DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY, U.S. 1946-1954:
THREE AT THE INTERSECTION AND WHAT IT WROUGHT

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction: Of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy ............................. 1
Chapter 2. Eleanor Hadley: Anti-Trust in Occupation Japan ..................................... 16
Chapter 3. John Paton Davies: Dispatches from Wartime China .............................. 59
Chapter 4. Owen Lattimore: The Intellectual on Trial .............................................. 101
Chapter 5. Epilogue: John Paul Vann and the World He Inherited ......................... 129
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 145
Abstract

This thesis is about domestic politics and foreign policy in the United States from 1946 to 1954. Domestic politics in this case refers to the pursuit of electoral victory through the use of the tactic of fervent anti-communism. Foreign policy in this case refers to the essentializing misperception of East Asian countries during the early Cold War by Americans with preformed ideas about monolithic, worldwide communism. The years chosen cover the ascendancy of McCarthyism. During this period domestic politics and foreign policy reinforced one another to pernicious effect.

This thesis examines the cases of three experts who were purged. Eleanor Hadley served during the Occupation of Japan and worked in zaibatsu dissolution. John Paton Davies was a State Department officer in China who accurately reported on the rise of the Chinese Communists. Owen Lattimore was a renowned authority on China and Central Asia who was singled out by Joseph McCarthy. In the case of each, legitimate debate and ideological differences were seconded to domestic political maneuvering predicated on an essentialized view of Asia. By examining these three cases chronologically the arc of this phenomenon’s acuteness and public impact can be observed. One of the cumulative effects of this confluence of domestic politics and foreign policy was to stifle debate on Vietnam. This is seen through the experience of Army colonel John Paul Vann in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration.
Introduction

I) All Things Made New Again

History is a way of considering what has come before even as events seem to happen again. Henrik Ibsen puts it more eloquently: "I've only to pick up a newspaper and I seem to see ghosts gliding between the lines." Frank Holt, professor of ancient history at the University of Houston, uses this quote to begin his book about Alexander the Great's campaign in Bactria, present-day Afghanistan. "Afghanistan, the world's inexhaustible wellspring of warlords and terrorists, cannot escape the crosshairs of history. In each of the last three centuries, superpowers have trained their sights on this tragic land, determined to impose upon it a new world order successively British, Soviet and American. Such endeavors usually begin with confidence and end with catastrophe."

Holt discusses, briefly, the circumstances in the world at the date of his writing. In 2005 the United States was four years into war in Afghanistan. The similarities Holt finds are striking only in their testament to the immutability of old as new, the new as old, and how history may be enveloped in recurring cycles. I mention this because present convergences of US domestic politics and US foreign policy are not without precedent.

My thesis is about three persons of knowledge, Asia specialists, who were confronted by a particular, erroneous view of the places and peoples they knew. For domestic political advantage, figures in political life confronted these three with such perceptions of Asia and drummed them out of their positions of influence in government.

During the period I am examining such views became ever more essential to the

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exigencies of domestic politics its triumph would result in a persistent application of
inappropriate action to misconceived quandry.

I am writing about the early and later stages of the anti-communist fervor that
dominated American political life after the Second World War. I have chosen the dates
1946-1954. In 1946 the Republican Party won control of both houses of the US Congress
for the first time since the election of 1932, and Joseph McCarthy, the most public face of
anti-communist fervor, won a seat in the Senate. In 1954 the Republican Party lost
control of both houses of the US Congress, a condition that would remain for the next
forty years, and Joseph McCarthy was censured.

The geographical boundaries of this study are Asia. When I talk of Asia I am
talking about East and Southeast Asia, not South Asia or Central Asia or Siberia. I deal
with three countries: Japan, China, and Vietnam and what took place there outside of
major US combat. These three are circumscribed by the three major US involvements in
Asia during the period under consideration. I could deal with Korea. I do not because of
the sudden nature of large-scale US involvement that precluded the time necessary for the
debate and engagement in which domestic politics and foreign policy intersect.
Furthermore, during the Korean War much of the discourse focused on China and who
“lost” her, precipitating Chinese involvement in Korea.

I deal with Eleanor Hadley, John Paton Davies, and Owen Lattimore because I
feel that they represent a diversity of expertise and experience while suffering similar
fates. Also when we look at their stories chronologically we can observe an arc of
development: relatively minor Senators issuing impersonal critiques to a most famous
Senator, Joseph McCarthy, accusing an Asia specialist by name as a Soviet spy. Over the
period I am discussing domestic politics and foreign policy merged more firmly on the Asia specialists in question. The discourse also coarsened. In the case of Hadley, zaibatsu policy (anti-trust debate) was a real topic hotly debated and then twisted in the political sphere. In the case of Davies, involvement with Mao Zedong and revolution in China were actual events but more highly embellished in political discourse than in the case of Hadley. In the case of Lattimore, espionage accusations leveled were hokum only loosely tethered to reality. Public exposure of the cases, divergence from actual events in Asia, and the degree to which domestic politics was involved were more explicit over time. A narrative of the stories of the Asia specialists in question is a profound illustration of the history I have researched.

II) Domestic Politics

When I write about domestic politics I am writing chiefly about the preoccupation with winning elections. I am not talking about developing long-term advantage for a political party as much as I am talking about winning that next election. And I am writing about politics, the employment of ideology and manipulation of public opinion, to accomplish an end. There are, of course, many elements of a political agenda. Ideology is one. (Economics plays a great role) But I am less concerned with the motivations than I am with the process and how that process intersects with foreign policy. This is not domestic politics in its entirety. This is only one part of domestic politics. But I find the term to be convenient shorthand for the specific employments of anti-communism that I am discussing. I would like to present a concise historical tour of what I am discussing. Domestic politics and international relations have long intersected.
America’s war with Spain was America’s debut as a world power. But the groundwork for that debut had been in the making for years before. For some, Manifest Destiny was never seen to end at the California shore. Alfred Mahan was a Navy captain who wrote widely on the need for America to dominate not only the sea, but to expand her influence to foreign shores. He wrote one volume specifically on “the problem of Asia.”

Mahan’s ideas about foreign policy resonated with President McKinley and with McKinley’s political ambitions. The war with Spain was as much about domestic concerns as it was about foreign policy. The Spanish-American War greatly improved McKinley’s domestic political standing, as did the annexation of Hawaii. McKinley saw a symbiotic relationship between the war and his partisan standing: “what’s good for patriotism is good for us.” He claimed that when the war started, he didn’t know “within 2000 miles the location of the Phillipines.”

This is certainly a very encapsulated view of the Spanish-American War. There exists great debate on the issue. This is true for other historical examples I will discuss. I am not trying to claim any sort of comprehensive knowledge or authoritative conclusion on any one of them. I am, however, trying to illustrate that within these events domestic politics and foreign policy intersected. This should not be seen to preclude any other sort of debate.

McKinley’s vice-president learned well the advantages of international affairs in domestic politics. Roosevelt springboarded to the vice-presidency on the strength of his

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4 Ibid, 162.
5 Ibid, 172.
“Rough Riders” and he ascended to the presidency upon McKinley’s assassination. Roosevelt’s internationalism was muscular and he used it to his political advantage. The Perdicaris Incident is telling. In 1904 Perdicaris, an alleged US citizen, was detained by brigands in Morocco, led by a bandit named Raisuli. This seemingly minor incident prompted a surprisingly robust US response, explainable by the fact that it was an election year. President Roosevelt capitalized on the incident: he dramatically told the Republican National Convention that nominated him for a second term: “This government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.” The crowd loved it and the larger issue of his expansive, Big Stick view of US foreign policy. It generated what President Roosevelt termed “hot stuff”; a demagogic appeal to popular passions.⁶ Even that most idealistic of figures, Woodrow Wilson, was careful to cater to public opinion during his reelection campaign (“He kept us out of the war”), while keeping his internationalist impulses and the country’s forces in check until election season had passed. Action and inaction abroad were tied to domestic politics.

During the Second World War the United States congress refused to institute a labor draft, though it and an expanded military draft were sorely needed for the war effort. A larger military force might have ended the war in Europe a year earlier and precluded the Battle of the Bulge. But the Congress would not do it. “The political realities were such that… [the Army] was not going to get more people.”⁷ Viewing the first half of the twentieth century, Charles Beard maintained that foreign policy is a phase of domestic policy, an inseparable phase.⁸ Historian William Appleman Williams

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⁶ Beard, 59.
⁸ Beard, 9.
concurs that foreign policy is “intimately connected with domestic affairs.”

“Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear – kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor.” These words were not Williams’: they belong Douglas MacArthur. In the 1960 campaign for the presidency Senator John F Kennedy argued that there existed a “missile gap” between America and the Soviet Union. Kennedy warned that there was little reason to be confident “that we will be the strongest military power by 1963,” due to such appalling laxity under the administration of which Vice President Nixon was a part. The election of 1960 was very close, and such issues were seen as decisive. After President Kennedy had been sworn in, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was relieved to discover that there was no missile gap, and there had, in fact, never been one. McNamara mistakenly revealed as much to the press. Foreign policy and domestic politics are interdependent.

The story of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and President Johnson’s 1964 race against Barry Goldwater exemplifies the supremacy of the domestic sphere: Johnson used Vietnam policy to shore up his foreign policy credentials. Likewise, the revelation of The Pentagon Papers makes it clear that concern with the state of domestic support greatly influenced President Johnson’s decisions about that conflict in 1968. The way the war itself was run was subject to the pressures of domestic politics in other ways. A counterinsurgency war requires maturity and delicacy, but the US would send some of

the most ill-prepared of society. This would allow others not to go to Vietnam. Project 100,000 was a McNamara Defense Department initiative that sought to lower mental, physical, and psychological standards to take more men into the military to fight the Vietnam War. They were alternatively called “the moron corps” and “McNamara’s boys.” “Somebody had to help them get dressed in the morning,” explained one officer at Fort Polk. It turned out to be one of the most shameful aspects of Vietnam policy. The added manpower had the benefit of forestalling need to resort to the dramatic and politically undesirable alternatives of mobilizing the reserves or ending college and other popular draft deferments. It was presented as a way to help eradicate domestic poverty by employing the unemployable.

During the Nixon administration the sensitive issue of POWs and MIAs would serve as an indispensable tool for continuing the war, their safe return presented as justification for continuing the fighting. What the Vietnamese wanted to talk about at the Paris peace talks in 1969 was ending the war and US occupation of half their country. Washington wanted to make the POW issue the central issue of the negotiations. At the end of the final negotiating session of the year, the acting head of the US delegation devoted his final remarks to the prisoner problem, scarcely mentioning the question of peace. President Nixon’s focus on the POW/MIA issue was useful in addressing desperate political concerns; it was an indispensable and potent counterforce to the anti-

16 Ibid, 127.
18 Baskir and Strauss, 123.
20 Ibid, 58.
21 Ibid, 40.
war movement. Jerry Lembcke has written a powerful book on the ways in which the issue of “the troops” was used against the anti-war movement to facilitate continuance of the war which killed more of “the troops.” Even after the return of all POWs in 1973 the issue would linger, privileged as it had been by the Nixon administration. For the next twenty-two years the POW issue would stymie attempts to normalize relations with Vietnam. International relations would take a backseat to domestic politics.

Domestic politics played a hand at all stages of the Vietnam War, including the last official American deaths of that conflict, the Marines who died in what came to be known as the Mayaguez incident. In May of 1975, after the fall of Saigon, the American cargo ship Mayaguez was stopped at sea by Cambodians. The crew was released within forty-eight hours – considerably less time than the months it took to resolve the USS Pueblo affair of 1968 in which North Korea held a US Navy ship and her sailors – but President Ford still gave an order to bomb the island where the crew was being held and to assault the island with Marine forces who ended up suffering numerous casualties. The crew of the cargo ship was, in fact, off the island, headed for American forces, when the attack occurred. Why was the response so violent and dramatic when a more judicious approach might have resolved the crisis? A month earlier Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had been quoted: “The US must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power.” The audience was not international but domestic. After the Mayaguez incident, the New York Times noted that the Administration seemed grateful for the opportunity to demonstrate that

22 Ibid, 48.
24 http://www.usspueblo.org/
President Ford could act quickly. With Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld in the White House, President Ford would launch overwhelming military action to rescue the Mayaguez, an action that was as overwhelmingly popular domestically as it was unnecessary and lethal to the American forces it involved.25

In the 1986, during the Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan, pressed hard with Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in part because he desperately needed a victory ahead of the 1986 Congressional elections if he wanted to take away Tip O'Neill’s House Majority and head off the mounting Iran-Contra scandal.26 Representative Charlie Wilson (D – Texas) pressed hard for support of the mujahadeen, insurgents against the Soviet supported regime in Afghanistan, in part to stem domestic political concerns about his profligate lifestyle, which had drawn attention after a hit-and-run drunk driving incident on a bridge in Washington D.C.27 National politics and national security are always to some extent interrelated, writes Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, late of New York.28

III) Foreign Policy

When I write about foreign policy I am chiefly writing about that aspect of US foreign policy that essentializes the culture, politics, and people of other countries. In my thesis I will be dealing with this tendency as evinced in the fervent application of anti-communism in foreign policy; that is, the consensus that developed that countries in Asia

26 Ibid, 408.
were wholly communist or wholly on the side of the US and that their position could be
determined by the US because application of US will trumped that agency of these
nations. This essentialism divided the globe into a communist/anti-communist binary. I
would like to present a concise historical tour of what I am discussing. Such
essentializing has long existed.

In Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis the American mind perceives in the
frontier a broad, open canvas on which to create.29 The other that is the West, the
frontier, is not seen as a place that has its own reality of societies and a natural landscape.
It is a place for white men and their farms and cities. In The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy William A. Williams has observed that this thesis has helped to drive
American expansionism, and writers from Tocqueville30 to Sardur31 have commented on
the American need for "new and more distant journeys."32 The first President Roosevelt
and generations of Christian missionaries in China took up Kipling's "white man's
burden," his famous poem created specifically to impel an American audience amongst
whom Kipling lived much of the later part of his life.

In the early years of the Cold War legendary statesman George Kennan argued
tirelessly against the application of such sentiment abroad.33 Kennan saw that the great
danger for the US in foreign policy was not adhering to reality. His argument explicitly
presupposes a robust American notion of overseas action. Kennan observed "messianic
tendencies" in American foreign policy.34

31 Ziauddin Sardur, Why Do People Hate America? (New York: The Disinformation Company Ltd, 2002),
139.
34 Ibid, 12.
Kennan was not alone. Charles Beard devoted the latter part of his career to discussing US foreign policy. He was vehemently against expanded US involvement beyond the shores of North America. He wrote a highly critical work on FDR shortly after Roosevelt's death in 1945. His views were as clear as they were controversial. He noted and cautioned against being deluded by what he saw as false promises and delusions abroad. He urged what he called “continentalism,” which meant recognition of the limited nature of US power to relieve, restore, and maintain life beyond its own sphere - a recognition of the hard fact that the US, either alone or in coalition, does not possess the power to force peace on Europe or Asia or to assure establishment of democratic, pacific governments there.

Walter LeFeber wrote persuasively on the essentialist strain. He details how Nixon and Kissinger, upon reaching executive power in the United States government, looked for information to Woodrow Wilson, that most interventionist president. Kissinger spoke of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and its hold on the American psyche. Kissinger noted, "America was not itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. This is why Americans have always seen their role in the world as the outward manifestation of an inward state of grace." Natan Sharansky evinces this in his book, of which the second President Bush has said, "It will give you a sense of what I'm talking about." Sharansky writes, "I am convinced that a successful effort to expand freedom around the world must be inspired and led by the United States. In the twentieth

35 Bacevich, [the book was poorly received almost entirely on the timing of its release, the public still emotional so soon after FDR's death.]
36 Beard, 149.
37 Ibid, 152.
century, America proved time and again that it possessed both the clarity and courage that is necessary to defeat evil.”

IV) Actors

My thesis deals with three experts who found themselves at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy. These three have several things in common. Each of the three formed a knowledge of Asia by being there, as opposed to the many political figures who formed their views without such exposure. Each was pragmatic about the situation found. Each was the sort of American at odds with Graham Greene’s *Quiet American*: overly idealistic and overly unfamiliar with the terrain. Each at one point worked for the government, and was later persecuted by the government. Each had his or her life changed through confrontation with the US Senate. This list could certainly be expanded to include others, but I feel that these three provide a reasonable yet succinct arc of expertise and experience to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the intersection of domestic politics and international relations that I am writing about. By considering these three together one can observe the triumph of domestic politics and foreign policy over the Cassandra call of expertise.

I focus on the Senate because the Senate is the more deliberative body of Congress, the one most supposed to be free of wild politics. But I am arguing here that domestic politics is fundamental in how the US pursues foreign policy. For similar reasons I deliberately do not focus just on “the China Hands” because I want to show how broad-based I feel this mode of operation to be. US domestic politics and US

foreign policy engage one another in a symbiotic nexus to derail expert advice and not in a way that engages and contradicts the advice based on further information, but by discrediting the advice through calumny and specious assertions. The approach taken here is an admittedly broad one, in line with the approach in John Gaddis’s *The Landscape of History*. What is sought is a large picture that encompasses aspects of Japanese history, Chinese history, Vietnamese history (in the epilogue), and the benefits of the perspective of recent events. The US has taken a very broad role in world affairs since the Second World War. It is important to assess that history by considering the fates of three.

**Eleanor Hadley.** A Harvard trained economist who was sent to Japan after the end of the war to work on zaibatsu dissolution. The zaibatsu were economic trusts that were heavily involved in the Japanese economy since the Meiji Restoration in the later nineteenth century. She and her work became fodder for domestic political discourse and her steady efforts to bring change in Japan were thwarted. Zaibatsu dissolution was stopped before the trusts were abolished. Hadley was asked to be one of the first employees of the new CIA, but her security clearance was withdrawn after her time in Japan.

**John Paton Davies.** The child of missionaries, Davies was born and raised in China. He joined the Foreign Service and spent most of his career as one of the very few East Asia specialists in the US government before the Second World War. He served in the China-Burma-India theater during the war and maintained contacts with the Chinese Communists who were fighting with US interests. Davies tried to foster a relationship between Mao and the US government, warning that the Communists would win the
struggle for postwar control. His warnings went unheeded. When the Chinese Communists seized power, the question arose: "Who lost China?" Davies was one of the Foreign Service officers blamed, his accurate predictions taken as ipso facto evidence of collusion with the Communists. Davies was investigated many times but refused to resign, though urged. Finally, he was fired in disgrace and exiled himself in South America.

**Owen Lattimore.** One of America’s most renowned experts on China and Central Asia. Born to peripatetic parents, he spent the vast majority of his life in Asia, mastering Mandarin, Russian, and Mongolian. His area expertise was reflected in his writings and in his stewardship as editor of the Institute of Pacific Relations’ publication *Pacific Affairs*. He brought a view to pre and post World War II US-Asia relations that was learned, nuanced, and balanced. His writings were not pro-Soviet; rather they reflected the complexity of the situation in China at that time. He worked for the United States government during and after the war, but remained always a detached professional, ever willing to present the situation in Asia in general, and in China specifically, as he observed it and not as he wished it to be. Accused by Joseph McCarthy of being the top Soviet espionage agent in the United States, he was charged with perjury, cleared, and chose to live most of his later years in Europe.

This thesis is about domestic politics and foreign policy in the United States from 1946 to 1954. Domestic politics in this case refers to the pursuit of electoral victory through the use of the tactic of fervent anti-communism. Foreign policy in this case refers to the essentializing misperception of East Asian countries during the early Cold War by Americans with preformed ideas about monolithic, worldwide communism. The
years chosen cover the ascendancy of McCarthyism. During this period domestic politics and foreign policy reinforced one another to pernicious effect.

This thesis examines the cases of three experts who were purged. Eleanor Hadley served during the Occupation of Japan and worked in zaibatsu dissolution. John Paton Davies was a State Department officer in China who accurately reported on the rise of the Chinese Communists. Owen Lattimore was a renowned authority on China and Central Asia who was singled out by Joseph McCarthy. In the case of each, legitimate debate and ideological differences were seconded to domestic political maneuvering predicated on an essentialized view of Asia. By examining these three cases chronologically the arc of this phenomenon's acuteness and public impact can be observed. One of the cumulative effects of this confluence of domestic politics and foreign policy was to stifle debate on Vietnam. This is seen through the experience of Army colonel John Paul Vann in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration.
I) Introduction

The Senate Chamber of the United States is furnished with a half-circle of desks facing the dais of the President of the Senate. From a certain vantage point the arrangement, with its elevated tiers, resembles an arena for combat sport. Sometimes the Senators lend to this impression.

On December 19, 1947 Senator William Knowland, the junior Republican senator from California, took to the floor. He would come to be known as “the Senator from Formosa” and an “Asia Firster.” Scion of a prominent, conservative California family, he was initially appointed to his seat by Governor Earl Warren but had won the seat in his own right in 1946. He had run against Will Rogers Jr, son of the famous comedian, and accused Rogers of being “a Communist, fellow traveler.” The focus of his attention that day was efforts at zaibatsu dissolution in Japan.

In disregard of Washington’s request for a delay, Knowland waved a copy of FEC 230 aloft in disregard of its “confidential” classification, and denounced it heatedly as the work of irresponsible New Deal radicals still in the U.S. Government. That earned him his photograph, together with that of the title page of FEC 230, on the cover of Newsweek magazine...

Suddenly what had been a technical operation, so technical that assistant Secretaries could not spare the time to read the particulars, had become a national controversy.

I contend that in Occupation Japan the role of the zaibatsu in the postwar world was debated in a fluid atmosphere of vigorous contention amongst competing interests and

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41 Senate Chamber in US Capitol, (memory.loc.gov/.../5a37000/5a37630r.jpg).
43 Ibid, 61.
competing ideologies. But it was not this debate that decided what policy towards the zaibatsu would be. The decisions about the zaibatsu were fundamentally determined by the exigencies of US domestic politics which relied in turn on an essentialized view of Japan. The views of those who understood the issue of zaibatsu dissolution were de-privileged. The forces of domestic politics would further antagonize and punish the learned. Dr Eleanor Hadley was one of those experts.

II) Terms and People

This chapter involves a few possibly unfamiliar terms and persons. In the interests of narrative flow I would like to provide some exposition before storytelling.

The zaibatsu are defined by historian of Occupation Japan, John Dower, as “gigantic financial and industrial oligopolies.”45 Kozo Yamamura characterizes zaibatsu as “Semifeudal in that centralized control rests in a family... tightly controlled [in that] relationships among the affiliated firms [are] by means of holding companies... [with] extremely large financial power in the form of commercial bank credit.”46 Eleanor Hadley states that an individual zaibatsu consisted of a holding company which controlled a combine, or complex of corporations, and was family-dominated but sometimes not and existed between the world wars and other times as well.47 She feels they controlled the economy of Japan.48 Edwin Reischauer writes that during the Meiji Period (1868-1912) the zaibatsu, pejoratively known as “financial cliques,” concentrated

45 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan In The Wake Of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 68.
48 Eleanor Hadley, “Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07 7:00 am” (Honolulu – Seattle).
much of Japanese industry in their hands.

Wayne Farris, however, cautions against ascribing too much power to the zaibatsu; he contends that they were a middle-class phenomenon of modest influence. William Sebald explains that the theory that a small number of zaibatsu controlled the total industry was a doubtful premise and was never proved. T.A. Bisson states that “The zaibatsu form was not unique to Japan, but the huge scale that such groups as Mitsui and Mitsubishi attained and the number of zaibatsu formed in the course of industrialization were distinctively Japanese phenomenon.”

Other scholars prefer many different definitions. Lonny Carlile observes that “one could easily spend an entire dissertation trying to answer [the question of the importance of the zaibatsu].” Several authorities make this point: within reasonable boundaries a person can see in the zaibatsu what her or she wants. The person’s worldview matters in how a person responds to the subject of zaibatsu dissolution.

Dissolution of the zaibatsu was a contentious issue during the Occupation. It was generally agreed that some reform was necessary and that the institution of the zaibatsu could be faulted with some of the conditions leading to and abetting the war. The issue was how that reform would be enacted and how deeply it would run.

Yasuda Plan/Scap Plan 244 was the plan submitted soon after the Japanese surrender (August 14, 1945) by the Yasuda zaibatsu for the dissolution of the zaibatsu holding companies, but not the combines themselves, leaving the zaibatsu largely intact.

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50 Wayne Farris, “interview of 9/29/06 1:30 pm” (Honolulu, University of Hawaii).
54 Lonny Carlile, “Response To E-mail Question of 1/25/07 8:20 am” (Honolulu, University of Hawaii).
Effectively, it was an inmates-running-the-prison plan that would have left much of the zaibatsu structure unreformed. SCAP\textsuperscript{55} approved on November 6, 1945.\textsuperscript{56}

The Edwards Mission was sent to Japan amidst some press and liberal economists’ critiques of MacArthur’s leniency towards the zaibatsu\textsuperscript{57} and the shortcomings of the Yasuda Plan, economics professor Corwin Edwards was dispatched by Truman to Japan for ten weeks, starting in January 1946.\textsuperscript{58} The Edwards Mission, as he and his entourage were called, proposed sweeping measures for zaibatsu dissolution.

FEC 230 was the result of the Edwards Mission. The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established in Moscow, December 16 – 26, 1945. It consisted of eleven member nations.\textsuperscript{59} It was originally named the Far Eastern Advisory Committee, but that was changed when the Soviet Union insisted on a stronger role. In theory, it administered the occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{60} In practice, the US vote was decisive and MacArthur’s executive authority was nearly absolute.\textsuperscript{61} When the report of the Edwards Mission was transmitted to the FEC in May of 1947, it became, with relatively minor changes, FEC 230.\textsuperscript{62}

Charles Kades was an Army colonel, and the deputy chief of the Government Section on MacArthur’s staff, where Hadley worked. Kades was so skillful as an attorney that he could influence the conservative Courtney Whitney, head of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55} SCAP: Supreme Commander[er] for the Allied Powers. This was used both as the designation of the ruling authority during the Occupation and to refer to Douglas MacArthur personally.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Paul Baily, Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 36.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Howard Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 64
\item \textsuperscript{58} Kozo Yamamura, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{61} T.A. Bisson, Prospects For Democracy In Japan (New York: The Macmillan Company 1949), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Hadley, Antitrust In Japan, 129.
\end{itemize}
Government Section, who could in turn influence MacArthur.63 Despite the fact that
Kades was "an exemplary New Dealer."
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru remarked to
Kades, "You think you can make Japan a democratic country? I don't think so." Kades
replied, "We can try."65

Joseph Grew was Kades' ideological counterpoint. Grew was the American
ambassador to Tokyo from 1932 to 1942. During the war he was the best-known expert
on Japan in Washington,66 though he allowed in his memoir that throughout his ten years
in Japan he relied not on his own expertise in navigating Japanese culture and politics but
on that of the Counsellor of the American Embassy.67 He strongly endorsed the idea of
continuity in Japan, embodied in the figure of the emperor whom he believed should be
retained.68 He believed the war was the fault of the militarists whom he described as "an
oligarchy of Hitlers."69 Grew was perhaps the leading figure of the Japan Crowd, the
clubbish diplomats and businessmen with whom many conservative Japanese thought
they could work.70 The Japan Crowd and the New Dealers can be considered opposing
camps within SCAP.71

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63 Eleanor Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster: A Lifelong Adventure With Japan (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2003), 64.
64 Dower, 223.
65 Ibid, 65.
66 Dower, 217.
67 Joseph Grew, Ten Years In Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and
68 Dower, 217
69 Joseph Grew, Report From Tokyo: A Message to the American People (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1942), 16.
70 Dower, 221 and 531.
71 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 123.
It is my contention that the dominant factor in determining the zaibatsu policy of SCAP was the politics of the Americans determining that policy at any given time.\textsuperscript{72}

Ideologies were wedded to particular political sides. A see-saw battled ensued after the war to determine control of the policy; sides pitted against one another.\textsuperscript{73} I find that the major actors in this all had an ideological axe to grind, but ultimate success was determined by the nexus of foreign policy, predicated on essentialism, and domestic politics. Winning control of the policy was done by winning in the arena of domestic politics in the United States, irrespective of ideology,\textsuperscript{74} and that was achieved through the essentialist lens. Ideological argument would ultimately take a backseat to the later political struggle. As the subject of this chapter it is important to consider Eleanor Hadley's words with the realization of possible biases, but consider them nonetheless:

Author: How was the initial directive about zaibatsu dissolution first conceived?
Hadley: It was resolved at the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) level. It was a battle of ideology.

Author: Was opposition to dissolution financial or ideological?
Hadley: It was ideological. They didn't like such radical ideas.

Author: Was the Reverse Course a response to political pressures in the US?
Hadley: Yes, Knowland et al were horrified that their symbol of conservatism [MacArthur] would endorse such shocking ideas. It was anathema to Senator Knowland and his tribe.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72} In their biography of William Knowland, \textit{One Step From The White House: The Rise And Fall of Senator Knowland}, Montgomery and Johnson argue (55) that the major political arguments of the time dealt with 1) The New Deal 2) America's move from isolationism. I agree with this.
\textsuperscript{73} Dower, 365.
\textsuperscript{74} RAND, 53.
\textsuperscript{75} Eleanor Hadley, "Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07 7:00 am" (Honolulu – Seattle).
III) Developments of 1945

Eleanor Hadley was working for the OSS [Office of Strategic Services], forerunner of the CIA, when the war ended. She was on loan to the State Department at the time, working on a paper on the zaibatsu. Though there were others in government who could have ended up serving in that key position, Hadley was chosen because of her interest, her experience, and fortuitous timing (she had recently completed a project on the wooden-shipbuilding industry and was thus available for a new assignment). She would later go on to author one of the three “classic” assessments of the zaibatsu role in the prewar economy. Her path to the job is a compelling one.

From her memoir, we learn that Eleanor M. Hadley was born in Seattle, Washington, in 1916. Hers was a prosperous family and she was able to attend Mills College, graduating in 1938. A picture of her in the October 29, 1937 Oakland Tribune shows a serious but pleasant young woman attending a conference of the International Relations Club at Mills. She is quoted as urging the study of economics and politics and saying, “[It’s] time to go from the rake stage to the shovel stage,” urging active involvement in improving and not merely observing problems in society. After graduation, Hadley desired to live abroad. Her French was mediocre, her German non-existent. Why not East instead of West? China was far more studied than Japan and Hadley had been a chauffer for the America-Japan Student Conference of 1935, and later the Mills College delegate to the America-Japan Student Conference of 1936 in Tokyo.

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76 For example, Theodore Cohen who would go on to write Remaking Japan: The American Occupation As New Deal.
77 Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, 50.
78 Carlile.
Hadley arrived as a fellow at Tokyo Imperial University, then known as Teidai University, in the fall of 1938.

In 1941 Hadley returned to America and entered the doctoral program in economics at Harvard. With the outbreak of World War II Hadley finished her Ph.D. comprehensive examinations and departed to Washington to work for the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of today's Central Intelligence Agency. With the Japanese surrender in 1945 Hadley endeavored to be assigned to the Occupation as an official, but she was initially denied a position because she was a woman. Even though she had written a paper on the zaibatsu she was not sent on the Edwards Mission. It was not until April of 1946 that she was able to receive an assignment to SCAP, Government section, at the express request of the Government Section for staff with some knowledge of Japan. Hadley would, in fact, do her dissertation research in her spare time while working for SCAP.  

It was important to understand the world into which Hadley arrived in April of 1946. The surrender of Japan was accepted on September 2, 1945. SWNCC150/4 (United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan) was signed by Truman on September 6, 1945. This is important because it demonstrates that, from the beginning,

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79 Hadley, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 105-106.
80 The recounting of Hadley's early life and career up to her assignment to SCAP is provided by Hadley in her memoir, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*. Thoughout this chapter I occasionally rely on Hadley for factual information available elsewhere but expressed best by Hadley who is the subject of this chapter as well as an expert on the zaibatsu. Where she is the only source, such as for information on her early life, I have used her writing judiciously. For example, Hadley claims significant discrimination because she was a woman. I feel that to be consistent with the times and I am comfortable using her as the only source for that. Hadley's opinions, however, are just that and are noted as such.
planning was not as complete as would have been ideal. Pertaining to the zaibatsu and zaibatsu dissolution, the document states:

SWNCC150/4 Part IV – Economic, Subheading 1 Economic Demilitarization: “The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.”

SWNCC150/4 Part IV – Economic, Subheading 2 Promotion of Democratic Forces: “Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade… [the policy will] favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

What was the genesis of this part of the policy? Where did these ideas for dissolution come from? In an interview, Hadley states that it was a battle of ideology, resolved above her at the SWNCC level. The conservatives, the Japan Crowd, did not want radical ideas about dissolution floating around, while her section of state strongly advocated it. Hadley herself was writing her government paper about the zaibatsu at the time, and she became persuaded by the liberal argument and dedicated to it. 82 In her memoir, Hadley notes that there was continuity in the Basic Directive regarding Japan from the Germany directive (JCS1170), which was formulated before Roosevelt’s death and thus bore the imprimatur of the New Deal. She also points out that there was a paucity of literature about the zaibatsu and that the Japanese surrendered before the Basic Directive was completed. The policy of dissolution became a fait accompli. It impacted

82 Eleanor Hadley, “Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07 7:00 am” (Honolulu – Seattle).
the paper she was still writing, as well as the Japanese combines that soon proposed the Yasuda Plan.83

Hadley’s ideas and observations about why dissolution was the decided upon policy are certainly germane, but not gospel. Yamamura writes that Allied policy was formulated in an atmosphere in which “reform” was key. Within Japan, socialists embraced it while conservatives abhorred it.84 Bailey writes about the struggle that went on between Grew and the Japan lobby and Bisson and the New Dealers.85 “Efforts to restructure the Japanese economy were perhaps the single most controversial issue of the occupation...the political clout of these two opposing forces [New Dealers and the Japan Crowd] would shift over the course of the occupation,” a RAND study about US nation-building concluded.86 It is my opinion that in the battle over dissolution the New Dealers simply beat the Japan Crowd in the Basic Directive/Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan round. President Truman approved it and sent it to MacArthur without informing or consulting with the allies.87 For the first eighteen months of the occupation, Washington regarded the breakup of the zaibatsu holding companies as critical to the reconstruction of Japan.88

The firmness of the decision, at that time, to favor dissolution of the zaibatsu can be seen in a transcript of an October 6, 1945 radio broadcast. NBC’s University of the Air hosted the thirty-fourth episode of a series entitled “Our Foreign Policy,” hosted by Sterling Fisher. Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs for the War

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83 Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, 51-55.
84 Yamamura, 1.
85 Bailey, 27.
86 RAND Corporation, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 45.
87 Ibid, 31.
88 RAND, 47.
Department, took part, along with John Carter Vincent (representing State for SNWCC) and Captain R.L. Dennison (representing Navy for SNWCC). A headline in FRUS [Foreign Relations United States, a text issued by the State Department] reads: General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines. This is from the transcript:

**Fisher:** All right, Capt Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: will we consider members of the zaibatsu – the big industrialists – who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

**Dennison:** We’ll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

**Fisher:** General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan’s war-making powers?

**Hilldring:** Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos – militarists – will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan’s war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There’s no other way to accomplish it.

**Fisher:** What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

**Vincent:** Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan – combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

**Fisher:** And the financial combines as well?

**Vincent:** Yes. General MacArthur, as you’ve probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

**Fisher:** Well, there’s no feeling here of “Don’t let’s be beastly to the Zaibatsu.” Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

**Dennison:** There’s no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher.

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89 It should be noted that John Carter Vincent was one the “China Hands” who I will talk about in a later chapter. It is noted here because, like Bisson, Vincent was associated with the Sinologists who took a harder line against Japan than the Japan Crowd. He would later be purged during the Red Scare. There was no representative voice of the Japan Crowd on this radio panel. I take this to show that the arguments of the Japan Crowd were muted, but not gone. I think Dennison is speaking euphemistically at the end.

In my argument about the primacy of ideology and its relation to Orientalism and domestic politics, it is important to note what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that there were not strictly economic interests at stake. There were American businessmen eager to do business in Japan and vice versa. In 1939 18% of total Japanese exports went to the United States, two thirds of it raw silk. Vehicle export was negligible. The United States supplied 38.7% of Japan’s import trade in that same year. The desire to restore that economic relationship clearly influenced those who urged a less strident policy towards Japan.91

T.A. Bisson was an important voice in SCAP. He was a China area expert, but working in Japan during the Occupation. Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru singled Bisson out for special criticism as “a radical element – a New Dealer.”92 A fierce critic of the zaibatsu, he labeled them, not the militarists, as the “epitome of modern Japan.”93 He worked for the Government Section. In T.A. Bisson’s view, in SCAP too many representatives from big American business had close ties to the financial and industrial elite of Japan.94 Noel Kent writes, “[zaibatsu] targeted for dismemberment in the early days of the occupation came to be viewed as the most likely vehicles for reestablishing Japanese export capacity.”95 These all fit into the larger, generally pro-business ideology of the Japan Crowd and their allies within the zaibatsu. “It was ideological,” Hadley insists. “They didn’t like such radical ideas. There was no financial

91 Bailey, 26. It should be noted that Bailey cites other authorities for the figures he used to draw his conclusion. I was able to use the original study for the Japanese export figures, and I concur with his conclusion.
92 Schonberger, 90.
93 Ibid, 97.
94 Schonberger, 100.
95 Noel Kent, Hawaii: Islands Under The Influence (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), 101. It should be noted that there is no citation of or elaboration upon this statement in Kent. E-mail correspondence with the author of 1/22/07 9:24 am yielded negative results.
losing [regarding Americans and zaibatsu dissolution]. The Japanese government was an intact government. The Chinese government hadn’t made the grade. There were all sorts of participation and operations by foreign investors in China and not in Japan. It was easy to get concessions [in China]. In Japan it was ideological, but in China strict financial interests were involved." Hadley also notes that businessmen were not permitted to enter Japan until 1947. American business leaders did have strictly economic designs on Japan, and these plans fit into the ideology of the Japan Crowd.

The adherents of the competing American ideologies, the New Dealers and the Japan Crowd, did battle in the landscape of post-surrender Japan. I am not trying to say that either the Japan Crowd or the New Dealers had, as a whole, an overly essentialized view of Japan. Ambassador Grew recalls: “The Japanese have known what we thought of them — that they were little fellows physically, that they were imitative, that they were not really very important in the world of men and nations. Believe me, I have been shamed more than once by the bragaddocio, self-confidence, and condescension manifested by our English-speaking peoples.” Grew had lived many years in Japan. Hadley had lived there as well. Bisson had spent much of his life in Asia. On reading their works and considering their careers, it is my opinion that they do not overly essentialize Japan. But they acted in a world that did, they worked with those who did not have their knowledge base, and they had to advocate for their ideological vision for Japan in that environment.

Dower’s *Embracing Defeat* is authoritative and he captures well the spirit in that time and place. “[The Americans] did initiate an impressive agenda of reform. But they

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96 Eleanor Hadley, “Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07 7:00 am” (Honolulu – Seattle).
ruled as mandarins themselves. There was...no accountability to anyone in Japan itself." 98 "Imagery of the Japanese (and Oriental) 'child' was almost reflexive amongst Westerners... the Sunday New York Times of April 15, 1951 observed that 'this [Japanese] point of view may be silly, even childish, but there is no question that it exists." 99 The notion of the Japanese as "obedient herd" and "monstrous beehive" stemmed from ethnocentric contempt as well as the elitism of the upper-class circles of Japan with which Western diplomats had associated. 100 Dower adds, "For the victors... the occupation of Japan was the last immodest exercise in the colonial conceit known as 'the white man's burden." 101

Nowhere was this attitude more pronounced than in SCAP, both in MacArthur himself and in the organization he headed. MacArthur was given to grand pronouncements about "the Oriental mind." 102 After nearly six years in Japan, in his farewell speech, MacArthur said, "The German people were a mature race. If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development... measured by the standards of modern civilization, [the Japanese] would be like a boy of 12 as compared with our 45 years of development." 103 This disquisition on the evolutionary backwardness of Japan fit perfectly with the patronizing and dismissive appraisals others were offering at the time. 104 "The general," Truman was informed by an envoy to Tokyo in mid-October of 1945, "stated that Oriental people suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them to

98 Dower, 560.
100 Ibid, 218.
101 Ibid, 23.
102 Ibid, 556.
103 Ibid, 550.
104 Ibid, 551.
childish brutality." MacArthur talked of planting "the seeds of Christianity" among a billion of these Oriental peoples on the shores of the Pacific."

MacArthur rarely if ever asked his staff questions about the country and he certainly did not seek information from the Japanese themselves. He led by example, and SCAP reflected it. MacArthur and his staff kept the several thousand Americans trained in Japanese language and culture out of the decision-making in the early days of the occupation. According to Theodore Cohen, "they were firmly kept out of Tokyo." A sheepish colonel who admitted in a job interview for SCAP, "I [do] not have any knowledge of things Japanese" was told, "If you knew too much about Japan, you might be prejudiced. We do not like old Japan hands." This did not apply in the case of Bisson, who was seen as a China Hand; or in the case of Kades ("I had no knowledge whatsoever about Japan's history, or culture, or myths."); or in the case of Hadley who only came to SCAP later because of discrimination against women. Grew did suffer from this, but not permanently. Ultimately, SCAP was unable to keep out the influence of those with experience in Japan, but SCAP was successful in contributing to the environment of foreign policy predicated on essentialism.

I am arguing that there was an environment of essentialism within the Occupation. I am further arguing that the notion of Japan as a canvas for American interests was used to serve the needs of domestic politics in the United States. I want first to consider this in light of the presidential ambitions of MacArthur. Later I want to talk

105 Ibid, 223.
107 Dower, 223.
108 Ibid, 224.
109 Ibid, 223.
110 Eleanor Hadley, "Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 11/20/05" (Honolulu – Seattle).

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about how domestic politicians within the United States would use an essentialized, anti-communist view of Japan to influence MacArthur. But first I want to talk about the aspirations of SCAP.

Since becoming Chief of Staff of the Army in 1930, MacArthur had displayed unusual political partisanship. It was not a trait he dropped. Eighth Army commander General Robert Eichelberger, who served under MacArthur, believed that his boss's push for a quick peace treaty was his way of "placing his hat in the ring for the presidency." MacArthur had sought the Republican nomination in 1944 and would seek it again in 1948. Texas Democrat Tom Connally, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voiced a common concern in the summer of 1945 when he told Truman it would be a "big mistake" to appoint "Dugout Doug as Allied Commander in Chief" in Japan. MacArthur, he predicted, would use the post to "run against [Truman] in 1948." Truman did not take Connally's advice. The legend would spread that MacArthur had single-handedly conceived the occupation in front of a thatched hut in the Philippines. MacArthur wanted what one observer called 'an absolutely immaculate occupation.' To this end, he sharply limited the profit foreign traders could take out of the country. This was one SCAP answer to politically damaging charges of exploitation.

Another was his breakup of the zaibatsu. MacArthur's championing of "economic democracy" had much to do with his presidential ambitions back home. MacArthur loyalists believed that, in addition to him being seen as championing

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111 Schonberger, 42.
112 Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur*, 144.
114 Ibid, 2.
117 Bailey, 38.
"economic democracy," a short occupation in which the general established his credentials as a successful statesman was crucial to the prospects for the 1948 election.\footnote{Schonberger, 51.} To this end, MacArthur wanted to drop troop strength in Japan right after the surrender. He claimed great cooperation on the part of the Japanese. "The smooth progress of the occupation of Japan enabled a drastic cut in the number of troops estimated for that purpose... Within six months the occupation force, unless unforeseen factors arise, will probably number not more than 200,000 men, a size probably within the framework of our projected regular establishment."\footnote{Bisson, 63.} The Washington Post accused MacArthur of "mixing politics with statesmanship" for the comment. A reduction in troop strength would allow a slackening of the unpopular draft. General Robert Wood, the Republican leader who became head of the MacArthur-for-President movement of 1948 told MacArthur that Truman was going to use the issue against him.\footnote{Ibid, 48.}

With this background, MacArthur’s quick embrace of the Yasuda plan makes more sense. Usually MacArthur’s partisan political ambitions merged successfully with his interpretation of the domestic reform agenda for Japan. But political opportunism gained the upper hand in this case. As has been discussed, in the early part of the occupation the breakup of the zaibatsu holding companies and combines was regarded as critical. Yet MacArthur hastily endorsed the Yasuda Plan.\footnote{Ibid, 64.} He would later retreat from the decision.

The Yasuda Plan was duly submitted as a formal act of the Japanese government on November 4, 1945. It was officially renamed SCAPIN 244. It called for liquidating

\footnote{118 Schonberger, 51.} \footnote{119 Bisson, 63.} \footnote{120 Ibid, 48.} \footnote{121 Ibid, 64.}
the holding companies of the zaibatsu, but not the combines themselves, in effect a very weak dissolution plan. Hadley recalls,

Because MacArthur recognized that he was not a technician in corporate finance, he cabled Washington on November 4 for its approval before officially accepting the Yasuda Plan. That was a most unusual action, as MacArthur was not in the habit of seeking approval for any of his judgments on how to proceed. Washington replied on November 6, saying in effect that he should accept the plan but maintain freedom of action for possible subsequent measures. Washington asked if MacArthur would like a group of technicians to advise him on combine dissolution. He replied affirmatively, and so was born the State-War Mission on Japanese Combines headed by Corwin Edwards, the Edwards Mission. I was not part of this group that was sent off to Japan to do this, although my participation might have been expected, as I had drafted the research paper on which the US position on the zaibatsu was based. It was simply unthinkable that a group made up of eight men could include one woman.

IV) Developments of 1946

Truman sent the Edwards Mission, and it would seem that a pushback against the Yasuda Plan was inevitable. On January 4, 1946 his Under Secretary of State George Atcheson cabled from Tokyo:

Dear Mr. President: Pursuant to your kind letter of November 20, 1945, I submit the following... The mandates for freedom of speech, press, and assembly, abolition of thought control, universal suffrage, dissolution of the Zaibatsu... are all now on record... It is only natural that in the confusion, chaos, and demoralization, each group will try to salvage its own particular interests... I have not altered my opinion that the Emperor system must disappear if Japan is ever to be really democratic.... There is so much pessimism here in American quarters at the decision for Allied participation in control of Japan. This seems to be shown in hesitancy to push forward with our own program as already planned... A great part of Asia is in political ferment, as suppressed and underprivileged peoples

122 Bisson, 71-73.
123 Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, 79. I quote Hadley at length because I think she explains the events succinctly and clearly. I find the facts to be accurate, as well as the issue of discrimination.
seek to gain for themselves some measure of the individual freedom and dignity which Americans have struggled for and have achieved.\textsuperscript{124}

The policy, and the emphasis of the policy, regarding the zaibatsu was now on record, but I think Atcheson – who was a China expert and whose appointment had been a striking insult to the Japan Crowd\textsuperscript{125} - was right: dissolution was not decided upon. Nor were the issues of retention of the Emperor, involvement of the FEC, or how the US would respond to the communist gains in China. Even though bold pronouncements had been made about zaibatsu dissolution, the situation was in flux.

The ideological struggle within the Occupation can be seen in the Constitutional Convention of 1946 in which the Government Section of SCAP essentially wrote the Japanese Constitution. On February 4, 1946 Whitney convened his staff and informed them MacArthur had entrusted them with, in the next week, writing the Japanese Constitution.\textsuperscript{126} MacArthur himself would remain detached from the day-to-day work.\textsuperscript{127} The minutes of the February 4, 1946 briefing state: “General Whitney intends to convince the Foreign Minister… that the only possibility of retaining the Emperor and the remnants of their own power is by their acceptance and approval of a Constitution that will force a decisive swing to the left.”\textsuperscript{128} The Japan Crowd, who had described the zaibatsu leaders as “moderate” and urged less strident reforms, were the odd man out.\textsuperscript{129}

The dominant, controlling faction at the Convention was the New Deal/China Hand camp which offered the less racially and culturally condescending argument.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{124} FRUS, 1946. Vol II, 93.
\textsuperscript{125} Dower, 222.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, 360.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 367.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 362.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, 221.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 220.
Kades possessed a New Deal skepticism toward the elitism of the "old Japan hands." This outlook allowed for the iconoclasm necessary in promoting radical constitutional revision such as describing the emperor as only a "symbol" of the state.\textsuperscript{131} Of the mild post-surrender reforms proposed by the Japanese leaders and supported by the Japan Hand camp, Kades said, "They wanted to take a tree that was diseased and prune the branches... We felt it necessary to, in order to get rid of the disease, take the root and branches off."\textsuperscript{132}

It is interesting to note that one of the very few on the committee with genuine knowledge of Japan was Beate Sirota, a twenty-two year old Austrian Jewish woman who had been raised in Japan.\textsuperscript{133} Thanks largely to her, the Constitution affirmed "the essential equality of the sexes."\textsuperscript{134} This is ironic, given that Hadley was not in Japan at the time because of gender discrimination. Amidst the seeming progressivism of the Constitutional Convention, however, it should be noted that this was a group of largely junior American officials writing a constitution for a country about which they knew very little. Even with the best of intentions, this was still an essentializing environment and it contributed to an essentialized view of Japan.\textsuperscript{135}

Meanwhile, the Edwards Mission had embarked for Japan in January of 1946 and was in the country for nine weeks, until March. The report of the Mission was issued in March of 1946, after the group’s return to Washington. An excerpt:

1. Objective: The overall objective of Occupation policy in dealing with excessive concentration of economic power in Japan should be to destroy such concentrations as may now exist...

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 366-367.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid, 77.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 365.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 369.
\textsuperscript{135} Dower touches on the implications of this, 370-373.
2. Definition... of... excessive power... and excessive power should be defined as any private enterprise conducted for profit, or combination... which by reason of its relative size in any line or cumulative power of its position in many lines, restricts competition... uncertainty as to whether any specified enterprise is covered... shall be resolved in favor of coverage.\textsuperscript{136}

The report stated that dissolution was not being carried out.\textsuperscript{137} It also had the effect of establishing a framework for more aggressive dissolution. The FEC would eventually subscribe to it.

The FEC was technically part of the decision-making in the occupation, but in practice it was not true.\textsuperscript{138} April 30, 1946. A cable from Edwin Pauley, Truman's special envoy on reparations, was sent to Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clayton. It noted, "It has only been within the last few weeks that the program for removal of industrial machinery from Japan has been presented to the Far Eastern Commission for their consideration, and then it was only presented on an informal basis."\textsuperscript{139} Another cable, November 12, 1946, dealt with the issue of reparations: "It should be emphasized that a main purpose of our Reparations Conference proposal of July 25 was to surmount the interminable delays which would have been inevitable in routine FEC handling."\textsuperscript{140}

December 18, 1946: "General Derevyanko recommended that, in view of the importance of the liquidation program to the democratization of Japan, representatives of the Allied Powers... should be admitted as observers... He could have had little hope that such a request would be granted, and probably made it for the propaganda value of the

\textsuperscript{136} Hadley, \textit{Memoir of a Trustbuster}, 80.
\textsuperscript{137} FEC 230, 3, 5, 14.
\textsuperscript{138} RAND, 52.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{FRUS 1946}, Vol VIII, 300.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, page 391.
When the report of the Edwards Mission did reach the FEC in October of 1946 it was already interim US policy, subject to immediate application until approved or revised by the FEC where the United States was one of the four member states with veto right. In May of 1947 it was officially adopted and duly renamed FEC 230.

It should be noted that Hadley has a slightly different take on the Edwards Mission. She thought it too far-reaching and at the same time too dependent on the Japanese government for execution. "It was as if the commission had forgotten that MacArthur in reality was also responsible for national economic output!... [The Mission report] read as if using the Japanese government as the instrument of policy presented no problem. MacArthur would announce what he wanted and, lo! It would be done." In June of 1946, two months after her arrival in Japan at the behest of the Government Section of SCAP, which was desperate for someone with some knowledge of Japan, she wrote a memo about the zaibatsu dissolution. In her memo she pointed out:

2) It was because the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe the security interests of the United States and its Allies would be adequately safeguarded by territorially reducing Japan to the main islands and proscribing army, navy, air force, and selected industries, that they held certain political and economic changes to be essential... [the Directive read]"to favor a program for dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations."...
5) The Yasuda Plan had several interesting features...The Japanese were informed that combines were to be dissolved. The zaibatsu in the ambiguity of the term, however, [saw] an opportunity to give themselves the benefit of the doubt. Therefore, to avoid confusion as to the nature of their proposals they used the term, "holding company" in place of "combine."
Hadley further observes that the Edwards Mission Report was classified and had limited influence on the implementation of the deconcentration policy on the ground until it was formally adopted in May of 1947 when it had already been overtaken by events. She feels that "at that time [June of 1946] no one was pushing for antitrust policy as written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." A cable from SCAP to Pauley dated February 18, 1946 captures the sentiment, "The question of the Zaibatsu is such a complex financial and legal problem that we believe that it should be considered separately. This problem has been attached[attacked?] in action which Washington has approved, and a Washington mission is now studying the problem in Tokyo." SCAP was still on board with the Yasuda Plan. Hadley was pushing for a broader program to dissolve both the holding companies and the combines.

Hadley sees her memo as impacting the Yasuda Plan scheme for dissolution. Why? Hadley posits that a "conceivable connection" from Kades (her New Dealer boss) to Whitney (whom Kades could influence) led to MacArthur. She notes that upon the airing of allegations by Knowland, MacArthur drew attention to the fact that he was following the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as emphasized by Hadley. Hadley notes that he had not been doing that before she wrote her memo. Iwajiro Noda was a

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145 Ibid, 69.
146 FRUS 1946, Vol VIII.
147 Hadley, Anti-Trust In Japan, 20.
148 Hadley explains: "Kades was a very skilled lawyer. Whitney was really number one. He had been MacArthur's lawyer in the Phillipines. Kades was a liberal, but he could persuade Whitney, who stood a good chance of persuading MacArthur." Eleanor Hadley, "Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07" (Honolulu-Seattle).
149 Eleanor Hadley, "Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 11/20/05" (Honolulu - Seattle).
150 Ibid.
textile and trading company executive and spoke excellent English. He was the Holding Company Liquidation Commission\textsuperscript{151} chief liaison man with SCAP. He said of Hadley:

[The Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP] would not have carried out the dissolution so sternly... [had not] the idea [been] supported and further prompted by Miss Hadley of the Government Section of SCAP. You know the opinion of the Government Section had an important influence on the enactment of the... directives of zaibatsu dissolution... and the opinions of the Government Section were for the most part based on Miss Hadley's recommendations... Her attitude toward Japanese zaibatsu was stern or almost cruel.\textsuperscript{152}

Prime Minister Shigeru, writing in his \textit{Memoirs} in 1960 remarked: "It seems that two persons within GHQ had played particularly important roles in the drafting of the purge plan, a Mr. Thomas Arthur Bisson... and a Miss Eleanor Hadley."\textsuperscript{153}

Evidently both the Edwards Mission and Hadley's memo were important in pushing zaibatsu dissolution beyond that called for in the Yasuda Plan. Both were also important in pushing MacArthur from the Yasuda Plan towards a more robust intention for zaibatsu dissolution.

\textbf{V) Developments of 1947}

In 1947 MacArthur belatedly adopted the arguments of the left, especially on zaibatsu reform, to better his domestic political position.\textsuperscript{154} MacArthur was going left as the Truman administration and Washington were going to the right. This would set the stage for Knowland's December 19, 1947 speech in the Senate denouncing FEC 230.

\textsuperscript{151} This was the body set up by the Japanese government under the Yasuda Plan (Bisson, 73).
\textsuperscript{152} 1952 roundtable discussion in Kaizo magazine, quoted by Hadley, \textit{Memoir of a Trustbuster}, 108.
\textsuperscript{153} Hadley, \textit{Memoir of a Trustbuster}, 109.
\textsuperscript{154} Schaller, \textit{Douglas MacArthur}, 145.
want to talk about the changing climate in the Truman administration and MacArthur’s move to the left.

Two good pieces of scholarship I have found on the domestic political climate as it relates to the occupation of this period and zaibatsu dissolution come from Michael Schaller\textsuperscript{155} and Robert Harvey. I will use their analysis and then explain why I agree with them.

In July 1947, without consulting Washington, MacArthur unveiled his own recovery package. Since 1946, he had blocked a proposal (formally known as FEC 230) to dismantle Japanese industrial combines or zaibatsu. Now, just as Washington resolved to make industrial recovery a priority MacArthur ordered the Diet to pass a bill dissolving the combines...

George Kennan warned cabinet members that out of ignorance or duplicity, MacArthur had opened Japan to Communist influence... He portrayed the attack on the zaibatsu as a “vicious” scheme to destroy the major barrier to Soviet penetration in Asia... As the general’s critics suspected, his support for zaibatsu dissolution reflected his political ambitions. MacArthur had encouraged his supporters to enter his name in several Midwestern primaries. The earliest vote took place in Wisconsin, home of the general’s father and where he himself had lived briefly. To enhance his native son status, MacArthur’s campaign relied on Phillip LaFollette, scion of the influential Wisconsin political dynasty renowned for its anti-monopoly crusade... A Japanese informant reported that when the Diet almost adjourned without passing an anti-monopoly bill, an aide to MacArthur told Prime Minister Katayama that the law “must be passed so as not to embarrass” the general who “expected to be nominated for president.”...If the Japanese caused him problems, it would “prejudice the future of Japan when the Supreme Commander became president.”\textsuperscript{156}

In \textit{Douglas MacArthur}, Schaller elaborates on MacArthur’s motivations for his embrace of zaibatsu dissolution: he was trying, in moving to the left, to outmaneuver Truman, who

\textsuperscript{155} “MacArthur, who sought the Republican presidential nomination in both 1944 and 1948, considered Japan a political stage on which to demonstrate his executive ability.” (4)

\textsuperscript{156} Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 8. Schaller covers this same ground in his other book, \textit{Douglas MacArthur}, quoting MacArthur as asserting that the “Ike for President” movement was “directed against me and will backfire.” (146)
he felt was trying to outmaneuver him with his new, right stance on foreign policy.\textsuperscript{157} MacArthur was in the race, and trying to sell himself as a patriotic populist.\textsuperscript{158}

Biographer William Manchester: “He was a candidate and very eager to enter the picture.”\textsuperscript{159} Even Courtney Whitney, author of \textit{MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History}, acknowledges that MacArthur sought the presidency. Whitney portrays him as an exceedingly reluctant candidate, but allows that MacArthur had to consent to have his name on the ballot in Wisconsin’s presidential primary.\textsuperscript{160} I think the attempt at the presidency, as well as allowing Kades and the New Dealers such influence in the Constitutional Convention in light of his early endorsement of the Yasuda Plan, shows that MacArthur was willing to align with different ideological camps to achieve his political goals.\textsuperscript{161} Whitney was loyal in this. But the ideological ground was shifting beneath MacArthur.\textsuperscript{162}

In July of 1947 George Kennan published his famous X article in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, in which he laid the groundwork for the US policy of containment. He begins by noting that Soviet power is in large part defined by ideology. Here is his summary: “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly

\textsuperscript{157} Schaller, \textit{Douglas MacArthur}, 142.
\textsuperscript{159} Manchester, 521.
\textsuperscript{161} Nebraska congressman A.L. Miller had written MacArthur that, “unless this New Deal can be stopped, our American way of life is forever doomed.” MacArthur replied, “I do unreservedly agree with the complete wisdom and statesmanship of your comments.”
\textsuperscript{162} Hadley offers compelling evidence of the shift in climate of opinion. She points out that reparation removal signified the switch from ex-enemy to partner. \textit{Antitrust in Japan}, 146.
shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of
Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence."  

Michael Harvey writes:

Kennan was no crude anti-communist... but the Kennan thesis also
legitimized a crude world view which was to come to the fore both in
Washington – where it reached its ugliest expression in McCarthyism –
and in Japan... In September 1947, the Policy Planning Staff in
Washington issued a top secret 37-page document which called for a
radical revision of policy toward Japan. It summarized: A major shift in
U.S. policy toward Japan is being talked about under cover. Idea of
eliminating Japan as a military power for all time is changing. Now,
because of Russia’s conduct, tendency is to develop Hirohito’s islands as
a buffer state.  

But MacArthur read the change as a direct attack on his control of occupation policy and
as a threat to his presidential ambitions.  MacArthur had been whipsawed by the
rejection of the 1945 reform agenda, the Yasuda Plan. Then he, belatedly, went to the
left in embracing New Deal zaibatsu dissolution. Then the Democratic cold warriors
around Truman, who had displaced the New Dealers, lambasted MacArthur’s adherence
to a “leftist” reform program. Caught between deposed and ascendant factions in
Washington, MacArthur tried desperately to preserve his political options. But he had
little room to maneuver. Even acknowledging his ambition and monumental ego, his
futile effort to stay on the “winning side” of the policy debate rendered him somewhat
pathetic.

foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html (I will discuss this further
in a subsequent chapter)
164 Robert Harvey, American Shogun: General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the Drama of Modern
165 Bailey, 37.
166 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 145.
That is how several historians see it. I agree with them, especially on the notion that the ideological ground in Washington was shifting.\textsuperscript{167} Here is why. On July 10, 1947 Atchenson cabled Truman. He passed on a memo entitled Dissolution of the Trading Companies/SCAPIN 1741, noting “It is intended that individual components of restricted companies (so-called ‘Zaibatsu’ concerns) will be reorganized rather than dissolved. However, [unspecified] believes that the directive of July 3 will impress the Japanese business world with the possibility of prompt and effective dissolution, and will spur other restricted concerns to submit plans for reorganization as requested.”\textsuperscript{168}

John Paton Davies\textsuperscript{169} was working for Kennan when he cabled his boss on August 11, 1947: “It would seem that a peace settlement for Japan proposed by the American Government should further American aims in Japan and the Pacific area. The central American objective in this respect is taken to be a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy.”\textsuperscript{170} On November 23, 1947 Hugh Borton, Special Assistant To The Director Of The Office Of Far Eastern Affairs gave a speech on the topic of “American Occupation Policies In Japan” to the Academy of Political Science in New York. The zaibatsu were not a top item, nor were the zaibatsu mentioned by name at all. “Policies were to be laid down with the object of insuring a wide and just distribution of income and the ownership of the means of production... a bill is now before the National Diet providing for the liquidation of undue concentration of power.”\textsuperscript{171} This was technically in accord with the Basic Directive of 1945, but did not capture the spirit of “the existing

\textsuperscript{167} See also RAND, 34, 48.
\textsuperscript{168}FRUS, 1947, Vol VI, 253-254.
\textsuperscript{169} I will write about Davies in a subsequent chapter. Davies was a China Hand and his statement here demonstrates, I believe, how firmly the new, anti-dissolution policy was becoming.
\textsuperscript{170} FRUS 1947 Vol VI, 485.
economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed" - the first line SWNCC 150/4 Part IV.172 Something had changed.

It came to a head in December of 1947. William Knowland’s family was a venerable Republican one in the state of California. They owned the Oakland Tribune, ironically the paper Hadley’s picture had appeared in when she was a student at Mills and advocating political engagement. The paper was accused of red-baiting in the city elections of 1947.173 J.R. Knowland, William Knowland’s father, was at the helm. Knowland’s father’s ties to Governor Earl Warren had gotten Knowland appointed to the Senate seat in August 1945 when it was vacated by the death of Hiram Johnson.174 He was discharged from the army and went straight to the Senate. He initially declared himself “a liberal Republican pointed toward national social programs and business stability.” He was the youngest member of the Senate (born June 26, 1908).175 He won the seat outright in the Republican Congressional takeover of 1946, the same year McCarthy was elected to the Senate, and became the youngest member of the Senate (born November 14, 1908). Knowland would make his mark as “the Senator from Formosa.” By 1950 his foreign policy views would put him in the right wing of the Republican Party.176 But anti-communist rhetoric was a part of his campaigning from his initial victory in 1946 to his defeat for re-election in 1958.177 His motivations on December 19, 1947 were ideological and political.

Senator Knowland: “It is unbelievable to me that such a document [FEC 230] could be put forward as representing the policy of the government of

173 Montgomery and Johnson, 64.
175 Ibid, 53.
176 Ibid, 85.
177 Montgomery and Johnson, 61 and 248.
which I am a part...If some of the doctrine set forth in FEC 230 had been proposed by the government of the U.S.S.R, or even by the labor government of Britain, I could have understood it. As a statement of policy being urged by the Government of the United States, I find a number of proposals so shocking that I have today written a letter to the Secretary of State...The country and the Congress should be told who the originator of this proposal is...The country and the Congress should be informed as to whether Gen. Douglas MacArthur was consulted in advance regarding these economic policies being followed in the name of the American Government in Japan, or whether he has been given directives from Washington which he has no choice but to carry out."178

Politicians make speeches all the time.179 Knowland, though, was backing his claims up with black and white proof (in actuality indirect proof), the December 1, 1947 edition of Newsweek, and the subject of that was a “confidential” report. The wording in the introduction of the document can be read in more than one way:

A report giving a critical analysis of American occupation policies in Japan is now under serious consideration by high War and State Department officials. It was prepared by James Lee Kauffman, a prominent New York lawyer, who visited Japan late last summer on behalf of business clients...He was one of five American businessmen suggested to MacArthur as an economic cabinet last spring...Mr Kauffman made his report in a private capacity and so far government officials have not discussed it publicly. However, since it is being officially considered and since it deals with a vital but little-known phase of American occupations policies, Newsweek herewith presents excerpts from it. Mr. Kauffman’s opinions, naturally, are his own.180

Minus the italicized phrase, on behalf of business clients, it would be a reasonable error to conclude that Kauffman’s report was something other than the opinion of a private citizen and not a government official or someone else with some sort of special access.

178 Hadley, AntiTrust In Japan, 137-138 as quoted in Congressional Record, December 19, 1947, pp. 11,686-88.
179 The incident was noticed. In a Nippon Times article of October 18, 1949, a staff writer noted: ‘Just about the time the bill was sent to the House of Councillors by the lower house, Newsweek in its issue of December 1, 1947, reported that there was a body of opinion in America which... urged a reexamination of the plan. This gave rise to the suprise that the bill might be held over.” (Bisson 140)
Both Hadley and Cohen have observed that the presentation of Kauffman’s article in Newsweek intimated that it was a secret government document.

Who in actuality was Kauffman? He was a prominent business attorney who detested what he perceived to be SCAP’s economic agenda, hence his scathing piece on zaibatsu dissolution for the December 1, 1947 issue of Newsweek. It should be noted that Army Under Secretary William Draper encouraged Newsweek and provided conservative Republicans like Knowland with critical information about the deconcentration program.181 This will be discussed further.

The title of the article Knowland was discussing was clear: “A Lawyer’s Report On Japan Attacks Plan To Run Occupation... Far To The Left of Anything Now Tolerated In America.” Kauffman alleged that zaibatsu dissolution policy amounted to a purge run by economic theorists of little practical experience, many of them former army officers who left uniform to command higher salaries as civilian employees in SCAP. Even friends of Joseph Grew had suffered under these men. Experienced businessmen (such as the ones who sponsored his trip for the piece) were not being used for their experience. Like Knowland, Kauffman stated that he was for some dissolution. Knowland stated in his floor speech he was for breaking up the cartels; in his article Kauffman stated that he was for breaking up the holding companies. But zaibatsu was an avenue for discussing something larger. According to Kauffman:

Japan is still the leading Oriental nation in ability, respect for law and order, and desire to work. It is not Communistic and while Communism is growing, Japan will embrace it only as a last resort...I am convinced Japan would be a most attractive prospect for American industry and a fertile field for American capital... our government [must

do] two things: First, put an end to the economic experiment being conducted in Japan. Second, replace the theorists...182

The article had words of praise for "the most skillful, intelligent, and sympathetic leadership of General MacArthur," and Knowland's outrage also abscended MacArthur. The reason for this is part of how Knowland ended up on the Senate floor with Kaufman's article. It was part of the ideological struggle going on over the occupation.

Harry Kern, who championed the piece, was the editor of Newsweek. Schaller states that Kern was also the one who sent Kaufman to Tokyo to write the piece.183 Harvey states that it was the American business community in Tokyo who paid for the trip.184 Hadley indicates that the important thing was that he intimated he was working for the Army.185 Bisson doesn't engage the argument.186 Dower doesn't even mention him. Schaller states that Kaufman influenced Kennan.187 What resounds in all accounts is that Kaufman and Kern were like minded ideologically. This was also true with Kern and Draper.

William Draper was Truman's Under Secretary of the Army from 1947 - 1949. In an oral history for the Truman Library he explains his involvement in the occupation:

"I arrived [in Japan]. I informed [MacArthur] that I was coming. He was at the airport to meet me, which I believe was the first time he'd met any official from Washington. He took me right to lunch and I said, "What can I do to help?" Almost the first question he asked me was, "Could you find me somebody that knows something about running the economy of Japan, because I don't. And my military officers who are responsible for it don't either," which was obvious and natural. So my quest back here was to find such a man, and it took some months...So the President invited Dodge to come to Washington. He told me that morning...

182 Ibid.
183 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 145.
184 Harvey, 387.
185 Hadley, Antitrust in Japan, 135.
186 Bisson, 139.
187 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 145.
before seeing the President that he wasn't going to take the job. The President saw him and Dodge had lunch with me and by that time he had taken the job.188

Not everyone thinks that it was such a sanguine relationship between Draper and MacArthur. Kauffman’s Newsweek article states that on his trip to Japan, the Draper Mission, Draper became alarmed when “he and other officials found FEC-230 not only provided for the abolition of the zaibatsu but also for a virtual destruction of Japanese business and the sale of its assets at nominal prices to select purchasers, including Japanese labor unions, of which about one-half are Communist-dominated.” Bailey writes, “Draper urged MacArthur to go slow on the purge and to wind down the dissolution program... MacArthur saw this opposition as a direct attack.”189 Schaller writes, “Draper agreed that SCAP had turned Japan into an economic ‘morgue’... he appealed for MacArthur to delay Diet consideration of the SCAP-sponsored deconcentration bill, the general repeated his demand that the Diet approve the law promptly... Draper encouraged Newsweek to attack SCAP in its December 1 issue... Draper then provided... Knowland (who was told that Japan might receive credits to buy California cotton), with critical information about the deconcentration program.”190 Harvey presents the most direct connection: “Kern tried to promote Draper as an alternative supreme commander to MacArthur. Draper sent a copy of the still classified anti-zaibatsu report to Senator William Knowland.”191 It’s important to recall that Knowland began his speech on the Senate floor by requesting that the State Department provide a copy of FEC 230 to the Senate; Knowland wasn’t supposed to have FEC

189 Bailey, 37.
191 Harvey, 387.
I conclude that the Draper-MacArthur relationship was not as smooth as Draper recalls.

MacArthur was off the reservation about zaibatsu dissolution. The Japan Crowd (e.g. Grew), the new Cold Warriors (e.g. Kennan), and the anti-communists (e.g. Knowland) were in the ascendancy. The ideological shift was strong enough to impact MacArthur. His political fortunes would suffer. But the view of Asia that he had used to his own political benefit – enhancing his own stature by presenting himself as savior of the Japanese – would continue. Others would use “the Orient” in a similar way. This can be seen in the way Knowland, Kauffman, and Draper spoke about occupation Japan.

In Knowland’s reckoning the FEC was not a body with little actual authority, but was, in fact, a vital part of creating the policy of zaibatsu dissolution. In his floor speech he singles out Labour Britain (Labour had won the 1945 election) and the Soviet Union as likely sources of a policy such as FEC 230. Whether intentionally or not, he was linking the two. And he was presenting a picture of occupation Japan that was at odds with that of a SCAP-controlled country. In this vision of Japan, the Communists are poised to take control of the economy (this from Draper), MacArthur is not in control of economic policy (this from Knowland), and he is being duped by the radicals in the midst of SCAP (this from Kauffman).

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192 On January 19, 1948 he would eventually claim to have gotten it from a “nongovernment source,” seeming stating he didn’t get it from Draper. (Hadley, Antitrust In Japan), 137.
193 State Department Bulletin, 1947 Far East ed: FEC expressed interest in being given an opportunity to pass upon the final draft of the Japanese Constitution (May 4, 1947, 802) and gave final approval to the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (June 17, 1947). In both cases the FEC was far behind the decisions being made in SCAP and Washington. In the case of the first, the draft constitution was made public on March 6, 1946 while the FEC made their request on March 20, 1946 (Dower, 383). In the case of the second, the anti-dissolution forces were already rendering the zaibatsu dissolution portions of the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan obsolete.
Before addressing the fallout of Knowland’s testimony, and the subsequent end of dissolution and the political fortunes of MacArthur, I want to talk about Hadley’s take on the episode.

In her 1970 book, *Antitrust In Japan*, she devotes a chapter to the controversy entitled, “The Public Debate: FEC and All That.” She observes that “American political mores require everyone to denounce monopoly and cartels, which all conservative critics were careful to observe, but when this has been dispensed with they indicated in unmistakable terms their distaste for both the attempt to break up the giant combines and the measures being used to accomplish the objective.”194 “With Senator Knowland believing [dissolution law] to be near-Communist and the Japanese Communist Party regarding it as an expression of monopoly capital, one has a rather striking example of the limitations of emotion as a tool of social analysis.”195 In her memoir, Hadley characterizes Knowland’s criticisms as “based on a highly inaccurate description of the law’s contents and the actions it engendered.”196

I was able to interview Hadley about the Knowland controversy:

Author: How did Senator Knowland and his like gain knowledge about Japan and the zaibatsu?
Hadley: Knowland didn’t have any. He told them that taking apart large businesses was not good. It was instinctual. James Kauffman [also].
Author: Would you put Senator Knowland and Senator McCarthy together?
Hadley: No, I would not put Knowland and McCarthy together. McCarthy was a loner.
Author: Did Senator Knowland and his like link communism with the New Deal practices implemented in occupation Japan?
Hadley: He did in a fuzzy way.
Author: Specifically, did he tie the advance of world communism to your efforts?

194 Hadley, *Antitrust In Japan*, 133.
195 Ibid, 141.
Hadley: In a goofy sort of way he may. China was further falling apart under Chiang. Soviets had a treat with Chiang opposing the Communists, negotiated before 1945.

Author: Are you saying Knowland was presenting an image of monolithic world communism?

Hadley: Yes, if one were liberal it showed doubtfulness about communism.

In my opinion, Hadley has an understandably harsh view of Knowland. She was one of the seemingly nameless people he was attacking. In their biography, Montgomery and Johnson presented a more balanced view of Knowland, and they praise the knowledge of China that he later developed. But that was after he had been to China on several occasions. And it did not pertain to Japan in 1947. He used the essentialized view with which he was presented and used it to achieve domestic political ends.

VI) Developments of 1948 and After

MacArthur had been rebuffed by the right. Not fatally for his career as SCAP, but for his domestic political ambitions. Going left to outmaneuver the new Cold Warriors had failed. He had lost his supporters. It was a bad position to be in on the eve of the 1948 presidential primaries. Asked by American conservative Robert Wood to explain his actions regarding the zaibatsu, he failed. Robert McCormick, conservative writer of the Chicago Tribune, flew to Tokyo and protested SCAP’s “socialistic economic policies.” MacArthur’s reply to did not calm him down: “This is not socialism. But it would be better to have real socialism than the socialism of monopolies.”

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197 Montgomery and Johnson, 86.
198 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 149.
199 Manchester, 495.
American right-wingers MacArthur was their once and future hero, but they were not sure he was in their camp at the moment.  

On January 19, 1948 Knowland renewed his attack on policy in Japan with a second speech on the floor of the Senate. Regarding MacArthur, he damned with high praise: “I have a very high regard for Gen. Douglas MacArthur... but the military phase of the occupation was completed months ago and was succeeded by the necessity of restoring the Japanese economy... [E]ither originating among doctrinaire New Dealers who found their activities limited in Washington... or finding its fountainhead in the Far East Commission, which initiates some policies for transmission to Gen. MacArthur, certain activities are open to serious question by both Congress and the people.”201 The FEC was toothless and MacArthur was very much aware of the direction of dissolution policy. By presenting MacArthur as the unwitting pawn of the FEC, Knowland did his image as a leader no favors. Asked whether or not the reverse course saw a response to political pressure in the United States Hadley recalls,

Yes, Knowland et al were horrified their symbol of conservatism [MacArthur] would endorse such shocking ideas. Selling shares to the public, restricted operations – anathema to them, Knowland and his tribe. It was a reversal of what I had anticipated. The dominant factor was US pressure: Knowland, the Pentagon, Draper, Kauffman.

Author: Was the easing of dissolution ultimately harmful to the occupation?
Hadley: Depends on where one stood in the political spectrum.202

The results of the Wisconsin primary were the last straw. On April 6, 1948 MacArthur was resoundingly defeated. Only his own victory and march to the White House could have protected his current vision for SCAP and zaibatsu dissolution. He

200 Ibid, 494.
201 Hadley, *Antitrust In Japan*, 140-141.
202 Eleanor Hadley, “Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07” (Honolulu-Seattle).
failed. Already the reverse course, as pertaining to zaibatsu dissolution, was well underway.\textsuperscript{203} By the summer of 1948, MacArthur had reversed occupation labor policy by withdrawing the right to strike from public employees. Zaibatsu dissolution was headed for a similar end. The reverse course would help to establish a domestic conservative hegemony that would remain dominant to the end of the century.\textsuperscript{204}

Throughout 1948, officials emphasized the importance of Japan’s economic recovery. In January Draper called for an end to the anti-zaibatsu campaign. He called MacArthur’s anti-monopoly measures dangerously socialistic. Kennan visited Japan in March to impress upon MacArthur the reorientation of Washington’s thinking. MacArthur soldiered on, as much to champion his doomed presidential ambitions as to resist outside interference. In June of 1948 the National Security Council document (NSC 13) submitted by Kennan and formally adopted in October stated that economic revival and political stability were to take priority in Japan. In December of 1948 Joseph Dodge was dispatched to Japan to oversee the economy.\textsuperscript{205} His conservative “Dodge Line” was vigorously imposed until the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950. He would come to join MacArthur as a supreme being in Japan. Stabilization, economic recovery, self-sufficiency were his watchwords.\textsuperscript{206} After his political reversal, MacArthur accepted Dodge’s economic initiatives. Dodge argued that a stable Japan would serve as “a key border area in the world-wide clash between communism and democracy.”\textsuperscript{207}

We can observe the denouement through the documents.

\textsuperscript{203} Schaller, \textit{Douglas MacArthur}, 152.
\textsuperscript{204} Dower, 271, 273.
\textsuperscript{205} Bailey, 55, 56.
\textsuperscript{206} Dower, 540.
\textsuperscript{207} Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 11.
On June 23, 1948 Draper received a cable from Assistant Secretary of State Saltzman regarding the hapless FEC: “Other members of the FEC have become increasingly restive because of the inability of the US representatives to take positions on matters of interest to them.”\(^{208}\) They would not have long to wait.

A cable of September 30, 1948 submitted “action to formally withdraw FEC 230 from the FEC.” It explicitly states the importance of “preventing the Japanese... from receiving the impression that the US is no longer interested in deconcentration... [and] ensuring that a relatively small but important part of the deconcentration program gets accomplished.” Another cable from the same day warned: “There is no doubt... but that the Soviets are on the offensive in so far as Japan is concerned...I think it would be a major error of policy to allow the impression to become general among the Japanese that all our principles are subordinate to the ultimate defeat of communism.”\(^{209}\) Don’t let the rhetoric get confused with reality seems to be the explicit message here.

On December 9, 1948 Frank McCoy, US Representative on the Far East Commission, gave a speech to the FEC. The first paragraph was direct: “Some months ago, my Government suspended its participation in discussions in the Far Eastern Commission of a United States policy proposal which was then under active consideration in the Commission. This proposal [was] designated as FEC 230... that the paper has become outmoded in so brief a period is a singular tribute to SCAP and the Japanese government.”\(^{210}\)

\(^{208}\) *FRUS 1948*, Vol VI, 321.
\(^{209}\) Ibid, 1021-1027.
William J. Sebald, Acting Political Adviser in Japan, did not agree with McCoy’s speech. In an August 25, 1949 cable he stated (with seeming relief) “It cannot be said that the deconcentration has been either a disruptive force, or a strong force making for, ‘industrial democracy,’ … The scope and effectiveness of the deconcentration program… are not impressive…”  

Sebald again. Cable of December 16, 1949: “Sixty-two more Japanese businesses and industrial concerns under restriction due to former zaibatsu connections, have just been removed from restricted listings, having complied with all removal requirements.”

On September 8, 1951, with the Korean War raging, the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed in San Francisco. There was no mention of the zaibatsu.

Only six years had passed since NBC’s University of the Air Program had broadcast the unanimous chorus in favor of zaibatsu dissolution. What had happened in the interim was that an issue of policy with ideological implications had become Orientalized as it entered the realm of domestic politics. Cold War implications were misplaced. It would not be the last time.

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211 FRUS 1949, Vol VI, 840-843.
212 Ibid.
VII) The Purge of Hadley

Hadley left Japan in September of 1947 to finish her doctorate at Harvard. The years ahead were black ones. She was recruited by the nascent CIA for analyst work, but she was unable to get a security clearance. She was turned down by several government agencies. She worked on the fringes of the Washington bureaucracy until 1956 when she got a job teaching at Smith College. In 1965 Henry “Scoop” Jackson took up her case. He was able to track down the retired Whitney who joined in the effort to clear her name. There was nothing in the GHQ-SCAP files to suggest disloyalty. At the end of 1966, through some machinations on the part of Jackson, Hadley was finally given her clearance. The years of banishment had been long. The climate in Washington had been harsh to one “under a cloud.” She had been blacklisted from before the coming of McCarthy and remained so long past his demise. Dean Rusk, an old college teacher, even refused his help.214 “I was afraid to get a book out of the library [in those days]... [I] was miserable going through it,” Hadley remembers.

The mystery of why she had been blacklisted was eventually resolved. Major-General Charles Willoughby had been the head of SCAP’s Military Intelligence Section. Later an advisor to General Franco, he maintained extensive surveillance on Japanese radicals as well as reporting critically on American reformers within SCAP itself.215 Willoughby was an ultraconservative and controlled censorship for SCAP.216 He had a personal rivalry with Whitney, which may have accounted for some of Government Section’s pursuit of reform: Whitney knew Willoughby would hate it. Willoughby

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214 Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, 121-145.
216 Dower, 406.
brought extreme right-wing views and a Prussian bearing to his job. MacArthur called him “my lovable fascist.”

Willoughby’s papers were declassified in 1975, including a report on “Leftist infiltration into SCAP.” Hadley was mentioned. The concern was that she was dating a journalist. “Her relative immaturity… suggest the possibility… [of] being exploited by leftists.” Hadley shared her thoughts on Willoughby:

Hadley: Politics shaped his job. He was security. After five years of Mr. Bush we know how far security can be pushed. I enjoyed having dinner with foreign correspondents, US and European. It’s possible I said something one night. I was never informed about that.

Author: What were the specific accusations against you?

Hadley: No specific accusations whatsoever. It was all done very quietly. The black ball consisted of telling people in D.C. that I was doubtful. I “might” have spilled the beans, I “might” have been indiscreet, I “might” have indicated SCAP direction to foreign correspondents. All “might have” – Willoughby’s wonderment.

Author: Would you have led a different life if you had not been black balled?

Hadley: 17 years out of [one’s] most productive makes a dent.

Without access to Willoughby’s files there is no way to confirm Hadley’s story. Still, I find it plausible. The forces around her, the clash of competing ideologies within SCAP and the US political scene, worked greater effects. I do not render judgment on the issue of zaibatsu dissolution. I simply do not know enough about it. What I do feel comfortable arguing is that the clash of ideologies within SCAP and beyond about zaibatsu dissolution became increasingly Orientalized the more it entered into the discourse of US domestic politics. And the more entrenched it became in US domestic politics the more Orientalized it became. The power of this convergence was more than

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217 Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 121.
218 His papers are on file at the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, VA, but not on-line. http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/archives_record.asp (accessed 1/30/07).
219 Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, 146.
220 Eleanor Hadley, “Telephone Interview With Eleanor Hadley 1/25/07” (Honolulu-Seattle).
enough to wreck Hadley's career in government. That particular injustice alone may not have been very significant. But were there others?
I) Introduction

In December of 1945, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States met to hear statements from the recently resigned Ambassador to China. General Patrick Hurley had been ambassador to China since November of 1944, but had abruptly quit his post little more than a week previous. In a statement announcing his departure he had leveled an explosive charge: that members of the State Department had actively conspired against US interests. "I was assigned to China at a time when statesmen were openly predicting the collapse of the National Government... we did prevent civil war between the rival factions, at least until after I had left China... Throughout this period the chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from the American career diplomats... a considerable section of our State Department is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China."221

General Hurley was no ordinary general, no simple career military man. He had been Secretary of War under President Hoover, and Time Magazine, owned and edited by China-born Henry Luce, touted the idea in 1931 that he would be the vice-presidential nominee in 1932 on a Hoover-Hurley ticket with "Patrick Hurley [carrying] on his square shoulders the full burden of the national campaign while the President keeps busy in the White House."222 Hurley was an imposing figure, physically and politically. When he

\[222\text{ TIME Magazine, "According to St. Patrick," Monday November 30, 1931 } \text{http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,753139,00.html].}\]
spoke, as he was doing in front of the Senate, people listened. The Hurley hearings broached the idea that the United States had a loyalty problem.223

Hurley said he had “never had a public statement of policy,”224 but that, as he understood it,225 the policy of the United States was that “the only Government of China which is recognized by the United States or by any other of the United Nations is the Government of the Republic of China headed by President Chiang Kai-shek.”226 Hurley said that, as he saw it, it had been his charge to “prevent the collapse of China, of the National Government of China, [and] to keep a Chinese Army in the war against Japan... I claim that under this policy, to be the policy of the United States, the career men opposed the policy... that they recommended in my absence that the Chinese Armed party, a belligerent whose purpose was to destroy the government that I had to sustain, be furnished lend-lease arms and equipment.”227 The proof of this was to be found in “top secret documents” which General Hurley stated could not be put into the record at the present time.228

Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin pressed the issue. Perhaps Hurley’s ordering of priorities was skewed, and the overriding US policy had been to fight the Japanese, not support Chiang’s government. He asked Hurley what the specific charges were and who they were against. He asked what the secret documents were that would prove these unspecified charges against these unspecified persons. “I confess that I am still

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224 United States Senate, 103.
225 Lohbeck, Don. Patrick J. Hurley. (Chicago: Henry Regenry Company, 1956), 310. [This book was written with the cooperation of Hurley and is essentially a hagiography. I feel comfortable combining it was a direct quote from the subject.]
226 United States Senate, 63. [It should be noted that, in support of this view of US policy, Hurley did quote Secretary of State Hull. But this statement was to the Japanese government and predated the bombing of Pearl Harbor.]
227 Ibid, 73.
228 Ibid, 71.
somewhat confused,” he said. La Follette continued to press regarding who had specifically done what, and when it had been done. Hurley replied, “Well, of course, I do not want to get into any witch-hunting controversy with individuals.” Other members of the committee pressed. Senator Green: “You have in your statement many times referred to the number of career men in the State Department who were trying to sabotage your policy and the policy of this country, but you accuse only [John Service and George Atcheson]. Are there any others you would like to include?” Hurley declined to answer, but eventually relented: “No, they were not the only ones who were disloyal to me. I would add to that list John Davies.”

By the fall of the next year Hurley would be running for a US Senate seat in New Mexico and La Follette would be defeated by Joe McCarthy in his own primary campaign in Wisconsin. John Paton Davies would be started down a decade that would see him investigated eight times for disloyalty and ultimately dismissed from the Foreign Service.

II) People

This chapter involves five major players: John Paton Davies, Patrick Hurley, Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek and the China Lobby. In the interests of narrative flow I want to provide some exposition before storytelling.

John Paton Davies was the son of a Baptist missionary, born and raised in China before and during the first World War. It has been said that the whole of American culture seems designed to make it difficult for Americans to move comfortably in many

229 Ibid, 77,
230 Ibid, 84.
231 Ibid, 92.
foreign cultures. An American public servant such as Davies is the case against this stereotype. He grew up with China in his blood, with love tempered by skepticism. He learned to love China the hard way, for, like the sons of other missionaries, he found disillusionment in realizing the futility of his parents’ work. Davies was brought up with a sense of the vastness of China, its resistance to outside influence, be it Western Christianity or capitalism or communism. His was a China determined somehow to define itself and shape its own destiny. Davies’ vision of China was a brilliant and far-reaching vision, but it did not necessarily serve him well.

College in both the United States (University of Wisconsin and Columbia University) and China (Yenching University) preceded his appointment to the Foreign Service, and by 1933 he was back in China as an embassy officer. For the next twelve years, save two in Washington D.C., Davies would watch and report from the country he knew best. First, however, he honed his skills in Chinese language and culture even more as an embassy language attaché and for two more years at Peking University where Davies spent long hours with his Chinese language tutor and hobnobbed with the foremost Western specialists on affairs Chinese. He boasted the resume of the consummate scholar-diplomat. It is neither exaggeration nor cliche to state that Davies was the best and the brightest in a very specialized field. And specialized it was, indeed; before the Second World War there were only a dozen or so members of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, one of whom was Alger Hiss.

234 Ibid, 438.
235 John Paton Davies. Dragon By The Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters With China And One Another (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972), 211. [the presence of Hiss would prompt much insinuation via association over the years]
Davies was often considered the most intellectual of the State Department China experts known as the China Hands. He was perhaps the most picture-perfect, as well. Dean Rusk said he was the embodiment of what a Foreign Service Officer should be. Davies even led an impromptu parachute jump during the war, landing safely and hacking his way with others through the jungles of the Patkoi mountain range over the Hump in the China-Burma-India theater.

At the State Department, it was necessary to find out who had “lost” China. A prime candidate was John Paton Davies, Jr. Of him John Service, a China Hand himself, said, “The firing of Davies finally sent a shock wave through the Foreign Service. If John could be fired, who might not be affected? After John there were no more firings. One could say, there was no one left to fire.” President Kennedy had said that he wanted, while in office, to clear two people: J. Robert Oppenheimer and

236 Kahn. page 10. [The China Hands are roughly defined as those State Department officers and other Americans of long-standing in China who, in the wake of the Second World War, warned the United States government that the fall of the Nationalists and Communist victory were imminent. The China Hands urged dialogue with Mao. Their views were rebuffed, and, when the Communists did succeed, the China Hands were accused of complicity with the Communists; modern Cassandra having evolved into the cause of her unheeded prophecies. In the McCarthy era these charges were quite damning, and the China Hands were forced from government service as a result – Ellen Schrecker. Many Are The Crimes. Little, Brown, and Company. Boston. 1998. Page 251]
237 Ibid. page 22.
238 Ibid. page 29. This story is also recounted in TIME correspondent Eric Sevareid’s memoir Not So Wild A Dream. Sevareid, independent of TIME, and other China journalists would write a letter on Davies’ behalf for the December 1945 hearings following Hurley’s resignation. [FRUS Hearings, 201]
240 It must be noted that Service, owing to his persecution during the McCarthy era, was fired in 1951, reinstated by court order in 1957 (in the meantime he had worked with steam traps), and finished out his days in a job that constituted bureaucratic purgatory. He left the government in 1962, at the age of fifty-three, on an enemic pension owing to the fact that he was never promoted after his initial firing. He decided to go back to school at this time and was told by the officials at UC Berkeley that he would need to take undergraduate courses in political science to be admitted to the graduate program. Apparently, he was judged to be remedial in the arena of political science. Service took an undergraduate class taught by Chalmers Johnson (future author of the influential Blowback). One day Johnson was holding forth with great confidence on the matter of Stilwell’s experiences in China when he discovered who was in his class. Johnson was so shaken he was barely able to finish his lecture. A few months later Johnson advertised for a graduate assistant to help with reading examination papers. Johnson was startled to find Service volunteering for the job, at the wage of $1.37 per hour. (Kahn, page 273.)
241 Ibid. page 305.
Davies. Oppenheimer was given the Fermi Award by the President. Davies would have to wait another decade.242

During the Second World War Davies was assigned to the staff of Joseph Stilwell, the General tasked with the CBI (China-Burma-India Theater). A large part of his service was in making contact with the Chinese Communists, which he did. Davies explained: “[Regarding] my relations with the Chinese Communists. I cultivated them. I did so for a purpose – to obtain information. I did so with the knowledge of my superiors and my American colleagues. It was an open relationship.”243 Oliver Clubb, himself a China Hand, said, “[Foreign Service Officers] are criticized sometimes for being pro this and anti that, when all they are is pro-United States... [their function] wasn’t to further the Chinese revolution or to stop the Chinese revolution, either one.”244

Davies advised rapprochement with the Communists in China as early as 1943245 because he was sure they were a powerful and lasting force.246 Davies wrote, “The Communists are in China to stay. And China’s destiny is not Chiang’s but theirs.”247 He urged the US to “capture the Chinese Communists before they go by default to the Russians.”248 Like it or not, the future is theirs, and we had better recognize it, Davies wrote.249 He freely admitted later that US advisers in China were determined to believe the best of the Chinese Communists in their zeal to achieve their war goal of defeating

242 Halberstam, 117.
246 Ibid, 154.
247 Kahn, 137.
248 Ibid. page 149.
249 Halberstam, 369.
None of this, however, can be correctly appreciated without an equally deep understanding of Davies' distrust of the Soviets.\textsuperscript{251} Davies simply did not see the Soviets and the Chinese as inextricably bound. Davies was transferred out of China in January of 1945 by Hurley who warned others that they would suffer the same fate if they “crossed” the Ambassador.\textsuperscript{252}

As for General Patrick Hurley, he was born in Indian territory, Choctaw Nation, in 1883. He started a law practice in Oklahoma in 1908 and was a colonel in the American Expeditionary Force during WWI. He was a tall, handsome man of flashy appearance with a pointed gray mustache and an important air.\textsuperscript{253} He was a self-made man of wealth and prominence, a pragmatist, and poorly educated. His thoughts about United States foreign policy were essentially ad hoc. Most of all Hurley was a kind of careerist, an opportunist.\textsuperscript{254} Notwithstanding, he was voluble and a forceful personality. Franklin Roosevelt once remarked that Hurley was the only man who could make Winston Churchill stop talking.\textsuperscript{255}

In August of 1944 President Roosevelt chose Hurley to go to China as his personal envoy, and in November he appointed Hurley as ambassador to China upon the resignation of Ambassador Clarence Gauss. Hurley was well-received by Chiang. Chiang preferred that sort of American to the sort who could read and speak Chinese and had spent a good deal of time living among Chinese. Hurley would see things the way

\textsuperscript{250} Rand, 238.
\textsuperscript{255} Lohbeck, 3.
Chiang preferred and Chiang would praise Hurley as a man with “a rare knowledge of
human nature.” Hurley was not a student of China. What he was, however, was the
living embodiment of the colors of patriotism and he hated diplomats. Hurley would
say of his China experience, “The Communist Party in China claims it is the reform
party. They are out of office and want to get in. The only difference between a Chinese
Communist and an Oklahoma Republican is that the Oklahoma Republican is not
armed.” Initially, Hurley saw the Chinese Communists just as he saw himself: an
outside power wanting to get on the inside.

Why Roosevelt was so tolerant of Hurley was hard for some to fathom, but the
President could hardly suffer in domestic politics. Hurley was an out-and-out
Republican, and this was the election year of 1944. The President was trying for an
unprecedented fourth term in office. He would choose as his running mate Harry
Truman, a Senate backbencher, because he appeared more moderate than Vice President
Henry Wallace, why should China policy be immune from the same pressures? With
next year’s election in mind, Hurley as a “tame Republican” might be useful. Further
evidence of Roosevelt’s attitude towards the China mission can be found in the man he
chose to be Hurley’s economic representative, Donald Nelson. Nelson had worked at the
War Production Board as chairman, but personality conflicts had made it a bumpy tenure.

256 Kahn, 122.
257 Ibid, 121.
258 Lohbeck, 5.
259 Kahn, 124.
260 William O’Neill. A Democracy At War: America’s Fight At Home And Abroad In World War II
261 Tuchman, 397.
For domestic political reasons it was necessary to remove him, and send him somewhere. The American political scene’s equivalent of Siberia was China.262

After meeting with an emaciated Roosevelt, only a few weeks from death, Hurley declared that American policy was to support only Chiang and the Nationalists.263 In late 1945, having been left in charge by an overburdened President Truman in the wake of his predecessor’s death, Hurley would resign from the Army; in so doing Hurley gained a platform from which he stated bluntly that it was the China Hands who had lost China,264 and that they “were disloyal to the American policy.”265 Hurley would run for the Senate seat from New Mexico three times - in 1946, 1948, and 1952 – and lose each time.266

One much more successful at accruing political power was Mao Zedong. He was born on a farm in Hunan province in 1893 to a family in modest but not destitute circumstances.267 By the time of WWII he was in control of Communist forces in China. Mao wanted a non-adversarial relationship with the United States, something not dissimilar from what the Nationalists enjoyed that would help him, at the very least, achieve better balance against the Soviets. This is not a claim without controversy. To establish its validity, as is being claimed here, two things must be established: first, that Mao and the Chinese Communists were not as inextricably attached to the Soviet Union as has been claimed by observers such as Hurley, and, second, that Mao overtly, and with at least some degree of credibility, expressed his desire for commonality with the United States.

262 Davies, 316.
263 John Paton Davies, “America and East Asia,” 388.
264 Kahn. page 174.
265 Ibid. page 177.
266 Lohbeck, 460.
The Soviet Union did not pay exceedingly close attention to the Chinese Communist party in its early days. Moscow sent two agents to the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in July of 1921. Mao Zedong was among the thirteen delegates. The Chinese listened to the Soviets, but did not take what they said as law. For their part, the two Soviet agents were not even present at the closing session. Stalin held in a speech in April 1927 that for Soviet purposes Chiang Kai-shek, himself originally a Communist, should be "utilized to the end, squeezed out like a lemon, and then flung away." This countered Trotsky who said that Chiang was not to be trusted at all. In an Orwellian historical footnote, Stalin had the text of the speech removed from all print so successfully that even in an old edition of the Daily Worker in the New York Public Library it had been torn out. Mao was reprimanded by the Comintern for going his own way and he would continue on an impermissibly independent course, challenging the infallibility of the Kremlin. For Stalin in the late 1930's Chiang had become an opponent, Mao an arrogator, and a potential competitor. There was a significant philosophical difference as well: the Soviets emphasized the importance of the urban proletariat in bringing about revolution, while Mao emphasized the role of the rural peasantry. The Soviets did not see their lot, in interests and philosophy, as bound without divorce from that of the Chinese.

John Service spoke personally with Mao in August of 1942. Service jokingly remarked that the name "Communist" might not be reassuring to some American

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268 Davies, 109.
269 Rand, 128. [Rand claims that Chiang was at one point a communist. Others claim he was merely allied with communists. The point is that at an earlier time he did not harbor the anti-communism he later would]
270 Ibid, 130.
businessmen. Mao laughed and said that they had thought of changing their name but if people knew them they would not be frightened. Mao then turned serious:

China must industrialize. This can be done — in China — only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are co-related and similar. They fit together, economically and politically. We can and must work together. The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang [Nationalists]. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence; we will welcome it. We have no silly ideas of taking only Western mechanical techniques... We will be interested in the most rapid possible development of the country on constructive and productive lines... America does not need to fear that we will not be cooperative. We must cooperate and we must have American help. This is why it is so important to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning. We cannot risk crossing you — cannot risk any conflict with you.  

Mao's extraordinary bid for a working arrangement with the United States was ignored by the American government at that time. But it was not to be the last overture. In 1945 Mao wanted to do business with the United States, but the Nationalists would not agree to share power. In 1945 Davies could still ask "will the Chinese Communists be willing to cooperate with us on terms equal to or better than those which they will extend to the Soviet Union? In other words, will they be voluntary creatures of Russian foreign policy? We do not know." What is germane is that Chinese Communist intentions were considerably more malleable than allowed by those such as Hurley. 

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273 Davies, page 321. [It should be noted that the suggestion here is not that Mao should, necessarily, be taken completely at his word. But, rather, that a Foreign Service officer would be obliged, at least, to report the conversation, leaving determination to be made at a different level. Reason existed to question the existence of an inherent, worldwide Communist monolith
274 Ibid., page 322.
275 Rand, page 252.
276 Davies, page 393.
with the Soviets was a decision, one informed by and not despite United States action.\textsuperscript{278} Chiang Kai-shek had considerable support from key actors within the United States while Mao Zedong did not enjoy such a lobby, though he did express a desire for an alliance with the United States. Mao wanted another partner with whom to better balance himself against the Soviets. This desire was conveyed by the China Hands, but it fell on deaf ears, drowned out, as it were, by the din and the dun of the China Lobby within the United States.

The man on the receiving end of the China Lobby’s largesse was Chiang Kai-shek. He was born in 1887 near the foreign treaty port of Ningbo, in Zhejiang Province, to a salt-merchant family. Originally a Communist ally, he was viewed by the US and other western governments as a dangerous Red until 1927 when he ordered the liquidation of several hundred Communists.\textsuperscript{279} By the start of WWII Chiang Kai-shek was in command of the Nationalist forces and engaged in a struggle with Mao’s Communist forces for control of China. In the wake of Japanese attack this created a situation of considerable, though not unanticipated, flux. Chiang had been planning for a showdown with the Communists for years and would withhold forces from engagement with the despised Japanese during the Second World War to save them for a later, internal struggle with the Chinese Communists.\textsuperscript{280} This and widespread corruption in Chiang’s government led to dispirited forces on the Nationalist side. It was summed up by General Joseph Stilwell, commander of the CBI and chief of staff to Chiang, when he stated that one thing alone might explain the fighting power of the Reds against an enemy with vastly superior

\textsuperscript{279} John Paton Davies “American and East Asia” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 3 (1977): 384.
\textsuperscript{280} Qitao Guo. Lecture of 4/12/06. University of Hawaii, History 312: History of China (1600 to present).
forces: the Red officers’ habit of saying “Come on, boys!” instead of the Nationalist officers’ “Go on, boys!”

What Chiang’s army may have lacked in enthusiasm they made up for with armaments. Unsurprisingly, Chiang’s metaphorical supply sergeant was that power which had most increased its stature as a result of the Second World War, the United States of America. US aid to the Nationalists was essential to sustaining control, but would prove to be limited which would prove to be limited in light of United States endeavors under the Marshall Plan, but that was essential to sustaining control in the hands of the Nationalists. Chiang was “hooked on US equipment.” He was able to be so because he had considerable political influence in Washington. The US chose to back Chiang Kai-shek and chose to oppose Mao and the Communists in so doing. This support, not popular support, was central to Chiang’s power.

As for the China Lobby itself, this refers to the small but vocal and powerful lobby within the United States for support of Chiang’s Nationalist government. The China Lobby had its roots in Christian missionary work in China in the nineteenth century. This religious interest in China was concomitant with increased commercial interest in China under the Open Door Policy. A China opened for US markets and US Christianity: these twin perceptions of China among Americans, and particularly the members of the China Lobby, were frozen in a mindset even after the end of World War II and the establishment in 1949 of a Communist government over all of China. Kennan

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283 Guo. Lecture of 4/10/06.
284 O’Neill, 300.
285 This contention is greatly informed by a presentation given by Joyce Mao of the University of California Berkeley at the University of Hawaii, Manoa, on February 22, 2006.
refers to this conception of China as a “myth.” Indeed, as John Melby writes, “it would be hard to find or imagine a situation in which policy was made and action taken on the basis of greater ignorance, more wishful thinking, and more fanciful myths.”

Yet myths are powerful and resilient constructs.

There was always a strong sense of essentialism in the China Lobby. Davies, a China-born missionary’s child, would write, “East Asia was for Americans the most remote part of the earth, and its various civilizations the most exotic. “The mirage of China as a vast and lucrative market and field for investment had enticed Americans for a century.” People would generally attribute the notion of “loss” to the missionary influence. “There developed a feeling of intimacy with the Chinese, which is very strange because the Chinese psyche and point of view, mentality, is really quite different from that of the United States… it’s largely a mystery to me why the American people took such a tremendous possessive, embracing approach to China.”

Roosevelt himself was not immune: he had a “willow pattern tea house” impression of China derived from family lore about ancestors in the old China trade. In December of 1943, Roosevelt did not impress Stilwell with his grasp of the China situation. The President was eager to tell stories about his forbears who had traded with the Chinese, tales of Old China. This was the most vivid part of the President’s China

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287 Ibid, 9.
289 John Paton Davies, “America And East Asia” Foreign Affairs, 55, no. 3 (1977): 368.
290 Ibid, 74-75.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid, 387.
knowledge. After the meeting, in the car ride back, Stilwell held his head in his hands in despair. 294

From the vantage point of the China Lobby, the Chinese people had always constituted a nation sympathetic to US interests. "Until 1945 it was fixed US policy to support the Nationalist Government of China, headed by Chiang Kai-shek," runs a representative statement. 295 "Until 1945 America's traditional Far Eastern policy for more than half a century had as its aim the preservation of the integrity and independence of China" is another. 296 This point of view precludes grasping the situation as it actually existed. The US association with China was vague and amorphous at varying points in time, depending on US needs. Frequently it was superseded by other concerns, such as the defeat of the Japanese in WWII. But the establishment of stark terms such as these had a tangible effect within US domestic politics: China had been "ours." And if it were "ours," then it must be "good." And if it were no longer "ours," it had been "lost." And if it were "lost," that would be "bad." And if it were "ours" to lose, then "someone" must have lost it. And "they" would be "bad" too. In her memoir about China and the Communist Revolution Freda Utley, an author often cited in sympathy by the China Lobby, writes "The moralist and the political philosopher will argue that it was the decay of our faith in the values which made us great and strong and free which has led the Western World close to the brink of disaster." 297 The use here of such similarly simplistic terms is not an unfair accounting of an argument that rested on such stark terms.

294 Davies, 281.
297 Ibid. page viii.
To be certain, the China Lobby was no more than a series of likeminded individuals and groups that were more or less closely knit to form, in its collective capacity, a pressure group. This is to say that there was no organization with the term “The China Lobby” on its official stationery. This is what makes the issues around which this disparate group coalesced all the more pertinent. As the issues at hand were the only unifying factors for the group, the issues themselves become of paramount concern. And these issues centered around a fantasy of a China that never existed – one in which China had a unified government amicable to the US in such a way that it was “ours” and could be “lost.” More troubling was the aim of the group to return that China to reality: a past fantasy to be realized in a future dream. This was the stuff of the China Lobby. Pearl Buck was a famed author on China and herself the daughter of missionaries. She had her own passion for China, but registered dissent from such missionary zeal and this orthodoxy regarding China. She complained in May 1943, “The Chinese are being exalted into persons such as cannot exist in our fallible human race. A dose of common sense is needed.”

Why was this group influential? The confluence of its thinking with domestic political ends was part of it, but the China Lobby had its own sources of power as well. Chief amongst these was the support of TIME Magazine magnate Henry Luce and the John Birch Society. It should also be noted that American Far Eastern diplomacy of the 1920s and 1930s – the years preceding the Second World War – was carried out – if not

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298 Koen. page 31.
always conceived – by a mere handful of State Department officials. This has been noted by Davies as well. The result was that there was not a great deal of history and force to counteract the aims of certain powerful persons and organizations. Henry Luce and the John Birchers, therefore, were able to exercise considerable influence through their own endeavors.

This is not meant to suggest that TIME Magazine was not important. On the contrary, its circulation was vast, as it remains today. Luce could and did wield great influence through his magazine and the columnists he chose to promote. Luce’s family had descended from Christian missionaries in China, and the Christianity-inclined Chiang and his Wellesley-educated wife were what Luce wanted to see in power in China. Luce considered Chiang a part of his own grand scheme for “Christianizing and Americanizing China.” This focus was, for Luce, personal and total. He promoted Chiang as the answer to all of China’s problems.

The John Birch society was named after a Christian Army officer who had been killed by Communists in China. By April of 1961 a Gallup Poll would record that thirty-nine million persons had read or heard of the Birchers. Their influence can be understood to predate this. The Birchers were passionately committed to an anti-communist China, despite whatever the reality on the ground may have been. Their position was influential beyond their numbers. A quote from a piece of Bircher literature by Bircher Gary Allen is representative of their attitude towards China and the

362 Ibid. page 17.
303 The exploitation and re-telling of his life and death can be compared to the Bush administration’s use of the death of former NFL player and Army Ranger Pat Tillman in 2004.
306 Mao, Joyce.
China Hands. "If Davies were ever to show his face in public he would be summarily lynched by good Americans." Allen would go on to note that after leaving the State Department Davies had lived in Chile for years and now there was a Communist dictator in Chile. Actually, Davies lived in Peru, not Chile.

III) The War Years and The Dixie Mission

My argument is that the documentary evidence, notably the war dispatches sent by Davies until he was forced from the theater, supports the contention that Davies was concerned with assessing, not supporting or opposing, the rival factions in China and that he did so with a particular eye towards the utility of these groups in opposing the Japanese. Furthermore, I argue that Hurley’s disagreements with Davies and accusations against Davies increased significantly as he became more heavily engaged in postwar domestic politics. Hurley’s charge that “the chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from the American career diplomats” is unfounded.

In the literature of this history, the most authoritative counterview to my contention comes from Chin-Tun Liang. Liang argues that Davies was, in fact, actively opposing Hurley. But his case rests on taking Hurley’s charges and then

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307 Kahn. page 225.
308 It should be noted that the most famous of current apologists for McCarthy is TV personality Ann Coulter in her book Treason: Liberal Treachery From The Cold War to the War on Terrorism. She wrote on Davies [Jewish World Review, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/coulter080703.asp accessed 3/7/07] in a short column on 8/07/03. She rests her case against Davies on the notion that Davies had “insisted” that the US “work with the Communists.” No such evidence has ever been produced, and Coulter certainly adds nothing to the debate beyond the statement “whether or not China could have been saved from communism, it is a fact that the WASP three-names like John Paton Davies weren’t trying to save it.” I cite her here because it is this argument, in its entirety, that constitutes the case, in its entirety, against Davies. To wit: to observe, is to endorse, is to collaborate. Coulter in Treason: “liberals invented the myth of McCarthyism... McCarthy was not tilting at windmills. He was tilting at an authentic Communist conspiracy.”
presenting summaries of Davies’s dispatches, none of which actually advocate supporting Mao and opposing Chiang, or of challenging Hurley either. According to one reviewer, Liang’s technique is flawed because it relies on a “shift in attribution and nuance [that] is important in assessing Davies’ judgment and reliability.” An example from the review is illustrative: Liang claims that Davies claimed the Chinese Communists “are agrarian reformers rather than Communists” when Davies was stating that foreign observers had made that observation and not he.

But I see a more significant problem: Liang uses the proxy of Hurley to make the more serious charge that Davies and others were active in supporting Mao and opposing Chiang, and he himself (Liang) merely asserts that Davies and others “generally support[ed] the Chinese Communists and denigrat[ed] the Nationalists.” I submit that this is no mere quibble: this is exactly the bait and switch strategy that was employed against Davies (and others) in domestic US politics: a sensational charge is gradually backed away from, which is not to say disavowed, and replaced by an amorphous charge of giving some sort of existential aid and comfort to the enemy. To be clear: the first step is to level a specific, grievous, erroneous charge for which there is no compelling evidence (John murdered Bob). Step two is to level an accusation of philosophical association that can never be wholly disproven as it depends on state of mind (John is

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311 Ibid. [It should be noted that labeling the Chinese Communists “agrarian reformers” was a charge also leveled at Owen Lattimore who did use the term, but used it to satirize those who used it - Kenneth Shewmaker, Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 245]
sympathetic to those who murder). Step three is to repeatedly charge guilt while blurring the line between the two accusations (John is for murder).

My examination of the documents available, notably the dispatches from China sent by Davies during the war, show that Davies was doing his job. A reviewer of these documents, Leopold, notes, “Although an occasional phrase, torn from context, would later be embarrassing, their dispatches outlined clearly what could happen.”313 Varg’s take: “In the seven months preceding the termination of the war the most perceptive overall analysis of the dilemma confronting the United States was that provided by John Davies. In a lengthy dispatch from Moscow on April 15 he refrained from recommending a future course. Given the situation as he saw it, there was, indeed, no course to recommend.”314 I present here my own, corroborating analysis.

During the war, Davies worked for General Stilwell. Stilwell was not enamored of Chiang Kai-shek.315 He did not think the future with Chiang held much hope for the United States’ interests in the region. Stilwell was receptive to Davies’ reports. Stilwell’s position was that supporting Chiang no longer made sense; he felt that Chiang was manipulating the United States and that the United States was not receiving return on its investment.316 Stilwell agreed with the China Hands that China and Chiang were not the same thing, that US policy for China should not simply be to support Chiang.317 This was not politically acceptable in Washington D.C. A new face was needed.

314 Varg, 179.
316 Ibid, 69.
317 Kahn, 130.
The Dixie Mission refers to the visits of US diplomats and military to the Chinese Communist stronghold of Yenan, from July of 1944 to March of 1947. It was called the Dixie Mission because it was communication with "rebel" territory.\textsuperscript{318} It was first suggested by Davies in a memo in January of 1944 and it had the support of Stilwell and gained approval from Roosevelt. The first visit took place in July of 1944. In October of 1944, at the urging of Chiang,\textsuperscript{319} Roosevelt fired Stilwell and in November appointed Hurley Ambassador to China. Hurley would lead the Dixie Mission and meet with Mao as well as Chiang. His steps and missteps in China were as convoluted as they were ineffective. He was out of his range. Upon arriving in Yenan, his aircraft dropping unexpectedly from the sky, he stood in the doorway of the plane, every inch the modern major general, and greeted the staring Communists with a Chocktaw war whoop.\textsuperscript{320} Hurley was, unsurprisingly, unable to broker a deal between the Communists and the Nationalists and, unsurprisingly, he ended up siding with the Nationalists. Mao felt that he had been betrayed. Any hope of conciliation was gone.

I will present at length dispatches from the relevant years so as to demonstrate that Davies was presenting the situation in China accurately and giving the US a considerable amount of time in which to act. He does not insist on US action, he recommends certain action. I submit that these are not the dispatches of a man acting against US interest and I think a fair reading will convince the reader likewise. I have chosen from the record those dispatches that are relevant to Hurley’s charges and I present them in this form in contrast to Liang’s method. I feel there is no stronger

\textsuperscript{318} Davies, 318.
\textsuperscript{319} Kahn, 129.
\textsuperscript{320} Rand, page 251.
argument for my case. This not raw text, it is a very few of the dispatches presented to give a picture of Davies’ actual wartimes activities.

**Dispatches of 1942** 321: On July 5, 1942 Davies met with both Communist and Nationalist officials. He observed that relations “would appear to have deteriorated... [there exists] a general picture of mutual distrust and antipathy.” “Central Government military authorities are conserving their strength out of domestic political consideration and leaving offensive action against the Japanese primarily to the United States and the British Empire.”

On July 10, 1942 Davies wrote: “Informants were critical of the extravagant praise in the American press of Chinese resistance... Chinese are amused by American eulogies of China’s military exploits, they stated. They asked if Americans who really mattered in the United States realized that true state of affairs in China.

On July 31, 1942 Davies wrote in appraisal of the China-India-Burma Theater: “The objectives of the Chinese Government are (a) to insure its own perpetuation and domestic supremacy and (b) to come to the peace table as militarily powerful as possible. The policy of the Chinese Government is therefore to conserve rather than to expend its military strength, counting on American air and sea power and possibly the Russian Army and Air Force to defeat the Japanese.”

On August 12, 1942 the Ambassador to China (Gauss) wrote to the Secretary of State (Hull): “Mr. Davies asserts that it is China’s policy to conserve rather than to expand Chinese military strength, China’s confidence being placed in American sea and air power – and perhaps Russian military and air strength - to defeat the Japanese.”

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321 All dispatches are taken from *Foreign Relations of United States* in the years noted.
In summary, 1942 was a year in which Davies noted the strength of the Communists, the relative weakness of the Nationalists, and the view of the United States that the reverse was true.

**Dispatches of 1943:** On March 9, 1943 Davies wrote to Gauss regarding the mission of Stilwell, his superior. “A fundamental difficulty which faces General Stilwell is that China’s policy in the prosecution of this war is not always parallel to ours... China’s policy, now that we are fighting the Japanese, is to remain technically in the war so as to be able to sit at the peace table as a ‘fighting’ ally... the Chinese Army is not an army in the sense that we use the word army. Rather it is an agglomerate of feudalistic military forces... Except for the Communist divisions and the small body of troops at Ramgarh, the morale of the Chinese Army is low... the intemperate eulogies of the Chinese Army which appear in the American press and over the American air (largely inspired by the Chinese pressure groups in the United States and uninformed American sinophiles) only play into the hands of the Chinese factions wishing to obtain lend-lease equipment without restrictions as to its use (or non-use).”

On June 24, 1943 Davies, now in Washington, wrote a lengthy memo regarding the situation in China as he saw it. “The conclusion is reached that, if civil war occurs, the Soviet Union will probably go to the support of the Communists and the United States will find itself backing the Central Government and so set against Russia... the Chinese Communists have come to control more territory than they ever have... As the Chinese Communists moved away from world revolution to nationalism they also moved in the direction of more moderate internal political and economic policy... No American
civil official has visited the Chinese Communist area and no American military observer has traveled in it since 1938."

On October 26, 1943 the Charge in India (George Merrell) enclosed a memo from Davies to Hull regarding geopolitics: "Japan should not be crushed, but should be used as a counter against Russia and China."

In summary, 1943 was a year in which Davies noted the increasing strength of the Communists, the decreasing strength of the Nationalists, and the US need to plan around the actualities and not on US wishes.

**Dispatches of 1944**[^322]: On January 15, 1944 Davies wrote again: "Only one official American observer has ever visited the Chinese ‘Communist’ area. That was six years ago... This much, however, seems clear. In Communist China there is... the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese regime in China... The Chinese Communists have repeatedly indicated that they would welcome American observers... We need to dispatch immediately, while it is still welcome."

On November 7, 1944 Hurley wrote: "Today I am going into territory held by Communist troops. I have an invitation to confer with the political leaders of the so-called Communist Party... The Generalissimo now desires to establish closer relations with Russia.

On that same day (11/7/44) Davies wrote: "The Communists have never received much more than advice and money from the Russians. And since 1937 the Soviet Union has scrupulously withheld all aid from the Chinese Communists. Russian materiel has

[^322]: It should be noted that, in his own collection of dispatches, Service recalls that: "After Stilwell’s recall [October 1944], I really felt that we were headed down the wrong track. Both Davies and I felt we were making a serious mistake in tying ourselves to the Kuomintang and giving in to Chiang." [Service, 329]

[^323]: The emphasis here is mine, the word is, of course, Hurley's.
gone to Chiang and been used exclusively by him – in part to blockade the Communists… the United States is the greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese Communists… we are the greatest fear of the Communists because the more aid we give Chiang exclusively the greater the likelihood of his precipitating a civil war and the more protracted and costly will be the Communist unification of China. So the Chinese Communists watch us with mixed feelings. If we continue to reject them and support an unreconstructed Chiang, they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be friends.”

In a separate dispatch, same day (11/7/44), Davies wrote: “The Chinese Communists are backsliders… Yenan is no Marxist New Jerusalem. The saints and prophets of Chinese Communism… lust after the gods of class compromise and party coalition… the Chinese communist leaders are realistic enough to recognize that they have now deviated so far to the right that they will return to the revolution only if driven to it by overwhelming pressure from domestic and foreign forces of reaction. There are several reasons for the moderation of the Communists: 1. They are Chinese… 2. They are realists… 3. They are nationalists…. The Communists are the toughest, best organized and disciplined group in China.

In a separate dispatch of the same day titled “Will The Communists Take Over China?” Davies wrote: “The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is mass support, mass participation…. Chiang’s feudal China can not long coexist alongside a modern dynamic popular government in North China. The Communists are in China to stay. And China’s destiny is not Chiang’s but theirs.”
On November 15, 1944 Davies wrote: “We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang’s Government and give him nominal support. But we must be realistic…. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime…. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point of view the most desirable possible solution.”

On November 17, 1944 Roosevelt wrote to Hurley, offering him the recently vacated ambassadorship: “If agreeable, would like to appoint you as Ambassador to China. Your intimate knowledge of the situation there, both from the military and diplomatic standpoints, I feel eminently qualifies you for this important post during the present critical times.”

On that same day (11/7/44) Hurley accepted: “I am grateful to you for your offer to appoint me Ambassador to China. I accept the appointment with a full realization of its significance in the present critical situation.”

In summary, 1944 was a year in which Davies accurately predicted the eventual Communist takeover and the appointment of Hurley augured the US commitment to the Nationalists.

Dispatches of 1945: On February 28, 1945 Davies sent a dispatch to the new (as of December 1, 1944) Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius. Davies wrote: “I was told by

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324 It should be noted that there is no specific policy directive in the dispatch.
325 It should be noted that Hurley does not request a specific policy directive.
326 It should be noted that Davies sent this dispatch from Tehran, having been removed from China, by Hurley, on January 9, 1945.
Dr. Chen Hanseng, one of China’s outstanding intellectuals who is now working for the British Ministry of Information... that the present leaders of the Communist Party, conspicuously Mao, who has never been out of China, were without strong Russian ties. The Chinese Communist military commanders, Dr. Chen observed, were also without close Russian affiliates and were loyal to Mao... [and that] the Chinese Communist Party was dominated by a group, led by Mao, with a non-Russian orientation."

On June 19, 1945 Hurley wrote to Stettinius:

"There is no question that relations between the Chinese National Government and the Communists are unsatisfactory, or that there have been recent clashes. That, however, is nothing new... There are also rumors afloat here that we do not credit to the effect that John Davies is responsible for news items in Moscow papers that appear to be adverse to the Chinese Government."

On November 26, 1945 Hurley cabled Truman his resignation.

IV) Domestic Politics

In resigning his post Hurley’s charge was that diplomats in the State Department, Davies in particular, were guilty of not supporting the policy of the United States in China:

"I owe it to you as well as to the country to point out the reasons for the failure of the American foreign policy in reaching the objectives for which we said we were fighting the war... It is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party... Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States."

327 Stettinius remained Secretary of State following Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945.
These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to
decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National
Army.... I requested the relief of the career men... there is a third world
war in the making... at the same time a considerable section of our State
Department is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as
specifically in China. The Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our
foreign policy in Washington during the late war is chargeable to the
weakness of our Foreign Service.”

Hurley stated that the policy was simple: support Chiang Kai-shek first and
foremost. This is not correct and its incorrectness vitiates all subsequent charges. To be
plain: I am not saying that the situation was black and white. I am saying that Hurley
was incorrect to present the situation as black and white. The US needed to support
Chiang to fight the Japanese. For the same reason the US needed to support the
Communists. It was not a case of either the Nationalists or the Communists, as Hurley
had it. There were a host of factors impacting US-China policy. Hurley held that the
only thing that mattered was supporting Chiang.

The China White Paper was published by the Department of State in August of
1949 as an apologia, an explanation, of official American action towards China during
and after the war. “It has been urged,” wrote Dean Acheson,329 “that relatively small
amounts of additional aid – military and economic – to the National Government would
have enabled it to destroy communism in China. The most trustworthy military,
economic, and political information available to our Government does not bear out this
view.”330 The China White Paper was produced in the hope that the record would speak

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329 Davies writes, “[in explaining, Acheson was] during the fury of the China Lobby... [by] public[ly]
explaining that the wise American policy toward China was to remain aloof and permit the natural force of
Chinese nationalism to combat Soviet attempts to dominate China.” [John Paton Davies, “American and
East Asia.” 391].

330 Ibid, xv.
for itself. Acheson transmitted the document to Truman. "I instructed those charged with the compilation of this document to present a record which would reveal the salient facts which determined our policy toward China during this period and which reflect the execution of that policy. This is a frank record of an extremely complicated and most unhappy period." "The record should be read in the light of conditions prevailing when the events occurred... In this period, military considerations were understandably predominant over all others." "It was precisely here that two of the fundamental principles of United States policy in regard to China – noninterference in its internal affairs and support of its unity and territorial integrity – came into conflict and that one of them also conflicted with the basic interests of Allies in the war against Japan." "It was evident to us that only a rejuvenated and progressive Chinese Government which could recapture the enthusiastic loyalty of the people could and would wage an effective war against Japan." The US was fighting the Japanese in Asia. This, not Chiang's predominance, seems to be chief amongst policy concerns.

On March 15, 1941, four days after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, President Roosevelt made an address in which he said: "China, through the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, asks our help." What Roosevelt did not say was that China and the Generalissimo were the same thing. On August 23, 1944 Roosevelt cabled Chiang: "I do

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331 United States Department of State, Introduction 6.
332 It should be noted: "[Hurley] could not view with equanimity proposals advocating this kind of flexibility." [Buhite, 183].
333 Ibid, iii.
334 Ibid, iv.
335 Ibid, vi. It should be noted that this is echoed in Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969), 135.
337 It should be noted that, on page 143 of FRUS Hearings, Hurley is asked "If you had succeeded in your unification program, you would have been willing to arm the Communists, then, would you not?" Hurley: "Oh, yes." "If they were going to fight with you?" "Oh yes, yes." "Yes."
not think that forces to come under General Stilwell’s command should be limited except by their availability to defend China and fight the Japanese.”^339 In December 1944 Hurley commented: “[The] facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party in China is not an agent of the Soviet Government.”^340

The policy of the United States was, as Acheson noted, complicated. The primary concern was defeat of the Japanese.^341 It was not to support Chiang. Even Hurley, at one time, acceded to this. “According to General Hurley’s report to the Department of State his instructions from the White House dated August 18, 1944 were (1) to serve as personal representative of the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; (2) to promote harmonious relations between Chiang and General Joseph Stilwell…. A few months later, after his appointment as Ambassador, General Hurley outlined his understanding of his mission and of United States policy in China in the following terms: “(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government, (2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic… (5) to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.”^342 The contrast is clear: the White House wanted smooth relations with Chiang while Hurley wanted US support of Chiang. Relating well and supporting one faction over all others are not the same thing.

After his resignation as ambassador Hurley’s line was that US policy had always been to support Chiang above all other concerns. His journey deeper into domestic US politics would be guided by this contention. Had the US simply done that – and the US

^340 Ibid, 73.
^341 This was echoed by Secretary of State Byrnes on page 146 of FRUS Hearings: “During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan.” Again on page 175: “The objective was to have them get together, and arm them to fight the Japanese. That is the policy of the United States.”
^342 Ibid, 71.
was prevented from doing that by the perfidious Davies and his cohorts – China never would have been “lost.” What I argue here is not that Hurley set out initially to charge Davies and others with treason so as to further his own domestic political agenda. Rather Hurley came to charge Davies and others with treason so as to further his own domestic political agenda. His fantasti view of China gained currency in domestic political discourse, this currency reinforced that very view, and this view came to fuel his domestic political engagement.

But whence did Hurley’s antipathy towards Davies and company stem? There were reasons rooted in both personality and ideology. Hurley’s frustration with Davies and company came from many sources. One was his own frustration at the failure of his mission, which he considered a very personal matter. He felt he had been “undercut” by the China Hands at various times.343 He was not informed of a proposed operation with the OSS and the Chinese Communists.344 He was ideologically and politically aligned with the China crowd. There was also a chance airport encounter with OSS chief Donovan. Donovan mentioned that Service was being investigated for Soviet espionage in the Amerasia Case. Service was cleared of that weighty charge, but “for Hurley a tip from ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan himself was as good as gospel, especially since it confirmed his own negative feelings,” Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh suggest. “Hurley leaped to the conclusion that his enemies in the diplomatic corps were not only plotting against him personally, but also undermining America’s China policy on direct orders from Moscow.”345

343 FRUS Hearings, 74.
This brings us back to the Senate hearings in December of 1945, with which we opened this chapter. The secret documents demanded by Hurley were produced by Secretary Byrnes in testimony. They did not contain explosive charges. Others came to the support of Davies and the China Hands. Atcheson cabled from Tokyo on December 6, 1945: “Mr. Hurley’s continuous assaults together with the falsity and apparent vindictiveness of his statements seem at this distance to place us in a position where a statement of some kind in refutation appears increasingly unavoidable... Mr. Hurley’s statement that any officer of the Foreign Service in China sought the downfall of the Chinese Government is completely untrue.” On December 8, 1945 Atcheson cabled again: “General Hurley began his assignment in Chungking with a strong prejudice against the Dept and the Foreign Service and especially officers who had served with [Stilwell]... [it was] a fixed idea with him that there were officers in the Foreign Service and American military officers who were in opposition to him.... I regard his attacks upon those officers... as based in the minimum on long standing prejudice, and as incomprehensible for any reasonable purpose.” John Service testified on December 8, 1945: “I am at a loss to understand his basis for the charges he has made against me. It seems obvious that he has not made a careful reading of my report and that he is not familiar with the background of my duties.” Atcheson, December 9, 1945: “Based upon the information which has thus far been presented to me, there is nothing in them to support the charge.” And on March 1, 1946 Green H. Hackworth, Legal Advisor submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State that

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346 *FRUS Report*, 150.
347 *FRUS 1945*, 728.
348 Ibid, 733-734.
349 Ibid, 738.
350 Ibid, 739.
concluded: "I have found nothing that leads me to feel that the charges were warranted."\textsuperscript{351} Texas Democrat Tom Connally gloated, "Pat’s fiasco did not confer any credit upon him. All we had to do was let him rave."\textsuperscript{352}

Hurley was wrong. His “secret documents” were not secret and proved nothing, or were simply non-existent. But Hurley would, in fact, continue to mention “secret documents” which supposedly supported his allegations.\textsuperscript{353} His hagiographer would charge that because Hurley refrained from revealing the secrets contained therein, Hurley was unfairly discredited.\textsuperscript{354} A friend told Hurley after his Senate testimony, “If you don’t bring out the documents you’re talking about, you’ll be crucified.”\textsuperscript{355} But domestic politics has its own logic and force. The false charges only gained currency. Hurley would refer to the China White Paper as an exercise to “disguise my true position in its effort to whitewash those subversives in the State Department who are responsible for the Communist conquest of China.”\textsuperscript{356} Against all the lack of evidence, Hurley and his adherents gained, not lost, authority in domestic politics. The \textit{Tulsa Tribune}, among others, touted Hurley for president.\textsuperscript{357}

Hurley was a true believer. While in Chungking he was almost alone in believing that his mission was successful. Hurley suggested to the United Press Bureau Chief in April of 1945, “Wouldn’t it be a great thing for me to get the Nobel Prize for settling the Civil War.”\textsuperscript{358} Such dissonance would not dissipate. “[Hurleys’s] complaints were vocal

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid, 744.  
\textsuperscript{352} Chern, 642.  
\textsuperscript{353} Lohbeck, 458.  
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid, 448.  
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid, 474.  
\textsuperscript{356} Buhite, 288.  
\textsuperscript{358} Varg, 179.
but unclear. They began with charges that Foreign Service Officers in China had been undercutting him and United States policy in China and ended with an attack on the Department generally, and presumably the Secretary, for not making its policy clear to the public. Throughout his charges ran the demagogic note of the impending era of the Red Scare, that those who differed with him were 'soft on communism.'\textsuperscript{359}

When General Hurley returned from China to denounce Davies and the China Hands, he found a ready ally in Senator William Knowland of California. At a fete thrown by Nationalist China's ambassador after the 1952 election, when the Republicans took over the Congress and the White House, Senators Knowland, McCarran, McCarthy, and other allies of the Nationalists raised glasses in a triumphal if unrealistic toast, "Back to the mainland."\textsuperscript{360}

A right-wing Republican, William Knowland had a deep hunger for power developed by the years of Democratic control since the onset of the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{361} Knowland was one who took the lead in the Senate for the China Lobby, securing $75 million in assistance for Chiang and other allies in Asia, as well as garnering a significant amount of the spotlight.\textsuperscript{362} On the issue of aid to Europe he would ask rhetorically, "Are we to take the position that human freedom is less worth supporting in Asia than it is in Europe?"\textsuperscript{363} Knowland said, "I will say... that I have no doubt that all the Communist

\textsuperscript{359} Acheson, 133.
\textsuperscript{360} Richard Fried, \textit{Nightmare In Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 148. [It should be noted that this story is corroborated in W.A. Swanberg, \textit{Luce and His Empire} (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 352]
\textsuperscript{361} It should be noted that domestic pressure alone was not sufficient to compel the policy towards China, but, in light of the mobilization towards the Cold War in Europe, domestic politics played a decisive role in the creation of China policy. (Christensen. page 64 -- 66.)
\textsuperscript{362} Christensen. page 95.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid. page 191.
forces throughout the world are tied together in a master plan.” The Senator also found time in his busy schedule, as we have seen, to denounce the anti-zaibatsu work of one Eleanor Hadley of SCAP. The resort to anti-communist themes was a basic political tactic of conservative congressmen during the postwar years. In this sense a Senator such as Knowland was a McCarthyite before the Wisconsin Senator appeared and remained so well after his censure and death.

The upside to the actions of one such as Knowland was that it strengthened his hand politically. One Foreign Service Officer in the 1950’s captured the downside in explaining why he would not put controversial assessments to paper. “What if I wrote a report and somebody like Senator Knowland saw it?” The primary mission of the Foreign Service had been effectively aborted by the China Lobby and its allies.

The Republican Party found common cause with the China Lobby. General Hurley’s fingering of Davies as the chief culprit in the loss of China was proof of how the Democrats had allowed themselves to be duped by the Reds in the Foreign Service and elsewhere. Alfred Kohlberg (to be discussed in the next chapter) thanked Hurley for doing his part “to check the slimy traitors who are playing the game of our enemies.” This despite the fact that not a single China Hand was ever found to have been disloyal.

The China Lobby was aided by General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur became more, not less, political with the outbreak of the Korean War. He made thinly veiled

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365 Hadley, “similarities in the Davies case [to my own].” Phone interview 2/9/06.
367 Kahn. page 70.
368 Rand. page 252.
369 Buhite, 286.
370 Ibid. page 311. It should be noted that the Venona cables support this [John Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 340-370]
attacks on President Truman and the Democrats. This, coupled with the attacks from
Senator McCarthy, almost certainly contributed to the defeat of many of Truman’s fellow
Democrats in the interim election of 1950.\textsuperscript{371} In April of 1951 Truman fired MacArthur
over MacArthur making public his differences on the question of invading China and
possibly starting World War III with the Communist nations of the world. There was talk
in Washington of impeaching President Truman.\textsuperscript{372}

While Hurley never actually joined the McCarthy camp in the strict sense, he did
his part in setting the national mood. Through his support of the Republican right and
through his own rhetoric developed in his political campaigns of 1946, 1948, and 1952, at
least indirectly, he aided the senator’s cause. Moreover, he “did not believe that we
should be fighting anyone who is fighting communism.”\textsuperscript{373} Republican politicians found
their hand strengthened by emphasis on the China issue and the issue of anti-communism
broadly construed.\textsuperscript{374} For example, McCarthy used the “agrarian reformers” charge
against Davies without further case.\textsuperscript{375} McCarthy was merely the most tactically brilliant
expositor of the link between China policy and the exigencies of domestic politics.\textsuperscript{376}
Senator McCarthy was given an arena of confusion in which to operate.\textsuperscript{377}

In February 1950 Senator McCarthy made his infamous speech in Wheeling,
West Virginia in which he alleged that 205 known Communists worked in the
Department of State. He also claimed that John Service had stated that “the only hope of

\textsuperscript{371} Christensen. page 180.
\textsuperscript{372} Purifoy. page 281.
\textsuperscript{373} Buhite, 285.
\textsuperscript{374} Bachrach. page 151.
\textsuperscript{376} Halberstam. page 131.
\textsuperscript{377} Fetzer, 19.
Asia [was] Communism.”McCarthy’s career would skyrocket at this point. The impact made by McCarthy’s tactics would lead congressional conservatives to support and even emulate him. What McCarthy offered was a new method, but one that was not all that new. With it conservatives could further not only anti-communism but domestic issues as well. The only “proof” ever needed for the gambit were such tidbits as the fact that during the Second World War the China Hands had used “Harvard” as their radio codeword for Communists. McCarthy would seize upon such “evidence” to make charges. The election of 1950, in which Republicans picked up five seats in the Senate and twenty-five in the House of Representatives, was generally conceded to be a McCarthyite victory. On July 9, 1952 Hurley addressed the Republican National Convention after McCarthy was introduced to a tumultuous reception.

McCarthy accused the Eisenhower administration of “batting zero” because Davies had not yet been fired. McCarthy used the fact that Davies was still in the State Department in his case against Eisenhower. McCarthy said, “We still have John Paton Davies on the payroll after eleven months of the Eisenhower Administration... John Paton Davies [is]... part and parcel of the old Acheson-Lattimore-Vincent-White-Hiss group who did so much toward delivering our Chinese friends into Communist hands.”

Davies was fired two years into Dulles’ term as Secretary of State, in 1954, after Dulles

378 Kahn. page 212.
379 Theoharis. page 18.
380 Kahn. page 64.
381 Purifoy. page 253.
384 Ibid, page 257.
had taken a searing from McCarthy on nationwide television.\textsuperscript{386} The firing came two days after the election, a concession to the perceived power of McCarthy.\textsuperscript{387}

Before his firing, Davies would write from Moscow (where he had been stationed after China), “Our foreign relations are in a fantastic state – wishful thinking, vacillation, secret skeletons, and pervasive confusion.”\textsuperscript{388} He would write about the time, “American foreign policy [was] sleepwalking.”\textsuperscript{389} George Ball would call the economic sanctions against China to come, “romantic delusion.”\textsuperscript{390} In an interview in 1999, Davies himself offered some thoughts on the domestic politics of the period: “I think [McCarthy was important in shaping American attitudes] only in a rather negative sense. That is to say, he raised doubts in everyone’s minds... he fed the Republican ambitions to bring down Truman through charges that he lost China, that his administration lost China, which is a rather fanciful thought.... It was a very effective issue.... Truman was on the spot as being the guy who lost China [Laughs] or his Administration had done him in.”\textsuperscript{391} “And as accepted policy, like a rut in a country road, is easier to bump along in than break out of, the American government continued to sustain Chiang on into the post-surrender period.\textsuperscript{392}

The China Hands had not lost China. They had not had it in their power to lose it or keep it.\textsuperscript{393} Hurley’s domestic politics were profoundly aided by the charge that those who had predicted the fall of China had in fact aided the fall of China, had in fact “lost

\textsuperscript{386} Ewald, 382.
\textsuperscript{387} Robert Newman, Owen Lattimore And The "Loss" Of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 480.
\textsuperscript{388} Ibid. page 183.
\textsuperscript{391} National Security Archive Interview.
\textsuperscript{392} John Paton Davies, “American and East Asia,” 388.
\textsuperscript{393} Kahn. page 2.
China.” “China was ours, and it was something to lose,” wrote the late David Halberstam. “It was an assumption which was to haunt foreign policy makers for years to come.”

V) Davies After China

Even after his expulsion from China, Davies continued to make his views known. In a 1947 dispatch to Japan he warned against encroaching communist influence. In a 1949 memo, he wrote “We should not consider US government financial assistance to Chinese Communist projects... and should discourage the enlistment of private American capital for such projects.” "The United States conducts its recognition policy in its own interest as it sees it. Our continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s government did not indicate devotion to it or any determination to impose it in authority over the mainland. Those in the United States who speak up vehemently for him are in a distinct minority.”

Davies requested transfer to Moscow after China. Here he was influential with George Kennan, famed for his authorship of the containment strategy in the Long Telegram and later the X-Article. This would prove the foundation of US strategy in the Cold War. Kennan deemed Davies “a rock of strength.” Davies was of enormous importance to Kennan in articulating postwar thinking, though it should not be inferred that Davies can be considered an “author” of the Long Telegram or the X-Article. Suffice it to say, however, that Davies’ thinking and assistance was as vital in Moscow as

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394 Halberstam, page 131.
395 FRUS 1949, 161.
396 FRUS 1951, 1481.
398 Kahn, 151.
it had been in China. And it was decidedly anti-communist. Evidence of this can be found in both the X article and the Long Telegram that preceded it.

In the Long Telegram the language resonates with Davies’ dispatches from China during the war. “We must study [Soviet Communism] with the same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it... we must see that our public is educated... I am convinced that there would be far less hysteri[a]... in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people... the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem... is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”

It is there in the X Article too: “[Communism] is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points... to avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.”

Joe Alsop, after initially persecuting Davies, testified to one of the State Department loyalty boards that investigated Davies, “As I thus reviewed the past, it struck me we would be much wiser to start loyalty investigations of the politicians who are now working all out to destroy the last vestiges of decency and fair play in our public life, than to waste time picking over the bygone views of such men as John Davies.”

The only thing anybody on the loyalty board wanted to ask about was the columnist’s

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399 Halberstam, 386.
400 Kenan, The Long Telegram, 10.
401 Kenan, X Article, 6 and 9.
“How We Lost China” article from four years earlier. Davies was under suspicion for a casual meeting with CIA officers in which he suggested recruiting Chinese agents. Owen Lattimore, who we will meet shortly, sent a pair of shoes to China via Davies. During the McCarthy days, this was seen as a “bribe.” Davies was grilled by the McCarran Commission, which pushed the Justice Department to indict him for perjury. It did not do so.

In July of 1951 the Department of State suspended Davies pending a loyalty investigation. By the end of the month it announced that he had been cleared. In January of 1953 Davies was again suspended. He was cleared and in March of 1954 Dulles refused to suspend Davies again. In November of 1954, finally succumbing to political pressure, Dulles announced that the rules governing investigations had been changed; Davies was suspended pending investigation not for loyalty, but for reliability and trustworthiness. At this time, Dulles announced that the recommendation was that Davies be terminated. “Mr. Davies’ lack of judgment, discretion, and reliability raises a reasonable doubt that his continued employment in the Foreign Service of the United States is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” In an age in which McCarthy was pillorying General George Marshall and then Eisenhower for treason, Davies knew he was lost. He refused, on principle, to resign. He was fired.

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403 Ybarra, 737.
404 Fetzer, 20.
405 Lattimore, 166.
406 Fried, 148.
407 State Department Bulletin 1951, 150.
408 Ibid, 278.
409 State Department Bulletin 1953, 121.
410 State Department Bulletin 1954, 528.
411 Ibid, 752.
412 Kahn, 244 – 246.
Vindication would be decades in coming, but it came. In January of 1973, in the Benjamin Franklin Room, on the eighth floor of the Department of State, lunch was served. The luncheon was sponsored by the State Department to recognize officially the career of John Paton Davies. The last combat troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam and President Nixon had returned from China. The public damning of Davies would be answered, decades after the fact, by a single, internal meal. President Nixon was not there, Henry Kissinger was not there, Secretary of State Willliam Rogers was not there, but the undersecretary for political affairs, Alexis Johnson, was there, though he did not speak. No member of the Senate came to the lunch, but shortly after it was over Senator Buckley, conservative from New York, wrote to the State Department to complain about the State Department having made its premises available for the affair.

Also not present was one John Paton Davies. When that day in 1973 arrived he was across the Atlantic, in Malaga, writing a book. Asked about the occasion, the man who had so honorably served and been treated so dishonorably was laconic. He said, “Washington would have been a long way to go for lunch.”

413 Kahn, 298-300.
I) Introduction

In the wake of the Second World War, Owen Lattimore was one of the most influential American scholars on the subject of China and Central Asia. He was one of the original “China Hands,” a man who had spent a considerable portion of his life in Asia, who had mastered obscure Asian languages, and who enjoyed great intellectual authority.\(^{414}\) He was both persona non grata in the Soviet Union and an advocate for the recognition of Mao’s government in China.\(^{415}\) Lattimore arrived at his conclusions by way of a lengthy resume that traversed the globe.\(^{416}\)

Joseph McCarthy was not an unintelligent man. Museum exhibits in McCarthy’s hometown of Appleton, Wisconsin attest to his remarkable feats of finishing grades nine through twelve in one academic year and working ten-hour shifts at night while maintaining a full course load at Marquette University in nearby Milwaukee.\(^{417}\) Never much of a reader, however, he relied on a prodigious memory that allowed him to recall names and facts for thousands of people photographed into his consciousness.\(^{418}\) His education was first directed toward a career as an engineer and then he turned to the law.


His only experience abroad came as a Marine during WWII\(^{419}\); he had no academic or personal knowledge of Asia.\(^{420}\)

These two men, one decidedly learned about China and Central Asia and the other decidedly not, would come to clash over the issue of the rise of Communism in China. They would first meet under the authority of the Tydings Commission, and later on under the authority of the McCarran Commission. In the exchanges between Joseph McCarthy and Owen Lattimore a struggle can be witnessed between competing views of the situation in post-WWII Asia \textit{vis a vis} the US. One is nuanced and informed – not to say unimpeachable in content – and the other seeks to overlay onto China a simplistic problem set, derived more from the exigencies of domestic politics in the United States than from the realities in China. Currency in American discourse would accrue to McCarthy’s contributions while Lattimore’s contributions would be de-privileged. The story of Lattimore and McCarthy is the story of an imagined view of the other, derived from and facilitated by the exigencies of domestic politics, gaining authority. It cemented the view of an international, monolithic Communist force.

\section*{II) Terms and People}

This chapter involves a few possibly unfamiliar terms and persons. In the interest of narrative flow I would like to provide some exposition before storytelling.

Owen Lattimore was born in the United States in 1900 to a father who taught languages (English, French, Greek, and Latin) in high school. In 1901 Lattimore’s father

\footnote{A politician who “gilds the lily” regarding his military career can arguably lose the presidency of the United States on this very point (see Kerry, John F). It is instructive to consider some of the gross distortions McCarthy employed when discussing his own service (“ten pounds of shrapnel in my leg”).}

took a job with the Qing Dynasty which was eager to train young Chinese in Western languages so as to send them to foreign colleges for technical training. The family moved to Shanghai.\textsuperscript{421} Lattimore was taught at home until 1912 when he was sent to England where his chief academic concern was doing well enough to win a scholarship to Oxford. He failed in this due to his lack of preparation in Western classical languages. He returned to China at the age of nineteen to seek employment.\textsuperscript{422} He would remain in China for roughly the next decade, working in business, learning Asian languages, writing, and traveling widely. He did not return to the United States until 1928. He then worked at the Institute of Pacific Relations, editing the organization’s publication, \textit{Pacific Affairs}, and then taught at Johns Hopkins. When the United States entered WWII, Lattimore served as FDR’s special envoy to Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{423} After the war he worked in Central Asia on behalf of the US government, but he was never actually in the State Department.\textsuperscript{424} It should be noted that Lattimore never attended college and had no Ph.D. or graduate work; also, he had spent his childhood and young adulthood abroad.\textsuperscript{425} One consequence of such a life was that Lattimore was superbly qualified to comment on events in China, but not prepared to deal with the verities of American domestic political life.

Joseph McCarthy is a familiar figure and little that I can present here will shed further light on him. One thing to keep in mind, however, is that anti-communism was less a lifelong, ideological crusade for McCarthy than it was a stance he adopted because it was politically expedient for him to do so. He grabbed the reins of a political

\textsuperscript{421} Newman, 3.
\textsuperscript{422} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{423} Hooper, 23.
\textsuperscript{424} Owen Lattimore, \textit{Ordeal By Slander} (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 5.
\textsuperscript{425} Newman, 16.
bandwagon gathering speed. In February of 1950 McCarthy was an obscure first-term Republican senator. His chances for reelection did not look bright. On February 9, 1950 he was to give a speech to the Ohio County Republican Women's Club in Wheeling, West Virginia on either a) housing or b) Communism. On the ride in from the airport he asked his welcomer which he should give; McCarthy went with the recommendation. That night he would charge that there were 205 card-carrying members of the Communist Party working in the State Department. He became an overnight sensation. What made the speech distinctive was that McCarthy had made the leap from speculation to fantasy: others had charged “treason,” but now he was using a fictional list to say “traitors.” And he was providing a hard number, 205, though this would change. It was a shift from insinuation to out-and-out accusation. Later McCarthy would broaden his charges to include ad hominem attacks: certain people might not actually be Communists but their sympathies lay in that direction, evidence of treason being unnecessary when dealing with a traitor. What is important to note here is that McCarthy’s ends were political, his charges without merit, and suffused with a fundamental misinformation of the issues at hand.

428 Ewald, 20.
429 David M. Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy* (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 109. [The number 205 came from a loyalty screening test of federal employees. Damaging information had been found in 284 cases; damaging information being defined as concerns such as alcoholism and sexual deviation as well as Communism. 79 were discharged outright, leaving 205. McCarthy concocted the notion that these 205 were all Communists. This math is also used by the Tydings Commission in the Tydings Report, 13] The next day, at a speech in Salt Lake City, the number of Communists would be 57 – same as the famous Heinz catsup.
The Tydings Commission was formed in February 1950 to investigate the charges McCarthy was making at Wheeling, on the Senate floor, and elsewhere. It was held because Millard Tydings (D - MD) and other Democratic politicians were eager to rebut McCarthy’s charges and squash the idea that they were not sufficiently anti-communist. The Republican Senators, while generally not willing to support McCarthy’s allegations, were not about to let the anti-communism issue be buried prematurely by the opposition. The Democrats held control of the Senate at this time, but the midterm elections were in nine months. Tydings himself was up for re-election. The Committee was not tasked with investigating the IPR itself, but the organization was implicated when McCarthy accused Lattimore of being “the top Russian espionage agent in the United States.”

On a strict party vote, the Tydings Commission cleared Lattimore of McCarthy’s charges, and strongly condemned McCarthy for “fraud and hoax” and “stooping to a new low in cavalier disregard of the facts.” This was mere weeks after the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The session was punctuated by Senator Kenneth Wherry (R - Nebraska) slugging committee counsel Edward Morgan. Morgan recalls the Republicans had passed the word before the report that “we’ll keep you on this till November and you won’t have time to campaign.” The McCarthy-allied Chicago Tribune declared Americans now had “a simple criterion for determining Communist influence in this

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431 Oshinsky, 115.
433 Griffith, 77.
434 Herman, 161.
country... it will be evidenced fully by counting up those who support the Tydings Report.”

The McCarran Committee followed the Tydings Committee which had, in truth, ended nothing for Lattimore and the IPR. Why had it ended nothing? Its findings were basically ignored by the McCarran Committee, which was formed after the election. The McCarran Committee was convened in December of 1950, after the midterm elections, and given a broad mandate to investigate “subversive activity” in the United States. It can be likened to a Senate version of the older House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The chairman of the committee was Patrick McCarran (D-Nevada). Nominally a Democrat, McCarran was politically reactionary and his opposition to President Truman was profound. McCarran supported the successful Republican candidate in the Nevada election for US Senator in 1950. McCarran’s sympathies were with McCarthy.

The IPR was the object of the first major investigation initiated by the committee. Lattimore was especially singled out for criticism. The Committee would ultimately charge that Lattimore had perjured himself before them in 1952. Lattimore was not officially cleared until shortly after he was indicted in 1954 by the Justice Department under pressure from McCarran himself. The judge in the case declared the charge “formless”, “[a] sham”, and under a “limitless” definition of “following the Communist

435 Oshinsky, 171.
436 An apt modern comparison would be Zell Miller (D – Georgia) who delivered a primetime address at the 2004 Republican Nation Convention.
437 Newman, 314.
438 Ibid, 417.
440 Griffith, 87.
line and promoting the Communist interests.\textsuperscript{441} Legally, Lattimore was clear. His professional reputation and that of his colleagues, however, would not recover.

**III) Domestic Politics**

Anti-communism was a winner as an issue in the early Cold War in general and in the elections of 1948 - 1952, specifically.\textsuperscript{442} This was true for both the Democratic Party internally, in the primaries, and for the Republican Party in the general elections. It was McCarthy’s party, however, that would derive the greater benefit. Furthermore, Communist triumphs in Asia, more so than in Europe, were crucial in fashioning this paradigm.\textsuperscript{443} Unity, as seen in the attitude towards Europe, was not evident in the attitude towards Asia.

The politicization of the issue of anti-communism was probable but not inevitable. The intrusion of domestic politics into foreign affairs did not begin after the Second World War, of course. On first hearing of McCarthy’s charges, Lattimore recalls, “I thought that attacking the Department of State in an election year was just another of those things.”\textsuperscript{444} The intersection of domestic politics and foreign affairs has always existed in some fashion, but it should be noted that during World War II the process was more pronounced in regards to Asia than it was respecting Europe, where, as William O’Neill writes, “FDR did not make hard choices and no one else could.”\textsuperscript{445} China, in

\textsuperscript{442} Newman, 212.
\textsuperscript{443} Newman, 123.
\textsuperscript{444} Lattimore, 5.
particular had captured the American imagination, and had this not been so there might have been a much better Far East policy.446

Anti-communist sentiment has a long history in the United States,447 but now communism and anti-communism began a contest for influence across the globe. It was seen in the United States as a contest of dire, unimaginable importance, though not by all.448 Some, chiefly George Kennan and other foreign affairs types like the “China Hands” and Owen Lattimore, did not see this “competition” for countries as the right framework with which to view the world; they opposed this monolithic consideration of communism in particular, preferring a view that allowed for the differences that exist between nations to play some part in how nations are viewed. They were arguing for a more complex view of the world than a simple Red/Free binary. There was an ideological conflict in America, distinct from the external conflict between the US and the USSR.449 Lattimore reflects on his testimony: “[The Senator’s] questions were an attempt to treat all problems in China, and all my ideas about them, as if Communism were the only issue.”450 In his Tydings testimony Lattimore explicitly states, “This obsession with a two-way division of the world is a communist dogma… too many Americans… have made the mistake of blindly taking over this Communist dogma.”451 I argue here that this way of looking at the world, this strident anti-communism, which had already begun to show itself in the election of 1946 in which the Republicans took

446 O’Neill, 57.
449 If these terms sound overly familiar it is perhaps, as Professor Herzstein notes, because a historical actor such as Alfred Kohlberg would, according to a relative, “be fairly content with American policies [2006] were he around today.”
450 Lattimore, 90.
451 Tydings, 829.
control of both houses of Congress,\textsuperscript{452} was of great benefit in the elections of 1950 and 1952,\textsuperscript{453} but would also have consequences.

From the first, McCarthy’s charges were constructed to maximize political benefit for himself and the Republican Party. No record exists of the exact speech McCarthy gave in Wheeling (he claimed he did not use a written text that night – and had not, as reported, cited the figure 205, but rather 57 Communists), but on February 20, 1950 he rose in the Senate to read what he purported to be his Wheeling speech into the record. He began by reading first a letter he had sent to President Truman: “We have been able to compile a list of 57 Communists in the State Department. This list is available to you, but you can get a much longer list by ordering Secretary Acheson to give you a list.... Failure on your part will label the Democratic Party of being the bedfellow of international communism.”\textsuperscript{454}

McCarthy went on to say, “I do not feel that the Democratic Party has control of the executive branch of the Government any more.”\textsuperscript{455} He framed the situation this way: “we are now engaged in... a war between two diametrically opposed ideologies.”\textsuperscript{456} Who was on which side? “There [the State Department] the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst.... I do not believe President Truman knows about them. I cannot help but feel that he is merely the prisoner of a bunch of twisted intellectuals who tell him what they want him to know.”\textsuperscript{457}

\textsuperscript{452} Oshinsky, 49.
\textsuperscript{453} Fried, 145.
\textsuperscript{454} Congressional Record of February 20, 1950, 1953.
\textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{456} Ibid, 1954.
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid, 1959.
The penetration was deep: “Case Number 9 is now a speechwriter in the White House... Case 12 started as a corresponding secretary at the White House.”

McCarthy addressed a recent speech by Truman, in which Truman had blasted McCarthy. “The leader of the Democratic Party, before seeing any of the evidence, made a speech in Chicago and said, ‘What the Senator from Wisconsin says is all untrue’... Frankly, I think he will not clean house until he determines it is politically inexpedient for him to do otherwise. I think the President is one of the cleverest politicians the Nation has ever had.” McCarthy concluded, “I feel very strongly that cases Nos. 1, 2, and 81 should not only be discharged but should be immediately prosecuted. However, unless the President will cooperate with us in that, the possibility of a successful prosecution is rather remote, because of the complete iron curtain of secrecy.”

Lattimore had not been mentioned thus far, but by the time the Tydings Commission had convened he had been labeled by McCarthy the “top Soviet spy.” McCarthy stated he would stake his whole case on the charge. Lattimore was called the “principal architect of our far eastern policy.” These were McCarthy’s famous charges against Lattimore. McCarthy would later back away from them, but never disavow them. Why Lattimore? Why was he suddenly thrust into the spotlight such that even before Lattimore had returned to the United States from a State Department mission in Afghanistan to appear before the Tydings Committee, President Truman’s comments

461 The charge is referenced repeatedly by both Newman and Lattimore in their respective books. It is also in Time Magazine, “Charge and Countercharge,” April 10, 1950. (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,856553,00.html?promoid=googlep)  
462 Ibid.  
had been solicited on the topic of Lattimore?  

McCarthy could not prove his charges against the 205/57/etc alleged “traitors” he had accused. His recourse in the bluff was to keep the hand going by upping the ante by serving up “the top Russian agent.”

But how did he settle on Lattimore? Alfred Kohlberg, a subject worthy of updated study, was a businessman with long-time interests in China who had been an ardent foe of the IPR since 1944 when he became convinced that the IPR, including Lattimore, was a tool of Moscow for noting the inadequacies of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces. He met with McCarthy in March of 1950. Kohlberg seems a plausible source, but his meeting with McCarthy occurred two days after McCarthy had already named Lattimore the “top Soviet spy.” It seems likely Kohlberg’s effect was to provide McCarthy with fuel against the IPR and Lattimore, which would sustain charges against both before the McCarran Committee and far into the future.

But why did McCarthy name Lattimore? It is not clear, but one story that made the rounds at the State Department was that McCarthy had been ready to name a particular State Department employee but John Foster Dulles personally asked McCarthy to lay off. McCarthy laughed, replied that he had plenty of names in his files, reached into a drawer and pulled out the Lattimore folder. His methods were that reckless.  

On another occasion, when asked by reporters where he was getting his names, McCarthy

465 Johnson, 166.
466 Forthcoming, from Robert Herzstein of the University of South Carolina. I use here a draft Herzstein presented to the Historical Society at Chapel Hill, NC on June 3, 2006.
467 Kohlberg would also help William F Buckley found the National Review and Robert Welch found the John Birch Society. Buckley would go on to edit a Red Scare apologia The Committee and its Critics: A Calm Review of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
468 Newman, 215. [N.B. files as used here should not be taken to mean an orderly system of record-keeping, but, rather, the loose collection of notes and letters that McCarthy had acquired since Wheeling.]
smiled grimly and said, “I’ve got a sock full of shit and I know how to use it.”469 This should be taken to show that McCarthy was motivated by something other than a search for communists. I submit that it was domestic political gain.

The Tydings Commission was another venue for McCarthy to further his domestic political agenda. McCarthy read from a text by one Father Kearney, writing in *Columbia Magazine*: “How come the State Department has to drag in Owen Lattimore to tell what’s what in the Orient? Hasn’t the Department got anybody on its own staff who knows anything?”470 The incompetence of the State Department, a branch of Truman’s executive, was a recurrent theme in McCarthy’s rhetoric. “I might say that I have not seen the original FBI files [on Lattimore],” said McCarthy at one point, challenging a Truman policy on keeping those files in confidence.471 “Some of [the Senators], I believe, have had the honest feeling that this was being done for political purposes,” added McCarthy.472

The Tydings Report, the result of the Tydings Commission, would be explicit on the matter. “It developed that [McCarthy] had no evidence whatever... he insisted that the evidence to support the charges concerning these individuals would be found in the loyalty files maintained in the executive branch of the Government.”473 “Few people, cognizant of the truth in even an elementary way, have, in the absence of political partisanship, placed any credence in the hit-and-run tactics of Senator McCarthy.... As

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469 Herman, 101.
470 Tydings Commission, 94.
471 Ibid, 279.
472 Ibid, 284.
473 Tydings Report, 5.
Senator Kenneth Wherry told Emmanuel Larsen, 'Oh, Mac has gone out on a limb and kind of made a fool of himself and we have to back him up now.'

The tenor of the McCarran Committee was decidedly different from that of the Tydings Commission. Still in the control of a nominal Democrat, the Committee was nevertheless allied with McCarthy. The purpose of the McCarran Committee was to determine whether the IPR, and specifically Lattimore, were communist. McCarran's opening statement, "In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy." Anyone who spoke against Lattimore and the IPR would be presumptively correct. Also, anything that Lattimore could not recall precisely would be considered perjury. A lengthy exchange at one point during the 1951 hearings centered on who attended a meeting twenty years earlier and whether it was or was not a lunch. Lattimore was upbraided for knowing that "the Communists had a party line." On another occasion he was criticized for remembering a meeting too well. He read a memorandum handed to him by his wife. Also suspicious. Books he had written were sold in Communist bookstores, though Lattimore claimed they were being used for background reading and not because they espoused communism. Lattimore made a joke at the expense of McCarthy and it was stricken from the record by the chairman, McCarran. What had changed between the Tydings Commission and the

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474 Tydings Report, 149.
475 McCarran Committee, 3.
476 Ibid, 3280.
477 Ibid, 3286.
478 Ibid, 3301.
479 Ibid, 3350.
480 Ibid, 3362.
481 Ibid, 3369. [McCarthy had gotten into a physical altercation with reporter Drew Pearson after Pearson had intimated that he knew about tax problems McCarthy had gotten into. During the hearing Lattimore}
McCarran Committee was the political climate. Domestic politics controlled the investigation.

The term McCarthyism was not invented by Lattimore himself (as has been contended), but by political cartoonist Herbert Block. On March 29, 1950 a Block cartoon was published showing a nervous and reluctant elephant being dragged to a dozen paint buckets, stacked one on the other and topped off by a large paint barrel labeled “McCarthyism.” The caption is a question posed by the elephant who asks the Republican Congressmen dragging him to the very shaky platform: “You mean I’m supposed to stand on that?”\(^{482}\) The implication is pointed and clear: the electoral hopes of the Republican Party in the upcoming fall elections were based on the smear tactics (red paint) of McCarthyism. Block thought it a rather tenuous line of challenge. In a sense he was right: in the upcoming election the Democrats managed to hang on to both chambers of Congress.\(^{483}\) Interestingly, in a national poll conducted by Harvard University in 1954 (four years after McCarthyism had been on the scene) 30% of respondents could not even identify Senator McCarthy.\(^{484}\) It poses an intriguing question: how deeply was the public affected by McCarthyism?

Politics, however, is not always about what the voters are thinking, but about what the politicians are thinking the voters are thinking. It is dangerous to try to discern with any precision the public mood, but it is perhaps easier to gauge the sentiment of public officials who number only a few hundred and speak frequently. In 1948 the Republican

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\(^{483}\) It should be noted that Richard Nixon won his Senate seat that year, defeating “the pink lady,” Helen Graham Douglas.

\(^{484}\) Fariello, 41.
Party had been convinced they would take the White House. They had won control of the House and the Senate in 1946. They were shocked to see Truman returned to the White House and to see themselves lose both the House and the Senate in 1948. The conclusion drawn by the Republican Party from the surprise victory was that the Democrats were “relatively invulnerable with regard to traditional domestic issues. Accordingly, key Republicans, looking for a way to recoup electoral fortunes, began to attack the Truman administration as ‘soft’ on Communism.”

In November, 1950 the Republicans, almost without exception, ran on a “Democrats are soft on Communism,” platform. Lattimore was the second-place scapegoat, after Dean Acheson.

The Democrats did manage to hold onto both houses in the electoral debut of formal “McCarthyism” in 1950, but Senator Tydings, a formerly unimpeachable conservative, went down to defeat in Maryland. This reverberated across the country and through the next few years and was a particular shock to the Democratic establishment. If Tydings, who had been thought impregnable, could be defeated, who was safe? This was also the year in which Senator Claude Pepper (D – FL) - called “Red Pepper” and not for his hair - was defeated in his own primary by George Smathers because of his liberal views and supposed friendship with Stalin. In the 1950 election one Democratic congressman, Eugene McCarthy, would note wryly, “I am the stooge of the CIO and the Communists… and my patriotism is questionable. I have not checked

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486 Newman, 309.
487 Heale, 68.
489 Griffith, 123.
490 Johnson, 169.
Mein Kampf, but I believe this is the recommended approach." The argument is this: McCarthyism was incredibly powerful in domestic politics because politicians – the ones, lest we forget, who make the decisions about foreign relations - reacted to it, whether the public did or not.

IV) Foreign Policy

The Lattimore case was always intimately tied to the politics of the day. China policy was a central issue: The Democrats were soft on communism - one could see this in the way they treated China, which had led to the Korean War - China had been lost because of traitors in the government - there was no greater traitor than the master spy, Owen Lattimore. And so the argument went. The case against Lattimore and the IPR, then, was seen as essential.

And what was the case against Lattimore? To be blunt, it was what can only be termed a fantasy. McCarthy’s charges, the charges endorsed by his supporters, were simply that. Lattimore was not the “top Soviet spy” and he was not “the principal architect of our far eastern policy.” There exists nothing to support either claim. Lattimore makes the observation that “the lack of evidence about me was one of my greatest difficulties.”

James Darsey has written eloquently on the role that fantasy played in the worldview of Joseph McCarthy. “McCarthy looked upon the postwar world and found it fantastic.” “In the world of fantasy, it is not obvious what things mean. The rules have been subverted and are no longer dependable. McCarthy, his appeals to

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491 Griffith, 122.
492 Fried, 130.
493 Lattimore, China Memoirs, 228.
common sense notwithstanding, understood this." Both Lattimore and his wife use this term in their memoir, Ordeal By Slander, citing a "fantastic civil war among American congressmen. In a different book Lattimore recounts that an FBI informant stated that she had been to Mexico in 1940 and interviewed Trotsky's assassin who stated the he was being protected by a very powerful man in Washington - Lattimore. Lattimore labels the case "fantastic." During his Tydings Committee testimony Lattimore spoke of Kohlberg and his associates, referring to "their own fantastic and discredited venom." One episode, in which Lattimore supposedly leads a student uprising in China is "fantastic and untrue." The repeated assertion that he was a spy and controlling US policy and the destiny of China is ipso facto evidence of essentializing fantasy.

Owen Lattimore was not a spy. His FBI file, released under the Freedom of Information Act in 1999, attests to this. In the released file, the sum total of the evidence against Lattimore consists of two claims. One confidential informant of known reliability stated that on one occasion a Soviet general had told him that Lattimore was a Russian agent. There is nothing further in the file about this. Another confidential informant, of unknown reliability, stated that Lattimore was giving information to the Soviets while working for Chiang Kai-shek. Most of his statement is

495 Ibid, 144.
496 Lattimore, 13.
497 Owen Lattimore, China Memoirs: Chiang Kai-Shek and the War Against Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), 231.
498 Tydings Commission, 425.
499 Ibid, 427.
501 Ibid, 2.
502 Ibid.
blacked out of the FBI file.\textsuperscript{503} There are some insinuations. Representative is the one in which it is noted that while he was at Johns Hopkins Lattimore employed a man who must have been a Communist because, “he adhered strictly to the political line laid down by the \textit{Daily Worker}.”\textsuperscript{504} Another confidential informant stated, “Lattimore is not a communist, and he is not a fellow traveler…. Lattimore has a peculiar temperament in that he has no objection to having people see him under compromising circumstances, and have them misinterpret it.”\textsuperscript{505} The FBI file continues with reviews of his public work and statements. The FBI file is decisive: Lattimore was not a Soviet agent or communist.

The Venona transcripts, the cables sent between Soviet spies in the US and their superiors in Moscow during the Cold War, attest to the fact that Lattimore was not a Soviet agent.\textsuperscript{506} His name appears nowhere in the decryptions. This should be evidence against the claim that Lattimore was a Soviet agent. But a 2004 review of a re-release of Lattimore’s \textit{Ordeal By Slander} has another take on the Venona transcripts: the reviewer describes an individual who was purportedly recruited by the Soviets but never “signed-up.” The reviewer concludes, “Lattimore certainly might have fallen into the same category.”\textsuperscript{507} The absence of evidence is not proof.

Lattimore was not the “principal architect of our far eastern policy” as McCarthy charged. Marshall states this in writing in a letter submitted to the Tydings Commission, and he is one of many who commit the same statement to paper.\textsuperscript{508} But could it have been true? What was the situation in China at the time \textit{vis a vis} any notion of “loss” to

\textsuperscript{503} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid, 12.
\textsuperscript{505} Ibid, 13.
\textsuperscript{508} Tydings, 874.
communism? Recent scholarship is in agreement that Chiang's forces, whatever the merit of their cause, were in serious trouble on their own. The debilitating effects of supposed American traitors could only have theoretically exacerbated an existing problem. They could not have created it owing to the vastness of China.\textsuperscript{509} Such a "loss" of China was already in the works. This is evident from the World War II dispatches of "China Hand" John Service, amongst many others.\textsuperscript{510} The verdict of contemporary scholarship, and the relevant contemporaneous sources, is this: there was significant strength to Mao's forces, independent of both the US and the USSR, that significantly challenged Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{511} McCarthy would write a full-length book about the treason of George Marshall, stating, "In a military sense, the Republic of China was in a position to meet any problem confronting it except the subversion of its will and the failure of supply from outside."\textsuperscript{512}

Alfred Kohlberg was a driving force behind the investigations into the IPR, though it may have been of some irony to him that the focus would flip from the IPR to Lattimore.\textsuperscript{513} He would contribute greatly to McCarthy's understanding of China as well; Kohlberg was the head of the so-called "China Lobby,"\textsuperscript{514} that influential and powerful group, to include Henry Luce, who supported Chiang Kai-shek. Kohlberg denied the existence of Sino-Soviet tensions.\textsuperscript{515} This is, as has been said, a reading at odds with history, but all else flowed from it. Chiang was battling bravely against Moscow's

\textsuperscript{509} It feels absurd to even point this out, which Lattimore does in his memoir on page 144.
\textsuperscript{511} Thomas X Hamme, \textit{The Sling and the Stone} (Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), 47.
\textsuperscript{513} Thomas, 41.
\textsuperscript{514} Herzstein, 2.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid, 7.
stooge, Mao. Thus, anything less than unqualified support of Chiang was party to the Kremlin. It is a strident and simplistic worldview. It fit perfectly with McCarthy’s agenda.

None of this, however, does justice to how little Lattimore was actually involved with the making of US policy. In The Foreign Relations of the United States volumes Lattimore is mentioned only twice in all of 1946. This is important as a measure of his influence because actual policymakers are heavily referenced in this official work. In both cases Lattimore’s name is mentioned in a tangential fashion and is related to an academic work he had published rather than something he had done.\(^{516}\) Lattimore is mentioned three times in the volumes of 1947. Each time it is tangential.\(^{517}\) It should be noted that one American official refers to Lattimore as “fellow-travelling” with no further comment.\(^{518}\) There is no further mention of Lattimore in the volumes up to the time of the Tydings Commission hearings.

On February 20, 1950, the day of McCarthy’s recitation of his Wheeling speech, the Senate chaplain prayed, “Our Father God, from all the traditions which separate us and write our names in different camps of thought and conviction we pause for the upward look which makes us one....” Members of the Japanese Diet were in attendance. It seemed a day fit for reconciliation.\(^{519}\) But it proved a day for fantasy. McCarthy was quick to dispel that notion, “there are 800,000,000 people under the absolute domination of Soviet Russia... on our side the figure has shrunk to around 500,000,000... when a great democracy is destroyed, it will not be because of enemies from without, but rather

\(^{516}\) FRUS 1946 Vol IX, 741, 1492.  
\(^{517}\) FRUS vol VII, 278, 310, 673.  
\(^{518}\) Ibid, 278.  
\(^{519}\) Congressional Record of February 20, 1950, 1905.
because of enemies from within."McCarthy was fast to note that a translator in the State Department was fired because he was “flagrantly homosexual.” McCarthy had been told by an intelligence man, “Practically every active Communist is twisted mentally or physically in some way.” “Unless one has a communistic background one cannot qualify for a position with the Voice of America, at least in the New York office... the one good, sure way not to get into the Voice of America is that one is a loyal American and an anti-Communist.” This was in addition to the continually fluctuating number of communists McCarthy knew to be in the State Department. There would be more.

One author has noted that cataloging all the fantastic charges made about Lattimore quickly becomes wearisome. It was much ammunition in what Lattimore describes as “a fantastic civil war among American congressmen and Senators.” It added up to what the Atlantic Monthly called “assassination by guesswork.”

McCarthy began by scoffing at Lattimore’s contention that the communists in China had any popular support. It was a world in which Lattimore “turned over one Far Eastern vote after another to Russia.” Lattimore had been called to Washington from the Khyber Pass in Afghanistan. McCarthy said, “[the Khyber Pass] as you know, is the one route from Russia over to the new area. What he is doing there I don’t know.”

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521 Ibid, 1961. [McCarthy returns to the homosexual theme, and repeats his “practically every active Communist...” line, on 1978.]
524 Newman, 245.
525 Lattimore, 13.
526 Ibid, 203.
527 Tydings Commission, 99.
528 Ibid, 100.
McCarthy stated, “I think [Lattimore] is one of the top espionage agents... far and away [one of the biggest]... I think he is the top Russian spy.”

Lattimore testified on his own behalf. By decision of the Committee McCarthy and Lattimore would not directly confront one another. Lattimore was quick to point out McCarthy’s fantasies. “I wonder a bit how a man so young as Joseph McCarthy can have become such an expert on the difficult and complex problem of China and the Far East. My wonder on this score increased when I read his speech on the Senate floor. Some of his material is from Chinese and Russian sources. I did not know the Senator was a linguist. But, really, the material that the Senator read is so badly translated and so inaccurate that I am sure that I should not like to place the blame for it on the learned Senator.” McCarthy had charged that Lattimore was unfriendly with Chiang Kai-shek. Lattimore produced letters to the opposite effect. McCarthy wondered why Lattimore had been taking pictures on a recent trip to Alaska. Lattimore offered to give him the camera. At one point McCarthy charged Lattimore with “leading several pro-Russia student uprisings in China.” Lattimore’s lawyer, Abe Fortas, read letters into the record attesting to the “absurdity” of the notion. Outside the hearings, McCarthy had Communist spies landing on the Atlantic coast by enemy submarine to hasten to Lattimore for their orders.

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530 Ibid, 479.
531 Ibid, 420.
532 Ibid, 423.
533 Ibid, 427.
534 Ibid, 428.
535 Neman, 215.
The only evidence that supported McCarthy, said Lattimore, was the testimony of Louis Budenz. Budenz was a former communist and lax Catholic who became a Notre Dame professor and professional anti-communist witness. Budenz’s proof, stated Lattimore, was that he [Lattimore] had done exactly the opposite of what the Party had wanted. On the whole, Budenz’s involvement ironically makes the case for, not against, Lattimore.

Budenz testified that Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party, but also admitted that he had never heard of Lattimore until given his file by the FBI and had no direct knowledge of him or his supposed subversive writings. Budenz published a book in 1948 entitled, *Men Without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the U.S.A.* He mentions Lattimore once: “[John Service] also served with Owen J. Lattimore as adviser to Vice-President Henry Wallace and to our government on Chinese affairs.” If Lattimore had been as important as Budenz implied in his testimony for the Tydings Commission, he should have mentioned him more than once in his book. Budenz’s statements were admittedly hearsay and he claimed that any documentation as to Lattimore’s role would have been on easily disposed of onionskin paper. He had no documentation for his charges. When asked why, if Lattimore was a communist, the *Daily Worker* had given his book, *Situation In Asia*, a poor review, Budenz replied: “We had the policy in protecting people who are out beyond the Party proper, to criticize them

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536 Tydings Commission, 803.
538 Ibid, 807.
539 Johnson, 168.
541 Packer, 131.
with faint praise – that is to say, that is, to damn them with faint praise – rather, to praise them with faint damns, is the way I want to put it.”

The Tydings Report would take up the cudgel against Budenz. The Tydings Report noted that, after sifting through all of Budenz’s testimony, he had made at least two definite statements: Lattimore was not a top Soviet agent, and apart from what he was told by others, he had no reason to think Lattimore was a Communist. Elliott Thorpe, a retired Army general who had been in intelligence and investigated Lattimore, said in the Tydings Report: “[I have] never heard a man so frequently referred to as a ‘Communist’ with so little basis in fact.” The Tydings Report concluded by noting that the Commission was already being accused of a whitewash, “in order to camouflage the fact that the charges made by Senator McCarthy were groundless and that the Senate and the American people had been deceived.”

The McCarran Committee would take up where the Tydings Commission had left off. With Tydings defeated electorally, and Democrats on the retreat after escaping only narrowly from defeat in the 1950 midterm elections, McCarthy had emerged stronger than ever. Why, though, did the McCarran Committee choose at this time to take on the IPR and Lattimore again? Besides the matter of unfinished business, there is a twofold explanation: First, in late December 1950 McCarthy’s office was contacted by the relative of the caretaker of a farm owned by a former IPR secretary who had stored old

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542 Ibid, 140. [A contemporaneous account of Lattimore’s life, John T Flynn’s The Lattimore Story, published by the same press that would publish McCarthy’s book on Marshall, also charges that Lattimore was a communist was, but has little support for these conclusions, beyond frequently reassuring its readership, “it is difficult to believe.” If the author does have support he does not provide it. But support is not necessary. This is the same type of reasoning used by Budenz in the Tydings Commission to accuse Lattimore: if one brings a libel suit when accused of being a communist one is a communist, if one fails to bring a suit one is also a communist, as Lattimore notes on page 121 of his memoir.]
543 Tydings Report, 56.
544 Ibid, 66.
545 Ibid, 149.
IPR files in a barn there. The FBI had already been through the files, but McCarthy imagined them to be a great evidential treasure surfacing,\textsuperscript{546} perhaps something like Whittaker Chambers’ microfilm in the pumpkin on his farm that Chambers had delivered to Nixon. This reinvigorated the charges against the IPR. Second, according to McCarran’s close friend, Norman Blitz, “Senator McCarran believed completely that there was one being in the United States who directed the operation of the Communist Party. He was completely convinced of this and so was McCarthy.... [McCarran] said, ‘I feel his influence all over Washington... if I make a hundred mistakes, and do eventually find that one man, I will have served my country well.’”\textsuperscript{547} The impetus to go after Lattimore and the IPR was fed by a former naval intelligence officer, Robert Morris, who had worked for McCarthy and now for McCarran. Morris believed that Lattimore really was the evil genius behind American failures in Asia and that the Tydings Committee had been a Democratic whitewash.\textsuperscript{548} Fantasy thus informed domestic politics.

Senator McCarran made it clear from the beginning where his sympathies lay. As has been noted previously, his Committee dedicated itself mainly to trying to catch Lattimore in a lie. It did this by continuously asking him about relative minutia. The members also used the tactic of guilt by association: Lattimore stated that the initials on a six-year old document relating to an article of alleged Communist sympathy were not his. Senator Morris then proceeded to list allegations of Soviet collusion against those who had initialed the document, Lattimore protesting meanwhile that he didn’t know anything about the document he hadn’t signed. McCarran conducted the Committee in this fashion

\textsuperscript{546} Newman, 317.
\textsuperscript{547} Newman, 315.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid, 318.
Of particular note is the fact that during the Tydings Commission hearings Budenz’s testimony had not been regarded as trustworthy, but to the McCarran Committee it was. Under McCarran, Budenz’s loose definition of a communist as one whose activity “lends itself to aiding the enemy of the United States, which is Soviet Russia” was taken as valid and Budenz’s testimony received no further scrutiny. This expansive view of what it meant to be a communist would lead to the charge of perjury against Lattimore.

The Tydings Commission had been able to restraint attacks on Lattimore and the IPR, but such restraint was gone under the McCarran commission. By this point the landscape (in domestic politics and the force of the McCarthy ideology) had shifted such that the charges of McCarthy and company would end in formal charges filed in federal court against Lattimore. The charges were for perjury and would later be dismissed, but the fact of their existence is proof of the hardening of positions that occurred: Lattimore and McCarthy both had had a serious case to make. McCarthy’s fantasies had been accorded the status of the truth.

V) The Consequences

By late 1954 McCarthy had been censured by the Senate after the televised Army-McCarthy hearings in which he had, by the reckoning of many, gone too far and attacked both the Republican President and the institution of the US Army. The televised hearings had been in the spring and early summer, and, by the late fall, McCarthy’s fate was evident even though the censure did not formally happen until December 2, 1954. A
political cartoon, however, captures a sense of what was to come after the end of McCarthy. A prostrate McCarthy wields a paint brush and lies next to a bucket of spilled paint, hearkening back to Herbert Block's original "McCarthyism" cartoon. McCarthy has fallen, but figures, one labeled Nixon, rush to his side. McCarthy holds up the brush and says, "Carry on, lads."552

Lattimore and the IPR were "vindicated." But by the early 1960's the IPR had seen its demise,553 and Lattimore spent much of his life overseas after the Tydings and McCarran committees concluded their reports.554 In 1955 Lattimore said, "The rigid ideology of the United States at mid-century distorted what we heard about China... only one line was tolerated.... American foreign service officers had to report what was politically acceptable... those who did not were fired... as a result, we now have, I make bold to say, the weakest foreign service of any great country in dealing with the problems of Asia, and especially China."555

Lattimore's statement could be seen as the self-centered grumblings of a malcontent. But perhaps he was not alone. Ellen Schrecker observes, "Other China scholars were affected [by the hearings on Lattimore and the IPR], for the IPR hearings politicized the entire field."556 "There is considerable speculation that the devastating effects of the IPR hearings on the field of East Asian Studies made it hard for American policy-makers to get realistic advice about that part of the world... there is no doubt that the legacy of McCarthyism in the academy and elsewhere did make it difficult for the

553 Hooper, v.
554 Newman, 496.
555 Ibid, 497.
556 Shrecker, 166.
government to act wisely in Asia.” 557 John Thomas writes, “The most serious effects…
[were] to transform legitimate issues of interpretation of events in East Asia and the
organization of Asian studies into questions of loyalty and security. In the process, the
original issues were obscured and their solution made more difficult.” 558

557 Ibid, 339.
558 Thomas, 167-168.
I) Prescience

By the end of 1954 Eleanor Hadley, John Paton Davies, and Owen Lattimore were gone from government and little lamented. 1954 was also the year that the French were defeated by Ho Chi Minh’s forces at Dien Bien Phu. United States involvement in Vietnam would grow. There was dissent. But the dissenters were disgraced persons, persons whom domestic politics had forced from the table. Their voices were not heard.

Hadley might otherwise have said, as she said about Occupation Japan, that those with the greatest confidence that America could succeed in Vietnam were those who were least familiar with the country, and that there were more of those than less. 559

Davies might have served in high position in the Far East Bureau of State had he not been destroyed by the McCarthy investigations. 560 He would have been a fitting candidate, strong and uncompromising, for Assistant Secretary. 561 In the days before Vietnam, Davies was in exile in Peru and he wrote, “The catch is that the tidy, constructive ends we wish to see achieved are not predictably served by violent, erratic means over which control is easily lost, quite possibly to our adversaries. We do not have the wisdom, temperament, discretion, or self-discipline to play around with other people’s social systems.” 562

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559 Eleanor Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster: A Lifelong Adventure with Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 56.
560 Halberstam, page 216.
561 Ibid, 431.
Lattimore in his testimony in front of the Tydings Committee: “Gentlemen, you cannot, you must not, permit a psychology of fear to paralyze the scholars and writers of this nation... no, sir: I do not think Indochina is on all fours with Formosa.”

In the Best And The Brightest, the late David Halbertstam, famed American correspondent in Vietnam both before and during the war, makes the case that a lack of expertise in greater Asia within the US was directly tied to the path to war in Vietnam. Historian of the Red Scare, Ellen Schrecker, makes this same point: “The purges had so thoroughly weeded out the government’s China Hands... a combination of ignorance, fear... led American policy-makers to embrace a hard-line, Manichaeian view of East Asia that bore little relation to what was happening there... The legacy of denial that McCarthyism bequeathed to the State Department would lead to disaster [in Vietnam].”

In his apologia, In Retrospect, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara is very quick to make the point that “when John F. Kennedy became president, we faced a complex and growing crisis in Southeast Asia with sparse knowledge, scant experience, and simplistic assumptions.” “When it came to Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was terra incongita... the irony of this gap was that it existed largely because the top East Asian and China experts in the State Department – John Paton Davies, Jr., John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent – had been purged

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563 Tydings Committee hearings, 826.
564 Ibid, 918.
during the McCarthy hysteria. Without men like these to provide sophisticated, nuanced insights, we – certainly I – badly misread China’s objectives.\footnote{Ibid, 32-33.}

American foreign policy was primed towards a military response to developments in Vietnam. The dominant view of Cold War international relations was NSC-68, which had sprung from Kennan’s X Article and Long Telegram. NSC-68 was a hastily drafted response to an immediate need, Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb.\footnote{Samuel Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” \textit{International Security} 4, no. 2 (1979): 124 and 126.} It stated that “the assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” The United States, the authors declare, must take whatever action is necessary to protect its basic values.\footnote{Ibid, 131-132.} It provided policy-makers with three paths of action. Number one amongst these was military build-up.\footnote{NSC-68, 12.} Released as it was on the eve of the Korean War, NSC-68 had force with the policy-makers. In the expression of the Domino Theory, it dictated the terms of US engagement in Vietnam.\footnote{Henry Kissinger, \textit{Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 44.}

I have been arguing that the confluence of domestic politics and foreign policy was key in driving a push towards a posture of hard-line, militant confrontation with East Asian countries believed to be communist. This is evident in the arc from the Long Telegram to NSC-68, which led into the Domino Theory. Simply stated, the Domino Theory was the belief that “allowing” a single country to become communist in a region meant that the other countries in the region would soon follow. John Foster Dulles declared in 1953: “If Indo-China should be lost, there would be a chain reaction.
throughout the Far East and South Asia.” President Eisenhower put it simply in 1954: “There was what you might call the ‘falling domino’ principle…”\(^{573}\) Kennan would claim that the intent of his original Long Telegram had been distorted.\(^{574}\) He was not a strong advocate of military engagement in Vietnam.\(^{575}\) I believe that domestic politics combined with an underlying foundation of essentialism in foreign policy, was key in US East Asia policy.

Halberstam states simply the underpinning that I am arguing, “China [had been] ours, and it was something to lose; it was an assumption which was to haunt foreign policy makers for years to come.”\(^{576}\) Beyond the notion that China had been “ours,” China had been “lost” to monolithic communism. But that existed more in the mind than in reality. Historian John Gaddis writes that at the talks in Geneva in 1954 the Viet Minh, the anti-French guerilla forces led by Ho Chi Minh, were at odds with Moscow and Beijing.\(^{577}\) “As the discussion of the Vietnam War has warmed… one glaring gap… has become increasingly apparent… each one of these protagonists – North Vietnam, Communist China, the Soviet Union – has its own particular interests and point of view, and these, while ostensibly geared to the common goal of ultimate triumph in South Vietnam, do not necessarily coincide…. An assessment of their differences is crucial to any appreciation of Communist strategies in Vietnam.”\(^{578}\) In 1965 Hans Morgenthau

\(^{576}\) Halberstam, 101.
wrote, “We are under a psychological compulsion to continue our military presence in South Vietnam as part of the peripheral military containment of China. We have been emboldened in this course of action by the identification of the enemy as “Communist,” seeing in every Communist part and regime an extension of hostile Russian or Chinese power. This identification was justified 20 to 15 years ago when Communism still had a monolithic character. Here, as elsewhere, our modes of thought and action have been rendered obsolete by new developments.”

Two days after the Kennedy assassination, President Johnson told his advisors, “I’m not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.”

The voices in government that would have spoken out against the notion that a monolithic, communist force was steamrolling the continent had been silenced in government discourse before the war started. Davies said, “China is the natural balance against Russia in Asia and Vietnam (Laughs) is the natural balance against China in East Asia.”

“What possessed Americans to become entangled in Indochina?… a Washington conviction, lasting some time after the Moscow-Peking split, that China and North Vietnam were integral parts of a monolithic international communism slavishly obedient to the Kremlin. Lattimore knew and said that the Vietnamese were no more puppets of the Chinese than the Chinese were of the Russians. But no one was listening to them. Domestic politics had marginalized them.

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583 Newman, 586.
II) John F Kennedy and Domestic Politics

Candidate Kennedy entered into a political world in which the notion of monolithic, worldwide communism directed from the Kremlin was sacrosanct. To challenge this prevailing wisdom was to appear “soft on communism.” To deviate from NSC-68’s reliance on military might to contain communism, both actively and through deterrence, was also to commit sacrilege. Certainly, Kennedy could have challenged the wisdom of this stance. Hadley, Davies and Lattimore did. But it would have cost him politically. Too often, public will prevails on a subject about which it knows nothing.\(^{584}\) In a contemporaneous text, Hofstadter writes, it seems we are opposed, out of our modern convictions, to the union of intellect and power.\(^ {585}\) Kennedy acceded to this essentialized view of communism in Asia and made policy accordingly.

The intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy is key to understanding of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy. Edward Miller writes that “American policy and strategy in Vietnam was something more than simply an ideologically conditioned response to perceived Cold War aggression… the US approach to nation building in Vietnam was derived from American beliefs.”\(^ {586}\) He also writes, “The lands of ‘the Orient’ loomed large in the geographical imaginations of European-Americans.”\(^ {587}\) I agree with Miller, but I am more interested in the way domestic politics converged with perceptions of the lands of “the Orient,” the supposed fungible nations that stood ready to fall like dominoes to communism.

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\(^{587}\) Miller, 19.
During the 1960 presidential campaign Kennedy made erosion of the US position in the world a major campaign issue.\textsuperscript{588} He wanted to "close the missile gap," a subject discussed earlier in this thesis. It was an aggressive, hard-line anticommunist theme that bought into prevailing wisdom about military force. Specifically, in the election campaign any prospect of a China battle made Republicans sniff success and Democrats run for cover. The lesson was confirmed for the President-elect when General Eisenhower told him that any change in China policy by the incoming Administration would bring Ike out of retirement fighting. Furthermore, any change in China policy would necessitate the agreement of the Far East Bureau at the Department of State which during the Eisenhower years had been methodically purged of dissent and staffed with Cold Warriors who took a hard-line on China.\textsuperscript{589} The official line was that as China had fallen, so would Vietnam. Davies writes, "Entanglement in Indochina was a lesson from the Truman experience with China - to "lose" a country to communism was, for the incumbent political party, to lose the American electorate."\textsuperscript{590}

This stance was a new one for Kennedy. While in the Senate Kennedy had supported, indeed, espoused, the notion that nationalism, not communism, was the basis of revolution in Asia. On April 6, 1954 he said in the Senate: "Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be told the blunt truth about Indochina... I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere... there is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among the people of that

\textsuperscript{590} John Paton Davies, "America And East Asia" Foreign Affairs, 55, no. 3 (1977): 392.
area... the facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be effectively maintained."

When he became president Kennedy embraced the domino theory, with its attendant emphasis on heavy military aid, because of these fears of being attacked by the Republicans as “soft on communism.” A National Security Action Memorandum of November 22, 1961 calls for more helicopters, more light aviation, and more heavy equipment to support the government in South Vietnam. It is the emphasis on a big army, not on a counter-insurgency force that de-emphasizes military force. In a letter of December 14, 1961 he wrote to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South Vietnam, “we are confident that the Vietnamese people will preserve their independence and gain the peace and prosperity for which they have sought so hard and long.”

In 1963 Kennedy reportedly said that if he withdrew completely from Vietnam, “we would have another Joe McCarthy red scare on our hands.” Lyndon Johnson expressed similar fears. Johnson told Doris Kearns that the loss of China had played a large role in the rise of Joe McCarthy, and that Truman had lost his effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over. He said that the potential loss of South Vietnam would shatter [his] presidency. H.R. McMaster, historian and commander of the 3rd

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591 PBS American Experience (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/).
593 PBS American Experience (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/).
594 Ibid. [It should be noted that Schlesinger in A Thousand Days accounts the reversal as well, 538]
Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Iraq War, writes of this time: “Vietnam policy decisions were made based on domestic political expediency.”

General Maxwell Taylor was at the heart of situation. The man who would first become Kennedy’s Military Representative to the President and then Kennedy’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with Kennedy’s hard-line views. But he had not always, just as Kennedy had not. Kennedy had become enamored of Taylor’s ideas about limited war over nuclear confrontation as articulated in Taylor’s book, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, which Taylor had written after leaving service with the Eisenhower Administration. Kennedy touted Taylor’s book during the 1960 campaign, criticizing Eisenhower’s hard-line policy and advocating “flexible response.” Halberstam writes eloquently of the way Taylor endeared himself to the Kennedys, and the Kennedys to Taylor. They charmed each other, personally and professionally. Taylor enjoyed close personal ties with President Kennedy and his family. Robert Kennedy even named one of his sons after the general. Taylor had espoused the non-political role of the military advisor when working for Eisenhower, but that changed with Kennedy. General Earle Wheeler said Taylor had an influence with Kennedy that went far beyond military matters. He was an unelected, not congressionally confirmed special military representative of the president. As he became more and more a member of Kennedy’s

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598 Halberstam and McMaster detail the uniqueness of the position and the personal nature of the Kennedy-Taylor relationship.

599 McMaster, 10.

600 Halberstam, 186.

601 McMaster, 54 [It should be noted that Halberstam explores this personal relationship in great detail in *The Best and the Brightest*, 186.]

602 McMaster, 17.

inner circle, he became more and more one of Kennedy's men, and they protected their ideas with ideological fervor.\footnote{McMaster, 21.}

What of the man on the ground, the general purportedly in the driver's seat? General Harkins was the first MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) commander. He was a company man who followed the dominant line. His thinking stayed very much inside safely defined parameters, and he took direction without much pushback.\footnote{Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and American in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 283-285.} He was very out of the loop. After the Diem assassination in November 1963 he sent this cable: "When I said last week I was out of the coup business I did not realize I was going to be so out of touch. In fact the Ambassador agreed to keep me informed. So I was a bit shocked when the Ambassador called me today on instruction from Washington to collaborate on reply to message... seeking further information from here... I really did not realize how imminent [the] plan is to implementation."\footnote{Moya Ball, Vietnam-On-The-Potomac (New York: Praeger, 1992), 75.} This is not to question Harkins professional fitness or draw a larger conclusion than this: he was the kind of general who very effectively did whatever his superiors wanted him to do and he did it without asking questions.\footnote{Toczek, David, The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything But Learn From It (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), xx. [It should be noted that the title of this book is taken from the battle itself and from Halberstam's wearied commentary on it in his book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era.]} This description of Harkins is meant to show that direction in Vietnam was coming from Washington, and not from the man on the ground.

The military man guiding efforts in Vietnam was Taylor, and Kennedy relied greatly on Taylor's judgment about Vietnam.\footnote{Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 251.} But dissent from the larger outlook was not tolerated. A telling event occurred in October 1961 when Taylor went on mission to
Vietnam. Kennedy made it plain that he did not want to hear from Taylor that more troops were needed. The troops allotted and the response formulated was working and working well. No more was needed, no less. Kennedy wanted that confirmed, and he went so far as to plant a story in the *New York Times* that Taylor was predisposed not to recommend more troops. Taylor could give advice, so long as it fit into the parameters defined by domestic politics.  

In the end Taylor came back from Vietnam declaring a widespread and substantial improvement in the military situation. Taylor was on board. This reinforced Kennedy’s Vietnam policy, continuing the vicious cycle. In his State of the Union of 1963 Kennedy would say, “The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam.”

### III) The World Vann Inherited

Into all of this walked Lt. Colonel John Paul Vann. He was a career Army officer whose story is masterfully told by his friend Neil Sheehan in *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. Vann described himself in testimony on February 18, 1970 in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “With the exception of 1964, I have been in Vietnam since 1962 working as an advisor in the field. I was over there as a military senior adviser at the corps level and then as a military senior adviser for more than a year to the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Seventh Division. In that capacity I had the responsibility for about half of the same area.”

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Vann went home in June 1963, Halberstam writes, he was “the most informed American in the country.” But it was for nothing; after his first tour ended in January of 1963, Vann and his views were purged.

Vann was brought back into a leadership position much later in the war, but in the early days he was forced from the debate. I am arguing that the insistence on a heavily military response to supposed Sino-Soviet directed communist encroachment in Vietnam was gendered by an essentialized view of a real place as dictated by the exigencies of domestic politics. Vann was forced from the debate because he challenged this. Vann represented a domestic political danger. Kennedy and his men did not attack Vann in the manner that McCarthy attacked Lattimore, but the result was the same. It happened over a tiny village in Mytho province, in a place called Ap Bac.

Vann was in IV Corps, an area near Saigon, advising Col. Bui Dinh Dam. Dam had been chief of staff to Huynh Van Cao, and Dam owed his rise to Cao’s patronage. Cao in turn had been empowered by Diem because he could be trusted not to produce ARVN casualties, which Diem believed threatened his authority.

The battle of Ap Bac took place on January 2, 1963. A Vietcong radio transmitter was discovered and Dam’s men were ordered to go after it. They arrived in the area to find that Vietcong guerrillas were doing something very unusual, standing their ground and fighting. By contrast the ARVN were very unwilling to pursue aggressively the VC. When in doubt the ARVN would do nothing. That was their system, but not the system of the VC. In the course of the fighting, the VC shot down five helicopters. They showed that they knew the weaknesses of American heavy equipment: they were able to

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612 Halberstam, 232.
613 Gelb and Betts, 304.
hit the guns on the personnel carriers, they were able to avoid the flamethrowers. Their ability to thwart US-backed ARVN firepower should not be overstated, however. Many VC were hit and killed. But they fought well enough to bring the ARVN and Americans to a draw. This was a huge loss when one considers the technical advantage of the ARVN/US. Also, the VC showed that they were willing to sustain enormous casualties and continue fighting. The ARVN were not willing to do that.

Cao did not want to fight. During the battle he took over from Dam and dropped his airborne in a spot that allowed the VC to get away. He wanted that to happen so he would not take more casualties and could claim that he had scared the VC away, a “victory.” But the VC would live to fight another day and Vann knew it. The battle could have been redeemed at the end with a good airborne drop that outflanked the VC, but Cao would not do it.614

Harkins told the press after Ap Bac, “Yes, that’s right. It was a Vietnamese [ARVN] victory. It certainly was.” Vann, who had been advising throughout the battle, called it a “miserable damn performance.” Neil Sheehan, covering events in Vietnam as a journalist for UPI, said, “We had been writing about these problems all along and accused of exaggerating. But Ap Bac is where it happened. In spades. Exhibit A. It was the ultimate confirmation of everything we’d been writing.”615

Vann wrote a report about the battle and what it portended.


With over 200 advisors in the field, we estimate, and I stress this can only be an estimate, that the total number of people killed was less than two-thirds of those claimed. Additionally, we estimate that from 30 to 40% of the personnel killed were merely bystanders who were unfortunate enough to be in the vicinity of combat action... Every time we killed an innocent person we lost ground in our battle to win the people. The majority of the Vietnamese population in the 41st DTA is not committed either to the Communists or the government, and indiscriminate killing by either side can be the deciding factor. Next to a knife, a rifle is the most discriminate weapon there is; it is the last one that was preferred for use in the 41st Tactical Area. I believe we are encouraging this attitude by making too many weapons other than the rifle available.616

The ARVN would not fight and the VC were too strong and the people were not being won over by the government. It was time to try something new. Vann was pushing for pacification. In arguing for pacification Vann was conceding that the current strategy was wrong, which meant that the ARVN/US were losing. General Harkins’ chief of intelligence told Harkins, “The only thing wrong with what [Vann] wrote is that all of it is true.” Harkins would decline to transmit tidings of such gloom to Washington.617 The bosses in Washington focused most of their attention on bombing, troops, and military statistics.618 The Army hierarchy felt that, to the extent that problems did exist, they could be handled through more of the same. Vann’s report was politically unpalatable and the standard reaction was a groove well-worn since the Second World War.

Vann departed from Vietnam on April 1, 1963. Since Ap Bac he had been trying to get higher-ups to listen to his account of the battle and what it portended. He headed for his new assignment, an unchallenging one in the Pentagon, with his resolve unbowed.

Vann was no neophyte as to how things worked behind the scenes. He was savvy as to the internal workings of bureaucracy. On his own initiative he shopped around his report on Ap Bac, briefing anyone who would listen. He finally found a sympathetic ear in General Barksdale Hamlett, the vice chief of staff for the Army, who was having his own doubts about Vietnam.

Barksdale recalls: “The most important thing was something I didn’t recommend; and that was that we didn’t commit combat forces.... I did do some things in trying to present this picture to the Chiefs. It almost got me in trouble once with Max Taylor, when I insisted that the Chiefs should hear a young officer who had come back from Vietnam with a story that was completely different from the one the we were getting with respect to the capabilities of the Vietnamese.... Taylor sort of pooh-poohed the whole idea and as I remember, he did agree to talk with Vann, but Vann never did get a chance to brief the Joint Chiefs on the situation in Vietnam... I’m sure what he had to say wouldn’t have made a great deal of difference and wouldn’t have changed the trend of things too much, maybe it would have.”

The presentation was blocked by Maxwell Taylor, and thus the Army’s position on how well the war was going was protected (had Vann briefed the Chiefs, it would have been much harder for the high-level military to go into meetings with the President and claim that the war was going well). In 1831 Carl Von Clausewitz wrote: “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are

619 Sheehan, 336.
621 Halberstam, 233.
embracing: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” In Vietnam and elsewhere the US was making that mistake.

In real time the trumpets don’t blare and theme music doesn’t swell. Life is mundane and the drama of events is sometimes hidden. Vann was scheduled to present his brief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 8, 1963. He had his uniform especially sent to the cleaners for the Monday of the briefing. He was scheduled to address the Chiefs at 2:00 pm and he stalled as long as he dared in submitting a copy of his presentation, knowing how explosive it would be. Four hours before the briefing, he parked himself outside the office of General Wheeler, the chief of staff of the Army, in case there were any last minute questions. At 11:00 am the phone rang on the desk of one of Wheeler’s aides. Vann overheard: “Who wants the item removed from the agenda?... Is it the secretary of defense or the chairman’s office?... Let me get this right, the chairman requests that the item be removed.” The aide answered that he would convey Taylor’s request to Wheeler. He hung up and looked at Vann.

"Looks like you don’t brief today, buddy."

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623 Sheehan, 340.
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147


149


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