities such as drinking water were lacking. It was clearly a result of insufficient preparations.

The worst problem, however, was the outbreak of a mysterious disease that took seventeen lives in six months and put more than half of the immigrants into their sick beds. This problem changed the American view of the Bolivian emigration project 180 degrees. The official survey by the American and Bolivian experts of the Uruma Colony concluded that the site was not the most desirable one for colonization because (1) soil was not good enough, (2) potable water was not easily available and (3) there was no access to the main road let alone to the market or towns. An American expert called the immigration project a fiasco and maintained it could have been avoided “if these points been known before the plans were finalized for this location” (National Archives 18 January 1955:1). Known to whom? The project planners were well aware of these issues from the very beginning but considered them manageable or had brushed them aside as trade-offs given other advantageous factors.\textsuperscript{19}

None of the physical aspects or information about the site had changed since Tigner visited the site. What had changed was the perception and the attitude of the American officials. Some officials even tried to shift the blame on the Uruma Society, by accusing the members of having selected the site as an investment opportunity for resale (National Archives n.d.[c]). The Okinawan press, which was under close scrutiny of the USCAR, criticized both the GRI and the Overseas Association for having “been carried away by the thought of sending off the emigrants as soon as possible.” It even blamed the emigrants as for being “too eager to think matters over carefully” and having “set out on their way with a light heart” (Okinawa Times, 30 January 1955). The same newspaper, it should be reminded, had hailed the emigration project as “a Godsend to the Ryukyus” before the tragic outbreak of the disease (Okinawa Times, 13 January 1954).

Keeping the Japanese Government at Bay

If the settlement site in Bolivia was indeed so disastrous and so obviously unsuitable, why did the American occupiers and the Okinawan leaders rush the emigration plan forward with such enthusiasm? The main reason was the growing protest against the land seizure by the U.S. military, as discussed earlier. But there was another reason. The Japanese government was planning an emigration project to Bolivia and other Latin American countries, which
the U.S. government felt compelled to beat. While Tigner was exploring the site for Okinawan emigration, he also kept a watchful eye on the Japanese government's plans. On his second trip to Okinawa, after his tour in Latin America, Tigner stopped in Tokyo and called on the Emigration Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese government to find out about their South American emigration program (National Archives 7 October 1952). He was concerned that "the progress of the Japanese Government in developing South American colonization will thwart USCAR's efforts to introduce Ryukyuan farmers to this area unless similar steps are taken by our Government." When the epidemic occurred in Uruma Colony, the U.S. government was guarded about the Japanese government's possible move into Bolivia. USCAR saw the Japanese government as "ever eager to fill any void left by the United States" and noted that it "secured a report from their Delegation in Peru" and took several measures (National Archives 23 March 1955:2).

Moreover, the U.S. was vigilant about Okinawans falling under the protection of the Japanese government. A memorandum from the USCAR in 1954 emphasized the State Department's "responsibility of providing protection for the emigres." It warned: "Failure to do this, will undoubtedly result in assumption of responsibility by a Japanese Mission. There have been rumors that this is now being contemplated" (National Archives 3 September 1954). Meanwhile, the U.S. sought to keep Okinawans away from Japan and the Japanese government. After all, it was the U.S. occupation policy to treat Okinawans as a separate people from the Japanese, thus insisting on referring to them as Ryukyuans. This policy was extended to Okinawan immigrants in Bolivia. Consequently, Okinawans remained pawns of the U.S. occupation policy in Okinawa, even when they went to such a distant place as Bolivia.

According to the Okinawan press, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had received from the Japanese Consulate in Peru a negative report about the Uruma Colony site before immigrants arrived there:

"[T]he Uruma settlement area in Santa Cruz seems to be located at a considerable distance from town, and the roads leading to the town are bad, with the result that transportation is inconvenient for transporting agricultural products, and even digging a well is said to require considerable amount of money. Consequently there are many difficulties in operating a farm. As a result, chances are that there may emerge those who will escape to town, or to adjoining countries such as Brazil, Argentina and others (Okinawa Times n.d.)."

Indeed, three-quarters of the immigrants left. This report shows that the undesirable condition of the Uruma site was known and that extreme hardships were anticipated. Yet, the USCAR and the GRI ignored it, and the applicants were kept in the dark about the real condition of the settlement site. It is not clear if this report from the Japanese government ever received attention from the USCAR or the GRI. The Japanese government officials' warning about the terrible conditions at the Uruma site were not made because they were concerned about the fate of Okinawans there. Instead they were more concerned about the possible consequences for the "reputation of the entire Japanese emigrants in Bolivia" (Okinawa Times n.d.). Thus, Okinawans were pawns of the Japanese government as well as GRI and USCAR. In fact, the Japanese government itself sent a group of immigrants a few years later to a settlement site in Bolivia with very similar conditions.20

In 1956, the State Department discussed the possibility of bringing Okinawans to the U.S. The discussion was a response to "the vigorous activities of certain officers in the Pentagon who are seeking to develop a program to bring Ryukyuans to California under a program similar to that developed for the Japanese." Those making the above proposal argued that the United States government's "official responsibility for Ryukyuans" was greater than for the Japanese (National Archives 24 August 1956). Their argument made sense, since in 1956 the U.S. was still occupying Okinawa while Japan's sovereignty had been restored; however their proposal was vetoed due to domestic political considerations. After all, no one in the United States government seemed to be interested in Okinawa's population problems. The GRI continued carrying out the emigration project until 1964 and sent a total of 3,200 Okinawans in ten years to Bolivia, far below Tigner's goal of 12,000.

Conclusion

The American forces used the rhetoric of population pressure to obfuscate the causes of social dislocation and displacement from land and housing in Okinawa, and presented an emigration program as a solution to the population problems. The emigration to Bolivia was implemented against the backdrop of massive land expropriation by the U.S. and the resulting anger among Okinawans. Emigration was to serve as a safety valve to contain the influence of Communism, and to secure the retention of military bases in Okinawa. Since the U.S. government's concern about Okinawa's population problems was rhetorical and emigration as a solution was political, there was no com-
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5. Gushi Kancho in Riberalta instigated this idea of new Okinawan immigration to Bolivia. He wrote about his idea to Nakamura Shingi, a fellow Okinawan immigrant in North America, on 1 April 1949, and also to Higa Shigeo, chair of the Okinawan Society in La Paz on 15 April 1949 (Gushi 1948–1954, vol. 1:18–21; vol. 2:1–2). Gushi from Riberalta, Shiga from La Paz and Jose Kame Akamine from Santa Cruz were the core members of Uruma Society.


7. I have yet to locate how Tigner came up with these ambitious figures.

8. Reading between the lines in the entry of Gushi Journal, it appears that Tigner had not included a tour of the Uruma settlement site in his itinerary. The members of the Uruma Society requested he visit the site (Gushi 1948–1954, vol. 3:71).

9. The Uruma Society submitted Tigner the following five conditions: (1) Uruma Society receives approval of the ten-year immigration plan from the Bolivian government, Tigner be responsible for asking the American and Ryukyu governments for funding for the travel and operation costs; (2) Tigner lobby the American government for financial aid for receiving new immigrants each year; (3) Tigner petition the American and Ryukyu governments to finance the two delegates for this immigration program; (4) the Uruma Society will not accept immigrants unless the above three conditions are met; and (5) Tigner survey the settlement site, while the Uruma Society engages itself in drawing up a ten-year immigration plan, and report to Okinawa about the site (Gushi 1948–1954, vol. 3:72–73).


11. For more discussion of why Bolivia was chosen, see my “Four Governments and a New Land: Emigration to Bolivia” (2002).

12. For example, the first paragraph of the memorandum from C. V. Bromley to Governor of the Ryukyu Islands is almost identical to Tigner’s memorandum to Coolidge in its line of argument and writing style (National Archives n.d.[a]). It is also evident in a memorandum to C. A. Sullivan from W. F. Marguat, Major General (National Archives n.d.[b]).

13. Tigner finished a voluminous report of his survey titled “The Okinawans in Latin America (Investigation of Okinawan communities in Latin America with Exploration of Settlement Possibilities)” in 1954. Incidentally, this report became the basis of Tigner’s doctoral dissertation (1956). The GRI commissioned its translation into Japanese as “Tigner Report” [Tigner hokokusho] in two parts in 1957 and 1959 in order to encourage the idea of overseas emigration. Its translator, Oshiro Shinjum, acknowledged in my interview on 6 June 1997, that the GRI officials were at a loss as to what to do with the population problems at the time and thought overseas emigration was probably the only way to deal with it. Tigner’s report, they hoped, would mobilize enthusiasm and financial support for emigration among policy-makers.
14. Okinawa Times reported on 12 January 1954, “Previously, GRI had sent Messrs. Ichiro Inamine and Hiroshi Senaga as ‘Emigration Delegates,’ and upon a careful investigation of the situation in Bolivia, they publicly announced that there were no cases of malaria or local disease there.” Also available at National Archives (Record 319, DA-CA, E: #60, File: Correspondence of the Public Affairs Division 1950–1964, Box 30).

15. Inamine had worked for the Manchurian Railway and had been engaged in intelligence work in Southeast Asia during the war.

16. Inamine Ichiro, Higa Shuhei and Walter Judd attended a conference with House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 24 November 1953 (National Archives 24 November 1953).

17. For example, Inamine forced an acquaintance from his old school into the committee, replacing a pre-war immigrant in La Paz who had dedicated himself to the plan (Gushi 1948–1954).

18. Aniya Susumu well documented the numerous problems that hindered the preparation progress. (Uruma 1995:72)

19. For example, a report from Chief of the Public Affairs Division at the conference 2 September 1954, notes the inadequate planning in the receiving party in Bolivia, the site being remote and in a thick jungle, and the soil as not of the best type. The report gives reasons or justification for all these points (National Archives 2 September 1954). Some of the surviving immigrants of the first group commented, however, upon accompanying me to the former Uruma Colony site in August 1967, that the soil was actually good.

20. The Japanese colony is called Colonia Japonesa San Juan, and is only about 100km west of Colonia Okinawa.

21. A shorter version of the analysis I present here can be found in Amemiya (2002b).

References


National Archives. 13 February 1950. Note from the Office of the Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands Subject: Emigration from Ryukyu Islands. Record 59, Dept. of State, General Records, Box 5689, File 894C112/10-853.


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——. 23 March 1955. Memo from PA to OCAMG on GRI Mission to Bolivia. Record 319, DA-CA, E: #60, Correspondence of the Public Affairs Division, Box 30, File: Ryukyuan Emigration to Bolivia, 1955.

——. 24 August 1956. Office Memorandum of Dept. of State, from Mr. Sullivan (FE) to Mr. Robertson (FE), on "Pentagon Proposal to Bring Ryukyu Farm Workers to the U.S." Record 59, Dept. of State, General Records, 1955–1959, Central Decimal File, Box 5115, File: 894C.06/12-2055.

Okinawa is one of very few Japanese prefectures which emphasize the ideology of peace. The 23rd of June 1945 is generally regarded as the date when the Battle of Okinawa ended, and around the 23rd of June each year, primary and secondary school students in Okinawa go through what is called “Heiwa Gakushū Shūkan” or Peace Education Week. There is some variation in length and content among schools. Teachers can give lectures on the importance of peace by using written and visual materials on the Battle of Okinawa and invite guest speakers, elders who actually experienced the Battle. Although more than a half century has passed since the Battle, conscious efforts to retain the memory of the Battle are highly visible. Cities publish oral histories of the Battle, collect direct accounts of the Battle through interviewing city residents, and relay the message of peace (Okinawashi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkoka 1998). Artists produce films of elderly speaking of their wartime experience in their native tongue (Nakasone 2003). Moreover, activists in the current anti-U.S. military base struggles place as one of the foundations of their struggle the significance of peace. For them, the existence and further construction of military bases is viewed as the antithesis to their vision of a peaceful Okinawa (Okinawa Taimusu 1998; Nago Shimin Tohyō Hokoku Shūkōka 1999). And, it is the Battle of Okinawa from which the ideology of peace springs.

While the experience of an historical event is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient to create memory since experience does not necessarily determine the way a certain historical phenomenon is remembered. First, memory is fluid. It changes over time. Second, memory is constructed; it is an ongoing process (Olick and Robbins 1998:133–4). However, even if it is a social construct, memory cannot simply be created in a vacuum. Instead, the construction of social memory is historically formed by the temporal and the site-specific socio-political context in which the agent is present. This view of
the relationship between present context and memory necessarily involves an historical analysis of the nature of the socio-political context (and changes within it) that impacts the way a certain phenomenon will be remembered, and moreover, how such memory has changed. In other words, in the process of remembering, the "past is produced in the present" (Olick and Robbins 1998:128). Recent theoretical arguments on the collective efforts of the construction of memory (Giddens 1994; Koselleck 1985; McDonald 1996; Olick and Robbins 1998; Yoneyama 1999) have stressed the importance of agency in the process of the creation of memory and the confluence of history and memory. Memory is a result of the agents' efforts to make sense out of the present condition.

If memory is a social creation, then what was the process of remembering that led to the current ideology of peace? That is, what were the postwar structural conditions of Okinawa in which the memory of the Battle of Okinawa was constructed? How exactly did the memory of the Battle change within those dramatically shifting contexts? In this paper, I argue that were it not for the postwar U.S. military administrative control over Okinawa, the resulting economic, political, and culturally oppressive conditions, and the continuing postwar concentration of the military bases, all with the consent of the national government of Japan, and the economic and social hardships faced by the Okinawan people caused by the existence of the bases, the memory of the Battle would not be as powerful as it is today.

What, then, was the process of memory of the Battle of Okinawa that led to the current ideology of peace? If Okinawa had been, in the final form of political policy, treated equally to mainland Japan, the memory of the Battle would not have held such critical nature as it does now. In other words, critique of the past is critique of the present. In this paper, I have examined the conscious efforts of the people of Okinawa to understand the present which in turn has meant to understand the past. This has resulted in a distinct form of remembering the Battle of Okinawa. Moreover, the postwar history of Okinawa showed drastic change from 1945 to 1972 and, along with such change, the content of the memory of the Battle changed. I have depicted such changes in this paper.

One of the major components of the postwar history of Okinawa has been the administrative control over Okinawa by the United States that began de facto in June 1945 and de jure in 1952, continuing until May 1972 when the administrative rights over Okinawa reverted to Japan. The issue of reversion was a significant part of the agendas that the various agents of social change put forth. This paper focused on the reversion movement that began immediately after the Pacific War initially on an individual level, later to be institutionalized with the formation of Okinawa Sokoku Fukki Kyōgikai, or Fukkikyō in 1960 that continued its reversion movement until 1972. I have focused on how the memory of the Battle of Okinawa was socially constructed within the context of the reversion movement.

This paper employs the method of discourse analysis. In order to view the process of the construction of social memory of the Battle of Okinawa, I have used historical documents written or spoken by the leaders of the reversion movement; these include items such as letters sent to government officials and speeches read at rallies. They are collected in the book Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Taisōhi (History of Okinawa Prefectural Struggle for Reversion) published in 1982. These written statements, characterized by their particular logic or flow of arguments, can be viewed as the "externalization" of underlying ideas and thinking of the agents. It is through this process of externalization that agents construct memory. Memory, therefore, is manifested as a discourse, as a result of the processes of meditation, and of writing and speaking. By analyzing these written statements, one is able to see how social memory was constructed, sustained, and altered as the socio-political context changed.

In this paper, I submit that until immediately before the signing of the Mutual Security Treaty in January 1960, reference to the Battle of Okinawa was largely absent in the documents that requested reversion of Okinawa to Japan. How the Japanese government used Okinawa during their imperial expansion of the Pacific War was intentionally absent from discussion. Until then, the reversion movement in Okinawa could be characterized as depending on the "benevolence" of the governments of Japan and United States to realize the Okinawans' "genuine wish as Japanese" of wanting to return to the motherland from whom they were "unfortunately" separated. Although the Battle was seen as an indicator of Japanese discriminatory behavior against Okinawa, the issue of discrimination was intentionally laid aside. Future prospect of Okinawa status has yet to be determined, leaving room for the people of Okinawa to imagine a Japan differently than the way they were treated in the past. But when the Treaty underwent the process of enforcement which meant the continuation of the administrative control of Okinawa by the United States, agents of the reversion movement perceived that it was the intention of the Government of Japan to prolong the separation of Okinawa from Japan for their political and economic interest. It is from here that the
past, i.e., the Battle of Okinawa, is “memorized” publicly or critically remembered in order to make sense of the then present actions of the Government of Japan. Thus, a critique of the present had at the same time been extended to a critique of the past.

As the reversion movement came to subsequent critical junctures, such as in 1967 and 1969, the joint communiqués show that Japan determined the conditions of reversion of Okinawa. Thereafter social memory was extended by the reversion movement beyond the Battle to include a criticism of the annexation of Okinawa by the Meiji Government of Japan in 1879. The memory of the Battle was contextualized linearly within the continuous history of discrimination committed against the people of Okinawa by Japan. The Battle was remembered as the undeniable proof that Japan had been using Okinawa for their interest since their contact with the people of Okinawa. I have analyzed such shift in the discourse on the Battle by focusing on how the discourse showed change in relation to the changing socio-political context the movement found themselves in.

Absence of Battle of Okinawa Discourse, 1945–1957

It is often said that the reversion movement began on an individual level right after the occupation force of the United States settled in Okinawa, and on an organizational level it began with the formation of Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai (Revert to Japan Movement) in 1951 (Arasaki 1976). Since the following was the earliest statement made and is recorded in the book Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Tōshī (History of Okinawa Prefectural Struggle for Reversion), I will quote it here to show how the discourse of reversion was present even in the earliest days of Okinawan activism in the post-war era. This passage does not represent an effort to construct public memory by a publicly noted organization; rather, it seems to be written by individuals. This statement, however, is useful in understanding the sentiment for reversion during the earliest post-war period in Okinawa. The statement is written by Nakayoshi Ryōkō, who is regarded to be the first voice for reversion. Nakayoshi had moved already to mainland Japan by 1950 and was intensively involved in petitioning activities.

Petition to General MacArthur, October 2nd, 1946.

...Within those from Europe and America, there are some who speak of the Japanese nationals’ past conduct of slighting and treating coldly the people of Okinawa as poor cousins, but this is a misapprehension, and there is absolutely no fact that the Government of Japan or the Japanese people discriminated the people of Okinawa. People of Okinawa have always been treated as equally as citizens of other prefectures, 70 years since being put under the administration of Meiji Government, Okinawa has gone through development as one region within Japan, and people of Okinawa at this present moment are again eager to be sustained as one constituent of the Japanese State. This is a very natural course... People of Okinawa’s rights in politics and administration have been nothing but equal with the mainland fellow countrymen, and there cannot be found any discrimination. This one definite point is the proof that Okinawa is a part of Japan and there is no room for doubt.

Considering from this very fact, present people of Okinawa’s eagerness for reversion is nothing but natural, having the basis in our deep human nature, and there can be found no other intent (Okinawaken Sokoku Fukki Tōshī Hensan linkai [hereinafter OSFTHI] 1982:8).

The wording of this petition is amazing for those who are familiar with the discourse on reversion which is seen in later social movement organizations such as Fukkikyō. Not only is there no mentioning of the Battle of Okinawa, but Nakayoshi and others who wrote this petition to MacArthur also stressed the historically inseparable “minzokuteki” or ethnic linkage between mainland Japan and Okinawa by overtly denying the notion of “discrimination” in any Okinawa-Japan relationship. He states that the eagerness for reversion to Japan is a very reasonable, natural sentiment that has its just origin in the past intimate relationship with Japan as a State. Also, there is a clear denial of the past regarding the discriminatory actions on the part of Japanese, both on the individual and national level, when confronting the issue of reversion and explaining, or making sense out of, the sentiment for reversion.

This absence of accusations or overt criticism by the people of Okinawa becomes clearly intentional in the early 1950s if one looks at the background of formation of Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai and their statements. Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai was formed on 29 April 1951, and is constituted of only two political parties, Jinminton (Okinawa People’s Party) and Shakai Taishūtō (Okinawa Social Masses Party). The Kiseikai was an ad hoc organization solely formed for the purpose of collecting signatures of the residents in Okinawa who supported reversion in order to send these signatures to those representatives involved in the consideration of the terms of the Peace Treaty (OSFTHI 1982:1292–1301). Following is their Statement of Intention:

Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai’s Statement of Purpose, (thought to be) May 12th, 1951
The fact that the Peace Conference that informs the end of World War II is about to be held is something delighting not only to Japanese for sure but also to those of the world who love peace. At the upcoming Peace Conference, the issue that determines our fate, which is the status of the Ryukyus, is going to be on the agenda again for sure.

We believe, especially taking in consideration the Ryukyus' historical, geographical, economic, cultural, and ethnic relation, that immediately reverting to Japan will bring us prosperity and happiness, thus here we have formed the Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai.

This Kiseikai, in order to prove that Ryukyuans are hoping for reversion, intends to create a signature book made by men and women at and over the age of 20 residing within the Ryukyus, and act so that reversion to Japan, which is the wish of the majority of the residents, is realized.

We will not make claims on Zenmen Kowa nor contend against hosting of the military bases. This movement will be restricted solely to the issue of Ryukyu's status. Furthermore, after completion of collecting signatures and sending the petition letters, this organization will automatically dismantle (OSFTHI 1982:22-23).

The Kiseikai makes a clear statement that reversion to Japan is needed for the happiness and prosperity of the Ryukyus. While there are no critical statements seen here against Japan, there is a conscious effort to resolve what appears to be a contradictory sentiment in the minds of the people of Okinawa: on the one hand recognizing the facts of discrimination and victimization by mainland Japanese, and on the other, overtly voicing pro-reversion, and not independence or trusteeship under the U.S.

Two articles, one written by Kanetsugu Saichi, the leader of Kiseikai and another written by Senega Kamejiro, the head of Jinminto present important arguments relevant to this period. First, the article by Kanetsugu:

"Nihon Fukki no Teisho ni tsuite," Sekai Shimbun, July 1951.

They [Independence Theorists] are with the illusory idea that the past Emperor-centered, undemocratic Japan still exists, but the present Japan is, under the new Constitution that rests the sovereignty in people's hands, has joined the flock of democratic nations centered around the United States and is striving to become the world's freedom-loving nation. They are overlooking, missing this reality, along with the fact that Japan's industry is with the conditions needed for development after the Peace Treaty is signed (OSFTHI 1982:81).

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 Those who exploited the people of Okinawa are the Japanese capitalists, great land lords, bankers....It was, in general terms, Japan's militarist government (Arasaki 1976:82).

Those who were for reversion recognized the "unforgettable historical events" of the past, but they concluded that since those who committed the past deeds were now deceased, those actions were not worth dwelling upon. Instead, the new Japan was striving to become a democratic, peace-loving nation under the new Constitution. Okinawan independence was not stressed because Japan "has the conditions needed for development after the Peace Treaty is signed." According to Arasaki, both the Independence Theorists and Reversion Theorists recognized the difficulty in economic independence. But they differed in their thinking about how to overcome this difficulty. The Independence theorists hoped for U.S. assistance, and Reversion Theorists sought the answer in reverting to Japan.

The conception of the United States military as a "liberation army" had already been questioned by this time, with experiences of "grotesque crimes committed by the occupation force" (Arasaki 1976:84–86). While the Independence Theorists, many of whom sitting in lucrative positions under the occupation, the Reversion theorists and ordinary citizens could stand no longer the devastating socio-political situation (Arasaki 1976:79). Arasaki writes, "Thus the reversion ideology, rooting from the mass' natural sentiment, reflecting their immediate demand, has gained a political justification. The ideology of reversion has gained its status as the one and only legitimate and progressive ideology" (1976:86). Therefore, one can say that the initial reversion movement was established by envisioning a "new Japan" that almost made it pointless to be insistent with Japan's past misdeeds. Olick and Robbins (1998:118) quote Nietzsche who stated, "The past has to be forgotten if it is not to become the gravedigger of the present." When reversion was perceived in hopeful terms...
for the people of Okinawa, the agents of the reversion movement required the benevolence of the Government of Japan to realize reversion, and the issue of past discrimination was consciously put aside.

However, against their will, the Peace Treaty was signed on 8 September 1951 and enforced on 28 April 1952. Okinawa went under U.S. control as stated in Article 3 of the Treaty (U.S. Department of State 1955). The Kiseikai disbanded in 1953, and another organization called Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai was formed on 10 January 1953. The initial members of this second Kiseikai were Kyōshokuin-kai (Okinawa Teachers' Association), PTA Rengō-kai (Association of Parent-Teacher Association), Fujin Rengō-kai (Women's Association) and Seinen Rengō-kai (Youth Association).

A plan was devised to travel to mainland Japan to make an appeal to those living on the mainland about the devastating situation and the issue of education in Okinawa. To strengthen the legitimacy of the appeal, the education organization was identified as the one to submit the resolution that the people of Okinawa were pro-Reversion (OSFTHI 1982). Thus this second Kiseikai was organized around the education field, and the first mass meeting of this Kiseikai (Dai Ikkaı̂i Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Sōkekki Taikaı̂) was held on the 17th of January 1953. The petition group went to mainland Japan on the 20th of January 1953 with the materials in their hands, including the first rally statement and resolution (Dai Ikkaı̂i Taikaı̂ Sengen, Ketsugi).

The following is a statement made at the Dai Ikkaı̂i Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Sōkekki Taikaı̂, or the regular reversion rally held on the 17th of January 1953.

Request Regarding Okinawa's Reversion to Homeland, sent to the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Each Political Parties

We here join the bloody cry of the inhabitants of Okinawa Islands and make a candid request regarding Okinawa's reversion to homeland to Your Excellency Prime Minister, your Excellency Minister of Foreign Affairs, and each political party leaders whom we cannot but revere.

We are very thankful of the fact that Your Excellency Prime Minister with each political party are showing deep interest regarding our issue of Okinawa Islands' reversion and striving to resolve the inhabitants' tragedy as soon as possible. But two years have already passed since the issuance of the Peace Treaty...and it is an unbearable ethnic tragedy that we have to be dependent on aliens in living our course of life without enjoying sufficiently the blessings of strongly reviving politics, economy, education, and culture of our Homeland, for there is a line deliberately drawn at the 29th parallel.... This supreme issue is not solely our own problem, but is also the responsibility of our Homeland's 80 million fellow countrymen (OSFTHI 1982:25).

Here, any attitude critical of Japan, either for signing the Peace Treaty or regarding the Battle of Okinawa, cannot be seen. Only the Peace Treaty is conceived of as a problem affecting Okinawa, and it is suggested that this problem should be solved collaboratively with the Homeland. Japan's agency in signing the Treaty is not stressed. The attitude is one of quietly asking for help without making Japan angry, and no hint of accusation is indicated.

Now let's look at a letter sent by Yara Chōbyō, President of Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai, to a mainland-based newspaper. This represents one active organization's position in Okinawa at that time, I believe.


President Eisenhower, in his State of the Union Address, stated that regarding Okinawa "we will maintain the military bases in Okinawa for an indefinite period of time." You took up this issue in the editorial and wrote “...We see the effectiveness of peace maintenance by United States forces, take as reasonable and moreover as needed the United States' establishment of defence of freedom (jiyū bōei tai sei). But reverting Okinawa as the Bo-nins have been will not be a hindrance to the United States' defense system since the Security Treaty is in effect. The statements on Okinawa will not be welcomed by both Japanese and Ryukyuans." This...speaks of our true feelings and we from our heart would like to show our gratitude and respect.

We, the Okinawa Shotō Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai, have developed the reversion movement based on the belief that maintenance of the military bases and the ruling of what is former Okinawa Prefecture is a separate issue, and reversion of the right to rule will not only contradict United States' Far Eastern Defense Establishment but will be something further conducive to the cooperation between Okinawa and the United States. But on the 11th, USCAR has made a statement that seems to suppress the rising reversion movement by the inhabitants. Because of this we cannot hope for further activities here in Okinawa (OSFTHI 1982:34).

Here one can see the position of this second Kiseikai regarding the issue of reversion and the presence of U.S. rule. Kiseikai is willing to concede to the presence of the U.S. as long as reversion is realized. Although this might be a reaction to the harsh suppression by the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) of political activities, this Kiseikai was apparently willing to work within the given situation offered by Japan and the United States. This Kiseikai was content with the fact that a mainland newspaper...
was voicing a position for reversion, and was not critical of the mainlanders' idea that Okinawa should still be hosting the U.S. military bases. Thus, in this time period, there is no critique of mainland Japan, and no discourse on the Battle of Okinawa can be seen.

**Emergence of the Battle of Okinawa Discourse**

In June 1954, Yara Chōbō quit as both the president of this Kiseikai and the Teachers' Association. The second Kiseikai dismantled after Yara became the subject of a crack-down by USCAR and resigned both as the head of the Kiseikai and the president of the Teachers' Association.

After the second Kiseikai disbanded, on the 27th of April 1957, there was a rally held called Sokoku Fukki Sokushin Kenmin Taikai, organized by Okinawa Seinen Rengokai (Okinawa Youth Association) and Shakai Taishū (Social Masses Party). There was cooperation by the Teachers' Association, PTA Association, Okinawa People's Party, and others. The Resolution made at this rally is worth noting since this appears to be the first public word voiced with a tone of criticism.

**A Request Resolution Made to the Mainland Government, the House of Representatives and House of Councilors, and Political Parties. April 27th, 1957**

...We 800 thousand prefectural citizens' misery is, after all, because of the continuing occupation rule that is against the decisive will of all prefectural citizens.

For 12 years since the war ended, we have suffered all kinds of hardships. We cannot bear it any longer.

More than 170 thousand citizens of Okinawa prefecture fell victim in the past war. Nevertheless, at the San Francisco Peace Treaty, we were made hostage as compensation for our Homeland's independence. If our long cherished hope of reversion is not realized this time, we end up shouldering a three-fold crucifix. We believe that the Okinawa problem is not solely Okinawa's problem, but it is to be resolved under the responsibility of 90 million nationals (OSFTHI 1982:44).

It is essential to explain the socio-political background of the years surrounding 1957. In 1956, Japan became a member of the United Nations, and its economy was growing. What is called the "old" Security Treaty was taken as a humilitatingly unequal treaty, and with the uproar of conservative nationalism in part affected by such incidents as the Sunagawa Struggle, there was a pressure on the government to come to terms with this unequal, subordinate status of Japan. The status of Okinawa was also taken into consideration along this line of nationalistic atmosphere (Arasaki 1976:187). Thus, the Kishi-Eisenhower meeting which was soon to be held was of considerable interest for activists in Okinawa. Having this situation in mind, we can take a look at the above resolution sent to the mainland government, and the Houses of Representatives and Councilors, along with each political party.

The Resolution first of all asserts a causal relation between the "misery" of people of Okinawa and the "occupation rule" by the United States. The miserable situation, i.e., having to "suffer all kinds of hardships," is because of the United States' presence. And where did this begin in the first place? The Resolution identifies the starting point of this misery: the Peace Treaty. The discourse suggests that Okinawa was sacrificed by the government in order to attain its independence. And, what is noteworthy is that the war experience is noted here in two ways: one stressing the agency of the people of Okinawa, and the other stressing the structural inevitability of their suffering. The former notion provides nuances of showing the war experience as proof that the people of Okinawa fought the war as Japanese. The number of war dead proves that Okinawa has the right to be included in the post-war measures just the same as mainland Japan. The latter notion is that Okinawa has had to sacrifice so many of its people—dying, facing a powerful force that they couldn't really do anything about. In short, the people of Okinawa were victimized in a war that wasn't of their own making.

Having embedded these two nuances, the Resolution moves on to criticize the signing of the Peace Treaty; that is, the government of mainland Japan traded the administrative rights over Okinawa to the U.S. in exchange for its own independence. The argument regarding the war experience is a bit ambiguous. Does it run, "How can you keep on doing this to us when we have fought the war with you?" or "Look at you. What you have been doing is continuously forcing us to sacrifice our lives for your own good?" It can run both ways, and I believe the intention is to provide both possibilities.

**Formation of the Battle of Okinawa Discourse: The Commencement of Victimization**

Without any notable statements made by organizations in Okinawa on the war experience after 1957, we move on to the year 1960. Japan in 1960 was considering the signing of what is called the "new" Security Treaty or the
Mutual Security Treaty and there were massive protests against the signing and ratification of the Treaty. The question of whether or not to continue the military alliance with the United States necessarily involved the question of whether to allow the United States to continue to control Okinawa. In a sense, 1960 was perceived by activists to be an opportunity where change in the status of Okinawa could be brought about. But on 19th of January, Kishi signed the Treaty. Six months later, on 19th of June, the Treaty was approved by the Diet, and on the 23rd of June, which is the day the Battle of Okinawa ended, the Treaty went into effect. In other words, the Government of Japan left the issue of Okinawa untouched and decided to maintain the status quo as a territory under U.S. administrative rule.

An organization called Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Kyogikai was formed on the 28th of April 1960. The following is a letter of protest made on the 28th of April by Fukkikyo at its Formation Rally, which was called “Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Kyogikai Kessei Taikai.”

A letter, sent to Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke:

For 15 years since the war ended, the 850 thousand prefectural citizens have been continuously requesting to the mainland government the realization of reversion to the homeland as our long-cherished “minzoku no” hope while suffering numerous hardships, but we have not seen any satisfactory efforts made until this date.

During World War II we have shed the blood of 300 thousands, and worse yet, the Peace Treaty was signed under citizens of Okinawa Prefecture’s sacrifice, being cut off from our homeland. Thus alien [iminzoku] rule began. The citizens of Okinawa prefecture alone are being made to shoulder three-folded sacrifice. We cannot but feel indignant over this behaviour of the mainland government.

...[The Government of Japan] has signed the new Security Treaty and is about to ratify this Treaty. This is something that will put off the reversion, thus it can never be approved. On last 13th at the Special Committee of the House of Representatives, your Prime Minister has answered, “For the purpose of maintaining peace in the Far East, possession of Okinawa by the Unites States is necessary.” This chills the blood of 80 million fellow citizens, and moreover, this is something that will add another humiliation to the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture. We have to question, “Whose Prime Minister are you? (Izuko no shushô nariya)” (OSFTHI 1982:58).

This letter is not ambiguous about the war experience. There is no room for reading the presentation as "we have fought the war as Japanese, but we were cut off from the mainland and victimized for the mainland’s own purpose" as in the statement of 27 April 1957. Instead, a continuing line of sacrifice is made clear in the above 1960 statement, and the war experience is noted as the starting point of the sacrifices. This is clear from the use of the word “worse yet.” The Japanese term used here is “sara ni” and it can be also read as “further, even, still.” My translation of “sara ni” as “worse yet” is not an exaggeration of the Japanese term. It represents the meaning the word holds by reading the actual Japanese text.

The discourse is, “people of Okinawa suffered massive bloodshed in the Pacific War, and what is worse, we were again victimized by the mainland government signing the Peace Treaty.” This continuation is shown by the word “sara ni” or in my translation, “and worse yet.” The agency on the part of people of Okinawa has disappeared, and the “victimization” discourse has made its clear appearance along with the appearance of Fukkikyo.

This was a historically critical moment for the people of Okinawa. The actions taken by the mainland Japanese were telling them something: the new Security Treaty was signed and was on the road to implementation. The passing of the new Security Treaty meant not even the maintenance of the status quo but a fortification of the Japan-U.S. military alliance, which meant a further victimization of Okinawa by the mainland Japanese. Moreover, if you take this year positively, the year 1960 was a chance for change. It was a chance for Fukkikyo to see if Kishi could take a tough position against the United States and to say “no” to the United States’ presence in Okinawa and, thereby, put an end to their misery. But what was Japan’s national representative’s position on this? It was, as in their Protest statement, that the possession of Okinawa by the United States is necessary for the peace of their region. Thus, Okinawa’s peace was being sacrificed for the peace of Japan, i.e., economic growth. And the Prime Minister said such sacrifice is, in the original “hitsuyo,” or necessary. This notion of “hitsuyo” incorporates the idea that the sacrifice of a small part is justifiable for the well-being of the whole. Fukkikyo criticized this position of the mainland Government as “humiliating.” The construction of social memory of the war experience as the starting point of the post-war history of victimization thus made its appearance in 1960. It was initiated by Fukkikyo as a way to consciously criticize the ongoing humiliating experience of the people of Okinawa in the post-war era. The use of the war experience powerfully argues that there is a continuation of the victimization committed by “their own government (Japan).”
The following is a statement written on 19 June 1960, when the new Security Treaty was ratified in the Diet. This letter was intended to be presented to the American President, which is why an English version exists, but it was not ultimately delivered. The statement below is the original English version.

Declaration and Resolution

In the last World War, Okinawa, on which the most bloody battle that the world has ever seen had been fought, has sustained incomparable ravages of war and hundreds of thousands of lives have been victimized. Emerging from the tragedy we who have survived the war has [have] continuously desired to put an end to the state of occupation at the earliest possible date seeking for peace and with our hatred towards war.

However, amidst our rejoicing over independence of our fatherland, Japan, as a result of effectuation of Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, Okinawa alone has been separated from her father-land and put under unilateral military administration of the United States.

Despite the past 15 years of our "bloody cry" for reversion to our father-land, the United States has continuously rejected the ardent desire of we, 800,000 Okinawa prefectural people, contending "she will maintain Okinawa as long as there exists a continued tension in the far east."

However, we, prefectural people, are unsatisfied with the attitude of rejection (OSFTHI 1982:60-61).

Here, the idea of "hansen heiwa" or the anti-war and peace is emerges and the source of it is attributed to Okinawans' unique war experience. Discourse on the Battle of Okinawa is here seen as the basis for the "hansen heiwa" ideology.

The next statement is a petition written to the representative of the Prime Minister's Office of the Japanese Government, Fujieda Sensuke, when he visited Okinawa. The date is noted as 28 December 1960.

Petition regarding the Reversion of Administration of Okinawa

...In World War II, citizens of Okinawa Prefecture have lost 200 thousand precious lives and all of its assets, and have been living through numerous hardships ever since.

Fifteen years have passed since Okinawa, against its citizens' will, was put under rule of the United States based on Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. During these years we have been appealing the reversion to our homeland, but this still has not been realized.

Why? That is because the Government of Japan has not taken any action demanding the reversion of administration of Okinawa Prefecture. If there can be seen such move, it is merely a teatime talk.

Up until present there can be seen no sign of an attempt for diplomatic negotiation, and this shameful attitude that leaves us lying dead makes us discontented.

But we still do not give up our faith in our weak-kneed homeland Government (OSFTHI 1982:66).

In the above quote, the linear continuation argument is evident. The two halves of the first sentence connect the suffering of the people caused by the devastation of Okinawa in the last World War, with the suffering of the post-war era—a continuation of suffering without a break. After noting the ongoing suffering, the petition moves on to accuse the mainland government's "shameful" unwillingness to put reversion negotiation on the table. While criticizing the continuing victimization on the part of the mainland government, Fukkikyō still held an almost desperate hope in the mainland government's action to break through the deadlocked situation of Okinawa as indicated in the last sentence.

We now move into the year 1961. This quote below is the Statement made at Fukkikyō's 3rd Regular Meeting on the 8th of April 1961.

Statement

In World War II, many citizens of Okinawa Prefecture lost their parents, brothers, husband, wife, and children. And even at present that nightmare of brutal bloodshed is unforgettable. Hatred against war that has taken away precious lives will not end....

Government of Japan though an independent country is leaving its own land and people under foreign rule, ignoring the prefectural citizens' deep hope. It is not only not striving for reversion of Okinawa but also signed the agreement with the United States of the revised Security Treaty that further fixes the current status of Okinawa.

We believe reversion to the homeland can be realized if the Government of Japan intends to demand from the United States the reversion of Okinawa (OSFTHI 1982:76)

This quote also shows the use of the Battle of Okinawa as the origin of anti-war ideology. The other point to mention is the agency on the mainland government's part in consciously signing the new Security Treaty with the
clear intention of prolonging the status of Okinawa as a land outside of Japan's administration.

Next is a petition statement made to the then Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato on 14 June 1961. On the chronological timeline, this statement is made after the Ikeda-Kennedy Joint Communiqué was publicized. As history tells us, there was no change regarding the status of Okinawa.

Petition of Reversion of Administration, made to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato.

...In World War II, [Government of Japan] made Okinawa lose close to 200 thousand lives and all of its assets, and moreover at the Peace Conference has allowed the rule by the United States. This responsibility is clearly on the Government of Japan. Because of the separation from our homeland, citizens of Okinawa Prefecture were made to undergo unimaginable, unbearable sacrifice. Forgetting even this, the mainland government we count on is being passive, thus the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture cannot help but be disappointed; this will only increase distrust against the government among the prefectural citizens.

...Can the 900 thousand prefectural citizens be just left like this? ... We do not wish to be used as a diplomatic tool of the mainland government endlessly and be victimized under international politics (OSFTHI 1982:99–100).

This statement almost needs no further elaboration. The image is that of the people of Okinawa being intentionally left as victims by mainland Japanese. Having been forced to go through the devastating past war, Okinawans were then used at the Peace Conference as a trade-off for mainland Japan's independence. Not only is the mainland government leaving the status of Okinawa as is, but also they are fortifying the Japan-U.S. military alliance in the process. Fukkikyo made a statement on 24 July 1961 as a direct reaction to the Joint Communiqué, which is called the "Statement against Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting and the Joint Communiqué," and in it stated clearly, "It is the Ikeda Administration of the Government of Japan that is preventing Okinawa from reversion" (OSFTHI 1982:102). Mainland Japan is consciously using Okinawa for its own well-being and, furthermore, that exploitation started with the Battle of Okinawa.

A statement made in 1962 is also very clear. This statement is again made to former Prime Minister Ikeda on 22 February.

Resolution of Protest against the Government of Japan, sent to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato

"Okinawa is not a colony. The issue of administration is an issue between Japan and the United States. Control of Okinawa is not against the United Nations Charter." As a reply to the resolution regarding the reversion of administration that was adopted at the last Legislature (of Government of the Ryukyu Islands), the Government of Japan has announced such a statement.

Citizens of Okinawa Prefecture, facing such news, were baffled by the very Government we have been relying on up to this point. We now hold infinite indignation [against the Government of Japan].

From this fact, we are now suspicious that it is the Government of Japan, submissive to the United States, who is delaying the reversion.

We have to remember. It is the Government of Japan that opened the way to indefinite rule by the United States.

Following the Pacific War, imagine how much sacrifice we were forced to pay under 16 years of military occupation. The attitude of the Government, ignoring and overlooking the state of separation of its own people, is never to be forgiven....

We cannot stand anymore being used as a diplomatic tool by the Government of Japan nor the victimization of the international situation (OSFTHI 1982:121–2).

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) continuously adopted resolutions requesting immediate reversion to the mainland. And quite often, both the Fukkikyo and GRI quoted the U.N. Charter, which advocated the equal rights of all human beings and their right to self-determination. Moreover, in December 1960 the U.N. made a proclamation on theessentiality of exterminating colonialism of every sort. The above quote in the Government of Japan's statement is a reaction to such resolution made by the GRI, quoting the U.N. proclamation regarding the existing colonialism.

With that statement by the Government of Japan, Fukkikyo again saw the Government's willingness to maintain the status quo by victimizing Okinawa, and Fukkikyo could only express "indignation." The people of Okinawa were sacrificed during the war, and the sacrifice still continued. This is the main discourse observed.

A statement made in 1964 is yet another example of the discourse of the Battle of Okinawa as a starting point of perceived continuing victimization.
Appeal of Reversion Made at the Sea Rally

...Today, the 28th of April, is the worst day for the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture on which we were made to face forced humiliation.

When the Peace Treaty went into effect by stampeding upon the will of the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture, we were pushed into the deepest gorge of grievance. 12 years since, being reminded of the fact that this tragedy, which nobody anticipated, is lasting for such a long time and having to continuously make an appeal for reversion every year, unspeakable anger wells up inside us. If we think for a moment, up until now, for almost 20 years since Okinawa was used as a breakwater for the defence of the mainland, thus the entire island being turned into ashes and paying 200 thousand sacrifices, there was not one day that came in peace to Okinawa (OSFTHI 1982:170-1).

The above statement was made on 28th of April 1964 at a rally conducted on the 27th parallel where the line of separation was drawn. The use of the phrase "up until now," and the following notion on the war experience as being "used as a breakwater," and the notion "there was not one day that came in peace to Okinawa" are all clear statements stressing the continuation of sacrifice starting from the Battle of Okinawa.

The next quote is a resolution made on 28 April 1965, to the newly elected former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and to the Presidents of the Houses of Representatives and Councilors.

Resolution of Request Regarding the Reversion of Okinawa's Administration

The Government of Japan has ... enabled the U.S. control of Okinawa for 20 years.

...By the existence of nuclear weapons installed in Okinawa, only the prefectural citizens are being exposed to the threat of war...

...[Government of Japan] is not even making an attempt to request the reversion to the United States when it is letting foreign rule over one's own people and are under critical situation...

How can a country now independent and a member of the United Nations let the United States occupy part of its own territory in such grand manner? We cannot but feel indignant. If our homeland is to complete its independence, it should settle the Okinawa problem as its postwar settlement (OSFTHI 1982:227).

The last sentence of this quote is noteworthy. Fukkikyo's conceptualization of the resolution of the "Okinawa problem" as the responsibility of the mainland Government's "postwar settlement," or sengo shori in the original Japanese text, indicates that something needed to be settled after the war that occurred during the war. The issue yet to be settled is the devastation brought about in the Battle of Okinawa, for which the Government of Japan is held to be responsible. Since the responsibility for that devastation still has not been resolved, Fukkikyo is criticizing this continuing festering of the issue.

The following is another statement made in 1965 though the exact date is uncertain.

Letter of Direct Appeal to Prime Minister Sato: An Appeal regarding Reversion of Okinawa's Administration.

...But we believe Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, which is putting Okinawa in its current status, is abolishable with Japan's strong request....

In the Battle of Okinawa, citizens of Okinawa Prefecture became the shield for homeland defense, and for 20 years since, we have been made to shoulder the crucifix and become the victim of United States' policy of military-first. Under such rule, basic freedom and human rights are being suppressed, and democracy and right to self-govern is being denied. Why do only the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture have to bear one-sidedly the responsibility of the homeland's war defeat? This is something never to be forgiven (OSFTHI 1982:234).

Two things are noteworthy about the year 1965, since this year is one of the years that there are numerous statements made by the Fukkikyo. First, 1965 represented the twentieth anniversary of the war's end. Fukkikyo held its annual April 28th rally, but with a theme "Freedom from 20 Years of Alien Rule." Second, the Administration of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was formed. Sato raised the reversion of Okinawa as one of the primary agenda items of his cabinet. The inauguration of the Sato Administration was taken by the agents of the reversion movement as an opportunity to realize their goal. In January, the first Sato-Johnson summit meeting was held, and on the 13th, Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué was announced, which again, supported the maintenance of military "facilities" in Okinawa.

The first sentence of the letter still indicates hope for the new administration, which was formed in November of 1964. Especially noteworthy, however, is the usage of the term "Battle of Okinawa" in the second paragraph; this appears for the first time in statements made by Fukkikyo. Since its formation,
Fukkikyō had been using phrases such as "in World War II" or "in Pacific War" in its statements. By this time, the implication or the intended meaning of "Battle of Okinawa" conveyed in the usage of those terms had been already well constructed. Explicitly using "Battle of Okinawa" to represent its war experience at this point makes the distinction between the war fought on Okinawa, including all of the experiences the Okinawans underwent, and other battles fought during World War II. The usage implies that there are specific elements, or a certain uniqueness to the war experiences of the people of Okinawa. If one is to look for the uniqueness within the above statement's context, it is the fact that citizens were made to sacrifice themselves for the country. The above words "shield" and "victim" are parallel. There is no break in the sentence of noting both the war experience and postwar experience; there is no break on the chronological timetable of history of victimization. In short, the Battle of Okinawa is the Commencement.

We now enter 1966. The following resolution was made to Prime Minister Sato and the Presidents of Houses of Representatives and Councilors on April 28th.

Resolution of Request regarding Okinawa's Reversion to Homeland

In World War II, we the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture were made to sacrifice great numbers of lives and assets under the name of homeland defense (sokoku bōei), and moreover, even under 21 years of postwar U.S. military rule, we have taken deep interest in peaceful reconstruction of Japan and developed a citizen's movement (minzoku undō) requesting Okinawa's reversion to the mainland for Japan's completion of independence. . . .

Last year when Prime Minister Sato visited Okinawa, he said "Post war era is not over until the Okinawa problem is solved." Nevertheless, Government of Japan made an official statement saying "there is no meaning in reverting Okinawa's administration by sacrificing peace and stability in the Far East," and this ignores the prefectural citizens' wishes. We voice here strong anger against the Government that is stressing the legitimacy of U.S. rule of Okinawa and advocating its righteousness (OSFTHI 1982:295–6).

In this statement, a reading of the mainland's government's attitude on the issue of reversion by the Fukkikyō can be seen. Sato might have been for reversion, but not in the way the citizens of Okinawa wished. Fukkikyō realized that Sato only supported reversion as long as "peace and stability in the Far East" was maintained, which meant continuing the same levels of U.S. military presence in Okinawa—essentially the same as the 1954 position; Fukkikyō opposes this. But on the part of Okinawa, the discourse showed a drastic shift. In 1954, the second Kiseikai did not exhibit any disagreement against such discourse of mainland Japanese; they agreed and even thanked Mainichi Shimbun for supporting their wish for reversion. Therefore, at that point, the second Kiseikai was for reversion even with the condition of the U.S. military bases. They had not yet conceptualized the discourse offered by mainland Japan as an indication of intentional victimization by the mainland Japanese. Fukkikyō, on the other hand, was very different. They criticized reversion with U.S. bases as "ignoring the prefectural citizens' wishes," and a case of repetitive ignorance and victimization committed consciously by the mainland Japanese. The above resolution begins with an accusation of mainland Japan's conduct during the war, and statement goes on to the critique of the current conduct of mainland Japan, asserting that this indicates the continuation of victimization, locating the beginning point: the Battle of Okinawa.

A resolution made to Prime Minister Sato on 2 November 1967 is similar to the above statement made in 1966.

Resolution of Request for Immediate and Unconditional Reversion

... The fact that during World War II Okinawa was victimized as the site of a fierce battle for homeland defense is something that both Government of Japan and its 100 million fellow citizens admit.

After the war, Okinawa was made to shoulder our homeland's crucifix as a measure for recovery of peace, and was put under alien rule against our will. During these years, our homeland Japan joined the United Nations and at the same time developed its economy, thus showed its country's status to the international community. But we were left aside under military rule for over 22 years . . . .

Two years ago in August, your Prime Minister's words "Post war era is not over until the Okinawa problem is solved" has given us hope, but looking at the Government's attitude regarding the Okinawa problem makes us more disappointed (OSFTHI 1982:373).

Here the discourse locates the Battle of Okinawa as the commencement point of post-war victimization taking into consideration the current behavior of mainland Government.

Let's look at the resolution in 1968, which was made to the Prime Minister and to the Presidents of Houses of Representatives and Councilors on April 28th.
Resolution of Request to the Government of Japan to Regain Okinawa

...Through all sorts of actions we have... appealed to the Government of Japan to immediately negotiate with the United States and raise the issue to the United Nations.

But the Government of Japan, despite the strong request of 100 million fellow citizens plus the 960 thousand citizens of Okinawa Prefecture, is emphasizing repeatedly the importance of the military bases in Okinawa, and is not showing any sign of changing its anti-national attitude and U.S.-subordinated foreign policy. Moreover, after last November's Sato-Johnson Joint Communiqué, the Government is trying to alter the issue of reversion of Okinawa into "Kokuboron [the issue of homeland defense]" and "Kakukichi-tsuiki Henkanron [Reversion of Okinawa with the nuclear bases maintained]" and is about to sacrifice Okinawa as war victims again, without reflecting on the past victimizing act committed against all Japanese nationals and also to neighbour countries.

We shall never let this happen (OSFTHI 1982:430).

Here again, Fukkikyo is clearly criticizing the present-day behavior of the government with a strong argument of continuing victimization. Additionally, it is interesting that Fukkikyo is extending the boundary of the "victimized." The tactic of widening the involved, thus shows intentionality to mobilize the largest possible population; in this case, specifically trying to connect or make a "rentai" or an alliance with the mainland Japanese thus offering the mainland Japanese a conceptualization they can act upon along with the people of Okinawa, can be noted here. The specificity of Okinawa's war experience is made relatively less strongly here in order to attain the above objective.

We now enter the year 1969. The following statement was made on the 24th of April to the Government of Japan.

A Public Inquiry to the Government of Japan

During World War II, we the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture were made to undergo such war devastation that we lost 100 thousand lives of non-combatant citizens. This is one of the most tragic events in Japan's history.

The Government not only ignored the postwar relief and reconstruction measures, but without taking into consideration the will of prefectural citizens, gave away the right to administer Okinawa to the United States on April 28th, 1952.

...Especially, the behavior of taking advantage of national sentiment for reversion of Okinawa and forcing the "Kaku-tsuki, Jiyushiyō Henkan"

is pointing towards the nuclear armament and rearmament of Japan. This not only breaches upon the Constitution and is against the national opinion but is also something that discriminates Okinawa again. One can see clearly the intent of trying to push Okinawa again into war devastation. We can never agree to this (OSFTHI 1982:492–3).

Again a clear discourse of continual line of victimization, or in the above specific statement "discrimination," starting from the Battle of Okinawa is seen.

The next quote is a statement made by Fukkikyo's then Chairman Kyan Shin'e on the day when Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué was announced, i.e., the 22nd of November 1969 (New York Times, 22 November 1969).

Chairman's Talk on Japan-U. S. Joint Communiqué

...We cannot stop fearing that in the near future, the Government of Japan might again discriminate against Okinawa and take cold-blooded measures.

We intend to clarify this along with the steps of the Government of Japan and the United States who are drawing the reversion agreement and exhaustively make requests and protests to the Sato Administration.

We announce our resolution to strengthen the ties of the prefectural citizens and to investigate the acts of discrimination taken against the prefectural citizens by the Government of Japan so as not to be ignored again.

Our will comes from the walking of 25 years of hardships up until now (OSFTHI 1982:533).

Here, the word "discrimination" is in full use. The word "again" in the first sentence seems to point to the initial discrimination as the signing of the Peace Treaty. But, in the last sentence, it notes the "25 years" of continuing hardships; counting back the 25 years takes the chronology of hardship to the year 1945 when the Battle of Okinawa was experienced. The Battle of Okinawa, therefore, is the beginning of post-war "hardships," and that road of 25 years includes repetitive encounters with "discrimination" against the people of Okinawa by mainland Japan.

The most notable event that occurred in the year 1970 is the extension of the Mutual Security Treaty. Following is the statement made at a rally called "Prefectural Citizens-wide Rally for the Obstruction of Progression towards the Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué and Demand for Complete Reversion" on 28 April 1970.
... At the last November's summit conference, Government of Japan and the Government of the United States made a deceptive agreement on "Kaku-nuki, Hondonami, 72-nen Henkan [Without nuclear bases, application of the Status of Forces Agreement, and reversion in 1972]." By including Okinawa's nuclear bases into the applicable sphere of the Security Treaty, Government of Japan is militarizing Japan with nuclear weapons, using Okinawa as a tool for the reformation of Japan militarism and establishment of Asia nuclear security system. Thus, the Government of Japan is trying to sacrifice again for the third time (OSFTHI 1982:602).

Three times of sacrifice—the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, signing of the Peace Treaty in 1952 excluding Okinawa, and the possible reversion of Okinawa on the condition of the maintenance of the U.S. military bases along with the nuclear weapons—are emphasized. Again, the Battle of Okinawa is located as the beginning of the history of continual sacrificing of Okinawa perpetuated by mainland Japan.

The next statement was made on the 23rd of June 1970, which was the twenty-fifth anniversary of the day the Battle of Okinawa ended.

6-23 Statement

Today, the 23rd of June is the day in which we communicate that during World War II 200 thousand victims numbered in Okinawa, and that we pursue indefinitely the responsibility of the State.

At the same time, it is the day we strictly remember the fact that we not only failed to prevent as Japanese citizens the government's war policy but could not see through the true nature of it. It is the day we make a determination to protect the Peace Constitution so that we do not go to war again. . . .

We cannot make waste of those cries of our fellow citizens who perished in the Battle of Okinawa. That is, "We shall never make war again," "Protect the Peace Constitution. Be and show the model to the world."

The Security Treaty has gone into automatic extension (OSFTHI 1982:611).

Quite a long time had passed since the agency capacity of the people of Okinawa in the Battle of Okinawa disappeared from the discourse on war experience. 1957 was the last statement in which the notion of war experience could be read both ways, as the people of Okinawa fought the war as Japanese, and as the people of Okinawa were victimized. Fukkikyō did not exist at that time, so the above statement would be the first public statement stressing the agency of the people of Okinawa in the Battle.

By bringing in to consciousness the fact that "we could've done something to prevent the war" or it was possible to "see through the nature of it," Fukkikyō was intensifying the fact that the Security Treaty went into extension. By focusing on their agency, Fukkikyō was alerting the people to their inactiveness or insufficiency of action. To put it more simply, Fukkikyō is saying the people should not permit Okinawa to become the ground for waging again. This means Okinawa should resist the hosting of U.S. military bases. Allowing the U.S. bases to remain is now framed as lending a hand to war-making. The extension of the Security Treaty is that proof. And the experience of the Battle of Okinawa is to be acted upon in order to see better what is going on at present and change the current situation. The day of the Battle of Okinawa is the day to remember the wrong-doing on the part of mainland Japanese and the passivity on the part of Okinawan people.

Battle of Okinawa as an Undeniable Case of Victimization and 100 Years of Discrimination

In 1971, the reversion that was about to be implemented, without tangibly decreasing the U.S. military bases, including the nuclear facilities, and by deploying the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF), began to be referred to by Fukkikyō, as the "Third Ryūkyū Shobun." Ryūkyū Shobun is the term used to point to the historical event of the Ryūkyū Kingdom being forcefully annexed into the Meiji Government of Japan as one of its prefectures. In this new discourse, the Battle of Okinawa, from the Commencement of Victimization, became part of an undeniable case of victimization, starting from the year 1872; this was the point at which political actions were initiated by the Meiji Government to include Ryūkyū as part of the new imperial Japan.

In 1971, the Defense Agency announced its Fourth Defense Plan, which included the plan to station 6,800 SDF personnel. And finally, on 17th of June, Foreign Ministers of both countries signed the Reversion Agreement.

The following is the statement made on the day of the signing of the Agreement.

Statement of Protest against the Signing of an Agreement on "Reversion" Ignoring the Prefectural Citizens, June 17th, 1971

Today, Government of Japan and the United States signed the Agreement on "Reversion of Okinawa"... We, from the stance of anti-war and
peace that has its basis on war experience, have stressed total reversion by removal of every military base and annulment of the Security Treaty, but the Agreement was signed by completely ignoring our fierce demand extending for a quarter century. We strictly reject this Agreement, at the same time protest with all our indignation (OSFTHI 1982:687).

In this statement one can see the shape of reversion the people of Okinawa desired. They wished for reversion without any kind of military base. This is based on the ideology of anti-war and peace, and this is based on their specific war experience that has been consciously built in relation to the post-war experience under U.S. military rule.

The following statement, also made on the 17th of July 1971 is a harsh criticism against the words of a political authority.


...The gist of Acting Minister of Home Affairs Mr. Nemoto's statements runs as follows. "Don't complain with the Government's policy on Okinawa. War devastation runs similar with the mainland. If we be too protective and over care, Okinawa will become a corpulent child, and this is going to grow anxiety among depopulated prefectures. Okinawa is merely one prefecture. Because I did not want to give them too much public promises, I didn't bother to visit Okinawa. Those things we can consider after reversion."

...What sorts of policy has the Government of Japan taken against Okinawa up to present? Compensation for the unprecedented losses the people of Okinawa suffered during the Battle of Okinawa was the offering of Okinawa under the American military rule. During those years, not only disqualifying us from the Special Reconstruction Measures for War Devastation (Sensai Fukkikyō Tokubetsu Sochi), the Government of Japan has been completely leaving aside the pains of the people of Okinawa under the U.S. military rule. Owing to this, it is the world's second largest GNP Japanese monopolistic capital that became corpulent. We have to say that the above statement is a very misconceived one.

The LDP Cabinet, surprised by the reactions stirred by the above statement, is striving to gloss over what was already said, but words such as "lack of consideration" nor "careless statement" will not do with this issue (OSFTHI 1982:689-90).

The above resolution shows the anger of Fukkikyō in seeing Minister Nemoto, someone who occupied such a high-ranking position and was part of the decision-making process on reversion, make such a cavalier and dismissive statement about Okinawa. They see the attitude of the Japanese Government on Okinawa, as ignorant and insulting. The Fukkikyō brings up their own interpretation of the Battle of Okinawa as an experience never to be forgotten in relation to the post-war measures. Fukkikyō is fighting against the attempted trivialization by the Government in saying "there is no difference in war devastation between the mainland and Okinawa."

The next statement is made to the Prime Minister, Presidents of both Houses, President of Special Committee on Okinawa, and to the head of Defense Agency, on the 4th of December at a rally voicing against the deployment of the Self Defense Force.

Resolution against the Deployment of SDF to Okinawa, December 4th, 1971.

The reversion we have been crying and demanding for the past 26 years was to go home in the state of true peace.

That is because reversion under such condition is the least way we can make up for those husbands and sons, brothers, sisters, and friends who were made victims of Japan's militarism.

...We have pursued our demand for reversion under suppression of the United States for 26 years, and when we thought we could finally return to our homeland, now 6800 Self Defence Force members are said to come to Okinawa.

During the last war, our parents were killed, food was taken away by force, mothers with crying babies were pushed out of the caves and died of hunger and bombs. These were all done by the Japanese Military, and we will never forget those fellows' death (OSFTHI 1982:724).

The specificity of the war experience of the people of Okinawa is noted here in detail. This shows the construction of public memory on the Battle of Okinawa in relation to the present situation, i.e., the stationing of the SDF in Okinawa. In addition to enduring the disappointment of not seeing the U.S. military bases disappear from their land, they see another military force, the Japanese Self Defence Force coming in. In facing this new reality, Fukkikyō bring up their memory of the Battle of Okinawa and the conduct of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Battle. Fukkikyō sees an unbroken line between the Japan Army and SDF, that is Japan militarism.

The following statement was made on the 15th of May 1972, the day of reversion.
Resolution of Protest against "Okinawa Shobun" based on Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué

We the citizens of Okinawa Prefecture have, from the brutal and miserable experience of war itself from the Battle of Okinawa, denied war and have been fighting for the realization of a peaceful Okinawa prefecture devoid of nuclear weapons and bases. We have been demanding this strongly to the Government of Japan and the United States on this.

Since the Japan-U.S. Joint Communiqué was announced, we have been strongly protesting that the intention of reversion is the fortification of military bases in Okinawa, and that this is an "Okinawa Shobun [Annexation of Okinawa]" forcing upon us a new discrimination and victimization...

...Today, the reversion of administration of Okinawa was realized, but this is a political and economic "Okinawa Shobun," thus we protest with fierce indignation (OSFTHI 1982:813).

The term "Okinawa Shobun" is used in describing the Reversion. The term appears when the people of Okinawa describe the "Hai-han Chi-ken" extended to Okinawa in the Meiji Era, which is termed "Ryuukyuu Shobun." In history books on Okinawa history, this term is often used to refer to the forcible annexation of Okinawa into Japan, and the subsequent unequal treatment against Okinawans by the mainland Japanese. Here, by using the term "Okinawa Shobun," Fukkikyō is constructing the memory of continual discrimination and victimization by extending the line of continuity prior to the Battle of Okinawa, all the way back to the Meiji era by noting the similarity between past events and current events. Inclusion of Okinawa by the mainland in order to utilize them, and ignoring the local voice in favor of the larger voice, the term "Okinawa Shobun," shows similar dynamics which has been continued for almost 150 years.

Even after reversion, Fukkikyō continues to exist and to make statements. If we think of Fukkikyō's goal, which was the realization of reversion, we can see that the reversion took shape in a way far different from what the Fukkikyō wished. As we have seen in this paper, Fukkikyō's statements had three main elements: Battle of Okinawa, Reversion, and Current Socio-Political Situation. Fukkikyō has been basically voicing for reversion without delay, "unconditional" means without exceptional conditions for nuclear facilities and other U.S. military facilities, and "full" means every Okinawa island including Miyako and Yaeyama Islands (OSFTHI 1982:463). The above slogan, hardened in 1968, also entails a sentiment for peace. Fukkikyō is against the Security Treaty, Revision of the Constitution, and revival of militarism (OSFTHI 1982:406).

This "Peace" discourse, i.e., wishing for a peaceful island free of nuclear weapons and military bases, becomes quite clear in the statements after reversion. Since that reversion was realized, the three elements have now become two elements, the Battle of Okinawa and the Current Situation. The public memory of the Battle of Okinawa has now become its firm basis for the "hansen heiwa" (anti-war and pro-peace) ideology.

Let's look at examples of statements made in the years 1972 after reversion up to 1973.

Resolution of Protest against "Yojibo" and SDF Deployment to Okinawa, August 10th, 1972

Prefectural citizens' rejection of SDF... originates from war experience, and based on the Hansen Heiwa ideology of the people of Okinawa, who have directly been made to face hardships of war threat and base sufferings. World War II, which Japanese militarism initiated, ended in Okinawa. And this Okinawa have suffered over 100 thousand war victims, and [the people of Okinawa] were dragged outside from bomb shelters, screaming and crying children were killed, entire families perished, mass-suicide, murder for being suspected of spying, etc. These facts of being stampeded upon by the shoes of brutal militarism we shall never forget, along with the Himeyuri no Tō, Kenji no Tō and Konpaku no Tō (OSFTHI 1982:821).

Bringing up the conduct of the Japanese military during the Battle of Okinawa is made in the face of the SDF's deployment to Okinawa. They make an interpretation of what the military is, or is not, as one can see in the statement made on 21 October 1972, that is "We have experienced ourselves in the past Battle of Okinawa that military...is by no means an entity that protects the people" (OSFTHI 1982:826). Their conceptualization proved to be right on the mark when an SDF personnel raped a woman in Okinawa within a month after deployment. They state: "This rape incident is the very proof that the SDF in no way differs from the U.S. military force along with the earlier Japan Army" (OSFTHI 1982:830).
Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to analyze the way social memory of the Battle of Okinawa was constructed. I have analyzed the changes in the discourse in relation to the changing socio-political situations, and shown the conscious efforts made by people living in the present to make sense out of the current situation they are living in by making sense out of the past.

Construction of social memory by the Fukkikyo was a political action, and by this case study, I attempted to show that experience itself is not the decisive factor of discourse on that certain experience. Instead, experience is interpreted and voiced in relation to the current situation one is living in.

The discourse on the Battle of Okinawa has changed from overt silence, a conceptualization of past discrimination as that "of the past," to commencement of conceptualization of "possible" victimization, and finally to an "undeniable case" in the midst of continuing victimization starting from the Ryuukyuu Shobun. Interpretation of and voicing of the experience of the Battle of Okinawa has been made as a result of activists facing the situation they were currently in, which was the reality of discrimination and victimization. To initiate a move for reversion that would offer a justifiable reasoning for the sentiment of people of Okinawa for reversion, the first Kiseikai constructed one interpretation of the past behavior of mainland Japanese, but their interpretation was not successfully received. In 1952, Japan traded off its small possession (Okinawa) for its own national well-being. In order to criticize this act of trade-off victimization, the experience of the Battle of Okinawa was offered as yet another interpretation.

By referring to the Battle of Okinawa, Fukkikyo was not critiquing the experiences of the Battle in itself, but in conjunction with the discriminatory treatment that they conceive Okinawa had been experiencing. In order to make sense out of that current situation, they brought up the memory of the Battle of Okinawa and interpreted past experience to understand the present.

In short, if there were no Battle of Okinawa fought, but still a separation from Japan, U.S. military rule after the war, and the heavy concentration of military bases, there would still be activist organizations in Okinawa and people would be protesting for reversion. Also, even with the Battle of Okinawa, had there not been the trade-off made with U.S. administrative control over Okinawa and Japan's independence, and moreover if Okinawa was included in the postwar economic growth without the concentration of the U.S. military bases, there would probably not be as strong criticism and activism in Okinawa on the issue of discrimination and victimization during the Battle. The conceptualization made by the first Kiseikai would probably have sufficed: "The aspect of discrimination is that of the past. Japan is a new born country with a peace Constitution." There would not be a tangible reality they would have felt the need to act upon in that case. But the reality has been quite different. Even after reversion, U.S. military bases were still concentrated on Okinawa. This has been the socio-political context Okinawans have been forced to live in and the continuation of such reality that framed the past in a certain way and requires remembering the Battle of Okinawa. The organizational effort of trying to make sense out of the present reality has required the remembering of the experience of the Battle of Okinawa to act upon the present. The past is needed to better understand and act at present.

Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Simon 1994). I have shown that there is no fixed, "true history" in this paper. Instead, history is interpreted and created by those agents concerned with the past, and this is done in order to engage with conditions of the present. 

Note

1. I have been using the term "Battle of Okinawa" in hindsight to refer to the historical event of the battle fought on Okinawa in the Pacific War; like many people of my generation, this is the term with which I am most familiar. I don't know what other term to use to point to this battle.

References


On the morning of 23rd of June 1945, an eerie silence fell on Okinawa Island and its surrounding islands. Most of the almost continuous gunfire of the past eighty-two days ceased as word spread that General Ushijima had committed *seppuku* (Japanese ritual suicide) in a cave which looked out over the South China Sea. The act signaled that the horrific Battle of Okinawa which claimed nearly a quarter million lives had effectively ended. Isolated hostilities continued, but for most of the Okinawans who survived, this day is held up as a special day of remembrance. *Irei no Hi* is a “day for consoling the souls of those who perished.” Since 1974, it is annually observed as an Okinawan Prefectural holiday, and while it is not a national holiday, because it is so important, Japan's national leaders often attend the annual memorial service held at the Heiwa no Ishiji (Cornerstone of Peace).

In Hawai’i, the Jikoen Hongwanji Mission of Honolulu held a 33rd-year memorial service (a Buddhist ritual) in 1977 for those who had died in
the Battle of Okinawa, jointly sponsored by Hui O Laulima and the United Okinawan Association. But for decades afterward, the memories of survivors and their family members were repressed in efforts to move on with their lives. That is, until 2005.

As the 60th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa approached, students from Okinawa, especially those in the newly created Obuchi Scholarship Program began to ask: “Why don’t Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu commemorate Irei no Hi? Why is it that so many young local Uchinaanchu know so little about this tragic and horrendous loss of life?” Not content to just wonder, the Obuchi students and some of their local friends located, contacted, interviewed, and helped create a memorial program where survivors of the Battle of Okinawa could share their tales of horror, of survival, and of recovery with younger generations of local Okinawans.
The following year, the Irie no Hi memorial service was held at the Hawai‘i Okinawa Center on 22 June 2006 in Hawai‘i to coincide with the 23rd of June in Okinawa. Kay Murata and Rev. Shinsuke Uehara shared their experiences of the Battle of Okinawa. A number of individuals also read excerpts of survivors’ stories, and Norman Kaneshiro shared several uta-sashin pieces. The Hawai‘i Okinawa Alliance (HOA), a loose coalition of individuals representing various groups working on issues related to Okinawa and Hawai‘i, organized the latter event.
In 2007, Jikoen Hongwanji Mission Temple was again the site of the Irie No Hi remembrance. Robert Kishaba and Yoshiko Sickels shared their personal stories of living through the Battle of Okinawa. Photographs are provided courtesy of Rinda Yamashiro and Seitaro Kawawa.
The term “diaspora” evokes images of scattered seeds, metaphorical for the male substance in Judeo-Christian and Islamic cosmology. Drawn from ancient Greek terms διά (through) and σπείρο, meaning “dispersal, to sow or scatter” (Vertovec 1996:99), the word “sperm” is etymologically connected to diaspora (Helmreich 1992:245). It is not surprising, then, that in the diaspora literature that men have tended to be the focus—as diasporic subjects who are forced to disperse from place to place. In contrast, women have been represented as the ones who maintain homes or “motherlands” where matrilineal family trees/systems and roots are reproduced. Increasingly, however, studies such as Helmreich (1992) and Gopinath (1995) are critiquing and challenging the male-centered diasporic discourse.

Similar to the male-focused tropes of diasporic discourse which have symbolically represented men as spreaders of seeds and women as stable motherlands, Okinawan folk botanical metaphors also represent men as seeds (sani in Okinawan or たね in Japanese) and women as seedbeds (なしご in Okinawan or なえしろ in Japanese) (Watanabe 1985:81). In these representations, women are described as passive receivers of the seeds and reproducers of them, especially through patriarchal descent groups and family trees, called munchuu.

These portrayals are replicated in the studies and literature of Okinawan immigrants, which have focused on and discussed masculine experiences, probably because they have been done by mostly male scholars. Tōyama Kyūzo has been celebrated as “the father of Okinawan immigrants.” Who, and where, then are the “mothers” of Okinawan immigrants? It seems that Okinawan (and Japanese) immigrant women are faceless bodies discussed only as “picture brides” or はより (family members or dependents) who were called over by the men who had already emigrated. Or, they are represented as “war brides” and “G.I. brides” who followed and were dependent on their (mostly white) American husbands.

While Okinawan men may have been the larger group of immigrants to Hawai‘i and the continental United States in the pre-1940 period, this certainly was not the case in the latter half of the twentieth century. The majority of the Okinawans who migrated to Hawai‘i and the continental U.S. after the Battle of Okinawa and during the U.S. Occupation of Okinawa, were women. This paper focuses on these Okinawan immigrant women—their life stories and networks—and views them as active agents in the fashioning of their lives in their new homes.

Okinawan immigrant women have created families and homes and have spread Okinawan culture out over new lands and islands. They have connected with one another, creating their own networks by participating in Okinawan music and dance clubs. Since these women's networks are often tied in with their family or extended kin, or village-based clubs, their networks have received less attention vis-à-vis the more officially recognized organizations such as the Hawaii United Okinawa Association (HUOA), the international programs of the Okinawa Prefecture, or the Worldwide Uchinanchu Business (WUB) network.

This paper focuses on the Okinawan women who migrated to Hawai‘i after the Battle of Okinawa. These women are called “Shin Issei” or “New Issei.” First, I explore how diverse they are in terms of their family structures and occupations, and how they differ from the Issei women who had come to Hawai‘i before the war. The earlier Issei women had worked on sugar and pineapple plantations and their husbands were mainly Okinawans and laborers. In contrast, Shin Issei women's husbands are occupationally diverse and often not of Okinawan descent. It is also important to note that the Shin Issei Okinawan women could not obtain any national citizenship during the U.S. Occupation of Okinawa. They were, essentially “state-less,” and merely carried the label “resident of the Ryukyus” on their passports. Some of them had lost their parent(s) during the war and, as war orphans, were offered scholarships to study in Hawai‘i. Others had lost their partners; eventually they became “war
bribes” or “G. I. brides” and moved to Hawai‘i. Thus, the experiences of these Shin Issei women may be considered diasporic since their migrations resulted directly and indirectly from the war and U. S. occupation. This study explores the socio-historical processes in which these New Issei diasporic women and their family members experienced the Battle of Okinawa, the U. S. military occupation, and their migrations to Hawai‘i.

The study of these diasporic women expands and enriches the literature on Okinawan women, which has tended to focus on either of two aspects which are often discussed totally separately. One body of literature is concerned with the so-called Okinawan traditional folklore; the other is preoccupied with the conditions produced by the U. S. occupation of Okinawa by the U. S. military. Some anthropological and folklore studies describe Okinawan women focusing mainly on their religious and spiritual aspects which strongly connect to the family structure and closed community, but not to the presence of the U. S. military bases (Higa 1987; Muratake 1971; Segawa 1969; Takaesu 1992; Tanaka 1977, 1981, and 1982; Watanabe 1985; and others).

On the other hand, other historical or socio-political literatures mainly discuss the problems which have been brought from the U. S. military bases (Hokama 1986, Kamiyama 1994, Takazato 1996, and others). Rather than emphasize only the religious or only the political issues, this paper tries to listen to these women’s voices, the melodies those women have created in polyphonic sounds as they have crossed private and public arenas: from romantic love to marriage, to having and raising families, from coping with working conditions, to dealing with citizenship, nationality, military affiliation, to gender and race/ethnic relationships.

Finally, this paper asserts that a women-centered diasporic Okinawan culture not only exists, but thrives—by looking at the activities of these Okinawan immigrant women dancers and their performative networks. This study relies on field research which I conducted in 1995–1996, and from 1997–1999. I interviewed shin issei women and their family members, and observed their network building by participating in their activities in Hawai‘i and Okinawa. I also referred to socio-historical data in written documents and photos.

**Okinawan Women and Marriage with American Military Personnel**

In January of 1946 in Okinawa, the ratio of men to women between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five years of age was three to seven (Hokama 1986:217–8). This meant the sex ratio in the peak reproductive years was severely unbalanced. Okinawan women played very important roles in the everyday life recovery attempts in the aftermath of the Battle of Okinawa. Some women worked in the U. S. military bases, where they met their American husbands, and they eventually moved to Hawai‘i. Other women were offered scholarships or opportunities to study and work in Hawai‘i. Those women who migrated to Hawai‘i after the Battle of Okinawa are New Issei immigrant women, the topic of this paper.

The Shin Issei Okinawan women who migrated to Hawai‘i after the war can be divided into two major groups. The first group is the so-called “war brides” or “G. I. brides” who married American military personnel stationed in Okinawa; the second group is composed of those women who traveled to Hawai‘i to study or to introduce special arts and skills.

In December 1945, the U. S. Congress passed Public Law 271, which came to be known as the “War Brides Act.” However, this act allowed American military personnel to marry only “Caucasian” women in Europe. Germans and Italians were free to marry American servicemen and come to the United States, but Japanese and Okinawans were not. This is because they were classified as “racially ineligible races,” based on the 1924 act that forbade Asian immigration. (Spickard 1989:132–3).

By 1947, however, many American G. Is had married Japanese and Okinawan women and were clamoring for permission to bring them home. In response, Congress passed an amendment to the War Brides Act that permitted Japanese and Okinawan spouses to enter the U. S. during 1947 and 1948. (Spickard 1989:132–3). Consequently, between July and September of 1947, sixty-two couples of Okinawan women and American military personnel married officially. Fifty-three Okinawan women married Nisei (second generation Americans of Japanese and Okinawan immigrants), eight with European-Americans, and one with an African-American (Uruma Shimpo [Uruma Newspaper] 5 September 1947, as cited in Takushi 2000:117). However, the U. S. military forbade intermarriage again in April of 1948. The military decided that “it was necessary to prohibit the residents of the Ryukyus and U. S. military personnel from marrying so that the military could achieve occupation easier and better.” This strategy was called a “non-fraternization” policy (Takushi 2000:118).

Then, four months later, the U. S. military reversed itself and once again allowed intermarriage because the number of intermarried couples
was increasing; this was in spite of intermarriage being officially forbidden. (Takushi 2000:119). After 1953, the total number of intermarriages ceased to be counted at the office, so it is difficult to get the exact total numbers from offices all over Okinawa (Takushi 2000:140).

Although the war or G. I. brides experienced their own “private” romances, their marriages were officially controlled by the “public” policies of the U. S. Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC). CIC checked the brides’ physical conditions and their beliefs in order to decide if they were proper brides for (reproducing) the U. S. military system (Kinjyo 1983:99-100). Thus, their marriages were both private and public: local and unique to Okinawa, as well as regulated by international and political issues.

The second group of Okinawan women consisted of Okinawan women who came to Hawai‘i after the 1960s for schooling or to introduce special skills such as Okinawan dance and music or arts. Some of them eventually met their husbands and have settled in Hawai‘i. Some of those women left for Hawai‘i before the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, so they had not obtained Japanese citizenship, and would have been “stateless” persons. Consequently, they were eager to obtain a “green card” through employment or marriage with an American. Thus, their lifestyles have also been influenced by their private and public statuses.

**Diasporic Memories, Dancing Melodies**

This section introduces the life stories of seventeen Okinawan women who migrated to Hawai‘i after the Battle of Okinawa. I came to know these women by participating in their Okinawan dance (eisaa) club activities, from 1997 to 1999. I discuss the organizational structure of the eisaa club, Ryukyukoku Matsuri Daiko, in a later section of this article.

Everyday experiences and life stories of these women and their family members reflect their post-WWII macro-level socio-histories as they ventured across Okinawa, Japan, Hawai‘i and the continental U. S. Here, my focus is on the processes by which these women left their motherland of Okinawa and became mothers of Okinawan culture in their new lands—particularly the islands of Hawai‘i.

**Diasporic Memories: Narrating Post-War Experiences**

As stated earlier, most Okinawans were forced to disperse from their homes and home villages and towns because of the war. They experienced being diasporic, forced “away from home on their homeland,” after the Battle of Okinawa, and under U. S. military occupation. The Okinawan women who moved to Hawai‘i after the war still carry the memories of their diasporic experiences. For instance, one woman born in the late 1930s, recalls her experiences as follows:

I was four or five years old during the war. My father passed away in the war, so I don’t remember his face clearly. So, we [three sisters and one brother] went to school as war orphans. I was shocked, you know, when I heard that my younger sister was told by other kids: “We envy you guys since you go to school with consolation money [which was offered from government].”

Another woman, also born in the late 1930s, recalled the Battle of Okinawa and the U. S. military occupation while at an Okinawan restaurant in Hawai‘i with her friends after they had finished eisaa dance practice in 1999. They were watching a Japanese TV program on Japanese sweets. She said:

I remember, during the war time, there was a river which brought sweets and candies from the American bases. There was a river by the refugee camp, and the river carried the candies. But, we didn’t eat them because people said they contained poison.

A woman whose husband works for the military responded, “Wait a minute. Poison? It couldn’t be true. Who in the world would put poison?”

Then, the first woman replied, “That’s why U. S. military men tore chewing gum into two pieces and ate half and gave the other half to us kids, to show there was no poison in it.”

Another friend laughed at their conversation, saying, “Come on, it’s a very old story, isn’t it?” But she herself recalled those days and said, “Actually, I did eat them up. I told the men ‘Give me gum!’”

Still other members of the group continued, reminded by a memory of being frightened by Americans in Okinawa:

In my case, there was an American housing near my house in Naha. One time, when I was a kid, I was climbing up the fence around the American house, the girl in the house found me and called up her father, “Daddy! Daddy!” Then, the father came out, carrying a rifle, aimed at me and shouted, “Get out of here! Get out of here!” (She gestured, pretending to be the father carrying the gun and taking aim).
As they engaged in yuntaku (informal talk) about the plans for visiting Okinawa in order to learn eisaa dance from members of the club’s “headquarters,” one of Hawai’i’s members recalled:

Regarding sightseeing in Okinawa, Moon Beach is close from my home town. We used to walk there for school trips. It took many hours to get there. There was another beautiful beach near Kin town. That’s America’s. When I was an intermediate school student, we went to the beach for cleaning. You are asked didn’t we swim there? No, no, we can’t go into beach (laughs), because we had to pick up garbage.

In these informal ways, Okinawan Shin Issei immigrant women in Hawai’i recall their memories of the aftermath of the Battle and their post-war everyday life, experiences of more than 40 years ago. Some of the memories reflect fear and frustration over U.S. military bases, and they are represented by references to particular objects such as “poisoned sweets,” “military housing projects,” “rifles and guns,” and the “military controlled beautiful beaches.”

On the other hand, some women retained positive memories of the U.S. military. A few women had worked on the bases and had met their American husbands in that way. This contradiction—a mixture of their positive and negative memories connected with the military—reflects one of the enduring characteristics of the post-war immigrant women from Okinawa to Hawai’i. This is because for each woman, personal diasporic experiences and memories have been (re)constructed by the macro structure of socio-political history of post-war Okinawa.

**Going/Coming to Hawai’i After the Battle of Okinawa**

There are five main reasons or motivations for why the seventeen women moved to Hawai’i. First and most important, seven of them came to Hawai’i after marrying Americans. Another six of them left for Hawai’i to further their studies. Two followed parents to emigrate to Hawai’i, one sought a career, the other person’s reason was unclear.

**Coming to Hawai’i as Wives of Americans**

Although marriage to Americans was the most frequently given reason for Okinawan Shin Issei women’s migration to Hawai’i after the war (seven out of the seventeen women interviewed), we cannot essentialize or stereotype these marriages. The narratives of these Okinawan wives are colorfully varied in terms of their marital conditions (e.g., divorce and remarriage), their relationships with husbands, and with (or without) their child/children, and

...
The narratives of these seven Okinawan women who married Americans in Okinawa and who subsequently moved to Hawai'i reveal variations in terms of their husbands’ and ex-husbands’ ethnic backgrounds, places where they have lived, and reasons for their marriage and migration to Hawai'i. Although there are differences among the women, it seems that they share in common stable lives after the marriage with American personnel. Those who married military personnel during the U.S. occupation of Okinawa did not have to obtain a green card or U.S. citizenship to live in the U.S. permanently. Moreover, they had access to social welfare for themselves and their children on bases, opportunities to travel abroad, and access to many new things which they had never had in Okinawa.

These women's conditions are quite different from the Japanese war brides' experiences on the continental U.S., as Evelyn Nakano Glenn discusses. Glenn states Japanese and Okinawan war brides in the continental U.S. faced much more difficulty as minority women with language problems and less social supports and networks (1986:231-2).

Unlike Japanese war brides on the continent, however, most Okinawan war brides and New Issei women to Hawai'i as a group experienced better social treatment and support from local Okinawans (those who had immigrated to Hawai'i before the war as well as by their descendants). Shin Issei Okinawan wives of military personnel in Hawai'i were also able to take advantage of their Japanese language skills and secure jobs in the local tourist industry, and in the local Okinawan and Japanese communities.

**Coming to Hawai'i for Education**

The second most frequent reason given by Okinawan Shin Issei women for coming to Hawai'i was education. Six among the seventeen women responded that they first came to Hawai'i in order to study English and to learn a special skill such as sewing. For example, Hana first came to Hawai'i in the early 1960s, when she was in her early 20s. Her mother's relatives in Hawai'i suggested that she come to Hawai'i to go to a "mishin school." Since her grasp of the English language was poor at that time, she thought "It might be a good chance for studying English." She recounted how she had come to Hawai'i:

> But it was a very funny story! I totally believed that the school was a "mission" school, but actually it was the Fashion Institute where taught how to use "mishin" (in Japanese) or sewing machines. Oh boy, my English was terribly bad at that time since I misunderstood "machine" and "mission." Moreover, I hate sewing, you know!

By the time Hana found out and rethought studying at The Fashion Institute, her U.S. visa had been issued already. Therefore, she decided to come to Hawai'i where she eventually married a local Okinawan and bore children. She recalls that because she had lost her father in the war and had relatives in Hawai'i, she was easily able to come to Hawai'i. She now works in the maintenance section of one of Hawai'i's highest-class hotels using the knowledge and skill she gained from The Fashion Institute.

Another woman, Akane, came to Hawai'i in the late 1960s when she was sixteen years old to go to high school. Now she works at a Japanese tourist company's subsidiary in Hawai'i.

**Other Reasons for Migrating to Hawai'i**

The remaining two of the seventeen women interviewed were elementary school students and had accompanied their parents when they emigrated to Hawai'i. Finally, one Okinawan shin issei woman, Tsubaki, had come to Hawai'i in search of employment. She is a hair stylist whose specialty is Japanese and Okinawan hair styling.

**Mothering in Hawai'i**

Some women were heavily involved in parenting roles at the time I conducted my fieldwork. Others, those in their sixties, had completed parenting and were busy with grandparenting roles. Those women who had children and grandchildren enjoyed recounting their parenting and grandparenting stories. Here we see how those women have become mothers and grandmothers, with different life stories but still with common thread that they are women, mothers, and grandmothers.

One woman, Hibari, married a Hawai'i-born Okinawan-American husband, a nisei. She recalls her married life and negotiating the immigration law as follows:

> If you want to get a green card through marriage with American, you have to stay in U.S.A. after getting married. When four years had passed since our marriage, I was thinking "finally I can go to Okinawa." But, I was pregnant in the fourth year. After all, it was the tenth year when I first got back to Okinawa since I had lived in Hawai'i with two children.

She continued to talk about how she raised children in Hawai'i:

> I was told by a hakuin [white] doctor that it might be easier for children to learn different languages if they speak several languages when they are
two to four-year old. The hakujin doctor told us that I should speak to our children in proper Japanese and my husband in proper English. I followed what the doctor said, and I seriously bowed to my baby saying, “Ohayo gozaimasu (good morning),” even though my baby did not understand what I was doing at all. I read Japanese loud when we ate, like “jaamu (juice), miruku (milk), coppu (cup)” both in Japanese and English. You say those words are English? You’re right, but I taught Japanese English, too.

One day, when the baby was seven-months old, we went out and found hibiscus. I said “hana, hana (flower),” pointing at the flowers, then the baby points at her hana (nose)! I was so surprised. And I asked her “Where is eye? ear? mouth?” [in Japanese], and the baby points at the places. Children are great, you know. They always listen to what you are saying. In the case of our first child it was okay because we lived in an apartment by ourselves. But the second child never learned the two languages because he grew up in a house with my husband’s mother [obaachan]. Obaachan [an issei from Okinawa] used to take care of the boy and speaks to him in Okinawan all the time. We got messed up in using our languages at home.

The hakujin doctor also told me that I should not read English children books for our kids. So, I tried to read Japanese picture books like Kikaidar, but they brought English books and asked me to read them. If I read them in English, they said, “Mom, no, you’re wrong” and they corrected my English. They learn phonics at preschools.

When Hibari goes back to Okinawa she shows her U.S. passport at the immigrant desk for “aliens” at airports in Japan and Okinawa. She reported that she does not feel any discomfort or see any contradiction in showing her “alien” or foreign passport in her motherland. Instead, she could only recall one “problem” when she went to Okinawa with her young children:

There was a big problem on the way to Okinawa. It was very difficult to bring two children with me to Okinawa, you know. The boy was two-year old. In Hawai‘i, I did not put a diapers on the boy at home in an American way, so I forgot to bring some diapers on the plane. I put them into a suitcase.

Then, I kept asking the boy “Wanna shii shii? Duu duu?” after every two hours till getting to Okinawa.

It seemed that raising children was much more important and real to her everyday life than the macro-level international politics in which she has lived. She states, “To me, Hawai‘i is now my home where my children and family have lived together.” Her narratives stress the challenges and pleasures of raising children rather than on the processes by which she has become a U.S. citizen from her earlier status of “resident of the Ryukyus” and the complexities of crossing over (“international”) boundaries.

Although Hibari narrates her experiences without stressing the issues of nationality and citizenship, she has lived her everyday life with the international politics among Okinawa, Japan, and the U.S. during and after WWII in the background. She lost her father who was drafted in World War II as a Japanese soldier. After the war, she went to schools having been offered consolation money. Her sister died on the way to school after falling from a military truck on which she was riding.

Furthermore, after she graduated from high school, she joined an organization of young people (usually between ages 18 and 30s), and recalls their organizational activities.

Before 1972, the club members discussed the reversion of sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan everyday. I joined the political demonstration for demanding the reversion of Okinawa to Japan [with 25,000 other workers, members of political groups, and students on June 19, 1960] when an American president [Dwight D. Eisenhower] came to Okinawa, all the way from the northern part of Okinawa island.

Then, she left U.S. occupied Okinawa for Hawai‘i for her studies, as a “resident of the Ryukyus,”—therefore, without a nationality. She obtained a green card or the right to live in the U.S. permanently after she married, and eventually became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. Thus, Hibari is an Okinawan woman whose life has been woven/ been woven by experiences of living through post-war diasporic Okinawa, of migrating to Hawai‘i, and of mothering in Hawai‘i. Written in/on her life are the micro- and macro- histories of modern Okinawa.

Okinawan Shin Issei women’s negotiating of these international complexities are not limited to marriages with the descendants of earlier diaporic Okinawans, or with descendants of Euro-American military personnel. As the U.S. military increasingly desegregated and incorporated men of various ethnic backgrounds, unanticipated consequences followed. These show up in various ways, including the issues and accompanying protests against the de jure and de facto U.S. occupation and continued presence of military bases in Okinawa. While negotiations take place at the macro-levels of international relations, Okinawans lived experiences include complaints about traffic accidents, victimization and assault (both sexual and otherwise), a two-tiered judicial system in which American military personnel who have perpetrated crimes against Okinawans have historically escaped with minimal sanctions. The U.S. and Japan ignored these complaints until 1995 when outrage at the
brutal sexual assault of a 12-year old Okinawan schoolgirl refocused international attention.

Takazato and Miyagi of the organization Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence, summarize the crimes committed by beihei (U.S. servicemen) against Okinawan women since the Battle of Okinawa. According to their research, eleven crimes by U.S. servicemen were reported in public records between 1947 and 1950. Included in the eleven crimes are four cases committed by Philippine Scouts who were categorized as U.S. Servicemen from World War II. These include a rape and murder of a twenty-four year-old woman by a Philippine serviceman; a kidnap of a woman and a murder of an Okinawan man who tried to help her by a group of Philippine servicemen, a shooting and rape of a housewife by a serviceman (Takazato 1996:240).

It is difficult to imagine what kinds of dramas actually played out behind these numbers. While some Philippine Scouts did commit crimes and were counted as the “U.S. soldiers” by Okinawan women activists, and while it is important to look at the structure of the U.S. military bases imposed in Okinawa, this method tends to oversimplify the categorization of women and men, and Okinawans and Americans. Some of the Philippine Scouts married Okinawan women while others committed crimes against these women. While this kind of categorization clarifies the shape of the structure and makes easier to see the power politics, it is also necessary to look at the diverse relationships among peoples living in and around the bases, and to listen carefully to their life stories. In short, anthropologists and sociologists need to study the lived experiences of common people, and show how social structures articulate with individuals’ lives.

As such, this paper now focuses on life stories of one couple—an Okinawan woman, a Filipino man, and their family. They have lived their own personal lives together but, at the same time, their intertwined lives are a result of the post-war public affairs that involve Okinawa, Japan, Hawai‘i, the U.S., and the Philippines. The couple married in Okinawa during the Korean war. The wife was born in Okinawa and her husband was born in Hawai‘i and they met when he was stationed in Okinawa during the war. He was not one of the Philippine Scouts that the U.S. military recruited from the Philippines, but a Hawai‘i-born Filipino American (second generation). Like him, there were other Hawai‘i- or continental U.S.-born Filipino American military personnel. From 1898 until 1934, the Philippines was a territory of the U.S., and thus Filipinos did not “immigrate” to the U.S., since they were already U.S. “nationals.” In 1934, the Philippines became a commonwealth, and immigration officially could occur. (Barringer, Gardiner and Levin 1995 [1993]:26)

Five children were born to the couple and they lived in a house “off base.” At home, the wife spoke Uchinaaguchi (Okinawan) and Japanese, and the husband spoke English. At school, the children spoke English since they attended Department of Defense Overseas Dependent Schools in Okinawa. They lived in multilingual, ethnic, and cultural environments at home, school, and neighborhood. This family moved to back Hawai‘i in the early 1980s because the father retired from the military. Their children hold U.S. citizenship, but the Okinawan wife/mother has not become a naturalized U.S. citizen; instead she holds a green card, which permits her to live in America permanently. It also means that she can stay in Okinawa with her sisters and brothers for as long as she desires, because she has kept her Japanese national citizenship.

Her five children are all in multi-ethnic marriages: with a Japanese-American who was born and raised in a U.S. military base camp in Japan; a Hispanic American who worked in a U.S. base in Okinawa; a Japanese American who worked in a U.S. base in Okinawa; a Japanese American from Japan; a Hawai‘i-born Portuguese American; and a Hawai‘i-born Okinawan and Chinese American. Thus, we can see various relationships and networks within this family’s members (ethnic, cultural, and national) all of which originally stem from this one couple of the Okinawan women and the Filipino American U.S. military personal.

This Okinawan woman’s grandchildren have also experienced an even more multi-located and cultural life. For instance, the Okinawan woman’s grandsons who were born in Hawai‘i had lived in Okinawa for two years because of their father’s (her son) job as a civilian worker in U.S. military bases on Okinawa. The grandson went to an elementary school for military dependents on base and he learned Okinawan dance, eisaa. He joined in the “Eisaa Club” in which about sixty students are enrolled at Bechtel Elementary School in Gushikawa. The dancers participate in the Gushikawa festival and interact with local Okinawan people through performing eisaa.

After returning to Hawai‘i, the grandson, his younger brother and his uncle dance eisaa together, joined an eisaa group, the Hawai‘i chapter of Ryukyukoku Matsuri Daiko (Festival Drums of the Ryukyuu Nation).
Diasporic to Women-centered Dancing Culture

This article has reviewed some life stories of the Okinawan immigrant women who came to Hawai‘i after the Battle of Okinawa. These women have negotiated and created their own ways of living in their post-war experiences, marriages with American military personal, migrating to Hawai‘i, and mothering and grandmothering across Okinawa, Hawai‘i, and U.S. military bases. They may have left Okinawa for Hawai‘i, but they have also brought Okinawa with them.

Instead of being passive by-standers in the midst of international geopolitics, in their own ways, these women have been active agents of change. Instead of public politicking, theirs has been through various diasporic activities, dancing eisaa and socializing with the club’s members. Dancing eisaa brings them opportunities to narrate and reconstruct their diasporic experiences in the present moment. Their diasporic memories become transformed into dancing melodies on the stages and backstages of eisaa dance.

From its religious origins, eisaa has evolved into a popular folk art in Okinawa and in overseas Okinawan communities (Shirota 1999). More recently, its stylized choreography and dynamic rhythm have attracted large audiences and an international following (Shirota 2000). The Okinawan immigrant women and their family members who share their life stories in this paper belong to the eisaa club, Ryukyuokoku Matsuri Daiko (RMD). Since its inception in 1982, RMD has consisted of approximately 500 members in Okinawa, and approximately 500 members in the chapters which are spread in the cities in Japan, the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, and Peru.

The Hawai‘i chapter of RMD was established by Akemi Martin, the wife of an American military physician, who while living in Okinawa introduced eisaa to other military personnel and their spouses. She reasoned that learning eisaa might be just the spark to quicken an interest in Okinawa, its people and their culture. The faculty who teach eisaa at the Bechtel Elementary School Eisa Club also learned the dance movements from her club.

Martin moved to Hawai‘i in 1996 and she established the RMD–Hawai‘i chapter branch. Two American women who performed the eisaa with her on bases in Okinawa also moved to Hawai‘i and joined the group. As of March 1999, there are forty active members who vary in age and ethnic backgrounds. Some are affiliated with the U.S. military, while others are from the local community.

There are fourteen Okinawan women dancers in the club who emigrated to the United States after World War II. Their husbands and ex-husbands include Okinawa-born Okinawans, Hawai‘i-born Okinawans and Japanese Americans, Euro-Americans, a Guam-born American, and a Hawai‘i-born Filipino American. Some of the women met their spouses when they stationed on Okinawa. They practice and perform eisaa throughout the year with their husbands and their children.

The diversity of Hawai‘i’s RMD membership is remarkable. The mix of dancers in the RMD–Hawai‘i chapter included U.S. military personnel, their war-brides and their family, former immigrant laborers and their descendants, and former prisoners of war internees and their descendants. This mixture of ethnicities and cultures in dance speaks of the modern Okinawan and Hawai‘i experiences.

The transforming effects of eisaa confirms Helen Thomas’s thesis that, “dance does not simply reflect social relationships, but can also contribute to shaping social relations and thus can contribute to change” (1995:170). At least in its experience in Hawai‘i, eisaa reflects ethnic diversity and social interaction. No doubt, eisaa has provided opportunities and spaces for new human relationships.

Cynthia Enloe (1981) asserts that people who live inside and outside military bases are often thought to be positioned in different categorizations:

- Women from different countries are separated by distance, and often race and inequalities of political influence. Prostitutes, girlfriends, wives, peace activists and women soldiers have learned to view each other as sexual or ideological rivals. (1981:91)

Enloe’s admonition to see beyond these artificially created constructions and to ask who benefits in global geopolitics by their continuance is a good reminder here. Okinawan women’s stories show how fragile those social constructions can be, for RMD’s performative networks seem to connect peoples crossing ethnicities, national citizenship, and military affiliation. In the case of RMD members, the presence of U.S. military bases brings opportunities to make a living, to meet spouses, to become friends, and to spread post-war Okinawan diasporic culture.

Indeed, the RMD–Hawai‘i chapter is a symbol of the diasporic and transnational Okinawan experience. The once ethnic-specific folk performance embodies the reality and aspirations of minority peoples who try to preserve
their ethnic identities in the face of foreign incursions and to maintain their identities although being dispersed overseas. But perhaps the international popularity of contemporary eisaa, while crystallizing the experiences and memories of a people, is its ability to articulate the hopes, local aspirations, and everyday experiences of ordinary folks.

It is important to emphasize that RMD—Hawai’i’s social networks have been created mainly by women. Unlike male-centered diasporic music and dance such as hip hop, reggae, Bhangra, and club DJ; and official governmental or overseas business networking organizations, RMD’s activities have been produced by mostly women members.

Additionally, the dance movements and uniforms of RMD are unique in terms of their transgender aspects. The energetic drumming dance was (or is, in parts of Okinawa) performed only by young men in their late adolescence or early adulthood in Okinawa. RMD allows women dancers to take big drum and perform in the same ways as men and in the same costumes.

RMD—Hawai’i’s active members are the Okinawan women in their fifties and sixties, their multi-ethnic spouses, children and grandchildren, their friends from their youth in Okinawa, and members of the larger local communities in Hawai’i—and it works. These women have enriched the post-war Okinawan diasporic and dance cultures as well as other performative networks. With their post-war lives rooted in and outside of Okinawa, and in and outside U.S. military bases, these shin issei women have spread out and “blossomed” via the dance, of eisaa. They practice twice a week and usually perform eisaa at local multi-ethnic and Hawai’i’s Okinawan community events on weekends. They also engage in fundraising for their club by selling andagi (Okinawan doughnuts) and their hand-made Okinawan and Hawaiian crafts. After each practice or event, they usually go to restaurants serving Okinawan foods and sing Okinawan songs at karaoke.

These New Issei women are teaching Okinawan music, dance, language, and cooking to Hawai’i-born Okinawans, including their children and grandchildren, as well as non-Okinawans. Their activities and practices are passed on from one hand to another, from ear to another, from mouth to another, and from one heart to another heart through eisaa activities. Therefore, their performative networks are spread out by their very physicality. These women’s cultural activities have reached out to various people, probably more directly than any other through written forms, and in modes more lively and energetic than any other recorded music and pictures. We can see, hear, and even smell and taste these women’s lived experiences on and behind the dance stage.

Notes

I wish to express a big mahalo (thanks) to those who shared their life stories with me, which made it possible to write this paper and enrich the literature on diasporas.


2. In general, the majority of immigrants were women from WWII and into the 1990s (Seller 1994:3).

3. There is another case of spreading Okinawan culture outside Okinawa by American military personnel stationed in Okinawa. According to Fujimori (1998), Okinawan kenpo (karate) and kobudo (weapons) has been introduced and spread in Hawai’i by Filipino American, Joseph A. Bunch, his wife, children and grandchildren. Bunch joined the U.S. Marine Corps. and learned Okinawan kenpo while stationed in Okinawa. “Sensei Bunch” founded his school, the Hawaii Okinawa Kenpo Karate Kobudo Sudokan in 1982. In 1998, there were 13 branches throughout Hawai’i (Fujimori 1998:68–69).

References


Who Is Uchinaanchu?

WESLEY IWAO UEUNTEN
ARAKAKI MAKOTO

Makoto: “Hi! My name is Arakaki Makoto.”

Wesley: “You Uchinaanchu?”

Makoto: “What’s your name?”

Wesley: “My name is Wesley Ueunten. I’m Uchinaanchu, too!”

Makoto: “‘Ueunten’ is Okinawan, but ‘Wesley?’ That’s not an Okinawan name. You’re not a real Okinawan!”

Wesley: “So, having an American name means I’m not Uchinaanchu? I’m Uchinaanchu! My grandparents are from Okinawa. And, I play the sanshin. Do you play the sanshin?”

Makoto: “No, I don’t play sanshin.”

Wesley: “See, you’re not really Uchinaanchu. You don’t know anything about Okinawan culture. I’m more Uchinaanchu than you!”

Makoto: “Do you have to play sanshin to be Okinawan? I bet you’ve never been to Mihama.”

Wesley: “Do I have to know all the towns in Okinawa to be Uchinaanchu? I’ve heard of Mihama. Isn’t that what they call ‘American Village’? That’s not really Uchinaa. I bet you eat American fast food. Not me! I grew up on Ashitibichi. I’m more Uchinaanchu than you!”

Makoto: “I don’t like Ashitibichi. Do I have to like all Okinawan dishes to be Uchinaanchu? I’m actually a resident of Okinawa. I’m legally Uchinaanchu. I’m more Uchinaanchu than you!”

Wesley: “Do I have to be living in Okinawa to be Uchinaanchu? My ancestors are from Sashiki and Ahagun. Where are your ancestors from?”

Makoto: “My dad is from Shuri, but my mom is from Ishigaki.”

Wesley: “What?? Ishigaki?? That’s not really Uchinaa! You’re only half Okinawan. I’m full-blooded Uchinaanchu. I’m more Uchinaanchu than you!”

Makoto: “Does blood make you Okinawan?”

Wesley: “Hmmm, I don’t know. What do you think?”

Note

This dialogue was presented in the “Uchinaanchu Worldwide Identity” panel discussion on September 1, 2003 at the First Worldwide Uchinaanchu Conference. It featured panelists professors Makoto Arakaki and Wesley Ueunten and provoked a lively discussion among the panelists and the audience. By way of context, Mihama is a relatively new resort/shopping/entertainment mall area in Chatan Town constructed on the site of a former U.S. Military facility; Ishigaki is one of several islands in the southern island group (also called Yaeyama or Sakishima) which is politically part of the Prefecture of Okinawa, although historically its residents spoke a language linguistically distinct from that of the main island of Okinawa. Ashitibichi is a traditional Okinawan gelatinous soup dish prepared with pig’s feet, kelp, vegetables and various seasonings.
Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu and Okinawa

Uchinaanchu Spirit and the Formation of a Transnational Identity

ARAKAKI MAKOTO

After “reannexation” by Japan in 1972, Okinawa struggled to reintegrate into the national life of Japan. After ten difficult years, the dream of returning to the Japanese motherland ended in the harsh realization that Okinawa would not become an equal partner with the other Japanese prefectures. It would remain instead a military zone. In the unequal power relationship that resulted, a positive Okinawan identity was guaranteed only by assimilating, by becoming “Japanese.” Only recently has this identity been questioned.

On 1 January 1984, journalists at Ryukyu Shimpo, a major Okinawan daily, began a series, “Sekai no Uchinanchu” (Okinawans worldwide), that proved to be extremely popular. Soon thereafter, Okinawa Television launched a series of features that highlighted the success of Uchinaanchu (Okinawans) overseas. The adventurous frontier spirit, hard work, and achievements of their overseas cohorts brought to mind for Okinawans the Ryukyuan kingdom and their former independence as a nation that existed in peace with other nations. Joining in, the Okinawan prefectoral government began promoting the image of the Uchinaanchu as an “oceanic frontier people,” “peaceful traders,” and “a people bridging the world.” These images are inscribed on a bell (ordered cast by Shô Taikyu [1415-1460] in 1458), Bankoku shinryô no kane, that once hung in the Shuri Palace.1 The inscription describes the ancient kingdom’s role as a prosperous trading nation that bridged the countries of East Asia: “The Ryukyuan kingdom, ideally situated in the southern seas, gathers wisdom from Korea, maintains close ties with China, and is the entryway to Japan. Abiding between [China and Japan, our kingdom] issues forth as the island of the immortals. Her trading ships, as the bridge to all nations (bankoku shinryô), gathered treasures from countries of the ten directions” (original inscription reprinted in Okinawa Ken kyôiku’inkai 1996:33).

Articulating Okinawa’s singular historical experience, the phrase “bankoku shinryô,” or “the bridge to all nations,” projects a very positive identity and at the same time identifies Okinawa’s unique place in Japan’s current global economic and political position. The presence of overseas Uchinaanchu communities lends credence to Okinawa’s claim to being a land possessed of the “oceanic frontier spirit” and one that acts as a bridge between nations. The presence of a worldwide Uchinaanchu identity supports the very foundation of Okinawa’s identity as “bankoku shinryô no tami” (a people bridging all nations) and makes the vision of a global Uchinaanchu community possible. Today, under the slogans “bankoku shinryô no seishin” (spirit of bridging the world), “worldwide Uchinaanchu,” and “Uchinaanchu spirit,” Okinawans are reconnecting with fellow Okinawans and Okinawan communities scattered throughout the world.

This essay has two purposes. The first purpose is to explore the identities of successive generations of Okinawans in Hawai‘i. During the years since the first immigrant Okinawans arrived in Hawai‘i in 1900, the Issei (first-generation) Okinawan immigrants, their Nisei (second-generation) children, their Sansei (third-generation) grandchildren, and their Yonsei (fourth-generation) great-grandchildren have positioned themselves in different discourses on the basis of their respective sociohistorical contexts and their relation to their ancestral homeland. The second purpose is to move beyond the social space of Hawai‘i and discuss narratives of a new relationship between Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu and their cohorts in Okinawa. As mentioned earlier, an Okinawan’s identity is empowered by his or her relation to overseas Uchinaanchu communities; at the same time, an aspect of the Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu’s identity is based on his or her relation to Okinawa. Recently, with the emergence of a worldwide Uchinaanchu network, Okinawans have articulated the Uchinaanchu spirit as the common bond with generations past and with other Okinawan communities scattered throughout the world. Through interaction and the production of a shared narrative of this spirit, Okinawans around the world have begun to form a discursive connection beyond their ethnicities and national identities.

This article is reprinted with permission from Okinawan Diaspora, edited by Ronald Y. Nakasone (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002).
The notion of the Okinawans as other (in relation to the Japanese) persisted in Hawai‘i, where Okinawans and Naichi (lit. “the Japanese heart— Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu and Okinawa land,” but often used to refer to immigrants from mainland Japan) were initially recruited to work as agricultural laborers. Unable to comprehend the language of the Okinawan immigrants, Naichi often pejoratively referred to Okinawans as “Japan-Pāke” (Japan-Chinese), an expression akin to “Japenese-kanaka,” coined in Micronesia. Reporting on the incomprehensibility of the Okinawans, the 7 February 1907 Nippon Jiji, a vernacular daily, published the following observation: “Okinawan immigrants seem to like music. In the plantation camps, after returning from work, they play their shabby jamisen and sing unintelligible songs.”² The immigrants from mainland Japan had presumed that the Okinawans would be Japanese, but experience soon proved them wrong. The first generation of Okinawans in Hawai‘i also experienced the ambivalence of being “Okinawan” and being “Japanese.”

The Okinawan-Japanese ambivalence persisted in the second-generation Okinawan community, and Okinawan-Naichi animosity also continued. But the ambivalence and animosity were based on different experiences. The prejudices of the Issei Naichi were strongly impressed on the Nisei Naichi. A second-generation Naichi man, for example, found that his mother belittled his Okinawan girlfriend because the Okinawans were heta (lit. “unskilled”); in this context, the expression meant “not smart”), they did not know how to speak “properly” to elders (Toyama and Ikeda 1981:133). The first-generation Naichi judged the Okinawan language to be “loud,” “rough,” “coarse,” “uncultured,” and “obnoxious.” Aware of this, Okinawans, often ashamed of their “unrefined” Japanese, would speak to Naichi Issei only in English (Toyama and Ikeda 1981:133–4).

Naichi discrimination pressured Okinawan Issei to reject their language and culture and to encourage their Nisei children to assimilate into Japanese and American communities. As a result, the schism between the Okinawans and the Naichi community began to diminish. In addition, the language barrier disappeared because both second-generation Okinawan and second-generation Naichi spoke English as their first language and shared similar experiences growing up in Hawai‘i. Moreover, mainstream America discriminated against all Asian communities equally, and, during World War II, Okinawans were lumped together with the “Japs,” further eroding the gulf between the two communities. Both Okinawan and Naichi shared the same subject position as Americans. Finally, since Naichi were not in positions of power in the greater Hawai‘i society, their attitudes toward Okinawans had little effect on the socioeconomic advancement the Okinawan Nisei. The Okinawan Nisei excelled in various professions, thrived in business, and became vital members of the Hawai‘i community.

The third and fourth generations of Okinawans constructed their subjectivity in the social context of the 1960s and 1970s, when “identity politics” were played out in the name of multiculturalism. Knowing one’s cultural roots became a positive value, and Okinawans in Hawai‘i began to form a new relationship with their ancestral homeland. During the 1980s and 1990s, as communications and interaction between the Hawai‘i Okinawan community and Okinawa became more frequent, Okinawan identity in Hawai‘i moved beyond its Hawaiian social space. At the same time, Okinawa identified itself as an island of kaiyō minzoku (oceanic frontier people) and began more actively to embrace its overseas communities, with which it had always maintained close connections. Remembering help received when it was most needed, Okinawa, its institutions, and its people were in a position to reciprocate by sponsoring leadership tours and awarding scholarships to overseas Okinawan students.

The Emergence of a Pan-Okinawan Identity

The emergence of a pan-Okinawan identity can be traced to the formation of the United Okinawan Association (UOA) in 1951, which emerged from a need to organize relief efforts in the aftermath of World War II. The Battle of Okinawa completely devastated Okinawa Island, and the survivors were in desperate need of aid. The Hawai‘i Okinawan community was hesitant to organize a relief effort because of the prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment. However, with the aid of the American Friends Service Committee, a group of concerned Okinawans organized the Okinawa Relief Clothing Drive Committee. This initial effort was replicated by other groups, whose efforts often overlapped as each group competed for recognition as the representative of Hawai‘i Okinawans. Recognizing the need for a united effort, the leaders of the Okinawan community revived a movement to establish an all-Okinawan organization that had been pursued before the war. After much discussion, the UOA was restrucutred as a congress of clubs rather than an association of individual members.

Membership in the clubs around which the restrucutred UOA was organized was determined largely by where in Okinawa immigrants had been born. The early immigrants established chojinkai (block associations), sonjinkai (village associations), shijinkai (city associations), even azajinkai (hamlet as-
Before the war, such “locality” clubs had been formed for the immigrants.

shared experiences formed the basis for a collective identity, the locality club even functioning as an extended family. But it was only after the war, with the organization of the clubs under the UOA, that a larger—Okinawan—collective identity emerged.

**Remembering Okinawa: The 1980 Leadership Tour**

The UOA commemorated the eightieth anniversary of the Okinawan immigration to Hawai‘i with a year-long celebration underwritten by the state legislature. And, as part of the celebration, the Sonjinkai (Town and Village Association) of Okinawa Prefecture and the Okinawa Prefecture City Mayors’ Association invited thirty-five young nisei and sansei between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five to Okinawa. These thirty-five young Uchinaanchu, all representatives of locality clubs, were selected from among more than two hundred applicants.

Prior to their departure, the (mostly sansei) representatives underwent several orientation sessions, including classes in Okinawan history, geography, and culture, conversational Japanese, and Hawaiian hula. Then, on 1 October 1980, they left for Okinawa. On their arrival at the airport, they were blinded by the lights of television cameras and greeted by waving hands and welcome signs as they made their way to claim their baggage. In the VIP lounge of the airport, they were presented with lei and greeted by government officials, including the mayors of various cities. They felt like “celebrities” (Study Tour 1981:220) and “dignitaries” (Study Tour 1981:194). The twelve-day tour, however, was more than a sight-seeing trip. The participants attended lectures on the history, culture, art, economics, and politics of Okinawa delivered by college professors and visited their ancestral villages or towns as official government guests. The participants were overwhelmed by the Okinawans’ hospitality, which was described as “first-class all the way” (Shiroma 1981:178) and “fit for a king” (Study Tour 1981:194). One participant remembered: “The anxiety quickly diminished when my aunt hurriedly came and gave me a big hug. She was so happy to see me [that] she started to do a kachashi [Okinawan improvisational dance]…. We met for the first time, but I felt a bond, a closeness between us” (Study Tour 1981:220).

Many felt a sense of belonging and a connection to their ancestral roots. One sansei explained: “From the moment I arrived at the Naha Airport, I had the feeling of belonging, the feeling of returning home, the feeling that this is where my ancestors came from” (Study Tour 1981:185). All found the three-day stay in their relatives’ homes—including a visit to their grandparents’ birthplace—especially significant. Okinawan traditions and customs that had once been obscure and unintelligible became immediately lucid and comprehensible (Study Tour 1981:205). Another sansei wrote: “I realize and understand now why my grandparents…always spoke [with] such love and warmth for Okinawa. I now share their feelings for their and now somehow my fatherland” (Study Tour 1981:123).

This new understanding and appreciation of their cultural heritage connected the participants to their Okinawan identity and roots. Their grandparents’ memories became their reality; they reconnected with their grandparents and formed new connections with Okinawa. Okinawa was not simply their ancestral homeland; now it was part of them. Very deep feelings were generated by the experience:

Meeting up with my roots has given me a kind of secure, deep-rooted feeling that this is where my ojichan [grandpa] and obaachan [grandma] came from, and these [my relatives] are the people who have the same basic kind of understanding and feeling that I have been brought up with…. I felt so close to these people, like there was a mutual openness and sharing with one another” (Study Tour 1981:192)

From seeing where my ancestors descended from, I knew I would have a better understanding of why things are as they are, and why I am as I am.... I have learned a lot about myself, thereby I feel a more complete person. (Study Tour 1981:138–9)

The warmth and hospitality of their reception in Okinawa made an indelible impression on the young sansei. Treated like family, they felt that they belonged. It was a highly emotional experience. One participant wrote: “Okinawa...the memories still brings tears of joy to my eyes” (Study Tour 1981:41). They returned to Hawai‘i with a renewed pride in their heritage.

The overwhelming hospitality and extensive generosity of the people and the prefectural government of Okinawa reflected their deep appreciation for the invaluable relief aid that Okinawa received from Okinawans in Hawai‘i after World War II. The Okinawan people had not forgotten what the grandparents and parents of the young Sansei had done to help them survive the aftermath of the Battle of Okinawa. The postwar relief effort was reminiscent of the generosity of the first Okinawan immigrants, who, even after working from dawn...
till dusk to feed their families, found enough money to assist family members back home, build schools, and contribute to other much-needed projects in their hometowns. Thirty-five years later, they showered their appreciation on the children and grandchildren of the early immigrants.

The tour experience awakened the Sansei to their heritage and instilled a pride in being Uchinaanchu. They returned with the resolve to preserve Hawai'i Uchinaanchu and Okinawa and perpetuate Okinawan culture and the Uchinaanchu spirit. At a reunion, the participants expressed their appreciation for the trip and dedicated themselves to launch a new movement, the Young Okinawans of Hawai'i (YOH), an initiative that neither the UOA leaders nor the prefectural government officials foresaw. The emergence of the YOH encouraged more members of the younger generation to participate in civic affairs and revitalized the Okinawan community.

The 1980 tour to Okinawa was a turning point in the history of the Okinawan community in Hawai'i. On returning home, the participants assumed leadership roles in various Okinawan organizations, including locality clubs. Three consecutive UOA presidents after 1981, in fact, were among the participants. Interest in Okinawan culture was renewed. Ten years after the 1980 tour, the Okinawan community again saw a need to nurture new young leaders to assume leadership positions. This led to a second leadership tour in 1993.

The 1993 Leadership Tour

On 20 July 1993, thirteen sansei and yonsei left Hawai'i for Okinawa as representatives of locality clubs. The ten-day historical, cultural, and business awareness program was modeled after the successful 1980 tour. The 1993 UOA Leadership Development Study Tour proposed to revitalize the Okinawan community by involving younger Uchinaanchu. Participants applied to and were selected by their locality clubs, which underwrote one-third of the tour's transportation cost. The UOA covered another one-third, while the Okinawan prefectural government covered all expenses in Okinawa. Before embarking on the tour, the participants attended an intensive, month-long series of lectures on Okinawan culture and society and workshops on such aspects of social etiquette as exchanging business cards. In Okinawa, they visited important government officials, businesses, and factories. The major part of the tour was the home stay with their relatives.

The participants found their home-stay experience the most rewarding. "That's where the Uchinaanchu spirit really came on," one sansei, Wesley Waniya, reported enthusiastically (conversation with author, 12 September 1994). Echoing a similar enthusiasm, others recalled the deep attachment they formed with their relatives, whom they had previously met only once or twice. Jay Ogawa recalled that he was treated "just like their own children" (conversation with author, 13 September 1994). Another sansei was highly apprehensive; he spoke little Japanese, and his relatives knew no English. Notwithstanding the language barrier, they "got along perfect." Waniya explained:

The more awamori we drank, the better my Japanese got, [and] the better their English got. By the end of the night, we shaberu [talked] plenty, talk­ing, talking, talking all kinds of stuff.... I went to visit my uncle, and my uncle hugged me. The basic stuff, I could understand. He was talking about my uncles [in Hawai'i] and asking me specific questions. That's when I was looking through my dictionary. But he didn't mind. He was very patient. I didn't feel uncomfortable at all. I felt I could always open up. And of course, when we go out for drinking, then my cousin goes, "Give me the dictionary!" and threw it away. [Laughs.]

Other participants shared similar experiences. Despite language difficulties, they were "laughing and crying [while] talking with each other," Waniya recollected. For Kevin Uyehara, visiting his relatives was a highly emotional experience, one that left an indelible imprint. He felt a connection with his relatives in Okinawa, and it gave him a new understanding of the Uchinaanchu spirit. He was touched when his grandfather's sister told him that she wished she had been young enough to learn English so that she could have talked to him. After he left her house, she followed him despite her feeble condition. As she pressed an envelope in his hand, he protested, "I am not here to take the money." Recalling that moment, he said, "I just wanted to meet them and pay my respect." Arguing with an "old lady that was [a] hardheaded Okinawan," he finally realized that she wanted to express her appreciation for the aid his grandfather sent her after the war. He was moved that she wanted to reciprocate after almost fifty years:

Not forgetting what happened in the past. Eh, it's what I call Okinawan heart. It's a giving heart. It doesn't know any boundaries. Through the ocean, and through all these miles.... You can walk to that house, knock on the door, and they are going to welcome you into their house and treat you like one of their family. You always feel welcome.... Jesus, we are just about complete strangers! They know we are related, but [they are] not like your mother or father. When they have that kind of love for you, this is as
much as that. It's really unique. And you are finding it so many thousands of miles away. I wanted to cry. This lady, she made me cry (Conversation with author, 13 September 1994).

As Uyehara indicated, the overwhelming hospitality shown the participants demonstrated the appreciation for the postwar relief projects organized by the Okinawans in Hawai'i. The young Okinawan tour participants also gained a sense of belonging through interacting with their relatives and visiting the birthplaces of their grandparents and great-grandparents. Once a sansei or yonsei established which village his or her family came from, the connection provided substantive family history that further reinforced a feeling of belonging.

**Uchinaanchu Spirit**

The participants from both tours often mentioned "Uchinaanchu spirit." "If there is anything that makes us the same Uchinaanchu as Issei, it must be this spirit. And what could be more precious to give to the generations to come?" Uyehara declared. All the participants affectionately speak of the "giving and loving spirit" of the early immigrants. This legacy is cherished and is still evident in the work of Hui O Laulima, a volunteer service club, and in the cultivating hands of the gardeners at the Hawai'i Okinawa Center. The 1980 participants defined this spirit as "mutual cooperation," "hard work," "good heart," and "emphasis on family." In a spring 1994 workshop, the 1993 tour participants agreed on five essential components of "Uchinaanchu spirit": an open, giving, sharing, supportive, helping, and encouraging heart; fellowship and cooperation; hard work; Okinawan cultural awareness; and emphasis on family. Although it did not appear on the list, humility was often mentioned as an important quality.

These definitions articulate the feelings of many Okinawans in Hawai'i. Some refer to this Uchinaanchu spirit as "the spirit of yuimaaru" (mutual help). Or is it the "aloha spirit," Okinawan style? Young Okinawans see parallels between the Uchinaanchu spirit and the aloha spirit. They believe that the Issei brought the Uchinaanchu spirit to Hawai'i; they found the same spirit in their relatives and other Okinawans they met. One participant marveled that, even though the Okinawans in Hawai'i and in Okinawa proper were brought up in different countries, their "cultural spirit is still the same." The majority of the personality traits and social values that characterize the Uchinaanchu spirit are shared by the traditional Hawai'i society that is passed on even today. The guiding principle of Hawaiian social relationships is "to minimize personal gain or achievement in order to maximize interpersonal harmony and satisfaction" (Okamura 1980:121).

Through their "local identity" and the "aloha spirit," third- and fourth-generation Okinawans found their discursive position in the Uchinaanchu spirit. This discourse served as a counterdiscourse to the negative narrative produced by the notion of Okinawans as the Japanese other. The discourse was a consequence of revitalized interaction between the Hawai'i Okinawan community and Okinawa as well as of the compatibility of the Uchinaanchu spirit with the aloha spirit that characterizes local identity. Today, the perceived Uchinaanchu spirit of the Issei is no longer the same. Mutual cooperation and assistance—values that were necessary to survive in the harsh colonial plantation environment and the rationale for locality clubs—are now embraced by the larger community. For the Sansei and Yonsei, traditional values have converged with local values. Discourses on the Uchinaanchu spirit and the aloha spirit are interwoven at their subject position: the Hawai'i Uchinaanchu.

**Toward the Okinawan Diaspora**

In 1990, the notion of a worldwide Uchinaanchu community became a reality when the Okinawan prefectural government hosted the first Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival. Okinawans living abroad gathered in Okinawa for the week-long event. The event quickened a worldwide sense of an Okinawan community, and the prefectural government pressed ahead with plans systematically to develop a network with and among overseas Uchinaanchu. This Worldwide Uchinanchu Network Project included the establishment of the Worldwide Uchinanchu Goodwill Ambassador program. This movement echoed tankoku shinryo no tami of an earlier time. Thirty-five hundred participants attended the second Worldwide Uchinanchu Festival in 1995 (see photo).

As a result of the Okinawan prefectural government's initiatives, the Hawai'i Uchinaanchu Business Group sought ties with Okinawan businesses in other parts of the world. In 1997, the group cohosted the first Worldwide Uchinanchu Business Network Conference in Honolulu and established the nonprofit Worldwide Uchinanchu Business International (WUB) in 1998 and the Worldwide Uchinanchu Business Investment in 1999. WUB Investment was established for the mutual support of its members, who purchase stock in cooperative ventures, the proceeds of which are then reinvested in the businesses of the group's members. The structure and spirit of the organization are reminiscent of the mutual-help associations established by the earlier
immigrants. A portion of the profits is donated to WUB International to promote, in addition to business networks, the exchange of information—and especially new technology—between other professional groups. It is too soon to assess the effect of the WUB. However, it seems likely to allow Okinawan businesses to expand their markets and engage in exchanges that can create new opportunities in Okinawa and other parts of the world.

Uchinaanchu Spirit and Uchinaanchu at Heart

Yuimaaru is commonly articulated both in Okinawa and in overseas Okinawan communities. The cooperative spirit of yuimaaru emerged in farming communities at a very early point in the evolution of Okinawan society. Mutual help was essential if the community was to be sustained. The old spirit has found new life. Pamela Tamashiro, president of the UOA, adopted yuimaaru, which she believed defines the essence of the Uchinaanchu spirit in Hawai’i, as her administrative motto for 1998. She reported her decision in the November/December 1997 issue of Uchinanchu, the organization’s newsletter. The spirit of yuimaaru is evident in other places. The 17 August 1999 Ryukyu Shimpo quoted Yonamine Shinji, the 1999 president of Worldwide Uchinaanchu—Brazil: “The Uchinaanchu spirit of yuimaaru is still alive in Brazil. Because of the spirit, many of us have succeeded. I want to share the spirit of yuimaaru with Uchinaanchu all over the world.” The spirit of yuimaaru is the cornerstone for the Third Okinawa Promotion and Development Plan, currently in effect. The plan envisions Okinawa as Japan’s southern hub for international exchange and cooperation with neighboring Asian and Pacific countries (Okinawa Prefectural Government 1996). Others envision the creation of an “Asian Community” with Okinawa as its hub (Omae 1993:79).

The global Uchinaanchu community is multiercnic and hybrid. Okinawans in Hawai’i have very little in common with other Okinawans in other parts of the world, except perhaps for a willingness to share the spirit of yuimaaru. Nonetheless, it is through this affectionate and humane discourse that Uchinaanchu and the Uchinaanchu at heart touch one another. Okinawa’s spirit of bankoku shinryo and the overseas communities’ Uchinaanchu spirit embrace each other to form vital new connections. This mutual embrace articulates discourses on what it means to be Okinawan. Unlike exclusive and fixed identities established through national agendas, diasporic Okinawan identities may be nonessential, decentered, nonexclusive, transnational, and fluid, even for those from the Okinawan homeland. These diasporic identities, I contend, can form a global, hybrid, and inclusive Uchinaanchu com-
munity that is neither ethnic nor national. Those who demonstrate the spirit of yuimaaru are Uchinaanchu at heart. In this diasporic space, Uchinaanchu at heart is—as James Clifford (1994) would assert—continually challenged and transformed.

Notes

1. The U.S. military seized the bell as war booty in the aftermath of the Battle of Okinawa. It was hung on the grounds of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, until it was returned to Okinawa in 1973 to commemorate its return to Japan. While at the Naval Academy, the bell was rung whenever Navy scored a point in Army-Navy games (Kerr 1958:100).

2. "Jamisen" is an expression coined by the Japanese to refer to the Okinawan sanshin. "Jai" means "snake." The sound box of the sanshin is covered with snakeskin.

3. The project was supported wholeheartedly by the UOA and the locality clubs because their membership was aging and their Nisei leaders saw in the project an excellent opportunity to nurture cultural awareness among the Sansei.

References

there are around 3,500 Amerasian children attending kindergarten through high school (Japan Federation of the Bar Association [hereinafter JFB] 1981:5). The majority of them attend public schools in Okinawa (see Table 1). Terumoto noted that the percentage of Amerasian children in the category "school unknown" was 8%. They were those who were not being schooled at public schools, private schools, the Department of Defense Dependents school (DoDDS) in the U.S. military base or free schools. This was extremely high compared to the total percentage of "school unknown" children in mainland Japan: 0.02% (Terumoto 2003:4).

At the same time, it is very unlikely to see adult Amerasians studying at a university, or working in schools, hospitals, banks and post offices. There are some Amerasian housewives. Some Amerasians work in the U.S. military base as store clerks. Others work at nightclubs, restaurants and cafes. There is no survey data on the adult Amerasians. Thus, Amerasians are more likely to be found working in the less secure sectors of the Okinawan economy.

Regarding higher education, I surveyed 52 Okinawan students at the University of the Ryukyus in 2003, using a questionnaire that asked about their experiences with their Amerasian classmates (see Table 2). The results show that none of the students had an Amerasian classmate in the university, although one out of three of them had one during school days. One student noted, "I had a very good hāfu (half) friend. He was superb at basketball and very popular in the classroom. There was no problem with discrimination." "No problem," but then the Amerasians just “disappeared” when Okinawan young adults entered the university. The Okinawan students did not seem to understand it.

**Actualized Issues of the Amerasian:**

**The Amerasian School in Okinawa**

The Okinawan people see Amerasian children more often than they do adult Amerasians. However, even the situation of these children had not been regarded as a social issue until the AmerAsian School in Okinawa (AASO) was founded in 1998. The foundation of the AASO revealed the existence of a minority in Okinawa who had been facing both unequal opportunity for schooling and racial abuse in public school.

The AASO is a free school that was founded by five Amerasian mothers. The school offers English and Japanese bilingual education for approximately sixty students from kindergarten to the ninth grade. Seven out of eight gradu-
a realistic choice for the Amerasian children since the children mainly spoke English at home and English was their language of learning. The survey results (see Table 3) shows that the most Amerasian students in the public schools did not have difficulty speaking and learning in Japanese. It suggests that the children who have difficulty following along in the Japanese class would have a place to learn in the public school (Terumoto 2001:179).

Abuse and prejudice are other serious obstacles for Amerasians who study in the public schools. The following is a comment of one student of the AASO who transferred from a public school:

When I was in the third and fourth grade, we learned about the war. The teachers' explanations went like this: "In Okinawa Americans raped Japanese women. Things like that happened and there are now a lot of cases of an international marriage." So, naturally, my classmates asked me such questions as "Was your mother also raped by an American G. I.?" "Your mother married an American man just for his looks, right?" (Thayer 2003:53).

Other options for schooling were quite limited. The DoDDS was not an option for Amerasian children whose fathers had retired from a job on the military base, or those who lived with single mothers. An international school, The Okinawa Christian School International (OCSI) had been a precious option for the Amerasian children until the school faced an environmental incident in 1997. Approximately eighty children had left the international school because of the anxiety over health (Thayer 2003:47). Consequently, some of the students' mothers decided to found the AASO by themselves.

AASO was founded because of a lack of choices for formal education for Amerasian children elsewhere in Okinawa. Moreover, the mothers were eager to create a place in which the hybridity of the Amerasians would be treated positively. The monolingual education (i.e., English or Japanese) created either "an American" or "a Japanese" identity that was not appropriate for the Amerasian children. Midori Thayer, who is the president at the AASO noted, "both American schools and public schools in Japan tends to treat an Amerasian student as a 'half'—a half valued person" (Thayer 2003:48). In order to overcome the negative stereotype of "half," the AASO introduced a bilingual education that is called education for "doubles."

The AASO encourages Amerasian children to accept their hybridity positively. The concept of "double" is not based on the essentialism that assumes Amerasians to be American and Asian by birth. The AASO expects the Amerasian children to cultivate various identities depending on the experience of dynamic flow across the national borders, family life and working life. The concept of "double" is an antithesis of "half," "double" symbolizes positive self-esteem with hybridity (Thayer 2003:49).

### Table 3

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<tr>
<th>Proficiency in Japanese of the Children with Dual Citizenship</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>No Difficulty in Conversation</td>
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<td>No Difficulty in Learning</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*Source: The Survey Results of Schooling of the Foreign Students and the Students with Dual Citizenship; The Department of Education in Okinawa Prefecture: 2000 (Terumoto 2001:186–8, 2003:7–9).*

Language and Identity in the AASO

Eighty percent of the classes at the AASO are taught in English. The students learn language arts, mathematics, natural science, social science and athletics in English. Meanwhile, the students learn Japanese, social science —especially Japanese history and geography—and mathematics in the classes that are taught in Japanese. It is obvious that the bilingual education in the AASO gives weight to English much more than Japanese.

The founding mothers wanted to offer opportunities to the Amerasian children that may connect them to their American father and American society. Over one-half of the students live with single mothers outside the U.S. military bases. Learning in English is a precious chance for them to accept their hybridity positively. There are other students who live with their fathers. They need to keep and increase their English proficiency to be able to communicate with their fathers. English is a communication tool and a symbolic tie for the Amerasian children.
Additionally, bilingual education intends to overcome the prejudice against "half." In Okinawa, there are two stereotypes about Amerasians. One is "shima hafu," those who cannot speak English. They tend to be subjected to considerable prejudice and discrimination as the "fatherless poor half" who can neither enter the U.S. bases nor go to America. The other is the more privileged "hafu" who can speak in English, and can enter the bases and go to America (Noiri 2001:144). Thayer noted:

I was also keenly aware of the harsh view held of Amerasian children and their mothers in Okinawa society. If an Amerasian child goes to a Japanese school and cannot speak in English, the child will be labeled an "Illegitimate Base Child." This is not only painful but also mortifying for a mother (Thayer 2003:49).

Meanwhile, the AASO does not expect all students to communicate in English and Japanese perfectly and fluently. The students come from various backgrounds: (1) children from the OCSI, (2) children who have attended the AASO since the kindergarten, (3) children who have moved from the U.S., (4) children who have transferred from public schools in Okinawa and (5) others. The students in the first three categories have been taught, and therefore, learned in English. However, their English proficiency varies depending on their family life and their experiences of living in America. The AASO respects their diversity, offering a flexible curriculum in a small-sized class (Noiri 2000:233-4).

Some of the teaching staff put students in pairs to assist each other. The AASO is the only one place in which Amerasian children can stay together every day. In this context, the AASO creates an ethnic community for the Amerasian children. Their experience of learning with Amerasian friends, English and Japanese perfectly and fluently. The students come from various backgrounds: (1) children from the OCSI, (2) children who have attended the AASO since the kindergarten, (3) children who have moved from the U.S., (4) children who have transferred from public schools in Okinawa and (5) others. The students in the first three categories have been taught, and therefore, learned in English. However, their English proficiency varies depending on their family life and their experiences of living in America. The AASO respects their diversity, offering a flexible curriculum in a small-sized class (Noiri 2000:233-4).

Living with Okinawans: A Case Study of an Adult Amerasian

Here we move to a case study of an adult Amerasian, Denny Tamaki, in order to examine the relationship between Amerasian and Okinawan. I use his biography Chotto Hito Iki (Let's Take a Breath) as a precious resource in which an adult Amerasian tells about his life experiences in his own words.

Denny Tamaki is one of the most well-known Amerasians in Okinawa. He was born in 1959. This is his second year as a political representative in Okinawa City. Prior to beginning his career as a politician, he had already achieved prominence as a popular radio personality, as an actor, and as a song writer. In spite of his status, I use his life story here as the case study because it shares many common characteristics with other adult Amerasians of his generation: child of a single mother, adoption, and school days with Okinawan peers.

The biography begins with a story of two mothers: "anmaa" (mother" in the Okinawan language) and okā ("mother" in Japanese). Anmaa is Tamaki's birth mother, and okā is his mother who adopted him from the age of one and raised him for ten years with lots of love. Anmaa had decided to put Tamaki up for adoption because of her job at a nightclub. It was the best job for her to earn a good income for single mothers in the 1960s in Okinawa.

Okā told me many things. The most precious word for me was "Kage Yadoyaru." It is an Okinawan dialect term that means "the appearance of person is just a matter of skin that overlaps you. If the skin is taken away, everybody might think of each other as if they are brothers. You can’t live with a narrow viewpoint that judges a person on his/her appearance."

It was a time when people were suffering trauma that was caused by the war. I was teased without any reason, being called "haafu," "mixed blood." Okā told me not to discriminate against a person because of the appearance, not to hate anybody who had teased me, because "Ichariha Chode," "Kage Yadoyaru." I think they are splendid words that should be remembered again at this moment, a time with racial conflicts, abuse and other terrible incidents (Tamaki 2002:12).

Although he experienced abuse, he enjoyed his childhood days with many Okinawan peers. The children played in the natural surroundings, making a secret base, jumping down from the tops of trees, and fishing. Tamaki remembered the days in 1960s with deep affection. He was always included in a kids group that consisted of ten children, including primary and junior high school students. The elders supervised the youngsters well. It was a kind of community culture.

However, when Tamaki became a junior high school student, the interaction style of the kids group changed. The junior high school students stopped playing with the primary school students. Each generation, each person seemed to become individualistic and did not dare to share experiences with other
generations. It was the beginning of 1970s. Okinawa had reverted to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, and while the Okinawan people made a great effort to catch up with Japan's main islands, they did not succeed.

These were heavy days for Tamaki. When he waved the Japanese national flag with Okinawan peers in the parade that claimed Okinawa's reversion, one person in the parade said to him, "You need not waive the flag." It was because the person viewed Tamaki as a "hāfu," whose father, an American soldier with the U.S. military, had occupied Okinawa more than twenty years.

I had an identity crisis, wondering who I was. I couldn't speak English, talking in Uchinaaguchi (the Okinawan language) and Japanese. My father was an American and my mother was an Uchinaanchu and Japanese. So what? My spirit of defiance was a reaction against others who had judged me on my appearance. It was a starting point of the life of Denny Tamaki (Tamaki 2002:70).

After graduating from college, Tamaki tried to become a musician. When he realized he lacked talent, he became a salesman at a furniture company to set up a new life. The company went under, and then he worked at an artists' office (publicist) in which Kiyan Marie, who was a nationally famous Amerasian singer, was a client. It was then that he started his career as a personality in radio programs. Tamaki changed his name from his given name, Yasuhiro, to Tamaki. He began to utilize the space or gap between aspects of American and Japanese culture to have an impact on the listeners. His friendly talk in the mixture of Uchinaaguchi and Japanese made him popular. "When you hear my name, Denny Tamaki, and see my face, you think that I am an American. However, if you listen to me talk, I'm definitely an Okinawan. You might enjoy the gap" (Tamaki 2002:107).

Tamaki was not the only one Amerasian personality in the 1980s. There was a very popular Amerasian pair, "Ken and Masumi." Unlike Tamaki, they had graduated from the DoDDS located in the U.S. military base. They could speak English. Ken and Masumi talked in the mixture of three languages: English, Japanese and Uchinaaguchi. The popular Amerasians in the radio programs cheered up many Amerasians in Okinawa who were facing identity crises (Okinawa Index 2003:11).

Tamaki began his new career as a politician in 2002. He was elected and was the top vote-getter. His success was not only because of his popularity in the radio programs, but also because of his dream that was shared by many Okinawans.

I wanted to become a politician, because politics is the way to deal with the issues in our daily life through cooperation. I want to do a job that makes people happy. If the job makes me happy, too, I want to continue it. I started to work as a politician keeping the stance of the days of radio personality: listening to the voice of community, encouraging them to speak to me (Tamaki 2002:115).

His vision as a politician reflects his experience in the Okinawan community. Tamaki would like to create a communal relationship that includes eco-money. The new relationship is called "Neo Yuimaaru" that suggests its roots are based on the traditional Okinawan way of life.

The basic trend of Okinawa should be the shift from the U.S. style consumer society to the European style network society. We are at the point in which we should create a new, more universal system. I think Neo Yuimaaru is the answer.

Neo Yuimaaru means reconstruction of human relationships. For example, if there is a ten-story building. Each floor has its mediator. People [on] each floor have a monthly meeting and have a chat. Such a neighborhood is more helpful than the consumer service. Everybody can express their talents. The splendid manpower network can be supported by local eco-money.

Helping each other meant voluntary work without compensation in the past. From now the Neo Yuimaaru creates new jobs with payment. The local government supports it (Tamaki 2002:138-40).

Amerasians' Identity and the Okinawan Language

Tamaki has been affected deeply by the Okinawan language. He noted the affection regarding his identity.

I'm a "shima hāfu" who was born and grew up in Okinawa island. As same as shima beer and shima sake (alcoholic drink) are fair brands, "shima hāfu" is also made in Okinawa. Shima hāfu is a half who cannot speak English, but who can speak the Okinawan dialect. I had been teased and stared at as a half who couldn't speak English in my childhood days. That was because I decided never to lose the Okinawan dialect. If I lose it, I might become just a half, nor a shima half. Now I can be proud of myself as a half, because I can speak the Okinawan dialect (Tamaki 2002:152).

The term "shima hāfu" is usually used as an epithet referring to the Amerasians who cannot speak English. However, Tamaki has subverted that meaning and instead put a positive spin on it; for Tamaki, "shima hāfu" is one who can speak the Okinawan language and who knows the Okinawan spirit.
For Tamaki, the Okinawan language consists not only of the words, but also the Okinawan way of life. It is a soulful message from both of his mothers, a bright memory in his childhood days and the Okinawan spirit of life to be lived together. To revive the Okinawan language in the local community is one of the most important goals for Tamaki's work as a politician.

Uchinanchu have lost many things with the dialect, including a feeling of respect for the elders. The Okinawan dialect can be used to tell our heart. When we communicate in the standard Japanese, we can't imagine how Okinawan people think of each other, respecting the elders, being gentle to the youngsters.

It is not just for the elders, but also for the animals, on the Okinawan customs and folklore. When people lose the Okinawan dialect, community means just a bunch of buildings, just a place to live. No one worries about the people's feeling that have continued through the customs and the environment. I think the dialect is a precious heritage that includes human history and the whole Okinawan world. If we lose the dialect, we might lose Ryuukyuu (Tamaki 2002:154-6).

Tamaki is not the only adult Amerasian who is trying to revive the Okinawan language. Another prominent person, Biron Figa (Higa) is a musical artist who sings and plays a traditional Okinawan musical instrument, the sanshin (a three-string instrument with a snake skin covered sound box and a neck). Figa and his Okinawan friends have held weekly Uchinaaguichi class for two years in the Haebaru Culture Center (Okinawa Times 2004:9).

It is interesting that the two prominent adult Amerasians, who live outside the U.S. bases, are affected by the Okinawan language so deeply. They are more eager than many other Okinawans to argue for the importance of the Okinawan language. In Tamaki's case, his own experience of identity crisis made him more sensitive to the relation between language and identity. Furthermore, the Okinawan language is a meaningful symbolic tie that connects the so-called hāfu to the Okinawan community. It is not just the proof of their belonging in the community, but also the issue through which they can assist in the promotion of the Okinawans' status and self-esteem.

"No Discrimination in Okinawa" Discourse of Okinawan Identity

The challenges of the AASO and Denny Tamaki raise yet another question: What do the issues of Amerasians mean for Okinawans? I will now examine the reaction of the Okinawa society to the education movement of the AASO.

At the level of an educational policy, the Department of Education in Okinawa Prefecture (DEOP) has been reluctant to consider the issue of Amerasians. Since the founding of the AASO, the DEOP has not provided any financial support for it. DEOP insisted that the Amerasian children with Japanese citizenship who are at the age of compulsory education should basically attend public schools. Meanwhile, the DEOP has neither set up an action plan nor an education policy to deal with abuse in the public school as the AASO has claimed several times (Terumoto 2000:104).

I shall argue that the prevailing conception of Okinawan identity makes it difficult to address full equality for Amerasians. The following comment by DEOP suggests that "no discrimination in Okinawa" exists:

"There is no discrimination in Okinawa. It is a pleasant situation for education. "International children" tend to be adjusting to the classroom at the beginning of the school days. However, when they become the 5th grade or the 6th grade, they notice what they are and have an inferiority complex. Teachers tell them that each human being has equal value (JFBA 1981:20)."

This was a response to the question that had asked if there were any problems for "international children" studying in the public schools. The lawyers of the JFBA conducted the survey in 1980. In fact, they collected qualitative data that shows serious racial attack and prejudice (JFBA 1981:19). However, the DEOP chose to interpret the issue as "inferiority complex" on the part of Amerasians and would not examine actual relationships between the Okinawans and the Amerasians in the public schools.

There might as well have been another, unwritten sentence that would make a couplet with the sentence "there is no discrimination in Okinawa." The unwritten sentence might be, "Discrimination exists in Japan." Hiroaki Idaka has pointed out that anti-Yamato (anti-Japan) consciousness was the base of Okinawan identity (Idaka 1986:18). The Okinawan people have had a strong distrust of the Japanese government and the Japanese since the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The distrust has increased since Okinawa's reversion in 1972. This was because of the U.S. military bases continuing to exist in Okinawa and 5,157 criminal incidents over 31 years for which 5,038 U.S. soldiers and civilians were arrested (The Okinawa Prefecture 2003:85). In this context, Okinawan identity contains a confrontation element: Okinawa versus Japan, the Okinawan people have had a strong sense of having repeatedly been forced to sacrifice. Moreover, Okinawans have been suffering identity contradictions, standing between two positions: following/obeying Japan and confronting Japan, especially on the issue of the U.S. military bases (Idaka 2001).
Both stances, obeying Japan and confronting Japan, result in the oppression minorities in Okinawa, the Amerasians. Perhaps because they were too faithful to the Ministry of Education and Science that has been eager to promote nationalistic education, the DEOP has been notably reluctant to accept the idea of diversity in education, and thus has been dismissive towards the AASO. Meanwhile, taking the stance of confronting Japan, some Okinawan people have stigmatized Amerasians as “outsiders” who disrupt the unity of Okinawa. In the worst case, Amerasians were viewed as an enemy within. This may be a reason why Denny Tamaki was told not to wave the Japanese national flag for Okinawa’s reversion.

“No discrimination in Okinawa” is an oppressive discourse for Amerasians and their mothers, for it forces them to be a silent, invisible minority. On the other hand, the discourse also suggests that the Okinawans are also a challenged people who have been suffering serious identity crisis. The discourse highlights how gravely the Okinawans have lost themselves, and these reflect on the attitudes towards the marginalized Amerasians.

Meanwhile, there is another new trend that has influenced Okinawan identity: the “Okinawa boom” that consists of Okinawan pop music stars, a very popular NHK television drama Churasan (The Beauty), and the increasing sales of Okinawan foods. The Okinawa boom started in the Japan’s main islands. Okinawan singers moved to Tokyo to gain a nationwide exposure. The television drama on an Okinawan girl and her family was made in Tokyo and aired nationwide. In the huge trend of consumerism in Japan, “Okinawa” has become a symbol of “healing,” a “warm family,” and “blue ocean, blue sky” (Tada 2004:68).

Tanaka Yasuhiro noted that the images of Okinawa also reflect on the reality of the Okinawan, remaking the discourse of “traditional” and “gentle” Okinawan.

The Okinawa began to share and praise certain sceneries arranged by symbols of “Okinawaness” A “story” has been created, relying on “origin” and “tradition.” In the mediated scenery, people start to act as “natural” as “gentle southern islanders” (Tanaka 2003:428).

The “Okinawa boom” might have erased an inferiority complex of the Okinawan people, encouraging them to accept a sophisticated Okinawan story. In this context of the Okinawa boom, some Okinawan might say, “No discrimination in Okinawa. And we are not discriminated against anymore.”

Consequently, they might not want to hear the story of those who are excluded from Okinawan society, the internally marginalized people, the Amerasians. If that reality of the diverse, conflicted society would emerge, it would undermine the image of the “gentle southern islanders.”

Conclusion

To complete this essay, I shall compare the strategies of the AASO and Denny Tamaki in the context of Okinawan identity.

It might be easy to view Tamaki’s affection for the Okinawan language as “over assimilating.” However, his purpose is not just to be “accepted” in the Okinawan community, but also to “empower” Okinawans to create a better society. In the context of Okinawan identity, his challenge can be viewed as liberating Okinawan people from the fictional identity that lacks content—images created by the Okinawa boom. In focusing on the Okinawan language, Tamaki’s strategy is to recreate the Okinawan spirit, to revive the Okinawan language in a way that suits contemporary Okinawa. In other words, he seems to create/recreate the content of Okinawan identity to include objectivity as part of its discourse.

Meanwhile, the AASO has taken another strategy. It introduced the new term “Amerasian,” and the discourse and the practice of education for doubles in Okinawa. AASO’s challenge triggers a discourse on Okinawan identity, highlighting the existence of internal marginalization/discrimination. It suggests that the real Okinawa is a diverse, conflicted society in which Amerasian children also should be able to claim equal opportunity and positive self-esteem. In contrast to Tamaki’s strategy, the AASO exposes the gap between the official discourse and the reality of Okinawan identity.

However, Tamaki’s challenge and the educational movement of the AASO share some aspects in a broader context. First, both of them suggest that the boundary between Okinawans and Amerasians is quite flexible, and they overlap on each other. Tamaki has been involved in the revival of the Okinawan language more keenly than many Okinawans. The AASO can be categorized as a grassroots movement by Okinawans, because it was founded by Okinawan women and has been supported by many Okinawan people.

Second, in spite of the differences of their strategies, both of them have been trying to empower Okinawan society: the AASO, as a result of their educational movement and Tamaki on the basis of political stance. The AASO
identified the “otherness” of Amerasian in Okinawa, introducing bilingual education in order to combat against prejudice. By contrast, Tamaki subverts the derogatory “shima hafu” epithet and asserts his belonging in the Okinawa community, by calling himself “shima hafu” with pride. However, both of them have given the rise to the controversy on the shift of the Okinawa society, actualizing the discourse of Okinawan identity.

Both challenges have just begun. We cannot determine at this time whether either or both of them might be accepted in the main stream of the Okinawa society. However, it is very likely the discourse of Okinawan identity will be more varied in the future. Some Okinawan people might continue to believe that the Okinawan is a distinctive, pure ethnic group in which each member shares a pride as an Uchinaanchu. Those people might not be pleased to accept the idea of diverse society which includes multiple distinctive identities. Meanwhile, other Okinawan people might view the issues of Amerasians as an entry point to consider and reach more flexible, diverse Okinawan identities.

The Amerasians in Okinawa insist on their “otherness” (i.e., the boundary between the Okinawan and the Amerasian) in some situations. However, the boundary can be adjusted or removed in other situations. The flexibility of this boundary exists partly because of the stereotyping and prejudice of Okinawans. Moreover, flexible boundary-making is also the strategy that Amerasians use to live in the Okinawa society, to negotiate on their own terms. In any case, attending to the concerns and issues of Amerasians might assist identifying issues that Okinawans tend to overlook. Amerasians, therefore, are not just a minority who experience prejudice and discrimination, but also people who can assist Okinawans to overcome their own identity disruption.

Two Worlds: The Amerasian and the Okinawan

Appendix 1

The School Song of the AASO
“Sweet Home, AmerAsian School”

ORIGINAL LYRICS: JENNIFER MATAYOSHI
COMPOSED BY SOEDA NOBUYOSHI / YUKI / SOUND OF JOY

What do I see?
Happy hearts all day
All the children
Work and play everyday
We’re happy
No matter what people say
We follow our hearts

離さないこの想いこの夢 (Will not let go this feeling and dream)
いつまでもこの気持ちを (Holding this feeling forever)
誰にでもできるはず (Everyone can do)
たえず笑顔で (Always with the smile)

AmerAsian School is treasure
AmerAsian School with wonder
We’re happy with who we are, Yes, we are
And never will give up forever

We make it through
When the bad times and good times
No matter what people say
We are proud of this AmerAsian School

思い出の学校 (School full of memories)
大きくなっても何度でも来るよ (We will come to visit even after we graduate)
過去、現在、未来はすばらしい (Past, Present, Future, it’s all splendid)
そう僕らは成長する (Yes we will grow up)
いい想いをつかんで飛んでいこう (Let’s make good memory and grow up)

AmerAsian School is treasure
AmerAsian School with wonder
We’re happy of who we are, Yes, we are
And never will give up, never will give up our hearts
Appendix 2
Attending the AmerAsian School
JACQUI THAYER

While I was growing up people used to say I was lucky and I did not understand why. They said it was because I could speak two languages and had two different cultures. I didn’t know why that was lucky; to me it was a normal thing. The AmerAsian School helped me to realize why I was lucky.

Before I attended the AmerAsian School I did not think so much about my identity. I never thought hard about why I had both an American parent and a Japanese parent. I didn’t think of myself as an American or a Japanese person. I thought it was normal for me to be able to speak in both English and in Japanese. The AmerAsian school helped me to realize that I had 2 different bloods running through me. That’s when I became aware that I was AmerAsian. They also helped me to see that I had a lot of advantages.

At the AmerAsian school we study both in English and in Japanese, but mainly in English. I use to think it was really tiring. I didn’t think it was really important to learn both my languages. Now I think this is a wonderful thing because not many children or people get the chance to receive education from both their cultures. It took me awhile to realize that I was lucky to get double the education.

New students who come into the AmerAsian School usually only know how to speak in one of their languages, and always needed a translator to translate for them. That’s when I realized that I didn’t need a translator; I could speak both languages without any help. I also realized that I could help people by translating for them. That’s when I thought I was lucky and felt thankful for the school teaching methods.

I am dominant in English more than I am in Japanese. I grew up mostly with English education and it was easier for me to speak and understand. I always read books and watched movies in English. I never bothered to pick up a Japanese book because I thought it was too hard. When I graduated the AmerAsian School and started to attend a Japanese high school, it was really hard for me because everything was in Japanese. I was used to hearing mostly English all day.

After a couple of months I got use to the Japanese around me. I started reading books in Japanese and I discovered that it wasn’t as hard as I thought.
Notes

I am indebted to Professor Masahide Ishihara, Professor Kyoko Hijirida, and Malcolm Henson for their assistance in completing this essay.

1. The gross area of the U.S military bases in Okinawa is 23,758 ha. It occupies 13% of the Okinawa islands. There are 49,279 U.S soldiers, civilians and their family members who live there. The towns and village with high proportion of the U.S bases are Kadena Town, Chatan Town, Kin Town and Yomitan Village. For details, see the website of the Okinawa Prefecture: http://www.pref.okinawa.jp.

2. The DoDDS (Department of Defense Dependents Schools) is the school on the U.S military bases that offer free charge education for the children of U.S soldiers and civilians.

3. The term free school means a kind of grassroots alternative school that is not categorized as a private school. It does not mean a school that offers education without charge.

4. The figure does not include the Amerasians who have only the Japanese citizenship and who have only the American citizenship. The survey also does not include the Amerasian students who attend private schools in Okinawa. The DEOP has not published the survey results. It is included in Terumoto (2001:186-8, 2003:7-9).

5. The OCSI experienced the smell of high-temperature gas in a new school building in 1996 when it moved from Urasoe City to Yomitan Village. It was a place where once there had been an industrial waste disposal facility. Some parents requested a relocation of the school, but the OCSI decided to stay (Okinawa Times, 14 May 1997:2).

6. The term shima means islands in Japanese. In this context, shima refers Okinawa.

7. According to the survey result that was conducted by the International Social Assistance Okinawa, Inc. in 1970, around 70% of the Amerasian children lived with single mothers. The proportion of the Amerasian children who did not live with their biological mother or their biological father was around 24% (International Social Assistance Okinawa Inc: 1983:157).

8. Eco-money is the money that can be used in a specific community. In many cases, eco-money has been introduced in order to revive local markets and small sized shops, recreating human relationship through cooperation. The use of eco-money has increased in many countries since 1990s (Nishibe 2002:205).

9. Originally the term "yuimaaru" means working style with cooperation, e.g., cropping sugar cane by all members of the community. In wider meaning it refers cooperation, helping each other.

10. According to the survey data in 2001 that was conducted by the Ryukyu Shinpasha, 44% of the Okinawan cannot speak in the Okinawan language. More young people than old can neither speak nor understand it (Ryukyu Shinpasha 2002:20).

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11. The Okinawa Women's Center Tiruru, that is funded by the Okinawa Prefecture, has dispatched two Japanese full-time teachers to the AASO. It is the only official support for the AASO at the moment.

12. Around 85% of the Okinawan people answered that they were proud of being Okinawan (Ryukyu Shinpasha 2002:16).

13. In this essay, the author uses the term Amerasian to refer the Amerasian children and adult Amerasians generally. Jacqui Thayer preferred to spell AmerAsian referring herself in order to emphasize her identity.
Introduction

"Speak Japanese! You're Japanese!" I was being reprimanded for speaking in Okinawan dialect to my friend. I had said to my friend, “Let’s go home” in my dialect: “dikka keera.” The principal was just behind us and had caught me saying the phrase. He had called the two of us into his office and explained why I was being reprimanded. I neither remember everything he said nor what I said, but I do remember what I was told: “do not speak” the Okinawan dialect. I don’t think that I had thought about my identity before the incident since I was only ten years old. I don’t remember, in fact, if I had cared whether I was Okinawan or Japanese; the principal, however, clearly wanted us to be Japanese, not Okinawan.

This incident happened in Okinawa in 1969, three years before Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972. Many Uchinaanchu, including Okinawans in Hawai‘i and on the continental United States, have had similar experiences: “Speak English. You’re an American.” “Speak Okinawan. You’re an Okinawan.” What does it mean to speak, or not be able to speak, a language or a dialect? Is it significant? In this article, I will discuss the linguistic acculturation of the Okinawan people in the U.S. and argue that language, or dialect, is important to one’s identity. In other words, who a person is (or is not), is intimately related to the language he or she speaks.

This article is organized in the following order. First, I will briefly describe what occurred in Okinawa with regard to its local dialect. Second, I will describe the linguistic acculturation of Nisei Okinawan Americans, presenting what I learned in interviewing some of them. Third, I will describe what happened after 1945 with respect to the Japanese language and the Okinawan dialect, presenting what I learned by interviewing four issei Okinawan Americans (often called Shin Issei) who moved to the U.S. around 1970, and what I learned about two young Okinawan Americans. Finally, I will make concluding remarks.
The Rise of “Standard Japanese” and the Fall of Okinawan Dialects

After the birth of a new nation state in 1868, uniting the entire nation was a primary concern for the Meiji Government of Japan. One method the government employed was to spread standard Japanese and to eradicate local dialects. In order to achieve this goal, a new school system was initiated throughout Japan and children were taught kokugo, “the national language,” which was based on Tokyo Japanese. However, teaching this national language was neither as effective nor as successful as the government had expected, since these young Japanese were exposed to the standard language only while in school. Meanwhile they spoke in their local dialects outside of school. According to Sanada (2000), language education aimed at the linguistic unification of Japan continued until the Showa Era before Japan’s defeat in World War II. Until then, local dialects were considered undesirable, something to be gotten rid of because they would hinder adoption of standard Japanese. Therefore, children were discouraged from speaking their local dialects and, when they were caught, they were rebuked and punished. In other words, children were denied the right to speak their mother tongues. This kind of effort by the authorities resulted in the formation of an inferiority complex in the children who could not speak Japanese fluently.

In the post-war era, the linguistic attitude of educational authorities toward the local dialects changed drastically. Children on mainland Japan were no longer discouraged from speaking their local dialects, which were no longer considered bad or undesirable. Organized efforts by the educational authorities to eradicate the dialects stopped. However, educational norms, nationwide radio and television programming, and a desire to improve socio-economically, influenced people to become increasingly fluent in “standard Japanese.” They became, in a way, bilingual—speaking both their local dialects and “standard Japanese.”

Okinawa had a history that was both similar and different from that in other areas of Japan with respect to language and culture education. As reported in Asano (1991), Asato (1983), and Oguma (1998), the primary purpose of education in Okinawa for the Meiji government of Japan was to Japanese the Okinawan people as quickly as possible. The central government in Tokyo considered the loyalty of Okinawans towards Japan to be low because, unlike other prefectures, Okinawa was formerly an independent kingdom, reluctantly incorporated into the Japanese nation. Therefore, it was imperative for the prefectural government to assimilate Okinawans’ local tongues to that of standard Japanese through public education. The problem was that there had not been much of an educational system for the general population in Okinawa. Consequently, the prefectural government began to train teachers in 1880, teaching them the Japanese language and other subjects, and these “make-shift” teachers in turn began to teach Okinawan children in that same year. This teaching effort not only marks the beginning of the educational efforts to make Okinawan children become Japanese, but it also means that public education in Okinawa began eight years later than in other areas of Japan.

However, according to Ota, less than ten percent of eligible Okinawan children attended school each year until 1889 (Asato 1993). In other words, the 90 percent of school-age children in Okinawa who did not go to school until 1889 did not have a chance to learn the Japanese language. The number of children attending school began to increase in 1890, and by 1906, more than 90 percent of eligible children went to school. In primary school, children learned “standard Japanese” and Japanese culture, and they were encouraged to view their native dialect and culture with disdain. In addition, when children were caught speaking their local dialect, even outside of school, they were reprimanded and punished for it.1 In other words, children were directed to constantly monitor their peers to catch them breaking the school regulations. By encouraging Okinawan people to discard their dialect and culture, the prefectural government was somewhat successful in the Japanization of the Okinawan people. Many Okinawans came to regard their dialect and culture as inferior to those of mainland Japan and something to be discarded.2

The Japanization of the Okinawan people was largely successful; however, I assert that the local government’s attempt to linguistically assimilate the Okinawan people into the mainstream and to eradicate local dialects through education was not fully successful. My assertion is based on interviews I conducted with twenty Okinawans who attended primary school during the 1920s and 1930s. Many of them did not go to secondary school; thus, they had only the compulsory primary education for four or six years, depending upon when and where they received their education. They shared that they had spoken mostly in their local tongues, not in Japanese, before they entered school. Although they learned the language while they were attending school, they seldom spoke Japanese outside the school. In addition, their parents did not speak the standard language. Consequently, only a few of them became fluent in the language. Most of them were not eager to master standard Japanese.
The Pacific War, however, forced Okinawan children to change their linguistic life. In the first half of the 1940s, teachers were strict about the use of local dialect and children were punished for speaking in their dialect even outside of school. In addition, parents were encouraged to speak to their children in Japanese, not in the Okinawan dialect. Thus, children began to speak Japanese with their friends outside of school, and with their parents at home. Finally, in the Battle of Okinawa, the situation came to a head. The Japanese military was already suspicious of Okinawans who spoke in their dialects, which the Japanese did not understand at all. It was reported that some Okinawans were killed by the Japanese soldiers because they spoke the Okinawan dialect during the bloody 82-day ground battle with the American military forces.

Japan's defeat in WWII did not bring an end to Japanization through education in Okinawa. The Ryukyuu Islands were occupied and ruled by the U.S. military for 27 years between 1945 and 1972, two decades longer than the rest of Japan. During this period, the American military government tried to separate Okinawa from Japan, claiming that Okinawans were not Japanese. According to Ginoza (1984:205-8), they knew that the Okinawans in Japan, Hawai'i, the U.S., and Latin America felt that they had been looked down upon as non-Japanese and discriminated against by Japanese from other areas of Japan. Strategically, the Americans used the term "Ryukyu" instead of "Okinawa" (e.g., University of the Ryukyus, or Ryukyu Police). They even encouraged Okinawans to speak freely in their local dialects. In addition, they planned to teach English in the elementary schools. However, plans to teach English to Okinawan children were withdrawn in a few years, partly due to opposition from Okinawan teachers.

The Okinawan school teachers did not support the plans to teach English in the schools because they wanted Okinawa to be re-united with Japan; for this to occur, they needed to educate Okinawan children as "Japanese." As a "logical" first step, the Japanization process involved encouraging children to speak Japanese and discouraging them from speaking the local dialect. Once again, children were reprimanded and punished for speaking their local tongues in the 1950s and 1960s, and the incident with which I began this article took place under these circumstances. Because of this Japanization movement, a lot of young Okinawans unnecessarily felt that Okinawan people were inferior to people in other parts of Japan. And, although I did not develop any inferiority complex, as a result of the movement and my parents' linguistic determination to speak only Japanese at home, I cannot speak the Okinawan dialect fluently although I can understand it when I hear it.

The reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 brought an end to the organized movement of Japanizing Okinawan children. Since then, children no longer are discouraged from speaking their dialect, nor have they been punished for speaking it. On the contrary, they have often been encouraged to perform plays in Okinawan dialect at gakugeikai or school plays. In addition, Okinawan children now have a chance to learn their local music and/or dance (whereas, I don't recall learning any songs in the Okinawan dialect and/or Okinawan dances while I was in elementary school). Furthermore, young Okinawans today have no inferiority complex about their identity, as their parents and/or grandparents did. Many of them are even proud of being Okinawan.

**Linguistic Acculturation of Okinawan Immigrants in the U.S.**

The first Okinawan "contract" immigrants to Hawai'i arrived on O'ahu in January of 1900 (see, among others, Sakihara 1981, Kimura 1988, and Wakukawa 2000). Their arrival was at least fifteen years later than that of Japanese immigrants from other parts of Japan. Tōyama Kyūzo, who brought twenty-six men from Okinawa, had to persuade the then-Governor Narahara to issue passports for those who wanted to work abroad. The governor, who was from Kagoshima, was concerned that these Okinawan men did not speak proper Japanese and had a cultural heritage different from that of the mainland Japanese. In other words, they hadn't become Japanese. Mori (1996) states that Tōyama argued against the governor, saying that these men would not need to speak Japanese in Hawai'i. Tōyama was wrong, in a way, because these first Okinawan immigrants were ridiculed for their "bad" Japanese and
discriminated against by other Japanese groups who had come to Hawai'i before the Okinawans arrived there.\(^6\) The ridicule and discrimination was the beginning of the Okinawan's struggle and hardship in Hawai'i.

Instead of describing the struggles of Okinawan Issei in Hawai'i and the U.S., I will focus on what the Okinawan second generation or Nisei experienced in terms of their language. I based this on the interviews I conducted with twenty Nisei. All of them received their primary education in Hawai'i before 1941. They had to go to "English school" in the morning and early afternoon, and then, went to "Japanese school" for about two hours later in the afternoon.

These interviews revealed that the girls, but not the boys, had been eager to learn Japanese. Most of the men I interviewed said that they went to Japanese school because their parents made them go. They said that their issei parents took it for granted that their nisei children would go to the Japanese language school. The boys, however, questioned their parents' reasoning; they thought that they should not have to learn Japanese, because they were not living in Japan. Since they had little motivation to learn Japanese, they tended to speak English, not Japanese, among themselves outside of Japanese school. The only opportunity they had to speak Japanese was when they talked with their issei parents because their parents could not speak proper English.\(^7\) On the other hand, the girls often thought it natural for Japanese children to go to Japanese school and learn the language. In fact, all the women I interviewed said that they enjoyed learning Japanese. They often spoke Japanese among themselves even outside of Japanese school, though they also talked with their Japanese friends in English (interview with S. A. 1998). When the nisei girls were at home with their parents, the girls spoke with them in Japanese.

While most Nisei Okinawan Americans went to Japanese school and learned the language, they did not compel their Sansei children to learn Japanese as their Issei parents had required of them. Nisei Okinawan Americans reported they wanted their children to go to Japanese school, but also wanted to respect their children's wills. For example, Y.K. asked his two sansei children to learn the language, and to his dismay, his son refused and his daughter went, but only for a short while.

The Sansei did not want to go to Japanese school because they had a lot of things to do at English schools, according to the Nisei parents. All the Nisei Okinawan Americans I interviewed wanted their children to learn English and get a good education, and learning the Japanese language seemed to be a low priority for the Sansei Okinawan Americans. With their Issei grandparents having passed away, Sansei had only a few opportunities to speak Japanese. Since they spoke with their Nisei parents and/or their siblings in English, there are only a small number of Sansei Okinawan Americans who can speak Japanese.

How about the Okinawan dialect? The Nisei Okinawan Americans I interviewed had little chance to learn their parents' native tongues. Kimura (1988), Wakukawa (1981), and others have reported that the Issei parents were ridiculed for their dialect and discriminated against by other kenjin. Additionally, they were discouraged from speaking their local tongues when they were in Okinawa by the prefectural government and schoolteachers. Thus, Okinawan parents knew what would happen if their children spoke in Okinawan dialect. To avoid discrimination and bias against their Nisei children, the parents preferred their children to be Japanese, not Okinawan, and assimilate into the "mainstream" Japanese group. This meant that the children would not be taught the Okinawan dialect.\(^8\) In some Okinawan families, such as in Y.K.'s, parents would speak with each other in their dialect, but they only spoke in Japanese with their children (interview with Y.K. 1998).

It seems, however, this was not the only pattern. I found there were a number of Nisei Okinawan Americans who could speak the dialect. Since their Issei parents were not able to speak Japanese fluently, these Nisei Okinawan Americans had to speak the dialect to communicate with their parents. Finally, there was occasionally an uneasiness among some Okinawans about their Okinawan children's inability to speak the dialect. A nisei Okinawan American, who was born in 1919 on Kukuihaele Plantation (above Waipi'o Valley on the island of Hawai'i), reported that he was criticized by other Okinawans on the plantation for his inability to speak the Okinawan dialect fluently. To sum up, although there was some criticism associated with not learning the Okinawan dialect, most Nisei Okinawan Americans in Hawai'i did not learn to speak their Issei parents' native tongues.

**Post-War Issei (Shin Issei) and the Sansei**

Because they had more opportunities to learn and speak the Japanese language than their predecessors, most Okinawans who came to the United States in the 1960s and 1970s spoke fluent Japanese. They are often referred to as Shin Issei. Moreover, they were exposed to the English language while they
were in Okinawa and are able to speak it to some degree. On the other hand, most Sansei Okinawan Americans speak only English; they cannot speak Japanese. In this section, I describe what has happened to the linguistic attitude of the Okinawans and the Okinawan Americans in the U.S. after 1945, based on the interviews I conducted.  

T. S., who was born in Nago, immigrated to the U.S. in 1969. He had attended high school in Okinawa. He remembered that one of his teachers, who was from Shuri, encouraged him and his fellow students to be proud of being Okinawan and did not discourage them from speaking the Okinawan dialect. T. S. was indeed happy to be able to speak his local dialect without being reprimanded. After graduating from high school, however, he moved to California. At a welcoming party organized by the Okinawan American Association in Los Angeles, he introduced himself in the Okinawan dialect. One senior member of the association was displeased at his speaking the dialect, and he told the young T. S. not to speak Okinawan dialect: “Speak Japanese. You’re Japanese.” The newcomer was shocked by this Okinawan elder’s reaction. Not knowing that these seniors had been discriminated against in the Japanese community, T. S. asked him, “What is wrong with speaking Okinawan dialect? After all, we are all Okinawan.” In 1971, he had planned to organize a group of young Okinawans in the area and had shared the idea with the senior executives of the association. Here again, one of the demands from the seniors was that the young Okinawans speak with each other in Japanese or in English, rather than in the Okinawan dialect. T. S. could understand the reasoning: since they were living among Japanese Americans and other Americans, they had better speak one of those languages, but he was not convinced that they should not interact in their own tongue. Ultimately, he decided not to organize the group as long as there was such a condition.

These experiences of T. S. illustrate the gap that exists between Okinawan Americans who came to the U.S. before 1945 and those who came after 1945. The former had experienced harsh persecution and discrimination at the hands of other Japanese. As a consequence, they wanted to be like other Japanese and hide their identity as Okinawans. On the other hand, since the latter had not had such experience, they did not try to hide that they were Okinawans. Furthermore, this experience gap between the two groups resulted in a conflict among Okinawan Americans but this may be abating. A senior member of the association told me that in the 1960s and the 1970s, some members opposed the performance of Okinawan dances and songs at picnics organized by the association. In recent years, however, that opposition has disappeared.

Post-war Issei Okinawan Americans wanted their children to learn Japanese, but for different reasons. They wanted their children to be proud of their linguistic and cultural heritage; however, they didn’t insist that their children be Japanese, because they considered their children to be Americans. Pre-war Issei Okinawan Americans, on the other hand, wanted their children to become Japanese and learn the language because they thought they would go back home to Japan. A shin issei, T. S., reported that he once asked his two sons to learn Japanese when they were going to primary school. They went to Japanese school to learn the language, but quit after about two or three years because they had few opportunities to speak it. Since the family lived in a white neighborhood and they were the only Japanese in the area, the children had no friends with whom they could speak Japanese. Consequently, their interest in learning Japanese waned, and T. S. did not insist any further. On the other hand, T. K., a native of Naha, taught Japanese to his children himself. All of his children were born in Okinawa and came to the U.S. when they were young. T. K. wanted them to assimilate into American society, but he also wanted them to learn Japanese because it was their heritage. Therefore, his children went to a local school to learn English, and to a Japanese school on Saturday to learn Japanese. When they moved to Salt Lake City, where they lived for seven years, no Japanese school was available. He then spoke to his children in Japanese since they would otherwise have not had a chance to speak the language. After a few years, his youngest child said that she would not need to learn Japanese because she was living in America, but the other two continued to study it and are able to write and speak it to some degree.

The last quarter of the twentieth century brought other changes. In the 1980s and 1990s many young Americans of Okinawan descent developed an interest in their cultural heritage and ethnic identity. Going to college or high school with other Asian Americans, they came to realize that they were not white Americans, and they desired to explore their identities. For example, T. S. told me the following story about his two sons, which I confirmed later by interviewing his elder son. The young U.S.-born Okinawan Americans who had refused to learn Japanese when they were in primary school in the white neighborhood, began studying the language after they entered high school. The major reason was that they wanted to be different from their white American friends. At the high school they attended, there were a lot of Asian Americans who took pride in their own identities. Inspired by their Asian American friends, these shin nisei brothers wanted to learn about their ethnic identity. Additionally, they wanted to be able to converse with exchange stu-
Linguistic Cultural Identity of Okinawans in the U. S.

Notes

1. The infamous hoogen fuda (a board necklace which students caught speaking hoogen or dialect were forced to wear until they could find another student speaking hoogen) was a mechanism for peer enforcement of this policy of speaking only standard Japanese.

2. I should mention that there were some Okinawan intellectuals like Chohu Ota who criticized the enforcement of assimilation and discrimination against Okinawans by the prefectural government which was managed by Tokyo-appointed bureaucrats (see, among others, Asato [1983] and Hiyane [1996]).

3. Okihumu Komesu (personal communication) suggested the following. The “Speak Japanese” movement centered in school was not successful because it was forcing children to speak the language. Instead, the significant change in the parents’ linguistic attitude toward Japanese and Okinawan became the major contributor to voluntary “eradication” of the local dialect. According to him, when parents started speaking Japanese after the war, even though they were not good at it, it gave children opportunities to speak the language both at school and at home. Thus, it reduced opportunities for children to speak their own dialect to those occasions when they interacted with their grandparents who could not speak Japanese. In addition, there were a number of Okinawans who changed their Okinawan family names to Japanese. For example, Nakandakari became Nakamura, and Agarie became Toe.

4. Indeed, despite the efforts of Okinawan teachers and children to “become Japanese,” “mainlanders” were largely indifferent to and ignorant about conditions in Okinawa. Some mainlanders thought that Okinawan people spoke English and wondered if they could speak Japanese, or if people in Okinawa were Japanese. I recall, when I was thirteen reading a letter from a junior high school student in Hokkaido which said: “if you can’t write in Japanese, please write in English. I will ask my English teacher to translate your letter to Japanese.”

5. Actually, the first Japanese immigrants came to Hawai‘i in 1868. Thus the arrival of the first Okinawans in Hawai‘i was more than thirty years later than the very first arrival of Japanese. According to Wakukawa (1981), more than 70,000 Japanese immigrated to Hawai‘i in the fifteen years between 1885 and 1900.

6. Although Kimura (1981) and Wakukawa (1981) state only that there were bias, insult, and discrimination against the first Okinawans in Hawai‘i, I presume that...
the reason was their language and culture which were different from those of the earlier immigrants.

7. Y. K., who was born in 1922, said that he spoke with his siblings in English while he spoke with his parents in Japanese.

8. As demonstrated in Ige, some parents taught that Okinawa was part of Japan and that Okinawans were Japanese: “Naichi people and Okinawans are both Japanese…Okinawa ken means Okinawa is one of the many prefectures of Japan just like Hiroshima ken and Yamaguchi ken. So Okinawans are Japanese…” (1981:150–1).

9. There are many Okinawan women who married American men after 1945 and are living in the United States. In fact, my elder sister is one of them, and I have several such friends. While I acknowledge the importance of investigating their linguistic orientation, that investigation would go beyond the scope of the present paper; therefore it will not be addressed here.

10. In fact, in an effort to preserve control over Okinawa, the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyus (USCAR) encouraged a Ryukyuan identity vis-à-vis Japanese identity.

References


Interviews

S.A. 12 September 1998. Personal interview, Hilo, Hawai‘i.


M.T. 7 September 1998. Personal interview, Los Angeles, California.
In the past two decades, an image of Okinawa has emerged eliciting much curiosity. Unlike the “dark” coloring which predominated the islands in the 1960s and the years immediately following the return of Okinawa to Japan, today’s Okinawa foregrounds the power of iyashi (healing of heart) via the media and tourism because of its tropical environment far removed from the stresses of urban life in hondo (mainland) Japan (Shinjō 2000). This popular image of Okinawa can probably be traced back to the early 1990s, when NHK featured Ryūkyū no Kaze (Wind of Ryukyu), a year-long television drama project. From that point, Okinawa experienced a significant increase in tourists, and Okinawan foods and products began to be featured in stores and restaurants in Japan. Additionally, Okinawa-born celebrities and popular music singers have made their way into the mainstream of Japanese culture, enhancing the image of the islander lifestyles to the mainlanders. Finally, another made-for-television serial, Churasan, featured the experiences of Kohagura En, a girl from a small home village in Okinawa, who travels to Tokyo and ends up touching everyone’s heart with her island spirit.

The popularity of Okinawa was seen in the political arena as well. Prime Minister Mori Yoshio, who had followed in the wake of the former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo who had passed away suddenly in 2000 following a stroke, held the G8 Summit in Nago, the northern part of Okinawa island. The Japanese government had selected Okinawa as the site in light of its strategic location presumably as a place of exchange among different cultures as well as to promote growth and development of this area (Ross 2000).

The Okinawa bāmu (Okinawa boom or fever), has also made academic endeavors possible. In 2000, the United States and Japan jointly created a new scholarship program named Obuchi-Clinton Scholarship and Fellowship Program to send Okinawan researchers and graduate students to the East-West Center in Honolulu. Each year Hawai‘i has welcomed several researchers from institutions in Okinawa such as the University of the Ryukyus, Meio University, and Okinawa International University. One of the areas of interest of these scholars has been the Okinawan language, or what we will call Uchinaaguchi (Okinawan language). The agendas of those interested in the topic of Uchinaaguchi range from those merely interested in preserving the near-extinct language, to those who want to restore full usage of the language.

Uchinaaguchi Community

The movement to revitalize Uchinaaguchi was not limited to the main island of Okinawa and its surrounding islands. Similar, but simultaneously unique, local efforts to promote the heritage language can be observed in the various Okinawan diasporic communities. This paper focuses on activities in one such diasporic site—Hawai‘i—where the Okinawan community is sizable and consequently has a very strong presence. Okinawans here have been able to hold on to their distinctive cultural identity, and yet participate in the larger community of multi-ethnic Hawai‘i. However, as Okinawan Issei pass away, one of the most distinguishing of cultural features, the Okinawan language, also passes with them (Miyasaki 1981).

Just as Okinawan communities in Japan have recognized the importance of their own language, Uchinaaguchi, to complete their identity construction, Okinawans in Hawai‘i have begun to discuss the need to take back their own “voice.” Many of the efforts to revitalize Uchinaaguchi in Hawai‘i have been initiated, maintained, and developed further by local residents of Okinawan descent. Even those who are not themselves of Okinawan descent have been inspired by the community efforts and have joined in these endeavors. In order to distinguish this network from the larger diasporic Okinawan community in Hawai‘i, we will hereafter use refer to this emerging network as the Uchinaaguchi community.

Before exploring the current activities of the Uchinaaguchi community, it is important to understand (1) the current status of the Okinawan language in Hawai‘i, and (2) the historical transformations which the Okinawan language has undergone over the past century in Hawai‘i. Understanding the life of a linguistic variation or “dialect” requires an examination of the directional events
of the past, as well as those of present-day Hawai‘i. Moreover, it requires an examination of the experiences of Okinawan populations in Japan, since the trajectories taken by those diasporic Okinawans were influenced by different (but not unrelated) socio-historical processes. In other words, in both diasporic locations, the net result of the social dynamic was a shifting of language usage away from Uchinaaguchi, toward the mainstream language (the Standard Japanese in Japan, and English in Hawai‘i), with very few native speakers of the Okinawan language remaining in either Japan and Hawai‘i.

In the first half of this paper, we briefly describe five generations’ worth of history of Okinawans in Hawai‘i. We highlight the linguistic aspect of this history, paying attention to how Uchinaaguchi was treated in each generation (Ishihara 2001; Kinjó 2001). The second half of the paper brings us forward to the current events and activities in the Uchinaaguchi community which range from individual activities, structured classroom-based activities, to mass media broadcasts. These all reflect what is happening in contemporary Hawai‘i and the perspectives of the members of the Okinawan community who have recognized the value that Uchinaaguchi plays in the continuance of their cultural heritage, identity and values.

Uchinaaguchi in a Hundred Years (or Five Generations of Okinawans in Hawai‘i)

First Generation: Immigrating to Hawai‘i

The first Okinawan immigrants arrived in 1900 and found employment in the sugar plantations of the Hawaiian Islands. Okinawans continued to immigrate to Hawai‘i and the continental U.S. until the enactment of the Asian Exclusion Act in 1924 which put a stop to virtually all immigration to the U.S. from Asia. Immigration to South America, which had been pretty much a trickle, grew by leaps and bounds thereafter. In Hawai‘i, most of the immigrants from Okinawa were laborers on the sugar (and later pineapple) plantations, and they lived in cane camps which were established by the planters in the first half of the twentieth century. Since occupations were often assigned by ethnic group, cane camps were often arranged by ethnic backgrounds, and it was in these camps that the Uchinaanchu from Okinawa first encountered large numbers of the Naichaa (people from mainland Japan), a contact which generated prejudice and discrimination. For the first quarter of the twentieth century, Okinawans resided in rural areas. In 1921, only 123 Okinawans were residents of Honolulu; however, by 1944, easily 3,000 had found suitable livelihood and residence in that city (Miyasaki 1981).

Second Generation: Multi-lingual Identity

The Naichi immigrants (mainland Japanese) were heavily influenced by the emerging Meiji nationalism (1868–1912), and they did not view the Okinawans as part of the “Japanese race.” They refused to recognize them as equals (Miyasaki 1981). This prejudice was most intense among the early immigrants on the plantations, where the two groups were being thrown together at work and in the camp housing, which heightened the differences in customs as well as language (Wakukawa 2000). The forced education of Okinawans in Yamatuguchi (Yamato or Japanese language) had just begun a few years before the first Okinawan immigrants ventured to Hawai‘i; therefore, very few of this generation were able to speak in standard Japanese language (Ishihara 2001). During this plantation era in Hawai‘i, Okinawans reacted in one of two ways. The first was to hide their Okinawan identity and try to “pass” as Japanese by changing their surnames and speaking flawless Yamatuguchi. Another, more collective response, was to form a largely self-sufficient, thriving community of their own. As a by-product of this solidarity, the culture of the Okinawans, including Uchinaaguchi, was well-maintained and practiced by their own community members.
The year 1941 was significant for all Nisei, including Okinawan Nisei in Hawai‘i. The Japanese Imperial Military had launched a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th. Martial law was declared and many Japanese community leaders were summarily detained and imprisoned. Even in the years before the attack, there was much anti-Japan sentiment which spilled over to the local Japanese Americans and Japanese Language Schools, an easy target, had been shut down. Although the scale of abridgement of their constitutional rights was smaller than the one experienced on the continental U.S., most Japanese Americans remained loyal to the country of their birth, the United States, and thousands Nisei fought (and died) in both the European and Pacific theaters. Their sacrifice, and those of the larger community, contributed to a better post-war treatment of individuals. But also meant the English dominance of the Nisei was passed on to the Sansei (third generation) Japanese (and Okinawan) Americans.

**Third Generation: “American” Identity**

Sansei Okinawans (the third generation) grew up in the aftermath of the Pacific War. Since the Nisei had experienced discrimination based on their cultural heritage, they were less likely than their parents to emphasize Japanese or Okinawan heritage, and certainly less likely to stress Japanese language instruction. Nisei wanted the Sansei to become “truly American” and, with few exceptions, and requiring that their children learn the Japanese language was not critical.

Additionally, by the 1950s, many of the Issei Okinawans who were the native speakers of Uchinaaguchi were beginning to pass away. This demographic pattern accelerated over the latter half of the twentieth century, so that reduced the both the numbers of native speakers and the occasions at which Uchinaaguchi could be spoken or heard. This also led to the shift and near disappearance of the Uchinaaguchi language.

**Fourth and Fifth Generations: Returning to the Roots**

In the latter half of the twentieth century, social movements such as the civil rights and feminist movements began to emerge. One repercussion of the emerging awareness of minority communities within the United States was the recognition that the traditional depiction of American society as a “melting pot” was flawed, and a new image of “salad bowl” came into vogue. As a result of this new rhetorical image, voices of those from diverse cultural backgrounds are now being featured in the foreground of American society.

Young (fourth generation) and Gosei (fifth generation) Japanese Americans are now seeing their ethnicity very differently than their parents and grandparents. Rather than downplaying their ethnic heritage, they are seeking to explore and engage elements of their cultural heritage(s). This seems to be the case especially among Yonsei and Gosei Okinawans in Hawai‘i.

In contemporary Hawai‘i, it appears that the younger generations of Okinawan descent initiate their search for roots by first exploring what we can call “visual culture” or what anthropologists often call “material culture.” They show great interest in and work conscientiously to improve their skills in learning Okinawan dance Ryuubu (classical/traditional dance) and Eisaa (folk and Obon or religious dance), or playing instruments like the sanshin (Okinawan three-stringed musical instrument with soundbox and neck), taiko (drums), and other performing arts associated with Okinawa. These are perhaps the most prototypically recognized as “Okinawan culture.” As such, the study of those performing arts enables the Yonsei and Gosei Okinawans in Hawai‘i to establish their social and ethnic identity as different from others (Kinjo 2001). In contrast to the social context in which earlier generations of Okinawans were embedded, “being different” from others is seen as a desirable quality in the contemporary society.

Language is another distinctive aspect of culture. The Yonsei and Gosei Okinawans have developed interests in their heritage language, Uchinaaguchi. Those living in the continental U.S., have little choice but to select Japanese as a language to access their cultural heritage because of the scarcity of language schools, courses or availability of instructors. However, Hawai‘i is unique among the Okinawan diasporas in developing Uchinaaguchi language development opportunities. The significant presence of the University of Hawai‘i’s area studies programs, combined with the relative post-war economic advancement of local Uchinaaguchi (a result of political and economic social justice movements) have made for a convergence of factors favorable for Uchinaaguchi language education.

**Community-Based Uchinaaguchi Classes**

**Uchinaaguchi Class at the Lanakila Senior Center**

In June of 1995, Takenobu Higa, with the assistance of Chiyoko Shironma, initiated an Uchinaaguchi class at the Lanakila Senior Center. Higa conducted the class of twenty senior members for approximately ten years, until the beginning of 2004. No formal lectures were given in this particular
class: the class mostly spent their class time sharing each member's various experiences in Okinawa, on topics such as nenjuu gyooji (annual events) or other festive activities in Okinawa. Discussions of festive events like Soogwachi (New Year's Day), Shiimii (Seimei-sai or Memorial Day), Eisaa (Bon dance) in August, etc., were opportunities for the class members to explore their own fond memories of food, customs, and various activities in their village lives. The class also learned Ryuuka (Okinawan poems), folk songs, and read articles from Okinawan newspaper clippings, as well as teacher-produced materials on health-related terms, etc. While playing the karuta game (a card game), the classroom was full of words in Uchinaaguchi.

At Lanakila Senior Center, Thursdays have been designated as Okinawa Day. During the morning hours, Okinawan ethnic groups can participate in their ethnic cultural activities such as Okinawan dance, crafts, and karaoke songs. Higa's Uchinaaguchi class which ran from 11:00 a.m. to noon with 20 members, was regarded as one of the most popular and successful classes. However, the ninety-year-old Higa experienced some health problems in 2004. He handed his baton over to Professor Zensei Oshiro of Doshisha University in Kyoto, who was spending his sabbatical year in Hawai'i. Professor Oshiro worked with the assistance of Chieko Miyazato for three months until his return to Japan in March 2004, after which Chieko Miyazato took over the teaching role.

The change of the instructor has brought some change in the participant population; people with no Uchinaaguchi background began to join the class. The diversity in the class meant that there were more varied interests and needs for instruction. Consequently, the class began to integrate more materials and activities produced by the instructor, rather than the previous mode of relying on the students as primary resource. The dominant medium of instruction also changed, and is now English and the so-called “common” Japanese language. Finally, in contrast to the time when participants actively shared their own stories in class, guest speakers are now invited to class to talk about their experiences in Okinawa (e.g., war memories).

Uchinaaguchi Class at the Hawai'i Okinawa Center

In contrast to the abovementioned example of an individual initiative, the Uchinaaguchi class at the Hawai'i Okinawa Center (HOC) began in 1996 based on the ideas and discussions generated in a program officers meeting. The idea to establish an Uchinaaguchi class began within the HOC and a volunteer teacher was sought out through the effort of the Center's organization and its associated community.

Grant Murata, generally known by his nickname “Sandaa” (or rascal one), a sanshin teacher in the Afuso Ryu tradition, volunteered to be a teacher, assisted by Chieko Miyazato in 1996. Later, he took on the teaching himself by holding monthly meetings. The present members consist of various age groups—those in their thirties, fifties, or seventies. The majority of the members are senior citizens, those who still hold onto the fond memories of their ancestors.

Initially, Shuri no Hibi (Daily Life in Shuri), a book by Fumiko Ikari was used as the class material. The book was popular and used in the Uchinaaguchi News Hour via the Ryukyu Radio Station in Okinawa. In subsequent monthly classes, Sandaa covered topics like family relations, numbers and counting, Kwatchi (food), and names for parts of the body; he used both English and Uchinaaguchi in his instruction. These bilingual materials are helpful to the English-speaking participants of the class. Finally, as an Afuso Ryu (Afuso School) sanshin teacher who has rich personal experiences of living in Okinawa, Sandaa's presence has been of great benefit to class members.

Media-Oriented Community

Uchinaaguchi Lesson on Radio KZOO

An AM radio station, Channel 1210, Radio KZOO, has developed a strong tie with the local Okinawan community. Keiko Ura, a native of Okinawa, has been a central figure in the promotion of Okinawa-related programming and activities such as the annual Okinawan Festival which features dance, taiko, sanshin, songs, food and other activities. KZOO offers Okinawa-related programming every Sunday afternoon, and between the hours of 3:00-7:00 p.m., listeners are treated to an Okinawan radio show with a variety of content. Additionally, the Sunday program is not only broadcast locally to the Hawai'i community, but also in Okinawa via Channel 22 FM Radio in Okinawa.

Throughout the year 2000, in commemoration of the centennial anniversary of Okinawan immigration to Hawai'i, Radio KZOO broadcast a language course entitled "Uchinaaguchi Kyooshitsu" (Okinawan language class). The Uchinaaguchi tapes, produced by Fumiko Ikari and James Tengan, aired from January through December of the year. According to Keiko Ura, the goal of Uchinaaguchi Kyooshitsu was to promote the heritage language,
targeting especially the younger generations of Okinawan descent. She received much feedback from the audience who remarked that it was a wonderful program because it provided opportunities for youth to communicate with their elders in their heritage language, and many wished for a repeat of this language programming.

Keiko Ura subsequently began a new program, “Introduction to Okinawan Music,” arranging songs with their explanations in a dramatization format. These dramatizations are based on each of the songs she plays, and are narrated in Uchinaaguchi, with explanations in Yamatuguchi (standard Japanese language). In this way, Ura is targeting a general Japanese-speaking audience and helping them understand and appreciate both the Okinawa minyo (folk music) and its language.

Institutional-based Uchinaaguchi Class

**Uchinaaguchi Course at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa**

Local Okinawans and friends of Okinawa in Hawai‘i have had to go it alone for many years to pass on Uchinaaguchi and the culture tied to it, while the primary academic institution in Hawai‘i has focused on teaching “Japanese” language, culture, and literature. However, several new trends have emerged recently which permit academics to propose and develop courses pertaining to minority groups. In 2002, under the leadership of then chair, Dr. Ying-che Li, the Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures of the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa approved its “Mission Statement” which included “to develop curricula in heritage languages and cultures related to Okinawa, Taiwan, etc.” The department now holds an institutionally assigned responsibility to promote curricula developments in heritage languages and cultures, in addition to the studies of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese as foreign languages. Benefiting from the university’s rich faculty resources, student interests, and community support, the department of East Asian Languages and Literatures provided course developers, Professors Kyoko Hijirida and Leon Serafin, with a two-year preparation period in 2002. In the implementation process, the course curriculum has faced various issues. These included decision-making in orthography, goals, and scope of the course content, teaching approaches, assessment tools, and so forth. In order to satisfy the institutional requirements such as grading, the Okinawan Language and Culture courses must have a clear set of course goals, content, instructional approaches, and evaluation methods. For example, Japanese 471, which is the first sequence of the two courses proposed, set forth the following course objectives:

**The course goals/objectives: Japanese 471 (3 credits) is one-semester course on Okinawan Language and Culture, designed for those who have Japanese-language speaking and reading ability at the level of completion of Japanese 302/308, to pursue the following goals:**

1. To acquire basic skills in listening and speaking, and reading and writing, and through acquisition of these skills to develop an appreciation of the Okinawan ethnic language, including differences from and similarities to Japanese.
2. To understand, appreciate, and acquire the basic characteristics of Okinawan language and folk culture reflected in such areas as folk-sayings, folktales, songs, and traditional events.

Students are also encouraged and directed towards the guidelines suggested in the National Standards. The course is built on a sound foundation of the Japanese language (300-level, advanced skills in listening, speaking, reading and writing) as a pre-requisite, so that students are able to develop Uchinaaguchi with the basic communication ability in the following communicative modes:

(a) **Interactive communication:** Students can engage in conversation, provide and obtain information including communicating feelings and emotions and exchanging opinions at the basic level.

(b) **Interpretative communication:** Students understand and interpret written and spoken Okinawan language on limited topics at the beginning level.

(c) **Presentational communication:** Students present information, concepts, and ideas to an audience of listeners or readers on certain topics.

(d) With regard to the Cultural Standards, students are expected to demonstrate understanding of Okinawan cultural characteristics by studying traditions, customs, manners, events, products, and their relationships with perspectives and/or underlying value system through proverbs, songs, dance, festivals, annual events, cuisine, folklore, tea ceremony (bukabuku-cha), artifacts and so forth.

Adopted from National Standards in Foreign Language Education Project (1999).

The following diagram illustrates the scope of the course contents. Additionally, the financial support provided by the UH–Japan Studies Endow-
Some challenges in the course development are how to revive Uchinaaguchi meaningfully for the college students via transformational goals (i.e., how do we assess the impact of these courses on these students?). That is, how can culturally grounded instructional content be developed that are more appealing and interesting to the learners; and how can choices on teaching strategies reflect the target cultural elements and values. Adopting the portfolio as assessment method may be most appropriate approach.

Conclusion: Future Development of Uchinaaguchi Community in Hawai’i

In this paper, we have explored the historical and current developments with respect to Uchinaaguchi promotion in Hawai’i. Although the progress made so far in the local sites as we discussed here is highly valuable, we feel that there needs to be a further step made in order to see the assured, positive growth of the Uchinaaguchi community. That is to establish a bi-directional network among the local sites within these communities—for instance between the locally founded classes and the institutionally organized classes which can then also communicate and exchange their resources with the media-oriented groups. This network among the local sites should be also extend to sites outside of Hawai’i, to such locales as Uchinaaguchi Hukyuu Kyoogikai (Society for Okinawan Language Revival), another important partner. We believe that the Uchinaaguchi community of Hawai’i can benefit from this kind of sharing, as can other communities in the other Okinawan diasporas. The people involved in the community are already eagerly headed in this direction and within a few years, we will probably find another milestone to place on the remarkable development of the community.

Note

1. Hoffman (1991) discusses two types of bilinguals. The first type are simultaneous bilinguals who have equal level of linguistic ability in their two languages, while the second type of bilinguals have superior linguistic ability in one of the two languages. Ishihara’s (2001) report seems to indicate that the environment in which Nisei Okinawans were immersed led to the latter form of bilingualism.

References


On 21 September 1997, I accompanied family elders on the Agari-umaai (Eastern pilgrimage), a pilgrimage dedicated to Amamikyu, the creator deity of the Okinawan and Amami Oshima Islands and the original ancestor of those islands’ people. It was a journey that evoked memory and imagination. The pilgrimage reaches deeply into Okinawan notions of creation, spirituality, ancestors, death and the afterlife, and identity. Retracing ancestral pathways brings to consciousness layered memories that commingle past and present. For this pilgrim, the journey also suspended time.

All journeys depend on where one has ventured. My participation in the Agari-umaai pilgrimage heightened my interest in Okinawan spirituality, an interest that had been sparked in 1995 by my presence at an umatchi, an annual observance that honors the family’s founding ancestor. During the course of conversation with family elders, I learned of the seven-year ritual cycle observed by the Nakasone munchu (family line). Agari-umaai is the first event in the cycle. Nakijin-nubui is the other major pilgrimage. Kin groups carry on this once-royal pilgrimage that ceased with the dissolution of the Ryukyuan kingdom in 1879. For more than four hundred years, the king, together with the chifijin (hereafter referred to as kikoe-ogimi, as it is known in the Japanese), the national priestess, made annual visits on behalf of the nation to offer prayers of thanksgiving and to observe memorials for the first ancestor. The pilgrimage reinforced royal authority and was a powerful focus of national identity that persists even today. Our pilgrimage retraced the royal route, but reduced the number of sites visited.

The modern Agari-umaai pilgrimage is an extension of the annual kami-ugan (prayers to kami; Jp. kami ogami) performed by kin groups, which visit sacred wells and springs, grave sites, and other reminders of their immediate ancestors. It was a journey that evoked memory and imagination. The pilgrimage reaches deeply into Okinawan notions of creation, spirituality, ancestors, death and the afterlife, and identity. Retracing ancestral pathways brings to consciousness layered memories that commingle past and present. For this pilgrim, the journey also suspended time.

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ancestors. The observances at well sites honor the resident water kami for their life-giving gift. At these sacred sites, pilgrims engage in ubinadii (Jp. おびなだい), a ritual in which water from these sacred springs is dabbed on the forehead to ensure divine protection. Pilgrims return to their villages and homes with the sacred water and repeat the ritual with those who remained behind. The sacred water is also offered at the ancestral altar. Family rites at grave sites and other places honor the memory of ancestors, who after thirty-three years become kami, take on a spiritual identity, and protect their descendants (Namihira 1997:69). Likewise, on the Agari-umaai pilgrimage, kin groups pay homage at sites honoring the original ancestor, Amamikyu, and other sites important to their earliest ancestors.

Joining my extended family on this pilgrimage offered a rare opportunity to observe a significant component of the Okinawan spiritual experience. I participated in the ritual observances as a representative of my branch of the family. With my father’s recent death, I am now the patriarch of my paternal grandfather’s lineage. The pilgrimage was a journey to places in my mind and heart. It is my intention to participate in subsequent pilgrimages and other observances special to my family and to sketch the seven-year religious cycle of an Okinawan family. A participant-observer, I alternated between the roles of pilgrim and scholar. I eagerly noted my observations and conversations. At each site, elders retold the associated myth and shared memories of previous pilgrimages and our common ancestors. Humor and story revealed deep feelings for the myth, the land, and the family. The storytellers, I realized, had incorporated into their identity the myth, the pilgrimage, and its landscape. Each retelling—and each visit—nurtures the identity of future elders. The spiritual torch is passed along by means of participation and observation.

This essay offers a contemporary perspective on the meaning and significance of the Agari-umaai pilgrimage, its specific sites, and rituals associated with Amamikyu. My reflections commingle the memories of family elders, who invoke memories of earlier ancestors, and the scribbling of scholars, who record and comment on the recollections of others. Kneeling in thanksgiving before sacred sites, images of the moment of first discovery, the joy of landfall, the hardships of a new beginning, nostalgia for the home left behind, and aspirations for progeny came to my mind. Landmarks invoke memory and imagination, allowing thoughts to move effortlessly between past and present. Weaving memory and imagination with scholarship and observation, I describe and reflect on my pilgrimage experience. How, I wonder, has a tiny island nation in the shadow of powerful civilizations been able to maintain its spiritual and cultural integrity? The effect of Chinese religions, the homogenizing efforts of the Japanese, the continuing presence of the U.S. military and modernization, all these things cloud ancestral memories. Will they lapse into forgetfulness? I begin with an overview of the myth of Amamikyu, continue with a description of the twelve sites that we visited, and conclude with some observations on the intersection of foreign religions and the resilience of the Okinawan identity.

Creation Myth

In Okinawa kō (Okinawan reflections), Iha Fuyū (1876–1947) speculates that Amamikyu (lit. “Amami person”) refers to the Amabe, fisherfolk who serviced the Yamato clan of Japan during the third century. The Amabe gradually moved from their original home in the Japanese Inland Sea south to the Ryukyus. Over time, Amamikyu came to be identified with the creator deity who arrived from the sea. The original home of Amamikyu is Nirai-Kanai, a great island that lies somewhere in the eastern sea. It is the dwelling place of the ancestors and the source of such knowledge as the agricultural arts.

The four written versions of the myth of Amamikyu were compiled within a span of approximately fifty years. During this half century, the myth grew in detail and complexity, revealing an evolving centralization of power and a hardening hierarchical structure in Okinawan society (Sakihara 1987:30-31). In Chūzan seikan (Mirror of the ages of Chūzan) by Haneji Chōshū (1617–1675; also known as Shō Jōken), its last official retelling, the myth legitimizes the Shō dynasty’s authority. Since scholarly debate on the details of the myth is of little concern for pilgrims, I turn to the Ryūkyū shintōki (Records of Shinto in Ryukyu), which relates the following:

Long ago, in the beginning, before there were people, a man and a woman descended from the heavens. The man was named Shinerikyu; the woman was called Amamikyu. The two resided in huts standing next to each other. At the time, the islands were small and floated on the waves. Tashika trees, thus, were brought forth and planted to form the mountains. Next, hikyu grass and adan trees were planted. Gradually the island took form. Yin and Yang were never consummated between the two, but since their residences stood side by side, the woman became pregnant with the coming and going of the wind. Three children were born. The first was the progenitor of the masters of various regions. The second was the predecessor of the noro [priestesses]. The third was the forebear of the commoners (Yokoyama 1943:108).
Like the Takaragahama in the Japanese classic Kojiki (Record of ancient matters), the Ryukyu shintōki posits an idealized heavenly abode where Teda, the sun and principal deity, resides. Teda summons Amamikyu to create the Okinawa Islands and asks her to bear children. The Chūzan seikan embellishes the myth. Amamikyu and Shinerikyu, female and male, are asked to descend to the world below, procreate, and prosper. The firstborn is the progenitor of the king, the secondborn the progenitor of the aji or local lords, and the third the progenitor of the commoners. The first female is the kiko-ōgimi, the second daughter the progenitor of the local priestesses. Continuing, the Chūzan seikan describes the creation of the seven major utaki, or sacred groves. They are, in order of creation, Ashimui of Kunigami, Kubō of Nakijin, Chinenmai, Seefadake, and Sosatsuno-Urahara, Amatsuji in Tamagusuku, Fubuumui on Kudaka Island, Suimui, and Madamamui. (Amamikyu is the creator of all other sacred groves and woods on all the islands.) Subsequently, Amamikyu ascends to heaven and asks for seeds of the five staple grains. The story of Amamikyu and Shinerikyu—the creators of the islands, the progenitors of the nation, and the bearers of agriculture—is an important theme in Agari-umaai.

As was noted, the Ryukyu royal house embellished the ancient myth of Amamikyu to legitimate its authority. However, in addition to this official version, in the far-flung villages and on isolated islands a second oceanic type of myth prevailed. First reported by Ifa Fuyū, a sister and brother pair who escape a great flood are considered to be progenitors of the people. Creation is not divine but much more humble. The survivors, after many great struggles, carve out a life for themselves and repopulate the land. Sister and brother, the progenitors of the people, enjoy equal prestige and authority. The sister assumes the role of the spiritual patron of her brother, who is in turn the sister's secular patron. This dual sovereignty, spiritual and secular, is a feature in Okinawan society.

The establishment of a hierarchical system of religious functionaries presided over by a royal priestess was an attempt by the kingdom to appropriate the folk religion (Mabuchi 1964:86). Under the Ryukyu kingdom, this pattern of dual responsibility extended from the village level to the national. The brother king held sway over political matters, and his sister attended to spiritual matters. The most important religious position, kiko-ōgimi, was reserved for a close female relative—a sister, a mother, or an aunt. Sharing equal prestige and authority, the king and the priestess consulted closely on matters of state. Similarly, the king accompanied the priestess on the Agari-umaai pilgrimage. Since the sister held sway in religious matters, the king had to be ritualistically transformed into a woman to enter Seefa-utaki and other sacred sites. While the Agari-umaai reinforces the royal house and its relationship to Amamikyu, the supporting administrative structure is grounded in the brother-sister dual-sovereignty creation myth.

Pilgrimage

While there is no historical record marking the beginning of the Agari-umaai, the Chūzan seikan mentions that, in the mid-seventeenth century, the king, together with the kiko-ōgimi, his spiritual counterpart, made annual visits to Kudaka Island in February for the mugi no minkyoma (first harvest) and in April, stopping at sacred sites in Chinen, Tamagusuku, Sashiki, and Ogata villages. On these visits, they prayed for national peace and a good harvest and conducted memorial services for the first ancestors. These pilgrimages drained the national treasury, and, in 1673, the regent Haneji Chōshū began sending a representative in place of the king. The ruling house continued the Agari-umaai pilgrimages until the Japanese destroyed the political and religious infrastructure of the kingdom. Soon thereafter, kin groups initiated the practice. The last kiko-ōgimi completed her final pilgrimage during the Taishō period (1912–1926). She died in 1944.

Traditionally, the Agari-umaai and other pilgrimages observed by families occur on or about the twelfth day of the eighth lunar month. Since, according to the Okinawan calendar, the eleventh day of the eighth lunar month marks the first day of the year, the pilgrimage is essentially a New Year's ritual. This period also marks the lull between the summer harvest and the winter planting. Kinfolks escort the pilgrims to the outskirts of the village with music and festivities. As in the past, elders carry a binsii, a ritual tool and supply kit, and a jubako, a container filled with food offerings. Before the advent of the automobile, the pilgrimage took over a week. Ours was completed in a day.

Our pilgrimage began with rites honoring our immediate ancestors at the family altar. We left the Wakugawa section of Nakijin Village and traveled to Yonabaru Village on the Chinen Peninsula, continuing from there to Yonabaru-ieega, Teda-uga, and Seefa-utaki. After a break for lunch, we reassembled at Nakandakari-bijaa, continuing from there to Tamagusukunuru-dunchi and the shrine of the Tamagusuku shaman, Yabusatsu-utaki, and Bin'udaki. We skipped the rites at Sonohiyan-utaki for prosaic reasons—parking on a late Sunday afternoon in and around Shuri Palace is impossible. Our pilgrimage
concluded at Saki-bijia in Naha City. Our route, with a few notable exceptions, retraced that of the royal pilgrimage. The day ended with festivities.

At each site, elders from the various branches of the family withdrew ukuu (incense; Jp. senko), uchikabi (ritual paper money), upanagumi (pure rice; Jp. ohanagome), and unsaki (Jp. osake; rice wine) from the binsui and offered prayers of gratitude and remembrances on our behalf. The elders, the ritual leaders, occupied the front row, while other kinfolk settled in the back. When the elders signaled that preparations were completed, we knelt and drew our hands in prayer. The elders offered barely audible words of self-introduction to the kami and asked for health and prosperity for the family. Incense was not burned but laid on yellow sheets of paper that represent money. At the conclusion of the prayers, sake was sprinkled on the incense and around the ibi, the stone representation of the kami and the focus of veneration. Offerings of food were made at Seefa-utaki and Sakibijia. Except for the shrine at Tamagusuku, our rites were held outdoors. The sacred sites are always close to the earth.

We arrived at Udunyama a few minutes before the appointed 10:00 a.m. starting time. I was filled with excitement for this long-anticipated journey. Approximately seventy kinfolk, elders and children, from different branches of the family gathered. Relatives long separated greeted each other and exchanged news. A cousin formally introduced me, and we proceeded with our first ritual observance. The gentle sea breeze tempering the already warm midmorning sun reminded me of Hawai‘i. I was struck by the simple, humble nature of the small cinder block and concrete shrine that sat on a concrete slab. No more than six feet high, about the size of a large refrigerator, the shrine was open on one side. A flat rock served as the altar. Located at the confluence of a river and the ocean, Udunyama marks the spot where Niruya-unusi, the principal deity of the Okinawan pantheon, revealed itself. Also at this spot, Amakudi, a heavenly maiden, descended and bathed her newly delivered infant. Spring was enclosed by a small concrete structure resembling a Shinto shrine. The king and kikoe-ogimi made offerings there before proceeding to Kudaka Island for other rites. Urban sprawl has encroached on both sites. My cousins remarked on the many new buildings that had arisen since their last visit, and we had difficulty locating Udunyama, which was situated at the edge of a school athletic field. Yonabaru-ieegaa is in a small children’s park and bordered on two sides by high-rise apartment buildings. At one time the entire area was forested.

A short drive from Yonabaru is Teda-ugaa, a most unusual site. Teda is the name of the sun deity that appears in Okinawan myth and song. Alighting from the car, we climbed a small hill and descended a steep edge of the sea. A concrete walkway made for an easy fifteen-minute walk. A cousin mentioned that, in the past, he had walked along the exposed reef to reach the pilgrimage site. After departing from Yonabaru Harbor, the king and kikoe-ogimi stopped here to ask for safe passage during their trip to Kudaka Island. Water no longer flows from this sacred spring.

We made our way to Seefa-utaki, the most sacred site of the Okinawan nation. Only women were allowed to enter during the days of the kingdom, but now all are welcome, and the site is popular with both pilgrims and archaeologists. Seefa-utaki has six sites for prayers: Ujooguti, Ufuduui, Yu’inchii, Sikyodayuru ga nuubii and amadayuru amika nuubii, Sanguui, and Urookaa. Of these, Ujooguti, Sanguui, and Yu’inchii correspond to named sites in Shuri Palace. Shuri Palace symbolizes the center of the secular world, and
Seefa-utaki is its spiritual counterpart. We offered rites at three sites, Yu’inchi, Sikyodayuru ga-nuubii and amadayuru amika nuubii, and a site just outside the sacred precincts.

From a sun-drenched open field, we climbed a short set of stairs, passing two small stone lanterns to the left as we came to the top of a low ridge. Our feet met with a narrow coral-cobbled pathway, and we were immediately drawn to that seemed to have been pushed up from the earth. The dense tropical thick canopy of trees. The ascending pathway wound its way past the remains of Ufuduui, the site where the initiation rites of the kikoe-ogimi took place. The shrine was destroyed during the Battle of Okinawa and has not been rebuilt. The pathway continued deeper into the forested hills to Yu’inchi, the site of our first prayers. The ritual site is on a low raised stage set with large coral rocks. The altar faces a shallow hollow at the base of a brownish-yellow-colored cliff. The spacious circular clearing facing the shallow cave had the feel of an amphitheater. Yu’inchi bears the same name as an open courtyard in Shuri Palace. Viewng the elders on the ritual platform, I imagined the king, kikoe-ogimi, and other religious functionaries in their white robes attending to the spiritual health of the nation.

After completing our rituals, we returned via a pathway that veered to the left. We entered a clearing, bordered on the right by a large sheltering coral overhang that seemed to have been pushed up from the earth. The dense tropical thick on the left curved to the right to enclose the space. We encountered our second ritual site, Sikyodayuru-ga-nuubii and amadayuru-amika-nuubii. Rainwater dripped from two stalactites, collecting in large hollowed-out stones. The volume of water that is collected is an indicator of the coming year’s agricultural yield. This water is also used for ubinadii. Immediately to the left of the hollowed-out stones is a low altar where we observed our second rite. Further to the left is an inverted-V passageway leading to the Sanguui worship site. This unusual geographic feature is formed by a perpendicular right wall that is buttressed by a second wall leaning against it. The darkened passageway dramatically frames the sunlit rock face at the far end. Walking through and turning left, the pea-green wisp of Kudaka Island floating in the deep blue ocean comes into view. This is the site of Seefa-utaki’s utuusi to Kudaka Island.

Completing our rituals, we found our way back down the forested passageway into the midday sun. We reassembled for a final rite in a small hollow to the left of the pathway. This site was not one of the six sacred sites in Seefa-utaki, and I am not certain of its significance. But it did seem to be an ancient burial site. Shortly after, we broke up for lunch. Although seemingly otherworldly, Seefa-utaki possesses a gentle ease that conveys a sense of reassurance. Its scale contributes to this impression. The trees are tall, and the rock cliffs are large but not overwhelming; the site has a number of sheltering caves and outcroppings and a thick forest that offered the earliest settlers safe haven from the rigors of sea travel and from frequent storms. The site also provided sustenance. Nearby are Ukinju and Hainju, the freshwater springs that are associated with the first rice fields. From the protected inlet, I imagined people harvesting fish and other foodstuff. On an earlier visit, my daughter, then fourteen years old, perhaps crystallized what might have been the feelings of the first inhabitants when she said, “This is a place where Totoro would live.” Totoro are gentle mythical forest-dwelling creatures who are protectors of children. They can be seen only by children who love them.

After lunch at a local restaurant, we reassembled at Nakandakari-bijaa, an artesian spring, and a most pleasant site. Water flowed from four openings in the side of a small cliff into a large cistern made from finely cut coral. The sound of rushing water and the trees tempered the afternoon heat. To the front of the cistern was a large open area, which must have served as the village square, where women came to draw water and wash and men stopped to rest after a day in the fields. I have found no detailed information on the spring, but its proximity to Mintun-gusuku, the first permanent home of Amami-kyu, suggests its association with the earliest settlers. At the small shrine, which stands above and to the left of the cistern, elders led us in prayers of thanksgiving.

Located above the rest of the village, and featuring a commanding view of the eastern Pacific, is a shrine cared for by the priestess of Tamagusuku. During the kingdom period, the Tamagusuku shaman, who belongs to one of the oldest families on Okinawa, performed thanksgiving and memorial rites with representatives from the court. The shrine is divided into two rooms with three altars. The altars held no images, only censors, offerings of greens and sake. I am not clear to whom these altars are dedicated, but it seems that the shrine held several ancient lineages. The elders offered incense to a select few censors. They also acknowledged fai nu kang, the hearth deity. Unlike the Chinese, who understand the kitchen god to be a messenger or representative of the god on high, the Okinawans understand the kitchen god to be the most distant ancestor.

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Taking leave, we proceeded to Yabusatsu-utaki. This utaki is associated with Amamikyu arriving on the island, her first home, and the first rice fields. Leaving the green plateau, we descended through a narrow road to the foot of a steep cliff. The blue waters of the Pacific merged with the sky. We arrived at a narrow strip of sugarcane field sandwiched between the beach and the cliff. The planter had dedicated part of his field to a parking lot to accommodate the many pilgrims and to earn some extra cash. From the parking lot, we walked between the fields back toward the cliffs to Ukinju and Hainju, the artesian springs that are associated with the first rice field. Rising above the fully matured sugarcane plants, the path split. The path to the left led to Ukinju (see photo below). Hainju lay approximately twenty-five feet to the right. I was struck by the humble nature of the springs. The waters that flowed were no more than a gentle trickle. It is hard to imagine their importance, but surely, for the weary immigrants who stumbled onto shore, fresh water must have been a blessing.

The observances at sacred well sites honoring the water spirit, clearly animistic, reveal the most fundamental religious sentiment of the Okinawan people. The Okinawans believe that the world is inhabited by myriads of supernatural and sacred spirits or kami. Prayers at these sites express gratitude to the water spirit for taking care of the ancestors and ask for health and prosperity for the family. Ukinju and Hainju, the first springs, are clearly the most important ritual water sites. The waters from Ukinju and Hainju flowed into two small fields of rice that had been planted a few weeks before. I was surprised to see them. They were too small to be of any commercial value. Someone had taken the time and effort to revere the myth. As I passed by, an elder remarked, “This is the beginning of Okinawa.” He was a farmer. In a previous visit to another well site, another elder had expressed a similar sentiment: “Water sustained the life of the ancestors and supported their crops.” At every well site, elders remarked on the reduced water flow. Teda-ugaa was dry.

After rites at Ukinju and Hainju, we made our way to Yaharajikasa, where, according to the myth, Amamikyu first set foot on Okinawa. The vast expanse of white sand between blue sea and green hills made for a most spectacular scene. The holy site, marked by a three-foot-tall stone pillar, stood in the sand, approximately twenty feet from the sea. The site is covered with water when the tide is in. We directed our prayers toward the low outline of Kudaka Island adrift in the distance. This site and the direction of the prayers recall Amamikyu’s descent on Kudaka Island and her arrival on the mainland.

The myth and the landscape encouraged self-reflection and transformed my perceptions of the scene. What could have happened here? Gazing over the ocean expanse, I imagined tired men and women grounding their flimsy ships, stepping into the gentle surf, and dragging their waterlogged belongings behind them. Although their footprints had long since been erased, I stood in the tracks of my ancestors. Picturing this event in my mind’s eye, I imagined them speaking to me directly. They related their relief at landfall, the heat of the burning midday sun as they drifted with the current, their longing for the home they had left behind. Imagining the past inspires thoughts of who one is, stimulating memories of distant ancestors. Perhaps someday my daughter will continue this pilgrimage.

We then proceeded a short distance to Hamaga-utaki, nestled in a thicket just above the beach. On top of an approximately six-foot-high coral retaining wall, a small shrine marks Amamikyu’s first home. From this temporary abode, she sought a more permanent home further inland and on higher ground, at Mintun-gusuku, where the graves of Amamikyu and Shinerikyu are located.
It took an hour to get from Hamagaa-utaki to Bin'nutaki, which is located about one mile east of Shuri Palace. Bin'nutaki is one of the seven sacred sites created by Amamikyu. This once-isolated site has an utuushi for Kudaka Island and Seefa-utaki. On ceremonial occasions, the king and other religious functionaries performed their rites. We dedicated prayers at two of the sites and at a shrine dedicated to four Okinawan kings, Shuten (1187–1237), Eiso (1260–1299), Satto (1350–1395), and Shō En (1470–1476), the founders of royal dynasties.

Our final stop was at Saki-bijia. The site is located between the bottom of a rather high cliff and a densely built-up section of Naha City. We performed rites at two sites dedicated to Ryūsen no kami, Dragon Spring kami. This site is not included in the Agari-umaai, and I am unclear as to its importance for my family. At the conclusion of these final rituals, we enjoyed food and companionship before dispersing.

Reflections

The elders who led us on our pilgrimage are keenly aware that they bridge the past and the future. Carriers of the memory of a tradition estranged by modernization, they transmit ancestral memories through story, ritual, and prayer. Later that evening, over dinner and other stories, we were asked to continue their work. This was the last pilgrimage for Uncle Jirō. “Today, I had trouble walking the distance. I will be too old for the next pilgrimage.” He is seventy-eight. The tone and content of the tradition are shaped by his life and those of the other elders. The next generation of elders struggling to find meaning in ancient rituals can look to the experiences of the Nedukuru brothers, Takashi and Mitsusaburo, in Man’en gannen no futtoboru or “Football of the first year of Man’en” by Ōe Kenzaburō, the 1994 Nobel Laureate. 13 The novel, renamed The Silent Cry in the English-language edition (Ōe 1974), is an attempt to bridge two historical periods, the first year of Man’en (1860) and Ōe’s own time (1960). Ōe’s metaphor of a football being kicked back and forth between the present and the past symbolizes the brothers’ obsession with trying to come to grips with their past through their present. The two brothers return home in hopes of building a life for themselves. Looking toward the future, they search the past. The ball kicked in 1960 bounces into 1860, where it is kicked back to 1960.

Like the Nedukuru brothers, I, too, look to the past to understand my present self. The modern pilgrimage preserves memories of the past. Its sites, reminders of another time, inform me of my connections with what has happened here in the past. At its best, the past offers counsel and instruction, telling me who I am in terms of where my ancestors have been. Imagination transports me to the past and enables me to relive through the myth such ancestral memories as the joy of landfall and the struggle to survive in a new home. This history, recounted with each visit, is layered with every retelling, but this layering has not diminished the sense of gratitude toward the original ancestors and the importance of life-giving water. Participation in and observation of ritual and prayer reinforce history and myth. Memory relives the past, and imagination transforms it. Myth continues to grip the imagination and hold meaning for this pilgrim. Repeat visits will reward the ever-changing landscape of memory and imagination.

The legends and rituals that accompany the Agari-umaai pilgrimage reveal the intrusion of foreign religions. I note two. First, ancestral veneration, a key feature in the village kamiugan and Agari-umaai pilgrimage, shares many features with the ancestral cult in China. The ancient Chinese believed the relationship between parent and child to be fundamental. Filial piety required children to honor their parents while they were alive and to provide proper burial and observe regular memorial services after they had died. While alive, the parents reciprocated with care and love; after death, as ancestral spirits, they looked after the welfare of their descendants. Such beliefs must have found a receptive audience among the Okinawans, for whom offerings and prayers of gratitude to the ancestors were already an important part of ritual life.14

Second, I noted on two occasions the presence of shrines dedicated to a fii nu kang, or hearth deity. Scholars have noted the similarity between the fii nu kang and the Taoist hearth deity and maintain that it is of Chinese origin (Lebra 1966:99–100). Sinologists speculate that the hearth deity appeared sometime before the sixth century B.C.E. Japanese scholars believe that the cult of the hearth deity is indigenous to Okinawa, as it is to many other early cultures (Kubo 1993:63)—and that its Chinese veneer entered with immigrants from the continent (Nakamatsu 1990:152–3). In China, the hearth deity is believed to be a lesser deity who reports the activities of the family to a higher deity, the lord in heaven. In contrast, the Okinawans believe that fii nu kang represent ukami or great kami, the first and earliest ancestors of the family lineage (Nakamatsu 1990:152). The fii nu kang also serves as an utuusi to distant prayer sites. The incorporation in Okinawa of this and other religious practices demonstrates the resilience and the openness of a people who live on the periphery of more powerful cultural spheres.
My research and observations led me to other aspects of Okinawan religion and culture and to unresolved discrepancies. Other than that they followed the traditional pilgrimage route, I uncovered no logic or pattern in the sequence of sites we visited. Further, I also discovered inconsistencies in many of the details surrounding the myths. For example, the official myth states that Amamikyu descended on Fabuu-utaki on Kudaka Island, before making her way to the mainland. But seven other sites scattered throughout Okinawa also claim to be the spot where Amamikyu first alighted. Further, while the tombs in Mintun-gusuku claim to house the remains of Amamikyu and Shinerikyu, other devotees believe that Amamikyu rests in a crypt on Hamahiga, a tiny island just off the Katsuren Peninsula.

Further research is required if sense is to be made of these and other discrepancies. Some of them can be explained by the successive waves of migrants settling at different sites and coming from different places. Families and regions evolved thematic variations of myths that add to the difficulty of arriving at definitive explanations. Such discrepancies, however, point to a spiritual tradition that is still vital and alive. In the absence of a "holy book" and a seminary where religious functionaries learn their faith and craft, the Okinawans, at least from what I observed, transmit their gratitude for the natural world and for their ancestors through participating in Agari-umaai and other ritual family observances. Through participation and observation, the pilgrims invest themselves in their Okinawan religion and identity.

In a journey that evoked memory and imagination, this pilgrimage reached deeply into ancestral memories of creation, spirituality, death, and the afterlife. My memories, shaped at every turn by personal biographies and intellectual proclivities, sustain the myth and the pilgrimage. Retracing ancestral pathways brought to light layers of memories that commingle past and present. Places possess a marked capacity for triggering imaginative insight, inspiring thoughts about who one is, memories of ancestors, and musings on what one might become. The pilgrimage, a journey of places in the mind, must be repeated.

Notes

1. Munchu (patrician; Jp. moncha) refers to sibling groups concerned almost exclusively with ancestral veneration.

2. In addition to Agari-umaai and Nakijin-nubui, each sibling group observes pilgrimages to its matsuuya (house of origin; Jp. motoya), where the memorial tablet of the original patriarch is enshrined (munchubaka, "sibling-group crypt"; Jp. moncha hakka), and other sites important to the first ancestor.

3. The Ryukyuan kingdom began with the first Shō dynasty (1406–1469) and ended with the Japanese annexation in 1879. Historically, the kingdom can be divided into two phases, the early kingdom (1422–1609), which includes the first and second Shō dynasties, and the late kingdom (1609–1879), during which the second Shō dynasty was controlled by the Satsuma domain.

4. The four versions of the myth appear in the Ryūkyū shintōki (compiled in 1605 by Taichū), the Omoro Sōshi, the Kikoe-ōgimi ogishiki, and the Chōzan seikan. Although the Omoro Sōshi was completed in 1610, its songs and poems date to a much earlier period.

5. Shinerikyu is the male counterpart of Amamikyu. Scholars debate whether Shinerikyu appears together with Amamikyu, Sakihara (1987) believes that the Shinerikyu is an echo expression for Amamikyu. Originally Amamikyu was gender neutral, but, under the influence of the Japanese myth of Amaterasu Omikami, Amamikyu and Shinerikyu were assigned gender.

6. The "utaki" is an indigenous feature of Okinawan religion. Every village, except those built since the Meiji period (1868–1912), has an utaki. The village utaki, located in the adjacent hills and forest, is associated with the founding family of the village and its burial site. The most sacred precinct of the utaki is a small clearing which offerings are placed and over which prayer is offered. Beyond the "altar" may be an ibi, a stone that personifies the spirit of the kami of the ancestral founder of a village. Often, however, there may be just a natural formation. On appointed days, the ancestral kami journeys from Nirai-Kanai, their home, and descend to the utaki. It is here that the ancestors are met.

7. Sakihara (1987:14–41) provides an extended discussion of the various forms of the myth. While Agari-umaai is specific to Okinawa, the myth of Amamikyu is strikingly similar to the Japanese creation myth related in the Kojiki and the Shintō religion. The Okinawans articulated their creation myth after the Satsuma invasion of 1609.

8. Mabuchi (1964) writes that, except for the Miyako Islands, belief in the sister patronage is widespread throughout the Ryukyus.

9. Niruya-unusi is also known as Agari nu unusi. "Niruya" refers to Nirai-Kanai, the original home of Amamikyu. "Unusi" means "lord." Hence, Niruya-unusi is the "lord of the heavens."
This article introduces Ijun, a religion that was founded in Okinawa in 1972. Based on traditional Ryukyuan cosmology and creation myth, Ijun can be classified as a new religion (Shimamura 1992) because of the recent origins of its formal organization and its syncretism of Buddhism, Shintō and Christianity. Ijun has grown to include about ten thousand adherents in Okinawa. It has been practiced on the island of Hawai‘i since the early 1980s by about one hundred adherents, primarily among Okinawan Americans.

The charisma of Ijun is expressed in its emphasis on spiritual healing, a central focus of its belief and practice. Also notable is the social syncretism practiced by the founder, Takayasu Ryūsen, who has introduced into the overseas branches spirit healers from other traditions in line with his universalist theology.

After two years of participant observation in the Hawai‘i branch, I conducted fieldwork in 1992 at the central church in Ginowan City, Okinawa, at other branches on the islands of Okinawa and Miyako, and at the Yokohama branch. In 1993, I observed Ijun’s sister shrine in Chang Hua, Taiwan. Visits to these branches offered an opportunity to observe the formulation and systematization of belief and practice. This paper focuses on the Hawai‘i branch, but also points to areas of contrast between Okinawa and Hawai‘i.

Ryukyuan thinking about the supernatural has been characterized by a “lack of imagination evinced with regard to the spirit world” (Lebra 1966:204). Lebra, for one, suggests that the “absence of complexity characterizing the belief system has constituted a survival factor” because it has enabled “assimilation of foreign traits” and has been a “barrier against sophisticated belief systems alien to Okinawan thinking” (1966:204). I argue that this absence of complex theology was used by Ijun’s founder to construct a universalist philosophy that facilitates cooptation of adherents from other religions, attracting some adherents overseas who may not share an Okinawan ethnic identity.
Japanese New Religions

According to Inoue, some new religions "reach out to non-Japanese in their proselytization attempts" (1991:9). Surveys were conducted by K. Yanagawa, H. Nakamaki and N. Inoue in 1977, 1979 and 1981, of the religions of Japanese in California (Inoue 1983:2). At the time these surveys were done, Sōka Gakkai had finished a decade of "fervent proselytizing activity" and had claimed to have about 230,000 adherents, "most of whom are non-Japanese" (Inoue 1983b:101–2). Numbers of adherents abroad tend to be as difficult to assess as numbers of adherents of new religions in Japan, but Sōka Gakkai probably has the most non-Japanese adherents, followed by Sūkyō Mahikari, PL Kyōdan, Sekai Kyūseikyō, Tenrikyō, and Seicho no Ie (Inoue 1991:20). The majority of these non-Japanese adherents are in California and Hawai‘i, and in the states of Paraná and São Paulo, Brazil (Reichl 1988, 1992).

In the experience of Okinawans in North America, Japanese Buddhist sects and new religions such as Sōka Gakkai are notable, but participation in Christian groups also is significant. As in Japan where Okinawans are more likely than Japanese to be Christian, in California, Okinawan Americans are more likely to be Christian than Japanese Americans (Okinawa Club of America 1988:410).

Gedatsukai of Japan, a new salvation-oriented Buddhist religion, was founded in 1929 with headquarters in Tokyo, but its overseas wing included "branches in Hawaii and Brazil in addition to the continental United States" (Ishii 1983:164). There are similarities between Gedatsu and Ijun in terms of their size, reliance on Japanese language for most communication, and spirit healing. And, in Gedatsu it is thought that "ancestral spirits trouble their descendants" (Ishii 1983:187), a direct parallel with Ijun. Gedatsu demonstrates that immigrants change Japanese religion as their own cultural orientation changes (Yanagisako 1985).

Both Ijun and Sekai Kyūseikyō emphasize healing, ancestral spirits, multi-ethnic membership in overseas branches that are dominated by middle-aged females of the Nisei generation, and Japanese language oriented service (Yamada 1983). Ijun resembles less Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō (TKJ), although both exist on the island of Hawai‘i (Nishiyama and Fujii 1991). Members of TKJ have "formed communities of like faith with strong in-group consciousness that stood religiously isolated from the Hawaii Japanese American society" (Nishiyama and Fujii 1991:146). Ijun, however, embraces those who belong to other religions, and adherents are well-represented in ethnic associations.

In his survey of Reiyūkai, Risshō Kōseikai and Myōchikai, Komoto (1991) shows that Reiyūkai and derived groups place particular importance on karmic hindrance due to ancestral spirits. "The question is posed: 'How are ancestors...to be understood within the personal religious experience of the believers?'" (Komoto 1991:121). For this, we need to begin with understanding Ryukyuan religion.

Kreiner (1968) establishes the basic shape of Ryukyuan religion: from a village near the sea one path leads up to shizen utaki (sacred grove) and deities from heaven; another path leads down from the ashiage or detached house for visiting deities, toward the ocean and deities that originate in the other world or Nirai-Kanai (Kreiner 1968). Between the place for those that come down from above (utaki) and those that come from below (ashiage) is the inner sanctuary ibi or moya (mound), a place to worship local deities such as those of the village founder and nuru (Jp. noro or priestess) (Kreiner 1968:114). The Ijun pantheon includes Kinmanmon and the Great Kami of Ijun from above, ancestral deities and spiritual servants (or kaminchu) like Takayasu, and deities from the sea that originate in Nirai-Kanai and Ryūgū.

Takayasu and Ijun's Founding

Takayasu, born in Naha in 1934, was said to have spiritual sensitivity (saadaka umare) after he predicted events and had a near-death experience in his youth. His apparent affinity with the supernatural led his mother to take him to Seicho no Ie. At first he acted like he was interested just to please his parents, but he became serious and was promoted to the top position in Okinawa by age thirty-six (Shimamura 1992:2). His use of Ryukyuan spirits in healing was criticized. He was forced to quit and took many adherents with him. After Takayasu left Seicho no Ie, he got the calling of kamidaiari which included disturbed sleep and vomiting. After the revelation of Kinmanmon early in 1973, Takayasu's condition stabilized (Shimamura 1992:3). He then formulated Ijun theology and began the journal Ijun.

Kinmanmon is described in the classic Ryukyū Shintoki (Creation Myth) by Taichū Ryōtei (1552–1639). Taichū Shōnin spent the years 1603–1606 in Okinawa waiting for a chance to sail to China and used the time to catalogue what he thought to be Buddhist deities in Ryukyuu (Sakamaki 1963:23–7; Ginoza 1988:137–44, 222–4). Kinmanmon appears to have qualities of both impersonal supernatural force and personified deity, a combination of animism and animatism (Saso 1990; Sasaki 1984). Takayasu describes Kinmanmon as
Hilo Ashagi meets on the first and fifteenth of each month. Ances-
t Tsu.
true enlightenment and as the universe itself: other deities are manifestations
of Kinmanmon.

Hori (1968:228–9) shows that many of the founders of Japanese new
religions have charismatic personalities and shamanistic backgrounds. Takayasu
fits this portrait. According to Takayasu, the voice of Kinmanmon identified
itself to Takayasu as the primary deity of Ryukyuu, not worshipped for 360
years (Shimamura 1992:3). Takayasu (1991, 1993) teaches that this was when
Ryukyuu lost its independent religious tradition to Japanese domination; in
this, Takayasu reveals his Okinawan identity (even nationalism).

Takayasu’s experience with Seichō no Ie suggests he had knowledge
of other religions when he founded Ijun. Ijun recognizes traditional deities
overseas, such as the goddess Pele in Hawai‘i and directs adherents to pray at
traditional Hawaiian prayer sites.

Ijun’s Service at the Hawai‘i Branch

Ijun’s Hawai‘i branch near Hilo is called an *asahi*, a place where the
Ijun altar is located. Okinawan-Japanese dictionaries define *asahi* as a small
building in the front garden of a main house, with varied use as a guesthouse
and storehouse. The meaning may come from the words *ashi* or “leg” and *ageru*
(to raise), and be “raised up on legs” or “a step up” (see Kreiner 1968:112).
Lebra’s glossary of Okinawan religious terms lists *kami asahi* as “a thatched
roof supported by poles or stone pillars and without walls, used as a major site
for public rites conducted by the community priestess” (1966:219).

Services are held twice a month. The first half is given to prayer and the
remainder to healing. Only the fact of holding the power symbol distinguishes
participants. In 1994, twelve power symbol holders led the Hilo Ashagi; four
are issei Okinawan Americans, three are nisei Okinawans Americans, one is
issei Japanese American, three are Caucasian and one is Hawaiian (the only
male). None are full-time specialists. Services are led by power symbol holders
who are of Okinawan descent.

Scheduling of Services

The Hilo Ashagi meets on the first and fifteenth of each month. Ances-
tral offerings in household shrines take place on these dates (Maretzki and
Maretzki 1966:69; Glacken 1955:284), as do regular offerings to the hearth
kami (spirit) (Lebra 1966:68). Although requests to the kami can take place
at any time, the senior female prays at the hearth on the first and fifteenth

| Lebra 1966:186). To members of the Hawai‘i branch, the dates when member
congregate (the first and fifteenth of the month), is presumed to be an element
of Ryukyuan religious culture. Members seem not to know why services are
held on the first and fifteenth; they only know those are days for religious rites
in Okinawa. Glacken (1955:293) describes Ryukyuan ceremonies that must
be performed when the tide is coming in or at high tide, something that had
religious significance. With two fifteen day lunar cycles to a lunar month,
Glacken’s informants were able to calculate the tides in their heads (1955:293).
Takayasu also could do this.

Content of Prayer: Prayers of the First and the Fifteenth

Prayers are repeated in the Hilo Ashagi, at services on the first and fifteenth
of each month. Power symbol holders have memorized the prayers; others read
them in Japanese or English. These prayers contain archaic language, Ryukyuan
words, and in some cases, Japanese characters with non-standard readings.
One prayer, “Words of Prayer for the First: Thanks to the Kami” (*Tsuitachi no
Inori no Kotoba: Kami ni Kansha*), is repeated on the first and another, “Words
of Prayer for the Fifteenth: Thanks to the Ancestors” (*Jagomichi no Inori
do Kotoba: Senzo ni Kansha*) on the fifteenth of each month. The members refer
to these as “Thanking the Kami” and “Thanking the Ancestors.” The first
prayer, “Thanking the Kami” contains the following:

We thank the Great Kami of Ijun for guidance, full of joy that we are able
to see this wonderful first day of the month. All is an incarnation of Nyo-i
Roku Shin helping my heart to blossom. Here, just as I am, I attain a religious devo-
tion. From this day the wonderful, universal power goes out to all people
and things, promoting love and peace everywhere. We are thankful that
we are protected by the kami and atrain harmony between ancestors and
descendants. From this day the wonderful, universal power goes out to all
people and things, prommting love and peace everywhere.

“Thanking the Ancestors” contains the following:

Kami, we have been blessed with wonderful ancestors. As a descendant of
(spaker’s place of birth). I am thankful that I am here today. The kami have
given me the marvelous Comfort of the Six Kami Powers (Nyo-i Roku Shin
Tsū). With this power we know that our honored ancestors lack for nothing
and are being transformed into kami. With the guidance of the Great Kami
of Ijun, the ancestral spirits are calm, harmonious, and full of joy. The brilliant
light and distinguished services of the ancestors make our cup runneth over
with joy, harmony, and peace. In the next world, we go with the ancestors,
and now we humbly thank them for showing us the way.
These prayers reflect the Ryukyuan world view. After some time, an ancestral spirit is transformed into an ancestral kami, and then finally into a non-personified kami. In a figure of the cosmos constructed by Takayasu, non-personified and personified kami are delineated (1991:230-1). This double focus on ancestral spirits and non-personified kami is important in the annual rites of the Ryukyuan kin group (Lebra 1966:171).

Offerings and Prayer Registration

Hilo Ashagi members fill out a card each month. On the card the adherent writes one of twelve zodiac signs according to year of birth called fushi and a statement describing the object of prayer, such as good health, success in business, and help with an illness. The cards are submitted with a cash offering and sent monthly to Ijun in Okinawa where the objects of prayer are reported to the kami via the hearth kami (Fii nu Kang) by incineration.

The cards instruct adherents to pray to the hearth kami on the first and fifteenth, and to accompany prayer by lighting “twelve and three” sticks of incense. It is explained that prayer can be carried out in one of three places: the alcove (tokonoma or Tukunuma), the hearth, and the altar (butsdan or buchidan). These three places are the focal points of traditional Ryukyuan domestic ritual (Lebra 1966:182-4).

Many Okinawans have simplified or discontinued these rituals except for that of the hearth kami conducted by the household’s senior woman (Lebra 1966:202). This rite is practiced by Ijun adherents in Hawai’i. In place of the three hearth stones in the kitchen the Hilo Ashagi sells a wooden pedestal and two ceramic vessels, called an otoshidai. Adherents keep water in one vessel, changed daily, and salt in the other, changed on the first and the fifteenth. When the water and salt are changed the following words are given in prayer: “We give thanks that once again today we are able to receive the blessing of continued use of fire and water.”

Some say the hearth kami itself is an object of worship. Others insist it only reports to higher level kami (Lebra 1966:23; Robinson 1969:64). In the Hilo Ashagi both are objects of devotion.

Power Cards and Power Play

A feature of the Ijun service is the power card (pawā kādo). Each adherent brings one to the services at the Hilo Ashagi and to lectures by Takayasu. Power cards, sold to members each year and also called power magnets, attract universal power. Receiving of the power heals and revitalizes. During a power play members hold the power cards in silence with eyes closed for several minutes, keeping in mind the object of their prayer. What is gained is not the help of the deity but an infusion of universal power. In Ryukyuan cosmology, mana or impersonal force is a central element (Sasaki 1984; Saso 1990; Lebra 1966:21).

Takayasu says the power can be used to heal, that it works regardless of one’s religious affiliation, and that it is best to maintain one’s power level by regular participation in Ijun ritual. Lack of harmony in marital or filial relations, physical or psychological illness, traffic accidents, and other misfortunes result from insufficient power. Adherents think that the power card erases bad karma, making life joyful.

Visual Ethos

In Ryukyuan ritual, the white gowns of priestesses in village rites (Maretzki and Maretzki 1966:68), the white ceremonial robes of high ranking priestess in the former state religion of Shō Hashi (Robinson 1969:27-28), and the white robes of priestess or kaminchu (Lebra 1966:68) are all examples of the general “absence of color in shrines, religious adornment, and paraphernalia” (Lebra 1966:204). Takayasu and his assistants have white garments for ceremonial appearances, as do power symbol holders at the Hilo Ashagi.

There is no visual representation of any deity on the altar at the Hilo Ashagi. The center of the altar is a crystal ball. However, there is a representation of the Great Kami of Ijun, a female figure with a halo, that members enshrine in their alcoves next to pictures of Takayasu. The crystal ball has a place in Ryukyuan myth and is central to the Lapis Lazuli Meditation that Takayasu describes (1991:255-7). He says that a revelation led him to employ a crystal ball in place of the mythical gemstone lapis lazuli. Called Sanko Hōju, it controls the tides and is the great treasure of Ryūgū (Takayasu 1991:269).

The primary symbol of Ijun is its monogram, five circles arranged around a slightly smaller, darkened circle at the core. The monogram represents the religions of the world drawn together by Takayasu’s universalist philosophy. Or perhaps the monogram is the cross-section of a neuron, symbolic of the role that the mind plays in the search for enlightenment (Takayasu 1991).

Also symbolic are the two characters used to write Ijun. The first is the character for “dragon.” The second is the character for “fresh-water spring.” The dragon is the symbol of the life force of Ryūgū and Kinmanmon; Ijun is
the welling forth of this life force. Takayasu probably saw the two characters at Taoist temples in Taiwan on the water fonts used by visitors to rinse their hands and mouth.

**Concepts in Esoteric Prayer**

The prayers on the first and fifteenth of the month refer to concepts from the Ryukyuan folk tradition (Amamikyu and Shinerikyu; Ryūgū; and Nirai-Kanai) and each of these three are cornerstones of Ijun theology (Shimamura 1992:5-9). Their use by Takayasu shows that one element of Ijun is Ryukyuan ethnic revival.

**Amamikyu and Shinerikyu**

These are the sibling creator deities of Ryukyuan myth (Robinson 1969:23; Kerr 1958:35-36). As recorded in *Ryukyu Shintoki*, two sibling deities existed at the beginning of time, a male named Shinerikyu and a female named Amamikyu. When a wind passed between their huts Amamikyu became pregnant. The first born was a son, the first political leader. The second born was a daughter, the first community priestess. The third born was another son, the first farmer. As the myth goes, the first fire was obtained from Ryūgū (Takayasu 1991).

**Ryūgū**

*Ryūgū* is a magical palace under the sea that appears in Japanese myth (Blacker 1975:75-76). *Ryūgū* is the Chinese term, the Japanese is *Tokoyo*. It refers to a “world of power beneath the water,” a spatially ambivalent otherworld in which shamans seek power (Blacker 1975:75). The word *Ryūgū* emerges in most of the prayer of the Hilo Ashagi.

**Nirai-Kanai**

“Nirai-kanai is a bright and rich land, a paradise, lying in the east or southeast, where the sun rises every morning” (Kreiner 1968:108). Okinawan-Japanese language dictionaries list the word as *giree kanee, niree kanee*, or *girai kanaz*, and define it as an otherworld that lies somewhere across the sea. To Takayasu, *Kanai* is the world of shapes, forms, and solid bodies, including the physical self, the indistinct body and the soul; *Nirai* is the hollow world of mystery with the qualities of eternity and awakening to satori (Takayasu 1991:103). In Takayasu’s “Structure of Ryūgū” (1991:103), we see that Nirai and Kanai are within the confines of the *Ryūgū*, as are Kinmanmon, the Great Kami of Ijun. *Ryūgū* is the cosmos itself.

In some parts of the Ryukyuan islands, men ritually represent deities from a land “called Nirai which, like Tokoyo, lies far away beyond the horizon of the sea” (Blacker 1975:73). *Nirai-Kanai* was known in myth as the “place of origin of the Okinawan people,” an island in the eastern seas (Lebra 1966:221).

Lebra (1966:99) found the word *giree kanee* (*Nirai-Kanai*) in a song sung by the *maru* (priestess) of Itoman, “who explained that giree was an old term for bone washing and that kanee had the meaning of beach.” Bone washing is a funerary custom performed several years after death (Lebra 1966:200), formerly done on the beach. Thus, it is “feasible to speak of a dead person as going to giree kanee in the sense of having posthumous existence” (Lebra 1966:99).

**Healing**

Takayasu began as a healer and healing was the cause of his split with Seichō no Ie. Takayasu’s assistant (*sōshū hosa*) is described as a shaman who leads the Fire Festival and meets with individuals to heal them and predict their futures (Shimamura 1993:58). Takayasu has said that he himself is the only true yuta in Okinawa.

Most Japanese new religions had initial periods when spiritual healing was a central part of belief and practice. In a typical example, early activity of Gedatsukai in the Tule Lake Internment camp led others to call it a healing cult (Ishii 1983:166). Watanabe and Igeta (1991:163) argue that a “religious founder’s charismatic authority is confirmed as he or she cures ills.”

The Hawai’i branch has made spiritual healing a preeminent concern by its practice of individual healing. The two- to three-minute healing of each of the twenty to forty adherents requires more time than the ritual itself. The healing ritual is described in Reichl (1993). There are oral and written stories of curing by Takayasu, his assistant and other healers throughout the organization. Adherents believe that the ability to heal arises from insentience, and that Takayasu is one of many religious leaders worldwide with healing ability (Takayasu 1991).

Lebra (1966:39) explains the concept of mani-gutu, that the past activity of ancestors affects the living, roughly equated to the concept of atavism. If an ancestor was offensive to a kami, then the descendant is visited by misfortune. Takayasu tells those who have an illness that the cause is lack of ritual attention to their ancestors. Those who have recovered from illness are told to maintain proper ancestral relationships.
Change in the Hawai’i Branch During 1990–1994

In June 1992 Ijun celebrated its twentieth anniversary. The Hawai’i branch had begun as a revolving credit association (tanomoshi or moai) with Ijun services in the homes of members in the early 1980s. In 1984, Takayasu performed the Fire Festival for the first time in Hawai’i and in September 1989, the Hilo Ashagi received an altar from Okinawa and began bi-monthly services at a member’s home. A woman was dispatched from Okinawa for some months to lead services and train others.

In September 1990, after ten years of coming to Hilo, Takayasu announced that he was promoting women to the position of power symbol holder. Four of the five were of Okinawan descent and one was of Japanese descent. All are Issei or Nisei. At public lectures, Takayasu encouraged the audience to attend the Hilo Ashagi where these women were to begin healing. The following year when Takayasu came to Hilo, he designated another five power symbol holders, of which three are non-Okinawan adherents, including one who was a Hawaiian priest.

Systematization of Ritual

Takayasu’s tape-recorded voice was first used to lead prayer recitation. The dispatch of a woman from the main church in February 1991 helped the new power symbol holders learn the service. Later another took her place. Ritual has been systematized. Impromptu discussions decided how many times to clap between prayers. Newly designated power symbol holders learned to do Ijun healing. The role of non-Okinawan holders of the power symbol has not been passive. The Hawaiian priest (kahuna) suggested that the healer and supplicant be encircled by others holding hands. This suggestion was adopted and became permanent. By the summer of 1992 the practice of holding hands during this ritual had spread back to the main church in Okinawa, a sort of reverse diffusion.

Nomenclature

The name Ijun has been used since the founding but in 1989 the name Okinawa Original was common in Hawai’i. In early publications the name Ijun Mittō was written in characters. Mittō was dropped and Ijun is now written in hiragana. The name of the primary deity has also undergone a transformation. In its earliest form it was Kinmamon (Ginoza 1988:137). Adherents first pronounced the name as Kimimannmomu then as Kimimanmon. Now it is Kinmanmon.

Charismatic Image of Ijun

To attract adherents Takayasu gives public lectures. Using an interpreter, Takayasu lectures in Japanese, then conducts a power play and individual spiritual healing. During these times Takayasu is a charismatic figure, walking through the audience of fifty to one hundred people, offering advice, responding to questions, and healing. For example, he approaches a mother and child and asks if the child has respiratory ailments. The mother responds affirmatively, surprised at Takayasu’s acuity. Takayasu then touches the boy’s head and announces to all that his lungs will be stronger in the future. After Takayasu’s visits in 1990 and 1991, a dozen new members started to attend the bi-monthly services. Paradoxically, there is no missionary work done by the local groups.

Takayasu’s religious philosophy draws adherents from other traditions (Reichl 1993). He designed theological arguments to attract Christians and Buddhists, in addition to those from other new religions. The sister shrine of Ijun in Taiwan contains a folk deity called Sekitō-kō that Takayasu says healed him in the 1970’s. Ijun adherents travel to this shrine, called Chintōgū, as pilgrimage.

Takayasu’s healing routine is part of his appeal. His ability to diagnose illness and prescribe remedy is legendary among Hilo Ashagi members.

Conclusion

Ijun is more concerned with practice and less concerned with belief. An influx of adherents led to questions that could not be answered by Hawai’i branch leaders. While this lack of explicit theology is typical of Ryukyuan religion, it was exaggerated by Takayasu to create a base for a world religion. The strategy has had some success in attracting non-Okinawan adherents.

In a survey of Japanese churches in Hilo, I found that those with congregations of one hundred or more have an ethnic mix. However, congregations the size of the Hilo Ashagi (twenty to forty-five participants) rarely include non-ethnic adherents, perhaps due to the use of the Japanese language. Japanese prayer at Ijun in Hawai’i is brief, and healing is an exercise in the control of universal energy. There is no sermon or attempt to teach laymen any details of the religion.

Many of the characteristics attributed to the new religions of Japan apply to Ijun, including charismatic leadership, concrete goals to alleviate suffering, syncretism, mystery, and novelty (McFarland 1967:71–94). Takayasu is a kami
person and fits the image of the charismatic founder. The group has concrete goals for health and a healing process. There is syncretism, both social and ideological, mystery induced partly by lack of concrete theological formulation, and Ryukyuan novelty.

The founder is critical of established religions but he has modeled a new order on established precedents (Hori 1968). An example is Takayasu’s idea that Kinmanmon has appeared to keep the wheel of life turning in Buddha’s place. Ijun shares many features with the Japanese new religions, including the charismatic leadership by a founder who began as shaman (McFarland 1967:71; Norbeck 1970:24; Thomsen 1963:26; Hori 1968). Also shared is the lack of importance placed on doctrine, “one of the least important aspects of the new religions” (Norbeck 1970:23). Ijun theology contains contradictions that justify the gender of the ritual leader, changed from female to male in 1989 (Reichl 1993). The simplicity of doctrine that I identify in Ijun is typical of the Japanese new religions (Norbeck 1970:21). Like Ijun, the new religions are both this—wordly in their efforts to help the living and other-wordly in their attention to the ancestors and promises of heaven (Norbeck 1970:21–24).

Ijun has taken elements from Shintō, Buddhism and Christianity, and looks like Shintō in its ritual and visual ethos. From Buddhism is transmigration (Takayasu 1991). From Christianity is the idea of heaven as a place for ancestral spirits to reside for all eternity. However, Ijun also includes unique elements from the Ryukyuan tradition such as Nirai-Kanai.

Unlike many of the Japanese new religions there is no parent-child model for social relations in Ijun. Social interaction among members of the Hilo Ashagi tends to be informal and egalitarian.

As a direction for future research, a systematic comparison of the Hilo Ashagi with those of Ijun adherents in Okinawa would illuminate the articulation of Okinawan culture in Hawai‘i, just as the study of Ijun in Yokohama will illuminate the articulation of Okinawan culture in Japan. The extent to which Ijun as practiced in the Ryukyuu islands differs from the new religions of Japan is also of interest to those who would understand the range of religious variability in complex society.

Notes
1. I use the term Ryukyuan to refer to religious and cultural practice that originated in the Ryukyu kingdom, and to material that relates to the entire island chain. The term Okinawan refers to people and practices in Okinawa island and the prefecture of Okinawa in contemporary times. I would like to thank the Department of Anthropology, University of Hawai‘i–Hilo for supporting my research. Special thanks to the adherents of Ijun on the islands of Hawai‘i, Okinawa, Miyako and Erabu for their cooperation with the research and patience in answering my question. I am especially grateful to Yoshiko Miyashiro, President of the Hawai‘i branch of Ijun.
2. Takayasu changed his first name from Rokuro to Ryusen in 1993. Ryusen is the standard reading of the characters used to write Ijun. Takayasu’s father was a theater manager. As a result Takayasu probably learned the technical aspects of drama.
3. There are no images or stories of Kinmanmon in which we learn of his acts or personality. As a result, it is difficult to think of Kinmanmon as a personified spirit.
4. This Japanese new religion, founded in 1930 by Taniguchi Masaharu, is described in McFarland (1967) and Hori (1968:244–246). Takayasu was head of Seicho no Ie in Okinawa in 1970, just two years before founding Ijun.
5. Also on the cards, printed in Japanese calligraphy, is the statement “Prayer of thanks to the ancestors and blessing for the family.” Words of explanation specify that the kami are contacted every Sunday at a rite called the go-shuhoo that is conducted at the central church in Ginowan City (Sōhonzan). The offering requested on the cards is three thousand yen but Hilo Ashagi members do not give any set amount when they give dollars.
6. Salt is thought to be effective for protection against malevolent spirits in Okinawa (Robinson 1969:37). Among members of the Hilo Ashagi, a member who feels that he or she is in crisis is given a small packet of sacred salt with the Japanese characters for kami and salt printed on the packet.

References


Thought Bytes on Uchinaanchu Identity/ies

Peter Shimazaki Doktor

To be honest, I have not put too much energy into defining "Uchinaanchu." As an educator and activist with a healthy sense of self, rather than an academic, other priorities draw my time and energy. Thus, what follows are simply "thought bytes." I hope they provoke reflection on our relations, generate critical discussion and move us toward constructive actions.

As a West Coast immigrant to Hawai'i of mixed ancestry, my experiences in Hawai'i reflect one of the many varieties among Uchinaanchu in the United States and I suggest there is no singular definition of "Uchinaanchu." For example, Issei, particularly Shin Issei, tend to see me as simply Uchinaanchu, or Uchinaanchu-American, especially when speaking with them in my limited Uchinaanchu and Nihongo. Conversely, many Nisei simply see me as Haole. And Sansei and Yonsei tend to be ambivalent, and simply see me as Hapa. These are just generalizations, of course. They suggest differences in perception among generations and regions—how I am seen depends on the eye of the beholder.

I am all of those above, but not exclusively any one of them. I am Uchinaanchu-American because my mother is an Uchinaanchu from Okinawa while my father is a German Jewish-American. Furthermore, while I was "made" in Okinawa, I grew up in California. My mother struggled with her new language, so I picked up some Nihongo and Uchinaanchu, but English was the dominant language of the household and community. Since I was neither raised in Hawai'i nor have an Okinawan family name, I'm sometimes perceived as Haole by some Nisei because I don't "look local." And Sansei and Yonsei tend to be ambivalent, and simply see me as Hapa. These are just generalizations, of course. They suggest differences in perception among generations and regions—how I am seen depends on the eye of the beholder.

One T-shirt design for a Hawai'i Blood Bank community service event sponsored by the Hawai'i United Okinawa Association depicted a moustache-donning blood drop cartoon character proudly proclaiming: "full-blooded Uchinaanchu." It represents a positive embracing of Okinawan identity; yet it also raises the question of whether "Okinawan-ness" can or should be measured in terms of blood quantum. Does not a social hierarchy follow from defining Uchinaanchu in blood quantum terms? Is one "more" Uchinaanchu if s/he has "more" Uchinaanchu blood or family name?

The U.S. and Japan, among other nations, have fixations with "blood" as part of their historical legacies of racist eugenics. The American "one-drop" rule consigned anyone with any African blood to lower caste status especially in the southern states. Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany obsessed on "racial purity" and ethnic purging. The American-imposed blood quantum requirements on the indigenous people of Hawai'i led to pilfering of native lands, forced many descendants from Hawaiian Home Lands eligibility and limited eligibility for reparation entitlements. This contrasts with other traditional cultures. For example, among the Maori of Aotearoa, ancestry is identified through genealogy: if one can trace an ancestor to Maori, one is simply considered Maori—not half or a quarter, not more or less Maori, but just Maori. It is interesting to me that in Hawai'i, I've been questioned about my "Okinawan-ness" by a few individuals—usually by peers who are half-Okinawan and half-Japanese themselves; it seems to me to be a projection of insecurity. Should I be considered any less or more Okinawan than they?

While the issue of Uchinaanchu blood quantum is generally innocuous in Hawai'i, it has real consequences for some "Amerasians" in Okinawa today. Amerasians, also questionably referenced as hafu (half) or kwatta (quarter), can become scapegoats for some Okinawans' justified angst against the proliferation of bases and continued occupation by the U.S. military. Gendered patterns complicate this further since Amerasian lineage patterns are usually maternally Okinawan and paternally American. Some Amerasians, products of the American empire, are forced by society to struggle with questions of self and how much to embrace their hybrid background, if at all.

Whether young Amerasians in Okinawa embrace their American ancestry may depend on whether the American parent is present in their lives. Some Amerasians and/or their mothers long to be bicultural and bilingual for identity and future employment, as some must choose a citizenship when they become age eighteen. Others may be completely estranged and uninterested.
in a culture far from their experience and knowledge, despite their physicality. For some who were abandoned, finding their military fathers in the U.S. or dreams of a life without the racism they experience in Okinawa is sometimes desired. Older Amerasians may resent any public attention or efforts to locate deadbeat fathers since, having been born and raised in Okinawa, their identity is "Okinawan" and they prefer to embrace the only culture they have ever known. Even the term "Amerasian" has a pitiful, victim connotation, one that grows even more complex as different ethnicities are infused into the admixture constituting the U.S. military. Due to the "poverty draft," the U.S. military is disproportionately represented by people of color, thus the "face" of Amerasians is changing. And the Okinawan Diaspora continues anew.

Diasporic Uchinaanchu identity is also generational and historically based. There are fundamental differences between the different waves of Hawai‘i’s Uchinaanchu. Descendants of Okinawans that emigrated from Okinawa before World War II (primarily plantation workers and mail order brides), tend to romanticize and essentialize provincial Okinawa (e.g., sanshin, kachashi, foods such as sataa andagi, etc.), ignorant or denying of the many hardships in Okinawan history. On the other hand, Shin Issei Uchinaanchu, especially the post-war generations and military wives, may recall the many adversities that prompted them to emigrate in the first place (e.g., poverty, overcrowding, unemployment/underemployment, oppressive patriarchy, increasing Japanization, etc.). To complicate matters, many Issei and Nisei Uchinaanchu consciously or unconsciously tried to assimilate into Japanese standards due to Naicha discrimination, or assimilated WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) American culture when that was necessitated by American discrimination prior to and during the Second World War. Newer generations can be even more ambivalent, preferring a generic "local" identity, either out of a lack of understanding or connection with their Uchinaanchu roots, or alienation after much assimilation away from it.

In Okinawa as well, there is another kind of ambivalence. While there is an indigenous Uchinanchu Non-Governmental Organization which petitions the Hague every year, filing grievances in United Nations forums for indigenous peoples (Association of Indigenous People of Ryukyu), and some academics identify Uchinaanchu as an indigenous people (e.g., Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu), there is a common reluctance among people in Okinawa to self-identify as "indigenous." While their identity is mixed intergenerationally as "Uchinaanchu" rather than simply "Japanese," most Okinawans do not see themselves as indigenous for a myriad of reasons. Some of these include the indoctrination by Japan’s centralized education, connotations of indigenous peoples as "barefoot and poor" (dochaku no ningen or do-jiin), rather than focusing on the sovereignty of the nation-state that was Ryuukyuu before Japanese colonization.

While identity is dynamic, changing within people’s lifetimes and in relation to different experiences, I feel it is important for Okinawan diasporic peoples to periodically assess where they might be on the continuum of being "colonized" (e.g., political-economic refugees) versus "colonizers" (settler-mentality). Such an assessment could sober and temper the identity hype. More important, it could serve as a check on their relationship and engender compassion for the indigenous and disenfranchised members of the communities they have adopted.

When an informal delegation of peace activists/community leaders came to Hawai‘i in 1999, Mashiki Tomi expressed to me the experience in Hawai‘i that most impressed her was the Kanaka Maoli struggles, specifically efforts to revive the Hawaiian language through charter schools. The struggle to retain one’s indigenous tongue is as important in the effort for justice and identity, as the struggle to reclaim land. Given the parallel experiences Okinawa and Hawai‘i have had with U.S. militarism and colonization, I believe Uchinaanchu and Kanaka Maoli can learn and support each other in their mutual struggles. Moreover, Hawai‘i Uchinaanchu could be bridges and allies in Okinawa and Hawai‘i’s respective futures in light of our comparable histories. After all, our respective destinies—whether preserved, extinct or transformed—may also be shared.

Note

The points raised in this essay were presented by Peter Shimazaki Doktor as part of a panel discussion on Uchinaanchu Worldwide Identity, one of the scheduled sessions of the First Worldwide Uchinaanchu Conference held on 1-2 September 2003 at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawai‘i. In collaboration with Doktor, the editor has developed his talking points into a reflective essay for this volume.
“Nuchi du Takara”
One’s Life is a Precious Treasure

ALLISON YANAGI

I see you laying there, the twinkle still in your eyes.
You seem so weak and frail, but your spirit is still so strong.
I think of all you taught me, words of wisdom and grace.
You saw who I am, long before even I knew.

Chorus:
Nuchi du takara.
Remember the past.
Live for the future.
This moment will not last.

As a child, we sat together, playing songs from the past.
I did not know then that they would make me who I am.
Now, I play for you, as you lie there in bed.
Still guiding me ahead, still smiling at the future.

Chorus:

Okinawans have a saying, “Nuchi du Takara,” which roughly means “one’s life is a precious treasure.” It affirms the preciousness of life for people who survived poverty and starvation resulting from being colonized and from the horrors of the Battle of Okinawa. I wrote these lyrics one day sitting in a car waiting to rehearse with a musical group which I was a member. My grandmother was in a nursing home at the time, and I began to think about her influence on my life. She is really the one who got me interested in Okinawan music and culture.

“Tinsagu nu Hana”
The Flower of the Tinsagu Plant

WESLEY IWAO UEUN TEN

I am writing this essay after previewing a film called Japanese Story for an Asian American studies course which I was helping to teach at the University of California, Berkeley. Since the course topic for the week was interracial couples, I thought the film might generate some good class discussion. The blurb on the DVD case characterized the film as a story about a Japanese sarariman and an Australian woman who end up falling in love.

Japanese Story was painful to watch. It portrayed the Japanese sarariman as awkward, stiff, and effeminate—exactly the opposite portrayal of white males. That wasn’t surprising, though. For as long as there have been movies, Asians usually have been portrayed in terms of stereotypes rather than as individuals. There has been little character development of Asian roles in the mass media beyond the sinister Fu Manchu, the Confucius-quoting Charlie Chan, or the martial arts expert for men, and the ruthless and oversexed “dragon lady” or the meek and subservient geisha for women. While Asian women are sexualized objects, Asian men are characterized as asexual. Even now, as popular as Jackie Chan is in the U.S., he almost never gets to kiss a woman, much less a white woman, in American movies.

However, that is not why I am writing this piece. While the portrayal of Asians, especially Asian men, disturbs me greatly, something I saw—or rather, heard—in Japanese Story went beyond disturbing. In a scene where the couple fall in love and begin to have sex (with the white woman astride the Japanese man, in the dominant position), the music in the background is that of the Okinawan folk song “Tinsagu nu Hana.” And, the song keeps popping up thereafter in odd scenes throughout the movie.

It might be easy to dismiss Japanese Story as yet another movie produced, directed, edited, and sold by people who simply do not know any better. Perhaps I should just let it slide, like I have done so many times with people who comment on how well I speak English, even after I’ve told them I was born and raised in Hawai‘i. If I reacted to every instance of cultural ignorance
that I encounter, I would be too busy to function in life. Besides, I also have
my hands full trying to rid myself of my own ignorance of other people who are
different from me. Maybe I should just follow the sayings I see on those
stickers they sell tourists in Waikiki—"Hang loose, bruddah!" or "Ain't no
beeg t'ing, bruddah!"

However, "Tinsagu nu Hana" runs deep in my heart and soul. Just as I
cannot help the culturally ignorant, neither can I help but be offended,
disturbed, and angered by having something of great spiritual value to me being
bought, sold, and desecrated.

In the course of learning the sanshin, I encountered the words and
music for "Tinsagu nu Hana" and eventually learned how to play and sing it.
However, it was not the first time I was exposed to the song. As a child, my
nisei mother (the second-generation offspring of immigrants born in Hawai'i)
that I encountered, I would be too busy to function in life. Besides, I also have
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disturbed, and angered by having something of great spiritual value to me being
bought, sold, and desecrated.

\[
\begin{align*}
Tinsagu nu Hana & \quad \text{Dye the tips of your fingernails} \\
Chimisachi ni sumiri & \quad \text{With the petals of the tinsagu blossom} \\
Uyanu yuushi gutu ya & \quad \text{Dye the teachings of your parents} \\
Chimu ni sumiri & \quad \text{Onto your heart}
\end{align*}
\]

I did not learn to sing this song until I was in my twenties. I had gone
to Okinawa to study at the University of the Ryukyus and, while there, I
pursued a lifelong dream of learning to play the sanshin (a three-stringed
musical instrument with a roughly square sound box and long neck). As long
as I can remember, the sound of the sanshin evoked in me an intriguing
combination of comfort and excitement. Perhaps it was because my mother was
learning Okinawan dance when she was pregnant with me. But, in Okinawa,
I was fortunate to learn sanshin from a teacher who had a strong voice. Not
only was his singing voice powerful, but also whenever he spoke, it was with
conviction and confidence.

Initially, I thought that "playing sanshin" meant just making sounds on
the instrument—that I could leave the singing to somebody else. What I came
to understand was that singing is the lifeblood of Okinawan culture. Long
before the sanshin entered Okinawa from China, priestesses (i.e., women) had
been conveying history, praying to the gods, and praising nature through song.
Eventually, I realized that while only a few people had the time and resources
to procure a sanshin and to learn to play it, singing without instrumentation
was done by almost everyone—women and men, old and young, poor and
rich—at all occasions.

In the course of learning the sanshin, I encountered the words and
music for "Tinsagu nu Hana" and eventually learned how to play and sing it.
However, it was not the first time I was exposed to the song. As a child, my
nisei mother (the second-generation offspring of immigrants born in Hawai'i)
would tell me about a song that her mother used to sing. She explained that
the song was about dyeing the teachings of your parents on your heart just
as you would dye your fingernails with the petals of the tinsagu flower. That
story stuck with me. But so also did the stories of how Okinawans—even Nisei
who were born and raised in Hawai'i—had felt that they had been stained
with a kind of "dirtiness" just because they were Okinawan.

How the song came down to me is particularly interesting. My grand-
mother's first language was Okinawan, but because of the discrimination
against Okinawans in the Japanese community in Hawai'i, she and other
Okinawans hid everything that looked, sounded, smelled, felt, and tasted
Okinawan. Like many other Okinawans, in public settings she spoke in the
mixture of Chugoku-ben (dialect), Hawaiian, English, Filipino, and Portuguese
that she had learned in Hawai'i—anything but Okinawan. Not wanting
to taint her children with the stigma of being Okinawan, my grandmother
purposefully refused to speak to her children in Okinawan. So my mother
learned about "Tinsagu nu Hana" in the composite language that they shared
in common.

My mother spoke "standard" English pretty well, but at home it was
more comfortable to speak in "pidgin" English. So I also "learned about"
"Tinsagu nu Hana" in the Hawai'i Creole English that I shared with my
parents and peers. Like my mother, however, I learned about "Tinsagu nu
Hana," but not to sing it.

It is fascinating how "Tinsagu nu Hana" has traveled through time and
space in my family. My grandmother was born in 1893, only fourteen years
after Okinawa was forcibly annexed by Japan in 1879. While modernization
efforts such as land reform and elections for representatives to the Japanese
legislature happened decades later on Okinawa than they did on the main-
land, the Japanese government was quick to introduce an education system
designed to create loyal subjects, workers, and soldiers out of Okinawan school
children. According to my mother, my grandmother had gone to school for a
few years in Okinawa. In 1890, three years before my grandmother was born,
14 percent of school age children in Okinawa were enrolled in elementary
school. In 1912, about the time my grandmother left Okinawa to come to
Hawai'i, 90 percent of Okinawan school children were enrolled in elementary
school (Sakihara 1981:15).

Imagine being born and coming of age at a time when government of-
ficials, educators, and intellectuals were deriding the ways of one's parents and
grandparents, and every generation before that as “barbaric” and “backwards.” Any school child who spoke in Okinawan was made to wear a wooden tag around the neck with the word “hoogen fuda” (方言 or dialect board) written boldly on it to signify that he or she had committed the offense of not being a proper Japanese. When my grandmother was about seven years old, the Japanese government also outlawed the tattooing of women’s hands. It seems, however, that my grandmother defied the law and tattooed her hands as a rascal young girl.

The stigma of being “inferior Japanese” followed Okinawans to Hawai‘i. Naichi (Japanese of the main islands) in Hawai‘i distanced themselves from the Okinawans in Hawai‘i calling them “Japan-Päke” (Japanese-Chinese). In 1900, while the Japanese controlled the government, the education system, and business back in their homeland, Okinawans were still the numerical majority. In Hawai‘i, however, Okinawans were a minority within a Japanese minority; consequently, the discrimination against Japanese intensified the Naichi feelings of superiority toward the later-arriving Okinawans who spoke differently, wore tattoos, ate different foods, and had different last names.

It wasn’t only the Japanese who thought Okinawans were inferior Japanese. Certain Okinawan intellectuals and opinion leaders also had internalized the idea that Okinawans themselves were to blame for the discrimination they faced. Kobashigawa (2005:5) found this passage by an Okinawan journalist writing about overseas Okinawan immigrants in 1926:

“If we had much of anything in Okinawa that was worthy of national pride, then it would have the power of changing other people when we openly engaged our ‘national customs’; unfortunately, that is not the case…. So…we must be careful not to make a display of our most striking and unique customs.”

Kobashigawa (2000:18) also found that a leading educator in Okinawa criticized the tattooing of hands and other body parts as “shameful” and wondered if there was a way for Okinawans over the age of thirty-four or thirty-five to hide their tattoos. This was in 1925, when my grandmother was 32.

I did not grow up in a time when Okinawans in Hawai‘i were treated by Naichi as if they were impure, but I do remember the 1960s and ’70s as a time when it was still not quite acceptable, certainly not fashionable, to be Okinawan. In those days, people spoke about being “Uchinaanchu” in private. Okinawans didn’t readily sing “Tinsagu nu Hana” or any other Okinawan songs in public. It may be my imagination or my faded memory of my grandmother, but I picture her always concealing the tattoos on her knuckles, placing her hands in positions that kept her tattoos out of sight. I’m not even sure there are any photographs of her that show her tattoos.

While Okinawans felt like they had to cover their tattoos, change their names, and lose their voices, however, they still passed on a part of their heart to the next generation through teaching songs like “Tinsagu nu Hana.” Consequently, using “Tinsagu nu Hana” as background music in a movie’s sex scene, destroys all the sentiment and significance that are imbedded in the song. However violent my reaction, I guess I should be grateful for the producers of Japanese Story for provoking and providing me the opportunity to reflect on “Tinsagu nu Hana,” for this reflection has allowed me to realize that the song ultimately represents a triumph over the complete colonization of the Okinawan heart.

When I was younger, I loved Hawaiian music, but when it became popular and faddish on the U.S. continent, I quit listening to it. One day, however, a Chicano friend of mine in the Bay Area gave me a CD of Facing Future by Israel Kamakawiwo‘ole (1993). Listening to the lyrics of one song, “Hawai‘i ‘78” really affected me:

Cry for the gods, cry for the people, cry for the land that was taken away. And then yet you’ll find, Hawai‘i.

If you tried, you could
Count the stars in the sky
But you cannot count
What your parents teach you

Passing on a part of the heart to the next generation is tricky business both for the persons passing it on and the persons receiving it. As the words above tell us, we can’t quantify what we get from the generation before us. Tradition, culture, and identity are not like heirloom jewelry that can be counted, assessed, and inventoried. They are not things; they are processes that both shape and are shaped by thoughts and feelings which interact with the surrounding world.

When I went to Japan in 1989 to study Okinawans living in Kawasaki and Tsurumi, places with large concentrations of Okinawans, I met a Japanese researcher who had studied “Okinawan identity” in those areas. I remember him sitting me down to tell me that Okinawans in Kawasaki and Tsurumi were identifying themselves more as Japanese, and that I was misguided in
wanting to see if Okinawans in mainland Japan had an Okinawan identity. “You would get more exciting research data,” he said, “if you studied the more recent immigrants in Japan.”

There was a house near where I lived with the name “大城” (Oshiro) written on its gate. One day when I was taking a walk with my baby daughter, I saw a man in the yard of the house. As politely as possible, I asked if he was Okinawan. He quickly waved his hand in front of him as if I were an unwelcome salesman and said, “Kankei nai” (There’s no connection). It could be that he really wasn’t Okinawan at all, but he seemed pretty offended that I even asked.

As in Hawai’i before the 1970s, being Okinawan in mainland Japan was not yet fashionable. Most Okinawans I knew then did not volunteer they were Okinawan, because attached to the label “Okinawan” were many stereotypes. Generally, Okinawans were seen as backward island people with strange customs, and prone to drinking and fighting.

In fact, there were even some bars in Kawasaki posting signs that prohibited the entry of Okinawans, because during this time of Japan’s bubble economy, many of them were coming to mainland Japan to work. Apparently, Okinawans would go to bars and speak in the Okinawan language, and when other customers complained, fights would break out.

Most Japanese and even many Okinawans with whom I spoke reported that discrimination against Okinawans in Japan didn’t exist anymore. It is true that there is less blatant discrimination of the sort which manifested itself in signs fronting apartment buildings and factories in Japan before World War II that said, “Chosenjin, Ryukyujin okotowari” or “Koreans and Okinawans need not apply.” But discrimination, like culture, might better be seen as a process than a thing. Two situations come to mind.

The first occurred around the time that the signs appeared in Kawasaki barring Okinawans from entering bars. I had gone to dinner with some young Japanese friends and, when the conversation turned to my interest in Okinawan identity, my friends told me that discrimination against ethnic minorities in Japan was a thing of the past. One talked about Koreans in Japan and told me, “It’s because Koreans think about discrimination that we Japanese also think about discrimination.” She concluded that if Koreans stopped thinking that they were being discriminated against, discrimination against them would disappear.

The other seemed to occur in response to my presentations about Okinawan identity a few times to college classes in mainland Japan. Inevitably, discussing identity led to discussing discrimination. To that, a young Japanese woman asked why I brought up discrimination against Okinawans since it had nothing to do with her. She conceded that her grandparents and maybe even her parents had discriminated against Okinawans, but that she certainly did not. After another talk I gave, a young man said in his written comments that he had never heard about discrimination against Okinawans and found it a fascinating history. However, at the same time, he wrote that it was my bringing up the subject of discrimination against Okinawans that caused him to have discriminatory attitudes towards Okinawans. In these two instances, it was perceived that my discussion of discrimination was either historically irrelevant, or would cause Japanese people to have these negative thoughts about Okinawans.

I imagine that what they were feeling was similar to what I had felt when I was a student at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa sitting in an Ethnic Studies class many years ago, listening to a Native Hawaiian woman talking about the oppression of her people in which Japanese Americans were complicit. My feelings were all at once—shock, guilt, resentment and discomfort—for which I wanted to blame her.

I found that Japanese, and even many Okinawans, believed that the signs that prohibited Okinawans from going into bars were to be blamed on the Okinawans themselves because they should have followed the prescription “Go in ireba, go ni shitagae” or “When in Rome, do as the Romans do.” I believe, however, that this represents historical and social myopia. Certainly, it is not appropriate for Okinawans to get drunk and fight. But, is it not also wrong for Japanese to fail to consider the possibility that the fights between Japanese and Okinawans could be based on lingering Japanese notions that Okinawans are “barbaric” and “backwards”? Because of these notions, the “privilege of remaining blind,” it becomes possible to place the blame for the cultural conflict exclusively on Okinawans.

It was this “privilege of blindness” that allowed the researcher I met to easily come to his conclusion that Okinawan identity among Okinawans in Kawasaki and Tsurumi was disappearing. It disavows the dominant society of any responsibility for continuing oppression, and assumes that everything is fine for Okinawans since, presumably, Japanese no longer discriminate against them.
After being told by that researcher that Okinawans were becoming Japanese, I went to Kawasaki and Tsurumi to meet Okinawans. I learned sanshin from a sensei in Kawasaki, and I frequented the district called Nakadōri in Tsurumi where the Okinawan Kenjinkai Hall and Okinawan restaurants, food stores, and other Okinawan-run businesses are. My research method differed from the method used by the Japanese researcher. I didn’t use a standardized questionnaire to get standardized answers in standard Japanese. I spent a lot of time just hanging out with residents. Many scholars think of temporarily going into the “field” as if they were astronauts going in and out of space. They move from “project” to “project”—usually not letting the people they “study” touch their hearts and vice versa. They rarely realize how intense and life-changing fieldwork can be.

One woman who is a member of the Burakumin (occupation-based caste) minority in Japan told me that many researchers have come into her community and have treated her and other Burakumin as if they were “himono” or dried fish or seaweed. She explained that all those researchers study Burakumin as if they were inanimate, lifeless objects rather than living, breathing, and thinking humans. In other words, she felt that researchers are more interested in Burakumin as “problems” or “issues” rather than in Burakumin as people.

By spending time in Kawasaki and Tsurumi, I found out that if I took the time to just listen, many things would be revealed to me. But at the same time, people only reveal as much as you reveal of yourself. The practice of “talk story” (or “yuntaku” in Okinawan) is a valid, but very challenging, methodology for expanding knowledge and testing one’s epistemology.

I wonder how much Okinawans living in Kawasaki and Tsurumi revealed about themselves to the Japanese male researcher asking them about their ethnic identity. I recall times when people on the continental U.S. would talk to me in broken English thinking I was a foreigner, even after I had reported that I was born and raised in Hawai‘i. And, often I would play along, speaking back to them in broken English, just to see how far it would go. It could be satisfying to both of us: the person speaking to me believed that he or she helped a little brown brother and I got a good laugh, which made up a bit for the indignity of being reminded of my perpetual status as subordinated “stranger” in this country (Certeau 1984:41).

Largely because education is associated with such things as the punitive and insulting hoogen fuda (dialect placard) and the forced Emperor worship that led many Okinawans to sacrifice their lives in World War II in defense of the rest of Japan, many Okinawans are wary around scholars, especially Japanese scholars asking them about their identity and culture. Away from these scholars’ gaze, Okinawans will share how they remember being told that their music and dance were “weird,” or being told how “good their Japanese was.” Many still say they are ashamed because of their surnames, Okinawan accent, and physical features. One woman I knew was even considering plastic surgery to make herself look more Japanese. Another woman from Okinawa told me how her husband, who was Okinawan but born and raised in Tsurumi, wanted to change their family name to something that wasn’t associated with Okinawa.

On a more macro-political level, many Japanese do not realize that the U.S. military presence that presumably protects Japan is disproportionately located in Okinawa. Seventy-five percent of U.S. bases in Japan are in Okinawa, which comprises only 0.6 percent of Japanese territory. Okinawa is roughly the size of Kaua‘i. Imagine if one-fifth of Kaua‘i was covered by U.S. military bases. Imagine whole villages having been dislocated by the bases. Imagine having to hear screeching jets and the thumping of helicopter rotors everyday and all day. Imagine some of these aircraft falling from the sky onto places where people work, live, play, and study. Imagine fearing that you may be the next target of violence by young men trained to destroy and conquer. Imagine people trying to live in peace, but not being able to.

| Yuru harassu funi ya | A ship sailing at night |
| Nimufaa bushi miati | Gets its bearings from the North Star |
| Wan nacheeru uya ya | My parents who gave me life |
| Wan du miati | Get their bearings from me |

I am proud of the fact that my father’s side of the family has a written genealogy going back to the early 1400s—even before Columbus stumbled upon the Americas. Our relatives in Okinawa sent a photocopy of this genealogy to my family in Hawai‘i when I was a child, and it has always been an important part of my identity. When I was in Okinawa, some people would be impressed when I shared that I was a descendant of the Ba uji (Ba clan).

Our family line is traced in the genealogy through the male line. However, in Okinawa, I also learned that my mother’s side of the family was descended from an “inagu gwansu,” which means “woman founding ancestor.” A relative told me that our ancestor was a single mother who set up her
own household several generations ago. I don’t know what the circumstances were, but she must have had a difficult time. That side of the family was what was called “muchii” or “without a genealogy” in the days of the Ryukyu kingdom, in contrast to upper class families such as my paternal line which was “chirimuchi” or “with a genealogy” (Matsuda 1967:185).

I was truly shocked to realize that one of my ancestors had been a single mother. I would have preferred to imagine all my ancestors being part of an upright, moral Confucian upper class. Perhaps imagining such ancestors would have given me a way to create a sense of Okinawan cultural superiority compared to other people (Pyke 2000).2

Gradually, however, I have discovered that Okinawan culture was a lot deeper and more diverse under the veneer of Confucianism. While Confucian influences have had a history of several hundred years in Okinawa, there has been a lengthier, indigenous flow of thoughts, feelings, practices, and perspectives that extends back for thousands of years. And I began to see “Tinsagu nu Hana” as part of that flow.

According to Okinawan historian Matsuda Mitsugu, women continued to be influential in the society and government of the Ryukyu Kingdom even after Chinese Confucian thought entered Okinawa from the 14th century. However, after Satsuma’s invasion of the Ryukyu Islands, the religious authority of women was challenged. Satsuma’s Ryukyuan government officials imposed Confucianism as the dominant ideology. It was under Satsuma’s rule that the chief priestess known as chifijin or kikoe ogimi was demoted in official rank and the practice of handing official documents to the King via priestesses was abolished (Matsuda 1967:86).

However, even as their authority in the government was being usurped, women still remained powerful. This is neither to say that Okinawa had an Amazonian culture, nor that women “had it better” in the days of antiquity because they had spiritual authority. However, I do propose that when we imagine our past and construct ourselves in the present, it might be useful to take a critical look at how other people have constructed us.

Constructions often serve certain group interests. For example, the Shimazu clan (the ruling family of Satsuma) periodically had large processions of Ryukyuans travel from Satsuma to Edo to show loyalty to the Tokugawa shōgun. Satsuma used these processions, known as Edo nobori, to enhance its prestige as a ruler of a “foreign” country. The Ryukyuans were required to wear Chinese costumes and headdresses and play Chinese musical instruments to emphasize their “foreignness.” Apparently these processions were noteworthy events in Japan and artists would make and sell woodblock prints depicting them (Watanabe 1970:6). Perhaps that’s why the first Okinawans in Hawai‘i were called “Japan-Pākē.” Satsuma efforts to portray Okinawans as foreigners in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries led to the persistent image of Okinawans as “strangers” in Japan as manifested in such present-day euphemisms for strangeness such as “chotto chigau” (a little different), “omashiroi” (interesting), and “ekizochikku na” (exotic).

On the other hand, Westerners at the turn of the twentieth century were apt to lump Okinawans in the great mass of people that they called “Orientals.” The line drawn between the West (the “Occident”) and the East (the “Orient”) defined people in the West as civilized, progressive, and enlightened. The people on the other side of the great divide were seen as uncivilized, backwards and, therefore, in need of guidance by the West.

Charles S. Leavenworth, in an account written in 1905 entitled The Loochoo Islands, provides a good example of how “Oriental” was the lens through which Okinawans and other East Asians were viewed. He wrote:

Those who had the pleasure of attending the Congress of Orientalists held at Hanoi in 1902 will remember an interesting lecture by Dr. Baelz of Tokyo, in which he upheld the theory of the general similarity of the peoples of Eastern Asia. When Chinese, Japanese, Coreans, Annamites, and others are dressed in a like fashion, let us say in the conventional clothes of modern Europe, then this solidarity of appearance becomes marked. There is more resemblance between these peoples than between the blond Teuton and the dark Celt of Europe. The appearance of the natives of Loochoo, when dressed in Japanese garments, approaches so closely to the looks of the Japanese themselves, that it seems a striking evidence in support of this theory. (Leavenworth 1981:77)

Nearly a century later, in California and with much ambivalence, I viewed Churasan (The Beauty), a very popular Japanese television series about an Okinawan family. It was quite gratifying to see Okinawan culture being portrayed positively for the world to see, for in the past the following things had been said about Okinawan culture, even by Okinawans:

It is regrettable that Okinawan emigrants in the past were less cultured than other Japanese. Perhaps, the same could be said even today. Among many of the emigrants from our prefecture, there were some who dared to behave rudely and felt no shame about it. Others, because of their improper attire
and strange behavior, gave a queer impression to foreigners and were even rejected and scorned by their own countrymen. (Nakamura 1981:77)

The broadcast of *Churasan*, along with the recent popularity of Okinawan music and the plethora of successful Okinawan entertainers in Japan, signify that we are in a new era in which Okinawans no longer feel they have to hide their identity and culture. For many Okinawans who have experienced discrimination, both in Okinawa and in the diaspora, this has been an important shift in paradigms.

However, I also had reservations about *Churasan*. It was not only the fact that some of the actors portraying Okinawans were “Yamatunchu” (mainland Japanese) with fake Okinawan accents. It also went beyond the portrayal of the Okinawan men as lazy, more apt to drink sake and play the sanshin rather than work. What bothered me most were the silences—what was not in *Churasan* even more than what was actually in it.

The first episode of *Churasan* opens with the birth of the main character Eri on 15 May 1972, the day that the U.S. “returned” Okinawa to Japan. In effect, Eri’s birth on that day symbolizes the rebirth of Okinawans as members of the Japanese nation. After all these years of being treated as barbaric and backwards by Japanese, Eri’s symbolic birth as Japanese should be a positive sign. However, throughout the series, there is never any mention of Japanese discrimination against Okinawans past or present. Of course, the producers of *Churasan* had to worry about offending viewers if they included too much controversial material, but whole chapters of Okinawan history were left out. There was absolutely no mention of Japan’s forcible annexation of Okinawa in 1879, the discrimination that Okinawans have faced in mainland Japan, or the sacrifice of tens of thousands of Okinawan lives during the Battle of Okinawa to save the rest of Japan in 1945. Furthermore, although there are many frames of Okinawan scenery throughout the series, the cameras managed to avoid capturing any presence of the U.S. military bases. The absence of mention of any, if not all, of these things is just too convenient to be accidental.

*Churasan* was broadcast soon after the 2000 G-8 Summit held in Okinawa. It was five years after massive protests had occurred following the brutal rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. servicemen in 1995. Those protests led the Japanese government to set up a Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) to deal with the demands of the Okinawan protestors. The SACO report, issued in 1996, specified that such major bases as the Futenma Air Station and the Naha military port would be closed. The catch, however, was that other bases in Okinawa would be built in their place. One proposal that eventually became public was to build a heliport in Henoko, Nago.

The Japanese government denied that its decision to grant Okinawa the privilege of hosting the Summit was connected in anyway to the military base issue. However, Okinawa was a late entry among eight prefectural governments in Japan that had submitted bids to host the Summit. Compared to favorites such as Fukuoka and Miyazaki, Okinawa was far behind in terms of quality of facilities and ease of security arrangements (Arasaki 2000:221). Also interesting was the fact that the main venue of the G-8 Summit was in Nago.

During the summer of 2004, I met an Okinawan activist who is fighting the Henoko heliport construction. He had come to San Francisco to appear in a court case against the heliport which is scheduled to be built upon a living reef that is a habitat for a marine species—the dugong. The ocean mammal is a relative of the more widely known fresh-water manatee. The heliport construction will no doubt cause the extinction of the dugong at least in Okinawa’s waters. In a speech that he gave to a gathering after the court appearance, he spoke about why he was involved in the struggle against the heliport. He mentioned his concern about the destruction of Okinawa’s environment, culture, and lifestyle, but what left the deepest impression was how he talked about his children. He said that he decided he had to do something because if he didn’t, he wouldn’t be able to face his children in twenty years if they asked him why he didn’t do anything when he had the opportunity to do so.

The verse “*wan nacheeru uya ya, wan du miati*” in “*Tinsagu nu Hana*” has always intrigued me. It reminds us to respect our elders and ancestors as emphasized in Confucian thought, and such respect is what keeps families strong and cohesive. But at the same time, and probably more important, “*Tinsagu nu Hana*” reminds us that the succeeding generations are our guiding light and it is they who illuminate our paths into the future.

| Yuru harasu funi ya | A ship sailing at night |
| Nimufaa bushi miati | Gets its bearings from the North Star |
| Wan nacheeru uya ya | My parents who gave me life |
| Wan du miati | Get their bearings from me |
Notes

1. French sociologist Michel De Certeau writes about how "science is limited in its ability to see beyond the apparatus of repression that it is part of. He writes:

   But this elucidation of the apparatus by itself has the disadvantage of not seeing practices which are heterogeneous to it and which it represses or thinks it represses. Nevertheless, they have every chance of surviving this apparatus too, and, in any case they are also part of social life, and all the more resistant because they are more flexible and adjusted to perpetual mutation. When one examines this fleeting and permanent reality carefully, one has the impression of exploring the night-side of societies, a night longer than their day, a dark sea from which successive institutions emerge, a maritime immensity on which socioeconomic and political structures appear as ephemeral islands (1984:41).

2. How a monolithic image of the "Normal American Family" becomes an interpretive framework for Asian Americans, giving meaning to their own family lives can be found in an article by Karen Pyke (2000). Pyke points out that on one hand, young Asian Americans see their families as overly strict and emotionally distant compared to "Normal American Families." Alternately, they positively assess their families as having somewhat superior Confucian cultural values, especially emphasizing filial piety, as compared to mainstream society which then fit into the "model minority" stereotype that is associated with Asian Americans.

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Social Process in Hawai‘i
Editorial Policy

Social Process in Hawai‘i is a journal published by the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Department of Sociology with the objective of disseminating to scholars, students, and the community the results of outstanding social science research on the people and institutions of Hawai‘i.

Since this journal’s inception, the Department of Sociology has taken the view that the communities in Hawai‘i offer a rich and varied opportunity for observing the interplay of social processes which maintain stability and provoke social change. It is our hope that the journal might stimulate social research in Hawai‘i, provide materials for instruction of students, and enhance the understanding of the community among those who live and work here.

With the support of the Andrew W. Lind Social Process in Hawai‘i Fund, we welcome suggestions and submissions for special issues (thematic edited works, small monographs) in addition to occasional issues of a more general character. Contributions are encouraged from University faculty, graduate and undergraduate students in Sociology and other disciplines as well as other knowledgeable persons in the community. Preference will be given to research based upon sound methodologies and systematic evidence. Articles should employ a mid-level of writing and minimize technical terms. The presentation of complex statistical techniques should be kept to a minimum, and where used, should be accompanied by a clear textual description of the technique and its results.

Manuscripts are evaluated by the editors and other referees. Editors may occasionally solicit manuscripts, but in general most selections will be from among unsolicited manuscripts.

Authors interested in submitting manuscripts for consideration should send three copies to SOCIAL PROCESS IN HAWAI‘I, Department of Sociology, Saunders Hall 247, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Honolulu, HI 96822. The following guidelines should be observed in preparation of the manuscript:

1. Due to space limitations, short articles are preferred. Manuscripts should not exceed 15 double-spaced pages. Photographs, charts and graphs are welcome.
2. Preparation of copy and the format for references should follow the guidelines of the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. In case of unusual problems, consult the Editor.
3. Manuscripts submitted to the journal should be of final draft quality; the editor reserves the right to make minor editorial changes.
4. The University of Hawai‘i guidelines for allocating credit for research and writing should be observed.
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